1. Air France vs.

Rafael Carrascoso and the Honorable Court of Appeals

PRINCIPLE: Can be liable for quasi-delict if there is pre-existing contract

PROVISION: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
Air France vs. Rafael Carrascoso and the Honorable Court of Appeals
Facts:
Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims bound
for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
March 28, 1958 – Air France issued Mr. Carrascoso a first class round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Mr. Carrascoso travelled in first class but
upon reaching Bangkong, Air France forced him to vacate his seat. Witness Ernesto G.
Cuento explained that the defendant airline believed that there was a ―white man‖ who had a
better right to the first class seat preoccupied by Mr. Carrascoso.
As expected, Mr. Carrascoso refused to give up his first class seat and that he would only
offer the seat over his dead body. However, plaintiff still ended up giving his seat to the
―white man.‖
Air France asserts that the issuance of the ticket, even upon Mr. Carrascoso‘s payment, did
not represent the complete intent and agreement of the concerned parties. The defendant
airline company claims that Mr. Carrascoso was well aware that the first class seats that were
given to him were not confirmed, but he was pacified through the assurance of tourist
protection.
Air France‘s own witness Mr. Rafael Altonaga testified that there was, in fact, a confirmation
that Mr. Carrascoso was entitled to the first class tickets given to him.
Issue:
Is Rafael Carrascoso entitled to damages despite the actuality of a pre-existing contract?
Ruling:
The Court does not understand why Air France issued tickets that it had no intention to
honor. Defendant received payment for the first class tickets but they allowed Mr. Carrascoso
to surrender his seat to their employees.
Despite Air France‘s contention that there is a pre-existing contract and that Mr. Carrascoso
is not entitled to damages, the mere act of threatening the plaintiff in order for him to vacate
his seat and surrender it to the ―white man,‖ is a tortious act. Air France‘s failure to give first
class accommodation to Mr. Carrascoso led him to suffer inconveniences, embarrassments,
and humiliations thereby leading to mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social
humiliation, and the like.
Although it is a well-established fact that a contract was entered into by the concerned
parties, the weight of the case is on the act of Mr. Carrascoso‘s wrongful expulsion.
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Air France threatened to throw Mr. Carrascoso out of the plane if he continues to refuse to
surrender his seat to the ―white man‖ therefore constituting a willful act that caused
loss/injury to the plaintiff.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that Rafael Carrascoso is entitled to:
a. 25,000 php as moral damages.
b. 10,000 php by way of exemplary damages.
c. 3,000 php as attorney‘s fees.
d. 382.10 php as refund for first-class ticket/actual damages.

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2. Philippines National Railways v. Court of Appeals

PRINCIPLE: Concept of Negligence (Degree of Negligence)

PROVISION: Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
× Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
× Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.

Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

× In the early afternoon of April 27, 1992, Jose Amores was traversing the railroad
tracks in Kahilum II Street, Pandacan, Manila.
× Before crossing the railroad track, he stopped for a while then proceeded accordingly.
× Unfortunately, just as Amores was at the intersection, a Philippine National Railways
(PNR) train turned up and collided with the car.
× At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the
intersection to warn motorists of an approaching train.
× Aside from the railroad track, the only visible warning sign at that time was the
defective standard signboard STOP, LOOK and LISTEN wherein the sign Listen was lacking
while that of Look was bent.
× No whistle blow from the train was likewise heard before it finally bumped the car of
Amores.
× After impact, the car was dragged about ten (10) meters beyond the center of the
crossing.
× Amores died as a consequence thereof.
× On July 22, 1992, the heirs of Amores filed a Complaint for Damages against
petitioners PNR and Virgilio J. Borja, PNRs locomotive driver at the time of the incident.
× In their complaint, respondents averred that:
1) The train‘s speedometer was defective
2) The petitioner‘s negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap
3) Then prayed for actual and moral damages, as well as attorney‘s fees
× The petitioners denied the allegations, stating that the train was railroad-worthy and
without any defect.
× According to them, the proximate cause of the death of Amores was his own
carelessness and negligence.
× PNR stressed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of the locomotive driver and train engineer, Borja, and that the
latter likewise used extraordinary diligence and caution to avoid the accident.
× Petitioners further asserted that respondents had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident but recklessly failed to do so.
× The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.
× On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision.
× The appellate court found the petitioners negligent.

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× The court based the petitioners negligence on the failure of PNR to install a
semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman.
× Moreover, the signboard Stop, Look and Listen was found insufficient because of its
defective condition.
× Lastly, no negligence could be attributed to Amores as he exercised reasonable
diligence in crossing the railroad track.
× Aggrieved by this reversal, the petitioners filed the present petition for review on
certiorari.
× The petitioners insist that Amores must have heard the trains whistle and heeded.
× The petitioners likewise add that the train was railroad-worthy and that its defective
speedometer did not affect the trains operation.
× Lastly, they insist that evidence showed sufficient warning signs strategically installed
at the crossing to alert both motorists and pedestrians.
× Respondents argued that the cause of the accident was petitioner‘s carelessness,
imprudence and laxity in failing to provide a crossing bar and keeper at the Kahilum II
railway intersection.
× Another crucial point raised is the manner in which Borja applied the brakes of the
train only when the locomotive was already very near Amores‘ car, as admitted by witness
Querimit.
× Finally, respondents claim that Borja‘s failure to blow the locomotives horn, pursuant
to the usual practice of doing the same 100 meters before reaching the Kahilum II crossing
point is an earmark of recklessness on the part of the petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court was correct in ascribing negligence on the part of the
petitioners

Held:

× It was ascertained beyond quandary that the proximate cause of the collision is the
negligence and imprudence of the petitioner PNR and its locomotive driver, Borja, in
operating the passenger train.
× The relevant provision is Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, which states that:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.
× The train was running at a fast speed because notwithstanding the application of the
ordinary and emergency brakes, the train still dragged the car some distance away from the
point of impact.
× Evidence likewise unveils the inadequate precautions taken by petitioner PNR to
forewarn the public of the impending danger.
× The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is
no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said device or equipment
be installed.
× The petitioner is liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which discusses the
liability of the employer once negligence or fault on the part of the employee has been
established.
× WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

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hereby AFFIRMED.

3. Philippine National Railways v. Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia

PRINCIPLE: Concept of Negligence (Degree of Negligence)

PROVISION/S:
· Article 2176 of the New Civil Code:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.
· Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Philippine National Railways v. Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia

Facts:
Rhonda Brunty, an American Citizen, was the daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty. , She
came to the Philippines in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her
Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz
sedan, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita.

It was about 12:00 midnight and by then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was
on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila. Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already
approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. By 2:00 a.m.,
Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad
track up ahead and that they were about to collide with the PNR Train.

· Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train. Rhonda
Brunty was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival to the hospital and Garcia
suffered severe head injuries

· Ethel Brunty sent a letter to the PNR demanding payment of actual, compensatory, and
moral damages, as a result of her daughter‘s death, but PNR did not respond. Therefore, Ethel
Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Manila.
• They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical
injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless
negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing.
There was no flag bar or red light signal, and that the flagman was only equipped with a hand
flashlight. They averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the performance of
their respective tasks and duties, particularly the pilot and operator of the train.
·PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the
selection but also in the supervision of its employees. It stressed that it had the right of way
on the railroad, and it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal. It stated that there
were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs posted on the sides of the road before the
railroad crossing.

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It stated that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelita‘s negligence
because he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Petitioner insists that Mercelita had
overtaken another vehicle a few yards before the railroad track. PNR insisted that Rhonda
Brunty cannot be allowed to receive what she is not in a position to give, having been a non-
resident alien who did not own a property in the Philippines.
Appellees Ethel Brunty and Garcia countered that Ethel Brunty is a non-resident alien who
can rightfully file the instant case
RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the plaintiffs Ethel Brunty. Therefore, PNR appealed
the case to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC. Thus, PNR filed
a petition for review to the Supreme Court.

Issue/s:
As between petitioner and Mercelita, whose negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision?
· Whether or not Mercelita, the driver of the Mercedes Benz, is guilty of contributory
negligence?
· Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance can be applied in this case

Held:
The Court ruled that petitioner PNR was negligent because of its failure to provide the
necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track. As
such, it is liable for damages for violating Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
It is impossible to see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks or a train ahead from the
Moncada side of the road since one‘s view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. A vehicle
coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching
train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m.
Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of providing adequate safety equipment in the
area. In view of the foregoing, the Court affirms the factual findings of the CA as well as its
conclusion on petitioner‘s negligence.
It was also established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70
km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track.
However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not negate
petitioner‘s liability. Pursuant to Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, the only effect such
contributory negligence could have is to mitigate liability, which is not applicable in this
case.
The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of the
petitioner, the Court holds that the above doctrine of last clear chance finds no application in
the instant case.

Wherefore, the Decision of the CA is affirmed with modifications. The award of actual
damages is deleted because the respondents failed to present evidence and receipts, and in
lieu thereof, temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. The
amount of ₱500,000.00 for moral damages is awarded.

4. Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo

PRINCIPLE: What is gross negligence?

PROVISION: Article 2201 of the Civil Code

In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those which are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the

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obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time
the obligation was constituted.

Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo

Facts:
Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel Benedicto Ronquillo had not been
blessed with a child despite several years of marriage. They thus consulted petitioner Dr.
Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant and chief of the Reproductive
Endocrinology and Infertility Section at the St. Luke‗s Medical Center. Dr. Ilao-Oreta
advised Eva Marie to undergo a laparoscopic procedure in order to determine the real cause
of her infertility.

The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. to be performed by Dr. Ilao-
Oreta. Eva Marie, accompanied by Noel, checked in at the St. Luke‗s Medical Center and
underwent pre-operative procedures. However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled
time for the procedure and the spouses received no prior notice of its cancellation. It turned
out that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5,
1999 in, Manila. Dr. Ilao-Oreta was on a return flight from her honeymoon in Hawaii and
arrived in Manila at 10:00PM of April 5, 1999. She estimated that she would arrive in Manila
in the early morning of April 5, 1999 and failed to consider the time difference between
Hawaii and the Philippines.

The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke‗s Medical
Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas City. They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged
loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral damages,
exemplary damages, costs of litigation, attorney‗s fees, and other available reliefs and
remedies. The RTC decided in favor of Ronquillo spouses and awarded Eva Marie actual
damages in the amount of P9,939 and costs of suit but ruled that the failure of the doctor to
arrive on time was not intentional. It found no adequate proof that Noel had been deprived of
any job contract while attending to his wife in the hospital. The spouses appealed to the Court
of Appeals and found that Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC and increased the amount of actual damages to P16,069.40. Dr. Ilao-Oreta was also held
liable to pay 50,000 as moral damages, 25,000 as exemplary damages, and 20,000 as
attorney's fees.

Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross negligence for her failure to arrive at the
scheduled time for the procedure

Held:
Gross negligence implies a want, or absence of or failure to exercise light care or diligence or
the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exercising any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected.

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Records show that Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an admitting order with her secretary for one of the
spouses to pick up, apprised Eva Marie of the necessary preparations for the procedure and
instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative treatments before leaving for Hawaii.
These acts reflect an earnest intention to perform the procedure on the day and time
scheduled.

It bears noting that when she was scheduling the date of her performance of the procedure,
Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for her honeymoon, and it is of
common human knowledge that excitement attends its preparations. Her negligence could
then be partly attributed to human frailty, which rules out its characterization as gross.

Dr. Ilao-Oreta‗s negligence not being gross, Ronquillo spouses are not entitled to recover
moral damages. Neither are the spouses entitled to recover exemplary damages in the absence
of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner, nor to award of attorney‗s fees as, contrary to the finding of the CA that
the spouses ―were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest,‖ the
records show that they did not exert enough efforts to settle the matter before going to court.

WHEREFORE, Dr. Ilao-Oreta's petition is granted.

5. Sicam v. Spouses Jorge

PRINCIPLE: In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that
one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
PROVISIONS: Article 1174 of the Civil Code
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable.

Article 1170 of the Civil Code

Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

Sicam v. Spouses Jorge

Facts:
On different dates from September to October 1987, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of
jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in Parañaque to secure a loan. On October 19,
1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were
found inside the pawnshop vault. On the same date, Sicam sent Jorge a letter informing her of
the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Jorge then replied
expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on
November 6 of the same year, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry.

Lulu Jorge, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the RTC of
Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of actual, moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. Sicam filed his Answer contending that he

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is not the real party-in-interest as the pawnshop was incorporated on April 20, 1987 and
known as Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc; that the corporation had exercised due care and
diligence in the safekeeping of the articles pledged with it and could not be made liable for an
event that is fortuitous. Jorge subsequently filed an Amended Complaint to include Agencia
de R.C. Sicam, Inc. Thereafter, Sicam filed a Motion to Dismiss as far as he is concerned
considering that he is not the real party-in-interest. Jorge opposed the same.

The RTC denied the motion and rendered its Decision dismissing Jorge‘s complaint as well
as Sicam‘s counterclaim. Jorge appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which reversed the
RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual value of the lost jewelry and
attorney's fees. Sicam filed a motion for reconsideration but then was denied, hence the
instant petition for review.

Issues:
1. Whether or not robbery is a fortuitous event.
2. Whether or not Sicam is negligent and liable for the loss of the pawned articles.

Held:
(1) Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the
possibility of negligence on the part of Sicam. In Co v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
―the fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another's rightful possession,
as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a fortuitous event. To be
considered as such, carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking of another's
property. It must be proved and established that the event was an act of God or was done
solely by third parties and that neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent
has any participation.”

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that ―except in cases expressly specified by the law,
or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.‖ Fortuitous events by definition are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements
must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be
impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from
any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.

Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time of the
robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop business in 1983, he thought
of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was
discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault inside
the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly adopted show that to them
the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated.
Sicam‘s testimony, in effect, contradicts his defense of fortuitous event.

(2) Yes, Sicam was negligent and liable for the loss of the pawned articles.

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Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that ―those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.‖ The following are proofs of Sicam‘s negligence:
Sicam‘s testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted by him in the
operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by
Sicam to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that
there was any security guard at all. Or if there was one, that he had sufficient training in
securing a pawnshop. Moreover, there is no showing that the alleged security guard exercised
all that was necessary to prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious
individuals were allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful that there was a
security guard, since it is quite impossible that he would not have noticed that the robbers
were armed with caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the employees.
Furthermore, Sicam admitted that the vault was open and its combination was off at the time
of robbery. These show that Sicam clearly failed to observe the care, precaution and vigilance
that the circumstances justly demanded.

6. David Taylor vs. The Manila electric Railroad and Light Company (MERALCO)

PRINCIPLE: Negligence of Children as the proximate cause of the injury

PROVISION/S: Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another‘s residence;
xx xx xx
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damaged done. Such fault or negligence, there being no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this chapter.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff‘s own negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant‘s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

David Taylor vs. The Manila electric Railroad and Light Company (MERALCO)

Facts:
The defendant, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15
years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age,
and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics whilst the plaintiff, MERALCO,
is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light
system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in
the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant
may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly
end of the island.
On September 30, 1905, David Taylor, with a 12 year-old boy named Manuel Claparos,
crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an
employer of MERALCO because said Murphy promised them that he will make them a
cylinder for their miniature engine. The visit occurred on a Sunday afternoon however

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finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in
machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.
They walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company
dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground which they took and carried on their way
home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a girl less than 9 years old named Jessie
Adrian, and all three went to Claparos‘s home where they made a series of experiments with
the cap. The series of experiments are as follows:
(1) They trust the end of the wires into an electric light socket.
(2) They tried to break the cap with a stone but failed so Claparos looked for a hammer but
found none.
(3) They opened the cap using a knife wherein they found a yellowish substance inside.
Taylor decided to put matches in the yellowish substance. He was holding it while Claparos
was the one who lighted the said substance which caused it to explode. The three kids were
injured. Jessie Adrian, who became frightened when the boys proposed putting matches, ran
away and received a light cut on the neck. Claparos had his hand burned and wounded and
Taylor was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule which injured his right
eye to such extent where its removal became a necessity. The counsel of the plaintiff stated
that defendant is liable to pay for damages because there were no measures adopted by it to
prohibit visitors from entering and walking about the premises. The trial court ruled in favour
of the plaintiff hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not David Taylor can recover damages from MERALCO
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that David Taylor is not entitled to recover damages from
MERALCO.
The Supreme Court used this premise in order to determine whether there is negligence in the
part of MERALCO:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

We have to take into consideration the fact that it is clear that the accident could not have
happened if the fulminating caps have not been left exposed at the point where they were
found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it
is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure
and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without
the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the
property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter
deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
Another factor is that the plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15,
more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea
as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the
injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with
which he was amusing himself.

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Upon stating that, it can be seen that the proximate cause of the David Taylor‘s injury was his
own negligence whilst the MERALCO‘s lack of care in keeping the caps in an appropriate
place or not taking measures in prohibiting visitors to enter its premises was only
contributory. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot recover damages.

7. Jarco Marketing V. CA (1999)

PRINCIPLE: Can Children be guilty of negligence

PROVISION: Article 2176 of the New Civil Code:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by
the provision of this chapter.
Jarco Marketing V. CA (1999)

Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)

Facts:
May 9 1983: Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's
Department Store, Makati City.
While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, she felt a sudden gust of wind
and heard a loud thud. As she looked behind her, she saw Zhieneth's body pinned by the bulk
of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help.
Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the
counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the Makati
Medical Center where she was operated on.
Next day: Zhieneth lost her speech and communicated by writing on a magic slate.
14 days after: She died on the hospital bed. The cause of her death was attributed to the
injuries she sustained.
After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing the
reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which
they had incurred. But, they refused to pay.
Criselda filed a complaint for damages
Jarco Marketing: answered with counterclaim and denied any liability.
Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to
freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. Zhieneth too, was guilty
of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on
her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong
support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
Maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection,
supervision and control of its employees.
Trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim
Proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it.
CA: favored Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a
structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" with a top wider
than the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly
distributed nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and
dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could
cause the counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously
brought to the attention of the management the danger the counter could cause. But the latter
ignored their concern.

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Issue:
(1) Whether or not Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident
(2) Whether or not Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence.

Held:
(1)YES. CA affirmed
Accident—Pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant
A fortuitous circumstance, event or happening—An event happening without any human
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens
Occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of
any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common
prudence
Negligence—Omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do
The failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other
Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of such tender
age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. W
Without doubt, Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger
posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the
situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners
miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
(2) No.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that
favors children below 9 years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In
our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted
without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over
nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over
the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter
was stable and sturdy.
Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.
Initially, Zhieneth held on to CRISELDA's waist, and only momentarily released the child's
hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was
reasonable and usual for her to let go of her child.
Further, at the time Zhieneth was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from
her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just 4 meters away - time and distance were
both significant.

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8. United States vs.
Santiago Pineda

PRINCIPLE: Pharmacist Diligence

PROVISION: Art. 2176
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter
. (1902a)

United States vs.
Santiago Pineda

Facts:
Feliciano Santos presented a copy of a prescription from Dr. Richardson, which he has
administered to Santos‘ horses on several occasions and had good results.
Santiago Pineda, a long-standing pharmacist and owner of a local drug store gave Santos
―potassium chlorate‖
Santos then prepared the medicine to treat the sick horses, but said horses died shortly
afterwards
Santos took the remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination
Drs. Peña and Darjuan after examining the packages, found that the packages contained
barium chlorate, a poison.
The two doctors went to the same drug store and bought ―chlorate potassium‖ but was given
barium chlorate.

Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, autopsied the horse and was able to conclude that the cause
of death was poison.

Issue: Whether or not Pineda is liable for negligence

Held: Yes. The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the
cost of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be
instituted
Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and
poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to
manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or
poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical,
medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison
shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this section if it differs
from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia.
The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following penal provision: "Any
person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not
more than five hundred dollar." The Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty
somewhat by providing that: Any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the

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 Philippine Islands contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions
of said law for which no specific penalty s provided shall, for each offense, be punished by a
fine not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he
sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison
under any "fraudulent name." It is the one word "fraudulent" which has given the court
trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive adjective?
Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant vigorously insists
upon, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law.
The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist
made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was
false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion; that
he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser
acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury.
Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in
nature, the question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an
absolute guarantor of what he sells. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor.

9. Mercury Drug v. De Leon

PRINCIPLES:

Extraordinary Diligence

Diligence of a Good Father of a Family
Proximate Cause — Liability for Damages

PROVISIONS:

ARTICLE 2176
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ARTICLE 2179
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded. (
ARTICLE 2180 (Par.5)
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Mercury Drug v. De Leon

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Facts:

Respondent Raul T. De Leon was the presiding judge of Branch 258, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Parañaque. On October 17, 1999, he noticed that his left eye was reddish. He
also had difficulty reading. On the same evening, he met a friend for dinner at the Foohyui
Restaurant. The same friend happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla, and had just arrived
from abroad. Aside from exchanging pleasantries, De Leon consulted Dr. Milla about his
irritated left eye. The latter prescribed the drugs Cortisporin Opthalmic and Ceftin to relieve
his eye problems.
Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon went to the Betterliving,
Parañaque — branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He
showed his prescription to petitioner Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant.
Subsequently, he paid for and took the medicine handed over by Ganzon. At his chambers,
De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff
applied 2-3 drops on respondents left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent felt
searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not subside.
Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine, Cortisporin Otic Solution.
De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and
teary. When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye
drops, Ganzon did not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully
read the prescription. In fact, it was her supervisor who apologized and informed De
Leon that they do not have stock of the needed Cortisporin Opthalmic. De Leon wrote
Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the day‘s incident. It did
not merit any response.
Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed him that their supervisor was busy
with other matters.
Having been denied his simple desire for a written apology and explanation,
De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. Mercury Drug denied that it
was negligent and therefore liable for damages. It pointed out that the proximate cause of
De Leons unfortunate experience was his own negligence. He should have first read and
checked to see if he had the right eye solution before he used any on his eye. He could have
also requested his sheriff to do the same before the latter applied the medicine on such a
delicate part of his body.
Also, Mercury Drug explained that there is no available medicine known as
Cortisporin Opthalmic in the Philippine market. Furthermore, what was written on the piece
of paper De Leon presented to Ganzon was Cortisporin Solution. Accordingly, she gave him
the only available Cortisporin Solution in the market.
Moreover, even the piece of paper De Leon presented upon buying the medicine can
not be considered as proper prescription. It lacked the required information concerning the
attending doctors name and license number. According to Ganzon, she entertained De Leons
purchase request only because he was a regular customer of their branch.

Issues:

 WHETHER OR NOT GANZON‘S NEGLIGENCE IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE

OF THE INJURY
 WHETHER OR NOT MERCURY DRUG AND GANZON ARE LIABLE FOR THE
DAMAGES

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Held:

The proximate cause of the ill fate of plaintiff was defendant Aurmila Ganzon‘s
negligent exercise of said discretion. She gave a prescription drug to a customer who did not
have the proper form of prescription, she did not take a good look at said prescription, she
merely presumed plaintiff was looking for Cortisporin Otic Solution because it was the only
one available in the market and she further presumed that by merely putting the drug by the
counter wherein plaintiff looked at it, paid and took the drug without any objection meant he
understood what he was buying.
Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzon cannot exculpate themselves from any liability.
As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care
and diligence is expected of them. Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have
laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and human health. In the United States
case of Tombari v. Conners, it was ruled that the profession of pharmacy demands care and
skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care
known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable
degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with
the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be exposed to
the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines. In cases
where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection or supervision of one‘s employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear
showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family.
Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption. Petitioners Mercury Drug and
Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high standard of diligence expected of them as
pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the
prescribed eye drops to De Leon. As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience
of Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has
ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms
length.There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to
prevent death or injury to any person who relies on one‘s absolute honesty and peculiar
learning.
The respondents are then required to pay the amount of 50,000 pesos for moral
damages and 25,000 pesos for exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.

10. Cruz v. Court of Appeals

PRINCIPLE: Concept of Negligence and Medical Negligence

PROVISION: ART. 2176
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Cruz v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On March 22, 1991, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother Lydia Umali to
the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City,

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Laguna. Lydia was examined by Dr. Ninevetch Cruz, the petitioner who found a myoma in
her uterus. Lydia Umali was then scheduled for a major examination the following day.
Rowena noticed that the clinic was untidy and the floor were very dusty. Due to the untidy
state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.

Before Lydia was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation
could be postponed, but Dr. Cruz insisted on continuing the operation. Rowena then informed
her mother, Lydia that she must be operated as scheduled. During the operation, Rowena and
her relatives waited outside for the operation of Lydia to be finished. While they were
waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operation and instructed them to buy Tagamet ampules
and Type A blood.
After the operation, Dr. Cruz asked the relatives of Lydia to buy additional blood for Lydia
but since there was no type a blood available in the blood bank, a person arrived to donate
blood and was later transfused to Lydia. Lydia was observed to be gasping for breath
therefore Dr. Cruz instructed her husband to buy oxygen. She was given the fresh supply of
oxygen as soon as it arrived. Due to Lydia‘s unstable condition, she was transferred to San
Pablo District Hospital. Lydia was re-operated by Dr. Ercillo because there was blood oozing
from the abdominal incision. Dr. Angeles, the head of Obstetrics and Gynecology was
summoned by the attending physicians but upon his arrival, Lydia was already in shock and
possibly dead because her blood pressure was already 0/0. While Dr. Cruz was closing the
abdominal wall, the patient died. Lydia‘s Death Certificate states ―shock‖ as the immediate
cause of death and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC) as the antecedent cause.
Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in
homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not
guilty for insufficiency of evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali's
death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Cruz was negligent in performing the operation on Lydia Umali and
whether or not Dr. Cruz is liable for the death of Lydia Umali.
Held:
Standard of care
Standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science
When the physician's qualifications are admitted, there is an inevitable presumption that in
proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and
skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established by expert
testimony.

Expert testimony
Expert testimony is essential to establish standard of care of the profession, as well as
that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. It is also
usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. There is an absence of any expert
testimony re: standard of care in the case records. NBI doctors presented by the prosecution
only testified as to the possible cause of death.

While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the lower courts constitute
reckless imprudence, this conclusion is still best arrived not through the educated surmises
nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert
witnesses. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from

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the realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen are incapable of
intelligently evaluating.
Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintiff
Plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a
causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create
a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v.
St. Luke's Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no cogent proof exists that the circumstances caused
Lydia's death, so the 4th element of reckless imprudence is missing.

The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage /

hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different factors.
Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut blood vessel
that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the probability that a clotting
defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death.

The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz'
allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz'
fault or negligence. This probability was unrebutted during trial.

11. Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete

PRINCIPLE: Medical professional diligence or standard of professional must be testified by

expert witnesses
PROVISION:
Medical malpractice is often brought as a civil action for damages under Art. 2176 of civil
code.
The defense in an action for damages, provided for under Art. 2179 of the CC:
―When plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his inury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence is only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages. But the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.‖

Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete

Facts:
Editha Ramolete who was then 3 months pregnant was brough to Lorma Medical Center
because she was suffering from vaginal bleeding, and through a telephone order given by the
petitioner since she was still not in the hospital that time, she advised Editha to be admitted in
LMC on that same day. They then proceeded to conducting the Pelvic Sonogram and it was
seen that the baby‘s cardiac pulsation was weak.
The following day, a pelvic sonogram was conducted again and it revealed that the cardiac
pulsation of the baby is not just weak but there was no fetal movement that is actually
appreciated. Since Editha is suffering from persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner
advised her to undergo a Dilatation and Curretage Procedure or raspa. This means to remove
the tissue from inside your uterus. This procedure is done to treat heavy bleeding or to clear
uterine lining after a miscarriage or abortion. On September 16, 1994 – she was once again
brought to LMC – vomiting and severe abdominal pains. (Drs. Dela Cruz, Mayo and
Komiya)
On July 30, 1994 the D&C procedure was conducted by Dr. Cayao-Lasam and the following
day Editha already requested to be discharged from the hospital, but the doctor didn‘t want to

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agree with her so in return she just advised that Editha should come back for a follow up
check-up after four days, but Editha failed to do so.
So on September 16, 1994 Editha was once again brought to LMC because she was suffering
from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. Dela Cryz, Dr.
Komiya and Dr. Mayo.
According to Dr. Mayo: there is a dead fetus in Editha‘s womb. After Editha underwent
laparotomy she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured
uterus. She had to undergo the procedure for hysterectomy – she has no more chance to bear
a child.
On November 7, 1994 – spouses Ramolete filed a complaint for Gross Negligence and
Medical malpractice aginst petitioner before the PRC. Professional Regulations Commission.
- Laparotomy is a surgical incision into the abdominal cavity for diagnosis or in
preparation for surgery.
- Ruptured uterus means that the tissues were torn apart
- Hysterectomy is the procedure wherein they remove all or a part of the uterus, that‘s
why there‘s no more chance for Editha to bear a child because it‘s in the uterus where the egg
when it has left the ovary, it is fertilized and implanted in the lining of the uterus.
TAKE NOTE: if you sued someone for Medical malpractice it must be testified by expert
witnesses.
THE CLAIMS OF EDITHA AGAINST DR. CAYAO-LASAM (her attending surgeon)
- Editha‘s hysterectomy caused by Dr. Cayao-Lasam‘s unmitigated negligence and
professional incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and failure to remove the fetus
inside Editha‘s womb.
RESPONDENT‘S CLAIM TO PROVE THAT PETITIONER COMITTED MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE:
1.) Failure to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha during her first day
of confinement at the LMC.
2.) D&C procedure be performed on Editha without conducting any internal
examination prior to the procedure.
3.) Petitioner – suggested a D&C procedure instead of closely monitoring the state
of pregnancy of Editha.
According to Dr. Cayao-Lasam, upon Editha‘s confirmation – she called the hospital to
anticipate the patient‘s arrival and ordered the needed medicines. She visited Editha on the
morning of July 28, 1994 as opposed to what Editha had claimed earlier.
On July 29, 1994 an internal examination was executed – Editha‘s cervix was already open so
petitioner discussed the possibility of a D&C procedure in case bleeding become more
profuse
Dr. Cayao-Lasam says that she just made a doctor‘s judgment based on the way her patient
feels and how she decribed it. On July 30, 1994 – Editha complained of her vaginal bleeding
and her passing out of some meaty mass in the process of urination and bowel movement –
the doctor advised to undergo D&C procedure
Dr. Cayao-Lasam was very vocal in the OR that she cannot see an abortus. (an aborted fetus).
She had an assumption that the abortus must have been expelled in the process of bleeding
Editha was the one who insisted to be discharged the next day after operation petitioner
agreed – advised she return for check-up on August 5, 1994 – she failed to do. It‘s her failure
to return for check up – contributed to her life-threatening condition on September 16, 1994 –
abnormal pregnancy ―placenta increta‖ placenta increta is an extremely rare and very unusual
case of abdominal placental implantation.
On March 4, 1999 the Board of Medicine or the Board of the PRC rendered a decision
acquitting petitioner from the charges filed against her. The Board held:

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- Based on the findings of the doctors who conducted LAPAROTOMY on Editha, hers
is a case of ectopic pregnancy Interstitial. This type of pregnancy is one that is being
protected by the uterine muscles and manifestations may take later than four months and only
attributes to two percent of ectopic pregnancy cases. When complainant Editha was admitted
at Lorma Medical Center on July 28, 1994 due to vaginal bleeding, an ultra-sound was
performed upon her and the result of the Sonogram Test reveals a morbid fetus but did not
specify where the fetus was located. Obstetricians will assume that the pregnancy is within
the uterus unless so specified by the Sonologist who conducted the ultra-sound. Respondent
(Dr. Lasam) cannot be faulted if she was not able to determine that complainant Editha is
having an ectopic pregnancy interstitial. Therefore, a more extensive operation needed in this
case of pregnancy in order to remove the fetus.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
- A particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon
to apply his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed
by the profession generally under similar conditions and in like surrounding circumstances.
- In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or
surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would
not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Cayao-Lasam is liable for gross negligence and medical
malpractice
Ruling:
FOUR ELEMENTS: Duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
- A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the
petitioner. As Edithas physician, petitioner was duty-bound to use at least the same level of
care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances.
Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert
testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.In the present case,
respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed
to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was
clearly an expert on the subject.
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the
subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities
on the subject or by practical experience.
Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and co-authored various
publications on the subject, and is a professor at the University of the Philippines.
- EXPERT TESTIMONY is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
According to Dr. Manalo: It is evident that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause
of the rupture of Editha‘s uterus.
2 reasons given:
1.) the instrument can‘t reach the site of the pregnancy, for it to further push the pregnancy
outside the uterus.
2.) ―the rupture could‘ve occurred much earlier, right after the D&C or a few days after the
D&C.
Telephone orders given by doctors are part of the reality of the present day.
From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that the D&C procedure was conducted – standard
practice with same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a

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condition under the same circumstances. There was nothing irregular in the way petitioner
dealt with Editha.
Discharged on July 31, 1994, respondent advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4)
days after the D&C. This advise was clear in complainants Discharge Sheet, complainant
failed to do so. This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the
doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted. Had she returned, the
respondent could have examined her thoroughly. Dr. Cayao-Lasam could have conducted the
proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine Editha‘s health condition and
applied the corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of Edithas
uterus.
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They
are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences specially so if the patient herself
did not exercise the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
Again, based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no
negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of Edithas injury was her
own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury. The final ruling of the court is
that the petition of Dr. Cayao-Lasam is granted and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 4, 2003is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Board of
Medicine dated March 4, 1999 acquitting petitioner is AFFIRMED. In this case Dr. Cayao-
Lasam did not commit a medical malpractice, if there was negligence in the part of the
attending surgeon it was only contributory and the doctor is not guilty of medical malpractice
thus Editha cannot claim for damages.

12. Peter Paul Patrick Lucas et al v. Dr. Prospero Ma. Tuano

PRINICPLE: Medical professional diligence / standard of professional must be testified by

expert witness. Negligence must be proved.
PROVISION: Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
In a medical negligence suit, the patient of his heirs, in order to prevail is required to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care and
learning possessed by other people in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of
such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.
There is a breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such
duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health constitutes
the actionable malpractice.
Peter Paul Patrick Lucas et al v. Dr. Prospero Ma. Tuano
Facts:
Sometime in 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas contracted "sore eyes" in his right eye.
Upon consultation with Dr. Tuano, Peter narrated that it has been 9 days since the problem
with his right eye began, and that he was already taking Maxitrol to address the eye problem.
According to Dr. Tuano, he performed "ocular routine examination" on Peter's eyes, wherein:
1. a cross examination Peter's eyes and their surrounding area was made, and 2. Peter's visual
acuity were taken, 3. Peter's eyes were palpated to check the intraocular pressure of each; 4.
the mortility of Peter's eyes were observed, and 5. the ophthalmoscopy on Peter's eyes was
used.
On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuano diagnosed that Peter was suffering from
conjunctivitis or sore eyes. He then prescribed Spersacet C-eye drops for Peter and told the
latter to return for follow-up after one week.

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 As instructed, Peter returned and Dr. Tuano discovered that the right eye developed
Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis, EKC, a viral infection. To address the problem, Dr. Tuano
prescribed Maxitrol, for a dosage of 6 times a day.
However, the EKC was getting worse yet Dr. Tuano still continued on advising the use of
Maxitrol, despite Peter's discovery of the inscribed warning written in its label.
Upon examination, Dr. Tuano discovered that the tension in peter‘s right eye was way over
normal. Dr. Tuano then ordered him to immediately discontinue the use of Maxitrol and
prescribed to the latter Diamox and Normoglaucon instead. He also required Peter to go for a
daily check-up in order for the former to closely monitor the pressure of the latter' eyes.
During one of Peter's regular follow-ups, Dr. Tuano noted the recurrence of EKC in Peter's
right eye. Thus, he referred Peter to Dr. Manuel Agulto, M.D., another opthalmologist
specializing in glaucoma treatment.
Eventually, Peter, in claiming to have "steroid-induced glaucoma" and blaming Dr. Tuano
for the same, filed a civil complaint for damages against Dr. Tuano. In their complaint,
petitioners averred that as the direct consequence of Peter's prolonged use of Maxitrol, he
suffered from steroid-induced glaucoma which caused the elevation of his intra-ocular
pressure, which caused the impairment of his vision which may lead to total blindness.
In rebutting petitioner's claim, Dr. Tuano asserted that the treatment made by him more than
three years ago has no causal connection to Peter's glaucoma. He further explained that 'drug-
induced glaucoma is temporary and curable, steroids have the side effect of increasing
intraocular pressure. Steroids are prescribed to treat EKC. Hence, the steroid treatment of
Peter's EKC caused the steroid-induced glaucoma.
RTC Ruling
The RTC dismissed the Civil Case for insufficiency of evidence, opining that petitioners
failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Dr. Tuano was negligent in his treatment of
Peter's condition. The trial court reasoned that the recognized standards of the medical
community has not been established in this case, much less has causation been established to
render Dr. Tuano liable. Further, absence of any medical evidence to the contrary, the RTC
ruled that it cannot accept petitioner's claim that the use of steroid is the proximate cause of
the damage sustained by Peter's eye.
Court of Appeals Ruling
The CA faulted petitioners because they failed to present any medical expert to testify that
Dr. Tuano's prescription of Maxitrol and Blephamide for the treatment of EKC on petitioner's
right eye was not proper and that his palpation of Peter's right eye was not enough to detect
adverse reaction to steroid.
During the trial in CA, Peter testified that Dr. Manuel Agulto told him that he should not
have used steroid for the treatment of EKC or that he should have used it only for two weeks,
as EKC iss only a viral infection which will cure in itself. However, Dr. Agulto was not
presented by petitioners as a witness to confirm what he allegedly told Peter and therefore,
the latter's testimony is hearsay. Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of and his own personal knowledge. Familiar
and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by resolution, hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence their claim for
damages against Dr. Tuano
Held:
Only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this court is not a
trier of facts.

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 The said issue constitutes a question of fact, as the Supreme Court is asked to revisit anew
the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. While this general rule admits of certain
exceptions, such as the circumstance when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence, but is contradicted by the evidence on record.
The fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which
can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible to ascertain the
merits of a medical negligence case without extensive investigation, research, evaluation and
consultation with the medical experts.
Petitioner's position in sum is that Peter's glaucoma is the direct result of Dr. Tuano's
negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol. Clearly, the present
controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on
the latter's professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to
prevail, is required to prove by is required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the
physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other persons
in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such failure, the patient or his heirs
suffered damages.
For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of
the medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged
violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code which states that "whoever by act or omission,
causes damage to another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, is there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called quasi-delict.
In medical negligence cases, the four essential elements are the following: 1. duty 2. breach
3. injury 4. proximate cause, which must be established by the plaintiffs.
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown that the injury for which
the recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done, the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events,
unbroken by intervening efficient causes.
Criminal Law- Proximate cause: It is the cause, which is the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. That is, the negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury.
Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the
proximate cause by preponderance of evidence, the patient must similarly use expert
testimony, because the question of whether the alleged professional negligence caused the
patient's injury is generally one for specialized expert knowledge beyond the ken of the
average layperson; using the specialized knowledge and training of his field, the expert's role
is to present to the court a realistic assessment of the likelihood that the physician's alleged
negligence caused the patient's injury.
In this case, Dr. Tuano was able to clearly explain what is only required of ophthalmologists,
in cases such as Peter's is the conduct of standard tests/ procedures known as "ocular routine
examination".
Even if we are to assume that Dr. Tuano committed negligent acts in his treatment of Peter's
condition, the causal connection between Dr. Tuano's supposed negligence and Peter's injury
still needed to be established. The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is
proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the
plaintiff's injuries.

Civil procedure, burden of proof: In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is more convincing to

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the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence or
"evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing that that which is offered in
opposition to it; in the last analysis, it means the probability of truth.
The RTC, Court of Appeals and even the Supreme Court; could not be expected to determine
on its own what medical technique should have been utilized for a certain disease or injury.
Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in speculations.
Doctor Tuano cannot be held liable because there wasn‘t enough evidence to prove his
negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals.
13. Tison V Spouses Pomasin

PRINCIPLE: Presumption of Negligence

PROVISION: Article 2185 of the New Civil Code

Tison V Spouses Pomasin

Facts:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jeepney, got into a vehicular mishap along Maharlika
Highway, Albay. Laarni Pomasin was driving the jeepney while the tractor-trailer, owned by
Albert Tison, was driven by Claudio Jabon coming from the opposite direction. Most of the
14 passengers of the jeepney died or got injured. On the other hand, Jabon and one of the
passengers in the tractor-trailer were also injured.

Respondents presented Gregorio Pomasin, passenger and Laarni‘s father, as witness while the
petitioners presented Jabon, the driver of the tractor-trailer. Respondents story alleges that the
tractor-trailer coming from the other direction encroached onto the jeepney lane where it hit
the jeep causing the death and injury to its passengers. Petitioners story on the other hand
alleges that the jeep fell of the shoulder of the road and was running in a zigzag manner
heading towards the tractor-trailer. Jabon then swerved the tractor trailer to the right where it
hit a tree, but unfortunately the jeep still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer.

Albert Tison extended financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000 immediately
after the accident and P200,000 to Cynthia Pomasin, Gregorio Pomasin‘s daughter. Cynthia
then in return executed an Affidavit of Desistance.

Respondents filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Antipolo. They alleged that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of
petitioners. Moreover, Jabon was prohibited from driving the tractor-trailer due to the
limitation imposed by his driver‘s license.

In their answer, petitioners countered that it was Pomasin‘s negligence which proximately
caused the accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by the Spouses
Pomasin to enter into an amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance.
Furthermore, petitioners complained that the respondents filed the instant complaint to harass

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them and profit from the recklessness of Laarni. RTC rendered judgement in favor of
petitioners dismissing the complaint for damages considering that the Spouses Pomasin
authorized Cynthia Pomasin to settle the case amicably for P200,000. RTC further held that
the proximate cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or negligence of Jabon but
because of Laarni.

The CA disagreed with the RTC and ruled that the reckless drving of Jabon caused the
vehicular collision. The CA relied heavily on the testimony of Gregorio saying that Jabon
was driving the tractor-trailer downward too fast and it encroached onto the jeepney lane.
Based on gravity of the impact and the damage done to the jeepney, the CA inferred that
Jabon was speeding. Tison was then likewise held liable for damages for his failure to prove
due diligence in supervising Jabon as a driver. Finally, the CA disregarded the Affidavit of
Desistance executed by Cynthia Pomasin because it had no written power of attorney and that
she was so confused at the time when she signed the affidavit that she was not able to read its
contents. Petitioners filed for a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied. Hence this
Petition.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner is the negligent party?

2. Whether or not Jabon is presumed negligent considering that he is prohibited to
drive the tractor-trailer?

Held:

NO, PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE NEGLIGENT PARTY. The Court agrees with the
conclusion of the RTC. The RTC found credibility in the testimony of Jabon because his
concentration is more focused than that of a mere passenger. Moreover, the declaration of
Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward and consistent. There is a
preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailor was in fact ascending. Considering its size
and weight, its speed cannot be more than a fully loaded jeepney which was running downhill
in a zigzagging manner.

NO, JABON WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. ARTICLE 2185 OF THE CIVIL CODE: The
legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was
violating any traffic regulation. In previous jurisprudence, it was held that a causal
connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation.
It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause
of the injury. In the case at hand, no causal connection was established between the driver‘s
violation of traffic regulation and the injury caused. In fact, it was proven by the petitioner
that the LTO merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in Jabon‘s driver‘s license.

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14. Sanitary Steam Laundry Inc. v. CA

PRINCIPLE: Presumption of Negligence

PROVISION: Article 2185 of the New Civil Code - Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Sanitary Steam Laundry Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
This involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of Sanitary Steam Laundry
and a Cimarron. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron where its passengers were
PMCI‘s employees and their family members and friends. They had just visited a company
project at Lian, Batangas and headed to the beach after. On its way back to Manila, at about
8:00 p.m., the Cimarron was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite when it was
hit on the front portion by the panel truck which was on its way to petitioner‘s plant in
Dasmarias, Cavite. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney in front of him
suddenly stopped so he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting it but that caused his vehicle to
swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck
collided with the Cimarron causing the death of driver of the Cimarron and two of his
passengers while several of others were injured. On Dec 4, 1980, private respondents filed a
civil case for damages. On Nov 23, 1990, the RTC of Makati held petitioner liable for the
accident. The CA, to which the decision of the RTC was appealed, affirmed its decision.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of
contributory negligence since the he was violating traffic rules specifically RA No. 4136 (i.e.,
violations such as the use of only one headlight at night and overcrowding) at the time of the
mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed to be
negligent. Also, the driver of the Cimarron had the last opportunity to avoid the accident.
However, because of his negligence, he was not able to avoid a collision with the panel truck.

Issue: Whether or not Cimarron driver‘s violation of traffic rules and regulations was a
contributory negligence?

Held:
No, the driver of Cimarron is not gulity of contributory negligence. It was not shown that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting of violation of law, is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioners contention that because of decreased
visibility, caused by the fact that the Cimarron allegedly had only one headlight on, its driver
failed to see the Cimarron is without any basis in fact. Testimonies show that the driver of the
panel truck lost control of his vehicle and bumped the Cimarron. Hence, even if both
headlights were on, it would have been bumped the same because the driver of the panel
truck could not stop despite the fact that he applied brakes. Nor is there any basis in fact for
the contention that because of overcrowding in the front seat, there was decreased
maneuverability which prevented the Cimarron driver from avoiding the panel truck. All
these point to the fact that the proximate cause was the negligence of petitioners driver. The
swerving of panel truck to the opposite lane could mean the petitioners driver was running
the vehicle at a very high speed and that he was tailgating the jeepney ahead of it. Petitioners

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driver claimed that the distance between the panel truck and the jeepney was about 12 meters.
If this was so, he would have had no difficulty bringing his panel truck to a stop. It is very
probable that the driver did not really apply his brakes but that finding the jeepney in front of
him to be in close proximity, he tried to avoid hitting it by swerving his vehicle to the left. In
the process, however, he invaded a portion of the opposite lane and consequently hit the
Cimarron.

15. Professional Services inc. (PSI) v. Agana

PRINCIPLE: Res Ipsa Loquitur, Captain of the Ship, EER

PROVISION/S:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one‘s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Professional Services inc. (PSI) v. Agana

Facts:
· On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of
bowel movement and bloody anal discharge.
· Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil
performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her
left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform
hysterectomy on her.
· After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it
and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room.
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖

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Issue/s:
1. Whether or not CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice.
2. Whether or not CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability.
3. Whether or not PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil‘s negligence.
Held:
1. DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
· Dr. Ampil failed to argue that the American Doctors might have left the gauze inside,
or that Dr. Fuentes is liable, since he examined Dr. Fuentes‘ work after.

· If he did intend to leave the gauze inside because of emergency reasons, he should‘ve
informed Natividad instead of misleading her and saying that the pains were natural after
surgery.
Medical Knowledge:
· Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision.
· Breach – failed to remove foreign objects.
· Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery.
· Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury.

2. DR. FUENTES IS NOT LIABLE:

· The Aganas‘ failed to convince the court that Dr. Fuentes is guilty, even with res ipsa
loquitor (The thing speaks for itself)
· Dr. Fuentes is not liable due to the Captain of the Ship rule
·
Captain of the Ship Rule:
· The operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all
personnel connected with the operation.

That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:
· He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
· He examined Dr. Fuentes‘ work and found it in order
· He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
· He ordered the closure of the incision

3.HOSPITAL OWNER PSI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL, AND

DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS.
· Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its
professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that modern
hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to its patients.
· Employee-Employer Relationship.
· Agency principle of apparent authority / agency
· Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

16. Tan v JAM Transit

PRINCIPLE: Res Ipsa Loquitur (The thing speaks for itself)

PROVISION/S: Art. 2176.

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the

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provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Tan v. JAM Transit

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and the reinstatement of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna.
In her Complaint, petitioner Luz Palanca Tan alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-
type jitney, driven by Alexander M. Ramirez, the said jitney figured in an accident at an
intersection along Maharlika Highway, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit passenger
bus bound for Manila The bus was driven by Eddie Dimayuga.
Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, causing the bus to collide with the jitney. Ramirez
and his helper were injured and hospitalized, incurring expenses for medical treatment at the
Pagamutang Pangmasa in Bay, Laguna.
The liability of Dimayuga is solidary with JAM, pursuant to Article 2176, in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The RTC ruled in favour of TAN, but the CA ruled in favour of Jam Transit.
There was no evidence as to between who among them was negligent in connection with the
incident.
The CA held that the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR can only be invoked when direct
evidence is not existent or inaccessible.
Issue:
Whether or not direct evidence is needed to prove the negligence of JAM.

Held:
Although there was no direct evidence that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking the
vehicles running along the right lane of the highway from the left lane, the available evidence
readily points to such fact.There were two continuous yellow lines at the center of the
highway, which meant that no vehicle in the said area should overtake another on either side
of the road.The double yellow center lines regulation, which this Court takes judicial notice
of as an internationally recognized pavement regulation, was precisely intended to avoid
accidents along highways, such as what happened in this case.
This prohibition finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136 (Land Transportation and
Traffic Code), Section 41(e).Furthermore, it is observed that the area of collision was an
intersection. Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 4136, likewise, prohibits overtaking or passing any
other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any intersection of highways, among others.
Thus, by overtaking on the left lane, Dimayuga was not only violating the double yellow
center lines regulation, but also the prohibition on overtaking at highway intersections.
Consequently, negligence can be attributed only to him, which negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by petitioner.
This prima facie finding of negligence was not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by
Dimayuga. Therefore, a finding that he is liable for damages to petitioner is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Actual damages is reduced to P1,327.00, and, in lieu of actual damages with respect to the
damage or loss sustained with respect to the passenger jitney and the cargo of eggs, the
amount of P250,000.00 is awarded by way of temperate damages.

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17. COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN INC.V.BELFRANLT DEVELOPMENT INC.

PRINCIPLE: Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur or ―The thing speaks for itself‖ PROVISIONS:
ARTICLE 1667: The lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased,
unless he proves that it took place without his fault. This burden of proof on the lessee does
not apply when the destruction is due to earthquake, flood, storm or other natural calamity.

ARTICLE 1174: Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, were inevitable.
COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN INC.V.BELFRANLT DEVELOPMENT INC.
Facts:
Belfranlt Development, Inc. (respondent) is the owner of Belfranlt Building in Angeles City,
Pampanga. It leased to petitioners College Assurance Plan Phil., Inc. (CAP) and
Comprehensive Annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP) several units on the second
and third floors of the building.
On October 8, 1994, fire destroyed portions of the building, including the third floor units
being occupied by petitioners.
An October 20, 1994 field investigation report by an unnamed arson investigator assigned to
the case disclosed:
0.5 Origin of Fire: Store room occupied by CAP, located at the 3rd floor of the bldg.
0.6 Cause of Fire: Accidental (overheated coffee percolator).
On November 11, 1994, petitioners vacated the leased premises, including the units on the
second floor, but they did not act on the demand for reparation.
Respondent wrote petitioners another letter, reiterating its claim for reparation, this time
estimated by professionals to be no less than P2 million.
In reply, petitioners explained that they could no longer re-occupy the units on the second
floor of the building for they had already moved to a new location and entered into a binding
contract with a new lessor.
Petitioners also disclaimed liability for reparation, pointing out that the fire was a fortuitous
event for which they could not be held responsible.
Issues:

1.) Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the fire that
partially burned respondent's building was a fortuitous event.

2.) Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable for
certain actual damages despite plaintiffs' failure to prove the damage as alleged.
Held:

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1.) No. The defense that the fire was a fortuitous event is untenable. Absent an explanation
from appellants on the cause of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
Article 1667 creates the presumption that the lessee is liable for the deterioration or loss of a
thing leased. To overcome such legal presumption, the lessee must prove that the
deterioration or loss was due to a fortuitous event which took place without his fault or
negligence.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as that which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In the present case, it was fire that caused the
damage to the units being occupied by petitioners.
The legal presumption therefore is that petitioners were responsible for the damage.
Petitioners insist, however, that they are exempt from liability for the fire was a fortuitous
event that took place without their fault or negligence.
The CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert testimony may
be dispensed with to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain:

a) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;

b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and

c) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.
2.) NO. The plaintiffs did not fail to prove the damages as alleged.

Petitioners were alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to
ascertain it, and respondent having no means to find out for itself, it is sufficient for the latter
to merely allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of the former and to rely on the
occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence.
Without a doubt, respondent suffered some form of pecuniary loss for the impairment of the
structural integrity of its building as a result of the fire.
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, because of respondent's inability to present
proof of the exact amount of such pecuniary loss, it may only be entitled to temperate
damages in the amount of P500,000.00, which we find reasonable and just.
The CA therefore correctly affirmed the RTC in holding petitioners liable to respondent for
actual damages consisting of unpaid rentals for the units they leased.
The CA deleted the award of actual damages of P2.2 million which the RTC had granted
respondent to cover costs of building repairs. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in
the amount of P500,000.00 were awarded by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

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18. DMCI v. CA

PRINCIPLE: Res Ipsa Loquitur – the thing speaks for itself

PROVISION: Art. 2176
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO,

respondents.

Facts:
At around 1:30 p.m. of November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M.
Consunji, Inc., fell on the 14th floor of the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City that led to his
death.

According to the report of P03 Rogelio Villanueva dated November 25, 1990:
Jose A. Juego was with his co-workers Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo and were performing
their work as carpenters at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance
Tower Building on board a platform made of channel beam with a plywood flooring and
cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly,
the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform, got
loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the
elevator core of the building under construction, crushing Jose Juego to death.
After the incindent, The victim was rushed to the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro
Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de
Yzo at around 2:15 p.m.

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego‘s widow, Maria Juego, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City a complaint for damages against the employer of her husband, D.M. Consunji, Inc. After
trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto.

As a result, D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

Issue:
Whether or not DMCI can be held liable for the death of Jose Juego on the grounds of
negligence under the principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that DMCI is negligent and can be liable for the death of Jose
Juego.
The court‘s basis to rule that DMCI is liable is the application of the doctrine res ipsa loquitur
in the case at bar.
The court expounded on the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur and explained that Res ipsa loquitur
is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided

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the following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.
The Court laid down that these three requisites are present in the case at bar with the
following explanation.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing
work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. The construction site with all its
paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control
and management of appellant; thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory
negligence was attributed to the appellee‘s deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also
present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant‘s negligence arises.

The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a
rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes
a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of
was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in
the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose
from or was caused by the defendant‘s want of care.
Petitioner argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it
proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondents husband.
When the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, the
defendants negligence is presumed or inferred. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh
the inference. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.
However, Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of
negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense
relating to the incident.

19. Ramos v. CA

PRINCIPLE: Res ipsa loquitor - The thing or the transaction speaks for itself.
PROVISION: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

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Ramos v. CA
Facts:
On the afternoon of June 17, 1985, Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, had
complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by presence of a stone in her gall
bladder.
Since the discomfort somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought professional
advice. She was told to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). She also underwent series of examinations which revealed that she was fit
for the said surgery. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, they hired Dr. Hosaka, a
surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka
assured them that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as
planned because Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation. While waiting for the
arrival of Hosaka, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist, ―botched‖ the administration of the
anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. This was witnessed by
Herminda Cruz, the sister-in-law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol
Medical Center. After the operation, Erlinda was diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse
cerebral parenchymal damage and that the petitioner alleged that this was due to lack of
oxygen supply to Erlinda‘s brain which resulted from the intubation.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for
damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in ―intubating‖ Erlinda.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the comatose
condition of Ramos.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that private respondents were negligent and are liable for the
condition of Erlinda Ramos.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff. Res ipsa loquitur is a procedural or
evidentiary rule which means ―the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.‖ It is a maxim for
the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances,
may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence.
Generally, in a medical malpractice case, expert medical testimony is relied upon to prove
that the attending physician has done a negligent act. In the case at bar though, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies
only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with
the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to
testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of
skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons,
external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given
by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is
permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the
aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine
the proper standard of care.

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20. PLDT V. CA

PRINCIPLE: The negligence of the plaintiff is the proximate cause of his injury.
PROVISION: Art 2179 (New Civil Code of the Philippines)
When the plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant‘s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
PLDT V. CA
Facts:
In the evening of July 30, 1968 spouses Antonio Esteban and Gloria Esteban sustained
injuries when their jeepney ran over a mound of earth. The said construction is being
undertaken by Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Gloria Esteban
sustained injuries on her arms, legs, and cheeks which eventually left a permanent scar on her
cheek. While Antonio Esteban sustained a cut in his lips and in addition to that the
windshield of their jeepney was also smashed. Spouses Esteban filed a complaint against
PLDT, the one in charge of the construction. It was alleged in the complaint that Antonio
Esteban failed to notice the accident mound due to the lack of warning signs and warning
lights. PLDT contended that they are not responsible for the injuries sustained by the spouses
by reason that the excavation is the undertaking of L.R. Barte and the proximate cause of the
injuries is the negligence of Antonio Esteban.
Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of Antonio Esteban.
Held:
Yes, the proximate cause of the injuries is the negligence of Antonio Esteban. The reason for
the injuries would be the unexplained swerving of Esteban. If only Esteban remained in the
inner lane and did not swerve from the left, he would not hit the accident mound. He also
claimed that he was running 25 kph, but it was proved by sufficient evidence that he was not
running at such speed. He could have avoided the mound if he was indeed running at 25 kph
for he will be able to hit the brakes in which the doctrine of the last clear chance may apply.
It was clear enough that Antonio Esteban failed to observe due diligence. It was also taken
into consideration that the spouses were residents of Lacson Street, therefore they are aware
of the ongoing excavation within their vicinity. In addition to that, the accident mound was
relatively visible therefore Esteban cannot claim that he did not see such.

21. MH Rakes, v. Atlantic

PRINCIPLE: The contributory negligence of the plaintiff

PROVISION: Art 2179 (New Civil Code of the Philippines)
When the plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant‘s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
MH Rakes, v. Atlantic
Facts:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was
at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the
malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which
were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay

35 | P a g e
upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent
them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the
rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke,
the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg,
which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.

Issue:
Whether the company is liable

Held:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in
fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the
boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there
was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side
of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of
the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the
workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in
some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the
failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the
sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer

for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted
against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No
criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to

his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the
"Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the
negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

22.------

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23. Juntilla V. Fontanar

PRINCIPLE: Fortuitous event

PROVISION: Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Juntilla v. Fontanar

Facts:
● The petitioner, Roberto Juntilla, is a passenger of the public utility jeepney on course
from Danao city to Cebu city.
● The jeepney was driven by defendants, Berfol Camoro and registered under the
franchise of Clemente Fontonar.
● When the jeepney reached Mandue City, the right tear tire exploded causing the
vehicle to turn ―turtle‖.
● Petioner, who was sitting at the front seat, was thrown out of the vehicle. He suffered
injuries and lost his Omega wrist watch.
● Petitioner filed a case of breach of contract with damages before the City Court of
Cebu City
● The defendants filed their answer alleging that the incident was beyond their control
and that the tire was newly bought and was slightly used at the time it blew up.
● Judge Romulo R. Senining of the Civil Court rendered judgement in favor of Juntilla.
Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu
● Judge Leonardo B. Canares reversed the judgment of the City Court of Cebu upon
finding that the accident was due to a fortuitous event therefore, exonerating the defendants
from any liability to the petitioner without pronouncement of costs.
● The petitioner raises the following alleged errors committed by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on appeal—
○ a. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to take
cognizance of the fact that defendants and/or their employee failed to exercise "utmost and/or
extraordinary diligence" required of common carriers contemplated under Art. 1755 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
○ b. The Honorable Court below committed grave abuse of discretion by deciding the
case contrary to the doctrine laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of
Necesito et al. v. Paras, et al.
Issue:
● Whether the tire blow out was due to fortuitous event

Held:
● NO, it was not a fortuitous event due to the following circumstances:
○ The Court of First Instance of Cebu erred when it absolved the carrier from any liability
upon finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event
○ The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a fast speed before the
incident. The jeepney turned ―turtle‖ and jumped into a ditch immediately after the tire blow
out. The jeepney was also overloaded.

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○ No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road
conditions or that the precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any
conditions liable to cause accidents.
● The following essential characteristics of caso fortuito are: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the
event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
● The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the
human will.
● Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed
safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up
thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.
● The source of common carriage, and by entering said contract, it binds itself to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. Unfortunately, this
obligation was not et by the respondents.
● Hence, the decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of City Court
of Cebu was reinstated with modification.

24. Southeastern College v CA

PRINCIPLE: Fortuitous Event

PROVISION: Art. 1174 ( New Civil Code of the Philippines)
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable. (1105a)

Southeastern College v CA
Facts :
Respondent Dimaanos are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City
Petitioner, Southeastern College, Inc., owns a four-storey school building along the same
College Road.
On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro
Manila.
Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents house.
An ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed
by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna.
In their report, they imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the
building and improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams to cause for the roof be ripped
off the building, thereby causing damage to the property of respondent.
Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana.
Petitioner interposed denial of negligence and claimed that the typhoon as an Act of God is
the sole cause of the damage.
RTC ruled in respondents‘ favor relying on the testimony of the City Engineer and the report
made after the ocular inspection.

38 | P a g e
Petitioners appeal before the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue/s:
1.) Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from
the impact of the falling portions of the school building‘s roof ripped off by the strong winds
of typhoon ―Saling‖ due to fortuitous event?

2.) Whether or not an ocular inspection is sufficient evidence to prove negligence?

Held:
1.) Yes, there is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural
occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight,
diligence or care.
In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered
thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely by
presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the
aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner‘s
school building after the typhoon.
2.) An ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the
eye is not always reflective of the real cause behind. A person claiming damages for the
negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative
of his injury or loss.
The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence, not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner‘s school building.

25. Nikko Hotel v. Roberto Reyes

PRINCIPLE: Volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he
is not negligent in doing so.
PROVISION:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Nikko Hotel v. Roberto Reyes
Facts:
(Roberto Reyes‘ version of the story)
Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at
around 6:00 o‘clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the
lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. Mrs.
Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel‘s penthouse in celebration of the natal day
of the hotel‘s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him

39 | P a g e
for which she replied: "of course‖. Mr. Reyes then went up with the party with Dr. Filart
carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter‘s present for the celebrant.
After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet
table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the
Executive Secretary of the hotel. In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the
other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the
party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance,
however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after,
while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached
and asked him to step out of the hotel.
(Ruby Lim‘s version of the story)
For Mr. Tsuruoka‘s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations
accordingly. The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka‘s closest
friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. At the
party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr.
Tsuruoka‘s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the
"captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. Mr. Miller
replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.
As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to
interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her
that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes
to leave the party as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to
inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.
When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom
she later approached. Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms.
Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Still, Mr. Reyes lingered.
When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as
there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity. However, as Mr. Reyes was already
helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito.
Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede
lang po umalis na kayo.‖ She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough
decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even
threatened to dump food on her.
(Dr. Filart‘s version of the story)
Dr. Violeta Filart also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr.
Reyes to the party. According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of
fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to
go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. There was a commotion and she
saw Mr. Reyes shouting. She ignored Mr. Reyes. She was embarrassed and did not want the
celebrant to think that she invited him.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya,"
to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
2.) If Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily
liable with her.

40 | P a g e
Held:
(1) No, Ms. Lim did not act abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party where
he was not invited under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Ms. Lim, not having abused
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made
liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
(2) Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee.
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-
crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he
is not negligent in doing so.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
(1) There is an act which is legal;
(2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
(3) it is done with intent to injure
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was
driven by animosity against him.
Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim‘s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot
amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart‘s companion
who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad
judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden is GRANTED.

26. Pantaleon v. American Express

PRINCIPLE: Plaintiff assumption of risk

PROVISION/S: Art. 1174.
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable. (1105a)

Pantaleon v. American Express

Facts:
Petitioner Polo Pantaleon and his family went for an escorted tour around western Europe
which was organized by Trafalgar Tours of Europe, Ltd. in October of 1991. Together with

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the tour group, they arrived in Amsterdam in the afternoon of October 25, 1991, which was
the second to the last day their tour. The group then decided amongst each other that they will
tour around the city the next day at an earlier time. The next day which was the last day of
their tour, the group arrived at the Coster Diamond House of Amsterdam, ten minutes before
9 AM. They were given a lecture about the art of diamond polishing that lasted for thirty
minutes and soon after, they were brought to the store‘s showroom for them to select items to
purchase. Mrs. Pantaleon planned to buy a 2.5 karat brilliant cut even before the trip. She
then, selected an item close enough to the approximation she wanted to purchase. She also
bought a pendant and a chain. The total cost of all the items was US $13,826.00.

Mr. Pantaleon presented his American Express credit card along with his passport, to pay for
the items. It was then handed to Coster sales clerk. This was presented at around 9:15 am,
before the tour group to depart. The sales clerk handed Mr. Pantaleon the imprint change slip
for him to sign. It was then referred electronically to the respondent‘s Amsterdam office at
9:20 am. Ten minutes later, the sales clerk informed Mr. Pantaleon that the sale was not yet
approved by the respondent. His son, who already boarded the bus, informed the tour group
and other family members. Mr. Pantaleon asked to cancel the sale instead. The store manager
asked the plaintiff to wait a few more minutes. After 15 minutes, the store manager informed
Mr. Pantaleon that the responded demanded bank references. He gave the names of his
depository banks and instructed his daughter to return to the bus and apologize to the tour
group for the delay.

At 10 am, which was 45 minutes after Mr. Pantaleon presented his AmexCard and 30
minutes after the tour group supposedly left, Coster then decided to release the items without
the respondent‘s approval of purchase. The spouse Pantaleon returned to the bus and
apologized but was only met with stony silence. The tour group‘s irritation was aggravated
after the tour guide announced the city tour was cancelled due to time constraints. They had
to catch a ferry at 3:00 pm at Calais, Belgium to London. Mrs. Pantaleon weeped and her
husband had to take tranquilizers to calm his nerves.

It later emerged that Mr. Pantaleon‘s purchase was first transmitted for approval to the
respondent‘s Amsterdam office at 9:20 am, Amsterdam time, then it was referred to
respondent‘s Manila office at 9:33 am. It was then approved at 10:19 am. The Approval Code
was transmitted to the Amsterdam office at 10:38 am, several minutes after the tour group
had left Coster, and 78 minutes after Mr. Pantaleon presented his card.

After the tour, Pantaleon and his family went to the US before returning to Manila on
November 12, 1992. During his stay, Mr. Pantaleon continued to use his AmexCard several
times without hassle nor delay but with two similar incidents that had happened in
Amsterdam. Mr. Pantaleon purchased golf equipment amounting to US $1,475 by using his
AmexCard. He then cancelled his purchase and borrowed money from his friend instead after
waiting for more than 30 minutes for the approval of the purchase. On November 3, 1992, he
purchased children‘s shoes amounting to US $87.00 at a store in Boston. It took 20 minutes
for the pruchase to be approved.

On November 4, 1992, after returning to Manila, Mr. Pantaleon sent a letter through the
respondent‘s counsel, demanding an apology for the ―inconvenience, humiliation and
embarrassment his family suffered‖ for the respondent‘s refusal to provide credit
authorization for the said purchases. The respondent sent a letter, in response, dated March

42 | P a g e
24, 1992, stated among the others that the delay in purchase in Coster was attributable that
the charged purchase was ―was out of the usual charge purchase pattern established.‖

Since responded refused to accede to Pantaleon‘s demand for an apology, petitioner filed an
action for damages with Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Pantaleon prayed for him to be
awarded ₱2,000,000.00, as moral damages; ₱500,000.00, as exemplary damages;
₱100,000.00, as attorney‘s fees; and ₱50,000.00 as litigation expenses.

On August 5, 1996, RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pantaleon. He was awarded

₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱300,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱100,000.00 as
attorney‘s fees, and ₱85,233.01 as expenses of litigation.

In August 8, 2006, CA reversed the decision and reversing the award given to Pantaleon,
holding that the respondent did not breach its obligation to him.

Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent breached its obligation to the petitioner?
2. Whether or not respondent is liable for damages?

Held:
1. Yes. The popular notion that credit card purchases are approved ―within seconds‘.
There is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take to
approve customer‘s purchase, especially if it‘s specifically contracted by both parties. One
hour appears to be unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a customer‘s
purchase
2. Yes, Pantaleon is entitled to damages not simply because AmEx incurred delay, for
which liability lies under Article 1170 of the Civil Code which led to injuries under Article
2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The unusual attending
circumstances to the purchase at Coster and there was a deadline for the completion by
petitioner before any delay would result to injury of his traveling companions which gave rise
to moral shock, mental anguish, wounded feeling and social humiliation suffered by
Pantaleon, as concluded by RTC.

27. Bataclan v. Medina

PRINCIPLE: Proximate Cause

PROVISION: Article 2176

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Bataclan v Medina

Facts:

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience,

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left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor.
Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe
Lara, seated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands
whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left
side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last
mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until
it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the
passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or
pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the
Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the
overturned bus.

There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the
wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and
rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made
to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a
fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers
trapped inside it.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were
removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud
Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees in the total amount of P87, 150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded
P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise
being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs
and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the
appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or
the fire that burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside.

Held:

š The Court ruled that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
š That the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light
with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available;
š And what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle
to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.

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š In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help.
š What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
š This aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear
to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus.
š According to the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by
her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano
Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus
inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because
they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the
said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions.
š Had he changed the tires, especially those in front, with new ones, as he had been
instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out
would not have occurred.

š All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle
negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and
the complete loss and destruction of their goods
š In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only
as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses
š As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of
the deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that
the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory
compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and other damages.
š We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal
services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of
the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may
well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by
the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
š In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court
are increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1, 000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6, 000)
PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the
death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from
hereby affirmed, with costs.

28. PHOENIX VS. IAC

PRINCIPLE: Proximate Cause

PROVISION: Article 2179
When the plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant‘s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

45 | P a g e
PHOENIX VS. IAC

Facts:
1. In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about 1:30am, private respondent Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general
manager of a marketing corporation, where he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.

2. He had just crossed an intersection and while driving down the street, his headlights were
turned off. When he switched on his headlights to ―bright‖, he suddenly saw a Ford dump
truck some 2 ½ meters away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a
curfew pass that night.

3. The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by the company
driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the lane that
Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew
so it was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were
no lights nor were there any ―early warning‖ reflector devices set anywhere near the truck,
front or rear.

4. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to be used the
next morning.

5. Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the left, but it was
too late. His car smashed into the truck.

6. Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including permanent facial scars, ―a nervous

breakdown‖ and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

7. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix.

8. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent‘s own negligence in
driving at a high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. It invoked
the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident
and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries alone

9. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not the collision was brought by respondent‘s own negligence.

Held:

No. Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligent but the legal and proximate cause of the
collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked.

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29. Dy Teban v. Ching

PRINCIPLE: Proximate Cause

PROVISION:
Art. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Art 2179
When the plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant‘s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Dy Teban v Ching

Facts:
At around 4:45 am on July 4, 1995, a certain Nissan Van owned by Dy Teban Trading inc. is
being being driven by Rogelio Ortiz. They were tasked to deliver ice in nearby barangays and
cities in Surigao City. On the other hand, a prime mover vehicle was parked at the opposite
side of the road because it suffered a tire blowout which occupied a substantial portion of the
national highway. He does not have necessary equipment to warn drivers so he placed a
banana leaf near his prime mover. A passenger bus was approaching and failed to notice the
prime mover he swerved to be able to avoid the truck which eventually led to hitting the
passenger van.
Issue:
Whether or not the improper parking of the prime mover is the proximate cause of the three-
way vehicular accident.
Held:
Yes, it is considered to be the proximate cause. It was held that Limbaga, the driver of the
prime mover, slept instead if keeping guard and warning the incoming of motorists of the
hazard. Limbaga also improperly parked the prime mover which eventually led to the
accident.

30. Picart v. Smith

PRINCIPLE: Proximate Cause (last Clear Chance)

PROVISION: Article 2176

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

47 | P a g e
Picart v. Smith

Facts:
Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La
Union when the defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his horn to give
warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he
had no sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and
when he had gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that it
turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got
injured. The horse died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was
guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

Held: Yes, the defendant Frank Smith Jr. was guilty of negligence.
As Smith started to across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider
would pass over the proper side. But as he approached toward the center of the bridge, he can
see to his eyes that this won‘t be done; and he must in a moment have known that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things,
this change of situation occurred while it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to
escape being run don by going to a place of a greater safety. The control of the situation had
then passed to the defendant.

31. Lapanday v Angala

PRINCIPLE: The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

PROVISION: Art. 2184.
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
Lapanday v. Angala

Facts:
At 2:45 pm on May 4, 1993 a Datsun crew cab driven by Apolonio De Ocampo hit a 1958
Chevy Pick-up owned by Michael Angala and driven by Bernulfo Borres. While the crew cab
was owned by Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation. And is assigned to its
manager by the name Manuel Mendez. The collision of both vehicles led to the damage of
the left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pickup.

Angala filed for a complaint against LADECO. He claimed that he is entitled to damages as
well as to attorney‘s fees. He claimed that he was slowly driving his pickup and slowly
making a left turn when he was bumped by the crewcab which was running at an average of
60-70 kph. It was further argued by De Ocampo that he was running at 40 kph and was about
10 meters aways as it makes a U-turn towards the left. He then admitted that he only stepped
on the brakes at after the time of the accident since it was unavoidable.

Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance was applicable.

Held:

48 | P a g e
De Ocampo has the last clear chance of avoiding the collision since he was the rear vehicle. If
only he was running at a normal speed he could have hit the brakes and avoided the collision.

32. Libi v. AIC

PRINCIPLE: Parents of the minor are primarily liable for damages caused by their child.
PROVISION:
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Libi v. AIC
Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, both 18 years of age were sweethearts until Julie Ann
broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. Wendell demanded Julie Ann to reconcile but the latter refused, prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died,
each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, Wendell‘s father.
Julie‘s parents herein private respondents filed a civil case against Wendell‘s parents to
recover damages contending that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. Dr. Jesus P.
Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions regarding
the autopsy of Wendell‘s body and concluded that the cause of death was not suicide as he
found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance
wound.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. CA
reversed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi are liable for vicarious liability.

Held:
Yes. The primary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and
criminal offenses. If the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor
children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on
the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary,
diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
The parent‘s liability being primary and not subsidiary shall cease if they exercised due
diligence of a good father of a family in accordance with the last paragraph of Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code provides that ―the responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages."

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The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. In this case, the
parents of Wendell Libi failed to exercise diligence of a good father of a family by safely
locking the fatal gun away. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not
diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much
so that it was only at the time of Wendell‘s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a
CANU agent and that Cresencio‘s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. The Libis are
also subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was
living in their company.

33. Tamargo v. CA

PRINCIPLE:
Parental Liability; Vicarious Liability or the Doctrine of Imputed Negligence
PROVISIONS:
Article 2176
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Article 2180
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains; in which
case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Tamargo v. CA
Facts:
On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for damages was filed by Macario
Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's
natural parents against spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

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Prior to the said incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt
the minor Adelberto Bundoc on December 10, 1981. This petition for adoption was granted
on November 18, 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Respondent spouses Bundoc claimed that the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere
filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court ruled that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals and contended that spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child,
Adelberto Bundoc.
Issues:
a.) Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be
given retroactive effect
b.) Whether or not the adopting parents (spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura) are
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against Adelberto Bundoc
Held:
a.) No.
The court did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as
to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had
no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. To hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since
they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Moreover, Article 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code provides that parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not
yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

b.) No.
It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him as Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides.
The law also imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them according
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. This principle of parental liability is a species of what is
frequently designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of ―imputed negligence under
Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself,
but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom
he is responsible.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a
tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty to
closely supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Thus the parents are to be held
liable for the ensuing damage. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and Article
221 of the Family Code of the Philippines also support this principle.

51 | P a g e
The Court ruled that the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred Adelberto was under the
custody of the Bundoc spouses thus parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto even though Rapisura spouses filed a
petition to adopt Adelberto before the incident happened.

34. Palisoc v. Brillantes

PRINCIPLE: ―Loco Parentis‖ – in the place of a parent

PROVISION: Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code
―Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.‖
Palisoc v. Brillantes
Facts:
The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and
on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with
another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At
that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a
machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to
the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped
slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face,
which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid
the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on
an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted.
First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a
hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died.
The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new
civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such
that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. There is no evidence
that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of
the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of
holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon.
Held:
Yes. The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the
provisions of Article 2180, are not applicable to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence
that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fist blows] lived and boarded with his teacher
or the other defendants-officials of the school.
The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the
issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, for damages caused by
their pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of
the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at
the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either, that the school involved is a non-
academic school, the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and
industrial school.
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and
severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the

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hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. The rationale of such liability of
school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students,
in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the child."
In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads
and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some
student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground
that they could be held liable under Article 2180, only if the student who inflicted the fatal
fist blows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school." There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the
school.
Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must
therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon
in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The
unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over
the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm,
whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable
unless they relieve themselves of such liability by "proving that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings
of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.

35. Amadora v. CA

PRINCIPLE: Substitute and Special Parental Authority

PROVISION: ―…Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.‖ (Article 2180, par. 7 of Civil Code)

Petitioners:
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A.
YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA

Respondents:
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR
LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA,
PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR
GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO
Ponente: Cruz

53 | P a g e
SUMMARY: Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code only the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades is made responsible of the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
Thus, the school, its rector, the high school principal, and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable.

Facts:

On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose
Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo Amadora.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, petitioners, as the
victim‘s parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against
the Colegio de San Jose- Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.

After trial, The Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the
plaintiffs in the sum of ₱294, 984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning
capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney‘s fees.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants
were completely absolved.

Issue: Whether or not respondents may be held liable for the acts of its students.

Held: No. Applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code:

At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose- Recoletos notwithstanding that the 4th year classes had formally ended.
It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or
merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savouring of the company of his friends in
the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the
custody of the school authorities.

The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none
of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its
discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo‘s killer.

At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules
and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the
tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required
to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the
custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was

54 | P a g e
committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing
discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they
had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations ,in
maintaining that discipline.

In the absence of teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable
especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun
from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action
or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for
which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting
of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that
killed the petitioners‘ son.

Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose- Recoletos cannot be held directly
liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is
made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held
to answer for the tort committed by any of other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss
in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.

36. Salvosa v. IAC

PRINCIPLE: If the student is not ―at attendance in the school‖ even if he is in the premises of
the school, there is no solidary liability on the part of the school.
PROVISION: Art. 2180 …teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody…

Salvosa v. IAC
Facts:
Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution and it is also an Institution of arts and
trade because BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering
Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics
Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses. Within BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio
Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit and Jimmy B. Abon is its duly appointed armorer. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not
being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders
from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot
Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the
former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro
died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of Homicide.
Then, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon and the
BCF .
ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party
defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, sentencing defendants Jimmy
B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to
pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro: P12,000.00 for the death of Napoleon
Castro, P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, P5,000.00
as moral damages, P6,000.00 as actual damages, and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs

55 | P a g e
and dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. On appeal by petitioners, the
respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon.
Held:
Under paragraph 7 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades are liable for ―damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody.‖ The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter ―stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to
the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
student.‖Jimmy B. Abon even if he is at the premises of the school, cannot be considered to
have been ―at attendance in the school,‖ or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon
Castro. Jimmy B. Abon was also supposed to be working in the armory with definite
instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Therefore, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds petitioners
solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon

37. St. Joseph’s College v Miranda

PRINCIPLE: Teacher and Schools

PROVISION: Art. 2180 of the Civil Code: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one‘s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

St. Joseph‘s College v. Miranda

Facts:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 PM inside St. Joseph College‘s premises, the class of
respondent Jayson Val Miranda was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur
powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of petitioner, Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the
subject teacher and employee of SJC.
While the class was having the experiment, Jayson checked the result of the experiment by
looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. It was being held by one of his group mates
who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. So the compound in the test tube spurted
out and some particles hit Jayson‘s eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his
group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson‘s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left
eye.
The school employees rushed him to the school clinic and thereafter was transferred to St.
Luke‘s Medical Center for treatment. He had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his
medication. Upon filing of this case in the lower court, Jayson‘s wound had not completely
healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, Jayson‘s mother, who
was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent ₱36,070.00 for her fares and
had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least ₱40,000.00.
Jayson and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish as a result of his injury due
to petitioners‘ fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon

56 | P a g e
each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages. Also, Jayson sent a
demand letter to petitioners for the payment of his medical expenses and other expenses
incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Jayson was constrained to file the complaint
for damages. Petitioners, therefore, should likewise compensate Jayson for litigation
expenses, including attorney‘s fees.
Petitioners alleged that on that day of the accident, the class was given strict instructions to
follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the
heated compound had cooled off. Jayson, a person of sufficient age and capable of
understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher violated such
instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound, and as a result, it cause
injury to his left eye.
After the treatment, Jayson was ready to be discharged and an eye test showed that his vision
had not been impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the
delay in his discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, Jayson‘s father, requested SJC to advance the
amount of ₱26,176.35 representing his hospital bill until his mother could arrive from abroad
and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, Jayson‘s parents, through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that
it should shoulder all of his medical expenses that had been incurred and will be incurred
further arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. Then the counsel for SJC,
explained that the school cannot accede to the demand because "the accident occurred by
reason of Jayson‘s failure to comply with the written procedure for the experiment and his
teacher‘s repeated warnings was the proximate cause of his injury.
So Jayson‘s father, on Jayson‘s behalf, sued petitioners for damages.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Jayson Miranda and ordered SJC, et al to be jointly
and solidarily liable to pay Jayson the following amount:
1. ₱77,338.25 as actual damages; However, said amount of ₱26,176.36 representing the
advances given to pay his initial hospital expenses is deducted from the ₱77,338.25 actual
damages herein awarded by way of legal compensation;
2. ₱50,000.00 as mitigated moral damages;
3. ₱30,000.00 as reasonable attorney‘s fees;
4. The costs of suit.
SJC, et al appealed to CA, but CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. SJC again appealed for
certiorari to the Supreme Court contending that: The proximate cause of Jayson‘s injury was
his own act of looking at the heated test tube before the compound had cooled, for which the
petitioners should not be liable; That CA erred in the award of actual damages, moral
damages, attorney‘s fees to Jayson.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners SJC, et al are liable for the injury of respondent Jayson
Miranda in accordance to Article 2180 of the Civil Code

Held:
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code states that the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one‘s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
In this case, petitioners could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of
care, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students. Tabugo was inside the
classroom when the class undertook the science experiment although Jayson insisted that she
left the classroom. However, no evidence was presented that Tabugo was inside the

57 | P a g e
classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. The Court is inclined to believe that
Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the accident happened and also perplexed
why none of the other students who were eyewitnesses to the incident testified in Court to
corroborate the story of the petitioner. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject
adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and supervision over petitioner
Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that the science
experiment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students. Sr.
Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility
because the other individual petitioners were under her direct control and supervision. The
negligent acts of the other individual petitioners were done within the scope of their assigned
tasks.
Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself, although
an educational institution may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT
SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the liability of the employer for the tortuous acts or
negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee.
Also, schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional
manuals but should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from expected
risks and dangers.
Wherefore, the petition is denied. The SC affirmed the ruling of the RTC and CA.

38. Professional Services v. Agana

PRINCIPLE : Res Ipsa Loquitur, Captain of the Ship, EER

PROVISION/S:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one‘s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Professional Services v. Agana

Facts:
· On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of
bowel movement and bloody anal discharge.
· Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil
performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her
left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform
hysterectomy on her.
· After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it
and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room.
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖

58 | P a g e
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
· Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: ―sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure‖
Issue:
1. Whether or not CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice.
2. Whether or not CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability.
3. Whether or not PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil‘s negligence.
Held:
1. DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
· Dr. Ampil failed to argue that the American Doctors might have left the gauze inside,
or that Dr. Fuentes is liable, since he examined Dr. Fuentes‘ work after.

· If he did intend to leave the gauze inside because of emergency reasons, he should‘ve
informed Natividad instead of misleading her and saying that the pains were natural after
surgery.
Medical Knowledge:
· Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision.
· Breach – failed to remove foreign objects.
· Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery.
· Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury.

2. DR. FUENTES IS NOT LIABLE:

· The Aganas‘ failed to convince the court that Dr. Fuentes is guilty, even with res ipsa
loquitor (The thing speaks for itself)
· Dr. Fuentes is not liable due to the Captain of the Ship rule
·
Captain of the Ship Rule:
· The operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all
personnel connected with the operation.

That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:
· He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
· He examined Dr. Fuentes‘ work and found it in order
· He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
· He ordered the closure of the incision

3.HOSPITAL OWNER PSI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL, AND

DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS.
· Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its
professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that modern
hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to its patients.

59 | P a g e
· Employee-Employer Relationship.
· Agency principle of apparent authority / agency
· Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility
39. NPC v. CA
PRINCIPLE: Employer-employee Relationship
PROVISION: Article 2180 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
NPC v. CA
Facts: On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power
Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its
destination, one of the trucks driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba collided with a Toyota
Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota
Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against National
Power Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then Court of
First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. PHESCO, then contended that it was not the
owner of the dump truck which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it
asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and
technicians for the latter‘s projects. NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of
the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO. The Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte, Marawi City rendered a decision dated July 25, 1988 absolving NPC of any liability.
Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on November 10, 1994
reversed the trial court‘s judgment, stating that:
―A finding that a contractor is a labor only contractor is equivalent to a finding that
there is an employer-employee relationship between the owner of the project and the
employees of the labor only contractor (Industrial Timer Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 202 SCRA 465). So, even if Phesco hired driver
Gavino Ilumba, as Phesco is admittedly a labor only contractor of Napocor, the statute
itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer (Napocor)
and the employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor (Phesco). (Ecal vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 195 SCRA 224).
Consequently, we hold Phesco not liable for the tort of driver Gavino Ilumba, as there
was no employment relationship between Phesco and driver Gavino Ilumba. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to hold the employer liable for torts committed by his
employees within the scope of their assigned task, there must exist an employer-
employee relationship. (Martin vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 591).‖
Chagrined by the sudden turnaround, NPC filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision
which was, however, denied on February 9, 1995. Hence, this petition.

60 | P a g e
Issue:
(1) Whether or not there was an existing employee-employer relationship between
PHESCO and NPC.
(2) Whether or not NPC is liable for the damages brought about by the dump truck
driver Gavino Ilumba under Article 2180.
Held: As for the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that PHESCO was engaged in labor only
contracting with NPC. Under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve the critical
path network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO, and the manning
schedule and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmation by
NPC.
It cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any sub-contract or lease, again NPC‘s
concurrence is needed. Even in the procurement of tools and equipment that will be used by
PHESCO, NPC‘s favorable recommendation is still necessary before these tools and
equipment can be purchased. Notably, it is NPC that will provide the money or funding that
will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that
the project being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of power energy facilities, is
related to NPCs principal business of power generation. In sum, NPC‘s control over
PHESCO in matters concerning the performance of the latter‘s work is evident. It is enough
that NPC has the right to wield such power to be considered as the employer
Secondly, NPC is liable for the damages of the tort by Gavino Illumba. Given the
circumstances stated earlier, the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the
labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal
employer. Since PHESCO is only a labor-only contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC,
including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees of NPC.
However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a labor only contract exists between it and
PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts
of the employee of the labor-only contractor. This argument by NPC is misplaced. It bears
stressing that the action was premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict
against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor
Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case.
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides:

―Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.‖

In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver.

Finally, NPC could still have disclaimed any liability had it raised the defense of due
diligence in the selection or supervision of PHESCO and Ilumba. However, for some reason
or another, NPC did not invoke said defense. Consequently, its liability stands.

61 | P a g e
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 10, 1994 and its accompanying resolution dated February 9, 1995 are AFFIRMED
without prejudice to the right of NPC to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba reimbursement
of the damages it would be adjudged to pay to complainants.
40. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Spouses Huang

PRINCIPLE: Defense of an employer: Liability of the employer for the acts/omissions of the
employee
PROVISIONS: Art. 2176 and Art. 2180 (Civil Code of the Philippines)

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil code is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.

Mercury Drug Corporation v. Spouses Huang

Facts: On December 20 1996, a Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641 collided with a
Corolla GLI Sedan with plate number PTT 775 in a road accident within the municipality of
Taguig, Manila. Mercury Drug is the registered owner of the 6-wheeler truck and has in its
employ the truck driver named Rolando del Rosario. The massive collision caused
respondent Huang to experience injuries and is paralyzed for life from his chest down and
requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatments. Driver Del Rosario only had a
TVR or Traffic Violation Receipt during the accident since his driver's license had been
confiscated for reckless driving. Del Rosario also admitted that after the impact, he lost
control of the truck and failed to apply his brakes. Despite the facts that Mercury Drug
requires its applicants to take theoretical and actual driving tests, Del Rosario took the driving
tests and and psychological exams when he applied for the position of delivery man, but not
when he applied for the position of a truck driver. He also used a light vehicle instead of an
actual truck during the driving test. Furthermore, bo tests were conducted on the motor skills
development, eye and hand coordination, visual attention, and perceptual speed. NBI and
police clearances weren't presented and Mercury Drug didn't provide a back-up driver for the
13-hour long trip during the accident. Spouses Huang contended that Mercury Drug
Corporation failed to exercise diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver, Rolando Del Rosario.

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Issue: Whether or not petitioner Mercury Drug is liable for his employee's negligent action?

Held: Yes. Mercury Drug Corporation is solidarily liable for his employee. Their liability is
direct and isn't conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior
showing of insolvency of such employee. To be relieved from the liability, Mercury Drug
should prove that it exercised due diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision
of its employee. During the accident, they allowed Del Rosario to drive without a license.
The absence of necessary tests and clearances during Del Rosario's application is a proof of
employer's negligence. Del Rosario was also holding a TVR for reckless driving but no
disciplinary action was taken against him. In the selection of its prospective employees, the
employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. In the case, the employer, Mercury
Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedures but it wasn‘t enough in a sense
that it didn‘t exercised such measures when Del Rosario applied for the position of a truck
driver but only during Del Rosario‘s application for a delivery man. Mercury Drug failed to
discharge the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its employee, Del Rosario. They are liable for all the damages
which are natural and probable consequences of the act.

41. Lampesa v De Vera

PRINCIPLE: Once negligence of the employee is established, the employer must prove that
he exercised due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee to
escape liability.
PROVISION: ARTICLE 2180 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE – ―Employers shall be liable for
the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.‖

Lampesa v De Vera
Facts:
On December 28, 1988, De Vera, Jr. boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City
driven by respondent Modesto Tollas. Upon reaching the KM 4 marker of the national
highway, the jeepney came to a complete stop to allow a truck, then being driven by Dario
Copsiyat, to cross the path of the jeepney in order to park at a private parking lot on the right
side of the road. As Tollas began to maneuver the jeepney slowly along its path, the truck,
which had just left the pavement, suddenly started to slide back towards the jeepney until its
rear left portion hit the right side of the jeepney. De Vera, Jr., who was seated in the front
passenger seat, noticed his left middle finger was cut off as he was holding on to the handle
of the right side of the jeepney.

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Issue: Whether or not Copsiyat, along with his employer Lampesa, are negligent and are
therefore liable for the injury of De Vera Jr.

Held: Yes. Copsiyat, along with his employer Lampesa, are negligent and are therefore liable
for the injury of De Vera Jr.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which we cannot pass upon
in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.

In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found Copsiyat negligent in maneuvering
the truck and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by De
Vera, Jr. Lampesa was also held accountable by both courts because he failed to exercise due
diligence in the supervision of his driver. This Court is not bound to weigh all over again the
evidence adduced by the parties, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court on the matter of petitioners‘ negligence coincide.

Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises
that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said employee.18 To
rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and convincing proof that he
exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees.

Lampesa claims he did his legal duty as an employer in the selection and supervision of
Copsiyat. But the record is bare on this point. It lacks any showing that Lampesa did so.
Admitting arguendo that Copsiyat did show his professional license when he applied for the
job of truck driver, Lampesa should not have been satisfied by the mere possession of a
professional driver‘s license by Copsiyat. As an employer, Lampesa was duty bound to do
more. He should have carefully examined Copsiyat‘s qualifications, experiences and record
of service, if any. Lampesa must also show that he exercised due supervision over Copsiyat
after his selection. But all he had shown on record were bare allegations unsubstantiated by
evidence. Having failed to exercise the due diligence required of him as employer, Lampesa
cannot avoid solidary liability for the tortuous act committed by his driver, Copsiyat.

42. Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.

PRINCIPLE: The Defense of the Employer

PROVISION/S: Art. 2179

When the plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant‘s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

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Art. 2180 par. 5

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any
business or industry.

Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.

Facts:

Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as a clerk, receiving a monthly
wage of Php 25. He utilizes the train station located near his home. On January 20, 1915 he
was on aboard a second class car. He was about to alight the train but there was a defect with
regard to the platform. A passenger by the name of Emilio Zuniga successfully alighted the
train despite the fact that the platform was rising. When it was time for Jose Cangco to alight
the train, his foot came into contact sacks of watermelon which eventually led him falling
down the platform. He sustained serious injuries which led him having his arm amputated.

Jose Cangco filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance to recover damages from
Manila Railroad Co. It was held by the court that the company is not liable since the
proximate cause of the incident was the negligence of Cangco. Cangco failed to exercise due
diligence in alighting the train which caused his injury.

Issue:
Whether or not the Manila Railroad Company is liable for the injuries sustained by Jose
Cangco.

Held: Yes, Manila Railroad Company shall be held liable for the injuries sustained by Jose
Cangco by reason that it is their obligation to bring a passenger safely to his destination by
virtue of the contract of carriage. On the other hand, the employer shall be held liable for
whatever damage that his employee incurs by reason of negligence. The employer shall be
held solidarily liable with his employee. The negligence of the employee cannot also be held
as an action for defense with regard breach of contract. With regard to the issue of
contributory negligence, Jose Cangco is not guilty of contributory negligence since in the first
place, it not usual to have sacks of melon on the platform which imposes danger and he
cannot forsee the length of step he has to take in alighting the train.

43. Calalas v. CA

PRINCIPLE: Proximate Cause

PROVISION/S:

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755

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Art. 2179. When the plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant‘s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Calalas v. CA

Facts:
At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G.
Sunga, a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension
seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger
off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco
Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging
were done under sedation.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation
of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as
a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability
holding that it was the truck owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC‘s
decision, on the ground that Sunga‘s cause of action was based on a breach of contract of
carriage and not on quasi-delict.

Hence, this appeal from Calalas.

Issue/s:

(1) Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the accident
negates petitioner‘s liability

(2) Whether or not Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of
carriage

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(3) Whether or not moral damages should be awarded

Held:

(1) No. First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage. In this case, the
petitioner failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination as a common carrier in
violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause
applies only to cases of quasi-delict.

The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is
no relation between him and another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing
relation between petitioner and respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon
happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas‘ part,
which makes him liable.

(2) No. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two
meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than
the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension
seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers.

(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated
on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap
results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the
Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided
in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was
no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance
of the contract of carriage.

44. E. Merritt v Government of the Philippine Islands

PRINCIPLE: A state may only be liable if the damage was caused by a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do
the act performed.

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 PROVISION: Art. 2180
E. Merritt v Government of the Philippine Islands
Facts:
E. Merritt, an American doing business in the Philippines, was passing along the
Padre Faura Street riding a motorcycle vehicle. He is driving on the right side of the street
with a speed of 10-12 miles per hour. Suddenly, a general hospital ambulance rush towards
him, bumping the motorcycle. As a result, the petitioner was severely injured and became
entirely unconscious. According to Dr. Saleeby, the petitioner endured a fracture on his skull
and his right leg, and that his pulse is very weak that the petitioner is on the brink of death.
But luckily, the petitioner became conscious. But 6 days before the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed
that the petitioner‘s legs showed contraction and curvature which made his leg very weak,
thus making it impossible for him to walk nor stand steadily. According to various merchants,
the petitioner lost the energy, capability, and agility which he previously displayed before
enduring a horrible accident. Thus, Mr. Merritt dissolved a partnership with an engineer due
to his incapacity in mathematical calculation. And at the same time, he gave up a contract for
the construction of a building.
The petitioner then filed against the government of the Philippines for damages. The
lower court erred that it is clearly evident that the damage was merely due to the sole
negligence of the chauffeur (driver of the ambulance). Thus, the court find that the amount of
damages endured and being sued by the petitioner is worth P 18,075.
Act. No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915 states that:
―An act authorizing. Merritt to bring suit against the government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of the said islands to appear in said suit…‖
Issue:
 1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, merely waive its immunity from
suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
 2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
Held:
1. Yes. By allowing to be sued, a state waives its right against suit. However, it does not
concede its liability to petitioner, or create such action in the petitioner‘s favor. It
simply gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and allows itself to court‘s
jurisdiction.
2. No. Under Art. 2180, Paragraph 5:

―The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.‖

Thus, the state is not responsible since the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.

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45. Fontanilla v. Maliaman

PRINCIPLE: Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done.
PROVISION: Art. 2176
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

Fontanilla v. Maliaman
Facts: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially by its
regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted
in the latter's death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the
NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court awarded actual, moral and exemplary
damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the NIA
does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the
government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious
act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.

Issue: May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent?

Held: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by
the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. (Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R.
Nos. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991).

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were
travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely
Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit
within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to
reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage
from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the
driver and the supervisor in the group.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 2180 read as follows:

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Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.

2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated,
Paras; 1986 Ed. ).

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary

functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act provides:

Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as
the National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be
organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of
business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper
conduct of its business.

Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. Thus-

Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:

(a) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may
be necessary to finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a certain
period not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and

(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are directly or
indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives.

46. Vestil v. IAC

PRINCIPLE: He who possesses an animal for utility, pleasure or service shall be liable for
the damage which may have been caused by the animal.
PROVISION: Article 2183 of the New Civil Code
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall

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cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.

Vestil v. IAC
Facts:
 On July 29,1975, Theness Uy was bitten vy a dof while she was playing with a
child of the petitioner (Vestil) in the house of the late Vicente Miranda (Father of
Purita Vestil)
 Theness was rushed to Cebu General Hospital where she was treated for ―multiple
lacerated wounds on the forehead‖ and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo
 She was discharged after nine (9) days, but she was re-admitted a week later due
to ―vomiting of saliva‖
 The following day, on August 15,1975, Theness died.
 The cause of death was certified as bronchio pneumonia
 Seven (7) months later the Uy‘s sued for damages, alleging the Vestils were liable
to them as possesors of ―Andoy‖the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter.

Petitioner‘s contention:
 The Vestil‘s rejected the charge, insisting that the dog and the house belonged to
the deceased Vicente Miranda and such property was still part of Miranda‘s estate.
 The dog was a tame animal, and no one witnessed the dog bite Theness.

Issue: Whether or not the Vestil‘s are liable under Art. 2183 of the Civil Code

Held:
Yes, they are liable under Article 2183 of the Civil Code.
 The cause of Theness‘ death was from the dog bites.
 She developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies which then in turn, acquired
broncho-pneumonia, a complication of rabies. This was proved by a statement of
a medical professional during the trial.
 The Vestil‘s are the possessors of the property because it was found out that they
had exercised acts of possession during that time.
 The defense of the Vestil‘s that the house and ownership of the dog was still on
Vicente Miranda‘s estate has no merit.
 Liability is due to the possession of the dog, regardless of the ownership of the
dog or property, regardless if it would be tame or vicious or even if it had been
lost or may have escaped.
 Liability would still arise because one who possesses an animal for utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage caused by the animal.

47. Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai

PRINCIPLE: Imputed Negligence

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PROVISION: ART. 2184.

―In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.‖

CAEDO VS THAI

Facts:

A mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54
(now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving
his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son
Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo
and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai,
with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to
Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate
speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40
to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56
kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista.
The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's
vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of
him, only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should have given
him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not notice the
lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to
him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a
considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction.
Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane
was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear
bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along
as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle.
On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind.
Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would
be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky
maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was
moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was
already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in
front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car
on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was
insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and
wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the
collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The

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photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved
shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several

members of his family were injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the
defendants.

CFI of Rizal rendered judgment in favor of Caedo and against Yu Khe Thai and
Rafael Bernardo, ordering them to pay plaintiffs damages solidarily.

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award
of P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view
of the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim.

Issue/s:

(1) Who was responsible for the accident?

(2) If it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai,
solidarily liable with him?

Held:

(1) There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's
negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
(2) The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is
solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code,
which reads:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented
the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.

The imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an

ERROR.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the
owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for
the first time in the new Civil Code.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if
known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence
if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

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AS TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES:

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them
also actual or compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained.

The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their
injuries, other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the evidence.
Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable of
pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual, damages,
as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.

48. Quezon City v. Dacara

PRINCIPLE: City and Municipality (Negligence and Failure to exercise due care)

PROVISION/S:

 Rule 45 of Rules of Court

- Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

 Art. 2185 of the Civil Code

- Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violation any traffic
regulation.

 Art. 2189 of the Civil Code

- Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

 Art. 2219
- Moral damages may recovered in the following and analogous cases:

1.) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

2.) Quasi-delict causing physical injuries;
3.) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
4.) Adultery or concubinage;
5.) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
6.) Illegal search;
7.) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
8.) Malicious prosecution;
9.) Acts mentioned in Art. 309;
10.) Acts and actions referred to in Art. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused, referred to in no. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.

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The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned
in no. 9 of this article, in the order named.

 Art. 2229
- Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.

 Art. 2231
- In a quasi-delict, exemplary damages maybe granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.

 Republic Act 4136- Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Quezon City v. Dacara

Facts:

February 28, 1988, Dacara‘s Jr. 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan overturned in a pile of earth
diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City which was being repaired by the Quezon City
Government resulting to bodily injuries obtained by Dacara. Also, the vehicle of Dacara
suffered extensive damages when it hit the pile of earth diggings.

Indemnification was sought from the city government. In behalf of Dacara‘s Jr., Dacara‘s Sr.
filed a complaint for damages against the Quezon City Government and Engr. Thompson
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Fulgencio wanted to just have the amount of not less
than P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages, P30,000.00
exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorney‘s fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him.

In a special defence of the defendants, they defendants admitted the occurrence of the
incident but alleged that the subject diggings were provided with reflectorized traffic paint
with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. In short, defendants
claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary
measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the
diggings was precisely because of the latter‘s negligence and failure to exercise due care.

June 29, 1990, the RTC rendered its decision. That the evidences presented by the
respondents was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. The
petitioners appealed to the higher court but the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of the
RTC.

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Issue:

Whether or not Engr Ramir Thompson and the Quezon City Government be held liable for
damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr?

Held:

Yes. The negligence of Engr Ramir J Thompson as an instrumentality of the Quezon City
Government is the proximate cause of the injuries and damage to property suffered by
Fulgencio Dacara‘s (respondent) son, which make the Local Government Unit (LGU)
subsidiarily liable for the damage incurred. The petitioner‘s claim that they were not
negligent insisting that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of
the roadside construction, but none were presented, gave a more substantial support to the
report of the policeman who responded to the scene of incident that no precautionary signs
were found on the said place of incident. Thus, the LGU and Engr Ramir J Thompson as its
instrumentality were held negligent in the execise of their functions whereas capsulized under
Article 2189 of the New Civil Code that Local Government and its employees should be
responsible not only for the maintenance roads/ streets but also for the safety of the public.
Hence, compensatory damages were awarded to the respondent.

49. Guilatco v. Dagupan

PRINCIPLE: The existence of control or supervision of provinces, cities and municipalities is

sufficient for liability to attach.

PROVISION: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.

Guilatco v. Dagupan

Facts: In a civil action for recovery of damages filed by petitioner Florentina Guilatco,
judgment was rendered against respondent City of Dagupan:
1. Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff:
 Actual damages in the amount of P 15,924.00;
 Moral damages in the amount of P 150,000.00;
 Exemplary damages in the amount of P 50,000.00; and
 Attorney‘s Fees for P 3,000.00.
2. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendants City of Dagupan and City Engr. Alfredo
Tangco for lack of merit.

On July 25, 1978, plaintiff Florentina Guilatco, while she was about to board a
tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd., accidentally fell into a manhole located on said

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sidewalk, which caused her right leg to be fractured. As a result, she had to be hospitalized,
operated on, and confined at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital from July 25 to August 3,
1978. The pain has persisted even after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital
on October 9, 1978, to the present.
Despite her discharge from the hospital, plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches
and the Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of
the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter.
Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital have
confirmed the extent of the fracture and injuries sustained by the plaintiff.
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City admitted that said
manhole along the sidewalk is owned by the National Government and in his capacity as ex-
officio Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over
National roads.
On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court reversed the lower
court findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to
prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard. The city
contends that it is the Ministry of Public Highways who has control or supervision.
After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the
appellate court, as well as the arguments presented by the parties, we agree with those of the
trial court and of the petitioner. Hence, we grant the petition.

Issue: Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan
exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with Article 2189 of the
Civil Code.

Held: Yes, the liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by
pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in Article 2189 and it is not
necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for
liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over
the defective road or street.

In this case, the control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer. The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the
laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and
regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board, indicating that the
city has supervision and control. The express provision in the charter holding the city not
liable for damages sustained by persons due to failure of any city officer to enforce the
provisions can not be used to exempt the city, as it only lays down general rules and Article
2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from ―defective streets, public buildings, and
other public works.

The petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the respondent
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court,

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dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED with the
indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded:
(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the
amount of P 15,924 (namely P 8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P 7,420.00
as lost income for one (1) year and P 450.00 as bonus); P 20,000.00 as moral damages and P
10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The attorney's fees of P 3,000.00 remain the same.
50. Custodio v CA

PRINCIPLE:

There must be an injury before damages can be awarded

PROVISION:
Article 21 of the New Civil Code
 Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Damnum Absque Injuria
 ―loss without injury‖

Custodio v CA

Facts:

Private respondent Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment situated at
Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. Said property may be
described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. When said
property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were
acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of
said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that
there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by the Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.
Morato (respondent from the previous case) constructed her adobe fence and even extended
said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed.
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress
and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight
Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
Not satisfied therewith, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November
10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment
of the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:

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WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The
Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five
Thousand (P65, 000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30, 000) Pesos as Moral
Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10, 000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the
appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.
Issues:
Whether or not the award of damages is in order
Held:
No. The awards of damages in not in order. The award of damages has no substantial legal
basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages
was based solely on the fact that Mabasa incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals
when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim
of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of
right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can
be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have
acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts
should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. As a general rule,
there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and
proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to
another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property
makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as
fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured,
because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.

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51. OMC Carriers inc v CA

PRINCIPLE: Liability of Employers to damages caused by its Employees

PROVISION: Article 2180 (NCC)

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

OMC Carriers, Inc. v CA

Facts:

Employee, Jerry P. Añalucas, was driving an Isuzu private tanker with plate no. PCH 612
owned and registered by OMC Carriers, Inc. on August 4, 1995 at about 3pm along Quirino
Highway towards the direction of Lagro, Quezon City.

At Barangay Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City, the private tanker hit an Isuzu Gemini
with plate no. NDF 372 which was making a left turn towards a nearby Caltex Gasoline
Station mortally damaging 18-year old driver, Reggie T. Nabua, and was pronounced dead on
arrival at Fairview Polymedic Hospital.

Issue:

1. Did OMC Carriers, Inc. demonstrate the diligence of a good father of a family?
2. Did the Court of Appeals commit an error when it affirmed RTC‘s award of
₱60,000.00 as death indemnity and ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and was the
award of attorney‘s fees without legal basis?

Held:

1. No. There was no documentary proof or record tending to establish that the company
exercised good diligence.
2. Jurisprudence fixed death indemnity at ₱50,000.00, hence the amount awarded must
be reduced accordingly. Prevailing jurisprudence fixed moral damages at ₱50,000.00,
and the award of attorney‘s must have a justification, thus disallowed in the absence
of a statement why attorney‘s fees were awarded.

52. PNOC v CA

PRINCIPLE: Actual Damages

PROVISION:
Art. 2180 par. 5

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 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any
business or industry.

Art. 2199
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only
for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred
to actual or compensatory damages.

PNOC v CA

Facts:
On the morning of September 21, 1977 the M/V Maria Efigenia XV was on its way to
Navotas when it entered in a collision with Petroparcel. The Board of Marine Inquiry
rendered a decision that the Petroparcel vessel was at fault. An amount of P6,438,048.00 was
established to represent the loss incurred by Maria Efigena Fishing Corporation.

Issue:
Whether or not Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation is entitled to actual damages.
Whether or not Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation is entitled to actual damages amounting
to P6,438,048.00 .

Held:
Yes, Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation is entitled to actual damages since they were able to
establish the fact of the loss and injury they sustained.
No, Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation is not entitled to P6,438,048.00 worth of actual
damages. It was enunciated by the Supreme Court that it is important to justify the amount to
be able to claim it. They should have availed of the best evidence there is to be able to claim
such amount.

53. Candano Shipping. v. Florentina J. Sugata-on

PRINCIPLE: Actual Damages

PROVISIONS: Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an

adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Candano Shipping. v. Florentina J. Sugata-on

Facts:

On March 27, 1996, M/V David Jr., owned by Candano Shipping Lines, sank together with
its cargo in Surigao del Sur. Melquiades Sugata-on employed by Candano Shipping Lines as
third marine engineer in the cargo vessel was one of those missing. Florentina Sugata-on

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(respondent and widow of Melquiades Sugata-on), went to the office of Candano Shipping in
Manila to claim the death benefits of her husband but it refused to pay. Thus, Florentina filed
an action before the RTC of Manila. She prayed that actual, moral, and exemplary damages
including attorney's fees, be awarded in her favor in view of the provision of Art. 1711 NCC.
The RTC decided in favor of Florentina. Candano Shipping filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied. It was then elevated the RTC decision to the CA which
affirmed with modification the judgment of RTC. The award for actual damages was
reduced from P998,400 to P608,400, while the awards for moral and exemplary damages
including attorney's fees were deleted for lack of sufficient basis for their allowance. In
arriving at the sum of P608,400, the CA applied the standard prescribed by Art. 194 of the
Labor Code. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Candano Shipping in a
resolution issued on April 1, 2004. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the formula for fixing the amount of death compensation in Art. 194 of the
Labor Code apply in determining the compensation claimed by the heir of the deceased
employee against the employer under Art. 1711 of the civil code

Held:

Yes. Petition is denied. CA is affirmed.

The remedy availed by Florentina in filing the claim under the New Civil Code has been
validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence. Floresca v. Philex Mining Company
declared that the employees may invoke either the Workmen's Compensation Act or the
provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will
exclude the other and that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will
exclude the other remedy except on the basis of supervening facts or developments
occurring after he opted for the first remedy. This doctrinal rule is rooted on theory that the
basis of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is separate and distinct from
the award of damages under the Civil Code. In this case, Florentina instituted a civil suit for
indemnity under the New Civil Code. The employer shall be liable for the death of personal
injury of its employees in the course of employment as sanctioned by Art. 1711 of the Civil
Code. The liability of the employer for death or personal injury of his employees arose from
the contract of employment entered into between the employer and his employee, which is
likely imbued with public interest. Accordingly, when the employee died or was injured
in the occasion of employment, the obligation of the employer automatically attaches. The
indemnity may partake in the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages, as the case may be.The provisions on damages of the New Civil Code
must be transformed into a more tangible and practical mathematical form, so that the
purpose of the law to indemnify the employee or his heirs for his death or injury occasioned

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by his employment under article 1711 may be realized. In regard to this, the formula for
loss of earning capacity enunciated in the case of Villa Rey v. Court of Appeals, in
computing the amount of actual damages to be awarded to the claimant under article 1711 of
the New Civil Code is adopted in this case.

54. Villa Rey Transit v. CA

PRINCIPLE: Actual Damages

PROVISIONS: ART. 2199
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

ART. 2206 The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article
291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of
testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.

Villa Rey Transit v. CA

Facts:
On March 17, 1960, Policronio Quintos, Jr. was riding the petitioner‘s bus, when the said bus
frontally hit the rear side of a bull cart filled with hay. The protruding end of the bamboo pole
at the rear of the cart penetrated the windshield of the bus and landed at Policronio‘s face. He
died of traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries. Private respondents are sisters and surviving
heirs of the deceased. They brought this action against Villa Rey Transit for breach of
contract of carriage. The trial court found that the death was caused by the negligence of the
bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under the contract of carriage with Policronio.
Issue/s:
(1) The number of years to be used as basis of computation
(2) The rate at which the losses sustained by respondents should be fixed

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Held:

(1) The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has no
fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral and material
damages involved, and so it has been said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for
measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by
precise mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary,
whichever is shorter, is an important factor.' Other factors that are usually considered are: (1)
pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary; (2) loss of support; (3) loss of service; (4) loss of
society; (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries; and (6) medical and funeral expenses."

Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in fixing the
amount recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole element
determinative of said amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and
the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In
short, the Court of Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability
upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.

(2) With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner impugns the
decision appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be
paid now, whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This
argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Alcantara case
points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in
litigations like the one at bar. Just the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner
herein is offset by the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to
take place upon the finality of the decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been
fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
at the time of his death, as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement Industries,
Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did
not consider, in the present case, Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future
income. Indeed, upon the conclusion of his training period, he was supposed to have a better
job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not considering the
growing importance of trade, commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income
level of officers and employees therein much more.

Damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support, they received or
would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of
petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary
expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Only net earnings,
not gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses
necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental
expenses.
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible
living and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a
month, and that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at
P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of
P33,333.33, the following should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of

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the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and
applied by this Court; (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private respondents for medical and
burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but
which, in view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and later
to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the amount
adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate sum of
P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the
promulgation of the decision of the trial court.

55. Spouses Zalamea v. CA

PRINCIPLE: Contract of Carriage

PROVISION: Art. 2219 and Art 1733

Spouses Zalamea v. CA

Facts: Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased
three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc.
(TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the
spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare
ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a
notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however,
the spouses Zalamea and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the
scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the number of
passengers who checked in before tem had already taken all the seats available on the flight.

Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the
flight to Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being
ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were
given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-
fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who
presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los
Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was full
booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from
American Airlines.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based
on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in
their favor ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines
together with moral damages and attorney‘s fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages
are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where
there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is a matter of record that overbooking
of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is
specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.

Issue: Whether or not there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the respondent TWA because
there was an overbooking.

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Held: Yes. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs.
Zalamea and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets.
The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official
publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in
fact.

Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable
to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the
law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable
law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. Where an airline had deliberately
overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of
them would show up for check in, for the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a
confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.
This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, a duty to
provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-
interest or enrichment. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, TWA is still
guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract
of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Moreover, TWA
was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to
discounted tickets. Evidently, TWA placed self-interest over the rights of the spouses
Zalamea and their daughter under their contract of carriage. Such conscious disregard make
respondent TWA liable for moral damages, and to deter breach of contracts by TWA in
similar fashion in the future, the SC adjudged TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

Respondent TransWorld Airlines must pay damages to petitioners in the following amounts,
to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the
tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to
Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

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(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.

56. BPI vs Court of Appeals

PRINCIPLE: Damages(in contracts and Quasi-Contracts)

PROVISIONS: Article 2201.

In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time
the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation. (1107a)

BPI vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Franco opened 3 accounts with BPI with the total amount of P2,000,000.00. The said
amount used to open these accounts is traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco. The funding
for the P2,000,000.00 check was part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI from FMIC‘s
account (with a deposit of P100,000,000.00) and credited to Tevesteco‘s account pursuant to
an Authority to Debit which was allegedly forged as claimed by FMIC.

Tevesteco effected several withdrawals already from its account amounting to

P37,455,410.54 including the P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco.

Franco issued two checks which were dishonoured upon presentment for payment due to
garnishment of his account filed by BPI.

BPI claimed that it had a better right to the amounts which consisted of part of the money
allegedly fraudulently withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up in Franco‘s account.
BPI urges us that the legal consequence of FMIC‘s forgery claim is that the money
transferred by BPI to Tevesteco is its own, and considering that it was able to recover
possession of the same when the money was redeposited by Franco, it had the right to set up
its ownership thereon and freeze Franco‘s accounts.

Issue: Whether or not the bank has a better right to the deposits in Franco‘s account.

Held: No. Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been
unlawfully deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing from the current possessor,
BPI simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value thereof,
which it had mistakenly debited from FMIC‘s account and credited to Tevesteco‘s, and
subsequently traced to Franco‘s account.

Money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this characteristic is all the more
manifest in the instant case which involves money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its
primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange, without other

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evidence of its title. Money, which had been passed through various transactions in the
general course of banking business, even if of traceable origin, is no exception.

57. Gatchalian v. Delim

PRINCIPLE: Loss of earning Capacity
PROVISION/S:
Art. 1733 - Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.
Art. 1755 - A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 2202 - In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by
the defendant.
Art. 2217 - Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

Gatchalian v. Delim
Facts:
On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as a paying passenger a
minibus owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a ―snapping
sound‖ was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle
and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid
by respondent‘s spouse, Mrs. Adela Delim, on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the
injured passengers, including Gatchalian, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit waiving
their claims against respondents. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim
to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering
and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead. In defense, respondent averred
that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid
and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him (private respondent)
and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit on 14 July 1973. The
trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court
ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not there was a valid waiver
2. Whether or not the respondent was negligent
3. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

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Held:
(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver
of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must
in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may
not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident
when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing;
that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers
who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read
the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances, there appears substantial
doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at
the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to
waive any right of action against private respondent.

(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome this
presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised extraordinary
diligence to prevent the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon
common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence. A
common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the
circumstances".

The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of
respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's
refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound"
and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical
safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.

(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost any
employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages on the
basis of speculation or conjecture.

Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is
another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory
damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as
possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of
the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity,
giving rise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.

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Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is
shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a
result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that
the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.

58. Simex International (Manila), Inc. vs. CA and Traders Royal Bank

PRINCIPLE: Earning capacity/loss of earning capacity

PROVISION: Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.

Simex International (Manila), Inc. vs. CA and Traders Royal Bank

Facts: Simex International is a private corporation engaged in the exportation of food

products. Simex is a depositor of Traders Royal Bank and maintained a checking account in
one of the bank‘s branches.

In 1981 Simex deposited P100,000 in the said bank therefore increasing its balance to
P190,380.74. Thereafter, Simex issued several checks against its deposit but it was surprised
as they had been dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Subsequently, California
Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) sent a letter of demand to Simex with a threat of
prosecution should Simex fail to make up for its insufficiency of funds. CMC suspended the
delivery of Simex‘s orders. Analogous letters were also sent by other creditors of Simex.
Simex then protested to Traders Royal Bank. It was found that the P100,000 deposit had not
been credited on time hence the dishonoring of the checks. The error was remedied only after
a while and the dishonored checks were paid after they were re-deposited.

Simex wrote a letter to Traders Royal Bank demanding compensation for the latter‘s ―gross
and wanton negligence.‖ Simex filed a complaint in the CFI of Rizal demanding payment for
moral and exemplary damages. However, the court held that the demands for moral and
exemplary damages were not called for so the CFI of Rizal awarded Simex nominal damages
instead.

Issue: Whether or not Simex International should be awarded moral and exemplary damages.

Held: Yes. Simex is entitled to moral damages (P 20,000.00) and exemplary damages (P
50,000.00). The negligence on the part of the respondent bank resulted to the prejudice
suffered by Simex. Simex‘ credit line was canceled and its orders were suspended until the
receipt of actual payment. Simex‘ business declined and its branding/reputation was tainted.
Simex was looked down upon in the business community therefore reducing/affecting its
earning capacity. A bank may be held liable for damages by reason of its unjustified dishonor
of a check, which caused damage to its client‘s credit standing.

The bank‘s act of negligence resulted to the violation of the fiduciary nature of its
relationship with Simex therefore resulting to their failure to fulfill their obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositor with meticulous care. Even upon gaining knowledge regarding the

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error in crediting the deposit, the respondent bank only took action to remedy the situation
one week later or twenty-three days after the deposit was made. Therefore, Traders Royal
Bank is liable under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code.

Traders Royal Bank was ordered to pay the petitioner, in lieu of nominal damages, moral
damages in the amount of P 20,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
and attorney‘s fees in the amount of P 5,000.00.

59. Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Vivian Tan Lee

PRINCIPLE:Concept of Negligence (Degree of Negligence)

PROVISIONS:
Article 2176 if the New Civil Code
 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Vivian Tan Lee

Facts:
 On March 17, 1991, plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and her husband Silvino Tan, while on
board a motorcycle driven by the latter, and a Metro Bus driven by Margarito Avila,
were involved in an accident. Silvino Tan died on the spot while plaintiff Vivian Lee
Tan suffered physical injuries which necessitated medical attention and
hospitalization.
 The respondent and her husband came from the Pasumbal Machine Shop, where they
inquired about the repair of their tanker. They were on a stop position at the side of
the highway; and when they were about to make a turn, she saw a bus running at fast
speed coming toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and
their motorcycle as well.
 The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No.119.
The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being
driven by Margarito Avila.
 On June 18, 1992, respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the death of
Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment expenses, medical
and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycle's repair, attorney's fees, and
other just and equitable reliefs.
 In its Answer, petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or lack of caution
of Silvino Tan and asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila.
 On March 25, 1993, the trial court issued a Pre-trial Order stating that the parties
manifested that there was no possibility of amicable settlement between them.
However, they agreed to stipulate on the following facts sated above.

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  For the defense, Margarito Avila testified that on March 17, 1999, at about 4:30 p.m.,
he was driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour on the Maharlika Highway. When
they were at Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, a motorcycle ran from his left
side of the highway, and as the bus came near, the motorcycle crossed the path of the
bus, and so he turned the bus to the right. He heard a loud banging sound. From his
side mirror, he saw that the motorcycle turned turtle ("bumaliktad"). He did not stop
to help out of fear for his life, but drove on and surrendered to the police. He denied
that he bumped the motorcycle.
 On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee filed a case for Damages based on
Quasi Delict arising from vehicular accident between a motorcycle and bus of Phil
Hawk. Before the answer, respondent filed an amended complaint, adding additional
damages and reliefs.
 The trial court held petitioner Phil Hawk liable for failing to exercise the diligence of
a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Avila, having failed to
sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification in the
award of damages.

Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages.

Held:
 The Supreme Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila,
for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the
road that resulted to the negligence of the bus driver who committed a Quasi-Delict.
 The petitioner‘s tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to
do so and also they did not know that Avila had been previously involved in
sideswiping incidents.
 The fact that the petitioner‘s bus driver saw the motorcycle trying to overtake the bus
while it was running at a speed of 60 km/h in which he would have the chance to slow
down and let the motorcycle overtake the bus. But even after the accident the driver
did not stop to help and just sped away for the fear of his life.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

60. Pleyto v Lomboy

PRINCIPLE: Earning Capacity / Loss of Earning Capacity

PROVISION: Article 2205

Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered:

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(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal
injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

Pleyto v Lomboy

Facts:

A head-on collision between a bus and a car along McArthur Highway in Gerona, Tarlac
happened on May 16, 1995 at around 11:30am.

Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc (PRBL), bound for Vigan, Ilocos Sur at the time
of the accident, is engaged in carrying passengers and goods for a fare servicing various
routes in Central and Northern Luzon. Its driver was Ernesto Pleyto.

Ricardo Lomboy was a passenger to a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Arnulfo Asuncion,
Ricardo‘s brother-in-law. Carmela, the daughter of Ricardo, also a passenger to said car,
suffered injuries requiring hospitalization. But her father Ricardo Lomboy died.

Ricardo‘s heirs filed an action for damages against Pleyto and PRBL.

A witness and one of the bus passengers, Rolly Orpilla, testified that Pleyto tried to overtake
a tricycle but hit it instead. Pleyto then swerved in to the left opposite lane and smashed the
Manila-bound car killing Arnulfo and Ricardo Lomboy while the other passengers, Carmela
and friend Rhino Daba suffered injuries.

According to Pleyto, the tricycle suddenly stopped without warning to which Pleyto stepped
on the brakes and bus lost speed but swerved to the other lane to avoid hitting the tricycle.
Unfortunately, it collided with the Manila-bound Mitsubishi car.

The trial court rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs awarding P1,642,521.00 for lost
earnings of Ricardo Lomboy. It found that Pleyto is negligent and lacked precaution when he
overtook the tricycle disregarding completely the approaching car in the other lane. Pleyto
should have been more prudent in overtaking considering the slippery road. The court held
that Pleyto violated traffic rules and regulations and was negligent under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code and PRBL liable as owner of the bus and as employer of Pleyto under Article
2180 of the Civil Code for its failure to observe the required diligence in its supervision of its
employees and the safe maintenance of its buses.

CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision with modification in the award of damages reducing
the award for loss of earning capacity to P1,152,000.00 and took note of the amounts that
were duly supported by receipts only.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in pegging the monthly living expenses at 50% of gross earnings
considering that no substantial proof was presented to prove Lomboy‘s gross income

Held:

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No reversible error may be attributed to the court in fixing the loss of earning capacity at the
amount P1,152,000.00.

In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the net earnings,
which is computed by deducting necessary expenses from the gross earnings, and not the
gross earnings, is to be utilized in the computation. The amount of net earnings was arrived
at after deducting the necessary expenses (pegged at 50% of gross income) from the gross
annual income. This computation is in accord with settled jurisprudence. (Villa Rey case)

The testimony of the wife, Maria Lomboy, that her husband was earning a monthly income of
P8,000.00 is sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of damages for loss of earning
capacity.

Jurisprudence provides that the factors that should be taken into account in determining the
compensable amount of lost earnings are:

 the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and,
 the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.

Factor No. 1

Life expectancy is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-age at death]) adopted from
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of
Mortality.

Factor No. 2

Multiply the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e, the total earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent of the gross
earnings.

Thus, in the given case, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity
is:

Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at the time of death) x (gross annual income –
reasonable and necessary living expenses)]

= [2/3 x (80 – 44)] x [(P96,000 – 50%of P96,000)]

= [2/3 x (36)] x [(P96,000 – P48,000)]
= 24 x P48,000
= P1,152,000.00

Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason
of the defendant‘s culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration of the spiritual
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.

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Thus, moral damages of P500,000 is reduced to P100,000 in keeping with the purpose of the
law and jurisprudence in allowing moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 61300
is AFFIRMED, with the sole MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to the
heirs of Ricardo Lomboy is reduced from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

61. Crisostomo v. People of the Philippines

PRINCIPLE: the basic principle of conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all. Being co-
conspirators, the criminal liabilities of the one and his co-accused or co-conspirators are one
and the same

PROVISIONS:
Article 2199: Except as provided by law or by stipulatin, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Article 2202: In crimes and quasi-delicts,the defendants shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or ommission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damage have been foreseen or could have been reasonably foreseen by
the defendant.
Article 2217: Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

Crisostomo v. People of the Philippines

Facts:
On or about the 12th day of February, 2001, in the municipality of San Miguel,

province of Bulacan, Philippines the above-named accused, conspiring and
helping one another, armed with a gun, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence
and intimidation upon person, enter the gasoline station owned by Jose
Buencamino and once inside, take, rob and carry away with them P40,000.00,
belonging to the said Jose Buencamino, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the amount of P40,000.00, and on the occasion of the commission of
the said robbery or by reason thereof, the herein accused, in furtherance of
their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
attack, assault and shoot Janet Ramos, cashier of said gasoline station, thereby
inflicting on her serious physical injuries which directly caused her death.
 Rodel Crisostomo during his arraignment he plead as not guilty of the alleged
crimes against him
 Version of the Prosecution
 On February 12, 2001, at around 12:20 in the afternoon, Rodelio Pangilinan (Rodelio)
was working at a gasoline station owned by Jose Buencamino (Jose) at Buliran, San

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 Miguel, Bulacan. He was by the gasoline tank which was two or three arms length from
the cashiers office when three armed men on board a motorcycle arrived.
 Two of the men immediately went to the cashier while the driver stayed on the
motorcycle. Inside the office, one of the men pulled out a fan knife while the other,
armed with a gun, fired a shot at Janet Ramos, the cashier. They forcibly took the money
in the cash register and the man with the gun fired a second shot that fatally hit Janet in
the right side of her head. The two armed men returned to their companion waiting by the
motorcycle and together sped away from the scene of the crime.
 Rodelio gave a description of the driver of the motorcycle but not of the two armed men
who entered the cashier‘s office since they had their backs turned to him.
 The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) prepared a cartographic sketch based on the
information provided by Rodelio. Jose, the owner of the gas station, stated that the stolen
money was worth P40,000.00. Receipts in the amount of P14,500.00 were presented as
funeral expenses.

 On February 23, 2001, Rodel Crisostomo was detained after being implicated in a
robbery that occurred in San Miguel, Bulacan. During his detention, Rodelio and
another gasoline boy arrived and identified him in a police lineup as one of the three
robbers who killed Janet.
 Version of the Defense
 Rodel Crisostomo denied committing the crime for which he was charged. He maintained
that the face of the man depicted in the cartographic sketch by the NBI was completely
different from his appearance in the police lineup in which Rodelio Pangilinan pointed at
him as one of the perpetrators. He argued that the only reason why Rodelio pointed to
him in the police lineup was because he was the only one in handcuffs.

 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court: The trial court rendered its Decision convicting
petitioner of robbery with homicide.

 The accused RODEL CRISOSTOMO y DE LEON guilty as principal beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as charged, there being
no circumstances, aggravating or mitigating, found attendant in the
commission thereof.
 He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of victim Janet Ramos in the amount of P75,000.00, the owner or
operator, Jose Buencamino, Jr., of the gasoline station that was robbed, in the
amount of P40,000.00 plus P14,500.00 as funeral expenses defrayed by said
owner for its cashier Janet Ramos, as actual damages, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.

 Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

 the CA affirmed with modification the conviction of petitioner, that the awarded civil
indemnity is reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000,00.

Issue:
 WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN THE
APRPECIATION OF FACTS AND APPLYING THE LAW IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

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 Held:
 The trial court properly denied the motion for inhibition.
 Petitioner is guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
 Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another;
(2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed.
 A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery.
 In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the genuine intention of the petitioner and his companions was to rob the gasoline
station. Rodelio testified that at around 12:20 in the afternoon of February 12, 2001,
Rodel Crisostomo and his companions arrived on board a motorcycle at the gas
station located at Buliran, San Miguel, Bulacan.
 While the Rodel stayed on the motorcycle, his companions entered the cashiers
office. One of them pulled out a fan knife while the other fired his gun at Janet. After
divesting the amount of P40,000.00, the man with the gun fired a fatal shot to the
head of Janet. The petitioners companions returned to and boarded their motorcycle,
and sped away together.
 From the foregoing, it is clear that the overriding intention of the petitioner and his
cohorts was to rob the gasoline station. The killing was merely incidental, resulting by
reason or on occasion of the robbery.
 The petitioner attempts to discredit Rodelio, the eyewitness presented by the
prosecution, by asserting that his testimony is in conflict with the statements in his
affidavit. In his testimony, Rodelio said that it was one of the men who entered the
cashiers office who was holding a gun while in his sworn statement, he alleged that
petitioner had a .45 caliber pistol which was poked at him. Such an argument fails to
impress as discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies made at the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witness. Sworn statements/affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former
are often executed when the affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which
transpired. Testimonies given during trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus,
testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits.

 Further, to the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to [this]
Court to relate to details of peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the
positive identification [by the eyewitness of the petitioner and his co-accused] as the
perpetrators of the crime.

 That Rodelio had to be subpoenaed five times and be arrested in order to testify for
the prosecution do not weaken the case against the petitioner and his cohorts. During
cross-examination, Rodelio explained that his failure to respond immediately to the
subpoena was because he does not know how to go to court.

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  Even assuming that Rodelio was initially reluctant to testify and get involved in the
ensuing criminal prosecution against the petitioner and his co-accused, this is but
normal and does not by itself affect [his] credibility
 the petitioner was positively identified by Rodelio as the perpetrator of the crime even
without a moustache and curly hair.
 Besides, not only did Rodelio identify the petitioner in the police lineup, he also
positively identified petitioner when he testified in court.
 The petitioner‘s contention that he did not conspire with the other accused in the
commission of the crime cannot be given acceptance. There is no doubt that the Rodel
Crisostomo participated actively in the commission of the crime.
 He was positively identified as the driver of the motorcycle with his two male
companions on board. They arrived together at the gasoline station. His cohorts then
went inside the office to conduct the robbery while he remained on the motorcycle
and waited for his cohorts. After his two companions stole the money and killed the
cashier, they sped away from the scene of the crime in each others company using the
same motorcycle.

 The concerted manner [in which the petitioner and his] companions perpetrated the
crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. Where conspiracy
is established, it matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the
victim.

 The consistent doctrinal rule is that when a homicide takes place by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide whether or not they actually participated in the
killing, unless there is proof that they had endeavored to prevent the killing. There
was no evidence adduced in this case that petitioner attempted to prevent his
companions from shooting the victim. Thus, regardless of the acts individually
performed by [the petitioner] and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in
conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all, [the petitioner] is guilty as a co-
conspirator. Being co-conspirators, the criminal liabilities of the [petitioner and his
co-accused] are one and the same

 The Civil Liabilities

 In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 each is granted automatically in the absence of any qualifying aggravating
circumstances. These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and evidence
other than the death of the victim owing to the fact of the commission of the crime. In
this case, the CA properly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. In
addition, we also award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
 To be entitled to compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of
loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party. [R]eceipts should support claims of actual
damages Thus, as correctly held by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, the amount
of P14,500.00 incurred as funeral expenses can be sustained since these are expenditures
supported by receipts. Also, the courts below correctly held petitioner liable to return the
amount of P40,000.00 which was stolen from the gas station before the victim was shot
and killed.

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 the Decision of the Regional Trial Court is affirmed with further modifications that
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Janet Ramos moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00.

62. People v. Bañag

PRINCIPLE: Damages (in Crime)

PROVISION: Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained
of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant

Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or

lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

People v. Bañag
Facts:
Accused-appellant Reynaldo Sahor Bañago was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of rape.
The prosecution presented the testimony of the thirteen-year-old victim, Dolores Jaurigue.
She testified that on October 15, 1993, she visited her sister, Dorotea Jaurigue-Mejico, who
was staying with her husband at the bodega of Bauer Company in Marilao, Bulacan. That
evening, she was left alone in the bodega as her sister attended a party. She went to bed at
around seven o‘clock. She was later roused from her sleep when she felt someone embracing
her. It turned out to be accused-appellant. Accused-appellant poked a gun at her and started to
remove her short pants and underwear. She tried to shout but accused-appellant slapped her
twice. Then, he took off his pants and underwear and succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of Dolores. He admonished her not to tell anybody about the incident. Thereafter, accused-
appellant put on his pants and left the room.
When Dorotea arrived from the party, she saw accused-appellant coming out of the bodega
zipping his pants. Dorotea asked Dolores what happened but she did not answer.
The following day, Dorotea again asked Dolores what happened the previous night. Dolores
told her sister that accused-appellant raped her. Afraid of what accused-appellant might do to
them, Dolores and Dorotea kept the incident to themselves.
It was only on March 18, 1994 that Dolores had the courage to tell her aunt, Lourdes
Corcuera, about the assault on her womanhood. Lourdes tried to talk to accused-appellant but
nothing happened.
During an altercation with Dolores‘ mother, Antonina Jaurigue, Lourdes divulged that
Dolores was no longer a virgin. Shocked about the revelation, Antonina sought for an
explanation. Dolores was compelled to tell her mother about the rape incident.
Antonina brought Dolores to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for physical
examination on March 29, 1994. The medico-legal report executed by Dr. Jesusa N. Vergara
of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory revealed that Dolores was ―in non-virgin

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state physically‖ and that ―there (were) no signs of recent application of any form of
violence.‖
On July 14, 1994, Dolores, assisted by her mother, filed a criminal complaint for rape against
accused-appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in ordering accused-appellant to indemnify (the) victim in the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages
Held:
The Court affirmed the conviction but modified the decision by including civil indemnity for
rape. It reiterated that the award of moral damages is separate and distinct from the civil
indemnity awarded to rape victims. It said:
The moral damages cannot take the place of the civil indemnity. While the award of moral
damages is discretionary on the part of the court, the civil indemnity, which is actually in the
nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.
16 Hence, in addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages, accused appellant is ordered to pay
private complainant the amount of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity.

63. Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court

PRINCIPLE: Attorney‘s Fees

PROVISION: Article 2208 of the New Civil Code - In the absence of stipulation, attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability
laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the
confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement between
him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly
confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vida de Casasola, and their two
daughters. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would
be computed as follows:

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a. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned
counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.

b. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be
divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and
Atty. Dante Cruz.

Issue: Whether or not Quirante could claim attorney‘s fees.

Held: NO. Attorney's fees claimed here by petitioners is different from attorney's fees as an
item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Well settled is the rule
that counsel's claim for attorney's fee may be asserted in the very action in which the services
in question have been rendered. However, an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after
the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the
court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from
which the fee is to be paid. Therefore, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the
amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light
of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action
may be availed of only when something is due to the client.

64. Manila Electric Company v. Ramoy

PRINCIPLE: ATTORNEY'S FEES
PROVISION: ARTICLE 2208 OF THE CIVIL CODE
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

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(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
Manila Electric Company v. Ramoy
Facts:
• On the year 1987, National Power Corporation filed an ejectment case in the MTC Quezon
City against several persons allegedly illegally occupying its premises, including Ramoy
(respondent).
• MTC ordered the defendants of the ejectment case to demolish or remove the structures
built on the land of NPC.
• On June 20, 1990, NPC wrote Meralco (petitioner), requesting to disconnect the electric
power supply to all residential and commercial establishment beneath the NPC transmission
lines along Quezon City.
• Meralco decided to comply with NPC's request; hence issued notices of disconnection to all
the establishments including Ramoy (respondent).
• On August 17, 1990, Meralco requested NPC for a joint survey to determine all the
establishments which are considered under NPC property due to closeness of the structures in
the said area. Shortly after, a join survey was conducted, and the NPC personnel pointed out
the electric meters to be disconnected.
• In due time, the electric service of Ramoy was disconnected.
• Ramoy testified that he is the registered owner of the parcel of land as a lessee. When the
Meralco employees were disconnecting their power, Ramoy contested by informing the
Meralco foreman that his property was outside the NPC property through pointing out the
monuments showing the boundaries of his property. However, he was threatened and told not
to interfere by armed men that accompanied the Meralco employees.
• It was later found in the ocular inspection ordered by the Court and attended by the parties
that Ramoy's residence were indeed outside of the NPC property.
• The RTC decided in favor of MERALCO by dismissing herein respondents' claim for moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. However, the RTC ordered MERALCO to
restore the electric power supply of respondents.
• The Court of Appeals faulted MERALCO for not requiring from National Power
Corporation (NPC) a writ of execution or demolition and in not coordinating with the court
sheriff or other proper officer before complying with the NPC's request. Thus, the CA held
MERALCO liable for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. MERALCO's
motion for reconsideration of the Decision was denied per Resolution dated July 1, 2003.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it awarded attorney's fees against
MERALCO.

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Held:
Although Meralco is deemed to have failed to exercise the utmost degree of care and
diligence required of their obligations, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney's
fees. The Supreme Court found that the award of attorney's fees is improper, since the
Supreme Court concluded that it is improper for the court to award exemplary damages; for
MERALCO did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Hence the attorney's fees are deleted as pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code of which
the grounds expressly stated are absent, to wit:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
65. Briones v. Macabagdal

PRINCIPLE: Bad faith, Negligence, Damages

PROVISION:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in
good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

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Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding
the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor
in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal
thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to
refund the amount expended.
Briones V. Macabagdal
Facts:
 Respondents‘ spouses purchased a land from Vergon Realty located in a subdivision
in Las Pinas (Lot 2R) with a registered TCT. Vergon on the other hand owns the
adjacent land (Lot 2S).
 In 1984, after obtaining the building permit and approval of Vergon, Jose Macabagdal
constructed a house on Lot 2R which they thought was Lot 2S. After being informed
of the mix up, spouses immediately demanded for demolition of the house
constructed. Jose, refused. Spouses then filed an action to recover ownership and
possession of the said land in RTC Makati.
 Jose, insisted that the lot which they constructed their house was the lot which was
consistently pointed to them by the Vergon's agents over the 7-year period of paying
the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded
indemnity from Vergon because of the warranty against eviction, in case the suit is
decided against them.
 RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. Defendants were ordered to demolish their house
and vacate the premises and return the possession of the lot to the spouses with
damages. Defendants counterclaim as well as the 3rd-party complaint were dismissed
for lack of merit and with no cause of action. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC.
Saying that, there was no basis that the error was Vergon's fault and that they cannot
invoke the defense of a purchaser in good faith for wrongful occupation of the land.
Thus, this petition.

Issue:
 Whether or not Petitioner‘s must bear the damage alone
 Whether or not Petitioners built the house in good faith and confidence in the
reputation of Vergon‘s agents when they pointed the wrong property to them
 Whether or not Vergon Realty was negligent

Held: Petition is partly meritorious.

 RTC erred in out rightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to pay
respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 527[14]
of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have
built the house in good faith (Art. 448).
 The builder, in good faith, can compel the landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to
pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal
and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for
instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land

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 without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land,
and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the
value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the
land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
 Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful
expenses they may have made on the subject property. (Articles 546 and 548 of the
Civil Code)
 Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the
subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the
value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
 As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show
negligence on Vergon's part. It is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection
of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. (Art.
2176)
 Therefore, the decision of the CA was affirmed with modification, The award of
moral damages in favor of respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal and the award
of compensatory damages and attorney‘s fees to respondent Vergon Realty
Investments Corporation are DELETED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 for further proceedings consistent with the
proper application of Articles 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.

66. Bank of America v. Philippine Racing Club

PRINCIPLE: The claim or recovery of attorney‘s fees shall be reasonable in accordance to

Art. 2208 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
PROVISION: Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

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(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

Bank of America v. Philippine Racing Club

Facts: Plaintiff Philippine Racing Club (PRC) is a domestic corporation and has an account
with petitioner Bank of America. Its authorized signatories are the company president and
vice-president. Before going abroad for a business trip, the officers pre-signed checks to pay
for any necessary expenses that may come up and was assigned to PRC‘s accounting officer
for safekeeping. Unfortunately, an employee of PRC got a hold of the said checks and was
able to encash it. Said check was filled with the use of a check-writer, wherein the blank on
the ‗payee‘, the amount in words was written with the word ‗cash‘ written above it. Without a
doubt, there was an irregularity with the checks and yet, the petitioner bank did not try to
verify with the corporation and proceded to encash the checks. PRC then filed an action for
damages against the bank. Lower court granted them awards for actual and exemplary
damages. Court of appeals then received an appeal implying that the petitioner followed its
obligation under the law and contract in encashing the checks since the signatures were in
fact genuine.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for negligence and accountable to pay
damages.

Held. Yes. While both parties are at fault, the bank has the responsibility of last clear chance
to prevent the fraudulent encashment. The signatures are authentic, but the irregularities on
the face of the check should have alerted them already. Banks are in the kind of business
where trust is deemed important since they receive their clients‘ deposits for
safekeeping. They must treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest
degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required of
banks are more than that of a good father of a family. The practice of pre-signing checks is a
seriously negligent act and is risky making the officers a contributor in the loss, thus
mitigating the petitioner‘s liability. Moreover, the employee who stole was an employee of
the plaintiff; as the employer, they must exercise control and supervision over their
employees. The court ruled that the petitioner be liable for sixty (60) percent of the damages
while forty (40) percent to the plaintiff.

67. Andrada v. Pilhino

PRINCIPLE: Attorney‘s Fees

PROVISION: Article 2208 (4) of the Civil Code

In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except in cases of clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff

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Andrada v. Pilhino
Facts: On December 28, 1990, respondent Pilhino Sales Corporation sued Jose Andrada, Jr.
and his wife, Maxima, in the Regional Trial Court in Davao City to recover the principal sum
of P240,863.00, plus interest and incidental charges.

Upon the application of Pilhino, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment against a
Hino truck and a Fuso truck both owned by Jose Andrada, Jr. However, the levies on
attachment were lifted after Jose filed a counter-attachment bond.

RTC rendered a decision against Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife. Pilhino opted to enforce the
writ of execution against the properties of the Andradas instead of claiming against the
counter-attachment bond considering that the premium on the bond had not been paid.

As a result, the sheriff seized the Hino truck and sold it at a public auction, with Pilhino as
the highest bidder. However, the Hino truck could not be transferred to Pilhino‘s name
because it was already registered in the name of Moises Andrada, which sale was unknown to
Pilhino. Moreover, Moises had mortgaged the truck to BA Finance Corporation (BA Finance)
to secure his own obligation.

BA Finance sued Moises Andrada for his failure to pay the loan. After a decision was
rendered in the action in favor of BA Finance, the sheriff levied upon and seized the Hino
truck while it was in the possession of Pilhino and sold it at public auction, with BA Finance
as the highest bidder.

As a result, Pilhino filed an action in the RTC in Davao City against Spouses Jose Andrada,
Jr. and Maxima Andrada, Spouses Moises Andrada and Clemencia Andrada, Jose Andrada,
Sr., BA Finance, Land Transportation Office (in Surallah, South Cotabato), and the Registrar
of Deeds of General Santos City to annul the following:
(a) the deed of sale between Jose Andrada, Jr. and Moises Andrada;
(b) the chattel mortgage involving the Hino truck between Moises Andrada and BA Finance;
(c) the deed of conveyance executed by Jose Andrada, Jr. in favor of his father, Jose Andrada,
Sr., involving a hard-top jeep; and
(d) the certificate of registration of the Hino truck in the name of Moises Andrada as well as
the registration of the chattel mortgage with the Registry of Deeds of General Santos City.

On March 25, 1998, the RTC, citing the compromise agreement between Pilhino and Jose
Andrada, Jr. that had settled all the claims of Pilhino against Jose Andrada, Jr., and the good
faith of Pilhino and BA Finance in filing their respective actions.

Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada then appealed the decision, which affirmed the
decision of RTC.
Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
1. W/N Pilhino was guilty of bad faith when it proceeded with the levy on execution
upon the Hino truck owned by Moises Andrada
2. W/N Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada are entitled to Attorney‘s Fees

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 Ruling:
1. The courts found that Pilhino had acted in good faith in bringing a civil case to annul
the deed of sale involving the Hino truck executed by Jose Andrada, Jr. in favor of
Moises Andrada, considering that Pilhino had believed that the sale in favor of
defendants-appellants [had been] resorted to so that Jose Andrada [might] evade his
obligations. The courts further concluded that no remedy was available for any
damages that the petitioners sustained from the filing the civil case against them
because the law affords no remedy for such damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
2. The courts ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to attorneys fees.
No premium should be placed on the right to litigate and that not every winning party is entitled to
an automatic grant of attorneys fees.

As noted by the Court in Morales v. Court of Appeals, the award of attorneys fees is the exception
rather than the rule. The power of a court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to
speculation and conjecture. The general rule is that attorneys fees cannot be recovered as part
of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.

Herein, the element of bad faith on the part of Pilhino in commencing and prosecuting the civil case,
which was necessary to predicate the lawful grant of attorneys fees based on Article 2208 (4)
of the Civil Code, was not established. Accordingly, the petitioners demand for attorneys fees
must fail.

68. Eastern Shipping v. CA July 1994

PRINCIPLE: Legal Interest
PROVISIONS: Article 2195
The provisions of this Title (on Damages) shall be respectively applicable to all obligations
mentioned in article 1157.
Article 2209
If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay,
the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per
cent per annum.
Article 2210
Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of
contract.
Article 2211
In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
Article 2212

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 Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point.
Article 2213
Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand
can be established with reasonable certainty.

Eastern Shipping v. CA July 1994

Facts:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and broker-
forwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by the
insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such losses/damages.
Eastern Shipping was consigned to deliver a cargo. Upon embarkment, the cargo was
found to be damaged while on transit. Mercantile Insurance contended that due to the
losses/damage sustained by said drum, the consignee suffered losses totaling P19, 032.95,
due to the fault and negligence of defendants. Claims were presented against defendants who
failed and refused to pay the same. As a consequence of the losses sustained, Mercantile
Insurance was compelled to pay the consignee P19, 032.95 under the aforestated marine
insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of said consignee
against defendants. Mercantile consequently sued the petitioner for recovery of damages it
paid to the consignee. The court a quo decided in favor of Mercantile and further stressing the
amount paid by the insurance company to the consignee be paid and with the present legal
interest of 12% per annum commencing on the date of the filing of the complaint, until fully
paid. Eastern Shipping now contests the ruling particularly on the issue of interest.
Issue/s:
a. Whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be
computed from the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is
rendered
b. Whether the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve percent (12%) or
six percent (6%)
Ruling:
Eastern Shipping was ordered to pay 6% on the amount due computed from the
decision dated February 3, 1988, and 12% interest, in lieu of 6%, was imposed on such
amount upon finality of the SC decision until the payment thereof.
The Court suggested the following rules of thumb for future guidance:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
delicts or quasi-delicts18 is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The
provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the
measure of recoverable damages.

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II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum
of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be
that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest
due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded.
In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum
to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extra judicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of
the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by
then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

69. Pan Pacific vs Equitable

PRINCIPLE: Interest
PROVISION: Art 2209 of the civil code, the appropriate measure for damages in case of a
delay im discharging an obligation consisting the sum of the payment of money is the
payment of penalty and interest at the rate agreed upon in contract of the parties.

Pan Pacific vs Equitable

Facts: Pan Pacific Service Contractors engages in contracting mechanical works in air
conditioning systems. On November 24, 1989, petitioner, through President Ricardo F. Del
Rosario, entered into a contract with respondent, Equitable PCI Bank. Both petitioner and
respondent agreed on nine change orders which costs P2,622,610.30. Thus, the whole project
totaled P23,311,410.30. It6 has also been stipulated in the contract that Pan Pacific may
adjust the price, in case of labor costs and material costs which was stated under paragraph
70.1 and 70.2 of the General Conditions for the Construction of PCIB Tower II Extension
(the escalation clause).

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Pan Pacific started the projected at the PCIB Tower II extension building in Makati City. It
was then completed in June 1992. Pan Pacific accepted the project July 1992. In 1990 prices
of labor costs and materials escalated. On April 5, 1991, Pan Pacific claimed a price
adjustment of P5,165,945.52. April 28, 1992, TCGI Engineers recommended to respondent to
reduce the price. In goodwill, Pan Pacific adjusted the price to P4,858,548.67. On April 28,
1992, TCGI Engineers recommended Pan Pacific to reduce the price again to P3,730,957.07
on the basis of the following factors:

1. Labor Indices of the Department of Labor and Employment.

2. PRICE INDEX OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.

PD 1594 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS AS AMENDED, 15
MARCH 1991.
SHIPPING DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PPSCI.
SUB-CLAUSE 70.1 OF THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT
DOCUMENTS.

Pan Pacific contended that respondent already estopped with such recommendation, from
disclaiming liability of P3,730,957.07 in accordance with the escalation clause. Due
extraordinary rise of the costs of materials and labor, Pan Pacific‘s capital became
inadequate. Despite demanding numerous times, respondent withheld payment of price
adjustment. Against its will, Pan Pacific was offered a loan of P1.8 million and promised that
respondent will release the price adjustment soon.

Pan Pacific repeatedly demanded respondent to pay the price adjustment. The loan matured
and Pan Pacific refused to pay it. It demanded the respondent to pay for the loan and its
penatlty.

On May 6, 1994, Pan Pacific filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity nullity/annulment
of the promissory note, sum of money, and damages against the respondent with the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 59. RTC made a decision in favor of Pan Pacific.

On June 2005, the CA modified the RTC decision, with respect to the principal amount due
to petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in its decision to award the unpaid balance of the price
adjustment, in fixing the interest rate at 12% instead of the original 18%.

Held: Yes, the petitioners allege that the contract between the parties consists of two parts,
the Agreement and the General Conditions, both of which provide for interest at the bank
lending rate on any unpaid amount due under the contract. Petitioners further claim that there
is nothing in the contract which requires the consent of the respondent to be given in order
that petitioners can charge the bank lending rate. Petitioners thus submit that it is
automatically entitled to the bank lending rate of interest from the time an amount is
determined to be due thereto, which respondent should have paid. Therefore, as petitioners
have already proven their entitlement to the price adjustment, it necessarily follows that the
bank lending interest rate of 18% shall be applied.

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 70. Bobie Rose V. Frias vs Flora San Diego-Sison

PRINCIPLE: Interest

PROVISION: Art. 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing. (1755a)

Bobie Rose V. Frias vs Flora San Diego-Sison

Facts:

Bobie Rose Frias owns a house and lot acquired from Island Masters Reality and
Development Corporation (IMRDC) through a Deed of Sale and covered by transfer
certificate of title (TCT) in the name of IRMDC.Frias, as the First Party, and Dra. Flora San
Diego-Sison as the Second Party, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) over the
property with the following terms and conditions

“xxx for and in consideration of the sum of P3,000,000.00 receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY, the parties have agreed as
follows:

1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of 6 months from the date of the execution of this
contract xxx to notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase xxx at a price of
P6,400,000.00 xxx another six months within which to pay the remaining balance of P3.4
million.
2. xxx
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first six months from the six
months from the execution of this contract, no interest shall be charged by the SECOND
PARTY on the P3million however, in the event that on the sixth month the SECOND PARTY
would decide not to purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY has a period
of another six months within which to pay the sum of P3 million pesos provided that the
said amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last six months only. Under this
circumstance, the amount of P3 million given by the SECOND PARTY shall be treated as a
loan and the property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage which can be
enforced in accordance with law.”

Frias received from San Diego-Sison P2million cash and P1million post-dated check dated
February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered the check stale. Frias then gave the TCT

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 in the name of IRMDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between Frias and
IRMDC.

San Diego-Sison decided not to purchase the property and informed Frias through a letter
reminding of the agreement that the amount of P2Million be considered as a loan payable
within 6 months. However, Frias failed to pay San Diego-Sison who later filed a complaint
for sum of money with preliminary attachment. Also, San Diego-Sison averred that Frias
tried to deprive her of the security for the loan when Frias made a false report of the loss of
her owner‘s copy of the TCT and be issued a new owner‘s duplicate copy of said title.

The trial court ordered Frias to pay San Diego-Sison the sum of P2million plus interest at the
rate of 32% per annum beginning December 7, 1991 due to the compounded interest
stipulated in the MOA. The appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s decision but modified
the rate of interest from 32% to 25% effective June 7, 1991 when the interest rate prevailing
in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum and that the P2Million was considered as a loan
in June 1991.

Frias argued that the interest rate was contrary to the MOA because it provided that if San
Diego-Sison would decide not to purchase the property, Frias has the period of another
six months to pay the loan with compounded bank interest for the last six months only.

Issue/s:

 Whether the compounded bank interest should be limited to 6 months only as stipulated in
the contract.
 Whether CA committed error in awarding 25% interest per annum on the 2million peso loan
even beyond the second 6 months stipulated period.
 Whether San Diego-Sison is entitled to moral damages.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF CORRECTIVE AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER EVEN IF NOT MENTIONED
IN THE TEXT OF THE DECISION.[22] Petitioner contends that the interest,
whether at 32% per annum awarded by the trial court or at 25% per annum as
modified by the CA which should run from June 7, 1991 until fully paid, is contrary
to the parties Memorandum of Agreement; that the agreement provides that if
respondent would decide not to purchase the property, petitioner has the period of
another six months to pay the loan with compounded bank interest for the last six
months only; that the CAs ruling that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not
a loan is contrary to Art. 1956 of the New Civil Code which provides that no
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.

Held:

FIRST RULING:

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 The Court said that the phrase “for the last six months only” should be taken in the
context of the entire agreement. It agreed with CA‘s interpretation of the phrase:
“Their agreement speaks of two periods of six months each. The first six- month period was
given to plaintiff-appellee (respondent) to make up her mind whether or not to purchase
defendant-appellant’s (petitioner’s) property. The second six-month period was given to
defendant-appellant to pay the P2 million loan in the event that plaintiff-appellee decided not
to buy the subject property in which case interest will be charged “for the last six months
only”, referring to the second six-month period. This means that no interest will be charged
for the first six-month period while appellee was making up her mind whether to buy the
property, but only for the second period of six months after appellee had decided not to buy
the property. This is the meaning of the phrase “for the last six months only”. Certainly,
there is nothing in their agreement that suggests that interest will be charged for six months
only even if it takes defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan.”

Having considered it as a loan, the monetary interest for the last six months continued to
accrue until actual payment of the loaned amount.

The court further explained why interest must be paid:

“ The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and thus,
until principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since
the debtor continues to use such principal amount. It has been held that for a debtor to
continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after
maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest, would constitute unjust
enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.”

 The Court found no error in awarding 25% interest per annum on the P2Million loan even
beyond the six months stipulated period. “The general rule is that if the terms of an
agreement are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail. It is further required that the various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that
sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.” Besides, Frias and San Diego-Sison
agreed and as stipulated in the contract that the loaned amount shall earn compounded bank
interests.

Yes. The court agreed with “the findings of the trial court and the CA that petitioner’s act of
trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the
title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
168173 entitles respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa
contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of
fraud.” Xxx “Petitioner’s actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for her
loan were it not for respondent’s timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC set
aside its previous order granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral
damages is in order

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SECOND RULING:
While the CAs conclusion, that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan,
is flawed since a simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest,[23] we
find no error committed by the CA in awarding a 25% interest per annum on the two-million
peso loan even beyond the second six months stipulated period.

The Memorandum of Agreement executed between the petitioner and respondent

on December 7, 1990 is the law between the parties. In resolving an issue based upon a
contract, we must first examine the contract itself, especially the provisions thereof which are
relevant to the controversy.[24] The general rule is that if the terms of an agreement are clear
and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall prevail.[25] It is further required that the various stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from
all of them taken jointly.[26]

In this case, the phrase for the last six months only should be taken in the context of
the entire agreement. We agree with and adopt the CAs interpretation of the phrase in this
wise:

Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of six months

each. The first six-month period was given to plaintiff-
appellee (respondent) to make up her mind whether or not to purchase
defendant-appellants (petitioner's) property. The second six-month
period was given to defendant-appellant to pay the P2 million loan in
the event that plaintiff-appellee decided not to buy the subject property
in which case interest will be charged for the last six months only,
referring to the second six-month period. This means that no interest
will be charged for the first six-month period while appellee was
making up her mind whether to buy the property, but only for the
second period of six months after appellee had decided not to buy the
property. This is the meaning of the phrase for the last six months
only. Certainly, there is nothing in their agreement that suggests that
interest will be charged for six months only even if it takes defendant-
appellant an eternity to pay the loan.[27]

The agreement that the amount given shall bear compounded bank interest for the last
six months only, i.e., referring to the second six-month period, does not mean that interest
will no longer be charged after the second six-month period since such stipulation was made
on the logical and reasonable expectation that such amount would be paid within the date
stipulated. Considering that petitioner failed to pay the amount given which under the
Memorandum of Agreement shall be considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the last
six months continued to accrue until actual payment of the loaned amount.

The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and
thus, until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to
accrue since the debtor continues to use such principal amount.[28] It has been held that for a
debtor to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same
after maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest, would constitute unjust
enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.[29]

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 Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned amount shall earn compounded
bank interests, and per the certification issued by Prudential Bank, the interest rate for loans
in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum. The CA reduced the interest rate to 25% instead
of the 32% awarded by the trial court which petitioner no longer assailed.

In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp.,[30] we upheld the validity of a 21% per

annum interest on a P142,326.43 loan. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,[31] we sustained the
agreement of the parties to a 24% per annum interest on an P8,649,250.00 loan. Thus, the
interest rate of 25% per annum awarded by the CA to a P2 million loan is fair and
reasonable.

Petitioner next claims that moral damages were awarded on the erroneous finding that
she used a fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her security for the loan; that such
finding is baseless since petitioner was acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony
filed by respondent against her.

We are not persuaded.

Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.[32]
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by
respondent against her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money
with damages filed by respondent against petitioner.

We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that petitioners act of trying
to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title
and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173
entitles respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded
in culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the
nature of fraud.[33]

The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in the event that respondent opts not to
buy the property, the money given by respondent to petitioner shall be treated as a loan and
the property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage. It was testified to by
respondent that after they executed the agreement on December 7, 1990, petitioner gave her
the owners copy of the title to the property, the Deed of Sale between petitioner and IMRDC,
the certificate of occupancy, and the certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC who signed
the Deed of Sale.[34] However, notwithstanding that all those documents were in respondents
possession, petitioner executed an affidavit of loss that the owners copy of the title and the
Deed of Sale were lost.

Although petitioner testified that her execution of the affidavit of loss was due to the
fact that she was of the belief that since she had demanded from Atty. Lozada the return of
the title, she thought that the brown envelope with markings which Atty. Lozada gave her
on May 5, 1991 already contained the title and the Deed of Sale as those documents were in

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the same brown envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior to the transaction with
respondent.[35] Such statement remained a bare statement. It was not proven at all since
Atty. Lozada had not taken the stand to corroborate her claim. In fact, even petitioners own
witness, Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not able to establish petitioner's claim that the title
was returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's testimony that after the brown envelope
was given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she placed it in petitioners attach
case[36] and did not bother to look at the envelope.[37]

It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of the affidavit of loss became the basis
of the filing of the petition with the RTC for the issuance of new owners duplicate copy of
TCT No. 168173.Petitioners actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for her
loan were it not for respondents timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC set
aside its previous order granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral damages
is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary
damages is proper.[38] Exemplary damages may be imposed upon petitioner by way of
example or correction for the public good.[39] The RTC awarded the amount of P100,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages. While the award of moral and exemplary damages in an
aggregate amount may not be the usual way of awarding said damages,[40] no error has been
committed by CA. There is no question that respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding attorneys fees because the trial courts
decision did not explain the findings of facts and law to justify the award of attorneys fees as
the same was mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the RTC decision.

We agree.

Article 2208[41] of the New Civil Code enumerates the instances where such may be
awarded and, in all cases, it must be reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be
granted.[42] Attorney's fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich the winning party at the
expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.[43] The award
of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for the
trial court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception
and justify the grant of such award. The matter of attorney's fees cannot be mentioned only in
the dispositive portion of the decision.[44] They must be clearly explained and justified by the
trial court in the body of its decision. On appeal, the CA is precluded from supplementing the
bases for awarding attorneys fees when the trial court failed to discuss in its Decision the
reasons for awarding the same. Consequently, the award of attorney's fees should be deleted.

71. Keiruf v CA

PRINCIPLE: Moral Damages

PROVISION: Art. 2219 (Civil Code of the Philippines)

Keiruf v CA

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Facts: On February 28 1987, the driver of a Pantranco bus with a plate number AVE-845 lost
control of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, fly over the center island occupying the
east-bound of EDSA, and bumped the front portion of an Isuzi pickup driven by Legaspi.
Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Keiruf, suffered injuries and were treated in a nearby
hospital. Lucila's physical appearance was disfigured which she claims to be the reason
behind their broken marital right to consortium. Spouses Keiruf raised that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding only P200,000.00 to Lucila Keiruf and P25,000.00 to driver
Legaspi for moral damages when it should at least have been P1,000,000.00 and P100,000.00
respectively. The husband of Lucila also claims that he is entitled to receive moral damages
for the psychological suffering he experienced for the loss of his right to marital consortium
which, according to him, has been diminished due to the disfigurement suffered by his wife.

Issue: Whether or not Victor Keiruf is entitled to moral damages?

Held: No. Victor's claim for moral damages due to deprivation of his right to marital
consortium is not supported by the evidence. His wife might have been badly disfigured but
there is no proof that his right to marital consortium was affected. Moral damages are
awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
action.

72. BF Metal v. Lomotan

PRINCIPLE: Damages and Negligence

PROVISION: Art. 2180.

―The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one‘s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible…
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry…‖

BF Metal v. Lomotan

Facts: In the morning of 03 May 1989, respondent Rico Umuyon ("Umuyon") was driving
the owner-type jeep owned by respondents, Spouses Lomotan. The jeep was cruising along
Felix Avenue in Cainta, Rizal at a moderate speed of 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Suddenly,
at the opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre Rivera overtook a car
by invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. The jeep was a
total wreck while Umuyon suffered "blunt thoracic injury with multiple rib fracture, fractured
scapula (L), with pneumohemothorax," which entailed his hospitalization for 19 days. Also in
view of the injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive, reducing his daily income
from P150.00 to P100.00.

Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action for damages against petitioner
BF Metal Corporation ("petitioner") and Rivera before the Regional Trial Court. The
complaint essentially alleged that defendant Rivera‘s gross negligence and recklessness was
the immediate and proximate cause of the vehicular accident and that petitioner failed to
exercise the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Rivera.

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In the Answer, petitioner and Rivera denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that
respondents were not the proper parties-in-interest to prosecute the action, not being the
registered owner of the jeep; that the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the fault
and negligence of Umuyon; and that petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.

The trial court rendered its judgment holding the petitioners liable for damages and attorney‘s
fees, and finding Rivera negligent when he failed to determine with certainty that the
opposite lane was clear before overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck he was driving. It
also found petitioner negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees when it
failed to prove the proper dissemination of safety driving instructions to its drivers.

CA affirmed the trial court‘s finding of Rivera‘s negligence, and that petitioner was liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not Umuyon and spouses Lomotan are entitled to damages and attorney‘s
fees.
Held: Yes, Umuyon and spouses Lomotan are entitled to damages and attorney‘s fees.
According to Art. 2199, Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. To justify an award of
actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be
given only to claims, which are duly supported by receipts. In the instant case, no evidence
was submitted to show the amount actually spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked
jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two different cost estimates to prove the alleged actual
damage of the wrecked jeep. Following Viron‘s case, neither estimate is competent to prove
actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages.

In the case of moral damages, those are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate
and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly
caused to a person. In order that an award of moral damages can be aptly justified, the
claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages and that the
injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the
Civil Code. However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan
whether arising from the criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the
negligence of petitioner under Article 2180. Article 2219 speaks of recovery of moral
damages in case of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries, the two instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for moral damages
to respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages where there is
injury to property, but the injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such
damages are justly due. There being no proof that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does
not apply.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It does not
need to be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or

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compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Spouses Lomotan have shown that they are
entitled to compensatory damages while respondent Umuyon can recover both compensatory
and moral damages. And because exemplary damages are awarded, attorney‘s fees may also
be awarded in consonance with Article 2208.
Damages Trial Court Apellate Court Affirmed Decision of
CA
1. Actual or PHP 96,700.00 - cost PHP 130,655.00 - cost PHP 72,000.00 - cost
Compensatory of repairing the of repairing the of repairing the
Damages owner-type job owner-type job owner-type job
PHP 15,000- medical PHP 10,167.99- PHP 10,167.99-
expenses medical expenses medical expenses
PHP 50,000- loss of PHP 2,850.00 - loss of PHP 2,850.00 - loss of
earnings earnings earnings
2. Moral Damages PHP 100,000.00 PHP 100,000.00 PHP 30,000.00
(awarded solely to
Umuyon)
3. Exemplary PHP 100,000.00 PHP 100,000.00 PHP 100,000.00
Damages
4. Attorney Fees PHP 26,000.00 PHP 25,000.00 PHP 25,000.00

73. People v Lizano

PRINCIPLE: In cases of rape, the victim is automatically awarded moral damages upon
proving the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
PROVISION: Art. 2219 Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases: …(3) seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts…

People v Lizano

Facts:

On 20 February 1997, Lizano was charged with three counts of rape in three separate
dates.
Sometime in January 1996, A, who was then only 11 years old, was sleeping inside
the house when her uncle, Lizano laid down beside her and began undressing her while
threatening to kill her, her grandmother and aunt if she tells anybody what he did.
Afterwards, Lizano also took off his clothes. He then went on top of A and inserted his penis
into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. A year later, on 18 January 1997, Lizano raped A
again and also the following day, at around 10:30 a.m.,for the third time. She, however,
declared during direct-examination that there were only slight penetrations in these two
occasions.

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 Delia Mayuga Ayuda, a Medical Clerk at the Tagkawayan District Hospital, whose
duty was to keep all the files of the patients in the hospital identified the signature of Dr. Juvy
Paz Purino in the Medico-Legal Certificate which contained the finding of a superficial
lacerations at 6 oclock and 8 oclock positions in A‘s hymen

Lizano denied raping A. He averred that on 19 January 1997, he was driving his
tricycle the whole day and got home 11 a.m. the next day. He however recalled an incident
where he asked A to get a spare part of a tricycle in the living room. Unable to follow his
orders, Lizano followed A inside the house. It was at that moment when his wife arrived and
accused him of raping A. Lizano said that his wife had induced A to accused him with rape
because of their frequent quarrels.

The trial court found the first incident of rape as credible and found appellant guilty.
However, he was acquitted in the last two incidents.

Lizano directly appealed to this Court which promulgated a Decision dismissing the
appeal and affirming in the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not Lizano is guilty of the crime of rape.

Held:

Lizano argued that the prosecution‘s evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction,
considering the delay on the part of the victim in reporting the incident which A satisfactorily
explained. Lizano threatened to kill her, her grandmother and aunt if she tells anybody about
the incident. This threat was directed at A, who was then only eleven years old. Considering
that the chils was only eleven years old, the death threat would instill fear into the child
stopping her from reporting the incident.

In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the credence to be

accorded to the complainant‘s testimony because of the fact that usually the participants are
the only witnesses to the occurrences. Thus, the issue boils down to credibility.with A‘s clear
account of the first incident of rape which unequivocally shows that she was indeed raped by
the accused Filomino Lizano.

Therfore Filomino Lizano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua under article 335 of the revised
penal code and is ordered to pay the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages because Moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases
without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed
that a rape victim had actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.

74. Occena v. Icamina

PRINCIPLE: Moral Damages on Libel and Slander

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PROVISION: Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

Occena v. Icamina

Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against private
respondent Cristina Vegafria stating that respondent had publicly, openly, and maliciously
insulted him by uttering words that seem to be defamation. Which tarnished his honor and
credibility It was decided, after trial, that respondent was found guilty for slight oral
defamation and was sentenced to pay the fine. The trial court, however, did not grant
damages for moral damages because the facts and circumstances presented by the petition do
not warrant such damages. Petitioner appealed the civil liability but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages for moral damages?

Held: Yes. Art. 2219 par. 7 of the Civil Code permits the granting of moral damages for any
form of defamation. This provision warrants the petitioner to recover from the respondent,
damages for injury to his reputation and feelings. Furthermore, offended party is allowed to
recover punitive or exemplary damages. Every malicious act, if there is no good intention and
justifiable motive, is remembered as a defamatory imputation. The style and tone may be
inferred as malice. The calling of names to the petitioner caused him social humiliation.
Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish. From what is present, we can rule
out that the petitioner is entitled to moral damages amounting to five (5) thousand pesos for
moral damages and another five (5) thousand for exemplary damages.

75. ABS-CBN v CA

PRINCIPLE: Who may Recover Damages

PROVISIONS: Article 19, 20, 21 of the New Civil Code

ABS-CBN v CA

Facts:

In 1990, ABS-CBN and VIVA executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby VIVA
gave ABS-CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some VIVA film. According to the agreement,
ABS-CBN shall have the right of first refusal to the next 24 VIVA films for TV telecast
under such terms as agreed upon by the parties, however, such right shall be exercised by
ABS-CBN from the actual offer in writing.

Sometime in December 1991, VIVA, through Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN

through its Vice President, Charo Santos-Concio, a list of 3 films packages or 36 titles from
which ABS-CBN may exercise its right of first refusal. ABS-CBN, however through Concio,
tick off only 10 titles they can purchase, subject to provisions and guidelines laid forth by the

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MTRCB. Therefore, it did not accept the said list as per the rejection letter authored by
Concio which was sent to Del Rosario.

Subsequently, in April 2, 1992, Del Rosario approached Concio with another list of
52 original movies and 104 re-runs, proposing to sell to ABS-CBN airing rights for P60M
(P30M in cash and P30M worth of TV spots). Del Rosario and ABS-CBN‘s General
Manager, Eugenio Lopez III, met at a restaurant in QC to discuss the package but to no avail.

Four days later, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon, Senior Vice President of
Finance of RBS (Channel 7) discussed the terms and conditions of VIVA‘s offer. The next
day, Concio sent to Del Rosario a handwritten note and a draft of the contract between ABS-
CBN and VIVA, containing a counter-proposal covering 53 films for P35M. VIVA‘s Board
of Directors rejected the counterproposal. After the rejection of ABS-CBN and following
several negotiations and meetings, defendant Del Rosario and Vivas President Teresita Cruz
signed a letter of agreement dated April 24, 1992, granting RBS the exclusive right to air 104
Viva-produced and/or acquired films including the fourteen (14) films previously ticked off
by ABS-CBN.

ABS-CBN filed a complaint for specific performance with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO against RBS, VIVA and Del Rosario and that there is
already a perfected contract between ABS-CBN in the April 2 meeting. Lopez testified that
Del Rosario agreed to the counterproposal and he (Lopez) even put the agreement in a napkin
which was signed and given to Del Rosario.

The RTC prohibited RBS from airing the subject films. RBS however posted a P30M
counter-bond to dissolve the injunction. Later on, the trial court as well as the CA dismissed
the complaint saying that there was no meeting of minds between ABS-CBN and VIVA,
hence there was no basis for ABS-CBN‘s demand. Furthermore, the right of first refusal had
previously been exercised.

RBS now filed a countersuit with a prayer for moral damages as it claimed that its
reputation was debased when they failed to air the shows that they promised to their viewers.
RBS relied on the ruling in People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB which states
that a corporation may recover moral damages if it ―has a good reputation that is debased,
resulting in social humiliation‖. The trial court ruled in favor of Viva and RBS. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not a contract was perfected in the April 2, 1992 meeting between the
representatives of the two corporations.

2. Whether or not a corporation, like RBS, is entitled to an award of moral damages

upon grounds of debased reputation.

Held:

NO, THERE IS NO PROOF THAT A CONTRACT WAS PERFECTED IN THE SAID

MEETING. Lopez‘ testimony about the contract being written in a napkin is not corroborated

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because the napkin was never produced in court. Further, there is no meeting of the minds
because Del Rosario‘s offer was of 104 films for P60 million was not accepted. And that the
alleged counter-offer made by Lopez on the same day was not also accepted because there‘s
no proof of such. The counter offer can only be deemed to have been made days after the
April 2 meeting when Santos-Concio sent a letter to Del Rosario containing the counter-offer.
Regardless, there was no showing that Del Rosario accepted. But even if he did accept, such
acceptance will not bloom into a perfected contract because Del Rosario has no authority to
do so.

As a rule, corporate powers, such as the power; to enter into contracts; are exercised by the
Board of Directors. But this power may be delegated to a corporate committee, a corporate
officer or corporate manager. Such a delegation must be clear and specific. In the case at bar,
there was no such delegation to Del Rosario. The fact that he has to present the counteroffer
to the Board of Directors of Viva is proof that the contract must be accepted first by the
Viva‘s Board. Hence, even if Del Rosario accepted the counter-offer, it did not result to a
contract because it will not bind Viva sans authorization.

NO, THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES CANNOT BE GRANTED IN FAVOR OF A

CORPORATION because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal
contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, it cannot, therefore, experience
physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a
nervous system. No moral damages can be awarded to a juridical person. The statement in the
case of People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB is a mere obiter dictum hence it is
not binding as a jurisprudence.

The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or
quasi-delict. Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Malice or bad
faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose
or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence. There is no adequate proof that
ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith.

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