PROVERB SEMANTICS

Studies in Structure, Logic,

and Metaphor

Arvo Krikmann

Edited by

Wolfgang Mieder

v
 GUILFORD COLLEGE

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■Library
Gift of

Wolfgang Miedei
PROVERB SEMANTICS

Studies in Structure, Logic,

and Metaphor

Arvo Krikmann

Edited by

Wolfgang Mieder

“Proverb ium”
in cooperation with the
Department of German and Russian

The University of Vermont

Burlington, Vermont
2009
 Supplement Series

of

Proverb ium
Yearbook of International Proverb Scholarship

Edited by Wolfgang Mieder

Volume 29

The cover illustration is a photograph of

Christian Grandl, Sabine Horn, Wolfgang Mieder,
and Arvo Krikmann (on the right),
taken in November 2008 at the Second Interdisciplinary
Colloquium on Proverbs at Tavira, Portugal

ISBN 978-0-9817122-4-6

© 2009 by Arvo Krikmann

Manufactured in the United States of America

by Queen City Printers Inc.
Burlington, Vermont
Contents

Editor’s Preface v
How I Started and Continued, and to Whom I Am Indebted 1
(Author’s Introduction)
On Denotative Indefiniteness of Proverbs: Remarks 15
on Proverb Semantics 1
Some Additional Aspects of Semantic Indefiniteness of 51
Proverbs: Remarks on Proverb Semantics 2
Some Difficulties Arising at Semantic Classifying 79
of Proverbs
The Great Chain Metaphor: An Open Sesame for 95
Proverb Semantics?
On the Relationships of the Rhetorical, Modal, 105
Logical, and Syntactic Planes in Estonian Proverbs
Proverbs on Animal Identity: Typological Memoirs 207
Imagery of Proverbs: The Great Chain of Being as the 247
Background of Personificatory and Depersonificatory
Metaphors in Proverbs and Elsewhere
Digging One’s Own Grave 301
Sources of Original Publications and Reprints 311
 Editor’s Preface

The seventieth birthday in a scholar’s life is a momentous occa¬

sion and deserves to be celebrated in the most meaningful manner
possible. Not quite a year ago, when I became aware of the fact
that my Estonian friend Professor Arvo Krikmann would reach
this age on July 21, 2009, I decided that it would be best to honor
this distinguished folklorist and paremiologist with an edited vol¬
ume of some of his most important contributions to proverb stud¬
ies. His work has had a tremendous international influence, and it
will be good to have these publications available in one invalu¬
able volume for proverb scholars throughout the world. While it
is a very special honor for me to serve as the editor of this seminal
book, I would like to stress that it represents a birthday present for
Arvo Krikmann from the international community of paremiolo-
gists. We all thank him for his untiring and pioneering work on
proverbial matters, and we wish him many more years of fruitful
work and personal happiness with his dear wife Luule and their
children and grandchildren.
This is not the place to review the long list of publications and
honors of this internationally acclaimed scholar from Tartu, Esto¬
nia. All of this is well documented on the internet under
https://www.etis.ee/portaal/isikuCV.aspx?PersonVID=654&lang=
en. Suffice it here to mention that Arvo Krikmann graduated from
the Department of Estonian Philology of Tartu University in
1962. From 1962-1969 he worked as a researcher and senior re¬
searcher at the Literary Museum in Tartu, from 1970-1972 he
took postgraduate courses, from 1973-1993 he has been working
as a junior and senior researcher at the Institute of Language and
Literature, from 1994-2000 as a head researcher at the Institute of
Estonian Language, and since 2000 as a senior researcher at the
Estonian Literary Museum. Having gained much acclaim for his
superb folkloristics scholarship, he became professor extraordi¬
nary in 1992 at Tartu University and in 1997 he received the high
honor of being named a member of the Estonian Academy of Sci-

v
ences. Among his many other honors are: member of the Finnish
Literature Society (1979), member of the editorial board of Prov-
erbium (1984), National Science Prize (1999), Cultural Endow¬
ment of Estonia Annual Award (2000 and 2004), member of the
Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europaea (2003), Baltic Assem¬
bly Prize for Science (2004), and honorary member of the Inter¬
national Society for Folk Narrative Research (2005).
His major research interests are concerned with culture and
society, approaching his erudite investigations primarily from the
point of view of folklore, humor, linguistics, paremiology, philol¬
ogy, semantics, and semiotics. His many studies on jokes and rid¬
dles are informed by a keen concern for the issues of ethnicity and
stereotypes being expressed in them. In addition, Arvo Krikmann
has also pioneered the geographical distribution of various folk¬
lore genres, making ample use of modem computer technologies
to map the appearance and density of their variants as they have
been recorded in different regions. His publications and lectures
on these topics in Estonian, Russian, and perfect English are
scholarly mile-stones with an undeniable influence on Baltic,
European, and global scholarship. There is no doubt that Arvo
Krikmann is one of the greatest folklore scholars of the modem
age who has brought much recognition also for the excellent work
being done by many other scholars in Estonia.
Of course, Arvo Krikmann is also one of the leading paremi-
ologists in the world, and he deserves to be mentioned together
with such great proverb scholars as Matti Kuusi, Grigorii
L’vovich Permiakov, Archer Taylor, Demetrios Loukatos, Lutz
Rohrich, Kazys Grigas, Alan Dundes, and others. Together with
Ingrid Sarv he published the monumental Estonian proverb col¬
lection Eesti vanasonad (1980-1987) in five massive volumes. I
have been the proud owner of this incredible paremiographical
accomplishment which represents one of the best and most com¬
plete collections of a national corpus of proverbs and which has
served as a model for other large collections of different lan¬
guages. Naturally Arvo Krikmann and Ingrid Sarv were also part
of the international team of paremiologists who, under the direc¬
tion of Matti Kuusi at Helsinki, put together the phenomenal
comparative proverb collection Proverbia septentrionalia. 900
Balto-Finnic Proverb Types with Russian, Baltic, German and
Scandinavian Parallels (1985).

vi
In addition to the eight major articles that are included in this
celebratory volume, there are many additional studies on proverbs
that Arvo Ki ikmann published primarily in his native language of
Estonian during the past four decades. They are listed as numbers
4536—4567 in my two-volume International Bibliography of
Paremiology and Phraseology (2009), but let me here cite at least
the following publications in English or German as an indication
of the breadth and depth of Arvo Krikmann’s paremiological
work:

Zur Problematik der Metasprache als Ausdruck der Bedeutungs-

streuung der Sprichworter.” Proverbium, no. 17 (1971), 624-626.
Some Aspects of Proverb Distribution.” Symposium on Mathe¬
matical Processing of Cartographic Data, Tallinn, December 18-
19, 1979. Ed. G. M. Remmel. Tallinn: Academy of Sciences of the
Estonian SSR, 1979. 28-44.

Towards the Typology of Estonian Folklore Regions. Tallinn:

Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR, Division of Social Scf-
ences, 1980. 14 pp.

“1001 Frage zur logischen Struktur der Sprichworter.” Semiotische

Studien zum Sprichwort. Simple Forms Reconsidered I. Eds. Peter
Grzybek and Wolfgang Eismann. Tubingen: Gunter Narr, 1984
387—408.

Some Statistics on Baltic-Finnic Proverbs. Tallinn: Academy of

Sciences of the Estonian SSR, Division of Social Sciences, 1985.
53 pp.

“The Tartu Research Group of Paremiology.” Folklore (Tartu), 2

(1996), 87-115. With 1 illustration. Also published in Proverbium,
13 (1996), 111-133 (with Ingrid Sarv).
“Finnic Paremiology: Past, Present, Future.” Congressus Nonus
Internationalis Fenno-Ugristarum 7.-13.8.2000 Tartu. Eds. Anu
Nurk, Triinu Palo, and Tonu Seilenthal. Tartu: Ulikool, 2000. I,
77-92.

“The Monograph Lithuanian Proverbs by Kazys Grigas and Its

Significance to the Paremiological Research.” Tautosakos Darbai /
Folklore Studies (Vilnius), 30 (2005), 23-42. With 11 maps.
Permit me to finish these short editorial comments with a few per¬
sonal observations. I have read and benefited from Arvo Krik-
mann’s theoretical and illuminating proverb studies for almost forty
years, and my International Proverb Archives at the University of
Vermont at Burlington contains all of these valuable publications.
Some of his papers included in this volume have revolutionized
paremiology. During these years he has consistently maintained his
cutting-edge research. He is one of the brightest folklore scholars
today, and he continues to advance proverb studies by means of his
keen and probing mind. He is a true giant among the proverb
scholars of the world, respected and admired by all of us who study
proverbial wisdom. The field of paremiology would not have at¬
tained its present-day level were it not for the seminal work of the
world-class Estonian paremiologist Arvo Krikmann.
Naturally we knew of each other’s work long before we started
corresponding in 1993. Since then, my file with our letters has
steadily grown, and I have just spent many hours rereading our
scholarly and personal epistles. Thus, on September 24, 2003,
I wrote: “Dear Arvo, You are the brightest paremiologist alive!
I have the highest respect for your work, from which I have learned
so much. You are a fantastic theoretician, while I am more the
pragmatist. It is good that we all have certain strengths, thus push¬
ing paremiology forward on all fronts.” Our letters are a heart¬
warming testimony to our friendship, taking delight in each other’s
work and in meeting at conferences. And so I wish that my friend
Arvo Krikmann will receive this book as a sign of my deepest ad¬
miration, friendship, and love for him, his wife Luule, and then-
family. Happy birthday, dear Arvo, and ad multos annos! - your
friend always, Wolfgang.

Wolfgang Mieder
July 21, 2009
Burlington, Vermont

viii
 How I Started and Continued,
and to Whom I Am Indebted
(Author’s Introduction)

This book is Professor Wolfgang Mieder’s flattering and touch¬

ing present to me for my 70th birthday. My personal indebtedness
to Professor Mieder has grown to be enormous over the last quar¬
ter of the century, and my role in our communication has mainly
consisted in accepting abundant and generous presents and other
benevolent favours. The lion’s share of my English and German
books on paremiology originates from the bulky parcels sent to
me by Wolfgang Mieder. Ever since Mieder breathed new life
into the dying production of paremiological serial publications in
1984 with his Proverbium. Yearbook of International Proverb
Scholarship, the Tartu Paremiology Group has been among its
complimentary subscribers. He kindly thought me worthy to be
one of the editorial consultants of this yearbook, reprinted my ear¬
lier writings on semantic indefiniteness of proverbs in its first two
volumes, encouraged me to contribute to later issues and wrote
positive reviews and references for my various applications. Pro¬
fessor Mieder helped expand the collection of the folklore library
of the Estonian Literary Museum, graciously agreed to be a mem¬
ber of the steering committee of the Centre of Cultural History
and Folkloristics in Estonia (2001-2007) and of the editorial
board of the Folklore: Electronic Journal of Folklore, visited the
Estonian Literary Museum during the congress of the Interna¬
tional Society for Folk Narrative Research (ISFNR) and ac¬
quainted himself with the Estonian Folklore Archives containing,
among other things, more than 100,000 records of proverbs.
This 29th volume of the Supplement series contains eight writings
on the semantics of proverbs (imagery, syntactic and logical
structure, etc.) first issued in 1974-2008. The original wording
and citation methods have not been changed, only certain mis¬
prints have been corrected and the graphical presentation of the

1
articles has been altered to some extent (the majority of the under¬
lines have been replaced with the spaced type, some emphases in
bold have been dropped, indentations of some paragraphs have
been removed, etc.).
The writings are arranged chronologically according to their
original official years of publication with the exception of the last
article entitled “Digging One’s Own Grave”, which bears the
mark “Excursus” and is an excerpt from a longer piece in the Rus¬
sian language called “Bioia# coBpeMeHHoii Teoproi MeTaijiopbi b
napeMuoaoruK)” [The Contribution of Contemporary Theory of
Metaphor to Paremiology], which appeared in 2001 in the Lithua¬
nian collection Tautosakos darbai [Folklore studies] XV(XXII),
pp. 17-92. The actual origins of these works are temporally more
dispersed; the incubation period preceding the publication of
some writings had been quite long; later works partly repeat ear¬
lier motives, etc.
Many things in my life have been purely accidental. During my
studies at the University of Tartu, quite by chance, I started spe¬
cializing in folkloristics and wrote two term papers and a BA the¬
sis on the structure of Schwanks and anecdotes. Partly owing to
that, my first job assignment involved the typological arrange¬
ment of the card index of Schwanks and jokes in the folklore de¬
partment of the Literary Museum in the period of 1962-1963.
Then, in 1964, the famous Finnish folklorist and paremiologist
Matti Kuusi launched a large-scale project on North-European
proverbs. Its first stage was expected to result in a comparative
volume on proverbs common to all Balto-Finnic peoples, the pre¬
paratory work of which was supposed to involve scholarly publi¬
cations on proverbs of several Balto-Finnic peoples (Estonians,
Votes, Livonians, Vepsians). Although, for various reasons, the
first stage of the project progressed rather dramatically (for a
more detailed discussion see “The Tartu Research Group of
Paremiology” by Ingrid Sarv and me (Proverbium. Yearbook of
International Proverb Scholarship 13 (1996), pp. 111-133)), it
was successfully completed in 1985 with the appearance of the
volume “Proverbia septentrionalia” (FFC no. 236). In any case, at
the beginning of 1964, when I was, half by force, assigned to par¬
ticipate in the project, I had practically no knowledge of proverbs.
Having been thrown into the water, however, the puppy had to

2
 swim. The primary task of the Tartu working group consisted in
the preparation of an academic publication on Estonian proverbs,
and it was believed, too optimistically, that 2 years would be quite
enough for such an undertaking. Because of that, the new-comers
had no other choice than to quickly start delving into the source
material. The formation and growth of empirical knowledge soon
began to generate theoretial impulses.
What were the elements of the overall background behind
those impulses for a novice paremiologist in Tartu in the 1960s?
What were the general fields of influence that nourished and
channelled those impulses?
1. The Finnish method as a theoretical substrate,
and Matti Kuusi’s paremiology. The share of the so-
called “red subjects” (the history of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, dialectical and historical materialism, political
economy, and later also the so-called scientific communism) in
universities throughout the Soviet Union including also Estonia
was rather high. The Soviet power, however, established itself in
Estonia only after the Second World War. Whereas Russian folk-
• loristics became locked into the vulgar-Marxist paradigm already
by the end of the 1930s against the backdrop of Stalin’s repres¬
sions, the Marxism in the courses on folklore read to me at the
University of Tartu was limited to a couple of generalized intro¬
ductory slogans and the teaching itself was, as before, essentially
based on the Finnish historical-geographical method. It is worth
to remember that in 1920-1939, the Professor of Folkloristics at
the University of Tartu was Walter Anderson, probably the most
eminent proponent of the Finnish method of all times and the au¬
thor of the methodologically exemplary monograph entitled “Kai¬
ser und Abt” (1923, FFC no. 42). For the Tartu Paremiology
Group, Matti Kuusi, with his phenomenal personality, was, of
course, the direct importer of the ideas based on the Finnish
method. The participants in the Balto-Finnic project were natu¬
rally and inevitably drawn into his sphere of communication and
theoretical influence. The two key words which, due to practical
necessity, became hot points for the crew of the project were “ty¬
pology” and “comparative analysis”: our task was to prepare a
comparative volume on proverbs common to Balto-Finnic peo¬
ples, and the presentation of the material in the academic publica¬
tion on Estonian proverbs, from the very beginning, was agreed to

3
be based on the typological principle. In 1965, Matti Kuusi also
initiated the creation of the international paremiological journal
(officially, information bulletin) Proverbium, which took on an
enormous importance due to its functions of bringing together re¬
searchers of proverbs, disseminating paremiological information
and ideas and coordinating paremiological activities throughout
the world.
2. Russian semiotics centred around Lotman.
During the Khrushchev Thaw that came after the denunciation of
Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union in 1956, Yuri Lotman, who taught Literature and Cultural
History at the University of Tartu, became the centre of the Tartu-
Moscow Semiotic School (TapTycico-MocKOBCKaa ceMHorauecKaa
uiKOJia). In 1964, this group started to organize regular summer
schools, mostly in Kaariku near Tartu, and launched a new re¬
search series in the Acta et Commentationes Universitatis Tartu-
ensis entitled Tpydbi no maKoebiM cucmeMaM / Sign Systems
Studies, which continues to be published today in the English lan¬
guage. My principal window into “the world of Lotman” was
Igor Chernov, one of Lotman’s most promising students at that
time, whom I knew very well and with whom I was in constant
contact. Igor had a personal library which at those times was con¬
sidered enormous and from which I could borrow valuable litera¬
ture to nourish my interest in paremiology and figurative speech.
In the Soviet Union of that day, “semiotics” was more than
just a term referring to a discipline concerned with signs. It was a
magic word symbolizing everything that tried to distance itself
from and present a contrast to the dominant Marxist treatments of
literature and culture, everything vibrant and progressive in those
areas of study. Semiotic was Yuri Levin’s research on the structure
and logic of riddles and proverbs, semiotic were Grigori Permya¬
kov’s semantico-logical classifications of proverbs and other folk-
loric short forms, etc.
3. Structural linguistics and linguistic statistics.
At the turn of the 1960s, Huno Ratsep began to hold special
courses on structural linguistics at the University of Tartu and to
offer promising linguistic students the opportunity to study a spe¬
cial in-depth curriculum which, among other things, also con¬
tained mathematical subjects. In 1965, the so-called Generative
Grammar Group (GGG) was formed bringing together younger

4
teaching staff, postgraduate students and undergraduates. The
GGG regularly held seminars and annual meetings and published
the research series Keel ja struktuur [Language and Structure] and
Keele modelleerimise probleeme [Problems of Language Model¬
ling], The group spawned a whole generation of prominent lin¬
guists. I was kindly allowed to attend the GGG seminars and con¬
ferences, and found this experience to be extremely enriching and
useful. Juhan Tuldava, working at the German Language Depart¬
ment in the University of Tartu, revived the linguistic statistics
scholarship in Estonia and edited the research series on quantita¬
tive linguistics entitled Linguistica.
4. Earlier works by Grigori Permyakov, M36pauHbie
nocjioeuijbi u nozoeopxu uapodoe BocmoKa (1968) [Select Prov¬
erbs and Sayings of Eastern Peoples] and Om nozoeopxu do cxa3-
ku (1970) ~ From Proverb to Folktale (1979). In 1974, I became
engaged in correspondence with Grigori Permyakov and he was
so kind as to include my articles in the collections FlapeMuonozu-
necKuii cdopnux [Paremiological Compendium] (1978) and Plape-
MuojiozunecKue uccjiedoenuji [Paremiological Studies] (1984) that
he edited. After Permyakov’s death in 1983, his widow Nadez-
hda Rashba gave the Estonian Literary Museum the entire schol¬
arly section of her late husband’s personal library (1883 items all
in all).
More generally, however, the Iron Curtain blocked access to the
greater part of Western literature on humanities subjects. For me,
though, this lightlessness was, fortunately, not so pitch-dark due
to my good friend Pentti Leino, a longtime Finnish Language
Professor at the University of Helsinki who, being Matti Kuusi’s
student, also started out as a folklorist and took part in the above-
mentioned Balto-Finnic project on proverbs. Soon, however, his
research interests switched to the general poetics and metrics and
then to syntax and cognitive linguistics. We got acquainted at the
Finno-Ugric Congress in Helsinki in 1965 and from then on up to
the collapse of the Soviet government in Estonia he had been send¬
ing and giving me dozens of books mainly concerned with linguis¬
tics and poetics but also classic paremiological works, including
The Proverb by Archer Taylor (1931) bearing Kaarle Krohn’s ex
libris, the almost 3000 pages thick Macmillan Book of Proverbs,
Maxims, and Famous Phrases (1965) by Burton Stevenson, etc.

5
 The scarcity of reading matter and the restrictedness of hori¬
zons were, paradoxically, even an advantage of some sort. If your
topic was not directly connected with ideological issues, you did
not have to worry whether your stances coincided with those of
the powers that be, whether you fitted into some existing school
or research paradigm, whether all the works that were supposed to
be mentioned were actually mentioned, whether you happened to
write something that had already been written, to invent a bicycle
that had already been invented, to break through a door that was
already open. This condition of an unscared animal facilitated in¬
dependent thinking, and that was how I started, just as many of
my Soviet contemporaries.
Browsing day after day the rich archival corpus of Estonian
proverbs, I began to notice certain things and ask myself certain
questions.
First of all, I tried to do various statistical analyses of prov¬
erbs. I remember with what upbeat enthusiasm (somewhere
around 1965) I told my course mate Mati Hint, who studied the
special linguistic curriculum, that I had made a great discovery
that proverbs contain many rarely-occurring words and few often-
occurring words and, to my shame, learned that George Kingsley
Zipf had already discovered that fact 30 year ago and that it was
true not only for proverbs, but for any natural text or a selection
thereof generally. I learned something positive too, though: what
the sentence length distribution of Estonian proverbial texts is,
that the syntactic symmetry typical of proverbs (such sentence
structures as Better... than...', Where..., there...'. Who...that..., etc.)
affects this distribution and that the position of a word in a pro¬
verbial text also determines statistical features characterizing
words occurring in this position, etc.
Then my quantitative observations switched to alliteration in
Estonian runic songs and, particularly, to the problems of geo¬
graphical distribution of Estonian and Balto-Finnic proverbs and
other genres of folklore. Since this volume does not contain any
of my works on this subject, I will not dwell much on these writ¬
ings here.
By 1969, the preparation of the publication on Estonian proverbs
had reached a deep crisis. Having nothing to lose, I decided to use
the opportunity and enrol for a postgraduate study programme at

6
the Institute of Language and Literature of the Academy of Sci¬
ences of the Estonian SSR. The topic of my postgraduate thesis
read “On the Problems of Studying the Content and World View
of Proverbs”. What was the focus of my interests and my empiri¬
cal and theoretical baggage at that moment?
L First and foremost, this baggage included certain knowledge
and beliefs about the typology and systematics of
proverbs. The Finnish school gave rise to the perception that
folklore functions in the form of typological units or types, i.e.
textual clusters which consist of varying texts, although the Law
of Self-Correction (Gesetz der Selbstberichtigung), or the law of
folkloric feedback discovered by Walter Anderson sets this vari¬
ability under control preventing it from destroying the typological
identity of folkloric plots. Kuusi researched within which dimen¬
sions and to what extent the variability of folkloric units occurs
and what conditions have to be in place so that we could talk
about the typologial sameness of texts. A proverbial text may
comprise the so-called kernel elements (i.e. words bearing the ba¬
sic imagery and the content), formulaic elements (words repre¬
senting various syntactic figures), filler elements, extending ele¬
ments, and repetition elements. On the other hand, each text has a
meaning. Texts may be said to be of the same type, if they have
the same core and the same meaning.
I rather quickly familiarized myself with the typology of Esto¬
nian proverbs, and the examination of the source material re¬
vealed that the variability within a particular type is, at times, al¬
most non-existent and, at times, quite rich in terms of figurative
lexis, syntactic formulas or both. Sometimes, however (especially
as far as productive topics and images are concerned), the types
tend to be bridged together or even form large groups of syno¬
nyms in which texts located at the opposite ends of the cluster are
already very different from each other, although the variability in
general is quite continuous and the internal division within the
group is fuzzy. In inter-typological terms, the boundaries between
the types can sometimes be very clear-cut and discrete and some¬
times very blurred.
In the autumn of 1968, I ascertained most of the typological
counterparts existing between the Estonian and Finnish material.
Already this comparison showed that the transition from mono¬
lingual to multilingual material evinced the same increase in type

7
volume and the blurring of type boundaries. This means that there
is no clear boundary between folkloric typology in the “usual
(i.e. Finnish school’s) sense and classes of the “supratypological”
structure of the content plane (at the level of synomym groups,
themes, etc.) of the proverb repertoire.
This understanding was also supported by the fact that the
creation of semantic, content-based classifications of proverbs
had come to be very high on the agenda in the paremiology ot
that day: it was then that Permyakov published his first attempts
to classify proverbs of Eastern peoples, and Kuusi dreamed about
an international type register, a “paremiological Aame-Thomp-
son” and published tentative extracts from it, for instance, “To¬
wards an International Type-System of Proverbs” (Proverbium
no. 19 (1972)) and elsewhere. His daughter, Outi Lauhakangas,
made this dream come true by making a large digital database
called The Matti Kuusi international type system of proverbs
(http://lauhakan.home.cem.ch/lauhakan/cerp.html).
The first three articles in this book are publications connected
to my postgraduate (“candidate”) thesis; they were written and
published practically at the same time. The third of them, “Some
Difficulties Arising at Semantic Classifying of Proverbs” is a
brisk critique of the above-mentioned classification attempts of
both coryphaei by a novice paremiologist.
2. The problems of metaphor creation in proverbs and
relations of proverb texts and metatexts describing
their content. The Estonian source material revealed a rich poly¬
semy of proverbs at the levels of both a single text and a type,
which in my earlier works I called “semantic indefiniteness”. It
was obvious that the content of a proverbial text could be de¬
scribed at quite a number of various levels of abstraction. It was
also obvious that the so-called formulaic elements of a proverbial
text could be understood in their direct sense only, whereas the
kernel elements could be used either in their direct sense only or
in both their direct and figurative senses. In this connection the
following two questions arose: 1) what kind of lexis can be used
(also) in a figurative sense? 2) what signals that certain words in a
proverbial text should be understood figuratively? It turned out
that the “proverb tends, very predominantly, to explain the more
complicated through the more simple, the less known through the
better known; it usually presents, for example, the mental through

8
the physical, the ideal through the material, the social through the
biological, the abstract through the concrete, etc. The oppositions
‘non-human’ ‘human’ and ‘natural’ <-» ‘cultural’ seem to play
a leading role in these alterations or transcodings” (see here be¬
low, p. 29). These issues are discussed in the first article of this
collection entitled “On Denotative Indefiniteness of Proverbs:
Remarks on Proverb Semantics 1”.
3. Proverbs proved to be indefinite also in functional ~
modal terms. As far as their surface modality is concerned, they
are mostly either statements or prescriptions. Actualizing in eve¬
ryday verbal communication, however, one and the same proverb
(as a text or a type) can, depending on the context, perform vari¬
ous speech act functions and/or several functions at the same
time: a proverb in the form of a statement can have cautioning,
advising, gloating, or comforting connotations; an order or a pro¬
hibition should have connotations that justify it, etc. It was obvi¬
ous that the evaluative, axiological modality had the paramount
importance as a vehicle for orders and instructions. That is why it
made sense to examine the relations between the modality levels
of proverbs at a three-dimensional scale: statement —> evaluation
—» prescription. All this is discussed in the article “Some Addi¬
tional Aspects of Semantic Indefiniteness of Proverbs: Re¬
marks on Proverb Semantics 2”, which, in addition to that, is
also concerned with indefiniteness in terms of the so-called actual
syntax and with the problems of textual variation, which were al¬
ready mentioned above in the subsection (1) on typology and sys-
tematics.
4. Why did my topic feature the world view aspect, which
in those circumstances was rather dangerous, because the only
right and possible world view was, of course, the Marxist one?
Archer Taylor (The Proverb, pp. 164ff.) points out that some phi¬
losophers of the past as well as modem researchers believe(d) that
proverbs provide a good platform for studying the mentalities and
world views of nations and warns that this assumption is illusory,
because a large share of any people’s repertoire is international
and consists of a mixture of dictums of various eras. It is also
common to commit the following methodological error: to pro¬
ceed from hypotheses bom in the author’s head and to use prov¬
erbs as a source of evidence to substantiate them. Taylor further
claims (pp. 168-169) that if he ventured to say something general

9
about ethical stances in proverbs, then he would speak of “adher¬
ence to the middle way” and “sound scepticism”.
If many Western works on paremiology were inaccessible to
me, then numerous Soviet writings on proverbs (chapters in over¬
view publications and university textbooks, monographs, articles,
etc.) by Marxist authors were readily available and contained all
the mistakes mentioned by Taylor: it was claimed that proverbs
perfectly reflected the world view, attitude to life and national
character of the Russian or some other people (or of working
classes in general) and that this reflection was absolutely positive:
industriousness, patriotism, wrath against foreign invaders, pro¬
test against exploitation, scepticism for religion, just and ethical
attitude to peers, etc. To be sure, it would be a suicide to assert
that the Marxist philosophy was a totally inappropriate framework
for studying the world view expressed in proverbs. The only pos¬
sible way to criticize such inadequate views was to claim that the
Marxism discernible in them was not a proper but a vulgarised
one. As an example of this kind of mimicry I would like to cite
the following excerpt (p. 58) from the introduction to the first
volume of Estonian Proverbs (1980), which practically repeats
the text of my thesis:
If a researcher uses the “sieved” proverbial material to study the
world view of the forefathers, then the following fundamental error,
among others, is likely to creep into his conclusions: the eventual
considerable understatement of the scale of the change in the heads
of the working classes and of the humanity in general brought about
by the advent of Marxist ideology as well as of the scale of the leap
that it caused in the progress of the human mind as a whole. Prece¬
dents are already there: interpretations of certain authors at times
give the impression that the spontaneous materialism of folklore is
only a few steps away from philosophical, dialectical-historical ma¬
terialism; or that the spontaneous peasant class consciousness dis¬
cernible in proverbs and other genres of folklore in its socio-
psychological form is almost the same as the treatment of class rela¬
tions in ideological form.
Any defence committee at that time necessarily included a certain
number of representatives of the Communist Party, whom my
hypocritical justifications could not deceive: all in all I received 3
votes against and was very close to failing. Fortunately, every¬
thing ended well. This book touches upon this buffoonery only in

10
passing (see passages on pp. 39 and 53): it was safer to summa¬
rise Hegel’s views by relying on Lenin’s notes in his “Philosophi¬
cal Notebooks”.

Following in the footsteps of structural linguistics and Noam

Chomsky’s syntax-centred transformational and generative gram¬
mar, other humanities were also engulfed with the faith in the
omnipotence of formalisms, which were believed to suit the de¬
scription of any material, be it figurative or poetic. In the Soviet
humanities of the 1960s “structuralism”, alongside “semiotics”,
became another buzzword having a vague meaning but rich in
socio-psychological connotations, which for some meant innova¬
tion and remoteness from the centre of power and for others was a
pejorative term used to refer to everything that was ideologically
suspicious, anti-Marxist, etc.
Formalized descriptions have a lot in common with logic. As
far as proverbs are concerned, the interest in their logical essence
was quite natural, because the surface structure of many of them
is reminiscent of If... then...- type of formulas. So, proverbs were
considered to be a promising material for studying not only the
national world view, but the national thinking as well. The logical
structure of proverbs is directly or indirectly discussed in the
works of Alan Dundes, Peter Grzybek, Constantin Negreanu, Pe¬
ter Seitel, Vilmos Voigt etc., Russian paremiologists Yuri Levin,
Mark Tcherkasski, and, of course, Grigori Permyakov himself, in
whose hierarchical classification of proverbs 4 higher classes or
the so-called invariants are just of a logical kind.
I was also preoccupied with this subject for some time. It was
high on my agenda after I had read Zoltan Kanyo’s book Sprich-
worter - Analyse einer Einfachen Form (1981) in which I found
support for my belief that due to their logical nature proverbs are
generalised implications, although I also became finally con¬
vinced that the means of predicate calculus are hopelessly inade¬
quate to be able to communicate something about the figurative
and functional richness of proverbs.
Owing to Peter Grzybek, I got the opportunity to set forth
those ideas in the article “1001 Frage zur logischen Struktur der
Sprichworter” that appeared in the volume dedicated to the mem¬
ory of Permyakov in the journal Kodikas/Code: An International
Journal of Semiotics (vol. 7, no. 3/4 (1984), pp. 387-408) and

11
that is not included in this collection. Later I also discussed the
problems of logic in proverbs in my course lectures “On the Se¬
mantics of Sayings”.
In this book, only the article “On the Relationships of the
Rhetorical, Modal, Logical, and Syntactic Planes in Estonian
Proverbs” is concerned with the problems of logic. This work,
published only in 1998, actually reflects the state of my mind at
the beginning of the 1980s when Proverbia septentrionalia was
nearing its completion. It reiterates some of the points introduced
in “1001 Frage...” as well as the ideas about the communicative
structure and modal levels of proverbs expressed in my works
written in 1974. Section 3 is an elaboration of the attempt to clas¬
sify tropes of Balto-Finnic proverbs, the more condensed version
of which can be found in the 13th column of the so-called analyti¬
cal table in Proverbia septentrionalia (see pp. 42—77 and the ex¬
planation of abbreviations on pp. 40—41) where the influence of
Lakoff and other cognitivists is not yet noticeable. At the begin¬
ning of 1980s, the work with Balto-Finnic material and the con¬
templation over the structural levels of proverbs brought me to the
verge of despair: their figurative, syntactic, logical and modal
structures turned out to be hopelessly intermixed, intertwined and
interdependent, and it was very hard for me to find my bearings in
the chaos. Section 4, “Some syntactic stereotypes”, being the core
part of this work, is an attempt to curb and check this chaos some¬
how as well as to demonstrate the relations between the structural
levels.
By 1985, when only dissertations written in the Russian language
could be defended in the Soviet Union, I decided to focus my
doctoral thesis on the study of animal metaphors (and, more
generally, on animals as figurative or literal characters) in prov¬
erbs. I put on cards ca. 60,000 texts containg animal denotations
taken from Estonian proverbs and sayings and ca. 40,000 texts
recorded from other peoples (as far as Eastern peoples are con¬
cerned, Russian translations from Permyakov’s library were par¬
ticularly useful) and tried to structure this textual mass somehow,
failing in this endeavour over and over again. Soon came the
collapse of the socialist camp in general and of the Soviet rule in
Estonia in particular, and my thesis on animal proverbs remained
unfinished. Only two excerpts from it have been published: the

12
article in Estonian on zoological hybrids and zoological
absurdities in paremias (in the journal Keel ja Kirjandus
[Language and Literature] 1992, no. 11) and the article in the
present collection called “Proverbs on Animal Identity: Typo¬
logical Memoirs” (based on the original published in the
e-joumal Folklore 2001).

The situation in Estonia immediately after the regaining of inde¬

pendence in the period from the autumn of 1991 until the spring
of 1992 can be literally described as a near-famine. Soviet money
was no longer valid, our own Estonian money was not yet in cir¬
culation, and all kinds of local cheques and slips (“tugriks” as
they were called) acted as means of payment. Shop shelves were
bare, and people fought in long queues for every loaf of bread and
every piece of sausage. The whole winter I was, without notable
success, trying to prepare something more or less drinkable from
the product that was called “coffee beans” and sold for outrageous
prices at the market but tasted like a mixture of dust and mouse
droppings, when, for the May holidays of 1992, I unexpectedly
received a parcel from Pentti Leino with some exciting contents:
two kilos of President’s Blend coffee and a photocopy of George
Lakoff and Mark Turner’s book More than Cool Reason (1989).
At that time, I was already aware of the cognitive revolution
which Lakoff and Mark Johnson brought about in the theory of
metaphor and the signs of which were already discernible in the
volume Metaphor and Thought (1979) edited by Andrew Ortony.
I also had the opportunity to read some excerpts from Lakoff and
Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980), which immediately be¬
came the bible of the cognitive theory of metaphor, and from La¬
koff s Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987). The 4th Chap¬
ter of More than Cool Reason entitled “The Great Chain of Be¬
ing”, though,was entirely devoted to the metaphorics of proverbs!
I tried to tap the knowledge of many of my educated Estonian
friends to find out what this nai've model called “The Great Chain
of Being” was all about, but nobody could help me (I learned
about Arthur Oncken Lovejoy and his philosophical treatise of the
same name only a number of years later). Reading the above-
mentioned chapter, however, I immediately understood that it dis¬
cussed the things which I had noticed already 20 years ago: that
the creation and comprehension of metaphors in proverbs is gov-

13
erned by conceptual distinctions NON-HUMAN <-» HUMAN and
NATURAL <-> CULTURAL (cf. p. 29 in this book), although the au¬
thors believed, quite groundlessly, in my view, that the movement
between these conceptual areas is unobstructedly two-directional.
Inspired by these and other discoveries, I briskly wrote the article
called “The Great Chain Metaphor: An Open Sesame for
Proverb Semantics?”, which Wolfgang Mieder kindly included
in the 11th volume of his yearbook Proverbium (1994).
From then on, two elements have obsessively recurred in my
works and lectures on the figurative semantics of proverbs: “The
Great Chain” and “Four Rules”. My perception of these issues is
most thoroughly set out in the above-mentioned long article “The
Contribution of Contemporary Theory of Metaphor to Paremiol-
ogy” (2001), which, unfortunately, has not been translated into
the English language. The penultimate section of this book enti¬
tled “Imagery of Proverbs: The Great Chain of Being as the
Background of Personificatory and Depersonificatory Meta¬
phors in Proverbs and Elsewhere” provides a somewhat more
detailed discussion of the philosophical and gnoseological nature
of the Great Chain, focuses on the NON-HUMAN <-> HUMAN dis¬
tinction and gives numerous examples of depersonification and
personification figures occurring in proverbs from Wolfgang
Mieder’s magnum opus A Dictionary of American Proverbs.
I have long been nurturing a dream to write a separate book on
the Great Chain of Being, but considering a whole number of
other things that I inevitably must complete before the Grim Reap¬
er knocks on my door, this plan is unlikely to come to fruition.
And last not least: Anne Hussar, Erna Normann, Veera Pino,
Ingrid Sarv, Rein Saukas, Elss Rivis, Lilia Briedis - my dear
fellow mates here and in eternity, together with whom I toiled a
double dozen years (1964-1988) over “Estonian Proverbs” - till
the end of my days I remain thinking of you with warmth and
fondness.

Arvo Krikmann
July 21,2009
Tartu, Estonia

14
 ON DENOTATIVE INDEFINITENESS
OF PROVERBS:
REMARKS ON PROVERB SEMANTICS 1

1. Three possible approaches

It seems to be reasonable to divide all so far used or imaginable

approaches to the semantics of proverbs into three basic modes
which differ in the nature of the initial information, in the ways of
manipulating this information and in the character (scope, reli¬
ability) of obtainable descriptions.

(1) The “purely semantical” (virtual, context-free) mode. We

use mere proverb texts (without regard to any direct comments on
their meaning and usage) as initial information and attempt to in¬
terpret them, proceeding from our personal knowledge and no¬
tions of (a) what interrelations hold between things in extralingual
reality, i.e. those between objects of every sort and kind, e.g.
physical, biological, psychical, social, cultural, etc., (b) what are
literal, non-poetic meanings of words appearing in proverb texts,
and (c) what proverbs themselves as such are, what universal se¬
mantic rules govern constructing and understanding them and in
which settings it would be appropriate to use this or that proverb.
This method, as maximally context-free,1 is maximally accessible
at the same time, but it has, on the other hand, the essential fault
that it provides us only with hypothetical results, i.e. it assigns to
each proverb (text) only a supposed “semantic potential”, and it
would be, in most cases, difficult, if not impossible, to verily the
validity of our interpretations, in particular if we have to do with
materials remote from our own culture or with international mate¬
rials that descend from many different cultures.

15
(2) The “pragmatico-semantical” (actual, context-bound)
mode. We take proverb texts for utterances (versus sentences)
and consider them only in their actualizations, i.e. in connection
with concrete verbal and/or material contexts which have ever
provoked uttering any of them, in the limits of fixed time, space,
language, social sphere, etc. Respectively, we regard as relevant
information only those records which contain authentic data in
such kind of circumstances. This approach would provide us, in
the limits noticed, with an entirely reliable set of real meanings of
each proverb, but its practical applicability appears to be utterly
questionable because paremiologists have hopelessly little infor¬
mation of such kind at their disposal. The last deficiency is global
and nowadays, evidently, already incompensable, because of the
continuing regression of proverbial tradition itself and the fact
that “hunting” for proverbial actualizations, e.g., in such a way as
Mathilde Hain (1951) has done, is an ultimately troublesome, un¬
profitable and thankless enterprise, however important and desir¬
able its results for paremiological research were.

(3) The “syntactico-semantical” mode. For the representatives

of this mode could be taken all particular approaches where the
problems of semantical comparing and the interrelations
of proverbs are involved, in addition to those of interpreting
(resp. using) and semantical describing each of them sepa¬
rately. In the ideal case, the syntactico-semantical approach can
aim at presenting a semantic description of the whole proverbial
repertoire of a certain nation or even a larger international stock,
in the form of unified classification or typology. The need for
such classifications and their scientific value, provided they are
constructed with sufficient strictness and accuracy, hardly calls
for a special argumentation. On the other hand, it is equally plau¬
sible that everyone who ventures at making attempts in this area
will encounter with many serious complications, both theoretical
and methodical. A more detailed observation of difficulties men¬
tioned would be a matter for a special issue, but it must be em¬
phasized here that a successful output can be gained only if we
are able to find metalingual devices for making the semantic rela¬
tions of each single proverb with all other proverbs explicit, in-

16
eluding the relations between the so-called synonymous proverbs.
The latter, in turn, assumes explorations on the connotative level
of proverbs in order to fix the distinctions of semantically similar
proverbs in terms more clearcut than their usual labellings with
the aid of words such as ‘nuance’, ‘shade’, ‘tint’, etc. Briefly, our
intentions here are somewhat similar to these of transformational
grammar in linguistics, namely, “to relate superficially distinct
sentences and distinguish superficially identical sentences”
(Chomsky 1957: 26). And last not least: the necessity for strict¬
ness and unambiguity of the metalanguage falls here into a par¬
ticularly acute opposition with the multilevel semantic indefinite-
ness of proverbs. A combined mode, applicable practically for
every kind of investigations in proverb semantics, including their
semantical classifying, should be regarded as the best. This mode
would accept all available direct data about these topics, as well
as our own more general knowledge and perceptions. But there is
likely no good reason to prefer or reject one or the other approach
on principle: they all have the pros and cons and, in the so-called
natural systems, it is sometimes rather difficult to distinguish the
“purely semantical” aspects from the syntactical and pragmatico-
functional ones.

2. The indefiniteness of denotation.

Some problems connected with the proverbial trope

As mentioned, the meaning of a proverb as a single (virtual or

written) text is, for a user or researcher, a mere semantic potential.
The final and maximally definite meanings of a certain text mani¬
fest themselves only in concrete actualizations of this text. We
have to do, thus, with two different phenomena: (a) the “absolute
sum” of all possible meanings of a given text, i.e. its potential
of interpretability, and (b) the sum of its real mean¬
ings manifested in all its actualizations up to the present mo¬
ment. As we know, in a general case, too little or nothing about
the traditional circumstances of using the proverb under discus¬
sion, we may fail, in all probablitiy, to formulate its potential as
exactly adequate (both in logical and “material” sense) to the set

17
of its real meanings in oral tradition, i.e. we are sure to make
some of the mistakes listed below:
(1) we interpret the text too loosely, i.e. give its description in
too general terms; though our description will include all real
“sub-meanings” of the text, it will also include a number of unreal
ones;
(2) we give a too narrow interpretation, which leaves out a part
of real meanings;
(3) both (1) and (2) together: the description introduces some
unreal meanings and neglects a part of real ones;
(4) the interpretation fails entirely and the formulation of the
2
potential does not include real meanings at all.
Let us try, for example, to observe the meanings of the Esto¬
nian proverb Tiihi kott ei seisa pusti (literally: An empty sack can¬
not stand upright). We can give it a rather narrow and concrete
meaning which would be quite acceptable to the majority of con¬
temporaries, and namely: ‘a stupid or inefficient person cannot
retain too long a position (e.g., hold a high office, have a good
reputation) he has obtained accidentally or thanks to someone’s
favour’. But the description can also be formulated in an utterly
abstract language, if we reason roughly in such a manner:
(1) sack - i.e. ‘some object’;
(2) empty - i.e. ‘does not contain or possess anything the
objects of such kind can, on principle, contain or possess’;
(3) to stand upright - i.e. ‘to be actually, during some
time, in immobile state in relation to some other object
(background), this state being considered as qualitatively
higher or more “negentropic” than the background’s state,
owing to that the possibility exists that this state will be re¬
placed by some other, less negentropic one, and some
supplementary conditions are necessary so that this state
could be preserved’;
(4) if we interpret both “emptiness” and “not-standing” as ac¬
tual states of the object, then “emptiness” can be considered as
the cause of “not-standing” and, respectively, “not-standing” as
the effect of the “emptiness”;
(5) similarly, only the “emptiness” can be considered as the
actual state, so that as to the aspect of “steadiness” both alterna-

18
tives (“standing” and “not-standing”) are possible, but the first
would be a real, probable possibility, and the second merely
a formal, improbable one;
(6) the “emptiness” can be interpreted as an internal feature
intrinsically proper to the object, and “not-standing” as an
external manifestation of this feature;
(7) the “emptiness” may also be conceived as intrinsically not
characteristic of the object but only as marking its extrinsic,
casual state, etc., etc.
Correspondingly, the semantic description of the sentence may
be formulated in several different ways, e.g.:
(8) ‘if the cause exists, it brings about a certain effect(s)’;
(9) ‘if real possibilities for happening of some event are lack¬
ing, this event will not happen indeed’;
(10) ‘if the object has an internal characteristic, the existence
of this feature must reflect itself in something external as well’;
(11) ‘the behaviour of the object depends on its state’;
(12) the description might be presented somehow more “dis¬
junctively” as well, e.g.: ‘the object which, in virtue of its intrin¬
sic properties or some extrinsic or occasional circumstances, has
no (or too small) possibilities to rise into a qualitatively higher or
more negentropic state cannot actually reach this state, at least un¬
til the factors excluding or minimizing this possibility are in force
(if they are not intrinsic); and if it even has reached this state ow¬
ing to some external or accidental circumstances, it cannot retain
this state if these accidental factors have ceased to operate’;
(13) the concept of ‘non-containable’ could be as well dis¬
played more concretely, e.g.: ‘an object (system) which does not
contain a sufficient quantity of a substance and/or energy and/or
information cannot rise from its existent state into a more negen¬
tropic one, or it will fall into a more entropic one if the influx of
the substance and/or energy and/or information has ceased or
fallen below the critical level’, or in some other way.
Descriptions of such kind, however, as applied to proverb
texts, seem to be rather inexpedient for several reasons: (a) they
reflect, above all, the peculiarities of the describer’s own world
view or consciousness rather than the properties of the object be¬
ing described; (b) by using such descriptions it is next to impossi-

19
ble to distinguish one proverb from another; (c) obviously, the
proverb text turns out to be an indefinite “potential” not only with
respect to its particular meanings in its concrete applications, but
also with respect to its conceivable semantic descriptions of ut¬
terly abstract and general character, i.e., we can assign a number
of different descriptions to the proverb text, no one of them being
exhaustive and, at the same time, we have no good reason to pre¬
fer any of them to others.
Consequently, we must introduce some restrictions. As the
proverb reveals a specific “humanocentric” tendency, i.e. a nota¬
ble bias to deal, above all, with ethical and social problems, we
may suppose: this saying ought to be interpreted as concerning
human relations as well. Then, the attribute empty might be con¬
ceived as characterizing some state, enterprise, performance or
statement of some individual or a group, more exactly, the de-
voidance of various physico-biological, intellectual, ethical, mate¬
rial or other goods and values, or the senselessness or wrongness
of someone’s statements or undertakings, e.g.: (a) ‘feeble’; (b)
‘sick’; (c) ‘hungry’; (d) ‘stupid’; (e) ‘evil’; (f) ‘poor’; (g) ‘idle
work or other senseless undertaking’; (h) ‘“empty” talk (lie,
boast, gossip)’, etc. The syntagm cannot stand upright can be in¬
terpreted in the same manner: (i) ‘falls down’; (j) ‘falls ill’; (k)
‘loses physical abilities (strength, capacity for work)’; (1) ‘dies’;
(m) ‘forfeits the reputation (favour, love, credit)’; (n) ‘loses the
position (role, office)’; (o) ‘loses the property’; (p) ‘does not suc¬
ceed in his work’; (q) ‘one’s lie, gossip, etc., proves to be void,
comes to light’, and so on. If we try, then, to combine the particu¬
lar “antecedents” (a)...(h) with the particular “consequents”
(i)...(q), a part of combinations received will already fall out on
the level of common sense, but a number of possible combina¬
tions will remain, e.g. ai (‘a feeble man falls down’), bk (‘a sick
man cannot work’), cl (‘a hungry man will die’), dm (‘a fool for¬
feits his reputation’), do (‘a fool sustains material losses’), also aj,
am, an, bi, bl, bm, bn, ci, cj, ck, dn, em, fm, fn, gp, hm, hq and
others.
Further, we shall find ourselves unable to bear any telling ar¬
gument for the existence or absence, frequency or rarity of any
particular combination in real oral currency. Fortunately, Estonian

20
 recorders have commented on this proverb rather numerously
(there are about 30 explanations at our disposal), and it appears
that the majority of them present the manifestations of only two
combinations, namely ck (‘a hungry man cannot work’) and hq
(‘a lie or groundless praise or boast comes to light’), and, on the
other hand, the combinations dm (‘a fool forfeits the reputation’)
and dn (‘a fool loses the position’), however natural and expect¬
able they seem nowadays, do not occur at all. Moreover, one of
the collectors has explained that this proverb hints at the fragility
of unrequited friendship or brevity of unilateral good deeds. Thus,
we find no appropriate column to file this case and have every
reason to ask whether our list of possibilities is exhaustive
enough, or whether overlapping of its particular members is pre¬
cluded. If we take into account that there is, after all, a comment
which permits this proverb to mean also ‘an ill-fed domestic
animal is not capable of work or he is of less use’, then even
our hypothesis about the “humanocentricity” of this proverb ap¬
pears to be inaccurate.
Let us give another analogous example. Suppose we have
come across the saying which advises to cure an injury resulting
from the bite of a dog with the hair of the dog that has bitten. This
sentence is likely to evoke in our mind some perceptions of the
following kind: (1) the dog bit - i.e. ‘something or somebody has
harmed somebody’; (2) the hair of the dog - i.e. ‘something or
somebody that belongs to the person or thing that has harmed’;
(3) to cure with the hair - i.e. ‘to compensate, restore’ (alludes to
the well-known magic treatment in folk medicine). Further, it is
rather difficult to imagine this general framework filled with
some more concrete content. The harming may be divided into
particular cases, e.g.: (a) ‘to wound physically, to cause pain or
sickness’; (b) ‘to harm morally (insult, slander, etc.)’; (c) ‘to
cause pecuniary loss (steal, damage some work or undertaking,
break or spoil or soil some thing, etc.)’. Whichever of these cases
we might take, it remains hard to find a fully suitable interpreta¬
tion of the curing with the hair which suggests the restriction
‘must be performed by the same person who had been harmed’.
And without any direct preliminary knowledge we could scarcely
guess that the primary and most widespread meaning of this sen-

21
tence is quite concrete and narrow, namely, it is used as a face¬
tious comment in the case of taking a drop for a hangover, and so
in several languages, e.g., in English, German, Danish (see Taylor
1931: 131-132, Koskenjaakko 1909: 8), Estonian and, probably,
in many others as well. The last interpretation puts every compo¬
nent of the metaphor to its place very exactly and spectacularly.
Elowever, the whole semantic compass of this proverb is not yet
exhausted thereby, and again, we ought likely to know by imme¬
diate sources that the saying can, also, occur as a direct magico-
medical instruction in its purely literal sense, e.g. in Russian (cf.
Yermolov 1905: 171), and after all, that a “little transfer” is pos¬
sible where the saying does not exceed the limits of the magico-
medical region, but need not be bound just to the dog and the hair
as such (see Koskenjaakko 1909: 7).
The cases above and a great number of others confirm the
well-known paremiological standpoint that the semantic indeter¬
minacy of proverbs springs first and foremost from the ambiguity
of proverbial tropes (metaphors, allegories, etc.). As the problems
of tropicalization exhibit some interesting sub-aspects of semantic
indefiniteness of lexical elements of the proverb text and as the
whole scope of the proverbs’ semantic indefiniteness is not lim¬
ited to the tropical image solely, some further remarks on these
topics might be permissible.
On principle, two diametrical approaches to the “lingual”
homo-/heterogeneity of the proverb text and to the poeticalness
/non-poeticalness of its lexical elements are possible.
(1) We treat the proverb text as internally heterogeneous and
try to divide its lexical components into “content elements”
(oelements) and “formal elements” (/-elements). The total of the
latter could be constituted, then, from (a) the so-called relational
words of every kind, e.g., those used in verbal inteipretations of
logical operations, quantifiers, etc., as is, not, and, or, every, all,
some, sometimes, never, etc.; (b) may-be, also the words marking
various modalities, e.g., good, bad\ must, may, cannot, etc.; (c) all
kinds of interrogative words; (d) the members of specific word-
pairs marking the so-called syntactic figures or syntactic formulae
of proverb texts, e.g., Who... that...-, If... then...-. Where... there...-.
Every... has his...-. Better... than..., etc., etc. The rest of the words

22
 would belong to c-elements and might, in turn, be divided into
semantically “literal” (cr)elements and “transferred” (^ele¬
ments. Of course, the dividing need not proceed exactly in the
way described,3 but the essence of this approach is that it does not
assign poeticalness to the proverb text as a whole — poeticalness is
assigned only to some elements of it, e.g., to c-elements, or, even
more restrictedly, to C2-elements merely. (This interpretation per¬
mits, incidentally, the existence of entirely apoetical proverbs, at
least on principle.) This point of view in its various modifications
is very widespread and generally accepted (properly, autocrati¬
cally governing) in paremiology.
(2) The proverb text is treated as internally homogeneous, to¬
tally poetical. Anyhow, its elements can be divided, but as to their
lingual origins everyone of them is to be considered as belonging
to the “secondary”, poetical (T’-)language and must be strictly
distinguished from all (in particular from homonymous) elements
of the “primary” language, i.e. ordinary non-poetic (/^lan¬
guage, and from all elements of the “tertiary” metalanguage
(M-language) used for describing the content of proverb texts.
A strict separation of the L- and M-lingual locutions is required as
well.4
Though the latter interpretation, as applied to proverbs, must
be treated with reservation in some points, it has some momen¬
tous advantages in comparison with the first, the usual concep¬
tion. They are as follows.
1. First of all, there are many instances where the ^elements
(relational words, members of the “syntactic formulae”, even par¬
ticular morphems) perform semantic operations very similar to
those appearing at the tropicalization. For example, in the text
CxojibKO Mydpeijoe, cmonbKo u Mnenuu, repeatedly referred to by
G. L. Permyakov (e.g. 1968a: 9-10, 1970: 12) as a specimen of a
completely literal proverb, the /-element cmonbKo is undoubtedly
of tropical quality: when cmojibxo in its literal sense stresses (ex¬
act or approximate) equality, while remaining indifferent to the
dimension of comparable quantities, then, in the present context,
it acquires a more indefinite meaning, namely an augmenta¬
tive one. It constitutes here a sort of “syntactic hyperbole” which
springs up roughly in such a way: on the one hand, our intuitive

23
expectations at this input are based on the “empiric law” which
prescribes that if the number of opiners is great enough, then,
very probably, the number of different opinions would be con¬
siderably smaller than the number of opiners themselves; on the
other hand, this proverb, obviously, just gains its aim and efficacy
if we presuppose that the number of opiners is great indeed -
consequently, the “empiric law” mentioned has been violated
here.
A quite regular feature is the participation of /-elements in
constituting a set of phenomena we could denominate commonly
as the cases of modal metaphor, e.g., (a) the rhetorical ques¬
tion which, in proverbs, is to be regularly interpreted as negation;
(b) a variety of ironical images where the implied axiologic (and
often also propositional) negation is formally expressed as affir¬
mation; (c) other cases where the formally indicative mood, due
to the content of concrete c-elements and/or contextual circum¬
stances, gets the meaning of some other modality (deontic, epis-
temic, etc.). Some instances of the last case will be briefly dis¬
cussed in the next part of this paper.
2. As Jakobson (1961: 400) suggests, just the very effects of
contrast and symmetry that inevitably occur with various
devices of parallelism must be regarded as very important
symptoms of poeticalness. If we distinguish three aspects in the
poetical structure of the proverb (text) - (a) e u p h o n i c a 1, (b)
syntactical, and (c) tropico-lexical, the interrelations be¬
tween the euphonies and tropics can be depicted roughly as fol¬
lows:
(1) the unity on the “material level” of the text: the euphonic
“ornamentation” of the text cannot be executed otherwise than by
means of selecting and repeating the word forms and/or combin¬
ing their arrangement;
(2) the opposition at creating the text: one has to reveal the
poetical ingenuity to some extent to avoid the destructing or
“blunting” the tropical image on account of “introducing” eu-
phonisms;
(3) the mutual compensation at the reception of the
(new-born) text: to be acceptable and viable enough and to force
its way into the oral tradition and survive in it, the text need not

24
display notable appeal in all possible aspects of (aesthetic and
pragmatic) evaluation; among these, it need not convey remark¬
able values both in its euphonies and its tropics, but can con¬
fine itself to being attractive either with its sound or metaphor
(or with something else having to do with neither sound nor
metaphor).5
The devices belonging to the poetic syntax of the proverb, in
contrary, seem to act as compensators both on the creation and
reception levels. For example, the above-mentioned device of
syntactic symmetry can, on the one hand, call into being
some spontaneous germs of euphony, e.g., the so-called paradig-
matical or grammatical (inch inflection) rhyme, “natural” rhythm
patterns, etc.; on the other hand, it serves directly semantical pur¬
poses: it “organizes” the content of the text, indicates the connec¬
tions between the c-elements (affirms and negates, concludes and
concedes, includes and excludes, and so on). Here a special men¬
tion must be made of the fact that syntactic symmetry brings
about the effect of “semantic symmetry”, i.e., as any other kind of
parallelism, it establishes a set of non-lineal relationships between
the c-elements, fixes a number of paradigms of secondary (poeti¬
cal) stage and manifests both (all) members of these paradigms
overtly in the surface structure of the text. Such paradigms, admit¬
tedly, often rest upon the ordinary f-lingual synonyms and anto¬
nyms, but they also enable to consider as oppositional, on the po¬
etical level, the relations of a great number of such words which
on the level of the L-language would be entirely disparate, e.g.,
those of the words ceduua and 6ec in the Russian proverb Ceduua
e dopody — dec e pedpo or of codaxa and eemep in the text Co6a-
Ka Jiaem - eemep Hocum or of tuul (wind) and sant (beggar) in the
Estonian proverb Mis tuul kivist saab voi sant saunanurgast (lit¬
erally: What can the wind get from a stone, or the beggar from a
cot corner), or of kuld (gold) and tsirk (bird) in the South-
Estonian proverb Kuld kuninga pungan, tsirk saksa kotun (The
gold /is/ in the king’s purse, the bird /is/ in the toff’s (gentle¬
man ’s) belly), and an infinite number of others.6
3. The approach under discussion does not oblige us to make
sharp and rigid “bivalent” distinction between the /- and c-ele-
ments on the one hand, and between the cr and c2-elements, on

25
the other hand. This is to be considered as an advantage, whereas
the borderlines mentioned do not really exist, and can be drawn
only at the cost of a good deal of arbitrariness. The situations in
both these aspects can be depicted, rather, as sequences of a great
number of “shades of grey” (darkening or brightening) on some
long scale. In the case of the //distinction, at one end of this
scale might lie, then, such most typical /-elements as listed on
page 22, and at the other end, may-be, some words with ulti¬
mately complicated semantic structure, manifold connotative
“overtones”, and so on.7 Equally problematic is the distinction of
cr and c2-elements. First of all, two different concepts are not to
be confused here, namely, (a) transferrability of words that
purely depends on their linguistico-semantical properties, and (b)
transferredness that can be judged of only by the circum¬
stances concerning this or that concrete actualization of some text.
So far, to our knowledge, nobody has attempted to clear up which
semantic features a word must have to be more liable or more re¬
sistant to tropicalization. On the one hand, as we saw, even the
/elements are not deprived of chances to perform tropical duties,
on the other hand, however, it is quite obvious that, in general, the
“contentlessness” (or formality) and the “intransferrability” of a
word tend to be positively correlated. The transfers of the ./ele¬
ments, in particular, are limited to a few single kinds of tropes;
the possibilities of the words denoting various kinds of very gen¬
eralized and abstract objects (e.g., philosophical, logical, ethical,
psychical, etc.) are, in this respect, quite restricted as well.
Though we cannot put forward any a priori lexicological crite¬
ria to decide firmly which function - either a “formal” or a “con¬
tent” one — a word can fulfil in a proverb text, or whether a word
can be received in the proverbial context only “literally” or
“transferredly” as well, and which concrete transfers it enables,
we might still try to delineate at least hypothetically some notes
about the criteria and rules governing the semantical operations at
“deciphering” the proverbial trope and understanding the proverb
text as a whole.
1. We might, for convenience, begin by stating that here the
need for “deciphering” (or interpretation, or “translation”) exists
indeed. This has to do just with Taylor’s (1931: 3) famous “in-

26
communicable quality” that “tells us this sentence is proverbial
and that one is not”. Although there have been some proposals,
e.g., by G. B. Milner (1969a, 1969b), paremiologists in general
have revealed little or no interest in clearing up the nature and
sources of this incommunicable quality. If we should venture, for
our part, to enumerate some factors that can occasion us to take a
certain sentence from the spoken chain for the proverb and to sub¬
ject it to some semantic alterations to make it meaningful and ac¬
ceptable in a given setting, among these factors might be, eventu¬
ally, e.g., the following ones:
(1) the text does not fit in with the situative and/or verbal con¬
text: it has an incorrect “quantifier” (of generality) and its literal
content is incompatible with the context or consituation;
(2) the statement presented by the text feels to be too self-
evident and trivial in its literal sense;
(3) either the literal statement in the text seems to be incorrect,
or the literal prescription (advice, interdiction) seems to be unrea- (
sonable;
(4) taken literally, the text seems to be nonsensical: the seman¬
tic incompatibility between the components of the text is percept-
able;
(5) the text is too regular and ornamental (syntactic symmetry,
euphonisms).
2. As to our present concern, points (2)...(4) are of most inter¬
est. Above all, it must be emphasized there are no clearcut border¬
lines between the proverbs with “too obviously” true, platitudi¬
nous content and those with undoubtedly wrong literal content, on
the one hand, and between the proverbs with wrong literal state¬
ment (or “wrong” literal prescription) and these with contradic¬
tory or nonsensical literal content, on the other hand, at least in so
far as we observe texts apart from their (real or imaginable) con¬
texts. In recent years several authors have discussed the matters of
distinguishing metaphorical expressions from non-metaphorical
ones and meaningful expressions from meaningless ones, and
have put foward roughly the following, full of suggestions, to our
mind, opinions:
(1) the metaphor cannot be explained simply as violating the a
priori imposed universal rules for “normal” connecting of words

27
(e.g. the so-called selection restrictions, etc.): not all metaphors
result from rule violations and not all rule violations result in
metaphors;
(2) expressions are semantically correct or incorrect, meaning¬
ful or meaningless not per se, but only with respect to this or that
concrete verbal and/or situative context where they have been ac¬
tualized;
(3) there are no clear boundaries (a) between the “normal”
polysemy of words and their metaphorical use, (b) between the
lingual (lexical, dead) and poetical (“fresh”, original) metaphor,
and (c) between the metaphorical and nonsensical word-
combination.8
3. If we accept the postulates above, at least two further con¬
clusions can be made at once. First, the context-free approach de¬
prives us of the main criterion to decide which operations are
necessary to transcode this or that literal meaning into one or the
other “factual” meaning (cf. points (1) and (2) above). Secondly
(cf. point (3) above), the tropes of folklore (inch phraseology) and
those of “literary” poetry occupy different stages on the scale
‘polysemy’ —» ‘lingual metaphor’ —> ‘poetical metaphor’ —>
‘nonsense’. Written poetry, especially modem one, strives to mi¬
nimize the redundancy between the elements of the poetic text,
hence just such metaphor, which “BHe aaHHoro nooTHnecKoro
KOHTeKCTa paBHaeTCH beccMbicmme” (Lotman 1970b: 250), and
which gets its sense through complicated and indeterminate asso¬
ciations even in the context, is received here as true and valuable.
The tropes of folklore and phraseology (inch the proverbial ones),
on the contrary, are traditional, stereotypical, already met and
known previously, as a mle, and automatically interpretable.9
4. As to the lexical composition of proverbial tropes, they are
quite stereotypical and humdrum already. There is a number of
semantic fields that lend their stocks quite readily to proverbial
images: among such vocabulary we find, e.g., names of various
animals and plants; names of terrain elements, natural phenomena
and “elemental forces”; toponyms and ethnonyms; somatic vo¬
cabulary; numerals; vocabulary connected with commodities,
housekeeping, various kinds of work and fare; words denoting

28
various human categories (relatives, social states and functions,
etc.).10
5. As to the above-mentioned impossibility to appeal to actual
contexts of proverbs, we can still construct a kind of, say, “vir¬
tual context to “decipher” them, utilizing our more general
knowledge and imaginations (a) about the extralingual reality;
(b) about the ordinary, L-lingual meanings of words, appearing in
proverb texts; (c) about universal rules of proverb-making (or
-shaping). Though the analysis of particular cases may offer
manifold difficulties, there appear to be some general principles,
according to which proverbial tropes are constructed (in the direc¬
tion: idea —> text) and which are working in the contrary direction
(text —> meaning) also at understanding them.
6. The proverbial trope is mostly paradigmatic, i.e. metaphori¬
cal.11 To be more exact, proverbial transfers seem to be not sim¬
ply transfers “from the left to the right” or vice versa, but specifi¬
cally directed and orientated. The proverb tends, very predomi- ,
nantly, to explain the more complicated through the more simple,
the less known through the better known; it usually presents, for
example, the mental through the physical, the ideal through the
material, the social through the biological, the abstract through
the concrete, etc. The oppositions ‘non-human’ <->• ‘human’ and
‘natural’ <-» ‘cultural’ seem to play a leading role in these altera¬
tions or transcodings.
7. Most frequently the proverbial trope presents itself in the
shape of allegory running through all the c-elements of the text,
“elemental forces”, inanimate natural objects, things, plants, ani¬
mals, etc., signifying human beings, human actions, goals and
products of human activities, etc.12 Such allegorical texts are
mostly internally “redundant” or include semantically compatible
elements, and they should be “translated” in corpore, the /-ele¬
ments belonging to the impersonal “informer” and representing
the indicative mood; i.e. the minimum of the participation of man
in the literal content of the proverb. The further “invasion” of man
into this literal content can proceed in two different ways:
(a) through the /elements (in the case of the imperative mood) -
there appears an impersonal “you” (the addressee) to whom the

29
proverb directs its orders, advices, interdictions, warnings, etc.;
(b) through the c-elements - man begins to act directly in the lit¬
eral content of the text or his presence is presupposed. Even if the
human being already participates in the literal content of the
proverb text, abundant chances for making transfers “from the
lower to the higher” (i.e. for expressing the higher through the
lower) will survive.13
8. At “unriddling” the proverbial allegory one ought necessar¬
ily to take into account both syntagmatic and paradigmatic fac¬
tors. The substantival “apices” of allegory though they are the
points where the transfer is maximally evident and clearcut (‘me¬
teorological phenomenon’ pro ‘human emotion’, ‘plant’ pro ‘hu¬
man being’, ‘animal’ pro ‘human being’, ‘thing’ pro ‘human be¬
ing’, etc.) - can seldom express something particularly essential
and determining about the factual (either traditional or conceiv¬
able) theme and idea of the proverbial sentence.14 On the other
hand, each single word belonging to the tropical image carries
into the proverb all the associations and connotations, emotive
“nuances” and “shades” connected with its literal meaning. How¬
ever refractory these connotative features are to semantical de¬
scription, they ought not to be neglected, nor their significance
denied.15
9. There is a number of “semi-formal” words (mainly verbs,
adjectives and adverbs) that act as a kind of “clues” at decipher¬
ing the allegorical chain. These words are notably more “content¬
ful” than the ordinary /-elements, but they are connectable with a
great number of concrete substantival referents. Besides, they
were transferred to various abstract and ideal objects so long ago
that we scarcely perceive any more metaphoricality in them.16
These words constitute certain “weak links” in the allegorical
chain and facilitate interpreting the substantival “trope apices”,
since they need not be conceptually altered immediately, as the
“apices” mentioned must. On the other hand, the existence of this
phenomenon makes it impossible to show strictly where the prov¬
erbs with “throughout transferred meaning” turn into the proverbs
in which all c-elements are tropical and in which, besides the c-
elements, some /-elements occur, which cannot yet demolish the
imagination of the “general transferredness” of the meaning, and,

30
 further, where the last condition, in turn, alters into such one
where the trope, without doubt, embraces only a part of all c-
elements of the sentence.
10. In the case of total allegory, the excessive triviality, insuf¬
ficient pragmatical load of its literal meaning (provided the ap¬
proach is context-free) are usually the factors impelling us to rein¬
terpret the text. In the case of the “partially tropical” text, on the
contrary, we necessarily have to do with some internal contradic¬
tion or incompatibility between the syntagms and single elements
of the text itself (taken literally). In the texts of this kind the op¬
erations on the syntagmatic (metonymic) axis prevail and trans¬
fers can be made in the direction contrary to the usual one, e.g.
when characterizing the non-human (inorganic, vegetable or ani¬
mal) through the human, the biological and the physical through
the social and psychical, and so on.17 There is a number of words
the appearance of which in the proverb text is quite reliably
symptomatic of that the trope embraces only a part of the c-ele-,
ments or is broken; these words have rather restricted possibilities
for tropicalization, not because they are highly abstract (though
some of them are indeed), but rather because they are innately
connected just with those semantic regions that serve as targets at
which the proverb most often aims its figurative statements and
prescriptions - i.e., they are linked with the psychical, ethical and
social aspects of the human.18
11. The ambiguity of the trope is not the sole source of the de¬
notative indefiniteness of the proverb. If a text does not include
any words expressing whatever physical reality at all, we have no
ground to speak of the trope as such. There are many proverbs
that consist, practically, of the /-elements and “semi-formal”
words merely, operating with very abstract and generalized con¬
cepts on the level of their literal meanings already, and reminding
of metalingual descriptions rather than of poetic texts.181 The do¬
main of the applicability of such proverbs often seems to be all
but universal, as they can impose very few restrictions on their
thematic (denotative) scope. Evidently, this universality is still
only apparent: if we were informed better than we are, it would,
very probably, turn out that the field of their traditional usage is
90
actually much more narrow than it looks.

31
Notes

1. Even this approach can be taken for context-free only relatively. The
researcher’s preliminary knowledge and imagination mentioned consti¬
tute here something similar to what J. Lyons (1971: 419) has termed re¬
stricted context, i.e. “the more general beliefs, conventions and presup¬
positions governing the particular ‘universe of discourse”’. Considering
the proverbs directly, G. L. Permyakov (1968a: 44) has called the set of
analogical preliminary information the logical context (jioeunecKuu koh-
meKcm), equivalent or similar to M. Cherkasskij’s (1968: 477) term se¬
miotic background (ceMuomuuecKuu rpou).
2. It is necessary to make to excursive remarks in connection with what
was said.
(1) When we considered some relations between proverb texts and
their semantic descriptions as mistakes, it does not imply that those
shortcomings might be contrasted with some “absolutely adequate” or
“absolutely faultless” descriptions. The maximally exact description of
the semantic potential of a proverb text is the same proverb text itself;
any other description can depict its meaning only approximately. The
description is inevitably poorer than the proverb text, when substituting
connotation-free words of the non-poetic metalanguage for the associa¬
tive, saturated with connotations words of the poetic object language; if
the elements of the metalanguage are not required to be connotation-
free, the description will also involve the noise, i.e. such information
that the object text does not contain; any description that is different
from the object text itself, will deform the structure of the object text,
and so on. Some years ago O. S. Axmanova (1971: 19-20) noticed in
brief of the difficulties linked with semantical describing of phraseologi¬
cal units. She made an entirely tenable critical remark that explaining
paraphrases employed in phraseological dictionaries, etc., are hopelessly
inadequate and incapable of reflecting the richness, expressiveness and
compactness of the underlaying sayings, but, unfortunately, she did not
put forward any constructive suggestions on her own part either.
(2) Sufficient knowledge of actual using circumstances of proverbs
would avoid the danger of misunderstanding proverb texts, but the
problems of unified describing the “sum of actual meanings” of this
or that proverb text would still survive to the full extent. We should
come across serious complications already at trying to divide this sum
(or to unite the meanings of the text in each single actualization) to more
or less clearcut subclasses or partial meanings, i.e. at trying to find out
the usemes of the proverb, if we may transfer B. J. Gorodetskij’s (1969:

32
174ff.) term concerning the polysemy of words to the matters of the
polysemy of proverbs.

3. For instance, M. Kuusi (1963: 340; 1966: 98) differentiates in the

proverb text, in addition to /^elements (Formelelemente, formulaelemen-
tit), kernel elements (Kemelemente, ydinelementit), filling elements
(Filllelemente, tayte-elementit), extending elements (Fortsetzungsele-
mente, jatke-elementit) and repetition elements (Parallelelemente, ker-
rannaiselementit).

4. Partisans of this interpretation might find theoretical support, for ex¬

ample, from R. Jakobson’s (1961; cf. also 1960: 375ff.) well-known
conception that a poetic text is poetical in its entirety; all its elements
and structures, inch grammatical ones, are put to serve poetical pur¬
poses. This thesis has been emphasized and somewhat altered by
J. M. Lotman (e.g. 1964: 64, 123ff; 1970b: 17-19, 25, 26): the elements
and structures under discussion are not only poetical, but also semanti¬
cally “loaded”; roughly speaking, they all are components of the unified
total structure of the poetic item, this total structure being, in its essence,
the content structure. v

The interrelations of the P-language with the L- and M-languages

would represent the two opposite modifications of the so-called meta-
semiotic relationship, which R. Barthes (1969: 89ff.) terms connotation
(here L—> P) and denotation (here P —» M).

5. Occurrences of the compensation between different stylistic levels of

folklore pieces have been noticed already by B. J. Yarho: the rhyming
verses of Russian chastooshkas turned out to be bound with repetition
figures more rarely than the not-rhyming ones, and the chastooshkas
concerning social and political matters revealed less frequent appearance
of repetition figures than those concerning love themes (see Gasparov
1969: 509). As to proverbs, B. Holbek (1970: 56) has supposed that such
stylistic features, as alliteration, rhyme, rhythm patterns, etc., appear
more frequently in the non-metaphorical than in the metaphorical texts.

6. The affairs mentioned make it questionable how promising the at¬

tempts to study the “logical” or syntactic structure of proverbs per se,
irrespectively of the content of concrete c-elements, might be. An at¬
tempt in this direction has been made, for example, by V. S. Bayevskij
(1970). He aims at constructing a generative model of a class of prov¬
erbs, this class being defined roughly as follows: the proverbs included
into the class must have an “implicative” symmetrical structure; both
halves of the text (the “antecedent” and the “consequent”) must consist

33
of one /-element and one verb; the verbs must be antonyms and belong
to the native vocabulary, etc. - e.g., proverbs Wmo noceeuib, mo no-
ofcnewb, rde nbtom, maM u Jibwm, etc. Just the precondition of antonym-
ity of the verbs is, to our mind, the essential weak link in the procedure:
therefore the set of the verb pairs involved comes to be limited (and, on
the other hand, extended) to a certain number of “ordinary”, L-lingual
antonyms on the special list. The participation of properly semantical
criteria themselves remains limited to the precondition mentioned, all
the following procedure of generating having degenerated to quite trivial
operations of selecting the verb pairs corresponding to the preconditions
set, and those of syntactico-morphological coordinating the selected
verb pairs with the set of possible pairs of /-elements, according to the
features, such as number, person, transitivity / intransitivity, animated¬
ness / inanimatedness, etc. If we have got, in this way, a number of
“synthetic proverbs”, we are still deprived of any reliable criterion to
decide which of the result sentences are grammatically correct and
also paremically acceptable, and which are, on the other hand, incom¬
patible with proverbial poetical patterns, though grammatically correct.
Evidently, much more interesting results might be gained, if we (a) pro¬
ceeded from an entirely “blind”, semantically, structure, e.g., (/verb))
—» (/verb2), or something similar to this; (b) provided ourselves with a
possibly great number of real proverb texts, corresponding to this formal
structure; (c) examined carefully which semantic properties and in¬
terrelations the opposed verbs actually reveal (the opposition of “ordi¬
nary”, T-lingual antonyms may be merely a particular case among all the
possible relationships); (d) formulated the semantic rules enabling us
to generate just the set of the real proverb texts; (e) tried to clear up
which “synthetic” proverbs can be generated with the aid of the same set
of rules, in addition to the really existent ones; (f) removed some restric¬
tions and considered which new sentences could be added, and so forth.
Equally misleading is to conceive that the c-elements can be equated
with the variables in logical expressions (cf. G. L. Permyakov’s (1970:
19) point of view: “... nocnoBHuy .aejiaiOT He peanHH, a JiornHecKaa
KOHCTpyioma, peanHH >Ke BbicTynaiOT rmiiib b KanecTBe “cTpomrejib-
Horo MaTepnajia”.”). The logical semantics is interested only in the
truth-value of the variables, not in their concrete content, and the possi¬
bilities of varying logical expressions also depend on only their truth-
value and the relationships of the logical operations, set axiomatically.
The real, traditional transformations of proverb texts (i.e. proverbial
variants), on the contrary, are fully dependent on the content of the con¬
crete c- and /-elements, and even if we do not study the actual trans-

34
forms of proverb texts, but the possibilities of transforming them
(e.g. a “fillability” of a certain /-framework with various different c-con-
structions, or, reversedly, the compatibility of a certain c-construction
with different /patterns), the semantical control of the acceptability of
the results must be permanently maintained. For example, it is mislead¬
ing to conceive that the proverbs as Enough is enough. Business is busi¬
ness, Boys will be boys, etc., which have outwardly a tautological form,
are tautological indeed and can be mapped by the formulae, as A = A,
X4 = x4, etc. (cf. Kongas & Maranda 1971: 80). May be, such proverbs
constitute a kind of proverbs with definite information-bearing structure.
Flowever that may be, every occurrence of the repeated words, e.g. boys,
must necessarily have a meaning, different from that of the other occur¬
rence: the first boys refers, supposedly, to some actual boy (or boys) be¬
ing talked about, while the second boys implies the class of boys, em¬
phasizing, presupposedly, just some negatively valued features boys
tend to have (e.g. naughtiness, bellicosity, etc.).

7. Contemporary semantics has a rather vague idea of how to tax the

stages of semantic complexity of words more exactly. In principle, it is
conceived to depend on the number of so-called elementary predicates'
(or semes) we need to represent the semantic structure of the word, and
on the interrelations of these predicates in the semantic representation of
the word. On the other hand, the number of hitherto postulated elemen¬
tary predicates is obviously insufficient to describe any more extensive
part of a vocabulary, and only a quite petty fraction of the vocabularies
of quite few languages has hitherto received its semantic description.
It is also questionable whether the rate of the semantic complexity of
words can be expressed by some quantitative parameters. We may
conceive, for example, that the number showing in how many different
proverbs a certain word (or word-pair, or -combination) appears, might
serve as an indirect indicator of the degree of formality or “contentless-
ness” of this word, at least in the limits of the proverbial area. However,
if we should compile a frequency word-index of that kind, the distribu¬
tion obtained would take the shape corresponding to the so-called Zipfis
rule, as it happens in frequency word-indexes based on any natural texts
in general, i.e. at one end of the scale a comparatively small number of
‘/words’’ (-pairs) would converge, each recurring a great many times,
and at the other end a great number of different “super-contentful”
words (-pairs), each appearing only once. Thus, for the most part of the
vocabulary this yardstick would not fit, after all.
Supposedly, an attempt could also be made to correlate the c/f-
distinction with the distinctions between the parts of speech or with the

35
distinction between the so-called lexical and grammatical meaning, e.g.
applying the “closed or open set” -criterion, put forward by A. Martinet,
M. Halliday, etc. (see, e.g., Lyons 1971: 436). Nevertheless, here will
also remain some quite serious cons, as this mode extends the set of f-
elements to include not only certain words, but also some morphems
signifying grammatical categories, and it is, on the other hand, quite
doubtful, to what extent we can take into account the morphological data
in the semantic analysis of a proverb text.

8. See, e.g., Bickerton 1969, Reddy 1969, Uspenskij 1969 and 1970,
Kaplinski 1972: 13ff. D. Bickerton (1969: 48) presents the following
classification of expressions: “(i) ‘literal’ expressions (iron bar, black
cat, etc.); (ii) ‘permanent’ assignments (iron discipline, yellow rat, etc.);
(iii) ‘temporary’ assignments {green thought, steel couch, etc.); (iv)
‘meaningless’ expressions {steel-mine, procrastination drinks quadru-
plicity, etc.)”. This classification permits stepped shifting of phrases, in
the direction (iv) —» (iii) —» ..., from one class to the another, and, there¬
fore, abrogates clearcut, excluding distinctions between the purely lin¬
gual polysemy and lingual (lexical, “dead”) metaphor, between the
“stale” (lingual) and “fresh” (poetic) metaphor, and between the ex¬
travagant metaphor and nonsense. However, this view is not shared gen¬
erally. For example, J. Pelc (1961: 331-334) has argued that the “ordi¬
nary” polysemy is strictly distinguishable from the metaphor, and
J. M. Lotman (1970b: 250) has emphasized that the lingual metaphor is
to be clearly distinguished from the poetic metaphor.

9. We do not find it expedient to discuss here in more detail the prob¬

lems of why proverbs have still kept safe their poetic attraction for the
circles using them, why, despite of all that, people have still taken the
trouble to retain these apparently “dull”, utterly “hackneyed” cliches
during millennia, and why they reproduce them in their speech. Let us
only call attention to J. M. Lotman’s highly interesting conception on
the fundamental difference between folklore as the “aesthetics of same¬
ness” (“scmemuKa mootcdecmea”) and the modem literature as the “aes¬
thetics of opposition” (“ocmemuKa npomueonocmaesieuuH”) (1964: 172-
183), and on the folklore communication as a specific kind of the auto¬
communication (1970a).

10. Some of the semantic fields mentioned have been noted by

J. V. Rozhdestvenskij (1970: 228).

11. For the connection between the metaphor and paradigmatics (sys¬
tem), and between the metonymy and syntagmatics, also for the relativ-

36
ity of their difference, see, e.g., in Jakobson 1956: 81 and Barthes 1969:
60. Barthes has ibidem noticed that the aphoristic types of discourse
constitute one of the areas where the metaphor predominates over the
metonymy.

12. Let us present, for example, some possibilities of transferring some

words and word groups.
(1) Stone can be linked to man through the physical and pragmatical
features of its ordinary referent, such as ‘hard’, ‘cold’, ‘inedible’, ‘infer¬
tile’, etc. Quite frequently stone is conceived in folklore as a negatively
valued poetic substitute for the heart, the bread and the earth. The im¬
ages connected, e.g., with the heart, eating and sowing are, in turn, quite
liable to transference from the physical and biological universe to the
mental and social ones: thus, we can signify, by means of stone, emo¬
tional stiffness, hardheartedness or sexual frigidity; by extending the
feature ‘inedibility’ to ‘unacceptability’ or ‘non-introducibility’ or ‘use¬
lessness’, stone can be applied to various moral and social contexts;
sowing on the stone also lets to interpret itself through the transferring
the concepts, as ‘soil’, ‘sowing’, ‘seed’, ‘reaping’, ‘yield’, etc., to the
mental and social referents, coming to mean, e.g., implanting the wis-’
dom, information, ideas, norms, etc. into innately infertile or intention¬
ally recalcitrant brains.
(2) Sea can be transferred to the phenomena of human life which
have the features as ‘changeable’, ‘fickle’, ‘moody’, ‘dangerous’, ‘vast’,
‘deep’, or which can be associated with the images of billowing, sailing,
harbour, coast, etc., which, in turn, are very suitable for metaphorical
transferring {sailing = ‘the course of human life in general’; to reach the
coast (harbour) = ‘to die’ or ‘to get married’, etc.). The features ‘vast’
and ‘endless’ bring about the pragmatic implications of inexhaustibility
and unaffectability (e.g. imaginations of drinking the sea dry in several
folklore genres, inch the image of the dog licking the sea in proverbs).
(3) Proverbs make use of the most part of the vocabulary marking
meteorologic and astronomic phenomena: human relations are expressed
through natural relations, social situations and psychical states of the
human being are signified through physical states of the nature, the
stages of the annual cycle are transferred to mean the stages of the hu¬
man life. So, sun and clouds can mean being in good resp. low spirits, or
refer to the alternation of good and ill luck or joy and sorrow in the hu¬
man life; storm can mean social disturbances or other impetuous move¬
ments in social life, or psychical or moral trials the man as a “traveller”
or “sailor” has to meet, or affective states of the human soul; spring and

37
autumn can refer to the ages of man, his green years and old age resp.,
and so on.
(4) Images coming from the vegetable kingdom are also quite fre¬
quent, though the characteristics of particular plant species are consid¬
erably less elaborated than those of animals. On the other hand, the bio¬
logical structure of the plant and its nexus with the environment differ
greatly from those of the human being (while the human being and the
animal are, in this respect, much more comparable): therefore some
good devices were found. Let us give some examples of tropicalization
of words signifying the “parts” of the tree. Root enables to express the
state of being permanently settled or getting acclimatized to a spatial or
social environment, e.g. cutting through the roots as severing the or¬
ganic tie of a botanic individual with its environment can be interpreted
as breaking the tie between a human individual and human envi¬
ronment, or vanishing someone’s life perspectives. Top (of a tree, as
well as that of a hill) as ‘the upper end’ or ‘the highest part’ can be made
to mean the head of man with corresponding metonymic associations, or
a certain social position. Bud, shoot, apple, cone, etc., as the “mediators”
or products of the generative performance of the plant can be applied to
mark, e.g., corresponding products of the sexual performance of the hu¬
man, i.e. children, but, being extended (on the basis of the features ‘gen-
eratable’ or ‘producable’), they can mean other mental or social “shoots”
or “fruits” as well; in connection with tree, fruit can also mean some
overt indication of hidden specific properties, etc. Kernel and shell are
proved to be suitable to denote whatever boon and a factor that hinders
reaching this boon, respectively.
(5) A very abundant representation in proverbial allegories and other
tropes have animals, at the cattle-breeding peoples domestic ones in par¬
ticular. But the beasts and birds of pray - wolf, jackal, crocodile, raven,
etc., - have also, since Adam was a boy, served as the signifiers of the
human (social or psychical) evil. It is also common to symbolize stupid¬
ity and obtuse stubbornness with ass and wether. And so on, and so
forth.
Of course, these and other images, well-known to each paremiolo-
gist, constitute no purely proverbial private property. The proverb shares
the most part of its tropes with many other folklore and literary genres,
particularly with proverbial phrases and fables. I. Sarv (1964: 327-400)
has demonstrated that the traditional characteristics of animals in Esto¬
nian folklore are, as a rule, considerably similar in several different gen¬
res.

38
 13. E.g., the words denoting bodily defects and injuries (sick, blind,
deaf, lame, humpbacked, etc.) can acquire the meanings of various intel¬
lectual defects or moral vices; states of physiological insufficiency or
satiety (hunger, thirst, full stomach) can be extended to mean mental and
social ones; psychical or moral detriments, pecuniary losses, mental and
social states of emergency, etc., can be expressed through physical inju¬
ries and states of emergency (blow, stroke, wound, drowning). Actions
of self-realization, also social actions, interactions, movements and pro¬
cesses, etc., can be signified with physical aspirations, activities, etc.
(climbing, creeping, kneeling, falling and rising, travel, hunting, scrap,
fleecing, sucking, milking). Cognition as such in general can be repre¬
sented through sensual apprehension (seeing, hearing, touching). As
mentioned, representatives of the somatic vocabulary very frequently
perform tropical duties, both in metaphorical and metonymical connec¬
tions: head symbolizes thinking, intellectual capability, also the func¬
tions of social government and leadership; eye and ear imply seeing
resp. hearing, but also immediate resp. indirect cognition in general;
nose conveys interesting possibilities for hinting at the intuition, wit, the
“sixth sense”; due to the physical salience of the basic referent of nose,,
and since this referent is known as the “acquainting organ” of some
animals, this word also enables to refer to curiosity, meddling, obtru¬
siveness, etc.; hand expresses actions, manipulations or skills of any
kind, foot and leg any moving or leaning or being based or supported,
incl. in the social sense. And so forth. This type of transfer might be il¬
lustrated with proverbs, as The blind man eats many a fly. Look before
you leap', Don 7 bite the hand that feeds you\ Every man must skin his
own skunk'. Don’t cut off your nose to spit your face'. Strike while the
iron is hot'. You made your bed, now lie in it.

14. The proverbial characteristics of animals, for example, are, as a rule,

not so clear and determined as those of the ass. If we know that a prov¬
erb text includes the word dog, we know almost nothing about the con¬
tent of this proverb. If we were told, in addition, that the word master
also occurs in this text, we might already suppose that there some rela¬
tion of social subjection or dependence is implied. Simultaneous occur¬
rence of the words dog and cat in the text allows of assuming that the
reference has been made to some prolonged antagonism or squabbling
(particularly between married people). The co-occurrence of the word
dog with wolf impels us to expect that we have here to do with an oppo¬
sition, e.g. ‘felon’ <-» ‘victim’ or ‘tracker’ ‘fugitive’, or that the con¬
trast ‘wild’ <-» ‘tame’ might be emphasized. If dog is related with bone,
we have all grounds to think that the general relationship ‘actor’ <-»

39
‘goal’ is involved here, more exactly, may-be, ‘destroyer’ <-» ‘destroy-
able’ or ‘desirer’ <-> ‘desirable’. And so forth.

15. B. A. Uspenskij’s (1970: 126) general standpoint might be remem¬

bered here: “...CMbieji cnoBa b ero nooTnuecKOM ynoTpe6jieHHH, c oa-
hoh CTOpoHbi, 3a^aeTCJi o6iahm (napaAHrMaTHuecKUM) 3HaneHHeM
cooTBeTCTByioinero cnoBa, a c Apyron cTopoHbi, — co3AaeTca koh-
TeKCTOM”. Concerning the proverbs specifically, N. Barley (1972: 744)
has recently noted: “If the use of distinctive features for contradiction is
impossible, they can still be used for connotation. There is, after all, all
the difference in the world between calling someone’s friends ‘Bees
round a rose’ and ‘Flies round a dung-heap’.” In the same paper, Barley
makes a very essential suggestion that the structural descriptions of
proverbs should be complemented with the so-called relevance restric¬
tions that would specify the scope of applicability of each proverb, just
dependently on the Z-lingual, literal meanings of its c-elements. The
need for such kind of restrictions becomes particularly evident if we are
concerned with distinguishing the so-called synonymous proverbs in a
semantical proverb classification.

16. To such “semi-formal” words might belong, e.g., the words marking
various kinds of spatial and temporal relations {great and little; long and
short, thick and thin; wide and narrow; deep and shallow; high and low;
upper and nether; far and near; within and without; together and apart;
beginning and end; old and new; early and late; yesterday, today and
tomorrow; swift and slow; seldom and often); but also the words express¬
ing various other relations, quantities and qualities, movements, proc¬
esses, actions, etc., etc. (many and few; more and less; first and last; one
and the other; heavy and light; difficult and easy; strong and weak; full
and empty; black and white; still and loud; hard and soft; fair and vague;
close and open; fall and rise; put and take; give and take; give and re¬
ceive; grow and lessen; hold and lack; gain and lose; lose and find; keep
and break; injure and improve; stand and go; go and come; show and
hide; reveal and conceal; turn and remain; gather; change; know; feel;
want; need; make; step; fit; bind; bring, etc., etc.). Here are some text
examples (the “semi-formal” words being underlined): The higher the
ape goes, the more he shows his tail; Old birds are not caught with
chaff; The chain is no stronger than its weakest link; Cross the stream
where it is shallowest; The leopard cannot change its spots; Oaks may
fall when reeds stand the storm; The hasty bitch bears blind whelps; A
cock is mighty on his own dunghill; Still waters run deep.

40
17. The “partially tropical” texts, displaying transfers in the “inversed”
direction, often occur just in the so-called weather proverbs. Let us give
some examples from the Estonian tradition (the tropicalized elements
being underlined): Kevadel vesi tark, siigisel loll (literally: In spring wa¬
ter is wise, in autumn - stupid); Hundile on udu onu, vihm velija kaste
kaelaloikaia (literally: The fog is uncle for the wolf the rain is his
brother, but the dew is his cutthroat); Loodetuul laheb ohtuks naise
juurde (literally: The nordwesterly wind goes to the wife by the evening
(i.e. calms)); Vihma latse ikeva, poua latse naarava (literally: The rain's
children are crying, the drought’s children are laughing); Heinamaa on
pollu ema (literally: The hay-field is the corn-field’s mother).

18. Some examples of the “human-bound” words: work; diligence and

laziness; care and carelessness; wisdom and stupidity; tongue, word,
talk; thought; joy and sorrow; luck and adversity; love and hatred; hon¬
esty and dishonesty; boldness and cowardice; generosity, stinginess and
greed; haughtiness and humility, etc. Some sentence examples (the
“human-bound” words being underlined): Misery loves company; Ne¬
cessity knows no law; Lies have short legs; Love is blind; Hope is a good
breakfast, but a bad supper; After-wit is dear bought; Pleasure has a
sting in its tail; Money is a good servant, but a bad master.
Though, may-be, of bookish origin (cf. Taylor 1931: 146ff.), but
nowadays still quite widespread at many peoples, seems to be the per¬
sonification pattern, connecting two ethical or some other abstract terms
with the words marking kinship relations if A is the mother (daughter,
brother, ...) of B’): Experience is the mother of wisdom; The thought is
father to the deed; Ingratitude is the daughter of pride; Disuse is sister
to abuse; Pity is akin to love.

19. Some examples: There is a place for everything and everything in its
place; To know everything is to know nothing; Extremes meet; The ex¬
ception proves the rule; Opinions differ; Mistakes will happen; All is
well that ends well; A good beginning makes a good ending; Never too
much of a good thing; Nothing so bad, as not to be good for something;
Better early than late; Better late than never; Never do things by halves;
Live and learn; Do as you would done by.

20. The borderlines between the “figurative” and “non-figurative” prov¬

erbs, as well as many other boundaries in paremiology, are quite inde¬
terminate. Nevertheless, attempts at distinguishing them terminologi-
cally have been made throughout the history of paremiology. As a result,
just the non-figurative proverb turns out to be christened with many dif¬
ferent names. Let us give a few examples:

41
 figurative non-figurative

(1) V. Dal’ (1957: 18,19) 1 nocjioBHua 1 nOCJIOBHHHOe

1 1 H3peneHHe
(2) A. Taylor (1931: 5-15) • (metaphorical) 1 (proverbial)
1 proverb • apothegm
(3) G.L. Permyakov nocjiOBHpa a(j)OpH3M
(1968a: 9-13) 1 1

(4) N.Barley (1972: 738ff.) proverb maxim

Distinctions of this kind are useful, on principle, in calling attention to

the phenomenon as such, but a more extensive repertoire as a whole
could hardly be divided, on the ground of this criterion, into two clearly
distinct classes, e.g., into the proverbs “c o6pa3HOH mothbhpobkoh 06-
rnero 3HaneHHH” and into those “c npaMOH mothbhpobkoh odinero 3Ha-
HeHHfl”, as suggested by G. L. Permyakov (1968a: 9-14). Due to the
“humanocentric” nature of proverbial world-picture, the “symmetrical”
model proposed by N. Barley (1972: 738ff.) might be regarded as inade¬
quate as well. Barley asserts that the metaphorical proverb operates on
one and the same degree of generality, apparently both “from the left to
the right” and vice versa (i.e. substituting the non-human for the human
or vice versa, the cultural for the natural or vice versa, the animate for
the inanimate or vice versa, etc.), while the non-metaphorical maxim
works on the vertical axis (more exactly, “downwards”), applying the
general statement given in the text to many different particular situa¬
tions. This model feels to be arguable in two mutually related points.
(1) It rests on the preconception that the binary oppositions used when
describing the semantical mechanism of the metaphor can be easily set
into a hierarchic arrangement. D. Bickerton (1969: 44ff), on the other
hand, has referred to some serious difficulties that arise at constructing
tree-formed classifications of binary oppositions. (2) The “traffic” of
transferences between the poles of the binary oppositions under discus¬
sion is not balancedly bilateral, as might be conceived. As mentioned
(cf. p. 29), it is much more vivid in some certain directions than in oth¬
ers; some theoretically possible cases are actualized very rarely, some
are practically precluded.

42
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1. TpH B03M0>KHbix noaxoaa. Ilpn nccaeaoBaHHH coaepacaHHa noc-

aOBHU, MOaCHO HCXOAHTb H3 TpeX npHHUHnHaabHO OTJIHHaiOmHXCa noa-
XOAOB.
(1) “MHCTO-CeMaHTHMeCKHif” (BHpTyajlbHblil, BHeKOHTeKCTHblfi)
iioaxoa. Hcxoahoh HH(j)opMauHeH cjiy>KaT cbmh TexcTbi nocaoBHp.
HccjieaoBaTejib He noab3yeTca HHKaKHMH HenocpeacTBeHHbiMH aaHHbi-
mh 06 hx 3HaHeHHH, a npn HHTepnpeTauHH tcxctob nocaoBHij onnpa-
eTca Ha coScTBeHHbie 3HaHHa h npeacTaBaeHHa o tom, (a) xaxHMH aBaa-
K)Tca cooTHouieHna Bemen b >kh3hh; (6) xaxoe 3HaneHHe hmciot
BCTpenaioiHHeca b nocaoBHuax caoBa b o6bihhom, T.e. HenosTHHecxoM
B3bIKe H (b) HeM BBJ15HOTCH nOCJlOBHHbl, KaKHMH CeMaHTHHeCKHMH
npaBHjiaMH onpeaeaaeTca hx nopoacaeHne h noHHMaHHe. 3tot cnoco6
aBaaeTca npeaeabHO yao6HbiM, ho aaeT anirib rnnoTeTHHecxHe pe3yab-
TaTbi, T.e. npHnncbiBaeT xaacaoMy TexcTy npeanoaaraeMbiH ceMaHTHHe-
CKHH nOTeHpHajT, COCTOflTeJIbHOCTb KOTOpOTO TpyAHO npOBepHTb.
(2) “CeMaHTHKO-nparMaTHHecKHH” (aKTyaabHbiH, kohtckct-
Hbiw) iioaxoa. HccaeaoBaTejib Ha6jnoaaeT TexcTbi nocaoBHu hckjho-.
HHTejIbHO B HX aXTyaaH3aUHaX, T.e. B CBB3H C HX CAOBeCHbIMH H/HJIH
MaTepnajibHbiMH xomrexcraMH, KOTopbie o6ycaoBHan aKTyajiH3auHio
3thx TexcTOB b npeaejiax onpeaejieHHoro BpeMeHH, MecTa, a3bixa, co-
UHajibHOH cpeat-i h T.n. 3tot cnoco6 mot 6bi b npHHUHne aaTb Maxcn-
MaJibHO aocTOBepHoe npeacTaBaeHHe o 3HaneHHH (3HaneHHax) nccae-
ayeMbix nocaoBHu. OaHaKO, npaxTHHecxn ero npHMeHHTb oneHb Tpya-
ho, Tax xax b pacnopaaceHHH napeMHOJioroB HMeeTca 6e3Haae>XHO Ma-
Jioe xoAHnecTBO npaMbix aaHHbix o 3HaHeHH5ix h ynoTpe6jieHHH nocao-
bhh h b Hacroamee BpeMa stot npo6en TpyaHO BocnonHHTb.
(3) “CeMaHTHKo-CHHTaKCHHecKHH” noaxoa. Oh npeacTaBJieH
noaxoaaMH, xoTopbie xpoMe HHTepnpeTauHH (ynoTpeSaeHHH)
xaacaon OTaeabHOH nocjiOBHHbi h BonpocoB ceMaHTHHecxoro onnca-
h h a, BXJHonaioT npoSaeMbi ceMaHTHnecxHX oth o hi e h h h Meacay noc-
AOBHuaMH, hx coaepacaTeabHoe cpaBHeHHe. B HaeaabHOM caynae 3tot
cnoco6 CTpeMHTca x axcnjiHxauHH ceMaHTHHecxoro onncaHHa HexoTO-
poro 6ojiee o6uihphoto penepTyapa b ueaoM (b (J)opMe cahhoh xaaccn-
(|)HxauHH hjjh THnoaorHH). HayHHaa ueHHOCTb tbxhx xaaccH(})HxauHH
6biaa 6bi HeoueHHMOH. OaHaxo, c apyron CTopoHbi, nonbiTXH co3aaHHa
tbxhx xaaccH(J)HxauHH HeH36ea<HO HaTaaxHBaiOTca Ha paa cepbe3Hbix
TpyaHOCTeH. YaaHHbiH pe3yabTaT npeanoaaraeT Haanane onpeaeaeH-
hoto MeTaa3bixa aaa axcnanuHTHoro Bbipa>xeHHa OTHomeHHH Meacay
nocaoBHuaMH, Bxaioaaa pa3aHHna Meacay t.h. chhohhmhbimh nocaoBH-

45
uaMH. nocJie^Hee, b cboio onepeAB, npeAnojiaraeT HCCAeAOBaHHe koh-
HOTaTHBHoro njiaHa C0Aep>KaHHfl nocAOBHU,. Tpe6oBaHHe 0AH03HaHH0C-
TH MeTafl3BIKa OKa3bIBaeTC3 npH 3TOM B npOTHBOpeHHH c xopoilio H3-
BeCTHOH MH0r03HaHH0CTbK> C3MHX nOCAOBHU, T.e. hx MHoroacneKTHOH

ccMaHTH^ecKOH HeonpeAejieHHocTbio.
IIpaKTHHecKH 6ojiee peaubHbiM Mor 6bi 6biTb HexoTopbiH kom6h-
HHpOBaHHblH cnocos, B KOTOpOM HCnOAb30BaAHCb 6bl Bee npaMbie A3H-
Hbie o 3HaneHHax nocjioBHU h KOTopbiH aan 6bi HccjieAOBaTejiio bo3-
mcokhoctb onepHpoBaTb TaK>xe coScTBeHHbiMH 3HaHHHMH h npeACTaB-

ACHHAMH.

2. HeonpeAeJieHHOCTb AeHOTaijHH. HeKOTopbie npo6jieMbi, cbh33h-

Hbie c nocjioBHHHbiMH TponaMH. Hiax, npn aHajiH3e tckctob nocAO-
BHU, MbI HMeeM Aeno C AByMS pa3HbIMH nOHATHAMH! (a) “a6cOJ!K)THOH
cyMMOH” Bcex ero B03M0>KHbix 3HaHeHHH, cocTaBJiaiomHx ero HHTep-
npeTauHOHHbm noTeHUHaji, h (6) cyMMOH Bcex ero AencTBHTeAbHbix
3HaneHHH, KOTopbie MaHHC^ecTHpoBanHCb b ero npexcHnx aKTyajiroa-
u,hax. K coxcaneHMio, b SojibniHHCTBe cnynaeB HaM He yAaeTca c(J)opMy-
jiHpoBaTb noTeHUHan 3HaneHHa nocjiOBHHbi takhm o6pa30M, htoSm oh
6biJi aACKBaTHbiM cyMMe ero AeMcTBHTeAbHbix 3HaneHHH, T.e. Mbi npn-
nHCbiBeM nocnoBHue icpoMe AencTBHTeAbHbix 3HaneHHH eme h He-
cytu,ecTByiOHi,He, hjih nacTb AeMcTBHTeAbHbix 3HaneHHH ocTaBAHeM BHe
paccMOTpenHH. MHorAa o6e 3th oujh6kh AonycKaiOTCA OAHOBpeMeHHO
HAH >Ke AeHCTBHTeAbHbie 3HaneHH5I nOCAOBHUbl He yAaBAHBaiOTCA BO-
Bce.
(B KanecTBe HAAiocTpaunn paccMaTpHBaioTCA bo3moxchocth hh-
TepnpeTau,HH sctohckhx nocAOBHp “Tiihi kott ei seisa piisti” h “Selle
koera karvadega tuleb suitsutada, kes hammustas”.)
CeMaHTHHecKaa HeonpeAeAeHHOCTb nocAOBHp npoABAaeTca npexcAe
Bcero KaK MHOr03HaHHOCTb nOCAOBHHHbIX TpOnOB, OAHaKO, 3THM OHa He
orpaHHHHBaeTca.

O npnpoAe h3bikoboh roMo/reTeporeHHOCTH TexcTa riocAOBHpbi h

n03THHH0CTH/Hen03THHH0CTH ero AeKCHHeCKHX 3AeMeHTOB B npHHUHne
B03MOACHbl ABe HpOTHBOnOAOACHblX TOHKH 3peHHA. (1) TeKCT nOCAOBH-
u,bi paccMaTpHBaeTca xax BHyTpeHHe reTeporeHHbin h ero CAOBecHbie
3AeMeHTbi noApa3AeAAioTCH Ha “3AeMeHTbi coAepAcaHHA” (c-3AeMeHTbi)
H “3AeMeHTbI (J)OpMbl” (^-3AeMeHTbl). K nOCAeAHHM OTHOCATCfl, HanpH-
Mep, T.H. peAHUHOHHbie H KBAHTOpHbie CAOBa, CAOBa, yKa3bIBaK)HIHe MO-
AaAbHOCTb, BOnpOCHTeAbHbie CAOBa, KOMnOHeHTbl T.H. CHHTaKCHHeCKOH
(})opMyAbi h T.n. C-3AeMeHTbi b cboio onepeAB moacho pa3AeAHTb no
3HaneHHK) Ha npaMbie (cr3AeMeHTbi) h nepeHOCHbie (c2-3AeMeHTbi).
noaTHHHOCTb npHCBaHBaeTca He ueAOMy TeKCTy nocAOBnpbi, a toabko.

46
HanpHMep, c-aaeMeHTaM nan eme 6ojiee y3K0 — TOJibKO C2-3aeMeHT3M.
(2) TeKCT nocaoBHu,bi paccMaTpHBaeTca xax BHyTpeHHe TOMoreHHbiH,

nOJIHOCTbK) n03THHeCXHH. KaaCAMH H3 erO 3JieMeHTOB npHHajlJIOKHT

BTOpHHHOMy”, n03THHeCX0My (77-)a3bIXy H OH CTpOTO OT^ejieH OT CBO-
HX B03MO>KHbIX OMOHHMOB B “nepBHHHOM”, T.e. o6bIHHOM, Hen03THHe-
ckom (77-)a3bixe h a3bixe TpeTbero nopaAxa - MeTaa3bixe onncbiBaio-
ipeM co^epxcaHHe nocaoBHUbi (M-a3bixe).

IlpezicTaBJiaeTCH, hto nocaeAHHH noAxoA HMeeT HeKOTopbie cy-

mecTBeHHbie npeHMymecTBa.

1. BcTpenaeTCH MHoro caynaeB, Kor^a ^-aaeMeHTbi BbinoaHaiOT b

nocjioBHu,ax ceMaHTHHecxHe (jxyHxpHH, 6aH3XHe (jjyHxunaM TponoB.
(B KanecTBe npHMepa paccMaTpHBaeTca TponHnecxoe xanecTBO cp-3ne-
MeHTa “cTOJibKo” b anemme F. JI. riepMaxoBa “CKOJibKo MyApeuoB,
CTOJibKO h mhchhh”). ^OBOJibHO peryaapHbiM aBaaeTca ynacTHe (p-3ne-
MeHTOB b aBJieHHax, KOTopbie mtokho 6bi Ha3BaTb Modcuibnou Mematpo-
pou, H B HHCHO KOTOpbIX BXOAHHH 6bl HanpHMep: (a) pHTOpHHeCKHH
Bonpoc, KOTopbin peryaapHO caeAyeT ocMbicjiaTb xax OTpHuaHne; (6)
Bcaxoro poAa npoHHHecKHe o6pa3bi, b KOTopbix MbicaHMoe axcHoaorn-
necKoe (HHor^a Taxace h npono3HUHOHaabHoe) OTpnuaHHe BbipaaceHo
yTBep>KA£HHeM; (b) Apyrne caynan, b KOTopbix (|)opMbi H3-baBTeabHoro
HaxaoHeHHa noaynaiOT HexoTopoe Apyroe 3HaneHHe MOAanbHocTH
(AeoHTHnecxoe, anncTeMHHecxoe) noA BanaHHeM xoHxpeTHbix c-aae-
MemoB w/'Hsm xoHxpeTHoro xoHTexcTa.
2. CymeCTBeHHblMH CHMnTOMaMH n03THHH0CTH MOaCHO CHHT3Tb
pa3Horo poAa 3(j)(j)exTb] xoHTpacTa h chmmctphh, B03HHxaK)ixune b
napaaaeaH3Me. Ecan pa3AHHaTb b noaTHHecxoH cTpyxType nocaoBHUbi
TpH aCneXTa - 3B(J)OHHHeCXHH, CHHTaXCHHeCXHH H Tpono-
aexcHnecxHH, to OTHomeHna 3B(J)ohhxh h TponHxn xapaxTepn-
3yioTca caeAyiouiHM o6pa30M: (1) cahhctbo b “MaTepnaabHOM naa-
He” xexcTa; (2) npoTHBonoaoacHoeTb b momcht C03AaHHa TexcTa;
(3) B3aHMHaa xoMneHcauwa npn BocnpnaTHH TexcTa. OAHaxo,
cpeACTBa, BxoAamne b noaTHHecxHH chht3xchc nocaoBHU, AeHCTByiOT
xax xoMneHcaTopbi xax b naaHe nopoacAeHHa, Tax h b naaHe Bocnpna-
THa. Tax, CBOHCTBeHHaa nocaoBHue CHHTaxcHHecxaa CHMMeTpHa MoaceT
Bbi3biB3Tb, c oahoh CTopoHbi, HexoTopbie cnoHTaHHbie npoaBaeHHa
3B(j)OHHXH (aBaeHHa T.H. rpaMMaTHHeCXOH pH(})MbI, B03HHXHOBeHHe
pHTMa h T.n.), c ApyroH ace CTopoHbi, - caya<HT HenocpeACTBeHHO
ceMaHTHnecxHM ueaaM: opraHH3yeT coaepacaHHe TexcTa h yxa3bmaeT
Ha CBa3H c-3aeMeHTOB (yTBepacAaeT h OTpHuaeT, coeAHHaeT h Hcxaio-
naeT h t.a.)- Oco6eHHO cymecTBeHHO to, hto CHHTaxcHnecxaa chmmct-
pna Bbi3biBaeT cBoeo6pa3HbiH acJxjjexT “ceMamnHecxoH cHMMeTpHn”,

47
T.K. yCTaHaBJIHBaeT MOXAy C-3AeMeHTaMH TeKCTa MHO>KeCTBO HeJIHHe-
apHbix oTHomeHHH, o6pa3yeT mhwkcctbo napaAHTM nosTHnecxoro
nopaAKa h MaHHcjiecTHpyeT 06a (Bee) HJieHa 3thx napalm HenocpeA-
CTBeHHO b TexcTe. TaKHe napaAHTMbi nacTO onnpaiOTCA Ha cHHOHHMbi h
aHTOHHMbl o6bIHHOrO H3bIKa, HO CHHTaXCHHeCXafl CHMMeTpHa AaeT B03-
MOKHOCTb paCCMaTpHBaTb Ha ypOBHe n03THKH Onn03HPHOHHbIMH H
Gojlbuioe KOJIHHeCTBO OTHOUieHHH T3XHX CJIOB, KOTOpbie Ha ypoBHe
^7-»3biKa 6buiH 6bi coBepmeHHo HecpaBHHMbiMH, HanpHMep, OTHoine-
HHe cjiob “ceAHHa” h “6ec” b nocAOBHpe “CeAHHa b 6opoAy - 6ec b
pe6po” hjih >xe oTHOineHHe cjiob “co6aKa” h “BeTep” b Texcre “Co6axa

jiaeT - BeTep hocht” h t.a. h T.n.

3. PaccMaTpHBaeMaa Tonxa 3peHHa He o6a3bmaeT Hac ycTaHOBHTb
neTKiie “2-BajieHTHbie” rpaHHUbi (a) MeacAy $-3neMeHTaMH h c-3JieMeH-
TaMH, h (6) MeiKAy cr h c2-3JieMeHTaMH. 3to oxa3biBaeTca yAoSHMM
noTOMy, hto takhx rpaHHu b AeiicTBHTejibHOCTH He cymecTByeT h ohm
MoryT 6biTb ycTaHOBJieHbi Jinuib OTHOCHTeabHO ycAOBHO. (B pa6oTe Mbi
noKa3biBaeM 6ojiee KOHKpeTHo Te TpyAHocra, KOTopbie bo3hhk3K)t npH
oueHKe B03M0iKH0CTeH TponH3apHH cjiob, yKa3bmaeM Ha KoppejiauHio
MeiKAy “6eccoAep>KaTejibHocTbio” cjioBa h “HenepeHOCHMocTbto’' ero
3HaHeHHH.)
/],ajiee AaeTca xpaTxaa o6maa xapaxTepncraxa ceMaHTHnecxHX
MexaHH3MOB nocjioBHHHoro Tpona b caeAyiomHX acneKTax:
1. riapeMHOJiorH noxa Maao HHTepeeoBanHCb TeM, KaKHe cjiaxTopbi
BOoSipe no6y)KAaK)T Hac HexoTopoe npeAAOixeHHe noTOxa penn hach-
TH(J)HHHpoBaTb xax nocAOBHuy h oSycAaBAHBaiOT noTpe6HOCTb b ero
CeMaHTHHeCXOM BHAOH3MeHeHHH AJia TOTO, HToSbl OHO CTajIO B AaHHOM
XOHTeXCTe OCMbICAeHHbIM H npHeMAeMbIM. ripeAnOAOIXHTeAbHO B HHC-
AO 3THX (JiaXTOpOB BXOAAT, HanpHMep, CAeAyiOIHHe: (1) CBOHM Heno-
cpeACTBeHHbiM 3HaneHHeM TexcT He cooTBeTCTByeT CHTyaTHBHOMy
h/hah peneBOMy xoHTexcTy; (2) b cbocm HenocpeACTBeHHOM 3HaneHHH
oh npeACTaBAaeTca cahuixom oneBHAHbiM aah noHHMaHHa h TpH-
BHaAbHblM, HAH (3) HenpaBHAbHbIM, HAH (4) SeCCMbICAeHHbIM; (5) OH
ABAaeTca no (JiopMe cahuixom ynopaAoneHHbiM h opHaMeHTaAbHbiM.
2. KaixeTca, hto hct hctxoh rpaHHUbi Me>XAy (a) nocAOBHuaMH co
“cahuixom TpHBHaAbHbiM” npaMbiM 3HaueHHeM h nocAOBHU,aMH c 6ec-
cnopHo HenpaBHAbHbIM 3HaneHHeM h (6) MeacAy nocAOBHuaMH c He¬
npaBHAbHbIM npaMbiM 3HaneHHeM h nocAOBHuaMH c npOTHBOpeHHBbIM
hah 6eccMbicAeHHbiM HenocpeACTBeHHbiM C0Aep>xaHHeM. B nocAeAHHe
roAti MHorne aBTopbi (B. YcneHCXHH, J],. BnxepTOH h ap ) Bbicxa3braanH
MHeHHfl, HTO BbipaKeHHa ABAAIOTCa CeMAHTHHeCXH npaBHAbHblMH HAH
HenpaBHAbHbiMH, ocMbiCAeHHbiMH hah 6eccMbicAeHHbiMH He camh no

48
Ce6e, a JIHllIb B CB5I3H C KOHKpeTHbIM KOHTCKCTOM, B KOTOpOM OHH JIBJ15I-

IOTCB aKTyajIH3HpOBaHHbIMH, H HTO HeT HCTKHX TpaHHIJ (a) MOKAy “HOp-

MajibHoft” nojiHceMHen cjiob h hx MeTacfiopHHecKHM ynoTpe6jieHHeM,
(6) Me>Kziy a3biKOBOH (“MepTBon”) h noaTHHecKOH (“cBexcen”) MeTacjio-
poil H (b) MOK/iy MeTacj)OpOH H 6eCCMbICJieHHOH KOM6HHapHeH CJIOB.

3. C apyroH CTopoHbi noHUTHo, hto Ha mxajie ‘nojiHceMH» ->

a3biKOBaa MeTacjiopa -> nosTHnecKaa MeTacjiopa -> hohcchc’ cjiojibK-

JiopHbie (BKJiioHaa <|jpa3eojiorHHecKHe) Tponbi Haxo^aTca Ha pa3HOH

CTyneHH, no cpaBHeHHio c TponaMH no33HH. Ecjih no33Ha CTpeMHTca k

bo3mo>kho cbokhm, HeH36biTOHHbiM TponaM, to Tponbi (fipa3eojiorHH H

(})OJIbKJIOpa BBJHHOTCH CTepeOTHnHbIMH, Tpa^HUHOHHblMH, KaK npaBHJIO,

H3BeCTHbIMH H aBTOMaTHHCCKH OCMblCJlflCMblMH.

4. Tponbi nocjiOBHU aBJiaioTca CTepoTHnHbiMH n CTepTbiMH y>xe no

CBoeMy JieKcnnecKOMy cocTaBy. CymecTByeT pajj ceMaHTHHecKnx no-
Jien, cjiOBapHbiM cocTaBOM KOTopbix nocjiOBnpa oxotho onepnpyeT: Ha-
3BaHH?i iKHBOTHbix, paereHHH, 3jieMeHTOB npnpoAbi, “cthxhh”; TOnOHH-
Mbl H 3THOHHMbi; COMaTHHCCKafl JieKCHKa; JieKCHKa, CBS3aHHaa C 6bITOM,
Tpy^oM n nnxaHHeM; cnoBa, o6o3Hanaioiij,He pa3Hbie HejiOBeHecKHe xa-
TeropHH H T.fl.

. 5. npe^cTaBjiseTca, hto cymecTByiOT HeKOTopbie o6mne npHHunnbi,

Ha ocHOBe KOTopbix KOHCTpyHpyiOTca Tponbi nocjiOBnp (b HanpaBjieHnn
H^,ea tckct) h KOTopbie flencTByioT b npoTHBonoJio>KHOM HanpaBjie-
hhh (tckct —> 3HaneHHe) npn hx ocMbicJieHHH.
6. Tponbi nocJiOBHpbi aBjimoTca, b ochobhom, napajmrMaTHHecKH-
mh (MeTaiJiopHHecKHMH), npn 3tom ohh HanpaBjieHHO-opneHTHpoBaHbi:
ohh BbipaixaiOT 6ojiee cjioiKHoe nepe3 6ojiee npocToe, MeHee H3BecTHoe
nepe3 6ojiee H3BecTHoe (HanpnMep, ayxoBHoe nepe3 (})H3HHecKoe, H^e-
ajibHoe nepe3 MaTepnajibHoe, aGcTparmoe Hepe3 KOHKpeTHoe). B sthx
BH^OH3MeHeHH5ix Be,qymyio pojib nrpaiOT onno3npHH ‘HeHejioBeHe-
CKoe : HejioBeHecKoe’ h ‘npnpo/iHoe : KyjibTypHoe’.
7. Haine Bcero nocJiOBHHHbin Tpon BbiCTynaeT KaK ajuieropna,
npoHH3biBaioiij;aH Bee c-3JieMeHTbi TeKCTa, TaK hto “cthxhh”, Heo^y-
meBJieHHbie oSbeKTbi npnpo/ibi, bcihh, pacTeHHa, >KHBOTHbie o6o3Ha-
naioT HejiOBeHecKHe cymecTBa, HejiOBenecKHe achctbhh, o6-beKTbi h
npo^yKTbi HejioBeHecKOH ^eirreJibHOCTH. TaKHe tckcth hbjohotch y>Ke
Ha ypoBHe npaMoro 3HaneHHa BHyTpeHHe HenpoTHBopenHBbiMH, h hx
cjie^yeT “nepeBOAHTb” b peJioM. Ecjih HaKJioHeHHe b sthx tckctbx hb-
jiaeTca H3T.aBHTejibHbiM, to ohh BbipaiKaiOT MHHHMyM ynacTHH nejio-
Bexa b npuMOM 3H3hchhh nocjioBHpbi. H ecjiH ynacrae nejioBeKa HMn-
jiHunpoBaHO Henocpe^cTBeHHO b SyKBanbHOM coaep>KaHHH tckctb noc-
aoBHHbi, to coxpaHaiOTca SoraTbie bo3mo>khocth ^jih nepeHeceHHa “c

49
6ojiee HH3Koro Ha 6ojiee BbicoKoe”, Bbipaacaa, HanpHMep, counajibHoe h
3TH4ecKoe nepe3 6HOJiorHHecKoe hjih MexaHHnecKoe, huh ^pyrHM ny-
TeM.
8. npH ocMbicJiHBaHHH ajuieropHH nocjioBHU caeflyeT yHHTbiBaTb
KaK CHHTarMaTHnecKHe, Tax h napa^HTMaTHnecKHe cjiaKTopbi. Homh-
HajibHbie “nHKH” ajuieropHH, b KOTopbix OHeBHUHOCTb nepeHOca aBJia¬
eTca MaKCHMajlbHOH, BHe KOHKpeTHOH CHHTaTMaTHHeCKOH CBB3aHHOCTH
nacTO MoryT He cooSmaTb HHnero onpe,nejiaioiiiero 06 H^ee h TeMe
nocjioBHU,bi. C ApyroH CTopoHbi, xa>Kfloe cjiobo b o6pa3HOM ynoTpeO-
JieHHH npHBHOCHT B n0CJ10BHU,y BCe CBOH KOHHOTaTHBHbie “HIOaHCbl”,
CBH3aHHbie c npaMbiM 3HaneHHeM.
9. HMeeTca paA “nojiycJiopMajibHbix” cjiob, KOTopbie aBJiaiOTca CBoe-
ro po^a cjiaGbiMH 3BeHbaMH b uenn ajuieropHH h oOnernaioT ocMbicjie-
HHe cyGcTaHUHOHaubHbix hhkob TponoB. C apyroM CTopoHbi, 3th cnoBa
He aaioT bo3mo>khocth noKa3aTb, r#e nocnoBHUbi c “noaHocTbio nepe-
HOCHblM 3HaHeHHeM” BHAOH3MeH»K)TCa B TaKHe, rjxe Tponbl OXBaTbl-
BaiOT TOJIbKO HaCTb C-3JieMeHTOB.
10. B nocjiexiHeM THne nocjioBHu; Mbi HMeeM nejio c npoTHBopenn-
BOCTbio hjih HecoBMecTHMOCTbK) BHyTpH caMoro TeKCTa Me*^y ero
CHHTarMaMH HJIH eAHHHHHbIMH 3JieMCHTaMH. ripH nOHHMaHHH T3KHX
TeKCTOB AOMHHHpyHDT OnepaiJHH Ha CHHTaFMaTHHeCKOH (MeTOHHMH-
necKOH) och, h nepeHocbi mo>kho nejiaTb b npoTHBonojioacHOM o6bin-
HOMy HanpaBJieHHH, T.e. xapaKTepH30BaTb HenenoBeHecKoe nepe3 ne-
aoBenecKoe, OnojiorHHecKoe h (J)H3HHecKoe nepe3 counajibHoe h ncn-
XHHecKoe h t.a. CymecTByeT pa/i cjiob, CBa3aHHbix c ncnxHHecKHMH,
STHHeCKHMH H COU,HaJIbHbIMH aCneKTaMH HejIOBeKa, HBJIHHHe KOTOpbIX B
nocjioBHue aBJiaeTca BepHbiM CHraanoM o tom, hto Tpon oxBaTbmaeT b
TeKCTe TOJibKO aacTb c-aneMeHTOB hjih aBJiaeTca caoMaHHbiM.
11. He TOJibKO MHoro3HaHHOCTb Tpona aBJiaeTca hctohhhkom ,qe-
HOTaTHBHOH HeonpenejieHHOCTH nocaoBHUbi. Hm mo>kct cjiyacHTb h
nojiHoe oTcyTCTBHe Tpona: cymecTByeT Sojibinoe KOJiHHecTBo nocao-
BHU, KOTopbie B AeilCTBHTeJIbHOCTH C0CT03T TOJibKO H3 $-3JieMeHTOB H
nojiy^opMajibHbix cjiob h KOTopbie cKopee HanoMHHaioT MeTaa3biKOBbie
o6i>acHeHHa co,qep>KaHHa, a He co6ctbchho no3THiecKHe TeKCTbi.
Ccjiepa hx pearibHoro (JjyHKiiHOHHpoBaHiia moikct OKa3biBaTbca 6oaee
y3KOH, HeM 3TO MOIKHO GbIJIO 6bl npeAnOJIOIKHTb Ha OCHOBe HX HHTep-
npeTauHOHHoro noTeHunajia.

50
 SOME ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF SEMANTIC
INDEFINITENESS OF PROVERBS:
REMARKS ON PROVERB SEMANTICS 2

1. The modal (functional, pragmatical) indefiniteness

As we know, proverbs do not function as mere poetic adornments
of speech; neither are they used, normally, to meet man’s needs
for philosophical phrasemongering. As a rule, they are used for
some practical, pragmatical purposes in various circumstances of
everyday communication. With the aid of a proverb one can aim
to provide an endorsement to his statements and opinions, fore¬
cast something, express doubts, reproach someone with some¬
thing, accuse someone of something, justify or excuse somebody,
mock somebody, comfort somebody, jeer at somebody’s misfor¬
tune, repent something, warn against something, advise some¬
thing or interdict somebody from doing something, and so on, and
so forth. It is unthinkable to consider the proverb apart from such
pragmatic functions.
Unfortunately, paremiologists have so far only some vague
ideas of the functions of proverbs. Moreover, the proverb lies just
somewhere on the borderlands between language and folklore,
and shares its functions with both of them, and one cannot say
there is a notable agreement between the conceptions of different
authors on the functions of language or folklore, neither is there a
notable unity in the terminology used by different authors who
have written on these matters.1 We accept here a more simple and
widespread scale, namely the set of three degrees
statement —» evaluation —> prescription.2
We suppose, however, this scale should fit in with the nature of
the proverb, and it has, incidentally, the virtues that it (a) operates

51
with concepts general enough, and (b) allows to consider the set
of its subfunctions (or functional aspects) as a unified system.
The functional aspects mentioned are in certain relationships
with grammatical moods of the sentence. Hence the illusion may
arise that proverbs can be classified functionally straight on the
ground of their “superficial” grammatical moods, so that the prov¬
erbs with stating (designative, informative) function were repre¬
sented with indicative sentences, and those with normative (pre¬
scriptive, evocative) function, respectively, with imperative sen¬
tences.3 This illusion, however, would be immediately shattered
against two complications:
(1) the evaluative (emotive, expressive) function has no sepa¬
rate or distinct manifestation (or “surface equivalent”) in the
shape of any grammatical mood;
(2) as affirmed by several authorities, every verbal utterance
fulfils not only one function, e.g. that corresponding to its gram¬
matical mood, but all its main functions (or at least several differ¬
ent functions) simultaneously;4 otherwise, a context-free proverb,
like any other utterance, is functionally indefinite.
It is likely unreasonable to imagine that the proverb could
have its say about the matters which have no social relevance or
topicality, or in situations including no alternatives, or that it
could state something with entire indifference, or put forward
statements which let no strategic (prescriptive) advices or hints to
be derived from them. It also appears to be obvious that a proverb
cannot order, interdict, advise anything without qualifying previ¬
ously as good or bad (or axiologically irrelevant) either the sug-
gestable or forbiddable activity or attitude itself or something
linked to this activity or attitude, e.g., its end, means, degree of
intensity, speed, time, place, etc.; and if the proverb puts forward
appraisals, these appraisals are, in turn, likely to be founded on
some cognized truths, laws and regularities (or current opinions,
beliefs or at least prejudices).
Let us take, for example, the common Estonian proverb Kes
kopikat ei korja, see rublat ei saa (literally: Who does not gather
the copeck that will not get the rouble). Superficially, this sen¬
tence is a pure statement. However, we are not capable of describ¬
ing its meaning to any extent without taking into account the

52
 pragmatical connotations and axiologic qualities of its main
c-elements copeck and rouble. Thus, we must immediately intro¬
duce the axiological concept of ‘good’, reasoning roughly as fol¬
lows: (1) ‘the copeck is money’; (2) ‘the rouble is money’; (3)
the money is a good’; (4) ‘the rouble is a greater denomination
than the copeck’; (5) ‘the rouble is a greater good than the co¬
peck’. Hence we get the following description on the stating-
evaluative level: (6) ‘who does not gather (spare) a lesser good,
that will not achieve a greater good’; further, the concept of
‘good’ can be specified, establishing the opposition between its
hedonic and utilitarian aspects: (7) ‘not-gathering (squandering) is
more pleasant’; (8) ‘gathering (sparing) is more useful’. The
premises mentioned enable us to give some interpretations on the
prescriptive level: (9) ‘gather (spare) small goods’ - i. e. active
“real strategy”; (10) ‘squander (do not gather) small goods, but
remember that then you must content yourself with your present
state, desist from striving for a qualitatively higher state in some
sense, etc.’ — i.e. a passive “pseudo-strategy”. The description can
be extended to some thinkable ironical, axiologically “in¬
verted” uses as well, the meaning ‘to strive for gathering’ of the
word to gather being altered into ‘to enable gathering’ and the
axiologic qualifier ‘evil’ being substituted for the qualifier ‘good’.
Then summarized description on the stating-evaluative level
might be ‘who does not strive for / enable the accumulation of the
good / bad quantity in some pragmatically important aspect, that
reaches / avoids the leap to the desirable / undesirable quality (in
some aspect bound with the previous one)’.
Thus, it feels rational indeed to conceive each proverb text as
performing all the three functions mentioned simultaneously. On
the other hand, the far- or deep-reaching interpretations of such
kind may often prove uncheckably arbitrary and “concocted”.
The functions under discussion could be arranged in a certain
natural way: statement -» evaluation -> prescription. This ar¬
rangement reflects the general succession of the stages of human
cognition (cf. e.g. Lenin’s well-known formula: immediate (sen¬
sual) apprehension -» abstract thinking -» practice). So, from the
theoretical or gnosiological point of view, the informa-

53
tive stage would be the lowest, the evaluative stage the intermedi¬
ate and the prescriptive one the highest. It is interesting to note
that from the historical point, if we consider these modes as
the historical forms of presentation the information serving the
purpose of social regulation, the genetical sequence of the stages
appears to be diametrically opposite: according to J. A. Levada
(1966: 68-69) the historically lowest, in this respect, is just the
directly expressed norm, prescribing that the ancestors’ practice
and customs be kept, and the highest is the informative form
where the addressee himself must draw conclusions from the cir¬
cumstances (facts, opinions, etc.) he was apprised of, and behave
accordingly. Anyhow, the stating and prescriptive functions oc¬
cupy extreme positions on our scale, and at the same time they
can be explicit as to their formal manifestation. As a rule, the
evaluative stage that lies between the is, vice versa, formally
implicit. The proverb disposes of almost no formal devices for
expressing its attitudes towards its topics except the /-pattern Bet¬
ter... than... and some other similar ones. Usually the appraisal
occurs implicitly, being hidden into the tropical tissue of the sen¬
tence, or it can be judged of only by extratextual para-factors in a
concrete actualization, such as the intonation and the facial ex¬
pression of the speaker, his social, sexual and age characteristics,
etc. The evaluative aspect, on the one hand, plays a very impor¬
tant role in the semantic structure of the proverb, for it is this as¬
pect that directly determines the implicit prescriptive output in the
proverbs with informative “surface function” (or indicative
mood). On the other hand, grasping the evaluative “shades” and
“nuances” of single lexical components and syntagms of the pro¬
verbial sentence and judging of the evalutive total qualifier of the
sentence as a whole are the things often very troublesome to do,
especially without any support from the contextual data, and they
cannot be done without a good deal of arbitrariness. By the way,
this complication is ill-natured in the sense that it enables to as¬
sign to proverbs ad hoc just such convictions and attitudes the in¬
vestigator is seeking for.
Let us give an example about the axiological ambiguity of the
proverbial trope. According to G. B. Milner, the English and Scot¬
tish versions of the proverb Rolling stones gather no moss have

54
 axiologically reverse meanings, depending on different interpreta¬
tion of the words rolling and moss', (a) the English version:
a restless, unstable, wandering from place to place, etc., person
gathers no money, wealth, property, etc.’; (b) the Scottish version:
‘an active, keeping on the move, etc., person “gathers” no stale¬
ness, stagnation, etc.’.
The following is an example about the extratextual factors. Let
us take some proverbs about social inequality, e.g., Kel vagi, sel
voimus (literally: Who has the might that has the power), Vaene
on rikka roog (literally: The poor is the rich’s food) or any other.
If the contextual data are lacking, different investigators can con¬
ceive them as expressing different sentiments and attitudes, such
as: (a) vigorous social criticism, realizaton and exposure of or
protest against social unjustice and the power of money in the
class society; (b) sorrowful irony of working people at their des¬
perately difficult and hopeless social and material status; (c) sen¬
timents of resignation, non-resistance, obedience, etc., implanted t
in the minds of working people by the ruling classes or springing
from narrow-mindedness and conservatism of the peasantry itself;
(d) cynical self-justification of the exploiting classes, or their at¬
tempts to show social inequality as natural, inevitable and eternal,
and so on. The texts under discussion can, on principle, express
all the listed attitudes and some others as well, but the c-elements
might -power and food have here a too neutral “timbre” to decide
which of these or other cases have or have not occurred actually
in oral tradition, and how frequently.5
If we use N for denoting some material situation concealed in
a proverb with stating surface function, then, depending on the
actual presence/absence (truth-value) of N and on its axiologic
value (good/bad), 8 different prescriptive outputs can be derived
from it: (1) ‘retain IT; (2) ‘abolish TV’; (3) ‘attain IT; (4) ‘avoid
IT; (5). ..(8) the passive equivalents of them.6
Beyond the axiological aspect, the modal indefiniteness of the
proverb can manifest itself also in numerous other forms. In sub¬
sequent, we shall briefly refer to some of them.
A proverb with prescriptive surface function need not be
moulded into direct (imperative) order or interdiction; it can be
formed as a grammatical indicative as well, i.e. as a formulation

55
of a norm or ideal severed from the concrete single addressee, by
means of such words as must, may, ought, cannot, etc., or their
E-lingual or poetical synonyms. But the text can lack even such
deontic determinants. In proverbs of many languages the word is
and its equivalents, also other copulae and the grammatical in¬
dicative as such in general, can get, besides their usual meaning
‘is actually’, also meanings as ‘must (be)’, ‘may (be)’, ‘is al¬
lowed’, etc., and is not (or the indicative negation in general), re¬
spectively, need not only mean ‘is not actually’, but also ‘is inter¬
dicted’, ‘ought not’, ‘need not (be)’, and so forth.
It is quite plausible that the assignment of (either informative
or prescriptive) surface function influences directly and thor¬
oughly the course of further interpretation, both on the functional
deep levels and also while considering the world outlook of the
proverb (i.e. whether we believe that there are reflections of either
reality or ideals in them). Depending on the concrete content
of the c-elements and the concrete actual setting, all the alterna¬
tives here can be implied, e.g.: (a) the reality not belonging to
standardization and regulation, or at least practically not governed
by norms and rules; (b) the norms which are regularly kept to (i.e.
the norms and/or the reality); (c) the norms which exist, but are
actually regularly violated (i.e. the norms but not the reality).7
For example, the Estonian proverb Kelle leiba sa sood, selle
laulu sa laulad (literally: Whose bread you eat, the song of that
you sing) could be received in several, different from each other,
functional variants, e.g.: (a) ‘it inevitably turns out that...’;
(b) you are constrained to “sing”, even if you do not like it’;
(c) ‘try to sham this “singing” outwardly’; (d) try to suggest
this conformable attitude to yourself, and so on.8
Sometimes it may remain questionable whether the grammati¬
cally indicative sentence ought to be interpreted as a statement
about some real fact(s) or as an epistemic sentence, i.e.
whether ‘is really’, ‘is known that...’, etc., or rather ‘there is the
opinion that...’, ‘it seems that...’, ‘it feels that...’, or whether the
proverb allows of both kinds of interpretation.
For example, in Estonian repertoire do occur lexically and
syntactically similar and, in all probability, also genetically con¬
nected sayings Soob vahe soodetu (literally: Little eats that who is

56
fed) and Soob palju soodetav (literally: Much eats that who is be¬
ing fed). However similar they were, the first saying is obviously
a statement about the reality, whereas the second one states a cer¬
tain opinion (illusion, feeling). The sentence Oma tilk on parem
kui voora hulk (literally: One’s own drop is better than other
man’s plenty) makes both interpretations possible, whereas Oma
lapse s- ei haise, oma lapse kisa ei kuule (literally: One’s own
child’s faeces do not stink, one’s own child’s cry is not beared
(i.e. does not disturb, derange, etc.)) suggests mainly epistemic
interpretation.
As a rule, a proverbial sentence leaves its “a 1 ethic quanti¬
fier” unfixed: we cannot say precisely how strong validity the
proverb tries to assign to its norms and statements. It feels, any¬
how, inexpedient to impute to the proverb ambitions of presenting
any, say, truths with absolute validity, even if it includes such
quantifying /-elements, as always, never, every, everyman, no¬
body, etc., or some of their more poetical analogues.
Thus, the semantic indefiniteness of the proverb embraces also’
its functional or modal aspects and manifests itself quite multi-
formly. If we mark with X the “material information” presented,
for instance, in the Estonian proverb Sober sobra naha koorib
(literally: The friend will peel the friend’s skin), this sentence as a
potential may get various concrete modal definitions, such as: (a)
‘it always turns out so that X\ (b) ‘one must fear that X; (c) ‘it
may happen that even AT; (d) ‘unfortunately, it often happens that
X; (e) ‘it is natural that A”; (f) ‘it is generally known that A”; (g)
‘there is the public opinion that A”, and so forth.

2. The indefiniteness of the information-bearing structure

(actual division) of the proverb text

G. L. Permyakov (1970: 19; cf. also 1968a: 26, 1968b: 226) has
repeatedly put out the thesis that “nocnoBHitM n noroBopKH hbjih-
fOTca 3HaicaMH CHTyaunn hjih onpeaeneHHBix oTHomeHHH Me>K,ay
BeiqaMH”. The concept of situation is somewhat ambiguous here,
and can be understood in several different senses, e.g.:
(1) Situation means the semantic interrelations of the words of
the proverb text itself (taken as context-free), these relations being

57
described in such a degree of generality that they cover the literal
meaning of the text, as well as all the conceivable transferred
meanings of it.9
(2) Situation refers to this or that concrete (immediately ap¬
prehensible or reproduced lingually) setting that provokes actual¬
izing of this or that proverb.10
(3) The author has not taken for requisite to distinguish the vir¬
tual situations presented in the content of the proverb texts them¬
selves from the situations actualizing proverb texts, for he sup¬
poses that the proverb text can be taken, in respect of the situation
actualizing this text, simply for a poetic copy, signifier or a de¬
scription of it.
The last opinion, though implicitly shared by many other
paremiologists and phraseologists, seems to be thoroughly unten¬
able. Let us put forward some imaginations of antithetic charac¬
ter.
(1) The relations of proverb texts to the situations actualizing
them are not correlated 1:1, nor can they be considered as rela¬
tions of variants (i.e. texts) to invariants (i.e. situations); texts and
situations are merely roughly correlated. One and the same text
(constant as to its wording) can be used in many different situa¬
tions and, respectively, different persons can respond to one and
the same situative “provoker” with different proverbs, depending
on which “irritant” from the complex of the situative “irritants”
the sender of the text topicalizes, how he evaluates this topical-
ized component of the situation and in what way he intends to
comment it upon.
(2) For several reasons it is arguable whether the semantic
structure of a proverb text can be called situation, even if taken
apart from any actual context: (a) situation seems to assume some
static relationship, setting, field of tension; proverb texts, on the
contrary, are sentences and the reception of them inevitably in¬
cludes the act of predication, i.e. inevitably represents a dynamic
process connected with, say, the moving of information; (b) situa¬
tion seems to require of its elements a certain “scenic unity”, be¬
longingness to one and the same “universe”, but it is difficult to
conceive anything concrete that could be such a “space” or
“frame” or “background system” inside which the virtual proverb

58
text could set up its situations; (c) the point of view under discus¬
sion would leave the specificity of proverbs among other signs of
situations unfixed, as at least “situations” (if not events) may
be called referents of the most part of signs; (d) situation hardly
fits for labelling orders and interdictions, but proverbs, as we
know, have frequently just the imperative form.
(3) Moreover, it is quite impossible to think of the act of ac¬
tualization of the proverb as simply of an act of signifying or
describing the situation, thanks the fact that the proverb fulfils not
only informative, but also axiologic and deontic functions in hu¬
man communication, i.e. the proverbial actualization divides its
context clearly into past and future components and connects it¬
self with both of them. For example, the proverb can regard an
actually given situation as an “input” and, proceeding from that,
predict some good or bad consequences, advise something, warn
against something, etc. But it can also take a real situation as an
“output” and derive from it retrospective suppositions about the
causes of what has happened, excuse some deed, reproach some-’
body, etc. Even if we should restrict our analysis to the (indicative
or prescriptive) surface function only, the actual division of the
proverb text would remain indefinite, and each text would have
chances to be actualized in two principal ways, opposite as to
their information-bearing structure: (a) prognostically, i.e.
when the apprehension proceeds from the nearest past (i.e. from
the “situation”) to the future, from the existent to the possible,
etc., and (b) retrospectively, when it proceeds from the near¬
est past to a more remote one, from the known facts to the un¬
known ones, from the effect to the cause, from the overt to the
covert, etc.
Let us give now some examples to illustrate our theses on the
indefiniteness of the information-bearing structure of the prov¬
erb.11
Example 1.

Pime kana leiab vahel ka ter a.

(literally: The blind hen sometimes finds a grain too.)
<— syntagm (a) —» <-syntagm (b)->

59
 Actualization 1. Somebody is being talked about, the partici¬
pants of the discourse having previously accepted the general
opinion that the person in question is clumsy, incapable, inatten¬
tive, that his actions and undertakings often tend to fail, and so
on. Someone remarks that, despite of this, the failure has made a
new attempt, and finds fault with it. Another person objects to it:
“Don’t say so, the blind hen sometimes finds a grain too.” - The
actualization is of prognostical type. At the level of indicative sur¬
face function syntagm (a) presents the given component, syntagm
(b) is new. Further, the information goes on moving in the sphere
of the new, at deep function levels, roughly so: (1) ‘“to find a
grain” is good’ —> (2) ‘being the “blind hen” is not a com¬
pletely bad state’ —> (3) depending on whether the actual ad¬
dressee is the actual “blind hen” himself or somebody else, ‘cheer
up and go on attempting, you can still “find the grain’”, or, re¬
spectively, ‘do not be sure that he whom you usually regard as a
“blind hen” cannot “find a grain” in particular cases’.
Actualization 2. Somebody has succeeded in something, and
this happening is being discussed. Only one of the communicants
knows something nearer about the person being talked about. The
competent person comments: “Well, the blind hen sometimes
finds a grain too.” - The actualization is retrospective not in tem¬
poral sense, but in the sense that here the apprehension proceeds
from the overt to the covert, from the single to the general. At the
surface level syntagm (b) is obviously given, while syntagm (a) is
new, e.g.: ‘N. is a blind hen’, and having interpreted blind hen, we
shall proceed at the evaluative deep function level: (1) ‘N. in
general is, after all, bad (incapable, clumsy)’, and hence the
prescription —> (2) ‘do not think that N’s success was regular’,
and —» (3) more general decisions follow as to further attitude to¬
wards N.
Actualization 3. The “grain” has still been “found”, and the
participants of the discourse know it; they are also fully aware of
personal characteristics of the “finder” - all this together consti¬
tutes the given information. The proverb text in corpore is new,
more exactly, the two connecting operations: (1) “amplified” de¬
scribing of this contradictory and unexpected happening, the de-

60
scription being transferred from the L-language to the /^-language
(this operation, of course, takes place at each proverb actualiza¬
tion); (2) carrying the single case under the general rule, resp. cer¬
tifying the general statement (i.e. proverb) through the concrete
happening against a concrete background, a certain “here-you-
are”-component that arises here. By the way, this is the only type
of actualization where the proverb text could be called, with more
or less good reason, the “sign of situation”.
Actualization 4. The proverb is actualized at the absolute be¬
ginning of the discourse, or it has nothing to do with the concrete
actual setting and/or topic of the conversation. Proverb-formed
titles of literary works, particularly those of plays can serve as ex¬
amples of this type of actualization; also proverb-formed intro¬
ductions of fables, occurring of proverbs in introductions of some
folk tales, the whole of the following plot serving as an exhaus¬
tive “exegesis” or “endorsement” of the parable, etc. In this case
the proverb text as a whole is given, and the information offered
during the subsequent explaining procedure constitutes the new.12
Example 2.

Ara vanasse kaevu sulita, kui uus valmis pole.

(literally: Don’t spit into the old well if the new one is not
ready.)
<-syntagm (a)-> <— syntagm (b) ->
In this example we consider only two actualizations, reverse as to
their information-bearing structure.
Actualization 1. Somebody has the “new well half done”, and
though he has no concrete intensions concerning the “old well”,
someone warns him, just in case, with this proverb. The addressee
finds that his present performance or state can nohow remind of
“spitting”, but the (metaphorical) situation of “unfinished state of
the new well” is quite fitting to refer to the existent (real) situation
- consequently, syntagm (b) ought to be regarded as the given in¬
formation. Further, the addressee has to interpret the metaphor in
syntagm (a) to realize against which action he had been warned.
Thus, syntagm (a) is what carries the new information on the sur¬
face function level. The following procedures on the deep func-

61
tion levels should clear up how the given interdiction ensues from
the given actual situation, finding what actual referents the im¬
plied components of the allegory (such as “water”, “thirst”,
“drinking” etc.) might have.
Actualization 2. Somebody shows disrespect for something or
somebody “old” (past, former), or intends to break off the inter¬
course with it (him), or to do away with it (him), or to destroy it
(him), etc. Doing so he is not conscious of possible bad conse¬
quences of his behaviour, and is admonished: “Don’t spit into the
old well if the new one is not ready!” The given information con¬
tains in syntagm (a). Connecting the interdictive modal construc¬
tion don’t with this syntagm introduces the first stage of the new
information. Thus, here the “rhematic” operations begin at the
prescriptive level. Further, here the operations on deep function
levels, motivating the interdiction received, must also follow.

Example 3.

Parent kodu kooruke kid voorsil vdileib.

(literally: Better a crust at home than bread and butter
in a foreign place.)
<— syntagm (a) —» <— syntagm (b) —»

Depending on the concrete situation, either syntagm (a) can be

topicalized (e.g. if someone grumbles at the scantiness of the
“crust of home”), or syntagm (b) (e.g. if someone’s well-being in
foreign parts has previously been praised). The whole “material
information” conveyed by the text can be given as well, analogi¬
cally to Actualization 3 in above Example 1. It must be remem¬
bered, however, that this proverb is one of those relatively rare
specimens with evaluative surface function, and deriving its deep
functions ought to proceed somehow otherwise, as compared to
the texts with “normal” (indicative or prescriptive) surface func¬
tion; on principle, we can move here in two different directions
from the surface function level. Hence considering the stages of
moving of the new information at deep function levels is con¬
nected here with complications too.

62
 Example 4.

The sentences A tree is known by its fruit and Lolli tuntakse suu-
rest naerust (literally: A fool is known by much laughing) display
a very similar surface structure, but differ notably in the possibili¬
ties of their actual division. In the first sentence, apparently, either
of the c-elements tree and fruit can perform the role of the given
information, while in the second one only much laughing can be
topicalized. Conceivably the difference is due to different interre¬
lations between the concrete c-elements in either case: between
the “tree” and the “fruit” a 1:1 relation seems to be presupposed,
while laughing fools constitute, obviously, only one of all possi¬
ble kinds of fools, and fool as such rather belongs to the evalua¬
tive than to the stating modal level. Thus, the reception of the
proverb about the laughing fool would proceed roughly so: on the
surface function level much laughing is given, fool is the new in¬
formation (more exactly, the predication ‘the laugher is a fool’);
the interpretation moves ahead on the evaluative level: ‘to be (re->
garded as) a fool is obviously bad’ -» ‘if being taken for a fool
results from much laughing, much laughing is bad too’ -> the
prescription: ‘do not laugh too much’.
In the few examples above we attempted to demonstrate
merely the indeterminacy of the information-bearing structure of
the proverb text, without any ambitions to deal with theoretical
and methodical problems of the actual division of proverb texts.
We are fully aware that actually the process of linking proverb
texts with their contexts is a notably more complicated process
than the above examples can show.13

3. Textual indefiniteness of the proverb as a type

There is an essential misconception which has tenaciously reoc¬

curred in the writings of several authors up to the present mo¬
ment. It is the point of view that proverbs represent a sort of
““ready-made” utterances” which “permit no extension or varia¬
tion” (Lyons 1971: 177) or “cliches” with invariable wording
which circulate “in the once and for all fixed form” (see, e.g.,
Permyakov 1968a: 9). Obviously enough, conceptions of this

63
kind can arise only if the investigator has a relatively small num¬
ber of texts at his disposal, or if he works mainly at printed
sources, particularly with more ancient ones. These sources often
obtained their content not from the living oral tradition, but, let us
borrow R. Abrahams’s (1967: 182) witticism, “begged, borrowed
and stole” it from other, still earlier printed sources.
True enough, the normal shape of the proverb as proverb
type (in the sense put forward by the Finnish school) is often
relatively clearly identifiable, as compared to longer and/or “not-
formulary” folklore items, and its frequency in the proverb type
(either in the oral currency or among archive texts) is often nota¬
bly predominant, as compared to other variants of the same prov¬
erb. The normal shape of a proverb can mostly be fixed with full
definiteness, i.e. numerous real texts, identical among themselves,
can be considered as its perfect representatives, and we need not
combine it from fragments of many different variants (as in the
case of folk songs) or content ourselves with a normal shape, tex-
tually indefinite altogether, that can be represented only at some
“emic”, metatextual level (as in the case of folk tales).
The variability of folklore pieces may not be so universal, as
the scholars of the Finnish school (and their successors) have
been used to think. In some genres of some peoples and cultures
the possibly exact reproduction of folklore texts can be seeked
for, indeed (cfi, e.g., Dundes 1964: 23, 24), but we have a good
reason to think that the folklore of cliches is a mere exception
against a background of varying folklore, and that the relation of
identity between the texts belonging to one and the same proverb
type is only a particular case against a background of a far more
usual relation of difference between them.
All the hitherto experience with any more extensive archive
material ought to convince us of the untenability of the cliche-
conception. If one would consider a sufficient number of authen¬
tic proverb texts recorded from the oral tradition, he could, in all
probability, see anything but cliches. The texts that, on the one
hand, must surely be taken for the representatives of one and the
same proverb, reveal, on the other hand, rich and multidimensio¬
nal variability: the vocabulary, syntactical constructions, euphonic
patterns - they all would proved to be varying manifoldly.14

64
 The variability of proverb texts cannot be the variability of
their “wording form” merely. V. Voigt (1970b: 126) notes: “An-
dert sich der Text eines Proverbium, so andert sich naturlich auch
dessen Bedeutung.” In connection with it we shall encounter with
a range of mutually interrelated problems, all of them linked with
the main question of how to distinguish the semantically relevant
differences between the proverb texts from the semantically ir¬
relevant ones.
(1) We would get a quite reasonable solution on principle, but
quite inapplicable practically, if we postulate that there are no se¬
mantically irrelevant differences at all, i.e. every, however slight,
alteration of the wording of the text eo ipso brings about a shift of
the meaning of the text (though, may-be also minute). But unfor¬
tunately or fortunately, up to now nobody has made any attempt
to describe explicitly such semantic micro-differences, which ex¬
ist, for instance, between sentences, as A new broom sweeps clean
and New brooms sweep clean, or between Measure thrice and cut,
once and Score twice before you cut once, or between There’s
many a slip ‘tween the cup and lip and Between the cup and the
lip a morsel may slip, or between Dogs that put up many hares
kill none and If you run after two hares, you will catch neither,
etc.
(2) We might suppose, then, that there are no semantic differ¬
ences at all between the variants above, and come to an agreement
that only the texts coming from different proverb types will be
considered as differing in the meaning, while whatever wording
variants inside one and the same proverb are regarded as irrele¬
vant or remaining below the level of susceptibility of our distinc¬
tions. However, this settlement would grant us only a partial suc¬
cess. Just the concept of proverb type itself is the peg on which
several specific complications hang. To divide some corpus of
proverb texts into sets of variants of different proverb types (or to
select from it all variants of a certain proverb type, or to decide
whether two texts are representatives of one and the same proverb
type or of different ones, etc.) we can utilize the criterion, put
forward by M. Kuusi (1966: 98; cf. also 1963: 340): “Wenn zwei
Sprichworter die gleiche Idee und den gleichen Baukem auf-
weisen, bilden sie Varianten desselben Sprichworts”. There is no

65
reason to call this criterion in question, for it corresponds to our
intuitive imaginations about the “variants of one and the same
proverb” in every respect. Nevertheless, if we should try to apply
this criterion for dividing a larger quantum of texts, there would
remain a considerable number of cases we could not firmly judge
of. The main cause of this trouble does not lie in the too impres¬
sionistic formulation of the basic initial concepts of idea and ker¬
nel, but in the fact some borderlines between different proverb
types are actually very clearcut and others very vague. The se¬
mantic space is “covered” or “fulfilled” with proverbial sentences
very unequally. In “densely populated” districts the tradition may
have looked up and realized all the possibilities for expressing
some concept or idea so thoroughly that literally all thinkable
lexical and grammatical manifestations of that concept or idea oc¬
cur in recorded texts already.1' Therefore, we may expect that
while considering a sufficiently large corpus of archive texts, one
will have quite frequently to do with very capacious “organic
molecules” (or the so-called type-groups or type-families) em¬
bracing several different “type nuclei”, instead of clearly distinct
proverb types. Taken separately, the most typical texts coming
from different nuclei might be regarded as representatives of dif¬
ferent proverbs without doubt, but, on the other hand, these nuclei
are bridged with each other by means of a set of variants which
can be arranged in such a way that the transition from one nucleus
to the other proceeds fluently, step by step, and we cannot show
precisely where the wording differences of variants of one and the
same proverb just turn into differences between (the variants of)
different proverbs. Consequently, it is impossible to formulate the
nomenclature of semantically relevant (i.e. “intertypological”)
differences of texts, clearly distinct from that of semantically ir¬
relevant (i.e. “intratypological”) differences, as the typological
interrelation of two or more proverb variants is determined not
only by the “absolute quantity” of their (semantic or formal) dif¬
ferences, but also by the proverbial environment or background
against which the comparable texts occur and against which they
must be considered.

66
Notes

1. For functions of folklore see, e.g., in Bascom 1954; a comprehensive

review of the functions of language and of conceptions concerning them
can be found in Robinson 1972. The functions of the proverb, as well as
those of folklore in general, have been conceived mostly as appearing in
a more general social and cultural context. The present writing, on the
contrary, intends to focuse just on the communicative functions of the
proverb, closely linked with its actual (vs. virtual) aspect. Thus, our con¬
cept of the proverbial function differs greatly from the meaning of this
term as understood by some other authors (cf., e.g., Voigt 1970a, 1970b;
Szemerkenyi & Voigt 1970; Jason 1971 etc.).
2. This triad might be paralleled with some other scales and opinions,
more or less analogous to it.
(1) V. I. Lenin’s (1969: 152-153) famous formulation of the dialec¬
tical way of cognition: “Ot mmoro co3eppaHH» k a6cTpaKTHOMy Mbiin-
jieHHK) h ot Hee k npaKTHKe...”.
(2) A. Taylor’s (1965: 7) statement: the proverb “summarizes a
situation, passes a judgement, or offers a course of action’*
/Spacing mine. A.K./.
(3) The well-known triplet of the functions of language, elaborated
by K. Btihler (1933): the so-called aspects of the first, second and third
persons. The same aspects have been presented by R. Jakobson (1960:
353ff.) as the principal functions among his so-called six basic aspects
of language, i.e. (a) the referential (or denotative, or cognitive) function,
focused on the context (the “aspect of the third person”); (b) the emo¬
tive (or expressive) function, focused on the addresser (the “aspect
of the first person”); (c) the conative function, focused on the ad¬
dressee (the “aspect of the second person”).
(4) Section B (“task area: attempted answers”) in R. F. Bales’s clas¬
sification of the functions of verbal acts, characterizing the interactions
in problem-solving groups, and namely: a verbal act (in its 6th function)
“gives orientation, information, repeats, clarifies, confirms”; it “gives
opinion, evaluation, analysis, expresses feeling, wish” (the 5th function);
it “gives suggestion, direction, implying autonomy for other” (the 4th
function) (cited from Robinson 1972: 44).
(5) Ch. Morris’s (1955: 95-103) kinds of pragmatic signs: designa¬
tor, appraisor and prescriptor.
(6) The branches of logic, inch the two more developed branches of
modal logic: (a) “ordinary” (propositional) logic that considers state¬
ments from the point of view of their t r u t h - v a 1 u e; (b) axiologic logic

67
that is concerned with appraisals and operates with the categories of
good, bad, indifferent, better than, worse than, etc.; (c) deontic logic that
deals with problems of norms, orders, interdictions, permis¬
sibility, etc.
3. Just these two modalities, the stating and the prescriptive, have been
noticed, incidentally, by H. Jason (1971: 618) who calls them “two
ways... in which the proverb brings its intentions to the listener”.

4. See, e.g., in Jakobson 1960: 353; Ivin 1970: 12; Halliday 1970: 144;
Robinson 1972: 52. It is of no moment here that Halliday’s and Robin¬
son’s nomenclatures of functions themselves are different from that used
in the present paper.

5. The complications ensuing from the axiologic indefiniteness of prov¬

erbs, e.g. their thematical ambiguity, have been formerly noticed by
V. Kafarov (1967: 13): “CKa>KeM, nocaoBHua “o6ombeT Becb Mnp nnia,
a caMa rojibiM-rona” Moraa 6bi nonacTb b pa3Hbie pa3Aejibi: oHa npo3By-
hht KaK >Kaao6a b ycTax paGoTHHKa h xax HacMeniKa b yciax TyHea^ua,
Sy^yuH CKa3aHHOH b ocy>K/i;eHHe HenpaKTHHHOCTH h OTcyrcTBHa cmct-
jihbocth, oHymnacb 6bi b pa3Aeae “yM - raynocTb”. OHa CBH^eTeab-
CTByeT Taioxe o TpyzrojnoSHH, ho b nepByio ouepe^b — o coimajibHOH
HecnpaBeaaHBOCTH..

6. For analogical variants, appearing at describing wishes, see in Ivin

1970: 124. To illustrate such kind of branchings, let us consider, e.g.
H. Jason’s (1971: 621) example Father and mother are as guests in this
world. Jason comments upon this text as follows: “This metaphor can
have two contradicting meanings: a) as the parents will soon leave this
world, use the opportunity to take care of them as long as they are with
you; or the opposite: b) if parents are burden to you, don’t worry. They
will die soon anyway.” As to the present example, the meaning of “two
contradictory meanings” might be somewhat specified. On the stating
(i.e. surface function) level both interpretations obviously give identical
results: ‘the parents will soon die’ or something similar. All the contra¬
dictions come in just on the evaluative level: interpretation (a) proceeds
from the presupposition ‘the death of the parents would be bad (be¬
cause...)’, while interpretation (b) proceeds from that ‘their death would
be good (because they are a burden)’. Correspondingly, the prescriptions
must also be different.

7. For the ambiguity of the term norm in ethics (‘reality’ or ‘ideal’ or

‘frame’) see in Arhangelskij 1968: 83; Kon 1967: 146, 215; Uledov
1968: 88.

68
 8. The well-known story about Mens sana in corpore sano provides a
good historical example of this kind of indefmiteness.

9. The way of forming and titling the logico-thematical groups in Per¬

myakov’s logico-semiotical proverb classification itself makes this in¬
terpretation possible. For example, in the texts included into the logico-
thematical group “Bemb h ee npoTHBonojioacHOCTb”, three semantic
components are distinguished: (1) the thing; (2) its opposite; (3) their
interrelation, formulated here as ‘co-existence / non-co-existence’. Thus,
e.g. the sentence rde cMex, maM u aie3bi gets the description ‘Bc*n<aa
Bemb cymecTByeT BMecTe (b e^HHCTBe) co CBoeft npoTHBonono^KHOCTbio
u He MOHeT cymecTBOBaTb 6e3 Hee’, and the sentence rde npudbuib,
maM nem ydbimna, respectively, the description ‘HuKaKaa Beum He mo-
>KeT cymecTBOBaTb BMecTe (b e^HHCTBe) co CBoeir npoTHBonojio>K-
HOCTbio; r^e Bemb, TaM HeT ee npoTHBonojioacHOCTH’ (see Permyakov
1968a: 202,205).

10. Cf., e.g., the subsequent passage: “Ecjih, .qonycTHM, penb u#eT o
KaKOM-HH6y^b HeOojrbmoM (no pocTy hjih no B03pacTy), ho xopouieM h
yMHOM HenoBeKe, onbiraoM h yMeaoM padoTHHKe, Mbi Tyr >xe BcnoM-,
hum nocjiOBHuy “Maji 30jiothhk, #a .gopor” /..../ ftHane roBopa, Mbi
noabHpaeM KJiHiue no xapaicrepy CHTyaquH” (Permyakov 1968a: 26; cf.
also 1970: 19).

11. All the methods appearing under the common denominator actual
division of sentence may be divided into two principal approaches.
(1) The “theme - rheme’’-division which is being carried out
on the ground of the semantic and syntactic structure of the sentence it¬
self, without regard to any concrete context.
(2) The “properly actual” division which is by all means a
context-bound procedure and takes into account the actual information¬
bearing structure of a sentence in a certain concrete actualization.
D. L. Bolinger (1952) terms the components of this type of division ma¬
terial information and actual information, P. Adamec (1966: 20-22),
respectively, ocnoea and ndpo, and M. Halliday (1970: 162ff.) given (in¬
formation) and new (information). If we have to do with proverbs, the
latter approach seems to be considerably more expedient, and we shall
accept it when considering the examples below (though all the situations
described are fictitious).

12. It might be referred, e.g., to the following points.

(1) The information conveyed by a proverb is not an absolute and
unchangeable “thing in itself’; here at least two aspects must be distin-

69
guished: (a) the “sender’s aspect”, or the intended result, and (b) the “re¬
ceiver’s aspect”, or the actually received result. These aspects need not
coincide (and, practically, they often do not): the receiver need not real¬
ize correctly to whom the saying had been directed; he need not under¬
stand the proverb in the same way as it had been intended by the sender;
even if he grasps the sender’s intentions adequately, he need not believe
the assertion (conclusion, prediction) presented by the sender, or need
not agree with the sender’s appraisal, or he may draw from what was
said prescriptive consequences altogether different from those sought by
the sender, etc.
(2) The information-bearing structure of a proverbial actualization
depends greatly on the concrete relationships of the communicants with
the concrete denotates of the c-elements of the text (e.g. with the actual
“dramatis personae” of the text).
(3) There are no strict borderlines between the communicative scene
and the more general social and cultural context in which those scenes
appear.

13. Cf., in this connection, V. Mathesius’s (1947) and J. Firbas’s (1966)

reasonings about the beginning sentences of folk tales, such as Byl jad-
nou jeden krai, etc.

14. For a telling example about the abundance of syntactical and modal
transforms the variability of proverbs displays, see in Kuusi 1967: 75-
80.

15. It is not without interest to note that something analogous is valid,

evidently, for the language as such in general. FI. Oim (1971: 207-208)
writes: “... it is not exact to conceive the semantic structure of language
as a “network” of evenly dismembered connections. Language turns out
to be structured in certain directions or districts in a notably stronger
way than in other ones. On certain topics a more detailed, a more re-
finedly dismembered communication seems to be possible than on other
topics.”

70
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72
Pe3ioMe

1. Mo^ajibHaH ((JjyHKUHOHajibHaa, nparMaTHnecKaji) Heonpeae-

jieHHocTb. B noBce^HeBHOM ynoxpe6jieHHH nocaoBHUbi, KaK npaBHjio,
Hcnojib3yioxca £jia npaKTHHecKHx (nparMaTHHecKHx) ueaen: ohh hc-
nojib3yiOTca ana ,qoKa3axejibcxBa hjih npe^CKa3aHH«, b hhx nmyx
onpaB^aHHa hjih H3BHHeHHa, c hx noMombK) yTeuiaiOT hjih ynpeicaiox,
npejyiaraiox hjih npe^ynpOKAaiOT h T.n. Bojiee xoHHoe npejicxaBJieHHe
o cjiyHKUHax nocjiOBHu noxa oTcyTCTByeT. riocaoBHua, Haxo^amaaca Ha
rpaHHue cjiojibKjiopa h a3biica, 6e3ycjioBHO pa3#ejiaex cboh (JiyHKi],HH c
Kaac^biM H3 hhx, oflHaKO, h o (JiyHKUHBX cjiojibKjiopa h H3biKa eine He
BbipaSoTaHO e^HHoro mhchhb h TepMHHOJiorHH ,zyia hx onncaHHa.
B pa6oie aioj,enxHpyexca Gojiee npocxaa h HanSojiee pacnpocxpaHeH-
Haa uiKajia:
yTBEP)KAEHHE -> OU,EHKA -> nPEflEIHCAHHE.
Ha3BaHHbie cjiyHKHHOHajibHbie acneicxbi HMeiOT HeKOTopyio po/jcxBeH-
HyiO CBB3b C PpaMMaTHHeCKHMH HaKJIOHeHHBMH npe^JIOXCeHHH. O^HaKO,
He ctoht nojiararb, hxo nocjioBHu,bi mojkho (JiyHKUHOHajibHO KJiac-
CH(J)HUHpOBaXb npaMO Ha OCHOBe HX rpaMMaXHHeCKHX HaKJlOHeHHH, X.K.f
(a) y 3BajHOaXHBHOH (HJIH 3MOXHBHOH, 3KCnpeCCHBHOH) (JiyHKLIHH
oxcyxcxByex coScxBeHHaa MaHHfJiecxauHa (“noBepxHocxHbin 3KBHBa-
jieux”) b BHue rpaMMaxHHecKoro HaKJioHeHHa; (6) xaacjioe Bep6ajibHoe
BbicKa3biBaHHe o^HOBpeMeHHo BbinojiHaex HecKOJibKo pa3Hbix (jiyHK-
Hhh, x.e. h GecKOHxeKCXHaa nocjiOBHua aBJiaexca cjiyHKUHOHaJibHO He-
onpeAeJieHHOH. Hepa3yMHO nojiaraxb, hxo nocjiOBHua Moraa 6bi 3axpa-
rHBaxb xeMbi, Koxopbie JiHiueHbi >KH3HeHHoro 3HaneHHa h aicxyajibHoc-
xh, hjih co^ep>Kaxb yxBepaqieHHa, Koxopbie Hejib3a 6biJio 6bi nepeBecxn
b cxpaxexHnecKHe peKOivieHjiaHHH. C apyroH cxopoHbi, ecjiH b nocjiOBH-
ue Henxo npeAnHCbmaexea hjih 3anpemaexca, sxo 3HanHX, hxo b Hen 3a-
paHee ^oji>kho 6bixb cKBajiHtJmuHpoBaHO xax xopouiee / njioxoe jih6o

caMO npe/yiaxaeMoe / 3anpemaeMoe aeHCXBHe, jih6o hxo-xo CBH3aHHoe c

3xhm, HanpnMep, ero uejib, cpeACXBO, cxeneHb HHxeHCHBHoexn, xeMn,
BpeMa, Mecxo, h x.n.; 3xh oueHKH b cboio onepexib ^ojokhm ocHOBbi-
Baxbca Ha KaKHX-xo y3HaHHbix HCXHHax h 3aKOHOMepHOCxax hjih xoxa
6bi Ha SbixyioiUHXca nojioaceHHax h npe,apaccy,HKax. (Ana Hjuiiocxpa-
u,HH npHBOAHXca xofl HHxepnpexau,HH 3Cxohckoh nocjiOBHUbi “Kes
kopikat ei korja, see rublat ei saa” nepe3 Bee xpn (JiyHKHHOHajibHbie

ypOBHH.)
BbiuieynoMaHyxbie (JiyHKpHH moxcho HeKoxopbiM ecxecxBeHHbiM

o6pa30M ynopaziOHHXb: yxBepacaeHHe —* oueHKa —> npeAnncaHHe. 3xox

nopa^oK oxpaa<aex o6myio nocjie^OBaxejibHOCxb cxyneHeii HejioBene-

73
CKoro no3HaHHH (cp. H3BecTHyio cjjopMyjiy JleHHHa: ayBCTBeHHoe boc-
npHaTHe —> aScTpaKTHoe MbimaeHHe —> npaKTHKa). C TeopeTHHe-
CKOH HJ1H rHOCeOJIOrHHeCKOH TOHKH 3peHHa HH(J)OpMaTHBHaa
CTyneHb aBaaeTca, tbkhm o6pa30M, cbmoh hh3koh, 3BaaioaTHBHaa —
cpeAHeft h npecKpHnTHBHaa - Bbicmen. MmepecHO OTMeTHTb, hto c
HCTopHiecKoii tohkh 3peHna, paccMaTpHBaa 3th CTyneHH KaK (jaop-
Mbi npeACTaBJieHHa HH(J)opMauHH, cayacameH qeaaM counaabHOH pery-
aaunn, hx ecTecTBeHHbiH reHeTHHecKHH nopa^OK npe^CTaBaaeTca 06-
paTHRM (cm. paSoTbi K). A. JleBaflbi). Bo BcaKOM cayaae, yTBepa^ato-
maa h npecKpnnTHBHaa c|)yHKu,HH 3aHHMaioT Ha HameS uiKaae KpaHHee
noaoaceHHe. IIo (fjopMaabHOH MaHH(J)ecTau,HH ohh MoryT 6biTb 3kc-
njiHUHTHbiMH. 3BamoaTHBHaa CTyneHb, KOTopaa HaxoAHTca Meayn,y
hhmh, Kax npaBHJio, BbipaacaeTca hmiijihuhtho, t. e. oueHKa CKpbiTa
b o6pa3HOH TKaHH TeKCTa nan ace o6pa3yeTca ToabKO no/i BanaHHeM
KOHTeKCTyajibHbix cj)aKTopoB. TaKHM o6pa30M, 3BajiioaTHBHaa CTyneHb
aBJiaeTca b ceMaHTHnecKOH CTpyKType nocaoBHUbi, c oahoh cTopoHbi,
Hpe3BbinaHHO cymecTBeHHOH, t.k. b accepTHaecKHX nocaoBHuax ou;eH-
Ka caMbiM HenocpeACTBeHHbiM o6pa30M onpeaeaaeT npecKpnnTHBHbiH
BblBOfl. C Apyroil CTOpOHbl, 0n03HaHHe 3BaaiOaTHBHbIX OTTeHKOB aeK-
CHnecKHX KOMnoHeHTOB nocaoBHUbi, a TaKace onpe^eaeHHe SBaaioaTHB-
hoh pe3yabTaHTbi nocaoBHU,bi b ueaoM aBaaeTca oneHb Tpy^HbiM h
no^nac BecbMa npoH3BoabHbiM.
(B nocaeflyioujeM H3aoaceHHH npHBOAaTca npHMepbi aKCHoaornne-
ckoh Heonpe^eacHHOCTH TeKCTa nocaoBHUbi.)
Ecan o6o3HaaHTb SyKBOH X HeKOTopyio cmyauHio, npeflCTaBaeH-
Hyio yTBepac^aiomeH nocaoBHupfi, to b sbbmchmocth ot Haanana / ot-
cyTCTBHa X h ot ee aKCHoaornnecKOH HanpaBaeHHOCTH (xopomee /
naoxoe), MoacHO BbmecTH 8 pa3Hbix npecKpnnTHBHbix caeacTBHH: (1)
‘coxpaHHTb X; (2) ‘aHKBHAHpoBaTb X; (3) ‘flOCTHmyTb X; (4) ‘hc-
KaiOHHTb X, H (5)...(8) - HX naCCHBHbie COOTBeTCTBHa.
Mo^aabHaa HHAe(J)HHHTHOCTb nocaoBHUbi HMeeT MHoacecTBO (jjopM
npoaBaeHHa h BHe aKcnoaorHaecKoro acneKTa.
(1) IlpecKpHnTHBHaa no (J)yHKU,HH nocaoBnpa He o6a3aTeabHO
AoaacHa 6biTb o(J)opMaeHa b bhac npaMoro npHKa3a hhh 3anpemeHHa
(HMnepaTHBa). OHa MoaceT 6biTb o(J)opMaeHa h b bhac H3naBHTeabHoro
HaKaoHeHHa, npH noMOiu,H MO^aabHbix caoB “Ha^o”, “MoacHo”, “Heab-
3a” h T.n. Ho h 3th AeoHTHaecKHe onpe^eaHTeaH MoryT OTcyrcTBOBaTb
b TeKCTe. CaoBa o6o3HaaaiomHe 3K3HCTeHU,HaabHyio Mo^aabHOCTb b
nocaoBHLiax MoryT npHo6peTaTb h 3HaaeHHa ‘^oaacHO 6biTb’ / Aanpe-
ipeHo’, ‘^onycTHMo’ / ‘He cae^yeT’ h T.n. B 3aBHCHMOCTH ot HCToaKO-

74
BaHHa noBepxHoeraoH (J)yHKu,HH KaK HH({)opMaTHBHOH hjih npecxpnn-

thbhoh Kap^HHajibHo 3aBHCHT flanbHeHiiiHH xoa HHTepnpeTauHH noc-

JioBHUbi Ha ypoBHe rjiyGHHHbix (jiyHXUHH, a TaioKe 6oJiee o6maa Mnpo-
B033peHHecKaa HHTepnpeTauna TexcTa (T.e. HiueM jih mbi b tom hjih
HHOM BbICKa3bIBaHHH OTpa>KeHHa JieHCTBHTeJlbHOCTH HJIH H^ea-
J10b). B 3aBHCHMOCTH OT KOHKpeTHOTO CO^ep)KaHHa C-3JieMeHTOB H OT
KOHKpeTHOH HCXOAHOH CHTyaUHH 3fleCb B03M0>KHbI BCe ajIbTepHaTHBbl,
Tax MoryT noApa3yMeBaTbca (a) .nencTBHTejibHOCTb, He noaneacaiiiaa
HopMHpoBaHHio h peryjinpoBxe; (6) HopMbi, KOTopbiM peryaapHO cae-
AyiOT, T.e. HOpMbI h/hJ1H aeHCTBHTeJIbHOCTb; (b) HOpMbI, KOTOpbie cy-
mecTByioT, ho CHCTeMaTHHecKH HapyuiaiOTca, T.e. HopMbi, ho He
AeHCTBHTejIbHOCTb.
(2) HHor^a ocTaeTca HeacHbiM, cjie^yeT jih HHAHxaTHBHoe npe/yio-
aceHHe HHTepnpeTHpoBaTb xax yTBepameHHe o HexoTopbix peaJibHbix
(JiaKTax, hjih ace xax snHCTeMHHecKoe npemioaceHHe (xax Hanpn-
Mep ‘b aeHCTBHTenbHOCTH...’, ‘H3BecTHO, hto...’ hjih ace ‘nojiaraK)T,
hto...’, ‘xaaceTca, hto...’ h T.n.).
(3) B nocJiOBHuax, xax npaBHJio, ocTaeTca OTxpbiTbiM Taxace h
“ajieTHHecKHH XBaHTop”: Mbi He MoaceM tohho onpeaejiHTb, xaxyio
CTeneHb o6a3aTeJibHOCTH nocjioBHU,a npncBaHBaeT cbohm HopMaM h
yTBepxc^eHHaM. Bo bchkom cjiynae npe,qcTaBjiaeTca Heu,ejiecoo6pa3-
hmm npHCBaHBaTb nocJioBHU,e npeflCTaBJieHHe 06 a6eojHOTHOCTH ycTa-
HaBJiHBaeMbix eio hcthh, Aaace ecjin b Hen npneyTCTByK)T Taxne XBaH-
TopHbie ^-3JieMeHTbi, xax “Bcer,aa”, “Hnxor/ia”, “BcaxHii”, “xaac,abiH”,
“hhkto” h T.n.

2. HeonpeaejieHHOCTb HH<|)opMauHOHHOH CTpyKTypbi (aKTyajibHoro

HJieHeHHn) nocjiOBHUbi. B pa6oTax T. JI. IlepMaxoBa He pa3 yTBepac-
aaeTca, hto “nocjiOBHUbi h noroBopxH aBJiaioTca 3HaxaMH CHTyaunn
hjih onpeAejieHHbix OTHomeHHH Meac,qy BeuiaMH”. IIoHaTHe “CHTya¬
UHH” b 3toh (JiopMyjiHpoBxe M05XHO noHHMaTb no-pa3HOMy: (1) “cHTya-
una” o6o3HanaeT ceMaHTHHecxne OTHoiueHHa cjiob, BCTpeHaiomHxca b
caMOM TexcTe nocjiOBHUbi; (2) “cHTyau,Ha” yxa3bmaeT Ha xohx-
peTHoe MaTepnajibHoe (hjih peneBoe) cocToaHHe, xoTopoe Bbi3biBaeT
axTyajiH3aiiHK) toh hjih npyron nocjiOBHUbi; (3) yxa3aHHbie Bbmie 3Ha-
neHHa “CHTyaUHH” He CHHTajiH Heo6xouHMbiM pa3annaTb, t.x. noaara-
jih, hto nocjioBHpy MoacHO cHHTaTb npocTO no3THHecxoH xonnen, 060-
3HanaiomHM hjih onncaHHeM CHTyaunn, xoTopaa axTyanH3HpoBajia noc-
jioBHpy. IlocjieAHee MHeHHe, ouHaxo, 6biJio 6bi coBepuieHHo HecocToa-
TeabHbiM. llocaoBHua BbinoaHaeT b HejioBenecxoM o6meHHH He TOJibxo
HHCjlOpMaTHBHyK), HO H 3BaJHOaTHBHyiO H npeCXpHnTHBHyK) (JiyHXHHK).
AxTyajiH3auHa nocjiOBHUbi hctxo pa3^eaaeT xohtcxct Ha xoMnoHeHTbi

75
npotujioro h Gy^ymero h CBA3biBaeT ceGa c kejk^bim H3 hhx. riocjiOBH-
ua MO>KeT paccMaTpHBaTb aKTyanbHO AaHHyio CHTyapnio KaK “b x o a ’ h
Ha ocHOBe 3Toro npeyraAMBaTb KaKHe-HnGyAb xopomne hah njioxHe
pe3yjibTaTbi, coBeTOBaTb HTO-HnGyAb, npe/iyiipe/iHTb ot Hero-HMOyAb h
T.n. Ho CHTyauHa, AaHHaa b A^HCTBHTeAbHOCTH, MoaceT paccMaTpuBaTb-

ca h Kax “bhxoa” h H3 3Toro MoryT 6biTb BbiBeAeHbi 3aKAiOHeHHa o

npuHHHax npoHCiHeaiiiero h T.n. Yace Ha ypoBHe HHAHKaTHBHOH hjih
npecKpHnTHBHOH noBepxHOCTHOH cjiyHKUHH aKTyanbHoe HJieHeHHe
TeKCTa nocjiOBHUbi ocTaeTca oTKpbiTbiM h b o6meM y KaatAoro TeKCTa
ecTb nepcneKTHBbi aKTyaAH3HpoBaTbca AByMa npoTHBonoAoacHMMH
cnocoGaMH: (a) npomocTHHecKH, rpe no3HaHHe ABHaceTca ot
HenocpeACTBeHHoro nponuioro (T.e. hcxoahoh CHTyapHH) b Gyaymee,
ot AeHCTBHTeabHoro k B03M0acH0My, h (G) peTpocneKTHBHO, rae
no3HaHHe ABHaceTca ot HenocpeACTBeHHoro npouiAoro k Goaee abacko-
My, OT H3BeCTHbIX (jiaKTOB K HeH3BeCTHbIM, OT CAeACTBHa K npHHHHe, OT

OTKpblTOTO K CKpbITOMy.
(3aTeM npHBOAHTca paA npHMepoB aaa HAAiocTpaunH Heonpeae-

aeHHOCTH HH(J)OpMai],HOHHOH CTpyKTypbl nOCAOBHAbl.)

3. TeKCTOBaa HeonpeAeJieHHOCTb nocAOBHpbi KaK THna. B nape-

mhoaothh pacnpocTpaHeHO AoacHoe npeACTaBaeHHe, hto nocAOBHpbi
aBaaioTca CBoeo6pa3HbiMH OKaMeHeAbiMH KJiHiue, KOTopbie ynoTpeGaa-
lOTca b pa3 h HaBcerAa CAoacHBUieHca h ycTOHHHBOH (|)opMe. TaKoro
poAa npeACTaBaeHHa MoryT, bhahmo, B03HHKaTb toabko TOTAa, KorAa b
pacnopaaceHHH HCCAeAOBaTeAa HMeeTca othochtcabho Maaoe koahhc-
CTBO TeKCTOB, H/HAH eCAH OH paGOTaeT TOAbKO C nenaTHblMH HCTOHHH-
kbmh, KOTopbie nacTO He OTpaacaioT oGcToaTeAbCTB GbiTOBaHHa achboh
TpaAHUHH. XOTa H BapHaTHBIIOCTb (jlOAbKAOpa B ACHCTBHTeABHOCTH He
aBAaeTca CTOAb yHHBepcaAbHOH, kbk sto Ka3aAocb npeACTaBHTeAAM
(Jihhckoh uiKOAbi, Bee a<e Becb HaKonAeHHbiH onbiT aHaAH3a apxHBHoro
MaTepnana yGeacaaeT Hac b tom, hto npeACTaBAeHHe o nocAOBHuax KaK
KAHine aBAaeTca coBepmeHHO HecocToaTeAbHbiM: TeKCTbi, BxoAamne b
oahh THn, BapbnpyioTca KaK b naaHe ackchkh, TaK h b nnaHe CHHTaK-
CHCa H 3B(f)OHHKH.
BapnaGAbHOCTb hocaobhhhbix tckctob He MoaceT GbiTb ahihb Ba-
pnaGAbHOCTbio cjiopMbi: H3MeHeHHaM b naaHe BbipaaceHHa TaK hah hha-
ne eonyTCTByioT H3MeHeHHa b nAaHe coaepacaHHa. TaKHM o6pa30M, pe-
AbiH paA npoGaeM cocpeAOTaHHBaeTca BOKpyr Bonpoca: KaK pa3AHHaTb
ceMaHTHnecKH cyipecTBeHHbie OTAHHHa Meacay TeKCTaMH nocAOBHp ot
ceMaHTHHecKH HecymecTBeHHbix. B npHHpnne pa3yMHoe, ho npaKTH-
necKH HenpneMAeMoe pemeHHe mm noAyHHAH Gbi, nocTyAHpoBaB, hto
ceMaHTHnecKH HepeaeBaHTHbix pa3AHHHH BOBce He cymecTByeT: noxa

76
eme hhkto He cyMen (aa h He nbiTaaca) 3KcnnHUHTHO onHcaTb ceMaH-
THHecKHe MHKpopa3JiHHna, KOTopbie HMeiOTca y oneHb 6jih3khx, ho He
nojiHOCTbio coBnaaaiomHxca TeKCTOBbix BapnaHTOB nocaoBHU. Mo>kho
ycaoBHTbca, hto pa3Hbie nocaoBHUbi (T.e. TexcTbi, npeacTaBaaioiHHe
pa3Hbie THnbi nocaoBHU,) aBaaKvrca ceMaHTHHecKH pa3aHHHbiMH, a Ba-
pHaHTbl OAHOH H TOH >Ke nOCJlOBHUbl - COBna^aiOT HJIH, BO BCflKOM CJiy-
nae, pa3JiHHaioTca jiHiub He3HaHHTejibHO. Ho h 3to pemeHne Bonpoca
o6ecnenHJio 6bi tojibko nacTHHHbiH ycnex, t.k. mhoto TpyaHocTen CBa-
3aHO c caMHM noHHTHeM THna nocaoBHU bi. ,H,aa onpeaeaeHHa oa-
HO/pa3HOTHnHOCTH TeKCTOB nOCJIOBHH,, MOaCHO n0Ab30BaTbCa, Hanpn-
Mep, KpHTepneM HAeHHoro h aaepHoro ToacaecTBa M. KyycH.
XOTB 3TOT KpHTepHH H HBJiaeTCa CaMbIM KOppeKTHbIM CpeAH CXOAHbIX,
Bee >xe npn npHMeHeHHH k SoabiiiOMy HHCJiy tckctob oh ocTaBaaeT
MHoro caynaeB HeonpeaeaeHHbiMH. raaBHOH npHHHHOH aBaaeTca He
CTOJlbKO HMnpeCCHOHHCTCKaa (J)OpMyjlHpOBKa OCHOBHbIX nOHaTHH
“Haea” h “aapo”, CKOJibKO to, hto rpaHHpbi Meacay THnaMH nocaoBHU
b aeHCTBHTejibHOCTH HHoraa OHeHb HeTKHe, a HHoara - oneHb
pacnabiBHaTbie. CeMaHTHHecKoe npocTpaHCTBO HanojiHeHO nocaoBHua-
mh oneHb HepoBHO. B Han6oaee “TecHO 3acejieHHbix” MecTax MoryT(
6biTb peajiH30BaHbi Bee bo3mo>khocth j\jih BbipaaceHHa HexoTopbix haefi
hjih noHaTHH HacToabKO noaHO, hto, npaKTHnecKH, Bee B03MoacHbie
aeKCHHecKHe h rpaMMaTHnecKHe cpeacBa BbipaaceHHa 3thx naen nan
noHaTHH BCTpenaiOTca h b peaabHO 3a<J)HKCHpoBaHHbix TexcTax. B aoc-
TaTOHHO SoaboioM apxHBHOM Kopnyce tckctob HaM nacTO npnxoaHTca
BMecTO neTKO pa3aHHaKHHHXca THnoB nocaoBHU HMeTb aeao c o6i>eM-
hbimh “opraHHHecKHMH MoaeKyaaMH”, KOTopbie oxBaTbiBaioT Hecxoab-
ko aaep pa3Hbix THnoB. 3th aapa CBa3biBaiOTca nocpeacTBOM BapnaH-
tob, nocaeflOBaTeabHOCTb KOTopbix MoacHO 6biao 6bi ynopaaoHHTb
tbkhm o6pa30M, HTo6bi nepexoa ot oahoto aapa k apyroMy nponcxo-
Aha 6bi no CTyneHaM. B cnay stoto Heab3a tohho yKa3aTb, rae pa3an-
HHa Meacay BapnaHTaMH oahoh h toh ace nocaoBHUbi nepepacTaioT b
pa3aHHHa Meacay BapnaHTaMH pa3Hbix nocaoBHip CaeaoBaTeabHO, oica-
3biBaeTca HeB03MoacHbiM ccfiopMyaHpoBaTb onpeaeaeHHyio HOMeHKaa-
Typy MeacTHnoBbix TeKCTOBbix pa3AHHHH, KOTopaa hctko OTaeaaaacb
6bl OT HOMeHKaaTypbl BHyTpHTHnOBbIX pa3anHHH, t.k. THnoaorHHecKHe
cooTHOiiieHHa TeKCTOB nocaoBHp onpeaeaaKiTca He ToabKO a6coaiOT-
hoh BeaHHHHOH 3thx pa3aHHHH, ho h nocaoBHHHbiM oxpyaceHHeM (nan
4»ohom), Ha kotopom 3th paaaHHna o6HapyacHBaioTca.

77
 SOME DIFFICULTIES ARISING AT SEMANTIC
CLASSIFYING OF PROVERBS

G. L. Permyakov’s semantic (or as put by the author himself:

logico-semiotic) proverb classification (1968, 179-347) and
M. Kuusi’s international type-system (1972; cf. also 1970) un¬
doubtedly stand out among all the attempts hitherto made in the
field. One of the important advantages these two systems have
over the ealier ones is a notably stricter and more logical way for
describing the meanings of proverbs. The most salient features of
both systems, as to their metalingual apparatus, are: (1) they oper¬
ate with concepts general enough to embrace the major part of the •
particular “sub-meanings” a proverbial sentence could ever have;
(2) they are oriented to binary oppositions; (3) on the main classi¬
fication level they assign sentence-shaped descriptions to
classifiable texts, instead of so far common “nominal” (noun- or
noun phrase shaped) labellings that are to locate each proverb into
this or that topical column.
The advantages mentioned, particularly point (3) above, di¬
minish noticeably the well-known danger of arbitrariness of clas¬
sification alias the vice of intersecting and overlapping
its classes. Nevertheless, neither of the classifications under dis¬
cussion, to say nothing of the previous ones, is able to eliminate
these dangers root and branch and on the principle. When consid¬
ering Permyakov’s system we can find a considerable multitude
of cases in it where, e.g. (1) texts with similar sense and wording,
even identical ones, are located into different classes, or (2) a text
or a group of texts that can be found in a certain class would be
equally fit or even fitter for some other class(es), or (3) some
“headings” of different classes of one and the same level turn out
to be structurally identical, but conceptually hyponymical, etc.
Thus, neither the transitional operations between the levels text —»

79
metatext, nor the interrelations of homolevel metatexts, nor the
criteria for differentiating metatextual levels themselves can be
regarded sufficiently strict or sufficiently explicit. Kuusi’s (1972,
733-735) criticism of Permyakov’s shortcomings is entirely ten¬
able, but one has evidently no ground to entertain a hope that
Kuusi’s own classification or any other to be, however successful
and valuable it might be in other aspects, could be a greater suc¬
cess in avoiding slips analogous to those made by Permyakov, un¬
til the methods themselves for constructing classifications are not
cardinally improved.
Now we shall discuss these problems in detail. Our aim is to
demonstrate that the troubles mentioned have their primary source
in two mutually related factors: (1) the partial (inexhaustive,
omissing) character of semantic descriptions of proverbs, and
(2) the hierarchical (tree-shaped) construction of existent classifi¬
cations.
Proverbs, even if we take each of them separately and without
regard to any possible contexts, appear to have rather complicated
structures. A context-free proverb (text or type) enables semantic
taxation in several different aspects.1 In each of these aspects the
proverb is, as a rule, describable not definitely, but with a good
deal of indeterminacy (i.e. as a set of alternatives). Moreover, the
aspects mentioned and others (see footnote 1) can be conceived,
on the one hand, as mutually excluding (parallel, paradigmatic),
but, on the other hand, as bound (consecutive, syntagmatic), and
different interpretations in one and the same aspect are usually not
fully exclusive, but partially overlapping. Different “transferred
meanings” (i.e. denotative variants) of a proverb need not be con¬
ceived simply as lying on one and the same “horizontal” level, but
rather as “more transferred” or “less transferred”, “more general¬
ized” or “more particular”, etc. Different syntagms and other lexi¬
cal components need not necessarily remain “balanced” (either
completely transferred or completely literal) in all interpretations,
nor need they remain immutably “unbalanced” in a certain di¬
rection. And so on, and so forth.
Discouraged by all these and other imaginable complications
(or failing to see here any complications at all), all the classifiers
hitherto have essentially simplified their task and tried to choose

80
 from the total of the semantic information a proverb offers some
“main” or “basic” or “most salient” aspect (relationship, idea,
substructure), mostly not even demanding that the criteria for
choosing be kept approximately firm and levelled in all particular
cases.
We do not think that there is a clearcut difference between the
problems (a) which elements and relations of a proverb text are
“picked up” or “covered” by a semantic description this text can
get, and (b) how the content of these elements and relations is
realized and described, since the metatextual elements can by no
means lie in 1:1 relationship with textual ones. But for conven¬
ience we may distinguish these aspects in order to emphasize that
the existent descriptions of proverb meanings, both in classifica¬
tions and elsewhere, are usually defective in two senses: (1) they
reflect too few of all textual (lexical etc.) elements and interrela¬
tions, and (2) they do not incorporate all different interpretations a
text as a whole or any of its components (syntagm, word-pair,
single word, morpheme) can get.
If we proceed from description of proverb texts to their
comparison, i.e. to classificatory procedures proper, we will
confront with the same troubles. As we saw, omission of a part of
semantic information may already occur at the description stage.
If not, on the comparison stage omissions are inevitable, since
there are evidently no chances of relating each particular proverb
with whatever other proverb within the limits of a “ready-made”
hierarchy-formed classification, because the metalingual “uni¬
verse” can hardly be divided into fully exclusive subsections (or
if, then perhaps only on an extremely “atomary” level).
In one way or another the necessary selections and omissions
are made and, as a result, a relatively large number of classes is
obtained, each class containing a relatively small number of prov¬
erbs and being defined on a relatively low stage of generalization.
Usually an attempt is made to reduce this set of low level classes
to a lesser number of more capacious classes on a more general¬
ized level of definition. If one proceeds by moving towards the
top of hierarchy, by forming new and new classes by means of se¬
lecting alleged “relevant” features of lower stage descriptions and
discarding alleged “irrelevant” ones, he will have, sooner or later,

81
all the proverbs reduced to some ultimately general and formal
“invariants”, such as Kuusi’s binary oppositions ONE : TWO; ONE :
all; one PART : THE WHOLE, etc., or Permyakov’s so-called
logico-semiotic invariants (\)p —» q; (2)p{x) -A q{x); (3) (p —> q)
-A [p(x) —> q(x)]; (4) [{p —^ x) a (q > x ) > (P > q) where p and
q are ‘things’, x and y are ‘properties of things’, > means prefer¬
ence and the others are used in their common meanings". The
categories of this level of abstraction are difficult, if not impossi¬
ble, to compare and relate through any still more general meta¬
terms. Hence the illusion may arise that the proverbs themselves
located into different super-classes also descend, in their deepest
essence, from some sharply distinct “galaxies” or represent some
incomparable elementary entities or germs and their relationships,
and that the ultimate purpose of a classification should just be
aimed at discovering these deepest data of origin that any proverb
is likely to hide in itself.
It is not even a matter of the principle, if the classifier imag¬
ines a proverb as belonging to one and only one invariant, or if
semantic potentials of proverbs are allowed to contain a greater
number of elementary semantic units and relationships, one or
some amongst them being only “main” or “focal” or “stressed”.
The point here is that each proverb or whatever “low” or “mid¬
dle” stage description of it displays manifestations of many
different “invariants” (inch binary oppositions) and, on the
principle, can be generalized towards and reduced to each of
them. Suppose we succeed (the ideal case) in constructing a meta¬
language proceeding from (or resulting in) as small as possible set
of elementary units and relations as possible and deriving all its
more “contentful” concepts and expressions from (resp. reducing
them to) these units and relations as strictly and definitely as pos¬
sible. In this case a semantic representation of any single proverb
would, very probably, take an overwhelmingly complicated
shape, but, on the other hand, it would perhaps become especially
evident that abstracting or generalizing a semantic description of
a proverb is nothing more than tearing a certain substructure or
partial relation out of the total structure at the cost of severance of
its ties with the rest of this total stucture (i.e. neglect all the rest of

82
semantic information). To repeat once more: one of the most mo¬
mentous deficiencies of whatever hierarchy-shaped proverb clas¬
sifications is that they enable to show only a too small part of all
similarities and other relationships the proverbs actually have and
our intuition can recognize.
Let us consider now some examples from Permyakov’s and
Kuusi’s systems to provide some casual illustrations for the prob¬
lems discussed above.

Example 1 (Permyakov): some series of proverbs that have

been separated, but should likely have been grouped together.
/text and page in /logico-thematic /description (the subgroup
Permyakov 1968/ group/ specification being
underlined)/
(1) MHoro pbiCKaio- Cyabba h ycepaue Cyabba h ycepaue B3auMO-
maa jiHcuua c ronoay 3aBHCHMbi: cvabba HHauBH-
He noaoxHeT(p. 207) aa 3aBHCHT ot ero vcepaua
(Tovaa, vchuhh). a ero
ycepaue - ot cyabbbi
(2) —“—(p.323) Mhoto hjih Mano? Mhoto - xonomo (adxbeK-
thbho), a Mano nnoxo (He
3(jKf)eKTHBHO); MHOTO -
nyume neM Mano
(3) Eeraiomaa cobaxa Tpya h pe3yjibTaT Pe3VJlbTaT 3aBHCHT OT Tpv-
KocTb HauaeT (p. 214) aa: mobbi nojivnuTb Hvac-
HblH 3(f)d)eKT, HeobxOaHMO
npHJio>KHTb Tpva (under-
lining questionable)
(4) Knioiomaa xypuua TpyaaiHMHca h Tot, kto TDvauTca, nonyua-
rojioaHOH He ocTaHeT- B03Harpaa<aeHHe eT bnara, a kto He TpvaHTca
ca (p. 247) - He nonyuaeT

On the one hand, none of the (underlined sections of) descriptions

can be regarded as essentially wrong. On the other hand, they are
very arbitrarily worded, differ greatly both in their modal (or
functional) and conceptual (denotative) manifestation, and display
their partial or inexhaustive character very conspicuously. Thus,
all the proverbs above are quite similar syntactically, having an
indicative (stating) surface mode; applying “deeper” terms, each
of them constitutes an implicative structure, say, ‘A —» Fur-

83
ther, all the texts allow of quite definite derivatives on evaluative
(axiologic) and prescriptive (deontic) levels, namely: ‘B (i.e.
“finding the food”) is obviously good’ —> ‘as A (i.e. “scouring
about”, “pecking”, etc.) is alleged to help to reach B, it is implied
to be good too’ -» ‘do AW As to the descriptions, they reflect dif¬
ferent fragments of the last train of thought. Thus, descriptions (1)
and (4) retain the stating surface mode of the underlying texts,
whereas (2) skips this surface stage and focuses on the problems
of evaluation immediately (and only); description (3), reversedly,
omits the evaluative stage and elicits the stating and prescriptive
ones, the latter being expressed not in terms of a direct order or an
advice, but by a formally indicative fixation of a certain norm or
necessity. Further, as descriptions (1) and (4) and the initial part
of (3) coincide modally, they can be compared on the basis of
metaterms they use. In this respect all the descriptions are greatly
different. Description (1) ‘the FATE depends on the ZEAL’ and
(3) ‘the RESULT depends on the WORK’ coincide in their surface
syntax and in the relationship between the members of the binary
oppositions involved, but differ in the opposed terms themselves.
(3) and (4) ‘He who WORKS gains BOONS’ coincide in the inter¬
pretation of the antecedent (WORK), and differ in their conse¬
quents (RESULT vs. BOONS) and in their syntactical manifestation.
Besides, (1) and (3) are conceptually roughly hyponymical: the
fate of an individual can be conceived as a sumtotal of particular
results he gains, plus some other, spontaneous happenings, and
the zeal, respectively, appears to consist of diligent working plus
some other intentional activities. Further, FATE, RESULT and
BOON include different axiological presuppositions: FATE is
markedly indefinite (good or bad), BOON is necessarily definite
(good), whereas RESULT is ambiguous: it can be interpreted as
good only (when opposed to ‘absence of result’) or indefinite
(good or bad). Finally, the descriptions are differently related to
the describable texts: (4) keeps to the surface structure of its
proverb more closely (both modally and syntactically), (1) and
(3) more approximately (only modally); description (2) reflects,
as a matter of fact, not the meaning of the underlying proverb text

84
as a whole, nor even that of its antecedent, but merely that of the
single word “much” (mhozo).
(5) roaoro u copoK CymecTByiomee HtO eCTb, TO H TOJIbKO TO
pa36ouHHKOB He pa3^e- h ucnojib3yeMoe MO>KHO B3»Tb (HCn0Jlb30-
HyT(p. 237) BaTb), a Hero HeT. toto
B3BTb Hejlb3fl
(6) CopoK pa360HHHK0B EoraTCTBO hjih jfeHbTH (SoraTCTBO) - 3JIO,
He CMoniH orpabHTB 6eaHOCTb? a hx OTCVTCTBMe - 6jiaro;
oanoro rojioapaHua SeaHOCTb Jiynme SoraTCTBa
(p. 335)

The interpretation of (5) follows the indicative surface mode of

the underlying proverb. When taken without any concrete context,
both the text and description are axiologically indeterminate: the
situation can be appraised either as bad (from the “robbers’ point
of view”) or good (if the “sufferer’s point of view” is thought of).
Description (6) omits the surface stage and manifests the latter of
the two evaluative alternatives above (i.e. the “sufferer’s aspect”). .
(7) Ka>xaoe Hanajio IIpe^ejibHOCTb - Bee HMeeT npenejibi; h Heifr-
HMeeT CBOH KOHen 6ecnpeaeJibHOCTb pajibHbie, h xopoinue. h nao-
(p. 187) xne BeuiH omaHHHeHbi bo BDe-
MeHH, noocTpaHCTBe h CTene-
hh; HeT HHHero, hto 6buio 6bi
6e3rpaHHHHO
(8) Ecjih ecTb Beuib u ee BcaKaa Bemb cvmecTBveT
Hanajio, 6yo,eT h npOTHBO- BMecTe (b eaHHCTBe) co CBoeft
KOHeu (p. 202) noJioacHOCTb nDOTHBOnOJIOlKHOCTblO H He
Mo>xeT cyiiiecTBOBaTb 6e3 Hee

It should be remembered that on the highest level of “invariants”

Permyakov operates with the concepts THING (BElH,b) and PROP¬
ERTY (CBOHCTBO). The examples above are conceived to be
manifestations of different invariants: (7) is likely to represent a
relation between a thing and its property, while (8) represents a
relation between different things. Indeed, taken superficially, the
wording of the texts may just produce such an interpretation:
(7) is a simple sentence with an asymmetrical syntactic construc¬
tion, (8) is, vice versa, a complex sentence with a symmetrical
structure. As a result, different syntactic variants of one and the

85
same proverb find themselves distinguished on the highest level
of classification.
Example 2 (Permyakov): a series of texts that have been
grouped together, but might be separated as well.
At the absolute beginning of Permyakov’s system (1968, 181)
we find, side by side, the four following texts:
(9) KaK KouiKy hu 6pocb, ona ua hozu cmanem;
(10) M uepe3 mbicnny npezpad eoda ece paeno menem e Mope;
(11) CKOJibKO 6bi pa3 Myj/cnuHa He DfcenujiCH, oh otcemimcH Ha
ofceHUfUHax odnozo cioiada;
(12) BopoOeu u do cma Jiem 6ydem npwzamb.
They all belong to a minimal subdivision of the logico-thematic
group “HEH3MEHHOCTb - H3MEHUHBOCTb” and share the descrip¬
tion ‘Bee Beipn nocToaHHO coxpamnoT cboh CBOHCTBa n hh npu
kbkhx o6cTOHTejibCTBax He npeBpamaiOTca hh bo hto apyroe...’.
It is verifiable intuitively that some “invariant” or “situation” of
the kind can be extracted from each text under discussion indeed.
On the other hand, a common part defined on such a high degree
of generality can practically say nothing about the potentials of
applicability of the underlying proverbs, since it does not exhaust
the whole semantic structure of any of them. Each text still con¬
tains other semantic elements and relations and can, according to
them, be grouped together with other texts. Thirdly, a description
like ‘something retains something despite of something’ or some¬
thing else retaining the essence of Permyakov’s description, ap¬
pears to be not only inexhaustive, but also partly incorrect. When
proceeding from the literal meanings of sentences (9)...(12), one
must concede that only the sparrow does retain something
(namely the peculiarity of its movement), while the cat and the
man only restore their previous state. What about water? Its ac¬
tivity should also be interpreted not so much as retaining its
movement, but rather as achieving its “aim”, some more en-
tropic state, etc. Besides, proverb (12) about the sparrow allows
of two different interpretations, depending on two possible ac¬
cents on “ao cTa jieT”: (a) ‘despite of its old age’ and
(b) ‘permanently, throughout its life’ - in the latter case the
proverb would not contain the semantic component ‘obstacle (de-

86
 spite of which...)’. Further, we can ask a number of questions
about the semantic components ‘subject’, ‘retainable (achievable,
restorable) state and ‘obstacle’, e.g.: (a) Is the subject (cat, water,
man, sparrow) an “elementary force” or an “object”? Is it animate
or inanimate? Is it human or inhuman? Is it cultural or natural?
(b) What kind of relationships involve the retainable (achievable,
restorable) state and the hindering (jeopardizing) factor? Are they
mechanical, biomechanical, biological, social, etc.? (c) Does the
instigator or the “cause” of the hindrance (danger) lie outside or
inside the subject? Has the hindrance been put in and negotiated
intentionally or is the process natural and spontaneous? (d) Is the
retainable (achievable, restorable) state more “negentropic” or
more “entropic” than its avoidable or temporary antipode? Which
of the two is more useful for the subject? Which of them is more
pleasant? And so forth. Different answers to these and other
thinkable questions will cause essential differences in semantic
potentials of these proverbs. Thus, text (9) may refer to somebody
whose skill and “flexibility” help him find a way out of all dan¬
gerous situations; (10) could perhaps refer to some process or un¬
dertaking that inevitably gains its end, finds its natural place, etc.;
(11) allows to be transferred from choosing a partner to other
stereotyped patterns of behaviour, or it may refer to somebody
who has over and over failed in his attempts to improve his state;
(12) might be humorous comment on some elderly, but cheerful
or flighty man.

Example 3 (Kuusi): alternative chances for choosing binary

oppositions.
In Kuusi 1972 we find two type groups: (1) ONE : TWO (MANY)
and (2) ONE : ALL; ONE PART : THE WHOLE. Both groups include a
number of types and subtypes. One can observe that the proverbs
located into these type groups (and partially the characterizations
of types as well) often contain semantic components as ‘insuffi¬
cient’, ‘too’, etc. Suppose that some other classifier might prefer
to build up, instead of the type groups proposed by Kuusi, another
group, perhaps something like MODERATENESS : IMMODERATE¬
NESS or SUFFICIENCY : INSUFFICIENCY or JUST : TOO, etc. This de¬
cision might even be justified, as the chosen concepts are capa-

87
cious and general enough, and, moreover, the oppositions above
might perhaps illustrate neatly the famous “middle way”-principle
of proverbial world-view (cf. Taylor 1931, 168; 1965, 7). Now
the concepts of ‘too’ and ‘just’ could be specified with respect to
various quantitative, spatial, temporal, etc. determinants, e.g.
(a,) ‘too many’, (a2) ‘too few’, (a3) ‘just the suitable number’;
(b,) ‘too much’, ..., (b3) ‘just the appropriate amount’; (ci) ‘too
great’, ...; (d,) ‘too prolonged’, ...; (ei) ‘too quick’, ...; (fi) ‘too
early’, ...; (gi) ‘too often’, ..., etc., etc. Thus, one could formulate
subclasses, e.g.:
(A) ‘Moderateness is good’ resp. ‘Immoderateness is bad’ in all
its possible manifestations;
(B) ‘Everybody has his own measure: what is too little (or insuf¬
ficient in some other sense) for one may be sufficient for another,
or what is easy for one may be too difficult for another, etc.’;
(C) ‘What is insufficient in certain conditions may be sufficient in
other conditions’;
(D) ‘It is sometimes difficult to find the right measure’;
(E) ‘There is always too much of bad and too little of good in the
world’;
(F) ‘The good, however great it were, all the same seems to be too
little, and the evil, however little it were, seems to be too great’;
(G) ‘Nature tends towards the “middle measure”; there are no per¬
fect things (happenings, etc.) in the world: “long” things are at the
same time “thin”, “thick” things are “short”, etc.’
And so forth. This type group could embrace Kuusi’s types 1.1-
1.10 and 1.15 (leaving out the rest 1.11-1.14), as well as 2.1-2.3
and 2.6, and besides a great number of other proverbs, including
the saying “One enemy is too many, a hundred friends are not
enough” (cf. Kuusi 1972, 728 and ideas (E) and (F) above).
Some other opposition pairs could be used for building up
paradigms which would eventually include some of Kuusi’s types
1.1-2.6. For example, when describing type 1.1, one can, instead
of the opposition ONE : MANY, choose, e.g. the opposition INDI¬
VIDUAL : SOCIETY. Accordingly, one might receive the following
classes, e.g.:

88
(A) ‘It is dangerous and/or unpleasant for an individual to live
(act, work, etc.) apart from the society’ resp. ‘It is safe and/or
pleasant for him to live together with others’ (cf. Kuusi’s types
1.1 and 1.6E);
(B) ‘An individual should interact (keep up friendship, etc.) not
with a too great body of men (cf. 1.4~C), though, as a rule, plenty
of friends is positive’ (cf. 1.4C);
(C) ‘A crowd can more than a single man’ (cf. 1.5 and 1.6);
(D) ‘Food and other boons are yet preferably relished individu¬
ally, rather than shared with fellowmen’ (cf. 1.7A, 1.7±);
(E) ‘A collective endeavour (work, caretaking) may fail or prove
careless, as all participants are relying on others’ (cf. 1.7B, 1.8);
(F) ‘One individual constitutes no society’ (cf. 2.IE, G);
(G) ‘The lack of one member cannot prevent (or his baseness
cannot spoil) collective undertakings’ (cf. 2.2);
(H) ‘One bad (lazy, immoral, etc.) member may spoil the whole
community’ (cf. 2.3);
(I) ‘Other (neutral and positive) examples are also infectious’ (cf/
2:5);
(J) ‘The community defends its members, shares their sufferings,
etc.’ (cf. 2.4A-C).
This type would thus exclude Kuusi’s types 1.2, 1.3, 1.4A, B and
1,4 A, B, 1.9-1.15, the major part of 2.1, also 2.4D and 2.6. On
the other hand, the members of the opposition INDIVIDUAL : SOCI¬
ETY can be related in many other ways, e.g.:
(K) ‘An individual belonging to a community must (or will) as¬
sume the manners and mentality (be they good or bad) prevailing
in this community’ (cf Kuusi 1971);
(L) ‘The character (ability, morality) of a collective body is de¬
termined by the characters (abilities, morale) of its members’;
(M) ‘A society consists of very different members’;
(N) ‘As an individual behaves towards the society, so the society
behaves towards this individual’;
(O) ‘The value (welfare, authority, etc.) of an individual depends
on his position in the society’. And so forth.
If we should venture, in connection with what was said above,
to suggest something to the honourable author, it might be per¬
haps as follows: to deliberate the possibilities of renouncing the

89
highest (type group) level of classification, and, e.g. to arrange the
types somehow formally and present, apart from the typology it¬
self, an index or some other construction that would indicate the
relationships between the types on a scale as large as possible and
in the strictest way possible.
Example 4 (Kuusi): the titles of the types are sometimes not
fully adequate to the proverbs themselves appearing in these
types.
Let us consider Kuusi’s type 2.4. The title of the type reads:
‘One member (of a family) suffers, all others (another member)
suffer(s)’. In this connection we shall set up three particular prob¬
lems.
Firstly, the problem of “another member”. On the one hand,
the opposition ONE : ANOTHER does not correspond to the general
definition of the type-group. On the other hand, adding the alter¬
native ‘another member’ is necessary, since, e.g. in subtypes (C)
and (D) we have to do just with “another member”, instead of “all
members” or “the whole body”. However, excluding (C) and (D)
from the type could hardly find justification, since the type per se,
without regard to type-group criteria, is internally very coherent
and well-formed.
Secondly, the problem of “suffering”. Sayings “/Je™ eq;aT
KHCJitie cjiHBbi, a ocKOMHHa y poAHTeueH” and “L’enfant a mange
des figues et c’est le ventre de l’ancien qui en souffre” allow of
two different variants of interpretation: (a) ‘One suffers (for the
consequences of his deeds), another sympathizes with him’ and
(b) ‘One has done a deed, another suffers (responds) for the con¬
sequences of this deed’ - i.e. the latter case would not correspond
to the title of the type. (If the “dramatis personae” are situated on
the temporal axis differently, e.g. in Permyakov’s (1968, 249) ex¬
ample “Otum ejin TepnKoe, a y aeTen ocKOMHHa” - the possibility
of interpretation (b) becomes especially evident.) Can we be sure
that “What happens to your wife happens to yourself’ implies
only bad happenings? Conceivably it may refer to good ones as
well. In “Ein Finger ist lieb wie der andere” there is no direct hint
at suffering at all; probably, it has included into the type due to its
close kinship with other “finger”-proverbs in subtype (A).

90
 Thirdly, the problem of “rhematic accent” or degree of speci¬
fication of the title. “Man hat zehn Finger, in welchen man
schneidet, tut es weh” and some others from subtype (A) obvi¬
ously require a more specified description than ‘If a member
meN suffers, the whole system N suffers’. The description could
be something like ‘If a susceptible system consists of several ele¬
ments or members of the same kind, the sufferings of any member
(no matter which) bring about the sufferings of the whole sys¬
tem’. Hence a new separate type can be established, roughly with
a “common denominator” like ‘If a susceptible system (either
with discrete or continuous elements) is subjected to irritation, the
result (i.e. external or internal reaction of the system) depends
only on the characteristics (e.g. “pleasantness”, intensity) of the
irritant itself, and not on the concrete conditions of applying the
irritant to the system, e.g. at which point (or to how many particu¬
lar elements) of the system the irritant is applied, etc.’. A type
formulated in this way would embrace most of Kuusi’s “finger”-
proverbs plus “No ease for the mouth when one tooth is aching”
(2.4B), also Permyakov’s (1968, 292) “EbioT BflOJib hjih nonepex,
Bee 6onbHo”, etc., and eventual “positive” analogues as well.

If we should dare, for our part, to propose some procedure, at

least on the principle, it might be as follows.
(1) Each proverb (text) should be described separately, pro¬
ceeding from its literal meaning, and it is necessary that (a) as¬
pects and methods of description be identical at all texts; (b) the
description be as complete as possible; (c) the elementary units
applied be as elementary as possible. (2) The descriptions of lit¬
eral (lingual) meanings should be transformed into actual (poeti¬
cal) meanings by alterating some particular substructures, replac¬
ing some particular elements, exchanging some “wrong” nodes,
etc., according to the rules elaborated for the purpose. (3) Each
description (of a poetical meaning) should be compared with all
other descriptions individually in order to discover more fre¬
quently recurring partial structures, more dense correlations be¬
tween those structures, etc., and thereby ways for simplifying the
presentation of descriptions should be found (e.g. by substituting
single metalingual words for more complex expressions, etc.).

91
 It is easier, however, to give these instructions than to put
them in practice.
Firstly, the number of complications will already arise at the
linguistic stage of description. (1) Of all branches of semantics
only generative semantics has been concerned with analytical
manipulations of the kind, and its progress in providing semantic
descriptions of concrete lexical units of concrete languages has so
far been rather modest. (2) GS has focused its main interests on
methodology and on the problems of relating surface structures
with deep structures, and little attention has been given to the
problems of concrete “linguistic chemistry”,3 such as: Which set
of elementary predicates we need for describing a more extensive
corpus of vocabulary? Are the hitherto postulated predicates
equally elementary ideed? Which might be a minimal set of “su¬
per-elementary” primes that would allow to define all other, more
complicated metalingual expressions? (3) Besides elementary
predicates that are properly analytical units, GS uses other kind of
categories for binding predicates with arguments, namely cases.
So far cases have been formulated and distinguished quite intui¬
tively and their semantic nature is not sufficiently clear yet.4 (4)
Functional and pragmatical aspects of language are just becoming
an object of a more vivid linguistic concern, and there are, for the
time being, not too many ready results and methods available in
the field. But as far as we have to do with proverbs, just these as¬
pects seem to be of particular importance.
Secondly, the approach proposed has its contradictions from
the side of poetics and folkloristics too. (1) This approach pre¬
sumes elaborating explicit rules for transcoding the literal (lin¬
gual) meanings of proverbs into “actual” (poetical) meanings (i.e.
decoding their transferred meanings), but we have very few inves¬
tigations into semantic theory of metaphor at our disposal, and it
would surely be a thankless task for a paremiologist to try to
compensate this shortcoming on his own. (2) If we construct a
semantic metalanguage for describing proverb meanings, we shall
inevitably “inscribe” in it something of our own world-picture
that, in turn, will reflect the world-realization of our culture and
time. There is likely no justification for speaking of a proverb
repertoire as a system in general, or of proverbial world-view

92
in general, unless we have a clearcut survey (a) about the ways
of functioning of a great number of international proverbs in dif¬
ferent cultures and societies, each proverb taken separately, and
(b) about the internal structure of a number of concrete (syn¬
chronic) repertoires of different peoples, cultures and epochs. In¬
asmuch as a proverb manifests all it has to say not in logico-
philosophical terms, but figuratively, it becomes questionable if
we have any ground to speak of proverbial meanings as “poten¬
tials” at all, beside these actual meanings they have or have had in
the tradition of concrete peoples, cultures, etc.
On the other hand, probably there is (and should be discov¬
ered) a number of “paremic universals”. When Kuusi’s type-
system is ready, paremiologists will certainly get a much better
insight into these universals than they have at present. Whatever
way we should choose for dismembering a national or interna¬
tional proverb repertoire, at any rate the frequency of some se¬
mantic structures would prove to be notably higher than that of
others. To put it more figuratively, some semantic districts are
populated more densely, other more sparsely, the third ones are
altogether uninhabited. At the moment prof. Kuusi is supposedly
the only investigator who has at his disposal such global aerial
photographs of the semantic territory on which the proverb
“lives”. For the time being, he has mapped its metropolises, towns
and highways between them. In future paremiology should extend
its field of activities to its boroughs, villages and other minor set¬
tlements as well.

Notes
1. Some of such aspects - e.g. stating, evaluative and prescriptive - have
been discussed by us elsewhere (Krikmann 1971; cf. also Example 1 in
the present paper). Interesting and valuable conceptions and remarks on
the evaluative and prescriptive (strategic, normative) aspects of the
proverb have recently put forward by many paremiologists (see, e.g.
Milner 1969, Priebe 1971, Barley 1972, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1973).

2. Permyakov makes use of binary oppositions as well: they serve as ti¬

tles for his basic level classes (i.e. logico-thematical groups) and are to
provide conceptual frameworks for formulating semantic characteristics
of subgroups.

93
3. For the term and and some linking problems see in Zwicky 1971.

4. Thus, Ch. J. Fillmoore himself (cf., e.g. 1968, 1971a, 1971b) has pre¬
sented several greatly different sets of cases.

References

Barley, Nigel 1972. A Structural Approach to the Proverb and Maxim. -

Proverbium 20.
Fillmoore, Charles J. 1968. The Case for Case. - E. Bach & R. T. Harms
(eds.), Universal in Linguistic Theory. N.Y.
Fillmoore, Charles J. 1971a. Some Problems for Case Grammar. -
Working Papers in Linguistics 10. Columbus, Ohio.
Fillmoore, Charles J. 1971b. Types of Lexical Information. - D. D. Stein¬
berg & L. A. Jakobovits (eds.), Semantics. Cambridge.
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara 1973. Toward a Theory of Proverb
Meaning. - Proverbium 22.
Krikmann, Arvo 1971. On the Semantic Indefiniteness of Proverbs. -
Annual Meeting of the Research Group for Generative Grammar.
(Abstracts). Tartu.
Kuusi, Matti 1970. How can a Type-Index of International Proverbs be
Outlined? - Proverbium 15.
Kuusi, Matti 1971. In community of defective or inhuman beings one
will assume the prevailing defect or peculiarity. (An example article
from the Type-Index. Manuscript).
Kuusi, Matti 1972. Towards an International Type-System of Proverbs.
-Proverbium 19.
Milner, G. B. 1969. What is a Proverb? - New Society no. 332 (6 Febru¬
ary).
Permyakov, G. L. 1968. nepMHKOB T. JI. H36pauHbie nocjioeupu u no-
eoeopru uapodoe Bocmoxa. MocKBa.
Priebe, Richard 1971. The Horses of Speech: A Structural Analysis of
the Proverb. - Folklore Annual of the University Folklore Associa¬
tion. Center for Intercultural Studies in Folklore and Oral History.
No. 3. Texas, Austin.
Taylor, Archer 1931. The Proverb. Cambridge, Mass.
Taylor, Archer 1971. The Study of Proverbs. - Proverbium 1.
Zwicky, Arnold M. Linguistics as Chemistry: The Substance Theory of
Semantic Primes. — Working Papers in Linguistics 8. Columbus,
Ohio.

94
 THE GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR:
AN OPEN SESAME FOR PROVERB SEMANTICS?

In “Metaphors We Live By” (1980) G. Lakoff and M. Johnson en¬

grafted a new, nowadays well-known branch on the theory of
metaphor. In “Women, Fire and Dangerous Things” (1987) La¬
koff investigated the cognitive models people use when under¬
standing and categorizing the world, and the role of metaphor and
metonymy in these models. In “More than Cool Reason” (1989)
Lakoff and Mark Turner developed the cognitivistic theory of me¬
taphor in various aspects. In “The Invariance Hypothesis” (1990)
Lakoff supposed that the most part of abstract reasoning happens
via metaphorical mappings, and many of the most basic concepts
in semantics (e.g. time, quantity, state, change, action, cause, pur¬
pose, means, modality, and even category) are also understood
metaphorically.
In “More than Cool Reason” Lakoff and Turner come across
the eternal paremiological problem: in what way do people under¬
stand figurative meanings of proverbs? To solve this problem
they propose the tool termed the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR (fur¬
ther: GCM) - a cognitive apparatus consisting of four ingredients:
1) the naive theory of the Nature of Things (further: TNT);
2) the Great Chain of Being (further: GCB) qualified as a cul¬
tural model;
3) the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor (further: GISM);
4) the Maxim of Quantity (further: MQ).
My paper intends to make some critical remarks on GCM.

1. GCB + TNT, and MQ

GCB is alleged to be a largely unconscious cultural model which
places all the things and beings as well as their properties on a
vertical scale and thus divides them into “lower” and “higher”
ones. The lowest level is occupied by inanimate substances and

95
things, the next level above by plants, the next one by animals,
and the highest level by human beings. (In its extended version
GCB also includes such “higher than highest” levels as society,
God, and the universe.) An object of any level has all the proper¬
ties of any lower level and, in addition, its “own” highest level
properties which determinate this concrete level and are lacking at
any lower level. The higher the level, the more ranks of properties
an object has. So, a human being has physical + biological + in¬
stinctual attributes and behavior + specific highest-order features
like intellect, moral, aesthetic sense, etc.
GCB-model does work, without doubt, in proverb semantics.
However, Lakoff and Turner leave it vague ho w it works, which
restrictions are involved, and so on. Let us list some of the main
contradictions.
1. On the one hand, Lakoff and Turner stress repeatedly that
the distinction “human / non-human” is very strongly marked in
the semantics of proverbial metaphors. More precisely, human
beings, relations and problems constitute the most typical target
domain of paremic metaphors, or “actual themes” of proverbs. To
be still more exact, it is just specifically human (intellectual,
ethical, social) problems that are most often dealt with in prov¬
erbs. All this appears absolutely valid, and paremiologists have
discussed the same topics during the past 20 years. (However, one
could ask which maxim is applied “to pick out the highest-
ranking properties available in each situation” (p. 173) - is it MQ
or, for example, the Maxim of Relevance?)
2. On the other hand, at the same time Lakoff and Turner as¬
sert that GCB actually works in both directions: “it allows us to
comprehend general human character traits in terms of well-
understood nonhuman attributes; and conversely, it allows us to
comprehend less well-understood aspects of the nature of animals
and objects in terms of better-understood human characteristics”
(p. 172). The paradox is that this assertion is also absolutely true
- but it is sharply incompatible with what was said above.
3. Sometimes, particularly in the analysis of “Big thunder / lit¬
tle rain” one can get the impression that despite of everything said
in (1) and (2) GCB is still a homogeneous network acting mo¬
notonously between all its levels and knots and enabling transfers

96
from anything to anything without any restrictions, even at one
and the same level. For example, “Big thunder / little rain” “might
be applied to a viciously barking dog, as a way of saying that
there’s no reason to be afraid of him” (p. 179); or it “works in
pretty much the same way as the English proverb ‘All bark and no
bite’ with the only difference that ‘All bark and no bite’ cannot be
applied metaphorically to dogs, but it can be applied metaphori¬
cally to thunderstorms” (p. 180); or it might be used in “a situa¬
tion in which an earthquake has just made a large rumbling noise
/../ to indicate that the earthquake won’t cause much damage”
(p. 179). Of course, such exceptional uses may happen, but I do
not believe that they represent the normal working routine of pro¬
verbial metaphors.
To get a more verified notion of what is frequent / allowed or
rare / excluded in the metaphorics of proverbs we should have a
considerable amount of direct data about proverb actualizations -
much more than paremiologists or others have at their disposal.
Therefore I would dare to hypothesize here merely some roughest
rules that I believe to govern the relations of words and meanings
in proverbs.
Rule 1. Example: “Everything has its beginning and end”.
If anything that acts or happens literally in the proverb belongs
to the “specifically human” (intellectual, ethical, social, abstract)
sphere then the metaphorical reading of the text is, on the princi¬
ple, impossible.
Rule 2. Example: “Like bird, like song”.
If both the literal referents (agents, objects, etc.) and their lit¬
eral predicates (properties, actions, interrelations, etc.) are of non¬
human rank, the mixing of these non-human GCB-levels is
avoided. Such texts are already literally meaningful (semantically
compatible, “smooth”) and result in sentential metaphors
(G. A. Miller’s term) that must be understood as sayings about
people.
Rule 3. Example: “Who digs a pit for another, shall fall
therein himself’.
If human beings participate somehow in the literal content of a
proverb - either as immediate actants, or impersonal “addressees”
of imperatives, or otherwise —, and the rest of the literal content

97
includes some lower-order-human or non-human components
(e.g., biological traits, animals) then the necessary minimum of
those lower-order or non-human constituents must be reinter¬
preted into the highest-order and/or human.
Rule 4. Examples: “A lie has short legs”; “A man cannot fly
higher than his wings enable”; “The man is a wolf’; “Your own
eye is the king”.
If the text in its literal plan is semantically “broken” (contra¬
dictory, incompatible) then the contradiction may be liquidated in
any suitable direction. Miller’s predicative and nominal meta¬
phors are the simplest representatives of this case. When the ac¬
tual context is absent, there is a strong tendency to read the be¬
ginning of the contradictive text as semantically “open” (literal)
and the predicative part as “hidden” (figurative); nominal meta¬
phors evidently allow only such reading.
As to the actual meanings the rules look something like this:
Rule A. Denomination is one-sided: when a proverb intends
to say something about human beings, they may be called just
men, or animals, plants, things, etc., but the contrary is impossi¬
ble: animals, plants, things and other non-human referents must
be denominated with their “right” names, not via human meta¬
phors.
Rule B. Predication is many-sided: it is possible to predicate
metaphorically something non-human to a human being or vice
versa, something physical to an abstract object, and so on.

2. GISM

When dealing with metaphors cognitivists operate neither with

term : term (or concept : concept) nor sentence : sentence, but
schema : schema relationships. In the case of proverbial meta¬
phors three types of schemas are involved:
1) the specific-level schema representing the source domain
(i.e. the literal content of the proverb);
2) the specific-level schema representing the target domain
(i.e. the content the user actually wants to put into the prov¬
erb);

98
 3) the generic-level schema mediating the transition from the
specific source to the specific target.
In its essence the generic-level schema is evidently nothing else
but the semantic common part between what was literally said in
the text and what was actually intended to be conveyed. Other¬
wise, generic-level schema is a kind of abstract-termed expression
(or “bundle of thoughts”?) characterizing the semantic capacity,
or “interpretational potential” of the proverb.
Pertaining to the essence of GISM as the whole, Lakoff and
Turner put it as follows: “There exists a single generic-level
metaphor, GENERIC IS SPECIFIC, which maps a single specific-
level schema onto an indefinitely large number of parallel spe¬
cific-level schemas that all have the same generic-level structure
as the source-domain schema” (p. 162).

Now let me list some questions and doubts provoked by the con¬
cept of GISM.
1. It is hard to conceive the relationship between the generic
and specific as a metaphor even in “Lakoff s spirit”: his meta¬
phors work, as a rule, “horizontally”, mapping the specific onto
specific or the generic onto generic, whereas here the connection
is overtly “vertical”. Hence the more general problem will arise:
which metaphor do the very parameters “horizontal” and “verti¬
cal” come from? ABSTRACT AND/OR CAPACIOUS CONCEPT IS HIGH
/ CONCRETE AND/OR CONTENTFUL CONCEPT IS LOW (AND WIDE?)?
Or, the usual metaphorical mappings of conceptual hierarchies
being remembered, perhaps they come from a still more “generic”
one, say, OUR CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM IS A PILE? But as the “world
of concepts” appears to be successfully juxtaposable with the
“world of material things”, it could be understood as if it were an
independent semantic domain and we might have a good reason
to ask: what would be wrong if one preferred to interpret this al¬
leged metaphor as a metonymy, a kind of “conceptual synecdo¬
che”, say, SPECIFIC STANDS FOR GENERIC?
(Many other analogous questions might be asked, for example,
does there exist one integral “world of modalities”, or must they
be kept separately? However, it is again considerably hard to in¬
terpret things like rhetorical questions, irony, “prognosis-formed”

99
orders and interdictions, etc. as modal metaphors; it seems much
more natural to speak about metonymies like QUESTION STANDS
FOR NEGATION; QUESTION STANDS FOR REPROACH; QUESTION
STANDS FOR IMPERATIVE; APPROVAL STANDS FOR CONDEMNA¬
TION; PROGNOSIS STANDS FOR ORDER, etc.)
2. The generic-level schema has to perform two evidently in¬
compatible tasks in GISM:
1) serve as a mediator between the literal and really intended
meaning in the case of each single actualization of a proverb;
2) sum up the information about the total semantic scope of a
proverb exhausting all the traditional and possible meanings it
has or can get.
3. As to the task (1) GISM as a metaphor appears to be
conceptually defective and insufficient to link together (map onto
each other) the specific-level source and the specific-level target,
because the generic-level component of GISM is also target. To
reach the aim the “mediating target” should be somehow related
to the “final target”, but we get no idea what kind of relation it
might be and how it could be termed, also what onto what this
operation would map, and so on.
(Actually, it is also impossible to interpret the two operations
involved in this process of analogy-grasping as two oppositely di¬
rected metonymies. In order to say that X STANDS FOR Y, this X
should be necessarily put into words. Here the only necessarily
verbalized thing is the proverb. Therefore it seems quite natural to
say that (VERBALIZED) SOURCE-SPECIFIC STANDS FOR (THOUGHT)
GENERIC. But what “stands” for what when the thoughts induced
by signals of non-verbal rank and the thoughts induced by words
are being related? What kind of signs should we use in our meta¬
language to put all this together? Do the proverbial metaphors al¬
together differ from the rest of metaphors significantly enough to
motivate the introduction of GISM-concept just on the occasion
of proverbs, and not in general?)
4. As to the task (2) GISM can hardly solve any of the related
fundamental problems long ago recognized and researched in
paremiology. For example, natural actualizations of a proverb in
different situations (as well as its context-free interpretations) can
be regarded not merely as differing in meaning, but also as more

100
effective (exact, apt, striking) or more inefficient (“loose”, inept,
clumsy, even failing). (The problem has been discussed by
R. Honeck and his colleagues.) If they all are being generated by
means of one and the same generic-level schema, the schema
ought likely to be something too abstract and contentless to retain
1:1 relationship just with a concrete proverb. Further, natural
proverb stocks include numerous, sometimes quite long series of
entirely or partially synonymous proverbs - what about their ge¬
neric-level schemas? Do some of them share some schemas? or
has each its own? or something else? Finally, one can ask, is it al¬
together reasonable to speak about a certain definite “generic
level” people use to decode proverbs? Context-bound actualiza¬
tions are rather understood via minimal necessary changes,
whereas “semantic emptying” of a context-free proverb can be
carried out step by step in various directions, having its “raw” lit¬
eral meaning on the one end of the scale and some ultimately con¬
tentless expressions like G. Permiakov’s “invariants” or
Z. Kanyo’s formula Vx (Px —» Qx) on the other.

3. Some other problems

To the authors’ mind, proverbs are metaphorical descriptions

of certain situations. This comes very close to G. Permiakov’s
opinion that proverbs are nothing else but signs of situations.
There are several different ways to distinguish proverbs from the
“lower forms of phraseology”. Permiakov, for example, uses a
“softer” criterion: proverbs are syntactically closed, proverbial
phrases are open. Z. Kanyo has postulated that proverbs are gen¬
eralized implications (cf. the formula above), i.e. share their logi¬
cal form with expressions representing laws. If the “soft” criterion
is used, a part of proverbs will certainly appear to be descriptions.
In “1001 Frage...” I tried to demonstrate that Kanyo’s “hard” cri¬
terion works in a sense much better than the “soft” syntactic crite¬
rion. But anyway, the bulk of proverbs does represent a kind of
empiric laws (i.e. generalizing assertions) or norms (i.e. generaliz¬
ing imperatives), and therefore their relationships with situations
(in the sense of everyday situations, or communicative con¬
texts, not cognitive schemas) are much more complicated than

101
those of descriptions. Situations serve merely as “topical induc¬
tors” for proverbs. Proverbs derive prognoses, explanations, ap¬
praisals and prescriptions from situations.
Lakoff and Turner admit that proverbs may accidentally imply
exhortations. They also note that “proverbs are always understood
relative to a background of assumptions and values, and with dif¬
ferent backgrounds the same metaphor can lead to very different
interpretations” (p. 187), and they give an excellent meditation
about possible referential and axiological interpretations which
the phrase “Jelly in a vise” might get in different contexts. But
they do not interpret assertions, appraisals and exhortations as
links of some integral “Great Chain of Pragmatical Being”. Nei¬
ther do they notice the exclusive importance of the good/bad-link
in the functioning of that chain.
Last but not least, I would like to draw attention to some more
general facets in Lakoff s metaphor theory.
Firstly, Lakoff s metaphor paradigms (like the largely cited
LIFE IS A JOURNEY, or PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, or A LIFETIME IS A
YEAR, etc.) resemble pretty much Permiakov’s invariants. Their
common feature is that both have been alleged not to intersect, at
least not on the principle. Actually they do intersect, or display
logical part-whole relationships, and the greater amount of them
we will invent, the more obvious this danger will become.
There exists another very fundamental problem which con¬
cerns interrelations of source and target concepts in the metaphor
and which has been noticed earlier, especially in connection with
Lakoff s Invariance Hypothesis (e.g., by C. Brugman, T. Onikki
and U. Nikanne). If the major part of abstract matters is mapped
(i.e. not merely termed but also thought) metaphorically, the cor¬
responding target domains should likely be lacking of independ¬
ent “a priori” conceptual structure, and consequently, there would
be no reason to speak about analogies between source and target
concepts, GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphors, and so on.

Note:

Presented to the Nordic-Celtic-Baltic Folklore Symposium (Copenha¬

gen, May 21-25, 1993).

102
References

Kanyo, Zoltan. Sprichworter - Analyse einer Einfachen Form. The

Hague: Mouton, 1981.
Krikmann, Arvo. “1001 Frage zur logischen Struktur der Sprichworter.”
Semiotische Studien zum Sprichwort. Simple Forms Reconsidered 1.
Eds. Peter Grzybek and Wolfgang Eismann. Tubingen: Gunter Narr,
1984,387-408.
Lakoff, George. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. What Categories
Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Lakoff, George and Mark Turner. More than Cool Reason. A Field
Guide to Poetic Metaphor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1989.
Permiakov, Grigori. Ot pogovorki do skazki (Zametki po obschei teorii
klishe). Moskva: Nauka, 1970. Also published in English translation
by Y. N. Filipov with the title From Proverb to Folk-Tale. Notes on
the General Theory of Cliche. Moscow: Nauka, 1979.

103
ON THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE RHETORICAL,
MODAL, LOGICAL, AND SYNTACTIC PLANES
IN ESTONIAN PROVERBS

1. On the logical structure of proverbs

According to the Hungarian scholar Zoltan Kanyo (1980) and

some others who have hitherto dealt with the logical analysis of
proverbs, proverbs are essentially generalized implica¬
tions.
Thus, the basic logical structure of a proverb could be ex¬
pressed as follows:
Vx (P(x) -> Q(x)),
which could be approximated in common human language as fol¬
lows: ‘for every x it holds that if it has the predicate P, it also has
the predicate Q\ In other words, it is the formula used since
R. Carnap to express any law. Prognosis and explanation
being the elementary practical applications of laws, these also oc¬
cur in cases of proverb actualization, while those actualizations
differ from each other by their information structure (or the so-
called actual syntax), i.e. by the way the fragment of reality re¬
ferred to by the proverb is related to the overt statement made in
the proverb text.
If we have, for example, an individual constant a — ‘Jack’, the
predicate constants P = ‘works’ and Q = ‘eats’, and an individual
human-denoting variable x meaning ‘someone’, then Vx(Px —> Qx)
could stand for the proverbial statement Kes tootab, see soob ‘The
one who works, eats’. The relationship between the given infor¬
mation and that inferred from the proverb could be conceived in
three variants as follows:

105
 1) Prognosis 2) Explanation 3) Law confirmed
An individual Pa Qa Pa & Qa
concrete case: (‘Jack is working’) (‘Jack is eating’) (‘both are known
facts’)
Generalizing Vx {Px —» Qx) Vx {Px —> Qx) x {Px —> Qx)
assertion:
Conclusion: Qa Pa ‘Vx {Px —> Qx)
(‘Jack can eat’) (‘Jack works’) was confirmed’

As for logical analysis of proverbs it involves a multitude of

complicated problems of principle, some of which I am going to
exemplify below (cf. also Krikmann 1984; 1987). Indeed, J. Lot-
man had good reason to point out dozens of times that the struc¬
ture of any poetical unit is its content structure. The point is not
whether proverb structure is approached by means of certain for¬
malized expressions or in some other way. It is rather that the no¬
tional apparatus of predicate calculus is too poor and traditional
logic that, while dealing with the truthfulness of statements, takes
no heed whatsoever of the contents of those statements, is totally
unsuited for the task.
The point is that right over the generalized implicational base
there may be hovering still another, parallelist upper level, tying
up two or more underlying implicational structures, but the opera¬
tion taking place on the upper level is not an implication in terms
of logic. In terms of predicate calculus this upper-level operation
could probably be called nothing but a conjunction, whereas in
common human language this relationship can be approximated
by means of such words as ‘and’, ‘in turn’, ‘but’, ‘whereas’,
‘like’, etc. As for its meaning, this relationship is mainly either
antonymous (Vaikesed vargad ripuvad vollas, suured soidavad
toll as ‘Little thieves are hanged, the big ones ride in coaches’), or
synonymous (Uni ei anna uuta kuube, magamine maani sarki
‘Dreaming won’t give you a new coat, sleeping won’t give you a
long shirt’), but more often than not it is much more vague or
complex. E.g. the proverb Meest sonast, harga sarvest ‘A man [is
taken] by the word, an ox [is taken] by the horn’ refers to what is
similar as well as to what is different between man and ox, and as
such can be interpreted either antithetically as: ‘A man is not an

106
ox, in his case a word will suffice’, or as a pair of synonyms: ‘All
creatures are subject to control, however different the means’.

2. On the modal levels and communicative structure

of proverbs

As is known, proverbs are actualized in the context of everyday

communication, performing the same functions, in principle, as
other utterances. They serve to confirm opinions, make progno¬
ses, express doubts, reproaches, accusations, justifications, ex¬
cuses, consolations, derision or malicious joy, regrets, warning,
recommendations etc. etc. In a broad sense these functions repre¬
sent the so-called speech acts, once so thoroughly discussed by
linguists (J. R. Searle, J. Austin a.o.).
Let us here present proverb modalities in the following simple se¬
quence or scale:

statement -> evaluation -> prescription.

This triad is nothing novel or extravagant, considering, for exam¬
ple, the following parallels, some of them more distant, some less:
(1) A.Taylor (1965: 7) has said that “the proverb summarizes a
situation, passes judgment, or offers a course of action”.
(2) The well-known triad of linguistic functions, the author of
which is Karl Biihler (1933) is included by Roman Jakobson
(1968: 353ff), as the first three, among his so-called basic aspects
of language, viz.
(a) the context-focused referential resp. denotative resp. cogni¬
tive function (Biihler’s “3rd-person aspect”),
(b) the speaker-focused emotive resp. expressive function
(Biihler’s “lst-person aspect”),
(c) the addressee-focused function (Biihler’s “2nd-person as¬
pect”).
(3) The so-called classes of pragmatic signs, developed by
Charles Morris (1955: 95-103), viz. designator, appraisor, pre-
scriptor.
(4) Branches of logic, inch the two best known ones of modal
logic:
(a) the “ordinary” statement logic or the logic of truth;

107
 (b) axiological logic, that deals with values, using such catego¬
ries as good, bad, indifferent, better than... etc.,
(c) deontic logic, that deals with norms, orders and prohibi¬
tions, inadmissibility etc.
The steps of our triad appear in a clear correlation with linguistic,
or grammatical modes of the sentence. At least the languages of
“European” standard feature definite means for overt expression
of assertive and prescriptive (imperative) modalities, but the
evaluative function has no independent formal manifestation
(there are indicative and imperative sentences, but no “evaluative
sentences”). Neither is an utterance confined to the communica¬
tive function manifested in its grammatical mode, but it performs
all its basic functions simultaneously.
The assumption that verbal activity (like any other) has a pur¬
pose of controlling the surrounding, directing the partner’s actions
etc. seems to presuppose that the ultimate or most “strategic” of
the three functions is the imperative (prescriptive) one. On the
cognitive plane the arrangement of the three steps seems to be de-
scribable by the so-called tree of optative strategies, which corre¬
sponds to the general logic of pragmatic reasoning:

Why, indeed, should the current tradition contain such a massive

amount of indicative proverbs in the form of a statement, if the
statements concerned only such topics that have no pragmatic
sense (social, moral, economic-utilitarian, medicinal, agrarian,
etc. etc.) whatsoever, or situations the interpretation of which ex¬
cludes all alternatives, or if the statements were so impartial that
they would exclude even the vaguest strategic implication hidden
in them, i.e. a recommendation or warning, an order or a prohibi¬
tion, a reference to a custom to be followed etc. Also, it seems

108
 obvious that a proverb in the imperative form, i.e. one that di¬
rectly recommends, warns, orders, or prohibits, could hardly trade
successfully, if the respective prescriptions were not understood
as being based on a reasonable argument, i.e. some underlying
facts that can be spoken of in the indicative form, such as laws of
nature, facts of human psychology, social circumstances etc.
However, transitions from statements to strategies or, vice versa,
the motivation of the commands can be made only via judgement,
i.e. an axiological intermediate stage at which something is quali¬
fied as good or bad, be it the very action (way of thinking, state
etc.) in question, or something else connected with the action, its
purpose, means, place, time, intensity, tempo etc.).
The fact that proverbs are not mere statements - indeed, for¬
mally, too, they often are imperative or interrogative sentences -
renders their interpretation by means of predicate calculus even
less promising. Things stand relatively simple as far as interroga¬
tive sentences are concerned, as in proverbs questions are always
asked rhetorically, being interpretable as negative statements: Kes
teise hcida usub? ‘Who will believe another man’s trouble?’
means that ‘nobody will’, and Kui kaua koera kaelas vorst sei-
sab? ‘How long will a sausage hang around a dog’s neck?’ means
‘not too long’ etc. Imperative sentences, however, will end up in
commands even if they are rhetorical, i.e. ironic or “hesitant”
(Pakupagarilapsele saia ‘Go on offering buns to a baker’s child’;
Pane kits karneriks ‘Just make a goat a gardener’; base sant
sauna, sant tahab lavale ka ‘Just let a pauper into the sauna - he
will want to get onto the platform’; Mine piive puudma, kaotad
kana ‘Just you go after the partridge - you’ll lose the hen too’).
Irony is extremely many-sided. Being, after all, a negation in the
morphological sense, it is even more essentially an axiological
negation. Irony has been classified as a trope and as a subclass of
the comical. All these approaches are in a way correct. Yet most
imperative proverbs carry nothing but outspoken, direct impera¬
tives: commands, prohibitions, recommendations, or warnings.
Imperative proverbs have given headaches to all who have ever
tried pressing proverbs into formulae, including Grigori Permja-
kov and Zoltan Kanyo. As for Galit Hasan-Rokem (1982: 19), he
even attempts to deny the occurrence of imperatives in proverbs.

109
arguing that imperatives appearing in proverbs are commands of
prohibitions only formally, i.e. syntactically, while actually they
are just statements about what pays and does not pay doing. Yet -
‘pays’ or ‘does not pay’ are obviously expressions of strategic
judgement.
At the same time Hasan-Rokem’s interpretation leads us to
still another point of contact between the modal levels of utter¬
ances.
As for its surface mode, a prescriptive proverb is mostly for¬
mulated as an imperative sentence directed to a concrete ad¬
dressee, the impersonal “you”, occurring rather often in Estonian
proverbs and especially frequently in Russian ones. But a “deon-
tic” proverb may also occur in the indicative form, expressing a
norm, ideal, permission etc. This function may be indicated by
ordinary deontic clues, such as ‘must’, ‘may’, ‘must not’, or some
other lexical means.
Yet the interpretation of the text on its deep functional level
depends vitally on whether we classify its surface function as in¬
dicative or normative. Depending on the (literal) semantics and
situational context of the proverb all of the following combina¬
tions are conceivable:
(a) reference is made to a part of reality not covered by the
norms;
(b) reference is made to norms regularly followed (i.e. norms
and/or reality);
(c) reference is made to norms usually violated (i.e. norms, not
the reality).
For example, in calendar proverbs with the predicate denoting a
human activity there is a regular co-occurrence of two modal lev¬
els one upon the other, viz. the statement of what is actually (usu¬
ally) done serves, at the same time, to point out what is to be
done: Maarjapaeval antakse sigade voti katte ‘On Lady Day hogs
are given their keys’ (i.e. the hogs should be let out and so they
really are let out); Suivili tehakse sompa ja talivili tehakse tuhka
‘Spring grain is sewn into wet soil and autumn grain into dry
soil’. Here both modalities occur indeed in one and the same verb
on top of each other, instead of the usual situation of statements
inducing imperatives, or imperatives motivated by actual facts.

110
 Sometimes it is hard to say whether an indicative statement
should be interpreted as a “propositional” or “epistemic” one, i.e.
whether ‘it actually is so’ or ‘it is known to be so’, or rather ‘it is
believed to be so’, ‘it seems so’, or whether both interpretations
are possible.
Let us compare, for example, a pair of such lexically close and
most likely genetically related sayings as Soob vdhe soodetu ‘The
one who has been fed eats little’ and Soob palju soodetav ‘The
one who is fed eats a lot’. The former saying should evidently be
interpreted as a “factual statement”, whereas the latter looks
rather more like an expression of a certain opinion or appearance.
As for Oma tilk on parem kui voora hulk ‘One’s own drop is bet¬
ter than a large quantity from a stranger’, the more likely interpre¬
tation ‘is actually better or preferable’ does not quite exclude
‘seems better’.

3. Trope classification

The following tentative typology draws of the material of Baltic-

Finnic proverbs. The classification criteria are as follows:
(1) the “normality” versus the contradictory or “broken” na¬
ture of the literal sense of the proverb text;
(2) the presence versus absence of semantic transformation
(trope);
(3) the totality versus partiality of the semantic transformation.
The classes will represent different combinations of those alterna¬
tives. The result is not an exhaustive typology but rather a list of
predominant combinations that is bound to get us into a scrape in
more complex cases, being unable to decide between competing
alternatives while trying to classify certain concrete proverbs.

Type 1: zero-trope sentences (maxims)

Flere belong proverbs the lexical material of which (abstract
words, words of non-material and non-biological aspects of man
etc.) should be taken literally. As for contents these proverbs con¬
cern mainly the mental activity of man and its products, as well as
the most general categories and dimensions of universal and hu¬
man existence, such as time, fate etc.:

Ill
 Inimene opib niikaua, kui elab ‘Man leams throughout his life’
(EV 2138; PS 20);
Ara kiida iseenast, lase teised kiita ‘Don’t praise yourself, let
others do it’ (EV 3749; PS 37);
Mida sa tahad teise kaest, seda tee ka teisele ‘What you want
from another person to do to you, you do to him’ (EV 11858;
PS 345);
Ukski ei sunni targaks ‘No one is bom wise' (EV 11420; PS
137);
Kes palju liigub, see palju naeb ‘Who wanders much, will see
much’ (EV 8319; PS 324).
As Bengt Holbek (1970, 56) has pointed out, there is a significant
negative correlation between the figurativeness of a proverb text
(metaphor, metonymy etc.) and its “euphonic ornamentation” (al¬
literation, rhyme, rhythm). This is only to be expected, as the op¬
position of tropes and euphony during the act of text creation is
just obvious: one has to be inventive indeed to find lexical mate¬
rial permitting to realize both the semantic image and the
euphonic aspirations at the same time.
Here we have also included a number of euphonically orna¬
mented proverbs, displaying no clear semantic transformation
enabling one to classify them elsewhere. Semantically such texts
often leave one with a certain “dislodged” or “jolted” impression
due to synonym selection performed for euphonic reasons, but the
actual psychological effect of those shifts is very hard to define
any more closely. A few examples:
Mida varem, seda parem ‘The earlier, the better’ (EV 13672;
PS 350; rhyme and rhythm);
Lesk on kuri lepitada, mehenaine meelitada ‘A widow is hard
to appease, a wife [who has been married before] is hard to
please’ (EV 5774; PS 431; alliteration + “paradigmatic” rhyme
+ rhythm);
Haryast orja kiidetakse, miniat ei millaigi ‘A slave is seldom
praised, a daughter-in-law just never’ (EV 8080; PS 408; allit¬
eration + rhythm);
Teeb hull paljugi, elab viisas vdhemalgi ‘A madman may do
many a thing, a wise man will live on much less work’ (EV
1584; PS 400);

112
 Peefune ku/ub>, voetune vaheneb ‘What is worn, wears, what is
eaten, wanes’ (EV 14346; PS 404);
Tuska tuli, kun tupakka loppu ‘Sad days arrived when tobacco
was finished’ (PS 474);
Keta kerran keksitaan, siici aina arvellaan ‘Who is once found
out is always mistrusted’ (PS 401);
On syopd sadstavallakin ‘There’s always a spendthrift to
waste a thrifty fellow’s savings’ (PS 398).

Type 2: cases of depersonification

As for the literal plane those texts are absolutely “smooth”, with¬
out contradiction, representing the so-called sentential metaphors.
Man is never mentioned here. But as orders and prohibitions can
be addressed to humans only, the modality of the sentence is in¬
dicative. The discrepancy leading one to re-interpret the text oc¬
curs between the proverb and its verbal and/or situational context:
“wrong” topic,’’wrong” referents, “wrong” relationships etc. (Or,
the familiar proverb is distinguished from the rest of the speech’
flow just “by sight” and the interpretation takes place quite auto¬
matically, or context-free text seems to be pragmatically poor, de¬
claring something there is literally no sense to declare). The
whole text is re-interpreted and “anthropicalized”. Conditionally
depersonifications may further be subdivided by their literal
agents and other lexical referents as follows:
(a) animal referents seem to be especially productive, not only in
the Baltic-Finnic repertory, but in world proverb lore as well:
Kui konn matta otsa saab, siis ta hakkab krooksuma ‘As soon
as a frog gets onto a tussock, he starts croaking’ (EV 4311; PS
267);
Seni kurg kooles, kui soo sulas ‘The stork dies while the
swamp thaws’ (EV 4584; PS 376);
Kass pia puja tege, a soko siinniise ‘A cat bears soon, but the
litter is blind’ (EV 3379; PS 34);
Kiiiisitu kass ei paase puusse ‘A cat without claws won’t get
into a tree’ (EV 3408; PS 507);
Kus harga, seal sorga ‘Like ox, like hoof (EV 18545; PS
745);

113
(b) as for the plant kingdom, it has provided much fewer refer¬
ents. In Baltic-Finnic material they mostly occur in such proverbs
that refer to the likeness of parents and children:
Kdbi ei kuku kdnnust kaugele ‘A cone won’t fall far from the
tree-stump’ (EV 4910; PS 10);
Kuidas kand, nonda vdsu ‘Like stump, like sprig’ (EV 4934;
PS 54);
(c) relatively less frequent are also referents representing mete¬
orological phenomena and inanimate nature:
Vaga vesi, siigavpdhi ‘Still waters — deep bottom’ (EV 13208;
PS 816);
Veereval kivil ei ole sammalt ‘A rolling stone gathers no moss’
(EV 13914; PS 17);
Vesi ei piisi soelas ‘Water won’t stay in a sieve’ (EV 13960;
PS 48);
Suo siella, vetela taalla, ei kuivaa kussaan ‘Swamp here, wa¬
tery place there, no dry patch just anywhere’ (EV 10603; PS
195);
(d) referents representing material objects (inch food):
Kaigas on kate otsaga ‘A cudgel has two ends’ (EV 2920; PS
104);
Tiihi tiinn kumiseb ‘An empty tun sounds loud’ (EV 12690; PS
165);
Pada soimab katelt, uhed mustad molemad ‘A pot is abusing a
kettle, while both are equally black’ (EV 8196; PS 53);
Voiet ratas ei kraaksu ‘An oiled wheel doesn’t creak’ (EV
7099; PS 91);
Kuidas vakk, nii kaas ‘Like bushel, like lid’ (EV 13230; PS
115);
Uus luud piihib puhta toa ‘A new broom sweeps clean’ (EV
12991; PS 116).

Type 3 can be divided into two subtypes:

Subtype 3.1: “materializations” or “biologizations”
In this group the literal contents of the texts is also void of con¬
tradiction and comes “of the same realm”. Unlike in the previous
type, however, here man either figures in the literal contents, be¬
ing associated with animals or some other nonhuman referents, or

114
literal reference is made to certain elementary (physical or bio¬
logical) levels of human existence. As for modality, any is ac¬
ceptable, yet the imperative one predominates. In principle, the
motifs underlying the semantic transformations are the same as
for Type 2 (“depersonifications”), but the transformations do not
apply to the whole text: the human agents and objects survive,
while - mostly in the predicative part - the zoological, botanical
a.o. nonhuman referents are replaced by human ones and the ele¬
mentary (mechanical, physical, biological) human properties, ac¬
tivities and relations are re-interpreted as phenomena of a higher
level - mental, social, or ethical. So the transformation is meta¬
phoric, paradigmatic, “inter-realm”. A few examples of either
case:
(a) man is associated with animals, birds or some other non¬
human referents:
Saada siga Saksamaale, pese siga seebiga, siga tuleb koju,
siga jaab seaks ‘Send a pig to Germany, wash a pig with soap.
- the pig will come home, the pig will be a pig (EV 10363; PS
758 and 271);
Paremb tigano peoh ku motus ossa paal ‘Better [to have] a
titmouse in the hand than a wood-grouse on a branch’ (EV
11998; PS 278);
Ara jookse vasikaga voidu ‘Don’t race a calf (EV 13873; PS
183);
Hunti kardad - ara metsa mine ‘If you’re afraid of a wolf,
don’t go to the forest’ (EV 1655; PS 353);
Kaugelt on kagu kuulus ‘A cuckoo’s is famous from afar’ (EV
4913; PS 604);
Pane sika sakkiin, jos on pain ‘Put the pig in the bag, if it’s in
the right position’ (EV 9221; PS 382);
(b) the elementary part refers to a higher level phenomenon
within the human frame of reference:
Akki haarad, suu palutad ‘If you seize [food] on a sudden,
you’ll bum the mouth’ (EV 733; PS 304);
Paku pagarilapsele saia ‘Go offering buns to a baker’s child’
(EV 8205; PS 879);

115
 Omad vitsadpeksavad koige valusamini ‘One’s own birch will
hit the hardest’ (EV 7881; PS 858);
Noorelt kiilvad, vanalt loikad ‘What you sow when young,
you’ll reap in your old age’ (EV 7483; PS 600);
Uhe kaega ei saa solme siduda ‘One cannot tie a knot with
one hand’ (EV 5004; PS 812; here we actually have a junction
of a metaphor and metonymy: the metaphor shifts the expres¬
sion to the physical level, while hand represents a synecdo¬
che);
Oige hdlma ei hakka iikski ‘No one will tear an honest man’s
coat’ (EV 14555; PS 855);
Teise asi aetakse (pika) puuga ‘Another man’s job is done
with a (long) pole’ (EV 11884);
Kes teisele auku kaevab, see ise sisse langeb ‘He who digs a
pit for another will fall in it himself (EV 1 1835; PS 1);
Anna pe- kiilasse, lase ise labi kiiljekontide ‘Give your arse to
the village, you’ll have to shit through your ribs’ (EV 8683;
PS 292);
Helmaa leikkaa, hihaa paikkaa ‘He is cutting a piece from the
flap of his coat to mend the sleeve’ (PS 332).

Subtype 3.2: “visualizations” and “scenarizations”

This subtype is close to the previous one, and there are numerous
problematic hybrid forms between the two groups. In our material
the focus of this subtype is predominantly (albeit not obligatorily)
human. As for the literal contents the texts of this subtype are ei¬
ther quite sensible and acceptable, or harmonious on the immedi¬
ate constituent level, so-to-say, yet somewhat weird as a whole.
Like in the previous group, only part of the lexical components
are subjected to re-interpretation. The factors actuating re¬
interpretation may be either purely semantic (depending on the
literal contents of the sentence) or pragmatic or context-
dependent. But unlike the Subtype 3.1, here the transformation
type is metonymic as the utterance contains some trope
“lumps” “of local importance” whose function is to represent a
conceptual structure or fragment referred to with certain perceiv¬
able components of that fragment. Again a few examples further

116
 classified (NB! one case of metonymy may represent several pa¬
rameters or types of substitution simultaneously):
(a) a phenomenon or event is used to refer to a time or place typi¬
cally associated with it:
Kanadega magama, sigadega tiles ‘To bed with chicken, up
with hogs’ (EV 3113; PS 575);
Kun sa kuulet kuren aanen, ala mene lammin jaalleen ‘When
you hear a crane calling, don’t you step on an icy plash’ (PS
638, hearing a call —> ‘cranes have arrived’ —> ’spring has
advanced to a certain stage’);
Jos ei vappuna vaossa, min ei pouka pohtimessa ‘If the peas
aren t in the furrow by the May-day they won’t be bounching
in the winnower’ (PS 825);
(b) appearance, outward manifestation is used to refer to the real
content, bulk, value, or other attributes, reason, essence, etc.:
In Hallipead austa, kulupead kummarda ‘Honour a grey head,
bow to a baldhead’ (EV 807; PS 571; in dialect usage kulupea>
is said to mean either ‘gray’ or ‘bald’) we have a three-stage
metonymy as ‘man’ is represented by head (synecdoche),
‘hair’ is represented by head (in case the head has a certain
colour, i.e. an antisynecdoche is performed), and ‘old’ is rep¬
resented by gray, bowing, on the other hand, as an expression
of respect exemplifies the same metonymic transference;
(c) a personal name, or an outward feature etc. is used to refer to a
more general human type (age, sex, etc.):
Mis Juku ei dpi, seda Juhan ei tea ‘What Billy doesn’t learn,
William won’t know’ (EV 2490; PS 856);
Nattanenast saab mies, aga mitte ttihjast naurajast ‘A snotty-
nose will be a man, a laughing fool will not’ (EV 7405; PS
380);
(d) names of parts of the body are used to refer to actions or func¬
tions associated with them:
Uks pea on hea, kaks veel parent ‘One head is good, two are
even better’ (EV 15012; PS 88).
Again, many cases are problematic to classify. Just a couple of
examples:

117
 (1) Kelle jalg tatsub, selle suu matsub ‘Whose foot toddles, his
mouth munches’ (EV 2399; PS 55). On the literal level physical
activity (resp. working) is related to eating. Yet it is hard to de¬
cide whether in actual cases of using the proverb munching has
always meant nothing but ‘eating’. In proverbs (and traditional
rhetoric in general) eating itself is known as a productive figure,
often referring to wealth, well-being, etc. This is a good example
of the above-mentioned relation between individual and general.
It is hard to decide whether (a) the wealth, prosperity o.a. socially
prestigious conditions have metaphorically been replaced
by eating (while ‘eating’, being subject to certain metonymic se¬
mantic shifts, is not just eating but eating on an intensive level,
i.e. eating regularly and/or frequently and/or plentifully and/or
good things), or whether (b) the abstract higher-level conditions
are metonymically represented by eating as a biological
component of the total semantic structure of ‘wealth’, ‘well-
being’ or some similar notion of a higher level. In addition, ‘eat¬
ing’ is not manifested directly by the word eating but by an evi¬
dently metonymic “auditarization” suu matsub ‘mouth is munch¬
ing’.
(2) Jos on paikka paikan paalla, niin on markka markan
paalla ‘Patch on patch, bill on bill’ (PS 623). The metonymic ap¬
proximations would probably be ‘clothes (repeatedly) mended’
and ‘a heap of money’. As money is involved, further interpreta¬
tion (trying to guess the reason for stinting) can hardly be ‘pov¬
erty’ but is rather ‘economy’, while the consequence should be
further interpreted as ‘wealth’ in a more general sense, thus a
metonymic development from beginning to end.
Metonymic “visualizations” and/or other “sensorizations”,
such as various words or phrases describing facial expressions,
pantomime or gestures are very common outside proverbs as well.
Every now and then we read that someone punastas ‘flushed’,
kahvatas ‘turned pale’, pooritas silmi ‘rolled his eyes’, vdlgutas
silmi ‘flashed his eyes’, pilgutas silma ‘winked’, raputas pead
‘shaked his head’, vangutas pead ‘wagged his head’, noogutas
‘nodded’, sugas korvatagust ‘scratched behind his ear’, kratsis
kukalt ‘scratched the back of his head’, naitas keelt ‘stuck out his
tongue (at smb.)’, laksutas keelt ‘clicked his tongue’, hammustas

118
huult ‘bit his lip’, qjas mokad mossi ‘pursed her lips’, kirtsutas
nina ‘wrinkled up her nose’, turtsatas ‘chortled, gave a snort’,
naitas pikka nina ‘made a long nose’ (referring to a clown’s ges¬
ture?), loi silmad maha ‘lowered her eyes’, kehitas olgu
‘shrugged his shoulders’, vdristas olgu ‘let his shoulders shud¬
der’, viipas ‘beckoned or waved to smb.’, loi kaht kdtt kokku
clapped her hands (in surprise)’, plaksutas kasi ‘clapped’, laiutas
kasi ‘spread his hands’, hoidis poialt ‘crossed his thumbs’, poru-
tas jalga vastu maad ‘stamped his foot on the floor’, trampis
jalgu ‘stamped her feet’ etc., cf. also the Russian (pokazat)
kukish ‘cock a snook at smb.’.

Type 4: exaggerations and overspecifications

Like the previous types 3.1 and 3.2 this is a “broken” or a clausal
trope in which the significance of various sizes, measures, values
etc. are intentionally either enlarged (hyperbole), or diminished
(litotes), or else a deliberate overspecification of certain numeri¬
cal data, dates etc. takes place, while actual reference is made to’
certain less definite measures, periods etc. In essence the trope
may be either metaphoric (e.g. the members of the comparison
coming from different semantic regions: Ara tee kdrbsest elevanti
‘Don’t make an elephant out of a fly’) or metonymic (the shift
takes us to the end of the scale without leaving the semantic re¬
gion: ...sajab seitse nadalat ‘it will rain for seven weeks’; uheksa
last ja uks sank... ‘nine children and one shirt’). For example:
Naine jouab pollega rohkem valja kanda kui mees koormaga
sisse vedada ‘A woman can carry out in her apron more than a
man can bring in by horseload’ (EV 7260; PS 314);
Lutsapaa do on nii pitk, et kotkas kukub puust maha ‘St.
Lucy’s night is so long that an eagle will fall from the
tree’(EV 6104; PS 303);
Paremb kiimme kiitii kui titsi nadu ‘Better ten brothers-in-law
than one sister-in-law’ (EV 5162; PS 230);
Karul on uheksa mehe jdud, iihe mehe moistus ‘A bear has the
strength of ten men but the mind of one’ (EV 1610; PS 217);
Tarkus on kallim kui kuld ‘Wisdom is more valuable than
gold’ (EV 11680; PS 306).

119
(In a sense all calendary proverbs belong here as in principle they
all are overspecifications.)
Type 5: an evident semantic mismatch between the literal
elements of the text
Conditionally, this material can also be divided into two subtypes:
Subtype 5.1: cases of the absurd, oxymorons, paradoxes
Some texts can be interpreted as marginal cases of hyperbole.
Phraseology, proverbs, children’s lore, etc. abound in tropes
based in the absurd, and using animal referents (cf. also Krikmann
1992) as well as many other stereotypes like the making of a rope
of sand or a porridge out of snow, the carrying of water in a sieve,
etc. Some Estonian and Finnish examples:
Naisterahvas pole inimene, mara pole hobune, kaer pole vili,
kadak pdle puu ja lest pole kala ‘A woman isn’t human, a
mare isn’t a horse, oats aren’t grain, a juniper isn’t a tree, and
flaunder isn’t fish’ (EV 2842; PS 60);
Ko kavvobaho kakit, sis lahebast lovvat ‘If you hide farther,
you’ll find it nearer’ (EV 3474; PS 102);
Kui on puhad, siis olgu died: eit, too lambajalg korraga
laualel ‘Once a feast, let’s feast: old girl, serve the whole
lamb’s foot!’ (EV 0; PS 749);
Kuin kova tulee, niin koiraskin poikii ‘Being hard up, even a
male dog will whelp’ (PS 705).

Subtype 5.2: personifications

Purely human intentional actions, personal properties, or relations
are attributed either to concrete non-human referents (animals,
natural phenomena, etc.) or to various abstract objects. In the lat¬
ter case more general effects of materialization or animation are
also involved. A few more typical cases classified by the object of
personification:
(a) meteorological a.o. natural phenomena and objects:
Sugiisene iio soitab uhiksma hobuse seljas ‘An autumn night
rides on nine horses’ (EV 11407; PS 386) = ‘the weather is
changeable’;
Madisepaev hakkavad korred lund vihkama ‘On St. Matthew’s
Day stalks begin to hate snow’ (EV 6279; PS 307);

120
 Poua lapsed naeravad, vihma lapsed nutavad ‘Draught’s chil¬
dren laugh, rain’s children weep’ (EV 9238; PS 876);
Kevadine paev toidab aasta ‘One spring day will feed the
year’ (EV 3682; PS 359);
Kuiinlapaev liiiiakse talve selg pooleks ‘On Candlemas win¬
ter’s back is broken’ (EV 12296; PS 436);
Maki velkansa maksaa ‘A mountain will pay its debt’ (PS
646);
(b) food and clothing:
Ei upsi uus kuub, tantsib tais koht ‘A new coat won’t hop,
dance will a full stomach’ (EV 12924; PS 865);
Vi in votab meele meeste peast ‘Booze will take the mind off
men’ (EV 14129; PS 300).
[The fact that at first sight the first example Ei upsi uus kuub...
seems to contain both personification and synecdoche, may
provoke a naive question: is this a case of the “doubling” or
just neutralization of the two tropes, of divergent axes as they
are? I mean, hopping and dancing seem to represent personify
• cation only on the condition that the new coat and full stomach
are both interpreted literally. If, however, we assume that it is
the coat and stomach that are used figuratively (denoting
‘someone who has the particular piece of clothing and the part
of body mentioned’) the personification seems to vanish alto¬
gether. Hopping and dancing are evidently cases of visualiza¬
tion, but again it is hard to say whether they are interpretable
metonymically or rather, metaphorically, i.e. whether the se¬
mantic shift should be interpreted as a case of cause being rep¬
resented by consequence (joy makes one dance), or as a trans¬
ference of certain physical objects to the mental world (though
the assumed similarity of hopping and joy seems rather
far-fetched).]
(c) time, time units, calendar dates:
Ei aeg meest oota ‘Time won’t wait for a man’ (EV 108; PS

171);
Aeg annab head nou ‘Time gives good advice’ (EV 59; PS
585);
Koik aastad ei ole vennaksed ‘All years are not brothers’ (EV
11; PS 98);

121
 Aika tavaransa kaupitsee ‘Time trades in his own goods’ (PS
635);
(d) various social phenomena:
Volg veli votta, verihand maksta ‘A debt is a brother to make,
but an enemy [literally: bloody tail] to pay back’ (EV 13923;
PS 383);
Amet ei kiisi leiba ‘A profession never asks for bread’ (EV
257; PS 615);
(e) somatic referents (mostly interpretable as metonymies):
Millest stida motleb, sellest suu rddgib ‘What the heart muses,
the mouth will speak about’ (EV 11341; PS 291);
Silm on kuningas ‘The eye is the king’ (EV10478; PS 226);
Tdis koht ei usu tiihja ‘A full stomach doesn’t believe an
empty one’ (EV 12361; PS 42);
Hunti toidavadjalad ‘A wolf is fed by his feet’ (EV 1620; PS
100);
Ei silmci osaa vie ‘An eye (= a look) won’t take a piece off
one’ (PS 696);
(f) the word, speech, speech acts:
Oleks on paha poiss “IT is a bad guy’ (EV 7817; PS 880);
Hea sona vdidab vdora vae ‘A kind word will win a foreign
army (or: force)’ (EV 975; PS 572);
Tootus ka hea mees ‘A promise is a good man too’ (EV
12307; PS 326);
Sona seob, sona paastab ‘A word will bind, a word will save’
(EV 11132; PS 231);
(g) various troubles, defective conditions etc.:
Ndlg rua sualab ‘Hunger will add salt to the meal’ (EV 7706;
PS 288);
Kiill hada nou annab ‘Trouble will give advice’ (EV 1790; PS
220);
Onnetus ei hiiiia tulles, aga hoiatab da minnes ‘An accident
won’t call out when coming, but it will warn when going’ (EV
14714; PS 112);
Kahju opetab targaks ‘Damage will teach one wisdom’ (EV
2927; PS 479);
Nalka ei ole tdti ‘Hunger is no aunt’ (PS 539);

122
(h) certain specific substantivized human activities and various
spiritual ethical, or other properties:
Hooletus ja dnnetus on seltsimehed ‘Carelessness and accident
are mates’ (EV 1500; PS 862);
Too kiidab tegijat ‘Work praises the master’ (EV 12515; PS
106);
Viha votab vilja maast, kadedus kalad merest ‘Hate takes the
grain from the ground, envy takes the fish from the sea’ (EV
14028; PS 384);
Ahkeruus kovan onnen voittaa ‘Hard work overcomes misfor¬
tune’ (PS 541).

Type 6: the agents are supernatural creatures or saints

I am still paradoxically confused over the problem whether there
is or is not a radical difference between the interpretations of such
texts by religious and not-religious people. Can it be that the for¬
mer perceive texts like Kui Luoja luob hingekese, siis ka einekese
‘If Lord creates a soul, he [also] creates food [for it]’ (EV 6021>;
PS 269) or Jummal vaest sallis ‘God likes the poor’ (EV 2614; PS
227) directly, whereas the latter take them as personifications?
Hard to believe and hard to be non-believing.
By way of convention I would include here a specific and rather
productive group of “saint-personifications” ocurring in
calendar proverbs:
Jaan votab piiti, Jaagup kaks, Laurits lakub pdhja ‘John takes
a tub, Jacob takes two, Lawrence will lick up the bottom’ (EV
2336; PS 808);
Jakob viskab raudnaela heinasse ‘Jacob throws an iron nail in
the grass’ (EV 2300; PS 760);
Kadri hakkab kusele, aga Andres pis tab pulga ette ‘Catherine
begins to piss, but Andrew stops the flow up with a rod’ (EV
2858; PS 114, 127);
Matti pihin nostaa, Matti pihin kaataa ‘Matthew raises the
torch holder, Matthew lowers the torch holder’ (PS 663).
From another aspect personifications of saints are a case of a
rather exceptional class of metonymic personifications
(generally, personifications are listed among metaphoric tropes).
On this basis personifications of saints could be thrown in with

123
some other paradigms as well, esp. with such personifications that
are based on certain expressions or proper names (v. 5.2f above),
inch those containing agent nouns in the function of proper names
like Kinkija on surnud ‘[Mr.] Giver is dead’ (EV 3796; PS 455);
Kinkija poja nimi olla ntitid Osta ‘They say that Giver’s son’s
name is Buy now’ (EV 3797; PS 455) etc., as well as with per¬
sonifications of somatic referents (v. 5.2e).

Type 7: proverbs with a parallelist (esp. comparative) super¬

structure
These proverbs form a weird intersection of the logical-syntactic
and trope structures. In this here typology only those parallelist
constructions get a separate type, in which the paralleled clauses
have divergent trope structures. If the structures are similar, the
proverbs are classified by the main semantic transformation ap¬
pearing common to both of the parallelist passages. So,
Harvast orja kiidetakse, miniat ei millalgi ‘A slave is seldom
praised, a daughter-in law just never’ was classified as a zero-
trope;
Kanadega magama, sigadega tiles ‘To bed with hens, up with
hogs’ and Hallpead austa, kulupead kummarda ‘Honour a
grey head, bow to a baldhead’ belong to “visualizations” (3.2);
Poua lapsed naeravad, vihma lapsed nutavad ‘Draught’s chil¬
dren laugh, rain’s children weep’, Viha vdtab vilja valjalt,
kadedus kalad merest ‘Hate takes the grain from the field,
envy takes the fish from the sea’ and Jaan vdtab ptiti, Jaagup
kaks, Laurits lakub pohja ‘John takes a tub, Jacob takes two,
Lawrence will lick up the bottom’ were under Types 5.2 and 6
as respective subclasses of personification.
In principle, antonymous components and those representing dif¬
ferent stages of a temporal sequence should - in case of a paral¬
lelist superstructure - belong to one and the same semantic re¬
gion.

Type 7 can roughly be divided into three subtypes.

124
Subtype 7.1: A clause of non-human reference + a clause of
human reference
The “non-human” part can be interpreted as a sentential-
metaphoric “depersonification” (i.e. Type 2 of the above), while
the “human” part is interpretable as one of the possible “transla¬
tions” or explanations of the preceding one. E.g.
Kala otsib, kus sugavam, inimene — kus parem ‘Fish looks for
where it’s deeper, man [looks for] where it’s better’ (EV
3051; PS 61);
Sademest tuli, sonast tiili ‘Fire [starts] from a spark, quarrel
[starts] from a word’ (EV 11184; PS 148);
Magi ei saa maega kokku, mees saab mehega ‘A mountain
won’t meet a mountain, but a man will meet a man’ (EV
6604; PS 610);
Jouheva hyva hevonen, paha vaimo hapsillinen ‘Good is the
horse with flowing tail and mane, bad the woman with di¬
shevelled hair’ (PS 634).

Subtype 7.2: an “elementary” human reference + a higher-

level human reference
E.g.
Os tat hobese, saa hool, votat naase, saa mure ‘Buying a horse
you’ll get care, marrying a woman you’ll get worry’ (EV
8134; PS 296);
Ema pis tab rinna suhu, aga ei pista meelt paha ‘Mother puts a
breast in the mouth, but she doesn’t put reason in the head (EV
621; PS 121);
Nina otsa naed, ea otsa ei nae ‘You can see the tip of your
nose, you can’t see the end of your lifetime’ (EV 7448; PS
346);
Ara mine sauna vihata ega linna rahata ‘Never go to the
sauna without a bath whisk or to town without money’ (EV
14069; PS 576).

125
Subtype 7.3: a quasi-intersection between two components
with human referents
Two objects are associated with kind of a “common denomina¬
tor”, while with one of the objects the association is normal on the
literal level, but with the other it can be only figurative. E.g.
Inimene laheb vanemaks, tobi laheb nooremaks ‘A person gets
older, the illness gets younger’ (EV 2112; PS 234; the struc¬
ture can probably be interpreted as a sequence of premise and
consequence);
Rikas maksab rahaga, vaene maksab nahaga ‘A rich man pays
with money, a poor man pays with his skin’ (EV 9680; PS
202).
Here I must admit that the division of parallelist structures into
the above subtypes is rather subjective, arbitrary, and simplifying.
A mere couple of examples:
(1) Meest peetakse sonast, harga sarvest ‘A man is held by his
word, an ox [is held] by the horn’.
The first component contains an implicit human agent and an
explicit human object, while the second component has an im¬
plicit human agent and an explicit animal object. The verb
pidama ‘hold, keep’ is a typical polysemantic representative of
what could be called “large verbs” (like minema/tulema ‘go/
come’, tooma/viima'' bring/take’, kaima/jooksma/seisma ‘go/run/
stand’, andma/vdtma/saama ‘give/take/get’ a.o.), the subsenses of
which have still retained a certain “direct sense” of physical
events. Consequently,
(a) by the configuration of referents the proverb could be
grouped among the subtype 7.2 (human higher-level + human
elementary);
(b) peetakse sdnast ‘held by the word’ is supposedly perceived
as something close to a semantic mismatch or at least a combina¬
tion less usual than peetakse sarvest ‘held by the horn’, which
means that due to the “inner defect” in the first component and
the “common denominator” the proverb resembles the case 7.3
(being, however, neither human-referenced all through, nor on the
same level);

126
 (c) the first half, dealing with man and his word, represent the
“actual” meaning or theme, while the ox-by-the-horn half is a
parallel interpretable as a sentential metaphor. Considering the
fact that the conceivable agents are referred to rather indirectly,
by the mere impersonal -foe-form of the verb pidama ‘hold’ (and
in elliptical variants even that is missing), the proverb could be
held the closest to 7.1 (human +non-human).
(2) Metsalind kirju, inimese elu kirjum ‘A wild bird has many
colours, but a person’s life has more’
- by its general structure the proverb tends to 7.1, while the di¬
vergent interpretability of the “common denominator” makes it
eligible for 7.3.
Clearly and inevitably, this as well as any trope typology is ex¬
tremely sensitive to intra-type variability. A couple of examples
to illustrate this statement:

Type EV 7299
This type compares woman’s anger and a certain wind. In the text
the common property underlying the similarity may be left un¬
worded as being familiar to the speakers anyway (though in ar¬
chive texts the information may sometimes be found in explana¬
tions to the proverbs):
(1) Idatuul ja naiste viha ‘East wind and women’s anger’ +
explanation: “A woman doesn’t stop quarreling until she’s
crying, and the East wind doesn’t stop before it’s raining”
(Kuusalu - R.Kravtsov; EV 0).
Sometimes it is added that the objects compared are similar, or
one and the same etc.:
(2) Keskhommiku tuul ja naese siida on uhesugused ‘South-
East wind and a woman’s heart are similar’ (Vigala; red. B6).
The similarity may also be explicated in terms that leave one with
an impression that both components are meant literally, while the
similarity may either be mentioned, or assumed by default.
(3) Kdrmetuul pole vihmata ja naiste viha pole nututa ‘There
is no South-East wind without rain and no woman’s anger
without crying’ (Haademeeste; red. F), or

127
 (4) Lounatuul ilma sajuta ja naese viha ilma nututa ei lake
iialgi mooda ‘South wind will never pass without rain and a
woman’s anger without crying’ (Jamaja; red. Ii), or
(5) Naiste viha ja hommiku tuul olevat uks ja seesama: naiste
viha lopeb nutuga, hommiku tuul Idpeb vihmaga ‘Woman’s
anger and East wind is said to be the same: woman’s anger
ends in tears, East wind ends in rain’ (Pamu; red. C2).
Those variants, esp. 3 and 4, could best be approximated by the
Subtype 7.1, but neither there, nor actually anywhere in our sys¬
tem, is there a right place for the structures ‘A and B are one and
the same/similar/...’ or ‘A and B are one (+ an explanation as to
what respect they are one)’, if A and B are noun phrases or just
nouns.
In view of the common tendency of proverbs to human refer¬
ence it could be assumed that the actual theme of those sayings is
woman’s anger. But there is also a variant
(6) Keskhomigu tuul on nagu naiste viha: hakkab sadama, sa-
jab kolm paava /.../, naiste viha ka mudu jarele ei anna kui
vesi taga ‘South-East wind is like women’s anger: once it
starts raining it will rain three days /.../, women’s anger will
also not give way until it comes to tears (literally: water fol¬
lows)’ (Emmaste; B7), meaning that the variant probably refers
just to the South-West wind, and so, in our typology the prov¬
erb would rather belong to Type 5.2, representing personifica¬
tion.
Next, let us have a look at the different ways of wording the inter¬
section. The three texts to follow all come from Kuusalu:
(7) Idatuulja naiste viha - molemil on lobuks vesi taga ‘East
wind and women’s anger-all end up in water’ (EEa);
(8) Idatuul ja naiste viha loppevad vihmaga ‘East wind and
women’s anger end in rain’ (H3a);
(9) Idatuul ja naiste riid loppeb ige nutuga ‘East wind and
women’s quarreling will always end in weeping’ (H4).
The latter two examples resemble 7.3 as the explicit intersection
applies literally to one part of the comparison and metaphorically
to the other, but the other distinctive features of 7.3 are missing.
Also, we can see that in the empirical material rain can function
as a metaphor of ‘weeping’ and weeping can be a metaphor of

128
‘rain’. But in some cases (see (7) above) the wording contains wa¬
ter, that is an abstracted common part of both ‘weeping’ and
‘rain’, which makes us wonder whether it is not a metonymy in
regard to either of the two.

Type EV 2300
The idea is that towards the end of summer, usually somewhere
, around St. Jacob’s Day grass will turn hard, which makes it diffi¬
cult to mow.
(1) Jakobipaevast viskab vanajumal raudnaela heina sisse
‘Since St. Jacob’s Day God throws an iron nail in the grass’
(Joelahtme; Ai). This would be a general case of Type 6; if the
recipient believes that those processes are personally directed by
God, the only part of the proverb that sounds figurative to him
would be throws an iron nail, for a non-believer, however, the
figurative structure could look more or less like that of the follow¬
ing variant:
(2) Jakob taob raudnaela heina ‘Jacob hammers an iron nail
into the grass’ (Rapla or Marjamaa, A3a). In our typology this text
is a special case of Type 6 as a “saint personification”. Statements
of this kind seem to have no universal quantifier at all. ‘Every
Jacob’ is, of course, absurd, but it points to the possibility that
generalization can be restored by metonymic reinterpretation
‘every Jacob’ as ‘every St. Jacob’s Day’.
(3) Jaagappae viskab raudnaela heinasse ‘St. Jacob’s Day
throws an iron nail into the grass’ (Haademeeste, A3a). Here we
also have a personification, but an ordinary, non-metonymic one
(something like 5.2c of our classification).
Actually, in the latter and in the penultimate example personi¬
fication is included in totally different trope structures. In (3) the
semantic “hitch” occurs at the transition from the subject to the
predicate: days do not practise any nail-throwing in the literal
sense of the word. In (2) the effect of strangeness will not arise
until the juxtaposition of ‘nail’ and ‘grass’. Up to that moment the
initial part of the sentence looks semantically homogeneous, al¬
though it is not so on the literal level - cf. some real “fragments
of the metaphoric world” like Kabi ei kuku kannust kaugele

129
‘A cone won’t fall far from the stump’ or Vaga vesi - siigav pohi
‘Still waters - deep bottom’ etc.
[Analogous illusions of “iso-universality” may be created under
different semantic conditions as well. E.g. Kange situb kannad
tais ‘A stiff one will shit on his heels’. The context probably
prompts that kange should be interpreted as ‘obstinate, head¬
strong’. This might cause a momentary confusion as to why the
heels etc., which in turn could lead the recipient to realize that the
statement is also interpretable quite literally, i.e. if kange means
‘stiff, rigid’ in the physical (or “direct”) sense, and probably cre¬
ates a powerful association or visual image. This is probably fol¬
lowed by an understanding of the context requiring that ‘stiff be
interpreted, after all, non-physically, and in this perspective the
metaphor survives only in the predicate part of the proverb. At
that it is even hard to find a word for the “actual” referent of the
heels (except, perhaps, something like ‘someone is incapable of
acting flexibly’). On the evaluative level the idea is clear, though:
something bad is prophesized.]
(4) Jaakobipaeval luiiakse raudnael heina ‘On St. Jacob’s Day
an iron nail is hammered into the grass’ (Johvi, Ai3bi). This
statement makes one wonder whether it can be called a personifi¬
cation at all, as here we have a human-specific activity, but there
is no referent to personify.
At the same time the impersonal -foe-form, as such, with this
little mystical tinge to it, is rather productive in Estonian calendar
proverbs: cf.
Jaanipaevast visatakse jahe kivi meresse ‘On St. John’s Day a
cool stone is dropped in the sea’ (EV 2332, A2);
Kiiiinlapdeval luiiakse kiilmal iiks sarv peast dr a ‘On Candlemas
one horn is broken off the frost’ (EV 5228);
Madisepaeval loigatakse loukese keel lahti... ‘On St. Matthew’s
Day the lark’s tongue is loosened...’ (EV 6276);
Mihklikuu sees antakse huntidele talvemoon katte ‘During Sep¬
tember the wolves are given their winter forage’ (EV 6812, A);
v. also EV 5234, 8175, 9307, 9329, 12296, 13975 etc.
(5) Jakupipaaval laheb heinale raudnael sisse ‘On St. John’s
Day an iron nail will enter (go in) the grass’ (Tartu-Maarja,
Ai6ai). As for this text, it could perhaps even be interpreted as a

130
personification somehow. In this case the personified subject
would not be the calendar date, but the ‘iron naif, metaphoric as
it is already. But the physical sense has been rubbed off the word
laheb ‘goes’ to such an extent that an Estonian would hardly de¬
velop an image of an iron nail entering the grass on its own feet.
Instead, laheb is interpreted more normally as e.g. ‘appears’.
(6) Pddle jakappaeva on heinal raudnael siis ‘Since St. Jacob’s
Day there is an iron nail in the grass’ (Viljandi, A2ob3). Here there
is even no trace of personification. Which does not mean, how¬
ever, that the text is not figurative at all: the phrase iron nail in
the grass is contained here as well as in all previous examples.
Now let us take this syntagm and ask again: how many tropes and
which ones have we got here? Could we, for example, call the at¬
tributive word iron an epithet? To what extent is it reasonable to
visualize the literal meaning of this phrase? I mean, is it or is it
not absolutely absurd to ask, for example, whether the nail is in-
si de the blades, or just lying on the ground between them.
Be as it may, we have a trope by means of which grass leaves
are attributed the property of ‘hardness’. What kind of a trope is
it? Knowing the “actual” meaning of the syntagma we might per¬
haps assume that grass itself is this ‘iron nail’, the latter represent¬
ing a metaphoric transformation, a contracted form of the com¬
parative statement ‘grass will turn hard like an iron nail’. But in
this case ‘grass’ should be taken as a literal subject that the meta¬
phor is predicated upon. And, as the subject is in the inessive
case, do we not run into a conflict with, e.g. the requirement of
syntactic identity applying to the two halves of metaphors, or me¬
tonymies, for that matter (cf. Jakobson 1956)?
In paremiological and phraseological material such inessive
prepositional or case constructions actually occur rather fre¬
quently:
Est. Tal on saatan sees ‘He has a devil inside him’;
Hung. Kutya van benne ‘A dog in the belly’;
Engl. A growing youth has a wolf in his belly etc.
Let us once more change our view, looking at a text in which the
hardening of grass is combined /contaminated?/ with other signs
of autumn approaching, such as the cooling of waters and the
darkening of woods:

131
 Jakobipadvast on kulm kibi joes, must mees poesas, raudnael
heinas ‘Since St. Jacob’s Day there’s a cold stone in the river, a
black man in the bush, an iron nail in the grass’ [Rapla or Mar-
jamaa, EV 2332 (C) + 2300 (I) + 3326 (F)]. The parallelism of
this text establishes a systematic relationship between certain
elements of nature and their properties: ‘river’ - ‘cold’; ‘bush’
- ‘dark’; ‘grass’ - ‘hard’, while neither of the first two pairs
can be transformed into a non-inessive comparison.
Consequently, it may be possible to interprete the ‘iron nail’ as
‘hardness’ or ‘something hard’, not ‘grass’. But this immediately
raises a question about the semantic relation between what is said
and what is meant. To argue that ‘hardness’ is replaced by ‘iron
nail’ on the basis of similarity that consists in the property called
‘hard’ would obviously be absurd. Does the interpretation rather
not correspond to the conditions of metonymy? At least among
Lakoff s metonymic patterns there is a substitution type ‘OBJECT
FOR ITS (SUBSTANTIVIZED) PROPERTY OR BUNDLE OF PROPERTIES’.

4. Some syntactic stereotypes

The clearest and most effective indicators of the stereotypicality

of proverbs are not, however, the basic formulae of logic and de¬
grees of modality or the basic patterns of semantic transforma¬
tions or other similar constructs, but rather syntactic cliches with
their more or less clear correlations with stereotypes occurring on
other levels.
Similarly, the well-known formula-like, or ornamental charac¬
ter of proverbs which has made some scholars to believe that it is
possible to subject proverbs to a logical description, manifests it¬
self first and foremost as syntactic symmetry (in Estonian inevita¬
bly accompanied by morphological symmetry). In proverbs of
Baltic-Finnic peoples (Finns, Karelians, Estonians, Votes) whose
fondness of the so-called runic verse can be observed in a consid¬
erable part of their “metric” folklore in several genres, structural
symmetry is particularly frequent and pure, especially as com¬
pared to German or Russian proverbs, for example, in which end
rhyme with its anti-parallelist effect is much more frequent. Syn¬
tactic symmetry is, by nature, yet another aspect of parallelism.

132
Having — in the above discussion of the logical structure of prov¬
erbs - pointed out a parallelist supra-implicational level, we
should like to emphasize that in proverbs, manifestations of paral¬
lelism are certainly not confined to this supra-level, but reach the
basic implicational level as well.
A large number of syntactic stereotypes can be found in the
proverbs of many different nations. Some of them are associated
with certain patterns called syntactic formulae such as,
Kes..., see... (He who...,...);
Kui..., siis... (If / When..., (then)...);
Kuidas..., nonda..., (Like..., like...);
Parem..., kui... (Better..., than...);
Igal... oma... (Every... has its own...) etc.,
marked, as we can see, even lexically. The rest are just frequently
recurring syntactic patterns. Examples of such stereotypes can be
found in the introduction to Vanasonaraamat (Book of Proverbs)
and in my articles on logical structure of proverbs (Krikmann
1984 and 1987). Until recently, there was no systematic account
of the stereotypes and their productivity in Estonian proverbs. The
survey below, however sketchy, is an attempt to fill this gap.
Ever since Eleanor Rosch’ publications, cognitive psychology
and linguistics have been interested in the so-called natural classi¬
fications and the related notion of a prototype. There is reason to
believe that, instead of being formed on the classical basis of the
generic and the specific, natural classifications rather tend to be
based on certain prototypes around which the human mind will
build classes with indistinct, fuzzy boundaries, and such natural
classifications are based on certain natural associations of proper¬
ties, or syndromes. The trouble with natural classifications is that
they never cover everything that can be classified, and one way
the natural classification (and language in general) can overcome
this difficulty is to classify the world from a particular aspect and
in just as much detail as necessary, doing it on the principle
“something important and the rest”. As a result, we have, say,
wedding songs, swinging songs, Martinmas songs, cradle songs,
harvest songs etc., and in addition, “just songs”. Even some more
consistent natural classifications may be structured radially on the
principle “something important versus all the rest” and if such a

133
classification comes from an alien culture, it may strike us as ab¬
surd and totally illogical, for we just do not know what is consid¬
ered important in that culture and what is not.
Two beautiful examples of such classification have been cited side
by side by the cognitivist semanticist and metaphor theorist George
Lakoff (1987: 92ff).
Example 1 represents fiction. This is J. L. Borges’ classification of
animals, taken as if from a fictitious Old-Chinese encyclopaedia Ce¬
lestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge.
Example 2 represents reality, showing the classification of objects in
the Dyirbal language, which is one of the aboriginal languages spo¬
ken in Australia (Lakoff says he has borrowed the example from
R. M. W. Dixon).
The following attempt to classify formal stereotypes bears a close
resemblance to the above examples, especially the “Old-Chinese”
one. There is no fixed level hierarchy, instead I have just tried to
guess what the prototypes might be. The classification is not even
purely syntactic, being based on syntactic as well as on modal
features. The attention has been concentrated on
(1) whether the proverb contains imperative components or
not,
(2) whether there is a parallelist high level in the text structure
or not, and
(3) whether the basic level of the text is expressed as a simple
sentence or a symmetrical implication.
When analysing the material, I tried to simplify it as much as pos¬
sible. As the units classified are individual texts (to be more ex¬
act, the head texts of authentic folk proverbs from the academic
publication Eesti vanasonad {Estonian Proverbs), 12671 texts in
total), the effects of syntactical or modal synonymy cannot be ob¬
served. Every untypical and/or complex and/or hybrid form has
been eliminated from discussion. Nothing at all has been said
about simple sentences (to save space and effort).
So I came up with the following list of eight syntactic-modal
metaclasses, or prototypes. The prototypes have been accompa¬
nied by rather inaccurate and preliminary assessment of their fre¬
quency in Estonian archive material: the T-column carries the
number of different proverb types following the pattern in ques-

134
tion, while the V-column shows how many authentic archive texts
are represented by the types. (This number is just a rough ap¬
proximation as every productive proverb is characterized by a
syntactic variation not at all less rich than lexical variation.)
Class T V
A. Indicative simple sentences 2730 18450
B. Non-equative sentences with recurrent parts 490 1580
C. Equalities and comparisons 580 2630
D. Inequalities (inch preferences) 710 4970
E. Symmetric implicational patterns 2660 15230
F. Units with a parallelist supra-level (in total) 2160 18100
G. Units with an imperative verb form (in total) 1450 9740
H. Rhetorical questions 390 2560

Next, our modest attempt at classification will be presented in a

more detailed way. For lack of space we have been able to pro¬
vide the subclasses with but a few examples, no more than 10%
of the total number of appropriate texts for smaller subclasses,*
and ab. 5% for bigger ones. Like the metaclasses, every subclass
is provided with T and V values: if the name of the subclass is,
for example, followed by the numbers (60-170), it means that our
sample contains ab. 60 different proverbs of this type, represent¬
ing ab. 170 authentic archive texts.

A. Indicative simple sentences without co-ordinated parts or

equalization
In order to avoid remaining in total darkness, we shall present a
very short list of the most widespread proverbs in the form of
simple sentences, just ab. 1% of the appropriate proverb types.
Suur tiikk ajab suu lohki (A big piece will rend the mouth)
Kabi ei kuku kannust kaugele (A cone never falls far from the
stump)
Hada ajab harja kaevu (Need drives an ox down the well)
Sober sobra perse koorib (A friend will skin another friend’s
arse)
Tiihi toob tiili majasse (Want will bring strife to the house)
Valel on luhikesedjalad (A lie has short legs)

135
 Veereval kivil ei kasva sammalt (A rolling stone gathers no
moss)
Terav kirves leiab kivi (A sharp axe will find a stone)
Tiihi kott ei seisa piisti (An empty sack cannot stand upright)
Oma kiitus haiseb (Self-praise stinks)
Ulekohus ei seisa kotis (Injustice won’t keep in a sack)
Uus luudpiihib puhta toa (A new broom sweeps clean)
Kdsi peseb kdtt (A hand will wash another)
Hea sona vdidab vdora vae (A kind word can win a hostile
force)
Ega agan agana paale haugu (A grain-husk doesn’t bark at
another grain-husk)
Oige holma ei hakka iikski (No one will tear at a right man’s
coat)
Hunt hunti ei murra (A wolf will not kill another wolf)
Jagajale jaavad napud (A dispenser will be left with his bare
fingers)
Omad vitsadpeksavad koige valusamini (One’s own rod beats
the hardest)
Aeg annab head nou (Time gives good advice)
Jakob viskab raudnaela heinasse (Jacob throws an iron nail
into hay)
Ega nimi meest ei riku (A name won’t spoil a man)
Uhkus ajab upakile (Pride will make a man topple over)
Igal linnul oma laul (Every bird has its own song)
Vagu lambaid mahub palju iihte lauta (Many meek sheep will
find room in one shed)
Kiill koer koera tunneb (A dog will recognize another)

B. Non-equalizing sentences with recurrent parts

Bl. Sentences with contrasting predicative components (60-

170):
Naesterahval on pitkadjuuksed, liihikesed motted (Womenfolk
has long hair, but short minds)
Vaenelaps vaksa kasvab, kaks kahaneb (An orphan grows by a
span, diminishes by two)

136
 Jumala kivid jahvatavad pitkalt, aga vaga peenikeste (Lord’s
millstones grind slow, but very fine)
Sugisel on suve silmad, aga talve hambad (Autumn has sum¬
mer’s eyes, but winter’s teeth)
B2a. Affirmative sentences with synonymous predicative com¬
ponents (100-230):
Voora leib king kikkani, vaak valgeni (A stranger’s bread will
crow till cockcrow, caw it will till the morning sun)
Nuur tiidrik, sel kiipseb porsas pdvves, kana kaindlas ja nisu-
leib nisa all (A young maiden - well, such a one has a piglet
growing on her bosom, a chick under her armpit and a wheat-
en loaf under the breast)
Edimine iki hiirtel, harakil (The first specimen will always go
to mice and magpies)
Leisik liiva ja nael karvu soob iga inimene aastas ara (Twenty
pounds of sand and a pound of hair are in every man’s yearly
menu)
Talupojad toitvad saksad ja sandid (Peasants feed both gentle¬
folks and beggars)
Jaagobipaevast jaab kaste kiinka aare, hall aja aare (Since St.
Jacob’s Day dew will remain on the hill, hoarfrost will stay
near the fence)
B2b. Negative sentences with synonymous predicative compo¬
nents (30-70):
Huatego pala-ai tulld, oi upu-ui vette (A good deed won’t
burn in fire, nor drown in water)
Ema ei siinni vakka ega varna (Mother doesn’t fit in a bushel,
nor on a peg)
Kitmine ei tii kedagi parembas, ei paksembas (Praise doesn’t
make anyone better, nor fatter)
B3. Sentences with recurrent parts, in which the predicative
components stand in an ambiguous or vague relation (20-
30):
Kiilm ajab mehe ree pealt maha, is tub ise peale (Frost drives a
man off the sled and gets on himself)
Maailm laheb vanemaks ja paav-paavalt ikka targemaks (The
world gets older and, from day to day, wiser)

137
 Raha tuleb, raha laheb (Money comes, money goes)
Inimene on ise oma jumal ja ise oma kurat (Man is his own
God and his own Devil)
B4. Sentences with recurrent parts branching off on a calen-
dary, or some other temporal principle (10-15):
Tedre lauluaeg peab olema kaks nadalad enne ja kaks paale
jilripdeva (A blackcock’s singing time is two weeks before
and two after St. George’s Day)
Enne ja parast partlepaeva kolm paeva ollev lepp paju pool-
velle (Three days before and after St. Bartholomew’s Day al¬
der is said to be willow’s half-brother)

C. Equalities and comparisons

Cla. Equalities of the type A is B (20-100):
Tahtmine on taevariik (Desire is heaven)
Aeg on raha (Time is money)
Silm on kuningas (The eye is the king)
Leib on peremees (Bread is the master)
Clb. Equalities of the type A is B’s C and inverse forms of the
type B’s C is A (165-840):
Habe on mehe au (Beard is a man’s honour)
Suu on siidame moot (Mouth is heart’s measure)
Naine on maja lukk (Woman is the lock of the house)
Laiskus on kuradipeapadi (Lazyness is the Devil’s pillow)
Vaene on rikka roog (A poor man is a rich man’s food)
Mees on naisepea (Husband is his wife’s head)
Ettevaatus on tarkuse ema (Caution is the mother of wisdom)
Haigus on surma kask (Disease is Death’s messenger)
Lukk on looma vari (A lock is an animal’s cover)
Tonisepaev on talve hari (St. Anthony’s Day is winter’s ridge)
Tamm on talupoja raud (Oak is farmer’s iron)
Lapsed on vaese varandus (Children are a poor man’s fortune)
Musu on muu asja kasiraha (A kiss is a handsel for something
else)
Koerapalk on malk (A dog’s reward is cudgel)
Teemehe lukk on solm (A wanderer’s lock is a knot)

138
Clc. Other /^-predicated comparisons beginning with a sub¬
ject (60-180):
Mets on vaese mehe kasukas (Forest is a poor man’s furcoat)
Koht on kdige kurjem kubjas (Stomach is the most ruthless
foreman)
Siga on ausa mehe leivakorvane (Pork is an honest man’s food
beside bread)
Too on lolli inimese ajaviide (Work is a fool’s pastime)
Kannatus on kallis asi (Patience is a precious thing)
Tarkus on tarviline vara (Wisdom is a valuable property)
Isa on pere leiva tugi (Father is the family’s bread support)
Cld. Equalities of the form A is half of B and A is two Bs (15-
130):
Puhtus on puul elu (Cleanliness is half the life)
Kang om kats miist (A lever is two men)
C2. Equalities beginning with a declinable attribute (50-450):
Vaga siga koti naaber (A tame pig is a bag’s neighbour)
Julge pealehakkamine on pool voitu (A brave beginning is half
the victory)
Ttihi koht on kdige parem kokk (Hunger is the best cook)
Kuues kiilinadal on rohunddal (The sixth sowing week is a
grass week)
Hea siidametunnistus on pehme peapadi (A good conscience
is a soft pillow)
Loll pea on kere nuhtlus (A stupid head is the body’s scourge)
C3. Equalities beginning with a genitive attribute or an at¬
tributive word (30-80):
Loodetuul on taevaluud (North-Western wind is the sky’s
broom)
Rahaahnus on kdige kurja juur (Greed for money is the root of
all evil)
Heateo pa Ik on kuri malk (The reward for a good deed is a bad
cudgel)
C4a. Elliptic equalities with recurrent parts, or equalities with
is or and as copula (40-120):
Teine inimene on teise kurat (A man is another man’s Devil)
Vana tee - vana sober (An old way [is (like)] an old friend)

139
 Lapse nahk ja koera nahk (A child’s skin and a dog’s hide
[should hardly be spared])
Uks koer teise vader (A dog is another’s sponsor)
C4b. Equalities with a full ellipsis or an and-copula, but with¬
out recurrent stems (10-70):
Kevadine paev - siigisene nadal (A spring day [is the same as]
an autumn week)
Poisslaps — takutsalg (A boy [is like ] a colt)
Vihma vili ja p5ua sokal (Rain’s grain and a drought’s chaff
[are the same])
C4c. Verbless equalities with an or-copula (10-60):
Naise varast rikkust voi koerasitast sonikut ( [One never gets]
any riches out of a wife’s property or manure out of dogshit)
Salajutt voi salasitt (Secret talk or secret fart [both will stink
sooner or later])
Poesi kill vai uisa kill (A boy’s tongue or a snake’s tongue [are
equally evil])
C4d. Equalities of the type A and B are the same ~ alike (40-
130):
Lapse kiilm ja koera nalg on uks (A child’s [feeling] cold or a
dog’s hunger are the same)
Naise rikkus ja titi pikkus on uks (A woman’s wealth and a
prick’s length are the same)
Lesk mees ja loigatud koer on uks (A widower and a gelded
dog are the same)
C5a. Comparisons beginning with a simple subject, and using
the verb be (15-15):
Siga on nagu saks (A pig is like a gentleman)
Vanatudrik kui kuijono kattai (A spinster [is] like a doddered
juniper)
Elu on liihike nigu uni (Life is short like a dream)
C5b. Comparisons using the verb be or an ellipsis, beginning
with a declinable attribute (15-70):
Kevadine lumi on kui kord sonnikut pollule (Spring snow is
like a layer of manure to a field)

140
 Rikas naine kui resu silmas (A rich woman [is] like a dust in
the eye)
Lesk mees nagu soendud supp (A widower [is] like warmed
soup)
C5c. Comparisons using ellipsis or the verb be and beginning
with a genitive attribute (30-70):
Mihe sugulane um ku toprarasvaga mug (Husband’s kin is
like a meal with suet [i.e. not as tasty as made with lard])
Laisa too — nagu kana haudub mddamuna peal (A lazy man’s
work - like a hen sitting on a rotten egg)
Vaese elu on kui tuli toores puus (A poor man’s life is [burn¬
ing low] like fire in undried wood)
C5d. Comparisons with the verb be, the halves of which re¬
peat certain declinable verb forms or their ellipses (10-^40):
Kolm korda kolida on niisamma had ku iiks kord poleda (To
move thrice is as good as to bum down once)
Naestega vaidlemine on kui vasikaga voidu jooksmine (Argu-
. ing with women is like racing a calf)
Ttitar mehele laulatetud on nagu kikk leivast dr a leigatud
(A daughter married to a man is like a slice cut off the loaf)
C5e. Comparisons with verbs other than be (15-70):
Uma kitt hais ku sitt (Self-praise stinks like shit)
Inimse elu ripub kui juuksekarva otsas (Human life as if hangs
on a hair)
C6a. A is B -equalities with the common feature made explicit
(3-4):
Lapsed on linnud: saavad suled selga, ongi Idinud (Children
are birds: as soon as they get their feathers on they are gone)
Poissmiis puulharga: saalt suit, kost saa (A bachelor [is] half a
bull: eats wherever he finds food)
C6b. A (is) like B -comparisons with the common feature
made explicit (20-30):
Lesk naine kui madal aed, kust kdik tile lahvad (A widow [is]
like a low fence where everyone goes over)
Talupoeg on nagu tolmune kott, ikka natuke tuleb (A peasant
is like a dusty sack, a little can always be got out of it)

141
 Tiihi jutt on kui hundi sitt: must ja karvane (A gossip [literally:
empty story] is like a wolfs shit: black and hairy)
C6c. Comparisons beginning with A and B (are the same) or A
or B, with the common feature made explicit (10-15):
Siga ja sepp on iiks: siga teeb sita, sepp teeb raua uueks (A
pig and a blacksmith are the same: a pig makes shit new, a
blacksmith makes iron new)
Sanna palamine vai latse kuulmine— vdikene asi (A sauna
_ burnt down or a child’s death - both are trifles)
C6dl. A and B -initiated equalities with the common feature
made explicit, which are syntactically affirmative sentences
with two subjects (130-590):
Rikka haigus ja vaese olu on kuulsad (A rich man’s illness and
a poor man’s ale are famous)
Noored neiud ja nisuleib lahevad ruttu vanaks (Young maid¬
ens and wheaten bread get old soon)
Naisterahva too ja marahobuse soomine ei lope Hal otsa
(A woman’s work and a mare’s eating never end)
Puhas suu, puhas kasi kaib maailma labi (A clean mouth, a
clean hand will travel round the world)
Mehine pere ja harine kari votavad Jumala kaest vagisi
(A masculine household and a cattle of many oxen will take
from God by force)
Vaeste vasikad ja rikaste lapsed surevad noorelt (Poor peo¬
ple’s calves and rich people’s children die young)
Surnu para ja naise vara ei kesta kaua (A dead man’s heritage
and a woman’s dowry don’t last long)
C6d2. Neither A nor B -initiated equalities with the common
feature made explicit, which are syntactically negative sen¬
tences with two subjects or two objects (40-200):
Laastutuli ja laenuleib ei kesta kaua (Neither chip fire nor bor¬
rowed bread last long)
Naisterahva viha ja vesikaare tuul ei anna enne jdrele kui vesi
valjas (Neither a woman’s anger nor the west-northwest wind
give way before water comes)
Inimese tahtmine ega porgu ei saa Hal tais (Neither a man’s
desire nor hell ever gets fulfilled)

142
C6e. Lists of more than two objects treated as similar, with
the common feature made explicit (50-290):
Kana laulmise, naise vilistamise ja lehma moirgamise haal
kostab porgu (The sound of a hen crowing, a woman whistling
and a cow roaring will reach hell)
Ilmas pole kolme asja: kivil juurt, linnul piima, veel oksa
(Three things are absent from this world: a stone’s root, a
bird’s milk and water’s twig)
Jiirisid, Marisid, korvhobusid ja koveraidpuid koik kohad tais
(There are crowds of Juris, Maris, sorrel horses and bent trees
everywhere)
Uks taitsamees ei anna teisele tarvitada oma nuga, hobust ja
naist (A real man won’t make his knife, horse, or wife avail¬
able to another man)

D. Inequalities (including preferences)

Dla. Symmetric Better... than... -preferences (340-2930):

Parem suutais soolast kui maotais magedat (Better a mouthful
of salted food than a stomach full of sweet stuff)
Parem karta kui kahetseda (Better be cautious than repent)
Parem hoida kui oiata (Better beware than groan)
Parem vana habeme all kui noore piitsa all (Better under an
old man’s beard than under a young man’s whip)
Parem korts kannas kui vill varbas (Better a wrinkle at the
heel than a blister on the toe)
Parem on oma ema vits kui voeraema vdileib (Better one’s
own mother’s rod than a stepmother’s buttered bread)
Parem oma riide soe kui teise mehe too soe (Better one’s own
clothes’ warmth than the warmth of working for another man)
Parem kodu koorukesed kui vdileib voorsil (Better pieces of
crust at home than buttered bread away from home)
Parem paluke leiba kui paha sona (Better a piece of bread
than a bad word)
Parem varblane peos kui tuvi katusel (Better a sparrow in the
hand than a pigeon on the roof)
Parem soonu soota kui koolu kosutada (It’s better to feed a fed
one than to restore a dead one)

143
 Parem vana varjun kui noore ilun (It’s better [to live] under an
old man’s shade than in a young man’s beauty)
Parem paksu painutada kui peenikest per an vedada (It’s better
to bend a plump one than to drag a slim one behind)
Parem oma ema must puder kui vddraema voileib (Better the
dark porridge of your own mother than a stepmother’s buttered
bread)
Parem hiiva rooga ule jatta kui vatsa revestada (It’s better to
leave some good food untaken than to split the stomach)
Paremb laih laudan ku vakev val ’a paal (Better a skinny one
in the shed than a well-fed one in the field)
Dlb. Better-preferences with a nonsymmetrical simple sen¬
tence structure (40-120):
Uks vana sober on parem kui kaks uut (An old friend is better
than two new ones)
Oma ema leib on parem kui vodraema voidleib (One’s own
mother’s bread is better than a stepmother’s bread and butter)
Odagune uhetu om paremp ku hummugune mostu (Rinsed in
the evening is better than washed in the morning)
Kodu om paremb ku pidu (Home is better than a feast)
D2a. Yoower-inequalities with a symmetric structure (50-330):
Enne saab ktilla ktiljest kui nalja otsast (You may sooner get
something from plenty than from hunger)
Enne saab rnadal marja maast ku korge take taevast (A low
one sooner gets a berry from the ground than a tall one picks a
star from the sky)
Ennemb saat kidsi rikka kaest kui helde vaese kaest (You
sooner get something out of a rich and stingy man than a poor
and kind one)
D2b. Shower-inequalities with the structure of a nonsymmet-
ric simple sentence (15-110):
Veike kivi Itikkab ennem koorma timber kui suur (A little stone
will upset a load sooner than a big one)
Ema polve naal kasuse lats innembi ku esa salve naal (Lean¬
ing on its mother’s knee a child will grow sooner than leaning
on its father’s bin)

144
D3. More-inequalities {enam in Estonian) with a symmetric
structure (20-220):
Enam saab ikka piskust toost kui suurest seisust (More is
achieved by a little work than by a long rest)
Enam tehakse nouga kui jouga (More is done by wit than by
force)
Enamb saap suur suikja kui kavva magaja (A frequent dozer
[i.e. a slow worker] gets more than a long sleeper)
D4. More-inequalities (enam or rohkem in Estonian) with the
structure of a non-symmetric simple sentence (120-470):
Arm aitab enam kui hirm (Love helps more than fear)
Laps on enam kui laast (A child is more [useful] than a splin¬
ter)
Isa sona enam kui ema vits (Father’s word is more than
mother’s birch)
Tasane tsiga tsung enamb maad ku rohtitelleja (A quiet pig
grouts more than a grunter)
Vasinu hobesele om tema korva suurune kikk leiba enamb kui
karnits kaaru (For a tired horse a slice of bread the size of its
ear is more than a measure [3.28 1] of oats)
Naine jduab pollega rohkem valja kanda kui mees koormaga
sisse vedada (A woman can carry out more in her apron than a
man can carry in by a load)
Janes teeb tihe ooga rohkem jalgi kui varsaga hobune tile suve
(A hare leaves more traces during a night than a mare with a
foal during a summer)
D5. Symmetrically or non-symmetrically structured easier-
inequalities (10-30):
Kergem teist laita kui ise paremini teha (It’s easier to criticize
another person than to act better oneself)
Kergemb kul’ata ku ttitid teta (It’s easier to rollick than to
work)
Rumalaste ktisida on kergem kui targaste kosta (It’s easier to
ask a foolish question than to give a clever answer)
Hoobelda on kergem kui maksta (It’s easier to boast than to
pay)

145
D6. #/gger-inequalities with the structure of a non-symmetric
simple sentence (15-20):
Sona vagi on suuremb kui sojavdgi (The power of a word is
bigger than [the power of) an army)
Hunt tile aja minnes on suurem kui hobune (A wolf, when
jumping over a fence, is bigger than a horse)
D7. IForse-inequalities with the structure of a non-symmetric
simple sentence (10-15):
Liinah om hulldp ku laanoh (It’s worse in a town than in a for¬
est)
Proosta ’ olok om hullob ku ’ vargus (Vulgar manners are worse
than stealing)
D8. .SWefer-inequalities with the structure of a non-symmet¬
ric simple sentence (5-30):
Kevadine muld on magusam kui stigisene tidal (Spring earth is
sweeter than autumn aftergrass)
Uni on magusam kui mesi (Sleep is sweeter than honey)
D9. More /?m:/0ws-inequalities (kallim in Estonian) with the
structure of a non-symmetric simple sentence (5-20):
Aus nimi on kallim kui kuld (An honest name is more precious
than gold)
Raholine stidti om kallimp kui kuld (A heart at peace is more
precious than gold)
DIO. 0/</er-inequalities with the structure of a non-symmetric
simple sentence (10-50):
Kaup on vanem kui meie (A deal is older than we are)
Ktisk on vanem kui inimene (Fiat is older than man)
Oigus on vanem kui kohus (Justice is older than court [or:
Right is older than duty])
Dll. JFiser-inequalities with the structure of a non-symmetric
simple sentence (10-160):
Muna on targem kui kana (An egg is wiser than a hen)
Hommik on targem kui ohtu (Morning is wiser than evening)
Ohtu on targem kui hommik (Evening is wiser than morning)

146
D12. Inequalities with other comparative words (50-300):
Ondsam on anda kui votta (It’s more beatific to give than to
take)
Veri on paksem kui vesi (Blood is thicker than water)
Igavam on lehm liipses kui tappes (A cow milked lasts longer
than a cow killed)
Oma suu on ikki lahemal ku latse suu (One’s own mouth is
always closer than a child’s mouth)
Kaks silma ulatavad kaugemale kui iiks (Two eyes reach far¬
ther than one)
D13. Various negative inequalities (20-150):
Hunt ei ole nii suur, kui hurjutatakse (The wolf is not as big as
it’s rated)
Ega putru nii palavalt siiiia, kui keedetakse (Porridge is never
eaten as hot as it’s cooked)
Muna pole targem kui kana (An egg is not wiser than a hen)
Kurat pole kunagi nii hirmus, kui teda maalitakse (The Devil
is never as terrible as it’s painted)
D14. Inequalities explained (5-10):
Armastus on hullem kui soetobi: soetobi ajab pad paljaks,
armastus ajab pe- paljaks (Love is worse than typhoid fever -
typhoid fever pulls the head bald, love pulls the arse bald)

E. Implications without a parallelist supra-level

Ela. Elliptic texts interpretable as universal implications

(400-2080):
Vaga vesi, siigav pohi (Still water, deep bottom [= Still waters
run deep])
Uheksa ametit, kiimnes nalg (Nine trades, hunger the tenth)
Persealune soe, ninaalune kiilm (Seat warm, food cold)
Unustab hoidja, tabab puiidja (Failed by the guardian, caught
by the pursuer)
Varsan opid, vanan pead (Learnt when a foal, kept when old)
Harva kaid, ausast peetakse (Seldom visiting, well treated)
Rummal pad, pal ’lu vaiva (A stupid head, lots of trouble)
Kaste enne jiiripdeva, rukis enne jaakobeid (Dew before St.
George’s Day, rye before St. Jacob’s)

147
 Hooletus ees, onnetus taga (Neglect first, accident next)
Kutsumata voerad, teadmata roog (Guests unbidden, food un¬
known)
Akki haarad, suu palutad (Hastily grabbed, mouth burnt)
Otav kala, laih Him (Cheap fish, weak soup)
Tasa soidad, kaugemale jouad (If you drive softly, you’ll get
farther [=Soft and fair goes far])
Paha koer, parem onn (A bad dog, better luck)
Elb. Elliptic texts interpretable as universal implications or
parallelist non-generalized patterns of the type A and B,
A, but B etc. (20-920):
Palju lapsi, laiad silmad (Many children, wide eyes [Warning
against eavesdroppers])
06 ees, surm selja taga (Night ahead, death close behind)
Palju kisa, vahe villu (Big raw, little wool)
E2a. Implications with If... then... (510-1080):
Kui tonisepaeval nii paljugi paikest paistab, et mees naeb
hobuse selga hiipata, siis tuleb kena aeg (If there is enough
sunshine for a man to get on horseback on St. Anthony’s Day,
there’ll be nice weather)
Kui saad tile koera, saad ka tile saba (If you’ve got over the
dog, you’ll get over the tail as well)
Kui seitsmevennapdeval sajab, siis sajab seitse nadalat (If it
rains on the Day of the Seven Sleepers [June 27], it will rain
for seven weeks)
Kui ktitinlapaava ajal saab harg raasta alt juua, siis maarja-
paava ajal ei saa kukkki (If a bull can drink from eavesdrop-
pings at Candlemas, even a cock can’t do it on Lady Day)
Kui paastumaarjapaeva oosel ktilmab, ktilmab veel 40 odd (If
it freezes on Lady Day night, it will freeze on 40 more nights)
Kui maarjapaeva 661 ktilm kanamuna valjas lohki loob, siis
tuleb ktilm kevade (If an egg will crack outdoors of cold on
Lady Day night, there will be a cold spring)
Kui kevade ktilm votab kormakudu, votab stigise vilja (If frog’s
spawn is frozen in spring cold, crops will be taken by autumn
frosts)

148
 Kui maarjapaeval lumi katusel, siis juripaev hanged aia dares
(If snow lies on rooftops on Lady Day, there will be snow¬
drifts at fences on St. George’s Day)
Kui mihklipaevaks puulehed maas, siis juripaevaks rohi maas
(If the trees are leafless on Michaelmas, it will be grassy on St.
George’s Day)
Kui piiiiad koigest vaest, saad ule igast maest (If you try from
all your might, you will get over every mountain)
On kange sonn, siis ka kanged kohitsejad (If the bull is strong,
the gelders are strong too)
Kui ei ole surmatobi, siis saab ikka viinast abi (If the disease
is not fatal, spirits will help)
Kui Jumal loob lolli, siis loob lollile ka molli (If God creates a
fool, he creates a trough for him, too)
Kui mardipaeval Soel selgelt looja laheb, siis tuleb had vilja-
aasta (If the Pleiades set cloudless on Martinmas, there will be
good crops next year)
Kui madisepaeval saeab, siis on paelu marju ja mardikid (If it
•snows on St. Matthew’s Day [February 24], there will be lots
of berries and bugs)
Kui mardipaeval lumi katuste paal, siis lihadepuhade aeg kah
(If snow is on roofs on Martinmas, it will be there on Easter as
well)
Kui rukkioras enne juripaeva paigast ara liigub, siis saab
enne jaagupipaeva loigata (If rye crop straightens up before
St. George’s Day, there may be harvest before St. Jacob’s
Day)
Kui saab sant, siis saab sandi poiss ka (If the beggar gets
something, the beggar’s boy gets something too)
E2b. Reverse kui (= if or when) -implications (150-550):
Siis on harjal handa tarvis, kui kiil kallale tuleb (The ox needs
his tail when a gadfly attacks)
Ega siis hing hukka ei lahe, kui ihu harida saab (A soul won’t
perish if the body is cleansed [about corporal punishment])
Ega kade keela, kui helde tahab (A stingy one won’t forbid
when a generous one wishes)

149
 Kull noid nou loud, ku poig puvva viias (Surely a witch will
find a way, if her son is taken to gallows)
Abi saab ikka, kui arstitakse (There will be help, if treatment is
applied)
Ega kuer siis kdjata, kui kondiga visata (A dog will not squeal
when hit by a bone)
Juripaev kui hobososita paal ka hallotki om, sos saa iks had
suvi (If there is frost at least on horse manure on St. George’s
Day, there will be a good summer)
E3. Implications with wwftV-patterns (70-640):
Koer haugub, kuni kiilaline tuleb (A dog will bark until a guest
arrives)
Seeni sopra kui soira (A friend until cheese [hasn’t been fin¬
ished])
Inimene dpib niikaua, kui ta elab (A man learns until he lives)
Seni kurg kooles, kui soo sulas (The stork will die before the
swamp thaws)
Peni seeni hauk, kui susi karja manu tule (A dog will bark un¬
til a wolf comes near the cattle)
Sant tanab seni, kui suu marg on (A beggar’s thanks last until
his mouth is wet)
E4. Where..., there... -implications and reverse implications
with (there)... where... (220-2200):
Kus suitsu, seal sooja (Where there is smoke, there’s warmth)
Kus hunti koneldakse, seal hunt on (A wolf mentioned, a wolf
present)
Kus tegijaid, seal nagijaid (Where there are doers, there are
witnesses)
Kus suitsu, seal tuld (Where there is smoke, there’s fire [= No
smoke without fire])
Kus hada koige suurem, seal abi koige lahem (Where the need
is the greatest, the help is the closest)
Kus dhtu, seal oomaja (Night will give the lodging [literally:
Where the evening, there the lodging])
Kus puud raiutakse, seal langevad laastud (Where trees are
felled, chips are bound to fall)

150
 Kodu sadl, kus kotid maas (Home is where the package is
dumped)
Siga soob sealt, kus mold ees (A pig eats wherever it finds a
trough)
E5. Implications with How many..., so many... (5-10):
Mitu paad, setu meelt (How many heads, so many minds)
Mitu meest, setu aru (How many men, so many minds)
E6. Implications with Like..., like..., As..., so... etc. and their
reverse forms (200-1770):
Kuidas kand, nonda vosu (Like stump, like twig)
Kuidas lind, nonda laul (Like bird, like song)
Kudas kula mulle, nonda mina kiilale (The way the village acts
towards me, the way I’ll react towards the village)
Kuidas lukkad, nonda laheb (The way you push, the way it
goes)
Kuidas too, nonda pa Ik (As work, as pay)
Kuida vakk, nonda kaas (As the box, as the lid)
Kuidas metsa hiiuad, nonda vastu kostab (The way you shout
to the forest, the way the forest will resound)
Kuidas kulv, nonda loikus (Like sowing, like harvest)
Kuidas mets ruttab, nonda pollumees ka (As the forest hurries
on, so does the farmer)
Kuidas ema, nonda tiitar (Like mother, like daughter)
Lind laulab nii, nagu nokk siatud (So the bird will sing, as its
beak has grown)
E7. Comparative The ...-er ..., the ...-er ... -implications (105-
820):
Mida armsam laps, seda kibedam vits (The dearer the child,
the harder falls the birch)
Mida rohkem koeri koos, seda vesisem lake (The more dogs in
the pack, the weaker the lap)
Mida varem, seda parem (The earlier, the better)
Mida korgemad lumehanged, seda suuremad viljarougud (The
higher the snowdrifts, the bigger the comricks)
Mida enam kassi silitad, seda korgemale ta saba tostab (The
more you stroke the cat, the higher it raises its tail)
Mida viksim, seda litsim (The more polite, the less reliable)

151
E8a. Implications with w&at-antecedent (Mis..., see... and
Mida..., seda... -patterns in Estonian) (220-1550):
Mis hundi suus, see hundi kohus (What is in a wolf s mouth, is
in a wolfs stomach)
Mis ajast, see arust (Out of time, out of mind [literally: What
is..., is...])
Mida Juku ei dpi, seda Juhan ei tea (What Juku [a boy]
doesn’t learn, Juhan [as a grown man] won’t know)
Mis tana tehtud, see homme hooleta (What is done today, need
not be cared about tomorrow)
Mida kiilvad, seda loikad (What you sow, you will mow)
Mis meele peal, see keele peal (What is on your mind, is on
your tongue)
Mis koer ei nae, seda koer ei haugu (What the dog doesn’t see,
it doesn’t bark about)
Mis ilhe meelest kuld, see teise meelest muld (What is gold for
one man, is but dust for another)
E8b. Reverse implications with what... (See..., mis..., Ei...,
mis..., Koik..., mis... -formulae in Estonian) (40-230):
Ei aiasiga tea, mis oueseale tarvis on (Never would a fatting
pig know what a free-running pig wants)
Harg pillab uhe korraga, mis saask umber aasta (An ox will
drop at a time what a gnat [would drop] round the year)
Koik on tiihi, mis sant laulab (Whatever a beggar sings is vain)
E9a. Implications with He who..., ... (Kes..., see... -formula in
Estonian) (460-1840):
Kes teisele auku kaevab, see ise sisse kukub (He who digs a
hole for another [to fall], will fall in himself)
Kes kopikat ei korja, see rublat ei saa (He who doesn’t save a
copeck, won’t get a rouble ever)
Kes kannatab, see kaua elab (He who suffers patiently, will
live long)
Kes kahju kardab, see onne ei leia (He who’s afraid of risk,
won’t find his luck)
Kes koik nommed kontsib, see koik marjad maitseb (He who
walks every moor, knows the taste of every berry)

152
 Kes koera ei sooda, see soodab varast (He who doesn’t feed a
dog, feeds the thief)
Kes hiljaks jaab, see ilma jaab (He who comes late, gets noth¬
ing)
Kes otsib, see leiab (He who seeks will find)
Kes ei tana pisku eest, see ei tana palju eest (He who doesn’t
thank for a little, will not thank for much either)
Kes naeru kardab, see peeru sureb (He who’s afraid of laugh¬
ter, will die in fart)
Kes palju raagib, see palju valetab (He who talks much, tells a
lot of lies)
Kes pdrast naerab, naerab paremini (He who laughs last,
laughs best)
Kes kellaga lehma otsib, see sitase saba saab (He who seeks
for a cow with a bell, will get [a cow with] a dirty tail)
Kes koik piihad peab, see koik naljad naeb (He who feasts
every holiday, will have to suffer every hunger)
Kes tuult kiilvab, see tormi loikab (He who sows wind, will’
reap storm)
Kes hirmuta kasvab, see auta elab (He who grows without
fear, will live without honour)
E9b. Reverse implications with He’s..., who... , Such a... that...
etc. (40-90):
Ei see siga sigine, kes ei vingu viiessa (Such a pig will not
thrive that doesn’t squeal when carried off)
Narr on see, kes rohkem lubab, kui ta jouab (Foolish is the
man who promises more than he can do)
Lammas on, kes end niita laseb (It’s sheep that has itself
shorn)
E9c. Implications with whom-antecedent (Keda..., seda and
Keda..., see... in Estonian) and their inverse patterns (15-
110):
Keda isa ei opeta, seda opetab ilm (He who is not taught by
father will be taught by the world)
Keda ei naha naamikus, seda ei sihita siidiski (She who is not
noticed in plain clothes won’t be interesting [literally: aimed]
in silk either)

153
E9d. Implications with w/mse-antecedent {Kelle..., selle... in
Estonian) and their inverse forms (40-610):
Kelle jalg tatsub, selle suu matsub (Whose foot strides, his
mouth smacks)
Kelle kaed sitaga, selle suu saiaga (Whose hands are in dirt,
his mouth is full of white bread)
Kelle laps, selle nimi (Whose the child, his the name [= The
seller determines the price])
Kelle leiba ma soon, selle laulu ma laulan (Whose bread I eat,
his song I sing)
E9e. Implications with specific He who has... or He who is...
-antecedent (Kel..., sel... in Estonian) and their inverse
forms (90-610):
Kel janu, sel jalad (He who is thirsty, has the feet)
Kel suur suu, sel lai selg (He who has a big mouth needs a
broad back)
Kel perse suiidas, kull tuu hindale sanna kiitt (He whose arse
itches will heat a sauna for himself)
Kel karnad, sel kuilned (He who has scabs has got nails [to
scratch] too)
Kel joud, sel oigus (He who has power is always right)
E9f. Implications with other case forms of the He who...
-pattern and inverse structures (15-50):
Kellele palju antud, sellelt ka palju noutakse (Who has been
given a lot, of him a lot is expected)
Seda vdib naiseks votta, kellega vaka soola seltsis oled ad
soonud (This woman you can marry, together with whom you
have eaten a bushel of salt)

F. Proverb texts with a parallelist supra-level and an indica¬

tive base

Flal. Parallelisms with negative and affirmative forms of

simple sentences contrasted (180-2260):
Varas jatab varna seina, tuli ei jata sedagi (A thief will leave
a peg on the wall, fire won’t leave even that much)
Kusija suu peale ei looda, aga votja kae peale liiuakse (No¬
body hits an asking mouth, but a taking hand will be hit)

154
 Suu teeb suure linna, kaed ei tee karbse pesagi (Mouth makes
a big town, hands don’t build a fly’s nest)
Onnetus kdib inimesi mooda, mitte kivi ja kandu mooda (Mis¬
fortune walks from man to man, not on stones or tree-stumps)
Sitke kannab siidi, heldel pole helmigi kaelas (A stingy one
walks in silk, an open-handed one has not even a necklace)
Nina otsa naed, aga ea otsa ei nae (The tip of your nose you
can see, but you can’t see the end of your time)
Ema pistab rinna suhu, aga ei pista meelt pahe (Mother puts
the breast in the mouth, but she doesn’t put reason in the head)
Vasib andja, ei vasi vastuvotja (A giver may get tired, not the
receiver)
Fla2. Parallelisms containing contrastive simple sentences
with recurrent elements and/or ellipses (260-1970):
Koera keele otsas rohi, kassi keele otsas tobi (A dog’s tongue
carries medicine, a cat’s tongue carries disease)
Sodjal pikk kdsi, loojal luhike (An eater has a long hand, a
striking hand is short)
Omad koerad kisuvad, omad koerad lepivad (Own dogs fight,
own dogs make peace)
Pdua lapsed naeravad, vihma lapsed nutavad (Drought’s chil¬
dren laugh, rain’s children cry)
Kitsi votab kirstust, belle votab persest (A miser takes from a
chest, an open-handed one takes from the arse [i.e. leaves
nothing in store])
Noorel nugise silmad, vanal varese silmad (A young person
has eyes like a marten’s, an old person has eyes like a crow’s)
Noor koer arritab, vana salvab (A young dog growls, an old
one bites)
Rutaka tile rumala, hillukse tile ilusa (The work of a headlong
person is unsightly, that of a sedate one is nice)
Herits kitt hinnast, hua mils teist (A vain man praises himself,
a good man praises another)
Vaikesed vargad ripuvad vdllas, suured soidavad tollas (Small
thieves hang on the gallows, big ones ride in chariots)

155
Fla3. Parallelisms consisting of contrastive simple sentences
in which all content words are different (180-1860):
Varane piihib nokka, hiline siputab tiibu (An early [bird]
wipes its beak, a late one shakes its wings)
Tegijal tood, magajal und (A busy man has work to do, a
sleeping man has his sleep)
Susi unetas, pini maletas (The wolf forgets, the dog remem¬
bers)
Siigisel suured soomad, kevadel keed magus ad (In autumn
there are big feasts, in spring even chaff tastes sweet)
Ei upsi uus kuub, vaid tantsib tais kdht (A new coat doesn’t
bounce, but a fed stomach can dance)
Tosi touseb, vale vajub (Truth will rise, untruth will sink)
Vilets vitsul peksetakse, onnis suul opetakse (A miserable one
is birched, a blessed one is taught by words)
Minial on mitu viga, ammal ei hada kedagi (A daughter-in-law
has many faults, there’s nothing wrong with a mother-in-law)
Rahu kosutab, vaen kaotab (Peace gains, hostility loses)
Flbl. Parallelisms consisting of synonymous simple sentences
with recurrent elements and/or ellipses (240-1820):
Hada ei anna habeneda, tiihi koht ei korgistada (In need one
can’t afford feeling ashamed, a hungry stomach can’t afford
being haughty [= Necessity knows no law])
Ilu ei panda padaje ega kaunist kattelaie (Beauty can’t be put
in the pot, fair looks can’t be put in the kettle)
Kass soob kaua hoietu, peni pikka peetu (Cats will eat what
has been kept too long, dogs will eat what has been saved
lengthily)
Viha votab vilja maast, kadedus kalad merest (Anger takes
crops from the ground, envy takes fish from the sea)
Kuri votab kulbist, paha sona pajast (Spite eats from the
scoop, a bad word [eats] from the pot)
Mure teeb mustaks, hada halliks (Heartache makes [the face]
dark, worry [brings] gray [to the hair])
Tuli ei taha tuhnakat tegijat, lats laiska hoitjat (Fire doesn’t
want a clumsy lighter, or a baby a lazy sitter)

156
 Vesine on veliste arm, sdklane on sosarde arm (Brothers’ love
is watery, sisters’ love is chaffy)
Hull kiidab orja tood, laisk kiidab lapse food (A crazy one
would praise a slave’s [or: servant’s] work, a lazy one would
praise a child’s work)
Sitast ei saa siidi, kanapasast kalevit (Silk can’t be made from
shit, or broad cloth from hen’s droppings)
Flb2. Parallelisms consisting of synonymous simple sentences
in which all content words are different (190-1710):
Merel silmad, metsal kdrvad (The sea has eyes, the forest has
ears)
Lehm liipsab suust, kana muneb nokast (A cow milks from the
mouth, a hen lays eggs from the beak)
Ool uheksa poega, paeval mitu motet (A night has nine sons, a
day has many ideas)
Jumalal pdevi, peremehel leiba (God will give another day,
the master will give bread)
Ega naer nahka riku ega tiihi jutt tiikki vdta (Laughter doesn’t
hurt the skin, nor does a rumour bite a piece off you)
Sademest tuli, sonast tuli (Fire [starts] from a spark, a quarrel
[begins] from a word)
Abi aiast, vari vorgust (Even a fence can help, even a net can
offer a shelter)
Viletsal visa king, onnetu kaua elab (A miserable one is tough,
a wretched one is hard to die)
Jumal korges, kuningas kaugel (God is high above, the King is
far away)
Ratsepal ei ole riiet ega kingsepal kinga (A tailor has no
clothes, nor a cobbler any shoes)
Tehtud leib siiiiakse, kasunud laps leitakse (A baked loaf will
be eaten, a grown child will be found)
Flc. Parallelisms consisting of simple sentences in an ambiva¬
lent or problematic ideological relation (190-1150):
Meest sdnast, harga sarvest (A man [is held/known] by his
word, an ox by his horn)
Sana pistab, sona peastab (A word can stab, a word can save)

157
 Vaiv om vanas saia, had om vanan elada (Growing old is
hard, but it’s good to live an old man’s life)
Ega korts pole porguhaud ega kirik pole taevariik (A pub is no
hell, nor is church heaven)
Soonud hingab, tdbine oigab (A fed man breathes [i.e. farts], a
sick man moans)
Oigus maamehel, oigus meremehel (Right the landsman, right
the seaman)
Ori moist orja opata, varas varast nuhelda (A slave [or: ser¬
vant] knows how to teach a slave, a thief knows how to punish
a thief)
Uks tahab ema, tdine tiitart (One wants the mother, the other
wants the daughter)
Rikkal raha, vaesel latse (A rich man has money, a poor man
has children)
Fid. Parallelled simple sentences in a vague temporal or de¬
gree relation (260-1100):
Uks patt vargal, iiheksa tagaajajal (A thief has sinned once,
the pursuer nine times)
Sark on ligi ihu, surm veel ligemal (The shirt is close to the
skin, death is closer still)
tits kordpetat pini luuga, todnd kdrd ei peta lihaga (Once you
can cheat the dog with a bone, but another time you can’t
cheat him with meat even)
Ohtu oli viis paari hargi, homiku ei ole vasikatki (Five pairs of
oxen in the evening, not a calf in the morning)
Kordiga ei saa kaugemale kui tile aja htipata, pudruga saab
ommeti teise perese (Gruel won’t help you farther than jump
over the fence, porridge will take you to the neighbour’s house
at least)
Rdhn on kirev, inimese elu veel kirevam (A woodpecker has
many colours, human life has more colours still)
Veri htiubib harvast, vesi ei htitibi kunagi (Blood clots seldom,
water never does)
Ida vieb kalad meresta, idakakku kattilasta (East wind takes
the fish from the sea, east-south wind takes them from the pot)

158
 Harvast orja kiidetakse, miniat ei millalgi (A slave [or: ser¬
vant] is seldom praised, never a daughter-in-law)
Pisike laps vaeotab polve peal, suur siidame peal (A little
child presses on the knee, a grown child [presses] on the heart)
Fie. Parallelled simple sentences in a calendary relation (70-
780):
Laurits laotab lehti, Parte/ poorab paid (Lawrence spreads the
leaves, Bartholomew turns the heads [of cabbages])
Kadri hakkab kusele, aga Andres pistab pulga ette (Catherine
begins pissing, but Andrew stops her with a stick)
Parm pask juanipaavani, siask mils mihklipadvani (A gadfly is
no trouble until St. John’s Day, a gnat is active till Michael¬
mas)
Kunnipaevaks on virgal maa kiintud, aga laisk tostab veel atra
aia paale (A hard-working man has finished ploughing by
Ploughing Day [April 14], when a lazy man is still heaving his
plough onto the fence)
Flf. Simple sentences linked in a parallelism by First..., after¬
wards..., First..., then... etc. (30-70):
Enne too tehakse, parast palk maksetakse (Work before, pay
after)
Enne moeldud, par as t tehtud (First thought, then done)
Enne mahub poue, pdrast ei mahu enam due (In the beginning
it fits in the bosom, later it won’t fit in the yard)
Fig. Simple sentences linked in a parallelism with Although...,
... (30-70):
Kahr on kiill kuri ellai, siski nahk om iks saksa saani paal (Al¬
though a bear is a wicked animal, his skin can be seen on a
gentlefolk’s sleigh)
Hanil om kiill luine vassar, kiill siski ara tund, mis kivi, mis
ter a (Although a goose has a bony hammer, it will tell a stone
from a grain)
Flh. Parallelisms containing a sequence of more than two
simple sentences (130-2060):
Aganas on leiva jatku, humalad on bile jatku, vest on pitka
piima jatku, tuhk on tubaka jatku (Chaff is the extension of

159
 bread, hops are the extension of ale, water is the extension of
milk, ash is tobacco’s extension)
Mart maandab, Kadri kaandab, Simun tei silda soie paale,
Niklus needab, Toomas tore miis soidab tile (Martin wets,
Catherine covers, Simon builds a bridge over bogs, Nicholas
rivets, Thomas, a proud man, rides across)
Hommiku hoolekagu, louna leinakagu, ohtu onnekagu
([Heard] in the morning - a cuckoo of charge, in midday - a
cuckoo of mourning, in the evening - a cuckoo of luck)
Torkuja jagu stitiakse ara, magaja jagu pannakse peaotsi,
ktilaskdija jagu jaata jarele (The portion of a reluctant one is
eaten up, the portion of a sleeper is put at the bed head, the
portion of the one away visiting is saved)
Jaan viskab esimese jahe kivi vette, Jaak teise ja Mihkel kol-
manda (John drops the first cold stone in the water, Jacob
drops the second and Michael the third)
Pollumees poline rikas, ametmees ajuti rikas, kaupmees kor-
rati rikas (A farmer is eternally rich, an artisan is rich at times,
a merchant is sometimes rich)
F2a. Parallelisms consisting of two simple sentences in the
form of an equality (metaphor) or comparison (9(M160):
Raakimine hdbe, vaikimine kuld (Talking is silver, silence is
gold)
Vanattidruk taevatui, vanapoiss on porgunui (A spinster is a
heavenly dove, an old bachelor is a hellstick)
Laenaja on sober, tagasinoudja vaenlane (The one who lends
is a friend, the one who reclaims is an enemy)
Votad naise, nagu regi peran, saad latse, nagu kivi rii paal
(When you marry a woman you feel a sledge behind you,
when a child is bom, you feel a stone on the sledge)
Vask vaese kuld, tina kehva hdbe (Copper is a poor man’s
gold, tin is a wretched man’s silver)
Vi Ik vihmavari, tomp tuulevari (A burl protects from rain, a
burl protects from wind)

160
F2b. A parallelist sequence consisting of more than two com¬
parative (simple) sentences (15-60):
Hundile one udu ono, vihim veli ja kaste kaalaldikaja (For a
wolf fog is an uncle, rain is a brother, and dew is a throat-
cutter)
F3. Parallelisms consisting of two inequalities (2-2):
Motsa varjun parep ku lehe varjun, mehe varjun parep ku
motsa varjun (A forest shades better than a leaf, a husband
shades better than a forest)
F4a. Parallelisms of two elliptical implications (60-230):
Kulmad joulud, soojad lihavotted, rohelised joulud, valged li¬
havotted (Frosty Christmas - a warm Easter, a green Christ¬
mas - a white Easter)
Virgad vanemad, laisad lapsed, laisad vanemad, virgad lapsed
(Hardworking parents - lazy children, lazy parents - hard¬
working children)
Pisikesed lapsed, pisike mure, suured lapsed, suured mured•
(Little children - little worry, grown children - big worries)
Suur jalg, suured saapad, suur kasi, suured kindad (A big
foot - big boots, a big hand - big mittens)
F4bl. Parallelisms consisting of two or more implications with
an If..., then...- or When..., then... -formula (80-460):
Kui kagu tuleb vitsa, siis vilja, kui urba, siis ohtu, kui lehte,
siis leiba (If a cuckoo alights on a bare tree, there’ll be good
crops, if on a tree with catkins, there’ll be awns, if on a leafy
tree, there’ll be enough bread)
Kui luiged madalalt lendavad, siis tuleb madal talv, kui luiged
korgelt lendavad, siis tuleb siigav talv (If swans fly low,
there’ll be a shallow winter, if swans fly high, there’ll be a
deep winter)
Kui otsas, siis hooleta, kui vatsas, siis vaevata (When finished,
there’s no worry, when [the food is] inside, there’s no trouble)
Kui ligi, siis puskab, kui kaugel, siis ammub (When close, it
will butt, when at distance, it will bellow)

161
F4b2. Parallelisms consisting of two or more inverse implica¬
tions with (Then)..., when... (10-40):
Mees nagusam, kui piip suus, naine nagusam, kui laps sules
(A man looks better when with a pipe, a woman is more beau¬
tiful with a child on her knees)
Kullake, kui annad, kurivaim, kui nouad (A dear friend when
giving, a damned nuisance when reclaiming)
F4c.Two parallel implications with until... (1-2):
Nikka ikkd kui ett, nikka polvo kui pdimu (There is life until
there is grain to be cut, there is age until there is crop to be
harvested)
F4d. Two parallel implications with Where..., there... (10-40):
Kus silm, seal kilim, kus solm, seal soe (Where there’s a loop,
it’s cold, where there’s a burl, it’s warm)
Kus haige on, seal on kasi, kus arm on, seal on silm (Where it
hurts the hand will go, where there’s a love the eye will go)
F4e. Two parallel implications with As..., so..., Which..., such...
etc. (10-50):
Kuidas tibu, nonda tervis, kuidas arst, nonda abi (Like penny,
like health, like doctor, like help)
Nii kui elu, nii om ehte, nii kui rdom, nii om rdiva (Like life,
like ornaments, like joy, like robe)
F4f. Two parallel implications with The ...-er, the ...-er (1-1):
Mida tar gem rahvas, seda rikkamad, mida rumalamad, seda
vaesemad (The cleverer people, the richer, the dumber, the
poorer)
F4g. Two parallel implications with What..., (that) ... etc.
(Mis..., see... in Estonian) or their inverse patterns (30-
230):
Mis kallis, see kaunis, mis odav, see mada (What is expensive
is beautiful, what is cheap is rotten)
Tunnukse ikka, mis vee veeretud, ei tunta saia soodud (It’s al¬
ways clear who [literally: what] has grown on water, it’s not
clear who has eaten whitebread)

162
F4hl. Two parallel implications with He who..., ... or a paral¬
lelism consisting of two inverse implications with It’s...,
who... (45-610):
Kes kooleh, sii kodu Icidb, kes elah, sii ette puutub (He who
dies will go home, he who lives will be encountered)
Kes teeh, see saab, kel pole teha, sel pdle saada (He who
works will get something, he who has nothing to do, has noth¬
ing to get)
Hea laps, kes hdsti tantsib, parem laps, kes paegal seisab (A
fair child who dances well, a better child who stands still)
Narr, kes Narvast naise votab, loll, kes linnast lehma ostab
(It’s a fool who marries a wife from Narva, it’s a dunce who
buys a cow in town)
F4h2. Two parallel implications with Kel..., sel... (= He who
has... or He who is...) or their inverse forms (15-150):
Kel vagi, sel voimus, kel kukkur, sel kohus (He who has force
has power, he who has a [big] purse has justice [on his side])
Ega see pole rikas, kel palju on, vaid see on rikas, kes omaga
rahul on (Not he is rich who has much, but he is rich who’s
contented with what he has)
F4i. A sequence consisting of three or more parallel implica¬
tions (20-380):
Kured lahvad- kurjad ilmad, haned lahvad - hall taga, luiged
lahvad - lumi taga (Cranes going - bad weather, geese go¬
ing - hoarfrost coming, swans going - snow on the ground)
Keda vahites, toda kahites, keda naaretes, toda haaretes, keda
otsites, toda trotsites (He who’s stared at is envied, he who’s
laughed at is seized, he whose company is sought is defied)

G. Imperative sentences
Gl. Sentences that are imperative in content, but indicative or
elliptic in form
Glal. Indicative instructions and standards in the form of
simple sentences with should, must, has (got) to etc. (40-
230):
Tonisepdevast pidi pool loomatoitu alles olema (On St. An¬
thony’s Day half the fodder had still to be there)

163
 Varust peab koera looma (A dog should be beaten just in case)
Kasku peab igaiiks taitma (An order is for everyone to obey)
Gla2. Indicative prohibitions and warnings with shouldn’t,
mustn’t etc. (30-50):
Ei voi koiki iihe paela peale panna (You can’t string every¬
thing on one thread [i.e. equalize])
Narriga ei maksa vaielda (It doesn’t pay to argue with a fool)
Haategu ei tohi unustada (A good deed mustn’t be forgotten)
Glbl. Orders and recommendations in the form A must be
done because... ~ otherwise B will happen etc. (5-10):
Kopikas peab taskus olema, muidu koerad kusevad peale
(There should always be a copeck in the pocket, otherwise
dogs will piss on you)
Las vares vaagub, kiill ta vakka jaab (Let the crow croak, it
won’t do it forever)
Glb2. Prohibitions and warnings in the form A mustn’t be
done because... ~ otherwise B will happen etc. (8-10):
Surnu suu paale ei kasta kohut moista: patutse oleme keik
(One shouldn’t condemn a dead man’s words - we are all sin¬
ful)
Jaanile ei tohi sonnikuhaisu ninasse lasta, siis ei kasva had
rukis (John shouldn’t be let to smell manure, otherwise rye
won’t grow good grain)
Glcl. Implications with If / When..., (then)..., the consequent
member of which is an order or recommendation with
peab (= should), or the consequent member is a prohibition
or warning with mustn’t, shouldn’t etc., or their inverse
forms (50-120):
Kui tahad targaks saada, siis pead oppima (If you want to be¬
come wise, you should study)
Kui vanad raagivad, peavad lapsed vaid olema (When adults
are talking, children should be quiet)
Kui kala ei ole, piab konn morda minema (If there’s no fish, a
frog has to be trapped)
Kui ei voi parata, siis peab laskma karata (If you can’t help it,
let him buck)

164
 Ei massa sis enap varrit kinni panda, ku hobono om ussajast
valla joosnu (It’s not worthwhile closing the gate, when the
horse has run out of the yard)
Kui sa annad, siis su pahem kasi ei pea teadma, mis parem
kdsi teeb (When you give, your left hand shouldn’t know what
your right hand is doing)
Ega siis ei saa anam koera soota, ku varas juba dues on (You
shouldn’t feed the dog when the thief is already in the yard)
Glc2. Implications of the form He who..., ..., the consequent
member of which is an order or recommendation with
must, has (got) to etc., or an interdiction with shouldn’t,
mustn’t etc. (30-200):
Kes huntide hu/gas on, peab nendega uluma (He who is
among wolves has got to howl together with them)
Kes ei taha tood teha, see ei pea ka sooma (He who doesn’t
want to work, shouldn’t eat either)
Kes kuulda ei taha, piab tundma (He who doesn’t want to lis-,
ten, must feel)
Kes algab, peab lopetama (He who makes a start has got to
finish)
Gld. Imperatives with should, mustn’t etc., that contain some
parallel (contrasted or synonymous) components (35-90):
Tudrukust ja hernest ei v5i kunagi ilma pudumata mooda
minna (Neither a girl nor a pea plant can ever be passed by
without laying hands on them)
Vanna voit naarda, a hadalist naargu-ui, vanast latt egaiits
(You may laugh at an old person, but not at a sick one, every¬
one will get old once)
Silmaga voib kiill vaadata, kaega ei v5i mitte keiki katsuda
(You can use your eyes, but you cannot use your hands on
every thing)
Elu peab elama, ussi peab tapma (Life has to be lived, a snake
has to be killed)
Sonal peab solm ja jutul jakk olema (A word should have a
knot on it and a story should have a continuation)

165
Glel. Various non-parallelist elliptic structures that are in¬
dicative in form, but imperative in contents (10-180):
Mees mehe vasta (Man for man)
Kirik keset kula (A church [shold be built] in the centre of a
village [about compromises])
Vorst vorsti vastu (A sausage for a sausage)
Magajalle piaalust ([Something to be put] under the head of
the sleeper)
Gle2. Two parallel ellipses, that by content are orders or
rules (60-450):
Ruga tuhka, tong mutta (Winter rye [should be sown] to ashes
[i.e. dry soil], spring cereal to mud)
Noorelkuul nurme, vanalkuul varju (By new moon [sheep
should be shorn] in the open, by old moon in the shade)
Kanadega magama, sigadega dies (To bed with hens, up with
hogs)
Silm silma vastu, hammas hamba vastu (An eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth)
Haigele arsti, tervele vorsti (A doctor for the sick man, some
sausage for the healthy one)
G2. 3rd person imperatives
G2a. Hyperbolic a.o. texts in the form Let there be A or B... or
Even if..., still... orif only... (30-170):
Olgu isa sikk voi ema kits, kui aga ise mees olen (Let the fa¬
ther be a billy-goat or the mother a nanny-goat, the main thing
is that I’m a real man)
Olgu sant voi vigane, paaasi et on isane (Let him be defective
or disabled, the main thing is he’s a male)
Ega pini ilma ei haugu, olgu susi ehk torvaskand (A dog won’t
bark in vain, be it at a wolf or a pitch stump)
Olgu aed nii suur kui ta on, mulk ikka uks (No matter how
large the pen may be, a gate is a gate)
Olgu poiss kolmest kohast olesidemega kinni, ikka saab naise
(Even if a boy is bandaged with straw in three places, he will
have a wife)

166
G2b. Optative sentences beginning with God forbid, God grant
etc. (20-80):
Jumal hoia mind sobra eest, vaenlase eest ma hoian ennast ise
(God protect me from a friend, from the enemy I’ll protect me
myself)
Jumal lasku soavage ikka kuulda, ei elades naha (God let us
hear the army, never see it)
Jumal hoidku hada iist, risti ja viletsust isegi hull (God save us
from trouble, there’s misery and woe enough as it is)
Jumal hoidku selle eest, ku orjast otsaline saab (God forbid a
slave [or: servant] from becoming a master)
Jumal andku ikka anda, aga mitte otsi (God grant us the role
of a giver, not of the one who begs)
G2c. Simple sentences with a 3rd person gu-, An-imperative
(30-70):
Kingsepp jaagu oma liistude juurde (A cobbler should stick to
his lasts)
Igaiiks kratsigu ise oma karnad (Every man should scratch his
own scabs)
Oigus olgu igaiihele (Justice should be for everyone)
Igaiiks piihkigu oma ukseesist (Everyone should sweep before
his own door)
G2d. gu-, Aw-imperatives in the form of an inequality (2-2):
Tagumised vdravad olgu ikka vahemad kui esimesed (The
back gates should always be narrower than the front ones
[about sparing])
G2el. Implications with If / When..., let... ~ (someone) should
(not)... etc. or an ellipsis (gu-, An-imperatives in Estonian)
(20-190):
Kui kaks konelevad, pistku kolmas nona voo vahele (When
two are talking, the third should stick his nose in the belt [i.e.
keep aside])
Latsele lauldas, morsja moistku (A child is sung to, a bride
should understand)
Kui onpiihad, siis olgupiihad (Once a feast, let’s feast)
Kui on lainud trumm, siis rningu ka pulgad (Once the drum is
gone, let the sticks go as well)

167
G2e2. Implications with He who... should (not)... etc. or with
an ellipsis (gu-, /cw-imperatives in Estonian) (15-50):
Kes on pandud orjama, see orjaku hea meelega (He who has
got to slave, ought to slave with delight)
Kes koore paalt soob, see soogu ka sisu (He who eats the
crust, should eat the crumb too)
Kes parent moistab, see parent tehku (He who knows better,
should do better)
G2e3. Other implications with ... should (not) do... etc. in the
consequent member (gu-, ^-imperatives in Estonian) (3-
50):
Mida parent on hobune, seda parent olgu piits (The better the
horse, the better the whip should be)
G2fl. Texts with one verb on -gu, -ku linking at least two
(contrasting or synonymous) components (15-30):
Silmad olgu ikka ees ja taga (One should always have eyes
both in front and at the back)
Tiitarlats pidagu suu, kde ja perse (A girl should hold her
mouth, hands and arse)
Moldri matt ja kortsi moot olgu maksetud (A millers toll and a
tavern measure should be paid)
G2f2. Fully parallelist texts with imperatives on -gu, -ku (20-
60):
Muu puu muhaku, lepa leht lehaku, tiitarlats olke vaik (Other
trees may sough, an alder leaf may murmur, a girl should be
quiet)
Soe olgu soonii, lamba olgu a/ale (Wolves should be fed, but
the sheep should survive)
Hull voib olla bile tegija, aga tark olgu linnase tegija (Ale can
be made by a crazy man, but malt should be made by a clever
man)
G3. Tow-imperatives
G3al. Orders and recommendations in the form of an im¬
perative simple sentence (30-250):
Sea suu sekki mooda (Adjust your mouth by the wallet [liter¬
ally: sack])
Pea pool suud kinni (Hold half of your mouth shut)

168
 Naist kiida aasta parast (Praise your wife in a year’s time
[earlier it is not sure if she deserves it])
Anna aega atra seada (Allow [them/us] some time to get the
plough ready)
data viimane hoop loomata (Save the last blow)
G3a2. Prohibitions and warnings in the form of an imperative
simple sentence (100-660):
Ara hoiska enne dhtut (Don’t jubilate before the day is done)
Tanasida toimetusi ara viska homse varna (Don’t hang to¬
day’s work on the tomorrow’s peg)
Ara kiida ilma enne dhtut (Don’t praise weather before eve¬
ning)
Ara ohtast aset kiida (Don’t praise your bed in the evening)
Ara polga esimest onne ial ara (Don’t you ever disdain your
first happy chance)
Ara pista pead tulle (Don’t put your head in the fire)
Ara maksa kurja kurjaga (Don’t pay an evil deed back with an
evil deed)
G3b. Preferences a.o. inequalities containing an imperative
verb form (15-40):
Parem kae sittuja silmi kui puuraiuja silmi (You better look in
the eyes of a shitting man than in the eyes of a woodcutter [it
is dangerous to stand near the woodcutter because you can be
hit by woodchips])
Parem vota sammu pealt kopik kui versta pealt rubla (You
better take a copeck for a pace than a rouble for a verst)
Paremb korja munakooro sisse kui lehma nissa (You better
collect in an eggshell than in a cow’s teat)
G3cl. Orders and recommendations in the form Do A, be¬
cause B... ~ otherwise B will happen etc., or prohibitions
and warnings in the form Don’t do A, because B... ~ other¬
wise B will happen etc. (55-320):
Vota naene naabritalust, teda tunned kasist-jalust (Marry a
girl from the neighbouring hut, for her you know by hand and
foot)
Hoidke omad mokad lukku, muidu lennab karbes kurku (Keep
your lips locked, or a fly will get down your throat)

169
 Ole oma sonale peremees, muidu saab sona suite peremeheks
(Be a master of your word, otherwise your word will be your
master)
Am usu ilma, ilm ajab puru silma (Don’t believe the world,
the world will throw dust in your eyes)
Ara sitta puudu, sitt hakkab haisema (Don’t touch shit, shit
will stink)
Ara usu hundi juttu, hundil on need hullud jutud (Don’t be¬
lieve a wolfs story, a wolfs stories are wicked)
Ara narri koera, koer salvab (Don’t tease a dog, a dog will
bite)
G3c2. Orders and recommendations in the form Do A, then
you’ll get /preserve B, or prohibitions and warnings of the
form Don ’t do A, then you ’ll avoid B (60-260):
Hoia ise, siis hoiab ka Jumal (Take care of yourself, then God
will take care of you too)
Tee food higiga, siis sood leiba himuga (You work with sweat
[on your back], then you’ll eat with appetite)
Pea suu kinni, seisab selg terve (Keep your mouth shut, then
your back will remain intact)
Korja digel ajal, siis on sul hada ajal (Save in the right time,
then you’ll have something in hard times)
Ara tee teisele head, siis ei sunni suite kurja (Don’t do fa¬
vours, then nothing bad will happen to you)
Ara ennast liiga kiida, siis sind keegi ka ei laida (Don’t praise
yourself too much, then nobody will find fault with you either)
G3dl. Implications of the form If / When..., then... or of the
inverse form, the consequent member of which is an order
or recommendation in the imperative form, also implica¬
tions with If / When..., don’t..., Don’t... before... or the in¬
verse form, the consequent member of which is a prohibi¬
tion or warning in the imperative form (170-1150):
Pista porsas kotti, kui pakutakse (Put the piglet in the bag
when offered)
Tao rauda, kui raud kuum on (Work the iron when it’s hot)
Paranda, kui paras aeg on (Mend when the time is right)

170
 Kui midagi teed, tee hasti (Whenever you do anything, do it
well)
Kui sona ei aita, siis lase kdsi kdia (If a word isn’t enough, use
the hand)
Ara enne vana kaevu tais aja, kui uus valmis ei ole (Don’t fill
an old well before the new one is ready)
Ara sooda siis koera, kui hunt karjas on (Don’t feed the dog
when a wolf is at the cattle)
Ara muil enne karu nahka ku karu kaes (Don’t sell a bear’s
skin before the bear is caught)
Kui katel keeb, ara sa enam tuld alia ajag (When the kettle is
boiling, don’t keep feeding the fire)
G3d2. Implications of other forms, the consequent member of
which is a prohibition or order in the imperative form (15-
50):
Ara liikka hornse peale, mis sa tana void teha (Don’t put off
till tomorrow what you can do today)
Ara sinna tuld tee, kus keige suurem vesi (Don’t make fire
where there’s most water)
Pane aga pauna, mis pakutakse (Put in the pouch what is of¬
fered)
G3el. Sentences with parallel (contrasting, synonymous etc.)
components containing a verb in the imperative (20-90):
Kolmo asja sisse ara usu kunagi: tuhja huunot, motsa ja
makajat (Never trust these three things: an empty building, the
forest and a sleeping person)
Lapsele anna hirmu ja armu (Give a child birch as well as
love)
Ara usu suure saksa suudja pisukese lapse perset (Don’t trust
a big nob’s mouth or a little child’s bottom)
Avida menejat morsjat ja asujat majja (Help a leaving bride
and a newcomer in the house)
G3e2. Parallelisms consisting of two simple sentences convey¬
ing an order or recommendation / a prohibition or warn¬
ing in the imperative form (130-920):
Rikkast perest osta hobune, vaesest vallast vota naene (Buy a
horse from a wealthy farm, marry a wife from a poor parish)

171
 Tee tood too ajal, aja juttu jutu ajal (Work at working time,
talk at talking time)
Halli pead austa, kulupead kummarda (Honour a grey head,
bow to a bald head)
Ela ise ja lose teisi ka elada (Live and let others live)
Uheksa korda mooda, uks kord loika (Measure nine times, cut
once)
Anna antust, murra murtust (Give of what has been given to
you, break from what has been broken for you)
Vota pits ja pea aru (Take a drop but be moderate)
Tee tood ja palu Jumalat (Work and pray)
Voorast ara vota, oma ara jata (Don’t take what’s someone
else’s, don’t give up what’s your’s)
Kanget ahvardamist ara pelga, suurt lubamist ara looda
(Don’t be scared by loud threats, don’t hope much of big
promises)
Ara usu uisu juttu ega peapoisi pettu (Don’t believe a snake’s
word, don’t trust a boy’s tricks)
G3e3. Parallelisms consisting of two contrasting simple sen¬
tences, one of which communicates an order, the other a
prohibition (80-720):
Narri meest, ara narri mehe miitsi (Gibe a man, not a man’s
cap)
Vota vana sona, aga ara sod vana osa (Take an old person’s
word, don’t eat an old person’s portion)
Ara kiida iseennast, lase teised kiita (Don’t praise yourself, let
others do it)
Raagi meest, aga ara nimeta meest (Speak of a man, but don’t
use his name [i.e. speak allusively])
Ara kiitle kinda sees, tule seisa meeste ees (Don’t you boast
[with your hand] in a glove, come out and stand up before
men)
G3e4. Parallel sequences consisting of three or more impera¬
tive simple sentences (20-100):
Nad palju, kuule palju, ara palju pajada (See a lot, hear a lot,
don’t say a lot)

172
 Tii esi, tdhuta toist, astu esi, aja muid (Work yourself, encour¬
age others, go your way, drive others on)
Unusta uni, maleta malu, pea noor mees meeles (Forget sleep,
remember what happened, keep the young man on your mind)
Ara pilka vigast, ara polga vaest ega narri notra (Don’t mock
at a cripple, don’t scorn a poor man or fool a feeble one)
G3e5. Parallel imperative components of a compound sen¬
tence with First..., then... etc. (30-280):
Enne motle, siis title (First think, then say)
Ptihi enne oma ukseedine puhtaks, siis mine teistel ptihkima
(First sweep in front of your own door, then go sweeping be¬
fore the others’)
Enne mune, siis kaaguta (First lay an egg, then cackle)
Tee enne, kiida parast (First do, then boast)
G3fl. Texts of the form Do / Don’t do A, because... or other¬
wise B will happen, with a parallelist initial component in
the imperative form (25-150):
Tee tood ja nae vaeva, siis saad taeva (Toil and moil, then
you’ll get to heaven)
Vaata ette, vaata taha, muidu jaad sa ajast maha (Look out,
look back, otherwise you’ll fall behind the times)
Pea ennast kolmest kinni: kaed suu ja perse, siis saad ilmast
hasti labi (Keep yourself bound in three places - hands, mouth
and arse, then you’ll get on well in the world)
G3f2. Patterns consisting of two or more parallel implications
with If / When A, then do B or If / When A, don’t do B and
an imperative verb (50-400):
Kui mees on hea, pista tal tiks silm ara, kui paha, kaks silma
(If your husband is good, stab one eye out of him, if bad, stab
two eyes [about sharing secrets, making expenses etc.])
Laheb jahimees metsa, pane pada kummuli, laheb kalamees
kalale, pane pada tulele (When a hunter goes to the forest,
turn the kettle upside down, when a fisher goes fishing, put the
kettle on)
Kui kuuled, ara pane kuulvas, kui naed, ara pane nagevas (If
you hear, don’t show you’ve heard, if you see, don’t show
you’ve seen)

173
 Oled vaene, siis ole vaiki, oled peratti, sis pia suu (If you’re
poor, keep quiet, if you are necessitous, just hold your mouth)
G3f3. Various complex sentences containing imperatives (40-
150):
Mis sa tahad, et teised peavad sinule tegema, sedasama tee
sina ka teistele (What you want to be done unto you, you do
unto others too)
Varasta, aga mitte nonda, et tiles tuleb (Steal, but don’t be
caught)
Kott olgu ikka enesest, saagu pdrss kust saa (Your bag should
always be ready, whence ever the piglet)
G4. Rhetorical orders
G4a. Rhetorical orders in the form of simple sentences (20-
130):
Paku pagarilapsele saia (Just go and offer whitebread to a
baker’s child)
Vota vahilt villu (Just go and take fleece from a crayfish)
Mine ntitid vasikaga voidu jooksma (Just go racing a calf)
Mine hundi suust tagasi votma (Just go taking anything back
from a wolfs mouth)
G4bl. Rhetorical orders with a consequent on see if, ask if etc.
(5-6):
Anna aitah kassi ehk koera katte, katsu, kas elab sellega (Just
you give ‘thank you’ to a cat or dog, see if it will live on it)
Ktisi kassilt, kas tal kiiisi on (Just ask a cat whether it has
claws)
G4b2. Rhetorical orders followed by a member with and yet
etc. (implying uselessness) (20-50):
Sooda hunti, hunt vaatab ikka metsa poole (Just feed a wolf—
the wolf will keep his eyes on the forest)
Poe ktill raudpahkle sisse, aga Jumal naab sind sinnagi (Just
hide in an iron nutshell, God will see you even there)
Viska koerale kont suhu, hakkab ommeti parast jalle urisema
(You throw a bone in a dog’s mouth, yet it will growl again
later)

174
G4b3. Rhetorical orders followed by a forecast of bad conse¬
quences (50-1350):
Lase sant sauna, sant tahab lavale ka (Just you let a beggar in
the sauna - the beggar will want to get to the platform as well)
Narri poldu iiks kord, pdld narrib sind uheksa korda (You de¬
ceive the field once, the field will deceive you nine times)
Anna perse kiilasse, siis situ ise labi kuljeluie (Lend your arse
to the village, then you’ll have to shit through the ribs)
Anna pill hullu katte, hull ajab pilli lohki (Just you give an in¬
strument to a madman - the madman will blow the thing asun¬
der)
G4c. A rhetorical order as the consequent member of an If/
When..., then... -implication (10-20):
Kui nalg kdcis, siis pane hambad varna (When hunger’s there,
just hang your teeth on a peg)
Kuera ei ole - haugu ise (No dog - do the barking yourself)
Mine siis viil laeva ehitama, kui uputus kdes (Just go and start
building a ship when there’s flood)
G4dl. Parallelist equalities with an or-copula, consisting of
two rhetorical questions (15-250):
Mine vihata sauna ehk rahata linna (Just you go to the sauna
without a bath-whisk or to town without money on you)
Tee tigedale head ehk kaitse kohna karja (Just you do a good
turn to an evil man, or guard the cattle of a wicked one)
Loo koera ehk silita koera (Beat a dog or stroke a dog [it’s the
same thing])
Mine surnut arstima vdi tarka dpetama (Just you go doctoring
a dead man or teaching a clever man)
G4d2. Two parallelled (contrasting or synonymous) rhetorical
orders, followed by a component with and yet etc., imply¬
ing uselessness (15-200):
Mine suurt saama, jdmedad jagarna, viimaks peenike pihus
(Just you go after something big, after a bulky share - in the
end you’ll find yourself in trouble [literally: holding a thin
end])

175
 Saada siga Saksamaale, pese siga seebiga, siga tuleb koju,
siga jaab seaks (Just you send a pig to Germany, wash a pig
with soap - the pig will come home, the pig will remain a pig)
Keeda sitta, kudsata sitta, sitt jaab ikki sitas (Cook shit, bake
shit - shit will remain shit)

H. Rhetorical questions
HI. Rhetorical questions on who (100-900):
Kes koera saba kergitab, kui ta ise (Who else will raise a
dog’s tail but itself?)
Kes virga vilja ara soob, kui laisku maa peal ei ole (Who
would eat the busy man’s crops, if there were no lazy people
on the earth?)
Kes ilma suu kinni paneb (Who could close the world’s
mouth?)
Kes kitsi karjaelajaks arvab (Who would count goats among
cattle?)
Kes kassile kala annab (Who would feed a cat on fish?)
Kes voib santi sundida, kui sant ei taha kondida (Who can
make a cripple walk if the cripple doesn’t want to?)
Kes ahna oonde taad, kui ei tikuta (Who would find a wood¬
pecker’s hollow if it didn’t give a sound?)
H2. Texts beginning with a rhetorical w/iaf-question (110—
560):
Mis sest kasu, kui lehm palju piima annab, aga jalaga umber
loob (What’s the use of a cow milking well, but knocking the
pail over?)
Mis lind see on, kes oma sulgi ei jdua kanda (What bird can’t
carry its own feathers?)
Mis seda sitta rattile saada, mis rattil ei saisa (What’s the use
of filling the cart with such manure that doesn’t keep on the
cart?)
Mes see ute huikamine, kui see passi padd ei poor a (What’s
the use of a ewe’s call, if the ram doesn’t turn it’s head?)

176
H3. Rhetorical questions on where, where to or where from
(30-190):
Kuhu sitt rattast jadb (Where does manure go from a cart?
[Sure something will stick])
Kus Must muu jatt (Where will Must [a black dog] leave its
ways?)
Kus muldine lumi on (Where’s last year’s snow?)
Kust rikas raha saab (Where does a rich man get his money
from?)
H4. Rhetorical questions on when (20-40):
Kunas sepal vaist om ehk kingsepal korraline saabas (Will a
blacksmith ever have a knife or a cobbler wear good boots?)
Millal harjal enne vasik oo old (When has a bull ever had a
calf before?)
Millal must koer valgeks laheb (When will a black dog turn
white?)
H5. Texts beginning with rhetorical questions on how long >
and how far (20-150):
Kui kaua koera kaelas vorst seisab (How long will a sausage
hang on a dog’s neck?)
Kaua vasikas palvetega elab (How long will a calf live on
prayers?)
Kauaks kala kassi ees (How long will fish keep before a cat?)
Kaua naaskel kottis seisab (How long will a bodkin keep in a
bag?)
Kaugele lind uhe tiivaga linnub (How far will a bird fly on one
wing?)
H6. Rhetorical questions on why (7-60):
Misparast siis sepp kaed tulle pistab, kui pihid ees on (Why
should a blacksmith stick his hands in fire, when the tongs are
there?)
Misparast kuer leiba siieb, kui ta ei haugu (Why does the dog
eat bread if it doesn’t bark?)
H7. Texts beginning with a rhetorical general question (kas in
Estonian) (10-10):
Kas joutumal vara on (Has a poor man any property?)
Kas kodul ratta all om voi (Does a home have wheels?)

177
 Kas keedet pada sdomdlda jaase (Will cooked food ever re¬
main uneaten?)
H8. Rhetorical texts beginning with how much, how many (8-
40):
Palju patuselle tarvis on, pista sormega silma- siida tais
(How much can a sinful man take - just poke a finger in his
eye and he’s raving mad)
Metuks mullale vaja (How much does an old person need?)
H9. Texts beginning with a rhetorical question on eks (2-6):
Eks naer tule ikka nuttes koju (Well, won’t laughter come
home weeping?)
H10. Texts beginning with a rhetorical question on voi (10-
70):
Vdi taud tiihjast toast midagi votab (Do you think the plague
would take something from an empty room?)
Voi siga taab, mis raba on (Do you think a pig would know
what draff is?)
Vdi Kirep killan seisdp (Do you think Kirep [a spotted dog]
would stay in a pack?)
Hll. Elliptic patterns that can be interpreted as rhetorical
questions (4-5):
Hada hiilgel vees (What’s wrong with a seal in water?)
Vigaks suure kivi taga hoisata (Do you think it’s hard to cheer
behind a big boulder?)
H12. Rhetorical questions in sentences containing various
parallel components (60-510):
Kes vaest varrule kutsub vdi puujalga pulma (Who would ask
a poor man to the christening feast or a timbertoes to wed¬
ding?)
Kas koeral kodu voi hundil oomaja (Where’s there a dog’s
house or a wolfs lodging?)
Kunas koke kulp isune vai taaripulk jamine (When is a cock’s
ladle hungry or the stopper of a beer keg thirsty?)
Kes kas si paras t laheb randa ehk kitse paras t lakka (Who’d go
to the seashore for a cat or to the loft for a goat?)

178
 Kohes kirep killast vai must peni hattsajast jaa (Do you think
Spot would stray from a pack or a black dog would miss a rut¬
ting season?)
Kes kodu musta vai teo laiska kaes (Who would notice dirt at
home or lazyness at compulsory service?)
Kauas luhike laul laulet voi vaese heng voet (Do you think a
short song or a poor man’s soul would last long?)

I. Exceptional forms

II- //-repartees (oleks in Estonian) in the form of an implica¬

tion, in the past form etc. (60-240):
Oleks on pahapoiss (‘If is a bad boy)
Oleks seal kuuned, ta laheks puu otsa (If a pig had nails, it
would climb a tree)
Oleks tadil till, oleks onu (If auntie had a wee-wee, she would
be uncle)
Oleks see koer mitte sitale lainud, ta oleks janese kdtte saanud
(If the dog hadn’t gone to shit, it would sure have caught the
hare)
Oleks uppus a a Jam bur i jdkke (‘If got drowned in the Jambur
river)
Oleks japeaks on vennad (‘If and ‘should’ are brothers)
12. Texts in the form Not all A are B etc. perceivable as partial
negation (20-160):
[ See also D. Mesher’s opinion:
http://www.sjsu.edu/depts/itl/graphics/claims/univer.html ]
Koik ei ole kuld, mis hiilgab (All that glitters is not gold)
Iga punane mari ei ole mitte maasikas (Every red berry is not
a strawberry)
Koik ei ole hope, mis laughs (Not all is silver that shimmers)
Iga kana, kes kaagutab, ei mune (Every cackling hen doesn’t
lay eggs)
Ei ole koik mesi, mis tilgub, ega koik tuli, mis valgub (Not all
is honey that trickles, nor is all fire that flickers)
13. Didactic monologues (100-340):
Vaskuss oli pidan utlema, et kui tal si/mad oleks, siis ta paneks
uhe ooga uheksa pere uksed kinni (A blindworm is told to

179
 have said that if it had eyes to see, it would close the doors of
nine farms [killing the people] in one night)
Kala utelnud: “Jumal hoidku mind iileliia vaese voi rikka katte
sattumast: rikas ntilib naha seljast, vaene silmad peast”
(A fish is told to have said: “God forbid me be caught by a too
poor or a too rich man: a rich man would flay me, a poor man
would eat out my eyes”)
Paastukuu utelnud kuiinlakuule: “Oleks mina sinust olema,
ma votaks koik ponnpead porandale, naese kaed leevaastja ja
koera kutised kunnisele, aga ma ei saa, mu teine silm jookseb
vett” (March is told to have said to February: “If I were you I
would freeze all nippers on the floor [inside], a woman’s
hands in the dough and a dog’s claws on the threshold, but I
can’t - one of my eyes is dripping”)
Tai utelnud: “Kurika all kuulan, pajas paisun, aga saanalein
on hingevotja ” (A louse is told to have said: “Under the beetle
I listen, in the kettle I bloat, but sauna steam is lethal to me”)
Kaer utelnud peremehele kiilviaegas: “Oleks sa mind sinna
mua peale kiilvaks, kus odra kiilvad, ma paneks sulle
kalevipiiksid kohe jalga” (Oats are told to have said to the
farmer at sowing time: “If you sowed me where you sow bar¬
ley, I would dress you in broadcloth trousers at once”)

As the reader has surely noticed, such traveling from one syntac¬
tic-modal cliche to another as well as to and fro between the syn¬
tactic-modal and other structural levels of proverbs can take us to
extremely complicated and intriguing relations and regularities,
which certainly deserve a separate analysis to come.

5. A close look at a formula pattern

We have selected a Who..., (that)... -model as the formula pattern

to have a closer look at, and to sum up the report, we will make
an attempt to study the behaviour of the formula in relations with
other formulas and other structural aspects of proverbs.

180
A. Relations with other implicative formulas

As mentioned above, the typology of formulas outlined in the

previous part of the article was merely a typology of the title texts
of types in the publication Eesti vanasdnad (further: EV). In fact,
every proverb type having a bigger number of records expresses a
vivid internal variability, which is synonymy by nature and con¬
cerns besides the lexical form the sc. formula elements and the
syntactic-modal form of sentences in general. At the moment we
can estimate quantitatively the structural variability of Estonian
proverbs only by the amount of the ‘encounterings’ or ‘intersec¬
tions’ of proverbial units with formulae (or other features of
form), not taking into account the record numbers behind each in¬
tersection.
At present it is not possible to assess the density of connection
between the syntactic types of formula or other structural features
in the corpus of Estonian proverbs as a whole either because the
total potent and co-appearances of most formulae and other form .
features are yet unknown.
Let us make a simplified summary of proverbs which include
texts with Who..., (that)... -formula (only or mostly or among
others or as an exception), and have a glance at the co-appearance
of other syntactic or modal stereotypes in these proverbs. The to¬
tal number of such proverbs in EV-publication turned out to be
924 (let me remind you that according to the typification made on
the basis of title texts the number of Who..., (that)...-formula
proverbs, inch all parallelist, imperative and other modifications,
was only 590).
Nearly half of the group is made up of types where the
Who...,(that)... -formula is altered by others; on the other hand,
347 of the 469 (i.e. ca. %) are the types represented by one record
only.
Here are some of the most productive and steady representatives
of Who..., (that)...-formula in Estonian proverbs:
Kes kopikat ei korja, see rublat ei saa (He who doesn’t collect
kopecks will not have a ruble) - EV 4360; ca. 210 records;
Kes kahju kardab, see onne ei leia (He who fears loss, finds no
happiness) - EV 2936; ca. 195 records;

181
 Kes koik nommed kontsib, see koik marjad maitseb (He who
wanders all the moors, will taste all the berries) - EV 7631; ca.
80 records;
Kes ei tana pisku eest, see ei tana palju eest (He who doesn’t
thank for the little will not thank for a lot) - EV 12406; ca. 60
records.
Who..., (that)... -formula prevails strongly also in proverbs
Kes kannatab, see kaua elab (He who suffers [or: is patient]
will live a long life) — EV 3174; ca. 200 records;
Kes valetab, see varastab (He who lies also steals [= Show me
a liar and I’ll show you a thief]) - EV 13278; ca. 110 records;
Kes ees, see mees (literally: He who comes first, is the man
[=First come, first served]) - EV 507; ca. 95 records.
The Who...,(that)... -formula appeared to have the following
number of variations with other implicative formulas:

1) elliptic formulas 94 cases;

2) If / When..., (then)... -formulas 89 ;
3) formulas with initial Whose 17
4) What..., (that)... -formulas 10 ;
5) The more...- -er, the -er... -formulas 8 —;
6) As..., so... -formulas 6-”-;

changes with other formulas are very small in number indeed.

According to this statistics the Who..., (that)... -formula seems
to have quite a strong identity. Its basic synonyms are the most
universal ‘unmarked’ representatives of symmetrical implicative
structures - the elliptic structures and If / When..., (then)...- struc¬
tures.
The general picture of variations in Estonian proverbs refers to
the fact that the synonymy between the If / When..., then... -
formula and the implicative ellipsis is extremely strong: e.g. there
are 148 proverbs among our Who..., (that)... ones which also in¬
clude the If / When..., (then)...-formula and/or the implicative el¬
lipsis; both of them are present in 35 proverbs.
Furthermore, at least in Estonian proverbial language, but pos¬
sibly even on a more general level occurs quite a spontaneous
natural correlation between the implicative types of formula and
the person of verb (in sentences lacking the substantive which

182
mark the agent): the stereotypical cases are (He) who does ~ is ~
wants ~ ...and (If / When you) do ~ are ~ waa? ~ ... forms. The
statistics on archive texts support the fact:

3 person 2nd person

Who...,(that)... -formula 1656 0
If / When..., (then)... -formula 80 767
Implicative ellipsis 90 609

The representatives of Who..., (that)... -formula in the current

study are the sentences with component Who (the consequent may
also include pronouns in other cases, e.g. seda, sel, selle, etc.); the
representatives of If / When..., then... -formula are the sentences
where either of the formula’s components occurs (i.e. is not el-
lipted); ellipses are the implicative texts where both formula ele¬
ments are lacking (a verb might still occur). We have taken into
account the purely indicative sentences as well as those which
contain sincere, ironical or indecisive imperatives, e.g.:
Kes aitab iseennast, seda aitab ka Jumal (Who helps himself ’
will be helped by God);
Hoiad ise, siis hoiab Jumal ka (If you help yourself, the God
will also);
Hoia ise, siis hoiab ka Jumal (Help yourself and the God will
also);
also,
Kes huntidega elab, hakkab ulguma (He who lives among
wolves will start howling);
Oled huntide hulgas, pead huntidega ulguma ([If you] live
among wolves you must howl as wolves);
Kui oled huntide hulgas, siis ulu huntidega koos (If you are
among wolves, then howl with wolves);
also,
Kes patsi laheb otsima, see kautab kannika (Who goes to find
a loaf will lose a cantle);
Puiiadpatsi, kaotad kannika ([If you] catch a loaf, [you will]
lose a cantle);
Mine patsi taga ajama, kauta kanikas ka ara (Go running after
a loaf, and you will lose a cantle);

183
 Ara mine patsi taga otsima, kaotad viimaks kanikagi ara
(Don’t go after a loaf, or you will finally lose a cantle),
etc.
My folkloristic intuition suggests that the proverbs of South-
Estonia might favor the direct address ‘sincC (you) -form as well
as the totally elliptic way of saying, in any indicative or impera¬
tive sentence. Furthermore, my intuition suggests that these very
features — the frequent use of 2nd person singular and elliptic style
- are characteristic to Russian proverbs. The latter suggestion
lacks evidence to prove it, the first one, however, does not. The
results of this test are shown on the four following cartograms
(see maps 1—4).

Map 1. The distribution of (He) who..., (that)...

-formula (the verb in 3rd person singular)

Map 2. The distribution of the 2nd person singular

in the elliptical implicative structures with
If! When..., (then)... -formula

184
 -formula (the verb in 2nd or 3ul person singular)

Map 4. The distribution of elliptical implicative

structures (the verb in 2nd person singular)

The density of distribution of each phenomenon was assessed by

first finding the relative frequency of texts expressing this phe¬
nomenon (the percentage of the total number of texts in our sur¬
vey) in each parish, then the numerical data of neighboring par¬
ishes were smoothed. Certainly, the current small test study pro¬
vides no complete overview of the frequency relations of you- and
/ze-modes in proverbs of different regions of Estonia, neverthe¬
less, it proves that among the synonyms of Who..., (that)...
-formula in Southern Estonia, and even more so in the south¬
eastern Estonia prevail the direct references in 2nd person singular
(map 2) and If / When..., then... -structures (map 3), and most
plainly the elliptical implicative structures (map 4). The high rates
in Hiiumaa on maps 2-4 are regretfully not reflecting the reality

185
but noises (i.e. they result from the small total of the subject and
the lateness of records).

B. Parallelist forms
In our study there is a total number of 107 proverbs with full par¬
allelist texts, incl. the alteration of the implicative simple form
with the parallelist-implicative form in 59 cases, the alteration of
the implicative structure with the parallelist compound of two or
more simple sentences in 24 cases, etc.
The parallelist forms are remarkable in a way that they can
substantially and in different ways change the logical and the
trope structure of a sentence.
The parallelist (He) who..., (that)... -proverbs reveal quite distinct
relations of synonymy (analogy) versus antonymy (opposition)
between the parallelled components.
The synonymous parallelism in Who..., (that)... -proverbs
is expressed in the following examples:
Kis hiljaks jaab, sit ilma jaab, kis kaua magab, see kahjatseb
(He who comes late, gets nothing, he who sleeps long, will re¬
gret)-EV 1263;
Kes hoiab, ei ohka, kes kardab, ei kahjatse (Who takes care
will not sigh, who fears will have no regrets) - EV 1416;
Kes kaarnat kasvatab, see silmad kautab, kes nogest silitab,
see kaed korvetab (Who raises a raven will lose his eyes, who
strokes a nestle will bum his hands) - EV 2832 + 7621;
Kes kannatab, see kaua elab, kes jarele annab, see jarjel istub
(He who suffers [or: is patient] will have a long life, he who
yields will be well off [literally: sit on the throne]) - EV 3174
+ 2759;
Kes koer, saab kolki, kes peni, saab pessa (Who is a dog will
be drubbed, who is a cur will be caned) - EV 4197;
Kes konsiks [=konksuks] loodud, on nooreld kover, ja kes ok-
kaks loodud, on nooreld terav (Who is cut out for a hook will
be twisted since his youth and who is cut out for a thorn will
be sharp since his youth) - EV 4301 + 7792.
The antonymous mode of parallelism is best expressed
in cases where it is marked by the affirmative or negative form of

186
a verb or adjective, by a pair of words, with one component de¬
noting the ‘contradictory’ negation of another, or by antonyms
marking various measures and qualities (big/small, many/few,
good/bad etc):
Kes see annab, see on sales, kes ei anna, see on sant (Who
gives is a gent, who does not is a beggar) - EV 311;
Kes ei ike ehten, tuu ikk ellen, kes ikk ehten, tuu ei ike ellen
(Who does not cry in wedding-clothes will cry in married life,
who cries in wedding clothes will never in married life) - EV
2284;
Kes kiilvab, see Idikab, kes ei kiilva, see ei loika (Who sows
will reap, who does not sow will not reap) - EV 5142;
Kes tood teeb, see leiba soob, kes laiskleb, see ndlgib - (Who
does his work will eat bread, who idles will starve) - EV
12466.
‘If yes, then yes and if no, then no’ -type of parallelisms contain a
paremiological hyper-problem in a very clear manner: are all
proverbs necessarily implications or are some of them still'
equivalences? For example, if we take a sentence: Kes teeb, see
saab, kes ei tee, see ei saa (Who does will get, who does not will
not get), then its only possible logical pattern should be
Vx ((Px —> Qx) & (Px —> Qx))
which is firmly reduced to logical equivalence
\/x(Px = Qx).
If the proverb provides only the first part of this double structure,
it is difficult to guess (even too strange to pose a question)
whether it is presumed that those who will not do might somehow
get, or they will not get for certain. The common sense would
consider the presumption that they will not, more logical (cf. also
Krikmann, 1987: 139-140).
Contradiction can be expressed by more figurative means as well:
Kes harg soob, see hdrg veab, kes sddsk soob, see sddsk veab
(Who eats [like] an ox will ‘drive’ [i.e. work] like an ox, who
eats [like] a gnat will ‘drive’ [i.e. work] like a gnat) - EV
1844;

187
 Kes harra siin, sie hdrra sial, kie tudmies siin, sie tiiomies
porgus (Who is a gent here will be a gent there, who is a
worker here will be a worker in hell) - EV 1877;
Kes lusigaga alustab, see kulbiga lobetab, kes kulbiga alustab,
see lusigaga lobetab (Who starts with a spoon will finish with
a ladle, who starts with a ladle will finish with a spoon) - EV
4523;
Kis reede ohtu peseb, see peseb piimaga, kis laupae ohtu pe-
seb, see peseb verega (Who washes on a Friday night will
wash with milk, who washes on a Saturday night will wash
with blood) - EV 5599).
As it turned out in the observation of the 7th trope type, parallel¬
ism is by no means indifferent towards the trope structure of
proverbs. For parallelism to seem as opposing, its components
must belong to one and the same “world”, or semantic field. The
number of possibilities is bigger in case of analogy parallelism,
but our Who..., (that)... -group attached to a human being in both
of its parallelled parts provides no adequate idea of this multiplic¬
ity. True enough, we might find here journeys through two differ¬
ent metaphoric regions (someone raises a raven and someone
strokes a nettle; someone is a crooked hook and someone is a
sharp thorn), but usually everything is reduced to pure lexical
synonymy within the same semantic region. Naturally, we find no
occurrence of trope type 7.1 here and type 7.3 could be found in a
very few cases - e.g. EV 9637: Ega see pole rikas, kel palju on,
vaid see on rikas, kes omaga rahul on (Not he is rich who has
much, but he is rich who’s contented with what he has) is based
on the figurative polysemy of the word rikas (rich). But it is no
coincidence that the synonymous parallelist compound is most
often formed by the linking of two different proverbs.
In Who..., (that)...-group we can also find examples on multi¬
partite parallelistic chains. Even bipartite parallelisms with a re¬
current member in the consequent of the first part and in the ante¬
cedent of the second part can be conceived as a special kind of
chain structure, e.g.:
Kes ei viitsi food teha, see peab kerjama, kes ei viitsi kerjata,
see peab surema (Who does not care to work must beg, who
does not care to beg must die) - EV 12465.

188
The chain might also be an analogy parallelism which is extended
into three or more parts, for instance:
Kes palub, see saab, kes otsib, see leiab, kes koputab, sellele
tehakse lahti (Who asks will be given, who seeks will find,
who knocks at a door will be opened to) - EV 8377 + 5185 +
4380.
Most often, the chain consists of three parts and is construed on
the same principle as the folkloric tripartite in general, inch in
folk tales: in the lsl part the topical motive is established, in the
2nd part we will find the synonymous repetition, and in the 3rd part
the turn (a point, a strong hyperbole, a transition to the abruptly
different semantic domain or other elements contrasting the pre¬
vious); so, the chain forms a climax:
Kes mehe riiet naerab, see naerab ratsepat; kes mehe nagu
naerab, naerab Jumalat; kes mehe tegusid naerab, naerab
meest ennast (Who laughs at man’s clothes laughs at the tailor,
who laughs at the man’s face laughs at God, who laughs at
man’s deeds laughs at man himself) - EV 7163;
• Annad pollute seitse korda, annab pold sada kdrda; annad
pbllule iiha kdrra, annab pold suite seitse korda; narrid pdldu
iihd kdrra, narrib pold sinu seitse korda (If you give [i.e.
dung] the field seven times the field will give a hundred, if you
give the field once the field will give you seven times, if you
taunt the field once it will taunt you seven times) - EV 9137.
In some cases which concern children’s folklore and which pro¬
verbial nature is somewhat problematic, the play at parallelism
takes place solely due to the fun of continuation (Lust zu er-
weitern) (see Krohn, 1926: 66ff.) and is orientated to the sounds,
the comic and the absurd.
A good example could be the proverb Kes ees, see mees (Who
comes first will be the man) - EV 507, continuing with: ...kes
keskel, see keiser ~ kera ~ kena oinas; kes taga, see taarinaga
~ tataari naba ~ tatikas ~ talle saba (...who comes second will
be a czar ~ circle ~ cute ram; who comes last will be kvass ~
Tatar’s navel ~ brat ~ lamb’s scut).

189
C. The modal structure of a sentence
As I already mentioned, it is hard to imagine what purpose could
be served with a proverb which provides no evaluation at all. But
evaluations could be included in proverbs in several ways. Let us
observe some more productive patterns on the example of Who...,
(that)... -proverbs.
1. “Bonuses” and “penalties”
In the antecedent, the who-person performs deeds which are seen
as either willful or optional; in the consequent there follows
something which is either good or bad for the who-person.
lal. “Bonus”, a favorable result for the rv/m-person - ca. 85
proverbs
It is somewhat difficult to point out the kinds of ‘bonus’ from the
mixture of literal speech and metonymy, still, we could distin¬
guish certain stereotypes.
Most often it refers to food, gain, haul, wealth, or the avoid¬
ance of hunger, want, etc., respectively:
Kes kibedat kannatab, see magusat maitseb (He who suffers
the bitter will taste the sweet) - EV 3684;
Kes higiga teeb, see himuga soob (Who works in sweat will
eat with appetite) - EV 12485;
Kes kass roidab, sii oma poja toidab (The cat who snoops
around will feed his kittens) - EV 3393;
Kes tood teeb, see nalga ei nae (Who works hard will feel no
hunger)-EV 12460;
Kes iiksi rohmib, iiksi pohmib (Who works hard alone will
gobble alone) - EV 15089.
We can also find obscure references to the gain of something
good, managing, success, position, survival:
Kes otsib, see leiab (He who seeks shall find) - EV 8147;
Kes tahab, see saab (Who wants will get) - EV 11480;
Kis pusib, sie suab (Who bungles will get) - EV 9066;
Kes piiiiab, see jduab (He who takes pains will get things
done) - EV 9400;
Kes souab, see jduab (He who rows goes far) — EV 11180).

190
The promises might also concern physical strength, knowledge,
wisdom:
Kes palju soob, see palju teeb (Who eats a lot will do a lot) -
EV 8335;
Kes stidb, sie jaksab (Who eats will be strong) - EV 11241;
Kid har’d stiti, tuu mde tege (Who eats a lot [literally: an ox]
will make a mountain) - EV 1847);
Kes palju ktisib, saab targemaks (Who asks a lot will get
wiser)-EV 5187;
the blessing of God:
Kes vaesele annab, sellele tasub Jumal saja vdrra (Who gives
to the poor will be rewarded by God for a hundred) - EV
13027;
Kes tood teeb ja vaeva armastab, seda aitab Jumal (Who toils
and moils will be helped by God) - EV 12457;
Kesse kassi kallistab, selle due dnnistab (Who cuddles a cat,
his farmyard will be blessed) - EV 3394;
Kes aitab iseennast, seda aitab ka Jumal (Who helps himself’
will be helped by God) - EV 1424;
the love and gratitude of fellow men:
Kes on hea, see kiitust saab (Who is good will be rewarded) -
EV1094;
the avoidance of negative emotions:
Kes kannatab, see ei kahetse (Who suffers will have no re¬
grets) - EV3173.
Ia2. “Penalty”, an unfavorable outcome for the re/io-person
ca. 230 types
This pattern is probably the most productive one among the prov¬
erbs. The stereotypes are more or less the same as was the case
with positive results.
The Jf7?o-person is foretold e.g. physical inconvenience, trou¬
ble, danger, pain, injury or illness:
Kes viiga timbre kdti, tuu oks hdmmest ka saa (Who handles
water is bound to get wet) - EV 13957;
Kes korgest kukub, saab kova hoobi (Who falls from height
will suffer a hard blow) - EV 4859;

191
 Kes valega haukap, sii valuga neelatap (Who bites with a lie
will swallow with pain) - EV 13240.
Most often (ca. 60 cases) the boding involves hunger, material
damage, poverty, bad harvest, or the bad quality of something:
Kes koik piihad peab, see koik naljad naeb (Who celebrates all
holidays will face all hungers) - EV 9361;
Kes liha otsib, see kondi leiab (Who looks for meat will find a
bone)-EV 5802;
Kes food ei tee, see suiia ei saa (Who does not work will not
get food)-EV 12453;
Kes kopikat ei korja, see rublat ei saa (Who doesn’t collect
kopecks will not get a ruble) - EV 4360;
Kes piivve latt puudma, kautas kana (Who goes to catch a par¬
tridge will lose a hen) - EV 9396;
Kes hiljaks jaab, see ilma jaab (Who is late will be left with¬
out)-EV 1263.
As with the promised goods, ‘penalties’ might take the form of a
vaguely specified misfortune, failure, loss or damage:
Kes kardab, see kaotab (Who fears will lose) — EV 3271;
Kes iihte ei taha, sii kahte ei saa (Who doesn’t want one will
not get two) - EV 14881;
Kes tuult ktilvab, see tormi loikab (Who sows a wind will reap
a storm) - EV 12222;
Kes algab hasti, lopetab halvasti (Who starts well will finish
badly)-EV 243;
Kes paljo koneleb, teeb hendale vaeva (Who talks a lot will be
in trouble) - EV 4835.
An unfavorable result might also appear in lack of knowledge,
failure in accomplishing purposes, degradation in ethic or some
other standards, etc.:
Kes vette ei hiippa, see ujuma ei dpi (Who does not jump into
water will not learn to swim) - EV 13956;
Kes hirmuta kasvab, see auta elab (Who grows up without
fear will live without honour) - EV 1296;
Kes sea seltsin elab, nakkab ka viimdta sitta sUiima (Who lives
together with a pig will end up eating shit) - EV 10339.
The w/zo-person might also be subject to sin, perdition, the anger
and punishment of God, he might fall prey to devil:

192
 Kes kulili soob, teeb kiimme pattu, kes selili soob, teeb seitse
pattu (Who eats lying on his side will commit ten sins, who
eats lying on his back will commit seven sins) - EV 10268;
Kes kurja kiilvab, see hukatust loikab (Who sows evil shall
reap perdition) - EV 4596;
Kes laubaosta vistleb, seda Jumal nustleb (Who whisks him¬
self on a Saturday will be punished by God) - EV 5598;
Kes kuratille annab sormeotsa, viimaks parib iho ja hinge
(Who gives the devil the tip of his finger will end up giving
him his body and soul) - EV 4588.
A penalty might also be the violence of fellow men and society
(beating, force, prosecution), cheating, “schooling in life”, laugh¬
ter and criticism, shame, distrust, hostility:
Kes koerust teeb, see kolki saab (Who is up to mischief will
get beaten) - EV 4197;
Kes kurja teind, see kurja vastab (Who has done evil will an¬
swer for evil) - EV 4598;
Kes koer om, see koera palga saab (Who is a dog [i.e. acts’
• mischievously] will get dog’s pay) - EV 4068;
Kis sandikeppi ja vangitorni naerab, see saab isi ka vangi
(Who laughs at beggar’s staff and roundhouse will be put to
prison himself)-EV 13647;
Kes pehme om, perse ala pandas (Who is [too] soft will be sat
on) - EV 8519;
Kes pea usup, saap pea petetus (Who believes [too] soon will
be deceived soon as well) — EV 12949;
Kes vanemate sona ei vota, kiill seda ilm opetab (Who does
not obey the parents’ word will be taught by the world) - EV
2206;
Kes kord on valetanud, seda teist kord enam ei usta (Who has
lied once will not be believed the second time) - EV 13276;
Kes habi otsib, habi leiab (Who seeks shame will find shame)
-EV 1718.
Negative emotions:
Kes paljo lainas, see paljo leinas (Who borrows [or: lends] a
lot, will regret [literally: mourn] a lot) - EV 8314;
Kes hooletu, see onnetu (Who is careless will be unhappy) -
EV 1494;

193
 Kes keeldu ei kuule, peab kahetsema (Who does not obey for¬
bidding will regret afterwards) - EV 3541;
Kes palju lubab, see palju kahetseb (Who promises a lot will
regret a lot) - EV 8320;
Kes varra naard, see hilda ikk (Who laughs early will cry
later)-EV 13670).
lb. The figure of speech allows the interpretation of both
“bonus” and “penalty” - ca. 10 types:
Kes koik nommed kontsib, see kdik marjad maitseb (Who
wanders all the moors will taste all the berries) — EV 7631;
Ken kaik katsub, sie monda nageb (Who touches [i.e. tries out]
all will see many a thing) - EV 3459;
Kes midake ots, food tole saa (Who seeks something will get
that) - EV 8146;
Kes vaikselt alustab, lopetab suureste (Who starts with small
will end up with big) - EV 14452;
Kes mida kiilvab, see seda loikab (Who sows what shall reap
that) EV 5150).
lc. Parallelist sayings, where the consequent of one compo¬
nent has the meaning of “bonus”, whereas the consequent of
the other component has the meaning of “penalty”
This small group reveals the connection between parallelism and
the axiological structure of a proverb. Part of the examples of this
group are already quoted in paragraphs about the antonymous and
chain parallelism; we will add some more to these:
Kes niidab Jamba pea, elab paar paeva, kes saba, see sada
aastat (Who shears the sheep’s head will live a couple of days,
who shears its tail will live a hundred years) - EV 7431;
Kes leivaga kerjama laheb, tuleb tiikiga tagasi, aga kes tiikiga
laheb, tuleb leivaga tagasi (Who goes out begging with a
bread will come back with a piece, who goes out with a piece
will come back with a bread) - EV 5662.

2. The “quasi-bonuses” and “quasi-penalties”

The “reality” of bonuses or penalties was not one and the same in
the previous series la-lc either: hunger or pain is obviously
somewhat more perceptible than, for instance, the want of spiri-

194
tuai welfare; still, the second part of the implication has so far al¬
lowed a serious interpretation in the ontologic sense, it was possi¬
ble to establish a causative bridge between the antecedent and the
consequent. We can still find proverbs where the establishment of
such bridges and the serious interpretation fails, i.e. we are con¬
cerned with the, say, “quasi-penalties” or, exceptionally, with
“quasi-bonuses”. This is a genetically heterogeneous, in many
ways hybrid and an interesting subject - the fusion of the onto¬
logical and the evaluative-normative, often the symbiosis of
mythological and rhetorical, where the original superstitious func¬
tion has been reduced to the rhetoric or has never even existed,
and a superstition (or a customary regulation) is being imitated
and simulated. Thus folk pedagogy arms itself with the mimicry
borrowed from folk religion and customs. Their second function
is to make jokes, i.e. they might be regarded as a kind of parodies
on proverb and religion (see also Krikmann, 1985: 480). As
tropes, the “quasi”-units are usually hyperboles.
2a. The “quasi-bonuses” might be found in single examples
where the feeling of invertibility results from a rough dissonance
between the antecedent and the consequent in the plane of com¬
monplace / sacred or significant / insignificant:
Kes lese auku harib, see taevariiki parib (Who takes care of a
widow’s ‘hole’ will inherit the heavenly kingdom) - EV 5759;
Kes sitika tee peal died poorab, saab iihe pulga iilemale (Who
sets a bug on its feet on the path will step up the staircase [to
heaven])-EV 10524);
also, a well-known alliterative set phrase: Kes kannatab, see
kaua elab (Who suffers [or: is patient] will live long) - EV
3174.
2b. There are more “quasi-penalties” - approximately 30 in our
material. The distinct motivation of these often grotesque and ab¬
surd figures is hard to determine. By large, we could distinguish:
the units, where a power of unknown origin seems to operate,
spreading grotesque failures and diseases, post-mortal horrors,
etc:
Kes naeru kardab, see peeru sureb (Who fears laughing will
die of fart) - EV 7136;

195
 Kes kusemata situb, see n-mata sureb (Who shits without uri¬
nating will die without f-ing) - EV 4688;
Kes naar, saa nagla (Who laughs will get a furuncle) — EV
7156;
Kes ahvardades ara sureb, see peeretades maha maetakse
(Who dies threatening will be buried with farting) - EV
14776;
Kes lihahimus elab, sii rasvandlgd surep (Who lives in lust
[for flesh] will die in hunger for fat) - EV 5822;
Kes isa ehk ema loob, selle kasi kasvab hauast valja (Who
strikes his father or mother his hand will grow out of the
grave) - EV 2207;
the units, which simulate sanctions following from customary
law:
Kes vana asja meelde tuletab, sel silm peast valja (Who re¬
minds [others] of an old thing will have his eye picked out) -
EV 13329;
Kes tangupudruga leiba soob, see saadetakse Siberisse (Who
eats bread with barley porridge will be sent to Siberia) - EV
11580;
Kes mullust malets ja toonast miili tulets, sel Idigats toine korv
arade (Who reminds of the past and recall what has been will
have his ear cut off) - EV 6882.

3. “Signalling”
In this group, the who-person is an object observed from outside.
The antecedent part expresses his more distinct outward qualities
that appear in a certain situation, the consequent provides predic¬
tions about his other, often hidden features which may compen¬
sate or annul what has been said in the first part, or the informa¬
tion given in the antecedent is spread on the other occasions
(times, places), or it predicts the further course of the situation the
w/io-character is in, etc.
3a. Signals of the good qualities of the w/m-person
Diligence, mettle, ability occur most frequently here:
Kid urn susi suule, tuu um kahr tuiile (Who eats (or: is agres-
sive) like a wolf will work like a bear) - EV 10788;

196
 Ken noorelt nobe, see virk vananagi (Who is quick in youth
will be diligent in old age) - EV 7469;
Kes mees siin, see mees seal (Who is man here will be a man
there) - EV 6507;
Kes uhest mees, see teisest mees (Who is a man for one thing
will be a man for another) - EV 14879).
Wisdom and broad-mindedness, kindness, keeping one’s word
and fidelity a.o. qualities are mentioned as well:
Kes tank, see vdtab opetust (Who is smart will learn) - EV
11603;
Kes palju kaind, see palju naind (Who has travelled a lot has
seen a lot) - EV 8319;
Kes kassi hoit, tuu hoit ka hobost (Who takes care of a cat will
take care of a horse too) - EV 3390).
3b. Signals of the bad qualities of the w/io-character
Proverbs consider socially evil or dangerous those who are, decid¬
ing by the outward features either
untrustworthy, liars or thieves:
' Kes usutav ei ole vaikesin asjun, see ei ole suurin ealgi (Who
can not be trusted in small things can not be trusted in big
things) - EV 8879;
Kes palju raagib, see palju valetab (Who talks a lot lies a lot)
-EV 8328;
Kes varastab, see valetab (Who steals that also lies) - EV
13776;
Kes valetab, see varastab (Who lies that also steals) - EV
13278;
evil, bad, naughty (as a dog):
Kes kodu karjub, see eemal haugub (Who shouts at home will
bark away from home) - EV 3964;
Kea make, tuu tike (Who is oily is also cruel) - EV 6325;
Kes vihane iite paale, see vihane tdise paale (Who is angry
with one is angry with the other) - EV 14030;
Kes koer elades, see koer surres (Who lives as a dog will die
as a dog) - EV 4050;
Kes koer siin, see koer seal (Who is a dog here will be a dog
there)-EV 4104;

197
dumb, ignorant:
Kid noorolt nuiatiikk, tuu vanalt puupala (Who is a piece of
stick in youth will be a block of wood in old age) - EV 7478;
Mis loll dhta, see loll hommiku (Who is stupid in the morning
will be stupid in the evening) - EV 6015;
Kes loll siindides, see loll surres (Who is bom stupid will die
stupid) - EV 6000;
stingy:
Kea antust ei anna, see ei anna kah aidast (Who does not
share what he is given will not share what he has in his bam) -
EV 327;
Kes palju lubab, see vahe annab (Who promises much will
give little) - EV 8321;
Kes om mako, tuu sako (Who is oily is also stingy) — EV 6333;
lazy, sluggish:
Kes palju raagib, see vahe teeb (Who talks a lot will get little
done) - EV 8330;
Kes elades laisk, see surres laisk (Whos’s lazy when living
will be lazy when dying) - EV 551;
ungrateful, indifferent, makes difference between himself and
others:
Kes ei tana pisku eest, see ei tana palju eest (Who does not
thank for little will not thank for much) - EV 12406;
Kes teise silmas pinda naeb, see oma silmas palki ei nae (Who
sees a mote in other’s eye will not see a beam in his own eye)
-EV 11889;
Kes ise haavu ei ole kannatanud, naerab armide ule (Who has
not suffered from wounds will laugh at scars) - EV 734).
3c. Good and bad signals in parallelist forms
Kes lahke, sie laisk, kes tige, sie tegija (Who is generous is
lazy, who is angry is diligent [about wives]) - EV 5281;
Kes ei nae narmas, see ei nae silmas; kes naeb narmas, see
naeb silmas (Who does not notice you in rags will not notice
you in nice clothes, who notices you in rags will also motice
you in nice clothes) - EV 7377.

198
3d. Axiologically indefinite signal
This group contains proverbs with the philosophical content,
which concern the relation between life and death, the unchange¬
able regularities of human psychology, fate and destiny, life’s
paradoxes, etc. which provide no active strategy for either who-
person or others concerned. The most productive Estonians prov¬
erbs on this subject might be:
Kes sutt latt pakku, lovvap kahro kate pojaga iist (Who flees
from a wolf will find a bear with two sons instead) - EV
10801;
Kes silmist, see meelest (Who is out of sight is out of mind) -
EV 10450;
Kes kala morran, tuu taht valla, kes vallan, tuu taht mdrda
(The fish who is in the weir will want out, who is outside will
want inside the weir) - EV 3059;
Kes korra polend, kardab tuld (Who has been burned once is
afraid of fire) - EV 9169;
Kes surmaks loodud on, seda ei aita arstirohud mitte (Who is’
- doomed to death will not be cured by medicines either) - EV
10727;
Kes ilma laind, see ilmas on (Who has gone out to the world
will stay there) - EV 1987;
Kes supiga suu poletand, see puhub ka vee peale (Who has
burnt himself with soup will blow on water as well) - EV
10698.

4. Sentences with purely evaluative consequent

Here we cannot possibly apply any ontological meaning to the
consequent, instead it obtains the purely evaluative quality (often
via a nominal metaphor or comparison).
This group also reveals that the normal or inverted order of the
parts of implication (i.e. seemingly quite a formal matter) is a
relevant determinant in the modal and trope structure of the sen¬
tence: while in sentences with ontologically interpretable conse¬
quent the normal word order was prevalent, purely axiologically
interpretable consequent is more often placed at the beginning of
the sentence.

199
 Something analogous appears in sayings of preferential struc¬
ture: there is a tendency to employ the symmetrical Rather ~ Bet¬
ter ~ ...than... -structure if both sides of the preference belong to
one and the same semantic ‘universe’, and the asymmetrical sim¬
ple sentence structure if the predicative part of the sentence con¬
stitutes a hyperbole (e.g. Parem kodu kooruke kui voorsil voileib
(Better a crumb at home than a bread and butter abroad) and Laps
on enam kui laast (A child is more than a splinter)) - cf. also
Krikmann, 1987: 141-142.
4a. Good evaluation to the rv/m-person
Some evaluations bear humorous or ironical connotations.
The evaluative words which occur most frequently are mees, tark,
hea, rikas (man, wise, good, rich):
Tuu om mees, kes naise moist vdtta ja hobese osta (A man is
who knows to marry a woman and buy a horse) - EV 6692;
Tark on see, kes tunneb, et ta alles rumal on (Wise is who ad¬
mits he is still ignorant) - EV 11650;
See inimene on rikas, kes palju oppind (A man who has
learned much is rich) - EV 9756.
A few examples on other evaluative words and appraising com¬
parisons:
Kes annab, sii om kuningas (Who shares is a king) - EV 311;
Kes hadas meile abi teeb, see on oige sober (Who helps us in
trouble is a true friend) - EV 1778;
Kes on hea naise saanud, see on hea asja leidnud (Who has
got a good wife has found a good thing) - EV 1093).
4b. Bad evaluation to the w/10-person
The evaluative words denoting some indefinitely bad quality,
miserableness: vaene, vilets, sitt (poor, miserable, poorly, shitty)
etc.:
Vaene sant on see, kes ilma kotita kerjab (A poor beggar is the
one who begs without a bag) - EV 13085;
Vilets, kes vene vesile jattab (Who leaves the boat on water is
miserable) - EV 14176;
Sitt mils om sii, kes kirveta kirikusse ldab (Who goes to church
without his axe is a shitty man) - EV 14566.

200
The evaluative words denoting stupidity: narr, loll, rumal (fool,
stupid, ignorant) etc.:
Narr on see, kes rohkem lubab, kui ta jouab (He’s a fool who
promises more than he can make) - EV 7388;
Loll, kes kohutdie ara teenib (He’s a fool who earns [i.e.
works too much for] a square meal) - EV 6009).
Evaluation by animal metaphors:
Lammas on, kes ennast niita laseb (It is a sheep who lets him¬
self sheared) - EV 5430;
Kes koera saba kergitab, on ise koer (Who lifts a dog’s tail is
a dog himself) - EV 4047;
Pint, kid pett, perse, kid petta lask (Who cheats is a dog, who
lets himself be cheated is an ass) - EV 8563.
References to erring against God:
Kea ule vanomba latt, tuu latt tile Jumala (Who disobeys his
parents, disobeys God) - EV 13634;
Kes koeruse parast kerjab, see varastab Jumalad (Who begs
for the sake of mischief steals from the God) - EV 4196.
Evaluation is given by comparisons or extended metaphors:
Kes kolm kerda oo kolind, sie on justku tulekahjust Idbi kdtind
(Who has moved for three times has as if lived through a fire
[= Three removes are as good as a fire]) - EV 4279;
Kes naisel Itivva lask, om niisama alato, kui olosi tsiga purno
(Who lets a woman slap him is as humiliated as if a pig has
bitten)-EV 7199;
Kes ottab lese kolme lapsega, ottab neli varast majasse -
(Who weds a widow with three children takes four thieves into
his house) - EV 5758.
4c. Good and bad evaluation together
Figural stereotypes are generally the same as in groups 4a and 4b.
This compound structure once again illustrates the plurality of
reasons evoking parallelism.
Let us have some examples of the occurrence of mees (man)-
evaluation and the co-occurrence of words tark + loll (smart +
stupid):
Koer, keda kutsutakse, aus mees astub ise (A dog who is
called for, an honest man goes himself) - EV 4093;

201
 Mees, kes saab, lits, kes laseb (A man who gets, a bitch who
lets) - EV 6573;
Tark, kes ajaga kaasa laab, loll, kes sorad vastu aab (Smart is
the one who goes along with time, stupid is the one who bears
his fangs) - EV 11636;
Tark, kes muigab, rumal, kes naerab (Smart who smiles, stu¬
pid who laughs) - EV 11637.

5. Forms which contain norms and imperatives

The Who..., (that)... -group does not allow to demonstrate the
modal synonymy involving imperatives too expressively, but it
forms a logical final stage in our “consequent-orientated” typol¬
ogy. We found out that the consequent of Who..., (that)... -
proverb might predict, for the w/zo-character himself or his fellow
men, axiologically marked real or quasi-situations and events, as
well as provide direct axiological assessments, which enable to
derive more or less definite prescriptions from them.
Eventually, it might contain direct prescription (i.e. order or
interdiction). In such a case the first part of the proverb might re¬
port either already existing or optative situation, to
achieve/preserve/avoid/liquidate which the imperative is for. All
in all there are approximately 60 items with normative or impera¬
tive consequents among our w/zo-proverbs.
5.1. Should ~ has to / can / must not -type indicative standardi¬
zation
Let us bring some examples for every deontic predicate (in the
examples we have tried to avoid sentences where peab means ‘is
forced to’)
Peab- (Should ~ has to) -sentences and other obliging indica¬
tives:
Kes supi teeb, see supi soob (He who cooks the soup must eat
it up himself [i.e. who messes up will bear the consequences])
-EV 11234;
Kes tahab teisi opetada, see peab ise oppinud olema (Who
wants to teach others has to be learned himself) - EV 14752;
Kes tapab, sii matab (Who kills has to bury) - EV 11589;

202
 Kes algab, peab lopetama (Who starts something has to finish
it) - EV 244;
Kes vola votab, see peab vola maksma (Who borrows has to
pay back his debt) - EV 14316.
Ei tohi/ eipea- (must not / need not) -sentences:
Kes ei taha tood teha, see ei pea ka sooma (Who does not
want to work, need not to eat) - EV 12448;
Tiidruk, kes mehe piikste jalge vahele lappi ei oska panna, see
ei tohi uleuldse mehele minna, sest mis mees niisuguse lolli
naisega tegema hakkab (A girl who cannot patch man’s trou¬
sers in between the legs, must not marry at all, because what
use does a man have of such a stupid wife) - EV 12597.
Voib / tohib- (can / is allowed) -sentences (they all happen to be
humorous preconditions for marriage):
Kes ahjuluuda moistab siduda, kotikangast kududa ja sea-
soolikaid poorata, see on meheleminemiseks kiips (Who can
tie an oven brush, weave a sackcloth and turn over chitterlings ,
is ready for marriage) - EV 177;
Kis mees soogivahes sada teevast kae otsas ara vahendab, see
vdib naese votta (The man who can sharpen hundred stakes
between two meals, can take a wife) - EV 6510).
5.2. gu- (should, let) -imperatives
Here, we will not make an attempt to distinguish the ‘sincere’ im¬
peratives from the gloating-ironical or warning-ironical ones, in¬
stead we will just bring some examples of sentences with second
parts containing gw-imperative.
It is practically impossible to translate the gw-imperative into
English, therefore the translation is provided by the meaning
solely.
Orders:
Kes perse teisele laenab, sitku ise labi kiiljeluude (Who loans
his ass to someone else should shit through his ribs) - EV
8683;
Kes oma sobrast tahab vaenlast teha, see laenaku talle raha
(Who wants to make his friend his enemy should loan him
some money) - EV 11056;

203
 Kes on pandud orjama, see orjaku hea meelega (Who is made
to slave should do it with pleasure) - EV 8109.
Prohibitions:
Kes kord “jaa” on oelnud, argu oelgu enam “ei” (Who has
said ‘yes’ once already should not say ‘no’ any more) - EV
2293;
Kes hunti kardab, see metsa argu mingu (Who is afraid of
wolf should not go into the woods) - EV 1655.
Obviously, the Who..., that... -structure almost automatically ex¬
cludes direct imperatives from consequent clauses. Considering
the general prevalence of negative (all the bad things, prohibi¬
tions) over positive in proverbs, the total of indicative and argu-
prohibitions is surprisingly scarce as well. Apparently, this ten¬
dency is also somehow in accordance with the paremic “3rd per¬
son ideology”.

Translated by Sirje Ainsaar and Kait Realo

204
References

Btihler, K. 1933. Die Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaft. Kant-Studien

38. Berlin.
EV = Eesti vanasonad. I-V:2. Toim. A. Krikmann, I. Sarv. Koost.
A. Hussar, A. Krikmann, E. Normann, V. Pino, I. Sarv, R. Saukas.
Tallinn, 1980-1988.
Hasan-Rokem, G. 1982. Proverbs in Israeli Folk Narratives: A Struc¬
tural Semantic Analysis. FF Communications No. 232. Helsinki.
Holbek, B. 1970. Proverb Style. Proverbium 15. Helsinki.
Jakobson, R. 1956. The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles. [Roman
Jakobson & Morris Halle] Fundamentals of Language, Hague.
Jakobson, R. 1968. Linguistics and Poetics. Style in Language. Ed. by
Thomas A. Sebeok. Cambridge, Mass.
Kanyo, Z. 1980. Sprichworter Analyse einer einfachen Form. Ein Bei-
—

trag zur generativer Poetik. Budapest.

Krikmann, A. 1984. 1001 Frage zur logischen Struktur der Sprichworter.
Semiotische Studien zum Sprichwort. Simple Forms Reconsidered I.
Special Issue of Kodikas/Code - Ars Semeiotica. An International
Journal of Semiotics. Vol. 7, No. 3/4, pp. 387-408.
Krikmann, A. 1985. Vanasonaparoodiatest. Keel ja Kirjandus 1985,
No. 8.
Krikmann, A. 1987. 1001 kiisimust vanasonade loogilise struktuuri kohta.
Dialoogi mudelid ja eesti keel. TRU toimetised, nr. 795. Tartu, pp.
120-150.
Krikmann, A. 1992. Harjamari, vahirasv. Zoohiibriididest ja -absurdi-
dest paroomikas. Keel ja Kirjandus, nr. 11, pp. 667-682.
Krohn, K. 1926. Die folkloristische Arbeitsmethode. Oslo.
Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago.
Morris, Ch. 1955. Signs, Language and Behavior. New York.
PS = Proverbia Septentrionalia. 900 Balto-Finnic Proverb Types with
Russian, Baltic, German and Scandinavian Parallels. By Matti
Kuusi in cooperation with Marje Joalaid, Arvo Krikmann, Pentti
Leino, Elsa Kokare, Kari Laukkanen, Vaina Malk, Ingrid Sarv.
FF Communications 236. Helsinki, 1985.
Taylor, A. 1965. The Study of Proverbs. Proverbium 1. Helsinki.
Vanasonaraamat. Comp, by A.Hussar, A.Krikmann, I. Sarv. Tallinn,
1984. [See also E-versions of Vanasonaraamat in Estonian
http://haldjas.folklore.ee/~kriku/VSR/FRAMEST.HTM
and German
http://haldjas.folklore.ee/~kriku/VSR/FRAMEGER.HTM]

205
 PROVERBS ON ANIMAL IDENTITY:
TYPOLOGICAL MEMOIRS

1. The Law of Folkloric Feedback and ‘Type Thickets’

Once folkloristics abandons its presently prevailing context-

oriented approaches and returns to studying folklore texts (I am
convinced that it is bound to happen sooner rather than later), it
will face numerous problems which have remained unsolved on
the previous turn of spiral. One of them concerns the typological
consistence and structure of folkloric genres. Below I will make
an attempt to elucidate some aspects of the problem on the exam- ,
pie of a single genre (proverbs) and a single notion {proverb
type). Paremiology and paremiography thus far have used primar¬
ily printed proverb publications (and earlier manuscriptal collec¬
tions) and/or archival manuscript material as their sources. Not
many nations boast extensive folkloric archives. Two conceptions
about the typological nature of proverbs have become dominant,
partly due to the nature of source material:
(1) Proverbs are cliches, always used in fixed, settled form.
This viewpoint is most expressively manifest in the works of
G. Permiakov (for example, 1968: 9 ff; 1970: 9 ff; 1979: 11 ff).
John Lyons (1971: 177), one of his contemporaries, has also
grouped proverbs together with some other types of expressions
under the category of ‘ready-made’ utterances, maintaining that
such expressions “permit no extension or variation”. Similarly,
I. Galperin (1971: 179-181) has argued that proverbs are variable
primarily as a result of writers’ (sic!) individual modification and
paraphrasing, as opposed to ‘their fixed form (the traditional
model)’, which is considered invariable.
(2) The Finnish school, whose main objective was to ascertain
the original form, time and place of origin and distribution routes

207
of folkloric units as distinctive types (rune song types, fairy tale-
types, etc.), believed that the diachronic development of folkloric
units could be traced in the variation of texts. Folkloristic studies
grown out from or influenced by the Finnish school still support
the view that proverbs, like any folklore types, appear in actual
language usage as variants, but the variation is limited and in
principle the typological landscape is discrete. According to this
conception tradition as such resembles a thin forest, where trees
are branched and the branches of some neighbouring trees might
even be intertwined, but it is clear (or at least it is possible to de¬
termine) where each branch stems from.
Kaiser und Abt (1923), a monograph by Walter Anderson, is
one of the fundamental works on the Finnish method, which is
significant for elucidating the history of the folk tale type AT 922,
but also for formulating the law of folkloric feedback (or self¬
regulation, or stability), das Gesetz der Selbstberichtigung, which,
in essence, is briefly the following. Variations of folk tales are
surprisingly undeviating from certain limits and the story will
never change beyond recognition, even if its lifespan is very long
and its circulation wide. According to Anderson, it is caused by
the fact that the narrator has generally heard the tale from not one
but from many different narrators, and has also heard it on various
occasions from the same narrator; all random fluctuations which
might drastically differ from the basic story are thereby sup¬
pressed, and the tale reassumes its basic form, ‘flows back to its
original streambed’.
Chapter 3 in the book Sissevaateid folkloori luhivormidesse I
(Krikmann 1997) discusses the peculiarities of the law of folk¬
loric feedback in proverbs and draws attention to the special para¬
doxical status of proverb lore on the background of other folklore:
★ On the one hand, proverbs and proverbial expressions are short
and ‘formulaic’ (in terms of their euphony, characteristic syntax
forms etc.) and the number of their actualisations, and therefore
also the number of instances of re-hearing is definitely larger than
that of some folk song or tale: thus, they appear to be more se¬
curely protected by the law of stability than longer units.
★ Conversely, any larger corpus of proverbs (the Estonian archi¬
val material, for instance) contains a number of examples, where

208
 the law of stability will probably fail. ‘Different proverbs’ start
intertwining through links of various types of hybrid forms. We
might even encounter vast typological ‘thickets’, where the texts
situating at the ‘different edges’ of the thicket bear almost no re¬
semblance to each other, while the thicket as a whole is extremely
coherent: to move ‘from edge to edge’ we must pass through nu¬
merous intermediary stages, each of which has its close and very
similar neighbours. It seems preposterous even to ask where the
‘variants of one proverb’ end and the ‘variants of another prov¬
erb’ begin, or how many ‘different proverbs’ could be found
within such a thicket. Moreover, it is paradoxical that the formu¬
laic short proverbs appear to be subject to typological hybridiza¬
tion far more often than the longer textual units ‘in prose form’.
This, too, can be explained: Typological identity of short texts is
more vulnerable, because it has less lexical ‘fulcra’, smaller range
of discretion, and the substitution of each lexical element changes
the impression it leaves considerably; whereas a longer text has
more lexical means to cement its identity, and the changes are less ’
disastrous for its typological self-preservation.
Certainly, the problem is not the different size (productivity)
of typological units: as a rule, a typologically discrete paremic
landscape also consists of the sc. cities, towns, boroughs, villages
and single farms, it is a common knowledge for all paremiolo-
gists. The problem is when we discover that we are dealing with a
metropolis consisting of, say, three concentric zones divided into
8 sectors by the principle points of the compass: the inner circle is
inhabited, say, by people; the outer circle by birds in the northern
sector, fish in the southern sector, insects in the eastern sector and
snakes in the western sector, bird-snakes in the north-western sec¬
tor and fish-insects in the south-eastern sector; the middle zone by
human-bird-insects in the north-eastern sector and human-fish-
snakes in the south-western sector, etc. (topologically, of course,
the above metaphor is a crude simplification, as besides figurative
lexica we also have to consider the logical form of the sentence,
traditional ‘syntax figures’, modalities, euphonic characteristics,
etc.).
This understanding must have been extremely inconvenient for
researchers of proverbial taxonomy, including compilers of prov-

209
erb publications with the basic typological level. Such publica¬
tions attempt to overlook (or elude) the existence of typological
mazes and still present the material as a linear sequence of dis¬
crete types. This is the case with the academic publication of Es¬
tonian proverbs Eesti vanasdnad (EV), the publication of Lithua¬
nian proverbs Patarlip paraleles supplemented with abundant
comparative European material, compiled by Kazys Grigas (PP),
the collection of favourite Finno-Ugric proverbs Proverbia sep-
tentrionalia, compiled by Matti Kuusi and his Finnish-Estonian
assistants (PS), and also the collection of favourite European
proverbs European Proverbs, by Gyula Paczolay (EP).
In the late 1950s Matti Kuusi started to collect information
about internationally known proverbs into his famous ‘pink card-
index’. His initiative expanded into systematic preparing of ‘the
Aarne-Thompson of Proverbs’, which 10 years later led to the
question of the register’s taxonomy. Grigori Permiakov’s at¬
tempts of classification were extremely topical in the paremiology
of that time, and in the early 1970s (in 1970 and 1972) Kuusi had
published some extracts from his system for tracing the general
outlines of its structure. His attempt in 1972 (possibly influenced
by Permiakov) was based on the extremely productive binary op¬
positions ‘one : two’, ‘one : all’ and ‘part : whole’, and clearly
displayed the existence of typological continuity of some parts of
the repertoire. The final version of the system (KL) is continually
organised according to the hierarchical-semantical principles, but
the choice of applied categories indicates to endeavours to
achieve a more homogeneous distribution and avoid the occur¬
rence of chain reactions, which might bring about typological
‘tangles’ (similar tricks have been made at the typification of Es¬
tonian proverbs in EV publication). Irrespective of this Kazys
Grigas (1996) seems to continually and steadfastly rely on the
theoretical and practical effectiveness of categorisation by types.
Noone has ever tried to investigate how such typological
‘chunks’ come into being. We should be certain of one thing,
though: the majority of typological links are in fact extremely
dense groups of synonyms, formed in pragmatically significant
thematic and conceptual areas. The part of typologically continu-
ative material becomes predictably large (and raises a critical

210
problem) especially in vast international corpuses of material, as
the ‘volume of semantic reservoir’ of proverbs is assumably finite
and the more material has been squeezed into it, the more ‘dense’
the material becomes.

2. Some general remarks on “animal proverbs”

14-15 years ago I entertained a hope to write a doctor’s thesis in

Russian on metaphors in proverbs, and I searched for material
which would be sufficiently large, but not too extensive, and in
well-balanced semantical and geographical proportions at the
same time (for example, the proportions of dog-metaphor in the
international proverb material would have proved too “long and
thin”, all metaphors in the whole Estonian material too “fat and
short”). Thus I decided to concentrate on ‘animal proverbs’: to
choose a tair amount of texts containing words denoting animal
referents (zoological creatures): fish, birds, insects, etc, but also
the names of animal families and genera, like animal, predator,
bird, snake, etc. I set about gathering material, and by the time I
became disillusioned for several reasons my file contained nearly
40.000 texts from printed and other sources from about 60 differ¬
ent nations and ethnoses, including those in proverb and prover¬
bial phrase form. Originally I have registered the occurrencies of
animals in both metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses.
The material, however, is incomplete: so far it does not con¬
tain a single text from the Romanic peoples, nor from Scandina¬
via, etc. Instead, it includes a considerable amount of material
from the Orient (mostly in the form of Russian translations).
The number of publications on animal proverbs and zoo¬
metaphors in proverbs is undeservedly small, considering that the
semantic field of animals must be the most productive one in pro¬
verbial metaphors. Researchers have mostly come upon animals
while either observing the relations between proverbs and fables
or while discussing references to agriculture and veterinary in
proverbs (most typical to German authors). One of the exception¬
ally few special publications of animal proverbs is Howl like a
Wolf. Animal Proverbs by Wolfgang Mieder (Shelburne, 1993).

211
 The pet question of different authors has always been the fre¬
quency of animals in proverbs: various statistics and ranking lists
on that subject have been published, but they tend to cover the
material of only one certain ethnic group, and the selections of
material have been rather small (see, e.g., Rooth 1968; Negreanu
1979; Ogishima 1992).
My data does not aim to point out certain ‘well-tempered’ uni¬
versal proportions either, but due to its multinationality and con¬
siderably larger total size, it is probably capable of illustrating the
relative frequencies of animals in proverbs on somewhat higher
degree of reliability. True, it also suggests that the proportions
vary from region to region considerably.
Irrespective of regional differences we might distinguish the
‘top-three’ group of equally favourite animals:
1-3) dog, horse, neat (cow/ox) (i.e. the earliest domesticated
animal and two major domestic animals);
they are followed by
4) hen/rooster; 5) wolf; 6) swine; 7) cat; 8) sheep/ram ~ wether
- these 8 most favourite animals are featured in nearly half of
all the occurrences of zoological terms.
These are followed by
9) fish (as a general term); 10) donkey and mule (primarily in
Oriental texts); 11) bird (as a general term); 12) goat; 13)
mouse - these 13 most frequently occurring animals make up
nearly 2/3 of all the occurrences of animal names in proverbs.
The following 7 animals are
14) crow; 15) snake (as a general term; although in some lan¬
guages it was not always easy to distinguish between the terms
for ‘snake’ and ‘worm’); 16) bear; 17) fox; 18) camel (also,
primarily in material of eastern cultures); 19) hare; 20) animal
(and its synonyms as a general term) - and these 20 most fre¬
quently occurring animals make up about 3/4 of all the occur¬
rences of animal terms in proverbs.
The following 5 would be:
21) frogs and toads; 22) fly; 23) lion (primarily in the material
of Oriental and African countries); 24) goose; 25) eagle - and
the 25 highest ranking animal terms make up about 4/5 of all
the usages of zoological terms. 43 most frequent animal names

212
 make up about 90% of all animal term usages, and the remain¬
ing approx. 250 terms of the ‘level of species’ (in my material)
only 10% of usages (cf. also Krikmann 1997: 193).
Two significant facts stand out in the above statistics:
1) the distribution of vocabulary into word usages is extremely
uneven and ‘Zipfian’: the number of the most frequently occur¬
ring words is small, the number of words of medium occurrence
is larger, and the number of rarely occurring words is large;
2) the domination of domestic animals is extremely strong in
proverbs (even in the material of hunting peoples, such as the Ya¬
kuts, for example).
Another main issue is the problem of “repertoire struc¬
ture”, or semantical analysis of sayings containing animal terms.
My briefly outlined below attempt of taxonomization is clearly
‘animal-centered’. Beside the subject itself, it proceeds from cer¬
tain additional facts:
1) a relatively abundant body of proverbial expressions, along-,
side the proverbs proper, which excluded e.g. the categorisation
based on universal statements (evaluations, prescriptions), but
still enabled to categorise the material according to the scenes,
situations, ‘schemes’ or ‘scripts’ displayed in the texts, elemen¬
tary pragmatic relations, etc.;
2) it seemed reasonable to preserve correlation between the
basic categories of the repertoire itself and the trope structure
(metaphore structure, primarily) of texts which belong to these
categories;
3) like any natural matter, the body of animal expressions is
divided according to the prototype principle into Tumps’ and
‘thin’, whereas the total amount of ‘lumped’ matter is considera¬
bly smaller than the randomly floating ‘thin’ matter (exceptions,
hybrid forms, etc.).
The larger and more distinct groups and swarms of material
are actually floating in a large amount of random ‘thin’ matter,
thus my real concern was to try to find out the so-called natural
categories on the ‘thick’ side of the matter as flexibly as possible
without any hope to describe anything that happens on the ‘thin’
side of the matter.

213
 By the time I gave up my research on ‘zoo-paremic’ material,
I had divided it into 4 main categories:
A. Proverbs concerning animal identity.
B. Proverbs concerning the relationships between people and
animals (usually in metaphorical meaning).
C. Proverbs concerning the relationships between (metaphori¬
cal, as a rule) animals.
D. Proverbs concerning the relation of animals (either meta¬
phorical or non-metaphorical) towards non-zoological nature
and dimensions.
As the current article focuses on category A, I will begin with a
brief characterisation of the rest of the categories.

B. PEOPLE / ANIMAL category

Considering the rules outlined in the so-called Great Chain Meta¬
phor by Lakoff & Turner (1989) or elsewhere (e.g. Krikmann
1994), we might assume that the key to understand these texts lies
mostly in ‘translating’, or rendering the animal terms from the
biological (instinctive) elementary level to the human level of
meaning, i.e. animals function as human beings or less definite
‘human factors’ in these proverbs. Also, this category contains a
number of texts with parallel structure, consisting of two contrast¬
ing components, metaphorical and literal, e.g. Satisfy a dog with a
bone and a woman with a lie; Give to a pig when it grunts and a
child when it cries, and you will have a fine pig and a bad child.
On rare occasions animal terms may literally denote animals.
The category contains several distinct subcategories and clus¬
ters.
One of them involves courage/cowardice in relating to ani¬
mals, trusting animals, etc.: such proverbs teach us why should
we be careful with some animals; emphasise that we should not
be scared of a dead lion, or a drawn tiger, etc.; inform that those
that bark, do not always bite, and vice versa; warn against disturb¬
ing a sleeping lion, or touch the nests and lairs of animals; often
they advise us to avoid contact with animals, as pairing up with a
dung-beetle you might end up in dung, lying down with a dog you
might get fleas, you will learn to howl living among the wolves,
etc.

214
 Another subcategory concerns affection towards animals, mar¬
riage and family relations with animals, giving birth to animals (a
Finnish proverb says: Marry a pig and you ’ll get piglets for good
measure; Marrying a bad wife is the same than marrying a snake,
goes a proverb from the East; yet sometimes people marry even
animals, if they happen to be wealthy, for example).
In proverbs animals are often depicted as troublemakers,
thieves and robbers; a separate subject is protecting domestic
animals from predators. Proverbs are somewhat differently dis¬
posed towards the gratitude/ingratitude of animals: an animal
might return a favour (Throw the dog a bone, and it will not
bark), or tease you instead (Help a dog out of water, and it will
splash water all over you). Yet another subcategory is concerned
with various hunting and fishing schemes, where animals are de¬
picted as prey (inch domesticating and training of animals, exter¬
mination of parasites, etc.). Animals are also frequent constituents
of various schemes of possession and ownership: for instance, the
relationship between a master and his animal, buying and selling,
stealing and swapping animals, the price and value of animals, the
troubles accompanying the possession of animals (No horse, no
problems). There are also a number of other smaller subcategories
and clusters.

C. ANIMAL / ANIMAL category

All the texts under this category are basically the so-called senten¬
tial metaphors, and in order to understand them we have to ‘trans¬
late’ the world of animals into the world of humans.
This category is also divided into several subcategories and top¬
ics.
There is, for example, an extremely productive cluster of
synonyms emphasising that animals (predators, in particular) do
not harm each other, and understand each other: wolves never
prey upon wolves, a dog does not step on another dog’s paw, etc.
Animal metaphors have also provided numerous possibilities to
discuss gender issues: looking for a mate, differences in gender
behaviour and roles of males and females, different species’ at¬
tempts to copulate, which usually fail, etc. Animal metaphors are
often used in expressing figuratively the parent-child relationship:

215
all animals protect and care for their young; even an ugly or weak
young is dear to his mother; a meek calf sucks two cows; a mare
might give birth to many colts, but dies with a bridle on.
There are a few highly productive patterns, which help us
model social relations best.
One of such patterns is ‘individual/herd’: the consistence and
structure of a herd; the status of an individual inside the herd, the
relationships between the herd and its leader; a stranger in the
herd, who is scorned, bitten and gored; reciprocal relationships
between herd members (one scabby sheep infects the whole
flock); metaphors of caravan, harness and stable.
Another scheme maps the relationships between the killer and
its victim, the eater and the one who is eaten: the most stereotypic
oppositions would be wolf/sheep and cat/mouse.
Proverbs and animal fables coincide in motifs which oppose
and relate a smart animal and a stupid one, or a strong and weak
one: a smart animal deceives a fool one; a weaker animal receives
advantage (protection) from a stronger one (a gnat on an ox’s
horn), weaker animals eat the leftovers of stronger animals; a
stronger animal takes the food of a weaker. Proverbs where one
animal is envious of another and wishes to be like that animal
(bigger, prettier, nobler), like a frog and an ox for example, bear
also similarity to fables.
The pot calls the kettle black -type of proverbs have their zoo¬
logical modifications, as well: an animal laughs at and criticises
another, who is actually smarter, prettier, etc., considering himself
better than the other.
The group of proverb materials opposing diligent and idle ~
early and late animals is also large and international, especially
the synonym of early/late bird (the early bird wipes its beak, the
late one shakes its wings).
There is a number of other less productive subcategories: an
animal dreams of a catch or food; an animal of dignity never pur¬
sues a trivial prey; where there is food, there are claimants (for
instance, ravens to a carrion); an overly aggressive animal harms
itself; even weak animals are not afraid of, or may attack the
strong animal if it is sick, old, captured, or otherwise incapable
and vulnerable, etc.

216
D. ANIMAL ALONE; ANIMAL AND NON-ZOOLOGICAL
NATURE, DIMENSIONS
It often remains uncertain whether this category involves animals
in metahorical or literal sense: for instance, could the Russian
BojiKa hozu KopMHrn [A wolf is fed by its feet] sometimes literally
refer to wolf or not? In many cases we might assume that both are
possible, i.e. the animal would serve as a double illustration of the
general rule.
One of the main clusters of class D is where an animal is de¬
scribed as a physical, biological, somatic construction. This clus¬
ter describes the body parts of animals, their functions and pur¬
pose, other physical-biological characteristics and parametres of
animals (sounds, motion, size and weight, food, faeces), their
outward appearance, physical beauty, emotional moods, etc.: e.g.
whining pig; a cat always lands on its paws; the fish begin to stink
at the head; even the roach has a heart (i.e. can get angry); and
many others. The cluster also displays some distinctive sub¬
clusters: the pattern ‘small, but smart ~ pretty ~ efficient’ (small
mouse, sharp teeth; a small worm gnaws even through the largest
things); animals are never weary or tired of carrying their own
body parts (the bird of its feathers, the ox of its horns, the ele¬
phant of its tusks); the animal admires its own tail, voice, etc.;
a satiated animal does not like its food (the mouse finds flour bit¬
ter).
Another larger subcategory associates animals with seasons,
times of day and weather: describing animals’ food supply at dif¬
ferent times of year (it is scarce in winter, for example), animals
with diurnal or nocturnal habits, the relations of animals to rain¬
fall, wind, temperature, daylight and darkness (the crane dies
while the bog is melting; eat fodder, cow, and remember past
summer; one swallow does not make a summer; no wolf is afraid
of rain or fog).
The third subcategory contains proverbs concerning animals’
relations to space, location as a habitat: there is no place without
animals (no lake without fish, no forest without birds); each place
has its own animals; each animal or bird likes its own nest best,

217
and does not foul it; an animal feels well in its natural environ¬
ment (no fish can live on a dry land; water is fine for a seal).
And now we will link the hitherto seemingly incoherent dis¬
cussions about type thickets and animal proverbs into an asser¬
tion: nowhere have I encountered a typological maze so large and
continuative as the “identity category” (category A) of animal
proverbs and proverbial expressions.

3. Proverbs of animal identity

The international proverb index by Kuusi and Lauhakangas (KL)

has categorised most of the proverb material concerning animal
identity (or that of other beings or things) under the following
categories:
Cl a. X’s basic nature, character will be unchanged; character¬
istics won’t be changed;
Clb. X is always X, although...;
Clc. No need to teach X belonging to its character; hopeless to
teach things not belonging to X’s character;
Cld. X will retain X’s habits and customs.
Explanatory notes: All original quotations of the following appear in
Italics, those in Estonian, Finnish, Karelian and Russian are followed by
translations into English in square brackets. Other English translations
(or renditions of translations) and also looser paraphrases are printed in
roman type.

Subcategory 1:
The animal retains its specific identity ~ it will not turn ~ can¬
not be turned into another animal

I will name the smaller groups and sequences of this subcategory:

Quasi-tautologies: ‘Animal X is X~ remains an X'

Koer jaab ikka koeraks [A dog always remains a dog] (Esto¬
nian: EV 4050); Hund bleibt Hund (German: W II 846 (672));
also Hungarian: Nagy e95
Siga jaab ikka seaks [A pig always remains a pig] (Estonian,
Haademeeste parish: EV 0); analogous proverbs Latvian (FS

218
 840, 100), Armenian (Karap. [2] 26, Karap. [3] 103, Shag.
424); Krio (Diachk. 278)
A cat is always a cat (a monkey is always a monkey) (Viet¬
namese: Br. 167, IGV 67)
Vieh bleibt Vieh (German: B 637)
A deer is always a deer (Ossetian: Ab. 92)
Janoi on ainos janoi [A hare is always a hare] (Karelian: KSp
119)
All representatives of species X are identical, similar, alike,
there is no significant difference between them
A beast is like a beast, a human like a human (Kara-Kalpa-
kian: Br. 257)
A dog is like a dog (Latvian: FS 1478, 998)
Ei kahdella konnalla ole valid [There is no difference between
two frogs] (Finnish: SI 100)
Kylld monta vuohta yhdennakoista on [Many goats come in
the same shape] (Finnish: VKS 242)
All monkeys have similar ugly faces (Tamil/Dravidian: VA
47)
Animal X behaves like animal X ~ persists in its behaviour ~
its nature ~ its character will not change
A dog has dog’s tricks: Koeral koera tembud (Estonian: EV
4069); Koiralla on koiran kujeet (Finnish: SI 140); analogous
proverbs: Karelian (KSp 179), Latvian (FS 828, 8050); Kus
koer kombe jatt voi halb peni ameti [Has a dog ever given up
its tricks, or a bad canine its trade] (Estonian: EV 4136); A
dog never gives up its tricks (Turkmen: Karr. 146); A dog be¬
haves like a dog (Kirghiz: Br. 275)
A wolf has a wolfs nature ~ trade (Latvian: FS 1225, 1585;
FS 527, 32002); Suvella on suven luonto: liha syo, nahan repii
[A wolf has wolfs ways: eats the flesh, tears the skins] (Fin¬
nish: SI 425); y eojiKa u noeadxa na eonnbio cmamb [A wolf
has wolfs wiles] (Russian: Rybn. 158); A wolf never gives up
its tricks (Ossetian: Ab. 17)
A hog has hog’s habits (Latvian: FS 1252, 69); A pig will al¬
ways behave like a pig (Armenian: Karap. [1] 21)
A cat has cat’s tricks (Latvian: FS 1444, 1545).

219
The retained species characteristics are sometimes described in
greater detail (somatic features, characteristic noise, motion, etc.).
Animal retains the somatic features of its species (incl. fur,
colour) ~ these cannot be eliminated ~ changed
We have, for example, a highly productive subcategory of in¬
ternationally known proverbs about leopard ~ panther ~ zebra,
who never changes its spots ~ stripes (Bible: Jer. 13:23; in my
material: British (T L206), Assyrian (Br. 102), Kurdish (Br.
335), Japanese (Fount. 360) texts; KL Cla 32, incl. abundant
material from Africa)
Dog’s fur will never change (Komi: Pies. 191)
Punaissa punainen lehma kuolooki [A brown cow dies brown]
(Finnish: SI 349)
Magpie’s plumage is always ~ everywhere black-and-white ~
it can’t be changed (Udmurtian: Krai. 133 and 134, Per. 76)
Yards dks iit’svalgo, kaarna iitekarvaline [A crow is always
white, a raven of the same colour] (Estonian, district Setu: EV
0)
A dog’s tail is always twisted (Urdmurtian: Krai. 189, Per. 61
and 66); A dog never changes the shape of its tail (Turkish: Br.
544); A dog’s tail will never be straight (even if it was
straightened between chumps of wood ~ in a tube ~... (for
seven years) (wide distribution in the Caucasus and Oriental
countries, e.g. Georgian: Br. 293; Armenian: Kar. [1] 21, Kar.
[2] 26, Kar. [3] 159; Ossetian: Ab. 112; Kurdish: Cel. 112;
Pushtun: LJ 35; Arabian: Br. 69, Sharb. 47; Tamil: VA 46;
Bengali: Br. 140; Malayan, Indonesian: Br. 364, Kol. 12; KL
Cla 19)
A hare has a short tail (Udmurtian: Krai. 188)
Lind ei heida oma sulge kunagi ara [A bird never loses its
feathers] (Estonian: EV 5917)
Animal X retains its characteristic way of moving, motor re¬
sponses, etc.
A magpie ~ A crow never stops hopping ~ A sparrow hops
around even when it’s 100 years old (German: B 129, 281,
345; Japanese: Petr. 67, Br. 619, Fount. 640)

220
 Die Sau lafit das Wiihlen nicht (German: B 345, 487, 686); cf.
also: He is like a hog, cannot help but root the ground (Mord¬
vin: Sam. 257)
Animal X retains its characteristic way of making sounds ~
has to make sounds ~ cannot be without making sounds ~...
Kuer on loodud haukuma [A dog is bom to bark] (Estonian:
EV 4123); Sehan koiran virka on etta haukkuu [Barking is
dog’s job] (Finnish: SI 143; cf. also Hungarian: Nagy k2210);
A dog has a habit of barking (Latvian: FS 231, 10151); A dog
cannot live without barking (Udmurtian: Krai. 189, Per. 161;
cf. also Komi: Pies. 194); Der Hund lafit das Bellen nicht
(German: B 71, 278, 345; also Hungarian: Nagy k2252);
A dog barks since it was bom (Korean: TKKCh 48); The
mouth speaks while it’s alive, the dog barks while it’s alive
(Somalian: Kap. 76)
There is no such thing as not braying donkeys (Arabian:
Sharb. 55; Aserbaidzhan: Gus. 113; Turkmen: Karr. 145)
All representatives of species X make similar sounds ~ Animal
X always and everywhere makes same sounds
All dogs bark the same (Turkmen: Br. 568, Karr. 147)
A rooster always crows the same (Tajik, Uzbek: Br. 457 and
582, Kal. [2] 333, Abdur. 168)
A cuckoo calls the same everywhere (Malagasy: Korn. 86)
All jackals cry the same (Bengali: Br. 120)
All synonyms of notion X have the same meaning ~ all sub¬
categories of species X are identical
Kass koska, koer sabak [The cat is koska, the dog is sabak
(koska means ‘cat’ and sobak means ‘dog’ in corrupt Russian)]
(Estonian, Kamse parish; EV 0)
A dog and a canine - both the same Tartars (Hungarian: Nagy
e27)
Hund ist Hund, Pudel oder Spitz (German: W II 847 (691))
Apina da oblesjan on yhtenjytys [Apina and oblesjan are the
same (apina - Finnish for ‘monkey’; oblesjan - corrupt Rus¬
sian word for ‘monkey’)] (Karelian: KSp 17)
Bar undPetz ist eine Hetz (German: B 6land 441)

221
 Goose and gander and gosling are three sounds but one thing
(British: TG351)
God-snake is no better than abeso-snake (Somalian: Kap. 38)

Subsequently, such proverbs may point out the individual features

of animals of the same species, although not changing the general
nature of the species.
X is X, be it a large or a small individual
Even a small viper is a snake, even a weak enemy is an enemy
~ A viper is always a viper, no matter how large, an enemy is
always an enemy, no matter how far it is, etc. (Mongol: Br.
398, DR 84; Chinese: Tishk. [1] 11, Tishk. [2] 7)
A calf of any size will still be a calf (Korean: TKKCh 57)
No matter how fat an ass gets - it will still be an ass (Ossetian:
Ab. 89)
X is X, be it of any colour
Black dog or white dog - a dog is a dog, etc. (of wide distribu¬
tion, particularly in the Oriental countries, for example: Ger¬
man: W I 847 (691); Russian: D 854, Rybn. 147; Ossetian:
Ab. 48; Dargin: Br. 207; Turkish: Br. 521; Tajik, Uzbek: Kal.
[2] 294, Br. 571, Abdur. 133; Turkmen: Karr. 114; Kirghiz:
Shamb. 27; Uyghur: SK 600); Black dog, piebald cur - both
are devils (Hungarian: Nagy k2037); cf. also KL Clb 13
Olgu porsas valge voi kirju, porsaks jaab ta ikki [Be a piglet
white or piebald, it will still be a piglet] (Estonian, Haade-
meeste parish: EV 0); A flecked pig or a brown pig, still a pig
(Kumyk: Naz. 105); Does it matter, whether a pig is black or
white (Turkmen: Br. 561, Karr. Ill)
Black snake or white snake, it still is a snake (Udmurtian:
Krai. 175; Tartar: Br. 481); Cursed be both the black and the
white snake (Armenian: Karap. [2] 36, Karap. [3] 215; Aser-
baidzhan: Gus. 54)
Hem, He rued Mepuu, a caepac Mepuu, a see mom Dice Mepuu
[No, a gelding is not bay but light bay, but a gelding is still a
gelding] (Russian: D 854, cf. also 209, 241, 265)
Cepa oeija, 6ejia oetfa — see oduu osenuu dyx [Grey sheep,
white sheep - both smell like sheep] (Russian: D 853)

222
X is X, be it a young or an old individual
Yksi on vanhu, toinen salgy, mieldy yhtenverdu [One is an old
horse, the other is a foal, both have the same wits] (Karelian:
KSp 600)
EbiK da mean - odHa podun [Ox or a calf - both from the same
family] (Russian: D 853)
Young rooster or old, what’s the difference (Aserbaidzhan:
Gus. 78)
Wolf cub is wolf, too (Uyghur: SK 970)
X is X, be it a male or a female individual
This group consists dominantly of proverbs from the Oriental
countries, and the animals occurring here tend to be good or ‘no¬
ble’.
(In forest) a lion is a lion, be it male or female (Kurdish: Br.
334, Cel. 261 and 365; Persian: Krgl. 239; Aserbaidzhan: Br.
38, Gus. 12); Don’t grieve over the birth of a daughter - a li¬
oness is as good as a lion, etc. (Uzbek: Abdur. 166; Turkmen:
Karr. 70)
' Male or female eagle, an eagle is an eagle (Armenian: Karap.
[1] 37, Karap. [2] 40, Karap.[3] 40)
Cf. also Russian: Hem, He codana, a cyna (D 265), Hem He
Kodeiib, a Ko6ejiuxa (D 265) [No, not a dog, but a bitch]

Further, ‘X is X -structures might occur alternately with ‘X is not

T -structures.
X is not Y ~ X can never be Y (or one subcategory of X will
never be another)
In this group animals are set in oppositions on the basis of their
size, dangerousness, ‘nobility’, etc.
A wolf is not a sheep (Latvian: FS 1552, 1956); Aus einem
Wolf wird kein Lamm (German: B 340, 681)
Aus einem Tiger wird nie ein Lamm (German: B 427)
A wolf will never be a sheepdog (Livonian: LV 878); Eihan
metsakoirasta ole kartanokoiraks [A wild dog will not become
a farm dog] (Finnish: SI 234); A sheepdog will never become
a bird-dog (Latvian: FS 609, 5253); Aus einem Mops wird kein
Jagdhund (German: B 402)

223
 If it’s a cat, it will never turn into a dog (Chinese: Br. 306); An
evil dog will never turn into a good cat (Indonesian: Kol. 11)
A kindly aver will never make a good horse (British: T A403);
A good horse becomes never a jade (British: T H645)
A donkey will not become a horse (Turkish: Ivan. 26; Tartar:
Br. 499); A horse can never become a donkey (Hindi: Br. 599)
A snake hatchling will never become a chicken (Armenian:
Karap. [2] 26, Karap. [3] 214)
Quite often birds are presented in a couple - a predator and a
harmless bird, a songbird and a voiceless bird, a ‘noble’ and a
‘vulgar’ bird:
A crow ~ A sparrow ~ An owl ~ A goose ~ A pidgeon will
never become an eagle ~ hawk (Latvian: FS 1263, 577; Ger¬
man: B 144, 188, 241, 328; Russian: D 724, Ruk. 84; Kirghiz:
Br. 270, Shamb. 346)
A crow ~ a sparrow will never be a nightingale (Estonian: EV
5957; German: B 328 and 413; Turkish: Ivan. 6)
Sometimes the pairs are randomly selected:
Ei tule variksesta vesilintua [A crow will never become a wa-
terbird] (Finnish: SI 523); Tyhjas tottu ei rodie, metsoi tetrez
mendy [Truth will not arise from an empty place, a wood
grouse with not turn into a black grouse] (Karelian: KSp 533);
A sparrow will never become a nightingale, a duck will never
get its wings wet (Uzbek: Br. 572)
Other random pairs:
A foal is not a chicken (Latvian: FS 997, 2816); Was ein
Schwein ist, wird sein Leben kein Ochse (German: B 528);
A cat can never become a cow (Korean: TKKCh 67); A cat is
not a hare (Latvian: FS 529, 1717); KaMenb — ne yzodbe, nec —
ne 6apan [A stone is not arable land, a cur is not a ram] (Rus¬
sian: D 470); A goat is not a dog, own child is not a slave
(Ovambo: Kuusi 1424); A turtle can never become an eagle
(Uzbek: Abdur. 156)

Further elaboration on the subject might vary in temporal or other

aspects.

224
X remains an X ~ It will never become Y regardless of time or
age: young and old, from birth till death, from dawn till dusk,
etc.
Kes koer elades, see koer surres [He who lives like a dog, dies
as one] (Estonian: EV 4050); Mis koer dhtul, see koer homikul
[A dog in the evening is the same dog in the morning] (Esto¬
nian: EV 4165); Who is a dog until noon, is a dog in the after¬
noon (Hungarian: Nagy d61)
Once an ass, always an ass (Latvian: FS 796, 4296); Bom as
an ass, lived like an ass, died an ass (Persian: Krgl. 193); Bom
as a horse - is a horse, bom as an ass - is an ass (Malayan, In¬
donesian: Br. 371)
Cjioh poduncH cjioh u ecmb [Bom as an elephant - is an ele¬
—

phant] (Russian: D 572)

A crow lives long, but it will always be a crow (Ossetian: Br.
407, Ab. 30)
Kmo eojiKOM podwicn, moMy Jiucou He dbieamb [Who was,
bom as a wolf, can never become a fox] (Russian: D 724, cf.
also D 723, Ruk. 125); Bojikom podwicn, oetfoii He dbieamb
[Bom as a wolf, will never become a sheep] (Russian: D 723)
Or some pairs of birds from Mordvin proverbs:
Bom as an owl - no good as a nightingale (Sam. 315); Bom as
a hen - will never become a duck (Sam. 210); Bom as a hen -
can never fly like an eagle (Sam. 209)
Further, a proverb may contain various though-clauses.
X is X ~ it will never become an Y, though it resembles Y in
outward appearance or colour
A dog is not a hare, even though it had the same reddish col¬
our (Hungarian: Nagy ny268)
A piebald goat will not become a tiger (Tajik: Kal. [2] 136)
A polecat might be piebald, but it will never become a lion
(Uzbek: Kal. [2] 136, cf. also Abdur. 122)
A fly might have antlers, but you cannot call it a buffalo (Chi¬
nese: Tishk. [1] 52)
A bee might have a striped back, but you cannot call it a tiger
(Chinese: Tishk [1] 52, Tishk [2] 42)

225
X will not become F, no matter how large it may be (presum¬
ing F is a large animal)
M3 (jojibiuozo ocjia ece ne euudem caoua [Even a large ass
will never become an elephant] (Russian: D 548)
A hog might be large, but it is not an elephant (Bengali: Br.
118)
Though the animal might change its fur ~ its skin, it preserves
its specific identity
A remarkably productive and widely known group of proverbs.
A wolf may change its fur, but never its manners ~ heart ~
teeth (Estonian: EV 1618; Livonian: LV 862; Latvian: FS
1652, 2352; German: B 40 and 681; British: T W616, W613;
Russian: D 723; Mari: lb. 109; Mordvin: Sam. 241; Komi:
Pies. 192; Armenian: Br. 72, Karap [1] 21, Karap. [2] 24,
Karap. [3] 48; Turkish: Leb. 40; Aserbaidzhan: Gus. 104)
Der Fuchs andert’s Haar und bleibt, was er war (German:
B 87, 181); A fox may change his heyre but not his minde
(British: TW616)
A dog may change its fur but not its manners, etc. (Estonian:
EV 1618; Livonian: LV 621; Latvian: FS 1341, 6845; Turkish:
Ivan. 36)
A snake may change its skin, but not its mind ~ manners (Ar¬
menian: Karap. [3] 216, Shag. 347; Persian: Br. 21, Krgl. 273;
Aserbaidzhan: Br. 37; Tajik: Kal. [1] 239; Turkmen: Karr.
119); A snake might leave its skin, but its heart remains the
same (Russian: Rybn. 107; Georgian: Br. 192); Die Schlange
wechselt wohl die Haut, aber nicht die Giftzahne (German:
B 219, 503; cf. also Latvian: FS 1600, 5608); CKunyna Kootcy
3Men, a nd npu neu ocmcuicn [A snake left its skin, but not its
poison] (Russian: Rybn. 76)
Cf. also PS 618; EP 32; KL Cla 33
You cannot turn ~ grow X into F
You cannot turn a bear into a wolf (Udmurtian: Per. 65); You
cannot turn a wolf into a bear (Udmurtian: Krai. 190)
You cannot turn a sheep into a wolf (Udmurtian: Per. 68); You
cannot turn a wolf into a sheep (Udmurtian: Krai. 125); You
cannot grow a wolf into a lamb (Komi: Pies. 36)

226
 Hundist ei saa karjakoera [A wolf would not become sheep¬
dog] (Estonian: EV 1611; cf. also Latvian: FS 1393, 2661)
You cannot make a tiger out of a sheep (Indonesia: Kol. 31)
You cannot make a sheep out of a goat (Udmurtian: Krai.
190); You cannot turn a sheep into a goat (Udmurtian: Per. 68)
You cannot make a nightingale out of a crow (Latvian: FS
1940, 2563)
X will never become Y (or subspecies Xm will never become
X„), no matter how hard it would work ~ try
All the examples under this group happen to be Russian proverbs:
He dyucn, Kopoeua, ne dumb 6uhkom [Take it easy, cow, you
will never be an ox] (D548)
Kax hu dodpucb eopona, a do cokojio danexo [No matter how
hard you try, crow, it will be a long way to become a falcon]
(D 724)
Cunuifa xomb mpecnu — otcypaeneM He dumb [A titmouse may
try until it bursts, but will never become a crane] (Ruk. 110%
cf. also Ruk. 62, D 847)
CKOJibKo ymxci hu dodpucb, a jiededeM ~ eyceu ue dumb [A
duck may try as hard as it can, but it will never become a swan
~ goose] (D 830, Rybn. 67)
X will never become F, no matter how fast it would run ~ how
high it would fly ~ how clever it would be, etc.
No matter how fast a watchdog would run, it will never be¬
come a hound (Uzbek: Abdur.122)
Even the fastest ass is not a horse (Uyghur: SK 1110); No mat¬
ter how hard would a crow try, it will never become an eagle;
how fast would an ass run, it will never become a trotter (Kir¬
ghiz: Shamb. 195)
No matter how high would a raven ~ sparrow ~ owl fly, it will
never become an eagle ~ hawk (Russian: D 830; Mordvin:
Sam. 210; Tamil: VA 48)
No matter how strong the raven’s grip, it will never become a
hawk (Uyghur: SK 1111); A ferret has stripes, but it will never
become a tiger; a crow is slick, but it will never become a
hawk (Uzbek: Abdur. 122)

227
X will always be X ~ it will never become Y, whereever it goes
~ An X at one place, an X at another
Kes koer siin, see koer seal [Who is a dog here, is a dog there]
(Estonian: EV 4104); Kes koir kotun, see koir vallan [Who is a
dog at home, is a dog outside] (Estonian: EV 4054); A dog
might go abroad, but it still is a dog (Malayan: Br. 379); A dog
is just a dog, even if it swims across the Danube (Hungarian:
Nagy d416)
Wo ein Esel eingeht, kommt auch ein Esel aus (German:
B 140, 261, cf. also 139, 172)
A snake is a snake even under the ground (Indonesian: Kol.
13)
Whereever a crow would fly, it will never turn into ~ be
thought of as an eagle (Udmurtian: Per. 76, Krai. 132)
A crow in the pond is the same than a crow on the shore (Lat¬
vian: FS 1594, 2998)
Send off a young X, it will return as an old X
Wenn man ein Kalb fortschickt, kommt ein Ochse wieder
(German: B 166, 299, 673); IJoexan meaenoK, a noeepuyncn
dbiKOM [A calf went off, an ox returned] (Russian: Ruk. 60, cf.
also Ruk. 106, D 440)
Vie porsas Saksaan, tuo sikana takaisin [Take a piglet to Ger¬
many, bring a pig back] (Finnish: VKS 411); Vie porsaana
kylaan, sikana takasi tuloo [Take a piglet to the village, a pig
will return] (Karelian: KSp 398)
X remains X ~ will not become something better ~ X will never
become F, even if it stayed at holy ~ sublime ~ faroff places ~
famous schools ~ important centres
Matti Kuusi has analysed this group of proverbs in his article Re¬
search problems in loan proverbs (1994/1998).
If (Christ’s) ass stays at Mecca (and Medina), it’ll still come
back an ass, etc. (widely known in the eastern cultures, e.g.
Persian: Br. 420; Pushtu: Br. 439; Tajik: Br. 457, Kal. [1] 308,
Kal. [2] 322; Uyghur: SK 751); An ass may go to Mecca, but
it will not become pure (Uzbek: Kal. [2] 322, Abdur. 179); An
ass went to Jerusalem 40 times and was still the same ass
(Armenian: Br. 88, Karap. [1] 21, Karap. [2] 26, Karap. [3] 77,

228
 Shag. 232); Ocen u e Kueee ~ Lfapeepade kohcm He 6ydem
[An ass will not become a horse even in Kiev ~ in Tsaritsyn]
(Russian: Ruk. 59 and 104); An ass entered a pharmacy and an
ass came out (Arabian: Br. 54); I sent my ass travelling, but it
returned the same ass (Kurdish: Br. 336)
Vie sika Saksaan, tuo sika Saksasta - sika sika kumminkin on
[Take a pig to Germany, bring the pig back from Germany - it
will still be the same pig] (Finnish: VKS 410, cf. also SI 404,
Spk 21); Saada siga Saksamaale, pese siga seebiga, siga tuleb
koju, siga jaab seaks [Take a pig to Germany, wash it with
soap, the pig comes back home, and a pig is still a pig] (Esto¬
nian: EV 10363); cf. PS 758; KL Clc 19
Vii koer kiriku ehk too tagasi, uhesugu karvane ikka [Take a
dog to the church and bring it back; it will still be the same
hairy dog] (Estonian: EV 4184); Wie der Hund in die Kirche
kommt, so geht er wieder hinaus (German: W II 875 (1299),
cf. also W II 835 (391)); Can a black dog turn into a holy cow
after a pilgrimage to Benares (Telugu: Br. 509)
' The wolf goes to Rome and there leaves his hairs and not his
manners (British: T W613)
Who goes a beast to Rome a beast returns (British: T B156)
Bar bleibt Bar, fahrt man ihn auch libers Meer (German: B
61)
Eine Cans iibers Meer, eine Gans wieder her (German: B 188,
392); IJoaemejiu 3a Mope eycu, npunemenu mojic He jiededu
[Geese flew overseas, but did not return as swans] (Russian:
D 327); Bopona 3a Mope jiemajia, da eoponoii u eepnyjiacb [A
crow flew overseas and returned as a crow] (Russian: D 440);
Bopona 3a Mope nemana, da jiymue He cmajia [A crow flew
overseas, but did not become any better] (Russian: Rybn. 66)
The animal retains its specific qualities (its characteristic call,
for example), even after having visited faraway ~ holy places,
etc.
Send a calf to Paris - it will return home and say ‘moo’ (Fri¬
sian: W II 1103 (86))
A cat may visit Mecca, but it will not stop meowing (Indone¬
sian: Kol. 9)

229
 EKypaenu 3a Mope jiemaiom, a ece odno Kypnbi [Cranes flew
overseas, but still shrieked the same] (Russian: D 440)
The animal remains itself ~ holds on to its habits or expecta¬
tions, even after having entered a monastic order
riocmpuzcR Kom, nocxuMuncn xom, a ece mom otce Kom [The
cat tonsured its head, the cat entered the higher monastic or¬
der, but the cat is still a cat] (Russian: D 658); Kom Eecmpa-
(fiuu nocmpuzcH, nocxuMUJicn, a ece Mbimeii eo cne eudum
[The cat tonsured its head, entered the monastic order, but still
dreams of mice in its sleep] (Russian: Rybn. 153)
Cf. also Georgian: A fox cropped itself to a monk (Br. 196)
The animal will not become a pilgrim or a monk, though it
has been to Mecca for 40 times
An ass who has been on a pilgrimage will not become a pil¬
grim (Kurdish: Cel. 336)
A camel might travel to Mecca (for 40 times), but it will not
become a hajji (Turkish: Leb. 43; Aserbaidzhan: Gus. 97;
Turkmen: Karr. 59)
A mouse converted to Islam, but the number of Muslims
didn’t grow (and the number of Chistians didn’t fall) (Arabian:
Br. 62, Sharb. 53)
X animal will always be X ~ it will never become F, though it
has lived among Fs
Let a cow into a herd of horses, but it still won’t become a
horse (Udmurtian: Per. 67)
A dog will always be a dog, even if it has grown up among li¬
ons (Arabian: Sharb. 58); A lion will always be a lion, even if
its claws have become weak, a dog will always be a dog, even
if it has grown up among lions (Arabian: Br. 61)
Exception: A wolf cub will always be a wolf, even if it has
growm up among people (Assyrian: Br. 94; Persian: Br. 418,
Krgl. 525)
X will never learn to sound like Fs, though it has lived among
Fs
A nightingale might grow up in the crow’s nest, but it will
never learn to croak (Bengali: Br. 140)

230
X remains X ~ it will never become F, though its outward ap¬
pearance is changed (tail or ears cut off, tail attached, etc.)
A dog will be a dog, even if you cut its tail off (Estonian, Rak-
vere parish: EV 0; Latvian: FS 542, 897; German: W II 826
(168); British: T D520); You can cut the dogs tail as short as
you like, but it will not become a hound (Kurdish: Cel. 276);
Chop off the dog’s tail - it will still not turn into a sheep ~
lamb (Russian: D 722; Mari: lb. 45; Udmurtian: Krai. 75, Per.
67; Armenian: Br. 75, Shag. 361)
Cut an ass’s ears - it will still not become an (Arabian) horse
(Turkish: Br. 539, Leb. 42); You can cut an ass’s ears, but it
will still not become a gazelle (Turkish: Ivan. 28)
You can cut off pig’s tail and ears, but it will still be a pig
(Turkish: Leb. 20); You can cut off pig’s snout and ears, but it
will still be called a pig (Aserbaidzhan: Gus. 65)
You can put a dog’s tail on a goat, but it will not become a dog
(Udmurtian: Per. 65)
►

X will not become F, no matter what sounds it makes ~ though

it sounds like animal F
No matter how much a goat would shriek, it will not become a
cow (Mordvin: Sam. 209)
No matter how much a crow would croak - it will not become
a nightingale (Kalmyk: Br. 241)
A crow may fly and cackle but it will not become a goose
(Kirghiz: Shamb. 175)
Cf. also KL Cla 31
Animal X remains X ~ sounds the same ~ it will not become F,
though it is stroked ~ it is sheared ~ combed / or: no matter
how much it is beaten (often occurs as alternatives and con¬
taminations of texts of the next group)
A beaten pig is the same than a pig who is not beaten (Latvian:
FS 1151, 330); Sui sika, pese sika, sika sika sentaan on [Comb
a pig, wash a pig, a pig is still a pig] (Finnish: VKS 411, cf.
also SI 403); Silita taikka pese sikaa, yhdella tavalla se vinkuu
[Stroke or wash a pig, it will whine the same] (Finnish: VKS
411); Lyd sikaa, pese porsasta, yhdella lailla ne vinkuvat [Beat
the pig, wash the piglet, both whine the same way] (Finnish:

231
 VKS 411); Siguja syota libo lyd, yhta hyvin rogajaah [Feed
the pigs or beat them, they whine the same] (Karelian: KSp
459, cf. also 458); Pottsii sivo libo kerita, yksikai vinguu [Hit
the pig or shear it, still whines the same] (Karelian: KSp 400,
cf. also 457)
A whisked dog is the same than a dog not whisked (Latvian:
FS 1551, 2870)
Strip the wolf of seven skins, it will still be a wolf (Georgian:
Br. 205)
Scratch an ass as much as you like - it will not become a horse
~ trotter (Armenian: Karap. [2] 33, Karap. [3] 75); No matter
how much you beat an ass - it will not become a horse ~ trot¬
ter (Armenian: Shag. 350; Persian: Br. 430; Pushtu: LJ 28, Br.
439); cf also Bengali: Tries to beat a horse out an ass (Br.
136); Beat an ass as much as you like - it will not become a
mule (Armenian: Karap. [1] 21, Karap. [2] 26, Karap. [3] 75,
Shag. 415)
An animal will not turn into another, even after washing or
bathing (in holy water)
No matter how much a crow would bathe, it will never be¬
come a goose (Armenian: Karap. [1] 22, Karap. [2] 26, Karap.
[3] 12, Shag. 360); A crow will never become a swan, even if
it bathed in the Ganges (Telugu: Br. 512; Tamil: Br. 496, VA
48)
If an ass bathes, will it become a horse (Malayan: Br. 378); No
matter how much you wash an ass, it will never become a cow
(Nepal: Br. 404)
An animal will not turn into another, no matter how you feed
it
Feed a crow whatever yo like, it will never become a falcon
(Kirghiz: Shamb. 174)
X will be X ~ it will not turn into Y though it has beautiful
bridles ~ silky girth ~ golden saddle ~ (Ps) saddle on
A stereotype opposition in the eastern proverbs is again formed of
an ass and a horse:
Put a nice harness on an ass - it will not become a horse (Ben¬
gali: Br. 132); Put a golden bridle on an ass - it will still be an

232
 ass (Turkish: Ivan. 21); An ass is an ass even under silk sad¬
dlecloth (Persian: Krgl. 518; cf. also Tajik: Kal. [1] 308, Kal.
[2] 322); An ass is an ass even with a golden saddle (Turkish:
Leb. 42; cf. also Ossetian: Ab. 35); Put a (horse) saddle on an
ass - it will still be an ass ~ will not become a horse, etc. (Tati:
Br. 500; Lesgin: Br. 352; Tamil: VA 45); You can saddle a
black ass - but it will still not turn into a mule (Aserbaidzhan:
Gus. 120)
Cf. also: Same ass, but a new ~ another saddle ~ has changed
its saddlecloth ~ ... (Armenian: Br. 82, Karap. [1] 21, Karap.
[2] 24, Karap. [3] 77; Kurdish: Cel. 337; Persian: Br. 427,
Krgl. 192; Assyrian: Br. 99; Arabian: Sharb. 19; Aserbaidz¬
han: Gus. 96; Pushtu: LJ 57 and 62; Tajik: Kal. [1] 188, Kal.
[2] 321)
Saddle a horse in gold - a horse is still a horse (Aserbaidzhan:
Gus. 65)
Pane sea selga kuldsadul, siiski jaab ta seaks [Put a golden
saddle on a pig, it is still a pig] (Estonian: EV 10361); Wenn
' man die Sau sattelt, wind noch lange kein Reitpferd draus
(German: B 486)
Der Ochs wird kein Reitpferd, wenn er auch einen Sattel be-
kommt (German: W III 1096 (77))
X will be X though clad in royal clothing ~ adorned ~ a golden
ring through its nose ~ a crown on its head, etc.
Hund bleibt Hund, wenn er auch ein roth Halsband tragt
(German: W II 846 (647)); A dog will be a dog, though gilded
with gold (Arabian: Sharb. 15)
Wenn man den Ochsen auch die Horner vergoldet, sie bleiben
doch Ochsen (German: W III 1105 (292))
A pig will be a pig, even if it had a golden ring through its
snout (Livonian: LV 807); Ceuubn e 3onomoM oiueuuuKe ece
ceuubM [A pig in a golden collar is still a pig] (Russian: D 587,
cf. also Ruk. 177); A pig is a pig even in silk (Mordvin: Sam.
248)
Adorn an ass as you like - it will still be an ass (Assyrian: Br.
99)

233
 Ahv jaab ikka ahviks, pane voi krimpleen selga [An ape will
always be an ape, though clad in silk] (Estonian, Urvaste par¬
ish: EV 0); An ape is an ape, though clad in scarlet ~ gold
(British: T A263, cf. also A262); An ape is an ape even with a
crown on its head (Japanese: Petr. 84)
Praise or adulation will not change the animal into another
Praising will not turn an ass into a horse (Turkmen: Br. 563,
Karr. 104)
Teaching or training will not change the animal
Train an owl as much as you like, it will not turn into a night¬
ingale (Persian: Krgl. 140)

Subcategory 2:
Son - parent relationship, transmitting of species characteris¬
tics from parents to their offspring
The son of X is also X ~ animal X gives birth to the same ani¬
mals ~ Y will not hatch from A’s egg, etc.
Was ein Kuh geboren ist, bleibt ein Rindvieh (German: B 335,
473)
A horse is born from a mare, a hero from a mother (Kara-
Kalpak: Br. 250; Kazakh: Br. 223); A horse is bom from
Argamak, evil is born from evil (Tartar: Br. 488); A mare
gives birth to a horse, a female donkey to a donkey foal (Aser-
baidzhan: Gus. 42); Humans give birth to humans, asses give
birth to asses (Kurdish: Br. 336)
A dog’s son is also a dog (Hungarian: Nagy k2304); A canine
mother’s daughter is also a dog (Nagy el00); Expect puppies
from a dog, sables from a sable (Armenian: Karap. [2] 26,
Karap. [3] 166, Shag. 483); A piglet is bom from a sow, a
puppy from a bitch (Udmurtian: Per. 108)
Piglet is the child of a pig (Latvian: FS 1225, 30919); Om
6o6pa - dobpenoK, om ceunbu - nopocenoK [From a beaver -
a beaver kit (is bom), from a pig - a piglet] (Russian: D 721);
Om jioch — nocnma, om ceunbu — nopocnma [From an elk — a
calf is bom, from a pig - a piglet] (Russian: D 721); cf. also
Estonian: Emmisel on kiimme poega, koegest saavad sead,
kubjal uksaenus, sellestki saa kubjast [A sow has ten sons, all

234
 will be pigs, an overseer has only one, he will not become an
overseer] (EV 660)
A kid will be born from a nanny-goat, a lamb from a sheep
(Ossetian: Br. 412, Ab. 91)
Karhull on karhun penikat [A bear has bear cubs] ‘cold sum¬
mer follows a cold winter’ (Finnish: SI 109, cf. also SI 110)
Suvell on suve penikatkii [A wolf has wolf cubs] (Finnish: SI
425); (Only) a wolf ~ cub is bom to a (female) wolf (Arabian:
Br. 64, cf. also Sharb. 39; Pushtu: Br. 439, FJ 14); A wolfs
son is also a wolf (Aserbaidzhan: Gus. 42)
Fion’s children ~ Those who are born from a lion will be lions
(Turkish: Br. 543, Ivan. 30; Uzbek: Br. 574, Abdur. 67); If the
father is lion, then the son is a lion cub (Vietnamese: Br. 153)
Kyi karme karmeen siittad [A snake will give birth to a snake]
(Finnish: Spk 172); Can a snake give birth to anything but a
snake (Arabian: Br. 66, cf. also Sharb. 39); A snake gives birth
to a snake, a wolf gives birth to a wolf (Udmurtian: Per. 107);
A scorpion gives birth to a scorpion, a snake to a snake (Tajik:'
• Kal. [1] 50, Kal. [2] 67; Uzbek: Br. 575, Kal. [2] 67, Abdur.
83)
Dragons give birth to dragons (Chinese: Tishk. [2] 66); A
dragon is bom from a dragon, a gossiper from a gossiper
(Vietnamese: IGV 32, Br. 168)
Frogs are bom from frogs ~ A frog’s son is also a frog, etc.
(Estonian: EV 4305; Japanese: Petr. 59, Br. 632, Fount. 258)
Saivaren tai paskantaa [Fouse shits nit(s)] (Finnish: VKS 339,
cf. also SI 387 and 496)
Once again bird referents form contrasting pairs: noble and vul¬
gar, predator with non-predator, song bird with a bird who does
not sing, etc.:
Only young crows hatch from crow’s eggs (Georgian: Br.
193); A raven is bom to a raven, a crow to a crow (Yakut:
Yem. 191); Eagle’s sons are eagles, raven’s sons are ravens ~
crow’s sons are crows (Yakut: Yem. 45); Open opna nnodum,
a coea coey podum [An eagle begets an eagle, an owl is bom
to an owl] (Russian: D 722); Eagle’s sons are eagles (Japa¬
nese: Petr. 81); Haukall on haukan pojat [A hawk has hawks’
sons] (Finnish: SI 35)

235
 A nightingale is bom to a nightingale, a cricket to a cricket
(Tajik: Kal. [1] 50, Kal. [2] 67)
JlypKci dypKy u ebicujtcueaem [A turkey is hatched from a tur¬
key hen] (Russian: D 721)
Phoenixes hatch phoenixes (Chinese: Tishk. [1] 38)
Animal X will not give birth to animal Y ~ The eggs of a cer¬
tain bird or snake will not hatch another bird or snake
Here the opposition of animals is unavoidable, and is still based
on the contrast of noble/vulgar, predator/harmless, pretty/ugly,
etc.
KouiKe mmpa ne podumb [A cat does not give birth to a tiger]
(Russian: Rybn. 96); A tiger does not give birth to a cat
(Tamil: VA 47)
An ass does not give birth to a horse foal (Ossetian: Ab. 92);
Can an ass give birth to a horse, can an ass mn faster than a
horse (Uyghur: SK 1427); A horse does not give birth to an
ass (Indonesian: Kol. 10)
Ega harjast janest siinni [An ox does not give birth to a hare]
(Estonian: EV 1823)
A dog does not give birth to a lamb (Armenian: Karap. [1] 22,
Karap. [2] 26, Karap. [3] 164, Shag. 417); Don’t expect lambs
from a dog (Georgian: Br. 200)
A wolf does not give birth to lambs ~ Wolfs son is not a lamb
(Turkish: Br. 545, Leb. 41)
A nanny goat does not give birth to a lamb (Adygei: Br. 33)
A pig does not give birth to a lamb (Turkish: Ivan. 26); A kite
does not give birth to an eagle, a pig does not give birth to a
lamb (Uyghur: SK 1424)
You can’t milk a rooster, don’t expect a calf from a pig (Komi:
Pies. 94)
He podum ceiiHbn 6o6pa [A pig does not give birth to a beaver
kit] (Russian: Ruk. 58); Om ceunbu ne podumcn 6o6penoK, —

moubKo nopoceHOK [Pigs do not give birth to beaver kits -

only to piglets] (Russian: Ruk. 36); including plenty of other
Russian variants - see for example Ruk. 128 and 185, D 722,
Rybn. 96)

236
 Ei siga sobelii saa [A pig does not give birth to a sable] (Kare¬
lian: KSp 458, cf. also 400); Ei koiru kunittsua sua eigo siga
sobolii [A dog does not give birth to a marten, nor a pig to a
sable] (KSp 179, cf. also 458)
CeuubH ne podum coKOJia [A pig does not give birth to an ea¬
gle] (Russian: D 722)
A frog does not give birth to snakes (Indonesian: Kol. 31);
Ega konna pojast kala ei kasva [A frog’s son will not grow
into a fish] (Estonian: EV 4302)
An eagle does not hatch an owl (British: T E2; Russian:
D 722); A raven does not hatch an eagle (Arabian: Br. 64,
Sharb. 40)
Adler briiten keine Tauben (German: B 27, 98, 579); An eagle
does not hatch a dove (British: T E2)
There are a number of other random contrasting pairs:
A nightingale from a crow (Udmurtian: Krai. 146); a peacock
from a crow (Russian: Rybn. 96; Tajik: Kal. [1] 65); chickens
from a crow (Karelian: KSp 558); chickens out of cuckoo’s’
eggs (Russian: D 456); swan from a hen (Uyghur: SK 1425); a
phoenix from a hen (Chinese: Tishk. [1] 39, Tishk. [2] 67); a
raven from a goose (Karelian: KSp 189), and others.
Bird, snake, etc. X does not lay eggs ~ its nest has no ~ it does
not hatch the eggs of bird, snake, etc. Y
You can’t take a chicken egg from a crow’s nest (Chinese: Br.
292)
Ei ole korpin pesas hanhen munii eiga hanhen pesas korpin
poikii [There are no goose eggs in the raven’s nest, nor raven’s
hatchlings in the goose’s nest] (Karelian: KSp 189); Varekse
pescist ei maksa hanemuna etsida [There’s no point in looking
for a goose egg in a crow’s nest] (Estonian: EV 13818)
Harakan pesasta ei pie ehtii hanhen munii eika sian paata
koyhan paasta [There’s not point in looking for a goose egg in
a magpie’s nest nor pig head (meant as a tidbit) in poor man’s
pot] (Finnish: SI 32)
A hen does not lay goose eggs (Ossetian: Ab. 61)
A hen does not hatch partridge eggs (Armenian: Karap. [2] 26)

237
 Thou shalt know an Eagles nest, disdaines to hatch a Crow
(British: T E2)
I don’t believe a dragonfly could lay eagle eggs (Georgian: Br.
198)
Ein Schlange legt keine Taubenei (German: B 353, 503)
Cf. also exceptions, where a bird is forced to lay or hatch the eggs
of another bird:
Gave chicken eggs to a crow (Vietnamese: IGV 23, cf. also
Br. 168); Hanhen pesah ei pie tuuva harakan munua [You
should not put magpie’s egg to a goose’s nest] (Karelian: KSp
49); A wild duck was forced to lay goose eggs (Ossetian: Ab.
33); Don’t force a titmouse lay crane eggs (Mari: lb. 86);
Don’t lay snake eggs under a hatching dove (Armenian: Shag.
508)
A young animal X ~ egg will grow into an adult animal X ~ it
will not grow ~ it cannot be grown into animal Y
Lapsesta mies tulee, penikaste koira kasvaa [A child will be¬
come a man, a puppy will grow into a dog] (Finnish: VKS
400, cf. also SI 324)
A foal will become horse (Livonian: LV 1020); A horse’s son
will become a horse (Hungarian: Nagy 1712); A horse will
grow from a foal, a man is a man since childhood (Tuva: HS
37)
An ass foal will grow into an ass (Armenian: Br. 79, Karap.
[1] 21, Karap. [2] 26, Karap. [3] 90); A little ass grew up -
still the same ass (Kurdish: Cel. 75); You can’t straighten a
twist in a pole, you can’t grow a horse out of an ass (Chechen,
Ingush: Br. 607); cf. also Armenian and Turkish: Though an
ass grows up, it will not become a stableboy (Br. 87, Karap.
[1] 21, Karap. [2] 26; Leb. 62)
Friiher ein Kalb, spdter ein Ochs (German: B 299, 434); Even
a calf will become a cow once ~ in time (Udmurtian: Krai.
160; Persian: Br. 421); cf. also Estonian: Kest lehm kasus, pidi
jo vaikult vasik olema [Who grows into a cow must have been
a calf once] (EV 5634)
Igast porsast kasvab siga [Every piglet will grow into a pig]
(Estonian, Tartu: EV 0); Aus einem Ferkel wird eine Sau

238
 (German: B 154, 487, cf. also 313); No matter how large a
piglet would grow, it will never become an elephant (Tamil:
VA 46)
A us Zicklein ~ Kitzlein werden Bocke (German: B 89, 311,
695)
Aus jungen Fuchsen werden alte (German: B 181)
(Every) wolf cub grows into a wolf (Turkish: Ivan. 6; Aser-
baidzhan: Gus. 43); A wolf cub will not grow into a dog
(Turkish: Ivan. 6; Kirghiz: Shamb. 100)
A lion cub will become a lion (Turkmen: Karr. 96); A lion cub
will not grow into a jackal (Bengali: Br. 129)
Even a chicken will become a hen once (Udmurtian: Per. 51)
A tadpole will become a frog (Ovambo: Kuusi 63); Was a tad¬
pole, became a frog (Japanese: Petr. 63)
Nits will be lice (British: T N191)
Cf. also: An egg that lies on the ground will once become a
bird that flies under the sky (Dargin: Naz. 64; Aserbaidzhan: t
Gus. 62; Kirghiz: Shamb. 146, 300, Br. 278; Mongolian: DR
61)
Even the young animal has its specific qualities and charac¬
teristics
A puppy barks, barks and grows into a dog (Aserbaidzhan:
Gus. 49 and 112; Turkmen: Karr. 139)
Isa virka pojalle, sijankdrsd porsahalle [Son will have his fa¬
ther’s job, piglet will have pig’s snout] (Finnish: SI 82, cf. also
SI 80, Spk 173); The young pig grunts like the old sow (Brit¬
ish: T P309); y ceuHbu u nopocnma punacmbi [A pig will
have piglets with snouts, too] (Russian: D 722, cf. also Ruk.
77)
Even a young mouse will become a rodent (Arabian: Sharb.
39)
A lion is scary even at the young age (Udmurtian: Per. 64;
Aserbaidzhan: Gus. 13)
Leopard’s youngs have spots too (Somalian: Kap. 68)
An elephant’s son is a giant too (Vietnamese: IGV 59)
Was von Hiihnern kommt, kratzt gern (German: B 277); lie
that comes of a hen, must scrape (British: T H420)

239
 4. And it goes on and on and on...

Due to the limited space, I managed to abstract only two subcate¬

gories of proverbs of animal identity. In reality this continually
shifting pattern will go on an on.
For example, in the following subcategory the specific or
gender identity of the animal changes, or the ani¬
mal will not pass it on to its young. Once again, the
change is presented through oppositions large/small, preda¬
tor/harmless, noble/vulgar, pretty/ugly, etc.
An Udmurtian proverb says that a hen could turn into a
rooster; the Hungarians think that a jade might become a magic
horse; in Japan even a mouse could become a tiger; in China
phoenexes can be bom in a crow’s nest; a Korean proverb says
that a father might be a lion, but its son is a jackal (or a Vietnam¬
ese proverb, which says that a tiger has given birth to a puppy, or
that a cobra has given birth to a lizard, or that a hen has hatched
ducklings); the Ovambos let a fly give birth to a bee; among the
Japanese and Uyghurs a kite could hatch an eagle, etc. etc.
The species of an animal (in the metaphorical meaning) can
change under specific circumstances and situations
(at the old age, for example, or when for other reasons incapable,
in trouble, in distress, with ill luck, in shame, abroad, etc.): thus
an old cat turns into a fox in Vietnam, an old lion into a dog
among the Ingush people, in Armenia a cat turns into a lion in
trouble, among the Bengali a cat may turn into a tiger in a fight, in
several eastern countries a horse in the stable could turn into a
donkey at times of bad luck, etc.
Another category consists of internationally known prov¬
erbs on exaggeration, where the opposition is formed of a
remarkably small and a huge animal, and the small animal is
turned into the large one: in Estonian proverbs it is usually a fly
that is made into an elephant, but the fly might be substituted
with, say, a gnat, a flea, etc., and the elephant with an ox, a camel,
a lion, etc.
There is yet another internationally known body of proverbs,
where a representative of a certain species is ex¬
cluded from the genus, or a subspecies from the

240
species: a mare is not a horse; goats are not livestock; a magpie
is not a bird; a ruff is not a fish, and many others. This body of
proverbs (like several others) is not limited to zoological images,
only, but spreads also to other semantical fields: A Zaporozhets is
not a car; a bedbug is not meat; a kopeck is not money; an apron
is not a garment; a woman is not a person; an inhabitant of Hiiu-
maa is not a man; etc., etc. Also such single statements tend to
merge and link together.
A parallel group of proverbs shows compassion to such rejects
and includes them among the species: a crow is a bird,
too; an ore is money, too; flea is meat, too, etc. (Further examples
about figurative lexica and links see for example Krikmann 1997:
162-164.)
Another distinctive group concerns the problems with
identifying animals (also other objects beside them), result¬
ing either from darkness, or otherwise disturbed perception, dull¬
ness, inexperience, emotional state, envy, greed, etc. of the per-
ceiver. Korean and Japanese proverbs note that it really is diffi- ’
cult to tell a crow from a raven. The British have a saying about
the people who are incapable of distinguishing things that: He
knows not a pig from a dog, the Russians: HudwtuKu om eopo6bn
nepacno3Haem [He can’t tell a turkey from a sparrow], A coward
thinks of the smallest animal as big and dangerous: a mouse as an
elephant in Tajik and Uzbek proverbs; a dog as a wolf or a kitten
as a bear among the Udmurts. At nights, when it’s dark and scary,
perception disorders are extremely common, but on the other
hand all cats are grey in the dark. And the neighbour’s hen look
like a goose probably in the whole Eurasia; according to an Ud-
murtian proverb the neighbour’s calf looks like a cow, or a cow
like a horse, etc.
Changes and conformities to species lead to the individual
similarities and differences of a parent and a son
(apparently, this group does not belong among the categories of
identity any more): arguing that like father, like son; that the
young learn everything from the old; that not all the sons of an
animal are alike, etc.

Translated by Kait Realo

241
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wortliche Ausdriicke aus deutschen Sammlungen vom 16. Jahrhun-
dert bis zur Gegenwart. Leipzig, 1984.
Br. = Tlocjioemfbi u nozoeopxu uapodoe Bocmoxa. Otb. peaafaop
H. C. EparHHCKHiL CocTaBHTeab K). 3. Eperejib. ITpeaHCJiOBHe
B. II. AHHKHHa. Moscow, 1961. [*]
Cel. = Kypdcxue nocnoeuqu u nozoeopxu na xypdcxoM u pyccxoM
H3bixax. Co6pajm, cocTaBHJiH, nepeBean, CHa6AHjiH npuMeuaHHaMH ’
. h npeAHCJioBHeM OpAHxaHe JfiKajwisi h /(>KajiHJie /facajiua. Otb.
pe^aKTop JT. H. riHpeHKo. Moscow, 1972.
D = Tlocjioeuifbi pyccxozo uapoda. C6opHHK B. )fajia. Moscow, 1957.
Diachk. = Llocjioeuqbi u nozoeopxu cbeppaneoucxux xpeonoe. Ha »3bi-
xax Kpno n pyccxoM. CocTaBJieHne, nepeBOfl, npeancaoBne h npu-
MeuaHHa M. B. /JbauKOBa. Moscow, 1977. [*]
DR = Momojibcxue uapodubie noaioeuqbi u nozoeopxu. nepeBO# c
MOHrojibCKoro A. JfaMSa-PnHHHHo. Moscow, 1962.

EP = G. Paczolay, European Proverbs in 55 Languages with Equiva¬

lents in Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, Chinese and Japanese. Veszprem,
1997.
EV = Eesti vanasonad I—III. Koost. A. Hussar, A. Krikmann, E. Nor-
mann, V. Pino, I. Sarv ja R. Saukas. Toim. A. Krikmann ja I. Sarv.
Tallinn, 1980-1985. [*]
Fount. = Fountain of Japanese Proverbs. /Ed. by?/ Taiji Takashima.
Tokyo, 1981. [*]
FS = [Manuscript texts from the Folklore archive at the Institute of Lat¬
vian Language and Literature]
Gus. = AsepbaudzHcancxue noaioeuqu u nozoeopxu. Co6npaTejib
A6AyJiBKacHM TyceuH3ajie. Baku, 1959.
HS = Tyeuucxue nocjioeuqbi u nozoeopxu. BTopoir Bbinycx. CoeraBH-
TejiH-nepeBo^HHKH: M. XaztaxaHo, O. CaraHoon. Kyzyl, 1966.

243
Ib. = MapuucKue nocjioeuifbi, nozoeopKu u 3azadKu. CocraBHa
C. H. H6aTOB. Joshkar-Ola, 1960.
IGV = BbemHOMCKue uapodubie nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu. nepeBoa c
BberaaMcicoro B. B. HBaHOBa, H. H. rae6oBOH h ByraHraTa. Peaax-
Top n. n. lleTpoB. Moscow, 1959.
Ivan. = TypeifKue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu. nepeBoa T. H. HBaHOBa.
Moscow, 1966.
Kal. [1] = 51. H. KanoHTapoB, TadotcuKCKue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu e
aHosiozuu cpyccKUMU. Dushanbe, 1965.
Kal. [2] = 51. H. KajioHTapoB, TadotcuKCKue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu e
cpaeueuuu c y36eKCKUMU. Dushanbe, 1969.
Kap. = CoMcmuucKue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu. Ha coManHHCxoM h pyc-
ckom a3biKax c pyccKHMH cooTBeTCTBHaMH. CocTaBJieHHe, nepeBoa,
npeancjiOBHe T. JI. Kanunua. Moscow, 1983.
Karap. [1] = ApMXHCKue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu. nepeBoa c apMBH-
CKoro T. O. KapaneTSHa. Moscow, 1964.
Karap. [2] = Apmhhckuu cpojibKJiop. nepeBoa c apMsmcxoro. CocTaBH-
Teab T. O. KapaneTSH. Otb. peaaxTop A. H. CajiaxflH. Moscow,
1967.
Karap. [3] = ApMHHCKue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu. CocTaBJieHHe h nepe¬
Boa F. O. KapaneTHHa. Otb. peaaxTop T. JI. nepMaxoB. Moscow,
1973.
Karr. = TypimeucKue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu. noaroTOBxa TexcTa,
nepeBoa h xoMMerrrapHH E. A. KappbieBa. Ashabad, 1961.
KL = M. Kuusi & O. Lauhakangas, [Unpublished type-system of inter¬
national proverbs]
http://lauhakan.home.cern.ch/lauhakan/cerp.html
Used and cited by permission of O. Lauhakangas.
Kol. = HudoHe3uucKue uapodHbie nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopKu. nepeBoa c
HHaoHe3HHCxoro JI. Koaocca. PeaaxTop n. n. neTpoB. Moscow,
1961.
Korn. = Cko3ku u nocjioeuifbi MadazacKapa. nepeBoa c Manbramcxoro
JI. KopHeeBa. Moscow, 1962.
Krai. = nocjioeuifbi, nozoeopKu ydMypmcKozo uapoda. CocTaBUTenb
H. n. KpajiHHa. Izhevsk, 1960.
Krgl. = nepcudcKue nocjioeuifbi, nozoeopKu u KpbiJiamue cjioea. H3aa-
Hne 2e, aonoaHeHHoe. CocTaBJieHHe, nepeBoa, BBeaerme h xommch-
TapHH X. Kopornbi. Moscow, 1973.
KSp = Karjalaisia sananpolvia. Toimittaneet L. Miettinen ja P. Leino.
Helsinki, 1971.

244
Kuusi = M. Kuusi, Ovambo Proverbs with African Parallels. FFC 208
Helsinki, 1970. [*]
Leb. = TypeifKue napodnue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopxu. nepeBO^ c Typeu,-
Koro B. JIe6eaeBoii. Moscow, 1962.
LJ = Acpzaucxue napodnue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopxu. nepeBO# c nymTy
K. A. JleOefleBa h JI. C. HijeBHH. Pe/raKTop n. n. neTpoB. Moscow,
1961.
LV = Liivi vanasonad eesti, vadja ja lad vastetega I—II. Koost. V. Malk
P. Dambergi, E. Kokare jt. osavotul. Tallinn, 1981. [*]
Nagy = O. Nagy Gabor, Magyar szolasok es kozmondasok. Budapest,
1966. [*]
Naz. = A. Ha3apeBHH, Omodpannoe no KpynuifaM U3 dazecmancxou
xonnexifuu nocaoeuif u nozoeopox. Makhachkala, 1958.
Per. = ydjviypmcKuu (ponbxjiop. Hoc/ioeuifu, a(popu3Mbi, nozoeopxu.
CocTaBJieHne, nepeBO#, BBe^eHne n KOMMeHTapun T. T. nepeB03HH-
koboh. Ustinov, 1987.

Petr. = HnoncKue napodnue nocnoemfu u nozoeopxu. nepeBO# c anoH-

CKoro n. neTpoBa. no,q pe^aKunen C. TyTepMaHa. Moscow, 1959.
Pies. = Komu nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopxu. Coct. O. B. njiecoBCKHH. H3a. .
BTopoe. Syktyvkar, 1983.
PP = K. Grigas, Patarhi{ paraleles. Lietuviif patarles su latviip balta-
rusiip rusip lenkip vokieciip anglip lotymp prancuzp ispani( atitik-
menimis. Vilnius, 1987. [*]
PS = Proverbia septentrionalia. 900 Balto-Finnic proverb types with
Russian, Baltic, German and Scandinavian parallels by Matti Kuusi
in cooperation with Marje Joalaid, Elsa Kokare, Arvo Krikmann,
Kari Laukkanen, Pentti Leino, Vaina Malk, Ingrid Sarv. FFC 236.
Helsinki, 1985. [*]
Ruk. = nocjioeuifbi, nozoeopxu, 3azadxu e pyxonucnux cdopnuxax
XVIII-XX eexoe. Ma^anne no;iroTOBHJiH M. >1. MeJibu, B. B. Mht-
po(f)aHOBa, T. T. UlanoBajioBa. Moscow-Leningrad, 1961.
Rybn. = M. A. Pbi6miKOBa, Pyccxue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopxu. Moscow,
1961.
Sam. = ycmnonoomuuecxoe meopnecmeo Mopdoecxozo napoda e eocb-
mu moMax. Tom ueTBepTbin, KHnra nepBaa: nocjioeuifbi, npucjioebH
u nozoeopxu. npe/pranoBue, BCTynnTeJibHbie CTaTbH, 3anncb 6oab-
uiHHCTBa TeKCTOB h hx CHCTeMaTH3auna, nepeBoa Ha pyccKHH h3bik,
npHMenaHHa h yKa3aTeaH K. T. CaMopo^OBa. no^ o6meft peaax-
nuevi 3. B. noMepaHueBoil, JI. C. KaBTacbKHHa. Saransk, 1967.

245
Shag. = JJepeeo cwibHO Kopnnjviu. nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopxu apMHn JJona.
3anncaK h cocTaBHJi IUareH IBarmum. npeancjioBHe: T. 3mhh.
Rostov-on-Don, 1973. [*]
Shamb. = Kupzu3CKo-pyccKue nocjioeuifbi, nozoeopKu u mpenenuH.
CocTaBHJi h nepeBen CbipraGeK IEaM6aeB. Frunze, 1979.
Sharb. = Apadcrue napodnue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopru. IlepeBO# c
apabcKoro T. ID. UlapbaTOBa. Moscow, 1961.
SK = YuzypcKue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopru. CocTaBHJiH h nepeBejiH
T. Ca^BaicacoB h ID. Kn6npoB. Otb. pe^aKTop A. T. KanaapoB.
Alma-Ata, 1978.
SI = Sananlaskut. Aineiston valinneet Kari Laukkanen ja Pekka Haka-
mies. Johdannon kirjoittanut Matti Kuusi. Vaasa, 1978.
Spk = Suomen kansan sananparsikirja. Toimittaneet R. E. Nirvi ja Lauri
Hakulinen. Toinen painos. Porvoo-Helsinki, 1953.
T = M. P. Tilley, A Dictionary of The Proverbs in England In the Six¬
teenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Ann Arbor, 1966. [*]
Tishk. [1] = KumaucKue napodnue nozoeopru, nocjioeuifbi u eupaotce-
huh. riepeBOfl c KHTancKoro A. TmiiKOBa. Pe^aKTop IT PleTpoB.
Moscow, 1958.
Tishk. [2] = KumaucKue napodnue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopru. IlepeBOA c
KHTancKoro A. TmiiKOBa. Biopoe AononHeHHoe h HcnpaBJieHHoe
H3^aHHe. Moscow, 1962.
TKKCh = Kopeucrue napodnue nocjioeuifbi, nozoeopru u eupaotcenuH.
FlepeBo^ B. ToncTHKOBa h Khm Kk> Hepa. Pe^aKTop n. PleTpoB.
Moscow, 1958.
W I...V = K. Fr. W. Wander, Deutsches Sprichworter-Lexicon. Erster —
funfter Band. Leipzig, 1867-1880.
VA = TaMUJibCKue napodnue nocjioeuifbi u nozoeopru. ElepeBoa c
TaMHJibCKoro H. BojucoBa h K. A(})aHacbeBa. Pe^aKTop n. rieTpoB.
Moscow, 1962.
VKS = Vanhan kansan sananlaskuviisaus. Suomalaisia elamanohjeita,
kansanaforismeja, lentavia lauseita ja kokkapuheita vuosilta 1544-
1826. Koonnut jajarjestanyt Matti Kuusi. Porvoo-FIelsinki, 1953.
Yem. = C6opnuK nrymcrux nocjioeuif u nozoeopoK. CocTaBHTenb
H. B. EMejibHHOB. Yakutsk, 1965.

246
 IMAGERY OF PROVERBS:
THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING
AS THE BACKGROUND OF PERSONIFICATORY
AND DEPERSONIFICATORY METAPHORS IN
PROVERBS AND ELSEWHERE

1. The essence of the idea of the Great Chain

71 years ago, Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, the founder of the history

of ideas, published his famous book The Great Chain of Being.
The naive folk model of the Great Chain of Being has gov¬
erned the world view of humans in classical antiquity, Middle *
Ages, Renaissance, and later. According to that model, all kinds
of objects constitute a hierarchical system in which every creature
or thing belongs inherently and immutably to a certain level of the
Chain. The highest level is occupied by God, this is followed by
the angels, various classes of people, animals etc.1
Encyclopaedia Britannica,2 for example, emphasises just the
three “initial ideas” originating from Plato - the so-called Princi¬
ple of Plenitude, continuity and gradation. Actually, however, the
main course of development of the Great Chain of Being (further:
GCB) model took place much later, and just after Plato and Aris¬
totle the “ladder of being” obtained most of its concrete rungs.
Plotinus and other neoplatonists contributed greatly, as did St.
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and the impact of the Middle
Ages in general was quite strong, as was that of Renaissance and
the Age of Enlightenment - I will decidedly have no chance to
recount the fate and decay of the GCB in detail. At the same time,
each step in its development and elaboration in some sense meant
the undermining of its authority. Linne, Lamarck and others trans¬
formed the initial ladder into a tree. Herder and other romantics
began to emphasize the individual value of the human person in-

247
stead of his or her belonging to a certain class or group. The final
deathblow to the GCB came from Charles Darwin, whose theory
of evolution put the GCB to move.
As the main topics of this paper are metaphors and proverbs,
not the GCB itself, I also bypass all the contemporary philosophi¬
cal discussion around the GCB and the concept of the history of
ideas in general.3

2. Some historical examples

Below I will offer just some texts, images and schemas depicting
the GCB or some of its parts.
The following is a very frequently quoted fragment of Alexander
Pope’s (1688-1744) An Essay on Man (1734):

See through this air, this ocean, and this earth.

All matter quick, and bursting into birth.
Above, how high progressive life may go!
Around, how wide! how deep extend below!
Vast chain of being! which from God began.
Nature’s ethereal, human, angel, man,
Beast, bird, fish, insect! what no eye can see,
No glass can reach; from infinite to thee;
From thee to nothing—On superior pow’rs
Were we to press, inferior might on ours;
Or in the full creation leave a void,
Where, one step broken, the great scale’s destroy’d:
From nature’s chain whatever link you strike.
Tenth, or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike.
And if each system in gradation roll.
Alike essential to the amazing whole;
The least confusion but in one, not all
That system only, but the whole must fall.
(Pope 1824 [1734]: 17-18)

248
Medieval model of “three cosms” and “three estates” of human society
Bruce R. Magee, British Literature (a lecture course)
http://www2.latech.edu/%7Ebmagee/20 l/intro2_medieval/estates&chai
n_of_being_notes.htm

Great Chain of Being

Macrocosm Mesocosm Microcosm

(Supernatural) (Earthly) (Individual)
(3 estates in red)

God "Clerks" Family Spirit

I "Knights" (reason)
(Clerics)
(State)
Angels
Husband I
I Pope Passion
People King
1 I1 Wife
I Archbishops 1
Animals Dukes
1 Son
lion Bishops i
Earls, etc. 1
dog Servants
1 I
I Priests 1
Plants Knights
|
Laity (non¬
Inanimate Serfs (peasants)
clergy)
Objects
Gold
Dirt

The same with a more detailed categorization of the “mesocosm”:

■ God —> Angels
■ Kings / Queens —» Archbishops —» Dukes / Duchesses —>
Bishops —> Marquises / Marchionesses —> Earls / Countesses
-» Viscounts / Viscountesses —»• Barons / Baronesses —> Ab¬
bots / Deacons -» Knights / Local Officials -» Ladies-in-
Waiting —> Priests / Monks -» Squires -> Pages —> Messen¬
gers —> Merchants / Shopkeepers -» Tradesmen -> Yeomen
Farmers —> Soldiers/Town Watch —> Household Servants —>
Tenant Farmers -> Shepherds/Herders -a- Beggars -> Actors
-» Thieves /Pirates —>• Gypsies
■ Animals -» Birds -> Worms
■ Plants
■ Rocks

249
 The Great Chain of Being.
From Didacus Valades, Rhetorica Christiana (1579)

The “ladder of intellect” from Shakespearean times by Michael Best,

Shakespeare’s Life and Times. Internet Shakespeare Editions,
University of Victoria: Victoria, BC, Canada 2001-2005
http://ise.uvic.ca/Library/SLTnoframes/ideas/chain.html

250
 3. The contemporary status of the GCB:
Metastases and fans

It is true that by the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th
century, the GCB had lost its status as the basis of the existing
philosophical and scientific world picture.
Nevertheless, the GCB is not an altogether forgotten and
abandoned topic of research. It is mentioned in a huge number of
histories of the natural sciences, theory of evolution, philosophy,
art and literature, and so on. A search in Google provides about
63,000 results. There are also several good reasons for this:
1. It has left multiple metastases in present-day science and
scholarship, such as
a) the problem of directionality versus spontaneity of evolu¬
tion, the meaningfulness of the very term of progress in general;
b) the problem of the place of mankind in nature;
c) problems of racism;
d) the problem of the very existence of and chances to contact >
the superhuman, spiritual and divine regions of being.
‘ 2. A certain simplified version of it hitherto sits very deeply in
our common minds: that humans represent the highest degree of
being (if God does not exist), animals are lower, and so on.

The GCB also has its contemporary fans, albeit mostly among
semi-esoteric authors such as Ernst F. Schumacher (1977) or Ken
Wilber, the developer of the so-called theory of everything and
integral psychology (e.g. 2000 [1996]; 2000a; 2000b, and tens of
other books).
The Traditional Great Chain of
Being in several works by Ken
Wilber.
Seems to be strongly influenced by
Ernst F. Schumacher’s sequence
m —> (m + x) —» (m + x + y) —»
(m + x + y + z) in his book (1977:
27) and elsewhere.
Here quoted from:
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/
books/ko smos/excerptG/part 1. c fm/

251
 The Great Chain in Various Wisdom Traditions compiled by Huston
Smith (graphic layout by Brad Reynolds) - from not yet published
Toward A Comprehensive Theory of Subtle Energies by Ken Wilber

Interior-Individual Exterior-Individual y
(Intentional) (Behavioral) \ \y
Vrtion-logic ]2 1 IT 12/ <f}
formal\ 11 \ \y SF2
rules 10 10/$fi
concepts 9 9y complex neocortex
symbols 8 $y ncocortex (triune brain)
emotion 7 7y limbic svsrcm
impulse 6 6y reptilian brain stem
perception 5 S y neural cord
sensation \ 4 Ay neuronal organisms
\y 3 1 y eukaryotes
irritability N. 2 2y prokaryotes
1 y molecules
prehension \ y atoms

pleromaiicy \
protoplasmicy ~ * >Gaiasystem
vegetativey/ J ' 'v hetcrocrophtc ecosystems
locomotive/*^ 4 X. societies with division of labor
j\*
uroboncy' 6
typbonic/' 7 WE ITS ?\-
archaic y 8 8 \tribc*
magicy 9 longing ? \,rib3l/»ilUgc
mythic y 10
rationale' H
ccntauricy' industrial 12Ny planetary
informational 13 \
Lower Right \
y Interior-Collective Exterior-Collective X.
X (Cultural) (Social) x*

Ken Wilber’s Model of Four Quadrants

252
 A simplified clarification of the Model of Four Quadrants by
Ken Wilber

“Model of seven kingdoms” from The Reflexive Universe (1976, Chap¬

ter IV) by Arthur M. Young
• Molecules have three axes of symmetry and no freedom
• Plants and atoms have two axes of symmetry (radial and cylindrical)
and one degree of freedom
• Animals and nuclear particles have one axis of symmetry (bilateral)
and two degrees of freedom
• Light and the “seventh kingdom” (i.e. the spiritual or divine domain)
have no symmetry and complete freedom

253
 4. The GCB and metaphors

Samuel Levin’s favourite and recurring example of metaphor in

his The Semantics of Metaphor (1977) is The stone died. Levin
lists and analyzes different possibilities for the interpretation (or
construal, in his own terms) of the sentence, and obtains, for ex¬
ample, the following variants:
1) some mythological stone died mythologically;
2) the stone eroded, was destroyed;
3) the blockhead ~ numskull, or perhaps heartless person died
and so on.
Some of Levin’s combinations feel counterintuitive, because they
violate the basic rule for simple linguistical ~ conventional meta¬
phors: The target comes first, and the figurative part follows (see
e.g. Turner 1991: 144). The very concept of the conceptual, or
cognitive, or experiential domain largely used in the Lakoffian
cognitive theory of metaphor is quite vague and ambiguous: for
some authors it is practically a synonym for the notion or schema,
for some others it means some abstract categories passing through
whatever parts of being and cognition, for some authors it coin¬
cides with the main divisions of the GCB, which is the topic of
my discussion here.
In addition, the conceptual domain is a tricky term because it
seeks to embrace, simultaneously both the ontological and gnose¬
ological ~ epistemological aspects of being and cognition.
Anyway, as we know that metaphorical transfers are not made
casually, from wherever to wherever, but the traffic between
some conceptual areas is very intensive and between some others
almost nonexistent, we evidently need some more general frame
of reference for the construction of our observations about the di¬
rections of metaphor-making.
As concerns cognition and epistemology, in recent decades the
view of the modularity of the human mind has become more and
more entrenched in many areas of research: linguistics, the theory
of religion, developmental and evolutionary psychology, so-called
cognitive archaeology, philosophy and so on. Jerry Fodor (e.g.
1983), Pascal Boyer (e.g. 1994), Jean Piaget (e.g. 1960), Howard
Gardner (e.g. 1983), Leda Cosmides & John Tooby (e.g. 1994),

254
Steven Mithen (1996), Dan Sperber (1994) and many others (see,
e.g. in Hirschfeld & Gelman, Eds. 1994) have compiled their own
lists of mental modules. These sets of modules differ greatly in
the number and content of their constituents.
As to the ontological categories proper, we must return, once
again, to the GCB.
In their seminal book More than Cool Reason (1989), George
Lakoff and Mark Turner used a certain variant of the GCB model
to describe the directionality of proverbial metaphors.
Lakoff and Turner state that the Great Chain is a naive model
about the Nature of Things, appearing both in a basic form as well
as in an extended one (includes God and society). In the basic
version of the model we see the usual hierarchical order of exist¬
ing entities (from substances and inanimate objects to plants,
animals, and finally human beings as the highest level). The
higher the entity, the more qualities or levels of functioning it has.
Inanimate objects have only physical qualities (complex objects
have also structural and functional features), plants have both ’
physical and biological features, animals have in addition to the
previous qualities also instincts, and human beings have all the
common features with lower levels, plus additional specific quali¬
ties like reason, higher-order emotions, language, aesthetic sense,
personality, sociability etc.

specifically
human
features
instincts instincts
biological biological biological
features features features'
physical physical physical physical
features features features
THINGS, PLANTS ANIMALS HUMAN
SUBSTANCES BEINGS

My own drawing inspired by the book More than Cool Reason

(1989, Chapter IV) by George Lakoff and Mark Turner

255
 III “HIGH”

][ II “LOW”

NON¬ HUMAN
HUMAN

A simplified version of the GCB schema:

here “LOW” means material, physical, “natural”;
“HIGH” means “specifically human” (mental,
intellectual, aesthetic, social, “cultural”)

Our schema divides levels of existence on two axes: first into the
human and the non-human, secondly into the mental and the ma¬
terial (if the higher neural activity of animals is not viewed as be¬
ing mental).
(The figure above is sketched down by me, and thus cannot be
found in Lakoff s and Turner’s book. All inanimate objects are
here brought together to a common level of ‘things and sub¬
stances’; Lakoff and Turner (1989: 170-171) differentiate be¬
tween natural physical things and complex objects on this level.)
Thus the human is the focal link in all metaphoric and other men¬
tal and linguistic transitions between the areas and levels of the
GCB.
The observations of many researchers of figurative language
convince us that there are two important distinctors or axes -
HUMAN / NON-HUMAN, and PHYSICAL / MENTAL - that govern
metaphorical traffic not only in proverbs, but also in idioms, so-
called conceptual, conventional and other “linguistic” or “en¬
trenched” metaphors. In everyday linguistical metaphors the
transfers are generally simple and unidirectional. That is often dif¬
ferent in “poetry proper”, however.4
Thus all “simple” metaphors can be divided, by and large, into
depersonifications and personifications. Thus, para¬
doxically, man is for himself simultaneously the most known and
the most unknown and mysterious object; the most typical target
and the most typical source of metaphors.

256
Depersonification is a transfer ~ mapping which represents a hu¬
man being
as an animal:
John is a gorilla ~ an old hog ~...
He is a wolf in sheep’s clothing
He barked at me, but did not bite
as a plant:
He plucked the finest flowers of youth
I am rooted in the soil of my home
The apple does not fall far from the tree
as something inanimate:
Our boss is sometimes an iceberg and sometimes a volcano
Daniel Webster is a steam-engine in trousers
All rivers reach the sea

Personification is a transfer ~ mapping which represents non¬

human beings and objects, as well as substantive properties, ac¬
tivities, ethical categories, abstract notions, expressions, etc. as -
human:
The lion is the king of all the beasts
The scraggy fingers of the trees touched my face
Spring calls the birds to sing
The bright sun smiled amicably on his face
The wind cries in the chimney
The pale-faced moon looks boldly on the earth
The tears of clouds washing away the soot
My soul sings and laughs
Idleness is the mother of all vices
Sleep and death are brothers

Many observations suggest that depersonification is the prevailing

direction of transfers in the newer layers of metaphors. Thanks to
investigations made by Jean Piaget (1960 and elsewhere), Stewart
Guthrie (1993 and others), however, there are serious reasons to
suppose that anthropomorphic-animistic, i.e. personifying meta¬
phors most likely prevailed in earlier layers of metaphor.
Why and when did such a radical change take place, then?

257
One hypothesis can be derived from the supposition about animal
metaphors in the same book “More than Cool Reason” by Lakoff
and Turner. Here is the fragment from it (1989: 193-194):
One of the most elaborate domains in which we understand the non¬
human in terms of the human is the domain of animal life. There we
have well-elaborated schemas characterizing what animals are like,
and we usually understand their characteristics metaphorically in
terms of the characteristics of human beings. Here are some common
propositions that occur in schemas for animals:
- Pigs are dirty, messy, and rude.
- Lions are courageous and noble.
- Foxes are clever.
- Dogs are loyal, dependable and dependent.
- Cats are fickle and independent.
- Wolves are cruel and murderous.
- Gorillas are aggressive and violent.
These are metaphorical propositions within schemas. They all in¬
volve conventionalized instances of the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR,
through which properties of things lower on the chain are understood
in terms of human properties. Our folk understandings of what these
animals are like is metaphorical. We understand their attributes in
terms of human character traits. We think of them, react to them, and
treat them as if we would a person with such traits.

There are also serious arguments for and against extrapolating the
same train of thought to other kinds of metaphors. I will not
speculate on these possibilities in further detail.

5. The GCB and proverbs

Lakoff and Turner thus emphasise the antropocentric nature of

proverbs. Humans are the main objects of interest of proverbs -
both directly and figuratively. Thus we can assume that man is
also the main target of metaphorical projection in proverbs.
Some of my observations on the direction of metaphorical pro¬
jections in proverbs, published in the 1970s (see Krikmann 1974:
19, 46; Krikmann 1978: 91; in more detail in Krikmann 1984,
written in the middle of the 1970s and published seven years later
in a collection edited by G. Permjakov) have later proved to be
cases of a more universal tendency.

258
 For example: “The proverbial trope is mostly paradigmatic, i.e.
metaphorical. To be more exact, proverbial transfers seem to be not
simply transfers “from the left to the right” or vice versa, but specifi¬
cally directed and orientated. The proverb tends, very predominantly,
to explain the more complicated through the more simple, the less
known through the better known; it usually presents, for example,
the mental through the physical, the ideal through the material, the
social through the biological, the abstract through the concrete, etc.
The oppositions ‘non-human’ ‘human’ and ‘natural’ ‘cultural’
seem to play a leading role in these alterations or transcodings”
(Krikmann 1974: 19).

After encountering Lakoff s and Johnson’s arguments, I formu¬

lated four rules that (with many eventual concessions and excep¬
tions) seek to define the behaviour of metaphors in proverbs (see
also Krikmann 1994: 119-120).
I have used G. A. Miller’s terminology from his classification
of metaphors (Miller 1979: 229-234). Miller distinguishes be- ,
tween three basic types of metaphors:
1) nominal metaphors: BE(x,y) where x does not actually equal y,
common examples being “John is a gorilla”, “Sally is a block of ice”,
“Man is a wolf’ and others;
2) predicative metaphors: G(x), where x is not really or does not
do G, i.e. metaphors that diagonally link the subject component from
the target domain with the predicative component from the source
domain, e.g. “The boy barked at me”, “She is withering away”,
“Time flies” or “Time heals all wounds”;
3) sentential metaphors: G(y), wherey is not actually referred to:
these metaphors take the form of a sentence, e.g. J. M. Reddy’s ex¬
ample “The rock is becoming brittle with age” describing an old pro¬
fessor of geology (already mentioned as an example in Reddy 1969:
242).

Sentential metaphors seem to be particularly closely related to

proverbs. Max Black (1962) marks that when forming sentences
that consist solely of metaphorical words we get proverbs, allego¬
ries or riddles.
I will now formulate the four rules for interpreting proverbial
metaphors and briefly discuss some related complications. The
bulk of proverb examples are taken from three classical editions:

259
“A Dictionary of American Proverbs” (AP) by Wolfgang Mieder
et al., “European Proverbs” (EP) by Gyula Paczolay, and “Prov-
erbia Septentrionalia” (PS) by Matti Kuusi et al.

The four rules

1. If a proverb consists exclusively of words literally denoting ob¬
jects and concepts belonging to “higher” levels of human func¬
tioning (i.e. mental, social etc.), and/or abstract concepts that also
belong only to humans, then the proverb is already “at home”, i.e.
has already become meaningful without any need or possibility
for further projection or mapping. In some cases a metonymic
correction is necessary. E.g.:
There is nothing new under the sun (EP No. 104); Every be¬
ginning (~ To begin) is difficult ~ hard ~ the hardest (EP No.
72); (If the) end (is) good everything (is) good (EP No. 52); So
many men, so many minds (EP No. 10); Every man has his
faults (EP No. 49); One learns until one lives ~ until death (EP
No. 31); Never (~ Do not) put off till tomorrow what you can
do today (EP No. 11); A true friend is known in need ~ adver¬
sity (EP No. 26); Better late ~ later than never (EP No. 33);
Rather hear ~ see than speak (EP No. 44); He that will not
work, shall not eat (EP No. 47); Do not do ~ wish others that
you do not like to be done to you (EP No. 57); He that lies also
steals (~ A liar is a thief) (EP No. 75); Like mother, like
daughter ~ Like father, like son (EP No. 21, 28 )

2. If the literal meaning belongs exclusively to the non-human

realm (i.e. only animals, plants and/or substances are mentioned
as agents and objects, and also the qualities, actions or relations
predicated upon them are of non-human character) and the text is
already meaningful (semantically consistent) at its literal level,
we are dealing with a sentential metaphor (in Miller’s sense), i.e.
the whole sentence is the metaphor and must be reconceptualized
to refer to something human. E.g.:
A (small) spark may (often) kindle a great fire (EP No. 15); A
barking dog never/seldom bites (EP No. 3); A horse has four
legs and still it stumbles (EP No. 25); A rolling stone gathers
no moss (EP No. 14); All cats ~ cows ~ pigs ~ sheep are alike

260
 ~ gray - black in the dark ~ a/ night (EP No. 79); d// that glit¬
ters is not gold (EP No. 19); Big fish eat little fish (EP No. 91);
Blood is not — will not turn water (EP No. 41); Constant drop¬
ping (— Many drops) wear(s) away the stone (EP No. 71);
Empty vessels make much ~ the most — greatest sound (EP No.
23); Fish always begin to stink ~ decay at the head (EP No.
97); Hawks - Ravens ~ ... w/7/ not pick out hawks’ ~ ... eyes
(EP No. 13); If an ass - beast ~ ox ~ /?/'g ~ ... goes abroad
(~ to a known seat of learning), an ass - beast - ... w/7/ return
(EP No. 87); It’s an ill — stupid bird that soils its own nest (EP
No. 106); jVew brooms sweep clean - well ~ feeder ~ best (EP
No. 12); AT? rose without a thorn (EP No. 66); AT? smoke with¬
out fire (EP No. 1); Owe scabbed sheep — calf - ... w/7/ war ~
spoil a flock (EP No. 56); Owe swallow does not make a sum¬
mer (EP No. 4); 57/7/ waters are - raw dee/? /zave a dee/?
bottom) (EP No. 78); 77/e a/?/?/e - pear - fruit - cone does not
fall (- never falls) far from the tree - trunk - root (EP No.
48); The ca/ would eat fish but would not wet her feet - claws
' — tail (EP No. 70); 77/e wolf - fox - dog may change its hair
but not its nature - skin (EP No. 32); When the cat is away,
the mice will play (EP No. 17)

3. If the text is meaningful (consistent) at its literal level and

represents human beings on some “lower” level of their function¬
ing (e.g. physical, biological, physiological), and in addition some
non-human constituents are involved (like plants, animals, things
etc.), then the denotative “lower” functions must be projected to
the “higher” level (mental, ethical, social, etc.), and a necessary
share of non-human constituents must be reinterpreted as human.
On the lexical plane, the human constituent may be repre¬
sented either directly (through substantives, e.g. child, mother,
carpenter, thief) or indirectly (through syntactic, or so-called for¬
mulaic elements): demands and requests, for example, can be ad¬
dressed only to humans, or the frequent He who... formula used in
proverbs and other deictics can signalize the presence of a human
agent or object in the text, and so on. E.g.:
A man drowning will catch at a straw - razor - snake - ... (EP
No. 81); A tree - An oak is not felled at one (- at the first)

261
 stroke (EP No. 46); An unbidden guest knows not where to sit
(EP No. 39); Appetite comes - increases with eating (EP No.
99); As you make your bed so you will lie — sleep — dream —
upon -on - z>z zY (EP No. 86); ,4s you sow, so you reap (EP
No. 2); Better one bird - pigeon - sparrow in the hand - plate
than two ~ ~ hundred in the air - ozz //ze branch -fence -
roof (EP No. 34); Do not look a gift horse in the mouth (EP
No. 5); Do not sell the bear’s skin (— Do not drink on the
bear’s skin) before the bear is caught ~ killed - shot (EP No.
38); Gz've him an inch - a finger and he will take an ell - a
/zazz<i (EP No. 36); //e adds oil ~ shvzw - fire - tow - wood to
the fire (EP No. 68); //<? Zzwys ~ se//s a arf ~ /zore ~ /?zg in a
poke (EP No. 69); He carries - draws water in the sieve (EP
No. 77); 7/e that climbs - flies - rises - sits high, falls deep
(EP No. 42); He that greases, travels (— Grease the wheel if
you intend the cart shall go) (EP No. 59); He that sows the
wind shall reap the whirlwind (EP No. 103); He who digs a pit
for another, falls in himself (EP No. 9); If - When a blind
leads a blind man both shall fall into a ditch (EP No. 35); If
one (- He who) runs after two hares, will catch neither (EP
No. 67); In the kingdom - country of the blind the one eyed is
king - ruler (EP No. 98); It is good - best - easy fishing in
troubled waters (EP No. 83); Measure - Think two - three -
seven - ten - hundred - many times (before you) cut once (EP
No. 62); Nobody cannot serve (- One cannot serve - It is dif¬
ficult to serve) two masters (EP No. 54); One must howl with
the wolves (EP No. 74); Roast pigeon - lark - sparrow - ...
does not fly into one’s mouth (EP No. 102); Stretch your legs
(-yourself) according to the cover (- until the cover reaches)
(EP No. 50); Strike when the iron is hot (EP No. 16); Sweep
(first) before your own door - doorstep - house - sidewalk -
... (EP No. 95); The cobbler’s wife is worst shod (EP No. 7);
You can see a mote in another s eye but cannot see a beam in
your own (EP No. 20)

4. The need for the reconceptualization of the sentential meta¬

phorical proverb comes from the contextual circumstances, or, in
the case of context-free interpretation, from insufficient “prag-

262
matic weight”, i.e. irrelevance, of its literal meaning. In the case
of nominal or predicative metaphors, on the other hand, the text
itself reveals a “breaking point”, i.e. a semantic contradiction or
incompatibility motivating the reinterpretation of some parts of
the proverb even without the presence of any context.
Another proof of the reality of such “inconsistent” or “partial”
metaphors are (quite rare) proverbs, where it is ambiguous which
part of the proverb should be reinterpreted, e.g. the Estonian
proverb Havi peas on rohkem kui rumala mehe peas ~ rohkem kui
vaese mehe aidas [literally: The pike has more in its head than a
stupid man ~ than a poor man in his barn] can be interpreted a) as
a hyperbole about the pike’s outstanding mental abilities, or b) as
a litotes pointing to the stupidity or material poverty of a man.
Both interpretations indeed occur in the source material.
In any case, partial (nominal, predicative, or more complex)
metaphors are quite common in the proverbs of all nations. In
such proverbs, projections can be made from both the non-human
to the human realm and vice versa.
Personification (or anthropomorphism, animation, in the more
general case) is the most frequent type of this kind of projection.
Misfortunes never/seldom come alone (EP No. 6); Fields have
eyes and woods have ears ~ Walls ~ corners ~ posts have ears
(EP No. 18, 22 ); The pot abuses ~ blames ridicules ~ laughs
at the kettle (though both are black) (EP No. 63); Love is blind
(EP No. 85)
Let us provide some additional examples from Neal Norrick’s
book “How Proverbs Mean” (1985) where most of the proverbs
are taken from his so-called “small corpus” (and all happen to
start with an “F”), e.g.
Favour will as surely perish as life; Fancy flees before the
wind; Familiarity breeds contempt, A fair pawn never shamed
his master. Facts are stubborn things; Fear has a quick ear
Some examples of partial metaphors with projections in the other
direction (i.e. depersonification, deanthropomorphism, deanima¬
tion) can be seen in the following Estonian proverbs:
Sulane on peremehe koer [The farm hand is his master’s dog];
Naine on maja lukk [Woman is the lock of the house]; Vaene
on rikka roog [A poor man is a rich man’s food (biblical)];

263
 Vaene on risu rikka silmas [A poor man is a speck in rich
man’s eye]
However, the proverbs obeying the “fourth rule” demonstrate that
the “horizontal” traffic between semantic worlds or conceptual
domains in proverbs is not arbitrarily bidirectional. Thus two
more rules concerning nomination and predication should be
added:
1. Predication in non-sentential metaphors can be two-
directional, from both human to non-human and vice versa.
2. Nomination, on the contrary, is only unidirectional. The
proverb can refer to the human being by figuratively calling
him/her an animal, plant, thing or just a human being, if wanted.
If, however, one wants to convey something proverbial about
some real non-human object (animal, plant, thing, food, disease,
natural phenomenon), this object can only be denoted by its
“true”, non-figurative name (a plant as a plant, an animal as an
animal etc.), though anything figurative can be predicated on it.
If a proverbial phrase generally stands for the predicative
component of an utterance and if I have correctly understood
Nigel Barley’s structuralistic slang, some very similar observa¬
tions about the directional restrictions of nomination were men¬
tioned in his work dating from the beginning of the 1970s. Even
though he does not talk about the opposition “human / non¬
human”, but instead “animate / inanimate”, he mentions that:
“While the proverbial phrase in Modem English allows both the
transformation of Animate -> Inanimate and Inanimate —> Ani¬
mate, I find no trace of the former semantic shift in true Modem
English proverbs” (Barley 1972: 742).

From the nature of the Great Chain of Being and the four mles
above, the two following corollaries can be deduced:
1. Sentential metaphorical proverbs with human source do¬
main and non-human target domain should be very rare.
2. Metaphorical projections between different non-human con¬
ceptual domains should be very rare.

To prove or falsify the suggestions, one must rely on factual

knowledge about the behaviour of proverbs in the actual paremic

264
tradition of one or another language or culture, not on a few ex¬
periments on present-day students in laboratories of particular
universities. Regretfully, there is not much information available
on this kind of authentic folkloric facts.
I was able to find only a few documented Estonian and Finnish
examples that falsified the above-mentioned corollaries:
(1) Mis noormees teeb, seda vanamees rikub [What a young
man does, the old man spoils] - it refers to something like ‘if it
freezes in the new moon, then it thaws in the old moon’.
(2) Hommikune kulaline laheb ruttu ara, ohtune jaab [The
guest who comes in the morning leave quickly, the guest who
comes in the evening stays longer] - (Russian loan?) refers to
the connection between the time when it starts raining and its
duration.
(3) Ttihi kott ei seisa push [An empty sack doesn’t stand up] -
Estonian proverb referring among other things to domestic
animals that lose strength and productivity if not properly fed.
(4) Karhull on karhun penikat [A bear has a bear’s pups]
' Finnish proverb, that among other things means that cold win¬
ter is followed by a cold summer.
Some of Lakoff s and Turner’s interpretations may also be con¬
sidered to be at best very exceptional if not altogether arbitrary:
“For example, “Big thunder / little rain” might be applied to a vi¬
ciously barking dog, as a way of saying that there’s no reason to
be afraid of him” (Lakoff & Turner 1989: 179), or further on
““Big thunder / little rain” works in pretty much the same way as
the English proverb “All bark and no bite”. [-] The only differ¬
ence is “All bark and no bite” cannot be applied metaphorically to
dogs, but it can be applied metaphorically to thunderstorms”
(ibid.: 180).
The following passages by Richard Honeck (1997: 142-143)
also seem purely “laboratorial”: ‘Too many cooks spoil the broth
[_] can comment critically on any situation that does not con¬
form to the ideal. This will usually be some human activity but
does not have to be. For example, we could apply “Too many
cooks...” to a beaver dam that is poorly built because several
families of beavers worked on it.” Or: “What are the pragmatics

265
of an ideal-confirming proverb, Make hay while the sun shines'?
[-] Again, this proverb, though typically applied to human ac¬
tivity, can be appropriately applied, say, to animals that engage in
sexual intercourse during the female estrus cycle.”
The obtained coarse-grained and exclusively metaphor-oriented
taxonomy leaves a bundle of mutually related and entwined prob¬
lems unsolved.

Rule 1, synecdoche, generalization and parallelism

Proverbs seem to have served as the principal midwife at the birth
of the tripartite-structured (source + target + generic) model of
metaphor in Lakoffian cognitivistics. The so-called generic-level
schema is a representation of the semantic (conceptual) intersec¬
tion of the two involved specific-level schemas (the source and
the target), formulated in sufficiently abstract and general terms in
order to cover the content of the source (i.e. the literal meaning of
the proverb) as well as all actual and eventual target situations
that are appropriate for using the proverb. Lakoff & Turner see
the relationship of the generic and the specific as metaphorical, as
the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor (further: GS-metaphor), but at
the same time emphasise the unique character of the metaphor:
unlike a usual metaphor, it does not relate two specific-level
schemas but “maps a single specific-level schema onto an indefi¬
nitely large number of parallel specific-level schemas that all
have the same generic-level structure as the source-domain
schema” (1989: 162). Thus the GS-metaphor aims to account for
a whole category of situations in the terms of one single situation,
and even allows one to understand proverbs without any context
being given (i.e. a specified target schema or evoking situation).
The latter is considered to be a special advantage and capability
of the GS-metaphor, because in this case “the generic-level sche¬
ma of the source domain counts as an acceptable target” (Lakoff
& Turner 1989: 165), and elsewhere Turner (1996: 27) has re¬
garded just such cases of contextless understanding as a proof of
the conceptual reality of the GS-metaphor. Hence the GS-
metaphor appears to be quite close to what I in an early work
(Krikmann 1974) have called the semantic potential of the prov-

266
erb. Also here above, when building up our rules for the interpret¬
ing of proverbs, we have actually borne in mind precisely the
generalized sum totals, or “figurative potentials” of the same
kind, and not the mechanical sums of their meanings in certain
documented actualizations.
The GS-metaphor entails some problems that are inconvenient
from the point of view of this topic.
1. It does indeed bear some resemblance to ordinary metaphors -
the analogy holds in both, and the so-called ontological corre¬
spondences between the components of source and target schemas
are present; the direction of mapping - “the less clearly delineated
in terms of the more clearly delineated” - also corresponds to the
general direction of metaphor-making.
On the other hand, the generic-specific relationship differs
greatly from the usual metaphorical (specific-specific) relation¬
ship and is more reminiscent of metonymy, or more specifically
the “logical” (category / member) subtype of synecdoche. Kovec-,
ses and Radden (1998: 68) argue: “...we regard proverbs as being
specific instances which metonymically, rather than metaphori¬
cally, stand for a generic-level meaning schema” (see also
Rudzka-Austin 1995: 239-242). Panther and Thornburg (2000:
225) also mention “a metonymy that we name GENERIC FOR SPE¬
CIFIC”. The triangulation rule in Tony Veale’s SAPPER-model
identifies the syntagmatic associativity between two concept
nodes and categorical relatedness of concepts, stating that the tri¬
angulation rule is invoked “whenever two concept nodes share a
common association or superclass” (e.g. see Veale 1997: 26). Cf.
also Peirsman & Geeraerts (2006: 307-308) about the metonymy
HYPERONYM FOR HYPONYM.

2. Whether the GS relationship is metaphorical or synecdochical,

it is evidently clear that the parameters of the figurativeness and
semantic generality, or abstractness, of the proverb are not inde¬
pendent from each other, but closely related (I share Zoltan
Kanyo’s claim (stated in 1981 and elsewhere) that logically all
proverbs are, in principle, generalized implications).
This makes critical the status of the proverbs under our “Rule
1”, that is, of non-figurative maxims.

267
 Nigel Barley (1972: 738) views proverbial metaphors as verti¬
cal and horizontal operations on a tree-form graph, stating that
“...we could usefully distinguish two forms of the manipulation
of the tree-diagram [-], a) sideways transposition (metaphor);
b) upward motion (generalization). [-] We are now in a posi¬
tion to see the relationship between the maxim (e.g. Everything
comes to him who waits) and the proverb proper such as The
leopard cannot change his spots. The maxim is already expressed
in general terms that are to be interpreted quite literally. The
proverb, on the other hand, is metaphorical and is expressed low
on the axis of particularisation.”
I herein completely avoid discussing the two most terrifying
related issues:
1) “translatability” of our mental, non-verbal imaginations
about, or mental representations of, the “actual” meanings of
proverbs to some metalinguistically verbalized propositions;
2) the divisibility of lexical constituents of proverb texts to
“formal” (logical, syntax-representing) and “contentful” words,
and perhaps to something between the two.
In any case, our mental intuitions of the general meaning po¬
tentials (or, cognitively speaking, generic-level representations) of
figurative proverbs should differ substantially from (representa¬
tions of) their literal meanings, but in the case of non-figurative
maxims the two representations should very probably coincide. If
ordinary language is used to verbalize these representations, they
should also come very close to the maxim texts themselves, and
further, semantic representations of some figurative proverbs
would turn out to be identical with some non-figurative texts, and
so on.
Thus it is difficult to see a way to save Lakoff s and Turner’s
tripartite model from collapsing under the weight of non-figura¬
tive maxims that threaten to push its source, target and generic
components together and make them indiscernible.
Taking things as they are does not necessarily save us from
weird theoretical outputs. According to Neal Norrick (1985: 109—
117), every proverb has a so-called standard proverbial interpre¬
tation, or SPI. SPI is quite similar to Lakoff & Turner’s generic
level representation of sentential metaphorical proverbs - for ex-

268
ample, the SPI of The early bird catches the worm would be ‘the
early agent gets the needed object’. When Lakoff & Turner qual¬
ify the GS-relationship as a metaphor, however, Norrick calls it a
(species-genus) synecdoche, that is, metonymy. Thus metaphori¬
calness remains reserved solely for proverbs obeying the “Rule 4”
in our taxonomy (see Norrick 1985: 117-128), and the important
‘human / non-human’ distinction remains altogether neglected.

3. The syntactic and logical structure of proverbs is also not inde¬

pendent from their figurativeness and generalization problems.
One of the most serious shortcomings of our metaphor-
centered taxonomy of proverbs is that it is unable to deal with ul¬
timately multiform phenomena of parallelism of which proverbs
abound.
To my view, as said above, proverbs are by their logical nature
generalized implications. Very often, however, that basic implica¬
tive level is superimposed with an additional higher parallelist
(logically, conjunctive) level.
• Parallelism in proverbs usually involves two elements or sub¬
structures, but can also evolve chains of three or more links:
America means opportunity, freedom, and power (AP: Amer¬
ica 2); Read much, speak little, and write less (AP: read 4); To
work hard, live hard, die hard, and go to hell after all would
be hard indeed (AP: hard 8); There are three kinds of people:
the wills, the won ’ts, and the can ’ts (AP: people 36)
Parallelism can be partial, e.g. Aristotelian structures with the
“absent fourth”, alias XYZ structures in Mark Turner’s terminol¬
ogy (see e.g. 1987; 1991: 183-215; 1996: 104-108; 1998: 52-55):
Diseases are the tax on pleasures (AP: disease 4); Experience
is the teacher offools (AP: experience 17); Idle hands are the
devil’s tools (AP: hand 25); Money is the source of all evil
(AP: money 42)
or the paralleled entities may be identified or connected through
certain “common denominators” (properties, consequences, etc.),
or defining their differences:
Actions and reactions are equal (AP: action 10); Anger and
haste hinder good counsel (AP: anger 3); Patience, time, and
money overcome everything (AP: patience 25); The difference

269
 between adults and children is that adidts don’t ask questions
(AP: adult 2)
Parallelism can also reveal a more or less total repetition of syn¬
tactic constituents of both ~ all of the component clauses in¬
volved:
Age and marriage tame man and beast (AP: age 1); Punish¬
ment and reward act like the bridle and spur (AP: punishment
2); Action without thought is like shooting without aiming (AP:
action 9); A heart without love is a violin without strings (AP:
heart 10)
Semantically, the parallel clauses can be related contrastively:
Many acquaintances but few friends (AP: acquaintance 4);
Hatred stirs up strife, but love covers all sins (AP: hatred 2);
Sloth makes all things difficult, but industry makes all things
easy (AP: industry 1); The heart of a fool is in his mouth, but
the mouth of a wise man is in his heart (AP: heart 71)
or synonymously:
One swallow makes not a spring, nor one woodchuck a winter
(AP: swallow); A father’s a treasure; a brother’s a comfort; a
friend is both (AP: father 1); All for one, one for all (AP: all 5)
or ambivalently, complemantarily, or in temporal order:
Hope is a good breakfast, but it is a bad supper (AP: hope 17);
Age should think and youth should do (AP: age 12); Act first
and think afterwards (AP: act 2)
Various combinations can also occur on the figurative plane, e.g.
a clause of non-human reference + a clause of human reference:
A pet person and a pet pig are the worst pets of all (AP: pet);
The blacksmith’s horse and the shoemaker’s family always go
unshod (AP: blacksmith 2); A whistling girl and a good fat
sheep are the two best things a farmer can keep (AP: whistling
2); Choose neither a woman nor linen by candlelight (AP:
candlelight)
or of “elementary” human reference + a “higher-level” human ref¬
erence:
Pride and the gout are seldom cured throughout (AP: pride
10); Poverty and hunger have many apt pupils (AP: poverty 5)
or a clearly joking, zeugma-like juxtaposition can be made:

270
 Give neither salt nor advice till you are asked for it (AP: ad¬
vice 17); Ambition and fleas jump high (AP: ambition 2); Po¬
ets and pigs are appreciated only after their death (AP: poet
3); Happiness is like jam: you can’t spread even a little with¬
out getting some on yourself (AP: happiness 19); The husband
is the head of the house, but the wife is the neck — and the neck
moves the head (AP: husband 15)
For a more extended and systematic survey of parallelism in Es¬
tonian proverbs, see Krikmann 1998b (Group F).
Proverbs with paralleled clauses, syntagms or concepts some¬
how by themselves strive to achieve generalization, but again blur
the source-target-generalization relationships.

Rule 2 and the figurative status of “allegory-like” compounds

of depersonification and personification

In the “Rule 2” proverbs, animals were expected to behave like

animals, plants like plants, and artefacts like artefacts. However, ,
there are a number of paremic items that reveal “domain interfer¬
ences”: the (metaphorical) animals or artefacts are ascribed
clearly human characteristics and activities: they think, speak,
love, blame or fear something, laugh at something, and so on.
Such cases are theoretically puzzling as they can be interpreted in
two different ways:
1) as depersonifications with some “gaps” or “errors”;
2) as examples of early “proper” animism, anthropomorphism
and allegory.5
For example:
Animals:
Foxes, when they cannot reach the grapes, say they are not
ripe (AP: fox 6); The fox condemns the trap, not himself (AP:
fox 14); Though the fox wear silk, he is still a fox (AP: fox 18);
When the fox preaches, beware of your geese (AP: fox 21);
The fox is all courtesy and all craft (AP: courtesy 18);
A scalded dog thinks cold water hot (AP: dog 32); Every dog
thinks her puppies are the cutest (AP: dog 58); Give a dog
enough rope and he’ll hang himself (AP: dog 63); The cat in
gloves catches no mice (AP: cat 23); Cows prefer the grass on

271
 the other side of the fence (AP: cow 8); Every horse thinks his
pack heaviest (AP: horse 32); The losing horse blames the
saddle (AP: horse 63); An ass thinks himself a scholar because
he is loaded with books (AP: ass 5); Every ass thinks himself
worthy to stand with the king’s horses (AP: ass 11); Every ass
loves to hear himself bray (AP: ass 10); A lazy sheep thinks its
wool heavy (AP: sheep 1)
Birds and eggs:
Crows weep for the dead lamb and then devour him (AP: crow
8); Each old crow thinks her young are the blackest ~ Every
mother crow thinks hers the whitest (AP: crow 9); Every duck
thinks it is a swan (AP: duck 3); The owl thinks all her young
ones beauties (AP: owl 2); Every bird likes to hear himself
sing (AP: bird 15); Eggs can’t teach the hen (AP: egg 10)
Artefacts:
A good anvil does not fear the hammer (AP: anvil 1); The an¬
vil fears no blows (AP: anvil 4); The old anvil laughs at many
hammers ~ An old anvil laughs at many broken hammers (AP:
anvil 6; hammer 1); The bait hides the hook (AP: bait 4);
A new broom sweeps clean, but the old broom knows the cor¬
ners (AP: broom 2); The kettle should not call the pot black ~
The pot can’t call the kettle black ass (AP: kettle 9)

Rule 3 and metonymy

Our taxonomy ignores the cofunctioning of metonymy with meta¬
phor.
The metaphor, relating different domains of experience, is a
paradigmatic operation. Therefore a metaphorical word, even
when vanishing in polysemy, usually retains contrastivity with its
original (physical or anthropomorphic) meaning and the etymo¬
logical paths of its semantic developments remain considerably
well traceable. The metonymy, on the contrary, makes “local”
syntagmatic (though syntactically “masked”) substitutions inside
one and the same domain, between contiguous conceptual and
lexical units, is characteristically pale and “reduced”, much less a
“trope” than the metaphor, and its linguistically entrenched occur¬
rences are much harder to detect.

272
The semantic status of the texts of this group is intriguingly am¬
bivalent. On the literal level of meaning, they seem semantically
“smooth” (congruous, consistent), yet their actual conceptual
structure is “broken”, i.e. multidomain. The ambivalent nature of
such proverbs becomes evident e.g. in Permjakov’s “homony¬
mous proverbs”, like Jlejtcaneeo He 6biom [Don’t hit the one who
is knocked down] or He nouMan - He eop [Not caught - not a
thief] that function as metaphorical proverbs where hitting no
longer stands only for hitting, catching no longer for catching
etc., but have originally been the historical customary rules of
Russian fist-fighting or forensic practice (see Permjakov 1975:
259, 264). Here the proverb’s “scenario” does not actually cross
the boundaries of the human domain, but relates its “lower” and
“higher” levels - and that is precisely the area where the bulk of
theoretical confusion between metaphor and metonymy seems to
occur.
The bulk of dilemmas between metaphor and metonymy arise
precisely when the figure relates to the “lower” and “higher” lev- ’
els of the human domain, particularly if the higher human proper¬
ties, functions, activities and relationships are spoken of in physi¬
cal, biological or physiological terms. Thus these dilemmas di¬
rectly touch the area of applicability of our “Rule 3” above. If the
border between the mental ~ social and “all the rest” is considered
to be stronger than the border between the human and non¬
human, then such cases begin to look like metaphors; if the ‘hu¬
man / non-human’ distinction is taken as superior, they begin to
look like metonymies.
In some earlier variants of classifications of Estonian and
Balto-Finnic proverbial figures (PS, pp. 40-41, 42-77 (Column
13); Krikmann 1998a), I tried to distinguish the proverbs under
“Rule 3” into two subtypes - “materializations” and “biologiza-
tions” (i.e. more or less purely metaphorical cases) and “visuali¬
zations” (“scenarizations”, “sensorizations”) that involved ele¬
ments of metonymy, that is, “some trope “lumps” “of local impor¬
tance” whose ftmction is to represent a conceptual structure or
fragment referred to with certain perceivable components of that
fragment” (Krikmann 1998a: 110).

273
For example, the following proverbs were qualified as ordinary
metaphorical “materializations” or “biologizations”:
Who digs a pit for another shall fall therein himself (PS No.
1); The shoemaker has shabby shoes, the tailor has patched
trousers (PS No. 7); Don’t spit into the well, you ’re going to
drink from it yourself (PS No. 9); You don’t see the beam in
your own eye, but you see the mote in another’s (PS No. 11);
When you flee a wolf you find a bear in the way (PS No. 12);
Thus the forest echoes as it is called (PS No. 19); Smite while
the iron is hot (PS No. 23); As the work so the wages (PS No.
44); Let a beggar into the sauna and he ’ll want to get on the
bench (PS No. 45); Measure seven times, cut once (PS No.
47); A large piece tears your mouth, a small one keeps you full
(PS No. 63); If you knew where you’d fall, you ’d put the cush¬
ion there (PS No. 86)
The following examples were counted as metonymic visualiza¬
tions, auditivizations or other “sensorizations”:
In at one ear and out at the other (PS No. 36); You shut a
large gate, but you can’t shut a man’s mouth (PS No. 40); One
head is good, two are even better (EP No. 15012; cf. PS No.
88); Teach a child when it still lies crosswise on the bench...
(PS No. 103); Better under an old man’s beard than under a
young man’s whip (PS No. 130); A man returns from across
the sea, but never from under the sod (PS No. 181); To the
sleeper a pillow, to the gadabout a threshold (PS No. 228);
Winter does not stay in the sky [= it will snow anyway] (PS
No. 232); It’s better to look into the mouth of someone laugh¬
ing than someone crying (PS No. 255); People don’t ask how
long it took to do, but who did it (PS No. 261); Wlio knows a
lot is asked a lot (PS No. 262); Better a mile out of the way
than an inch into danger (PS No. 285); The one with his feet in
the dirt has his mouth in the fat (PS No. 295); A good child
has many names (PS No. 330); What’s expensive is beautiful,
what’s cheap is rotten (PS No. 347); Send a child on an er¬
rand and you have to follow behind (PS No. 365); Man comes
from a sniveller, but not from an empty scoffer (PS No. 380);
Better a blister on your toe than a crease in your shoe [about
too small / too large footwear] (PS No. 394); Better a piece of

274
 bread than a bad word (PS No. 445); Where his darling, there
his eye; where the pain, there his hand (PS No. 460); The
threshold is low when leaving home but high when coming
back (PS No. 462); Big drifts in winter mean bins full of grain
in autumn (PS No. 501); Honour a grey head, bow to a bald-
head (PS No. 571); To bed with the hens, up with the cocks
(PA No. 575); Who is eating has a long hand, who is beating
has a short hand (PS No. 619); The skier gets sweaty, the
thresher gets warm (PS No. 641); A friend peels a friend’s
arse (PS No. 744); The doors to a courtroom are wide on arri¬
val but narrow when leaving (PS No. 788); Who is warm un¬
der his arse [= does not work] is cold under his nose [= has
nothing to eat] (PS No. 810); The fisherman thanks in the
morning, the hunter in the evening (PS No. 821); What Juku [
« little Johnny] doesn’t learn Juhan [~ big John] won’t know
(PS No. 856)
However, the distinction proved to be too coarse and left numer¬
ous cases that were difficult to position definitively between the '
“purely metaphorical” and “metaphorical-metonymical” occur¬
rences, for example:
The asker will not get a blow on the mouth, but taker will be
hit on the hand (PS No. 25); That which is on your mind is on
your tongue (PS No. 32); When two are doing business the
third must stay on the side (PS No. 68); The priest’s sack is
bottomless (PS No. 70); What the wind has brought, water has
flushed away (PS No. 153); Warmth won’t break bones (PS
No. 184); A dry spoon tears the mouth (PS No. 333); A dog
comes when bid, an honest man without invitation (PS No.
377); Set your mouth with the sack (PS No. 395); Who has
thirst has legs (PS No. 562); Who covers a patch with a patch
covers a penny with a penny (PS No. 623); The people’s pot is
thick (PS No. 654); A bad priest preaches about himself (PS
No. 694); The husband’s bread is the tastiest, the wife’s
clothes the whitest (PS No. 843); The stingy wears a silk dress,
the generous doesn’t even have a pearl round his neck (PS No.
857); Better to bend the fat than drag the skinny behind (PS
No. 870)

275
Rule 4 and the diversity of personifiable targets
The potential applicability of sentential metaphoric proverbs (the
eventual multitude of their targets) is given only by the linguistic
competence of users; as we aimed to demonstrate above via ex¬
amples from Honeck and Lakoff & Turner, the competence can
be insufficient. However, in toto the targeted area was believed to
be restricted to the human domain.
If proverbs with sentential personifications are practically non¬
existent, the actual diversity and fragmentarity of entities that can
be personified in proverbs already becomes visible in the proverb
texts themselves. The particular choice and frequency relations of
different types of personifiable (anthropomorphizable) targets are
obviously different in different cultures and languages. However,
my preliminary impressions tend to suggest that there is a surpris¬
ing lack of symmetry between the depersonification and personi¬
fication of that choice of targets. The expectedly “proper” per¬
sonifications, i.e. those with non-human targets (animals, plants,
inanimate natural objects, meteorological phenomena), do exist in
proverbs too, but occur relatively seldom. The bulk of the targets
are, on the contrary, concentrated on topics belonging to or at
least somehow connected with the human domain as such (like
human body parts or artefacts made and used by humans), but
particularly with the “higher” levels of the human domain, that is,
abstract concepts like substantiated human properties, capabili¬
ties, states, events, attitudes, actions, speech and other communi¬
cative acts, including “virtues and vices”, as well as time, fate and
death. And, of course, personification (anthropomorphization) is
practically the only way to speak of the superhuman “peak level”
of the GCB.
Thus the next paradox becomes evident: though concordantly
accepted as a trope, or mental operation, of the paradigmatic, i.e.
metaphorical kind, the personification in many aspects of its re¬
alization comes close to metonymy (and hence is also subjected to
all of the above-mentioned theoretical disputes connected with it).

In Krikmann 1998a: 114-117, I argued the following kinds of

targets to be particularly characteristic of Balto-Finnic (included
Estonian) proverbs:

276
 a) meteorological and other natural phenomena and objects;
b) food and clothing;
c) time, time units, calendar dates;
d) various social phenomena (debt, profession);
e) somatic referents (heart, eye, stomach, feet);
f) the word, speech, speech acts (‘If, (kind) word, promise);
g) various troubles, defective conditions, such as hunger, acci¬
dents etc.;
h) certain specific substantivized human activities and various
spiritual, ethical or other properties (carelessness, work, hate,
envy, etc.).

By and large, the same types of targets appear also to be frequent

in American proverbs:
Animals:
A dog is man’s best friend (AP: dog 13); The cat is a good
friend, but she scratches (AP: cat 24)
Body parts, blood, voice:
Empty heads talk the loudest (AP: head 13); The eye is not sat¬
isfied with seeing (AP: eye 29); The right hand is slave to the
left (AP: hand 53); The heart has eyes that the brain knows
nothing of (AP: heart 66); What the heart thinks, the tongue
speaks (AP: heart 83); A man’s best friend is his ten fingers
(AP: finger 32); Blood asks blood, and death must death re¬
quite (AP: blood 2); Blood will tell (AP: blood 7); The blood
remembers what the mind has never known (AP: blood 11);
The voice is the guardian of the mind (AP: voice 5)
Alcohol, drinks; food:
Wine is a mocker (AP: wine 17); Wine is the discoverer of se¬
crets (AP: wine 18); Whiskey - a good servant but a bad mas¬
ter (AP: whiskey 4); A man takes a drink, the drink takes a
drink, the drink takes the man (AP: drink 1); Candy is dandy,
but liquor is quicker (AP: candy)
Money, gold:
Make money your servant, not your master (AP: money 16);
Money greases the axle (AP: money 29); Money greases the
machine in the long run (AP: money 30); Money talks (but all
it says is goodbye) (AP: money 60); Money will be a slave or a

211
 master (AP: money 62); A coin is the best friend (AP: coin);
Your best friend is your dollar (AP: dollar 11); Two pennies
will creep together (AP: penny 19); Gold is an unseen tyrant
(AP: gold 9); Gold rules the world (AP: gold 18); When gold
speaks, everyone is silent (AP: gold 28)
Various artefacts:
The cards beat all the players, be they ever so skillful (AP:
cards 6); Little axe cuts down big tree (AP: axe 5); A good
book is a great friend ~ the best companion (AP: book 7);
Books are our cheapest friends (AP: book 16); Old books are
old friends (AP: book 27); Clothes speak for men, making or
closing their opportunities (AP: clothes 4); Good clothes open
all doors (AP: clothes 9); A sealed door invites a thief (AP:
door 3); Doors have eyes and walls have ears (AP: door 7)
Fire, flame:
Fire is a good servant but a bad master (AP: fire 21); Old
flame never dies (AP: flame 2)
Sun:
The sun never repents of the good he does, nor does he ever
demand a recompense (AP: sun 18)
Seasons of the year, months:
Winter comes but once a year, and when it comes, it brings the
doctor good cheer (AP: winter 3); Winter eats what summer
gets (AP: winter 8); April borrows three days of March, and
they are ill (AP: April 2); Sharp April kills the pig (AP: April
8); Till April is dead, change not a thread (AP: April 9); When
April blows his horn, it’s good for hay and corn (AP: April 11)
Time, day, today:
Kill time and time will kill you (AP: time 23); Take time by the
forelock (AP: time 35); Time and tide wait for no man (AP:
time 51); Time brings everything to light (AP: time 54); Time
changes everything (AP: time 57); Time changes the oak into
a coffin (AP: time 58); Time devours all things (AP: time 60);
Time erases all sorrows (AP: time 62); Time has a wallet (AP:
time 67); Time heals all wounds ~ cures all ills (AP: time 68);
Time is a cunning workman (AP: time 69); Time is a true
friend to sorrow (AP: time 74); Time is the best doctor (AP:
time 80); Time is the best teacher (AP: time 81); Time is the

278
 rider that breaks youth (AP: time 83); Time marches on (AP:
time 88); Time will tell (AP: time 98); Time works for those
who work (AP: time 99); Time works wonders (AP: time 100);
Today is yesterday’s pupil (AP: today 11); The day has but
one eye; the night has a thousand (AP: day 36); What a day
may bring a day may take away (AP: 45)
Fortune, faith:
Fortune always leaves one door open in disasters (AP: fortune
8); Fortune and misfortune are next-door neighbors (AP: for¬
tune 9); Fortune favors fools (AP: fortune 14); Fortune favors
the brave ~ the bold (AP: fortune 15); Fortune helps them that
help themselves (AP: fortune 16); Fortune is fickle (AP: for¬
tune 18); Fortune is the companion of virtue (AP: fortune 22);
Fortune knocks once at every door (AP: fortune 24); If fortune
smiles, who doesn’t - iffortune doesn’t, who does? (AP: for¬
tune 29); When fortune frowns, friends are few (AP: fortune
32); When fortune knocks, open the door (AP: fortune 33);
When fortune smiles, embrace her (AP: fortune 34); When for¬
tune smiles, take the advantage (AP: fortune 35); You can’t
overfill fortune’s sacks (AP: fortune 37); Faith laughs at im¬
possibilities (AP: faith 9)
History, age, end:
History teaches by example (AP: history 4); Age writes in the
sand (AP: age 13); The warnings of age are the weapons of
youth (AP: 19); The end crowns all (AP: end 7); The end justi¬
fies the means (AP: end 8)
Death:
Death defies the doctor (AP: 5); Death fiddles and we dance
(AP: 7); Death pays all debts (AP: 19); Death rides with the
drinking driver (AP: 20)

Personifications of substantivated human properties, capabili¬

ties, (emotional, deficiency, etc.) states, events, attitudes, ac¬
tions, speech and other communicative acts
Mieder’s collection of American proverbs, which on the one hand
reveals a strong historical substrate of classical (thus often liter¬
ary) European proverbs, and on the other includes a notably high

279
proportion of sayings of modem, more precisely American origin,
is particularly rich in such personifications.
Mother, father; daughter, son; sister, brother; parent,
child, and other kinship terms:
Absence is the mother of disillusion (AP: absence 4); Accident
is the mother of invention (AP: accident 3); Attention is the
mother of memory (AP: attention 1); Borrowing is the mother
of trouble (AP: borrowing 2); Diligence is the mother of good
luck ~ fortune (AP: diligence 4); Experience is the mother of
knowledge (AP: experience 14); Experience is the mother of
science (AP: experience 15); Frugality is the mother of all the
virtues (AP: frugality 2); Idleness is the mother of evil ~ mis¬
chief ~ all the vices (AP: idleness 12); Ignorance is the mother
of conceit (AP: ignorance 14); Ignorance is the mother of su¬
perstition (AP: ignorance 15); Necessity is the mother of in¬
vention (AP: 9); Patience is the mother of virtue (AP: patience
20); Politics is the mother of graft (AP: politics 4); Poverty is
the mother of all the arts (AP: poverty 16); Poverty is the
mother of invention (AP: poverty 18); Repetition is the mother
of learning ~ skill (AP: repetition); Sloth is the mother of pov¬
erty (AP: sloth 2); Sloth is the mother of vice (AP: sloth 3);
Practical utility is the mother of justice and equity (AP: utility
1); Want is the mother of industry (AP: want 5); Charity is the
father of sacrifice (AP: charity 8); Continuity is the father of
success (AP: continuity); Dissatisfaction is the father of ambi¬
tion (AP: dissatisfaction); Fear is the father of cruelty (AP:
fear 11); Ignorance is the father of crime (AP: ignorance 13);
The wish is father of the thought (AP: wish 3); Experience is
the father of wisdom and memory the mother (AP: experience
13); Poverty is the mother of crime; want of sense is the father
(AP: poverty 17); Gambling is the son of avarice, the brother
of iniquity, and the father of mischief (AP: gambling 2); Idle¬
ness is hunger’s mother, and of theft it is full brother (AP:
idleness 6); Admiration is the daughter of ignorance (AP: ad¬
miration); All arts are brothers; each is a light to others (AP:
art 1); Pity is akin to love (AP: pity 4); Poverty has no kin
(AP: poverty 11); Proverbs are the daughters of daily experi¬
ence (AP: proverb 2); Truth is the daughter of time (AP: truth

280
63); Zeal without knowledge is the sister of folly (AP: zeal 5);
Accident is commonly the parent of disorder (AP: accident 2);
Adversity is the parent of virtue (AP: adversity 7); Caution is
the parent of safety (AP: caution 3); Wise distrust is the parent
of security (AP: distrust); Industry is the parent of success
(AP: industry 6); Novelty is the great parent of pleasure (AP:
novelty 2); Caution is the eldest child of wisdom (AP: caution
3 var.); Eloquence is the child of knowledge (AP: eloquence
2); Glory is the fair child of peril (AP: glory 2); Intolerance is
the child of ignorance (AP: intolerance); Prejudice is the child
of ignorance (AP: prejudice 5); Success is the child of audac¬
ity (AP: success 29)
Friend, enemy:
Adversity has no friends (AP: adversity 4); Calamity is often a
friend in disguise (AP: calamity 3); Hunger knows no friend
(AP: hunger 9); Idleness and lust are bosom friends (AP: idle¬
ness 1); Good morals and good manners are sworn friends
(AP: morals 1); Silence is a friend that betrays no man (AP: ’
silence 6); Action is worry’s worst enemy (AP: action 7); Af¬
fectation is a greater enemy to the face than small pox (AP: af¬
fectation 2); Anger is a sworn enemy (AP: anger 12); Art has
no enemy but ignorance (AP: art 5); Your ignorance is your
worst enemy (AP: ignorance 27); Passion is ever the enemy of
truth (AP: passion 9); Art and science have no enemies but
those who are ignorant (AP: art 3); Envy is the basest of all
enemies (AP: envy 8); Absence is love’s foe: far from the eyes,
far from the heart (AP: absence 3)
Companion, neighbour:
Beauty and folly are old companions (AP: beauty 1); Cheer¬
fulness, helpfulness, and honesty are fine, good companions to
take with you through life (AP: cheerfulness 1); Best compan¬
ions are innocence and health (AP: companion 6); No com¬
panion can be better for us than gratitude in the darkness (AP:
companion 8); An evil conscience is the most unquiet compan¬
ion (AP: conscience 11); Insensibility is the companion of
drunkenness (AP: insensibility); My own thoughts are my
companions (AP: thought 11); Danger is next neighbor to se-

281
 curity (AP: danger 6); Joy and sorrow are next-door neighbors
(AP: joy 6)
Mistress; master, slave:
Art is a jealous mistress (AP: art 8); Diligence is the mistress
of success (AP: diligence 3); Love is the master of all arts
(AP: love 58); Necessity is a hard master (AP: necessity 7);
Want will be your master (AP: want 8); Debt is a hard task¬
master (AP: debt 4); While the word is yet unspoken, you are
master of it; when once it is spoken, it is master of you (AP:
word 61); Custom is a master that makes a slave of reason
(AP: custom 6)
Thief:
Care is beauty’s thief (AP: care 6); Opportunity is the thief of
virtue (AP: opportunity 14); Procrastination is the thief of time
(AP: procrastination 2); Punctuality is the thief of time (AP:
punctuality 5)
Teacher, pupil; guide:
Experience is a dear teacher (AP: experience 7); Mistakes are
often the best teachers (AP: mistake 8); Necessity is a good
teacher (AP: necessity 6); Poverty and hunger have many apt
pupils (AP: poverty 5); Custom is the great guide (AP: custom
10); Let your conscience be your guide (AP: conscience 18)
Various substantives:
A bad conscience is an accuser, judge, witness, and hangman
(AP: conscience 1); Inconsistency is the attendant of a weak
mind (AP: inconsistency 1); Punishment is a close attendant to
guilt (AP: punishment 5); Beauty is a good client (AP: beauty
8); Hunger makes the best cook (AP: hunger 12); Common
sense is genius dressed in its working clothes (AP: common
sense 3); Ugliness is the guardian of women (AP: ugliness);
Ignorance is an ungrateful guest (AP: ignorance 8); Fear is a
great inventor (AP: fear 8); Caution is the best keeper of a
castle (AP: caution 1); Hunger is a great leveler (AP: hunger
4); Hope is the nurse of misery (AP: hope 23); Kindness is a
great peacemaker (AP: kindness 13); Silence is a great peace¬
maker (AP: silence 7); Our doubts are traitors (AP: doubt 5);
Custom is a tyrant (AP: custom 8); Memory is the watchman

282
of the brain (AP: memory 2); Friendship is a magic weaver
(AP: friendship 5)
Verbs - speaking and other communicative acts:
Actions speak ~ lie louder than words (AP: action 14); Good
actions speak for themselves; they need no tin horn (AP: ac¬
tion 20); Great actions speak great minds (AP: action 21); An¬
ger and love give bad counsel (AP: anger 4); Light cares
speak; great ones are dumb (AP: care 13); Deeds speak louder
than words (AP: deed 12); Knowledge talks lowly; ignorance
talks loudly (AP: knowledge 29); Sickness tells us what we are
(AP: sickness 3); Light sorrows speak; great ones are dumb
(AP: sorrow 4); Truth gives a short answer, but lies go round
about (AP: truth 51); Let your will roar when your power can
but whisper (AP: will 4); Wisdom doesn’t always speak in
Greek and Latin (AP: wisdom 15); Conduct has the loudest
tongue (AP: conduct 1)
Dying, death; killing:
Anger dies quickly in a good man (AP: anger 6); Care killed '
• the cat (AP: care 7); Hope dies only when you die (AP: hope
14); Love never dies of starvation, but often of indigestion
(AP: love 77); Prettiness dies quickly (AP: prettiness); Vanity
dies hard (AP: vanity 4); Virtue dies at twelve o ’clock at night
(AP: virtue 22); Many good purposes lie in the churchyard
(AP: purpose 3); Secrets are never long-lived (AP: secret 13);
Truth never grows old (AP: truth 72); Virtue never grows old
(AP: virtue 34); A bad ~ good deed never dies (AP: deed 1);
Greed killed the wolf (AP: greed 2)
Breeding:
Candor breeds hatred (AP: candor 1); Delay breeds loss (AP:
delay 2); Greed breeds contempt (AP: greed 1); Sloth breeds
poverty (AP: sloth 1); Violence breeds hatred, and hatred dis¬
sension (AP: violence 2)
Teaching, nursing:
Example teaches more than precept (AP: example 3); Experi¬
ence teaches slowly and at the cost of mistakes (AP: experi¬
ence 18); Experience teaches wisdom unto fools (AP: experi¬
ence 19); Every failure teaches a man something, if he will
learn (AP: failure 2); Don’t nurse your sorrows (AP: sorrow 1)

283
 Sleeping, waking:
Affairs sleep soundly when fortune is present (AP: affair 1);
When sorrow is asleep, wake it not (AP: sorrow 16)
Eating, drinking, dining, gnawing etc.:
Hunger eats through stone walls and builds barricades (AP:
hunger 2); Malice drinks its own poison (AP: malice 1); Pride
breakfasted with plenty, dined with poverty, and supped with
infamy (AP: pride 11); Pride that dines on vanity sups on con¬
tempt (AP: pride 26); Inaction gnaws the heartstrings (AP: in¬
action)
Seeing, sight, blind:
Envy is blind (AP: envy 6); Hatred is blind, as well as love
(AP: hatred 1); Love is blind ~ Love is blind, deaf and speech¬
less (AP: love 51); Mother love is blind (AP: love 85); Fear
has many eyes (AP: fear 5); Love sees no faults (AP: love 79);
Malice has a sharp sight and a strong memory (AP: malice 2)
Knowing:
Love knows no boundaries (AP: love 65); Love knows no jeal¬
ousy (AP: love 66); Love knows no obstacles and grows with
them (AP: love 67); Love knows no season (AP: love 68); Vice
knows she’s ugly, so puts on her mask (AP: vice 7)
Curing:
Love cures coquetry (AP: love 32); Love cures the very wound
it makes (AP: love 33)
Coming, knocking, entering, departing:
When poverty comes in the door, love flies out the window
(AP: poverty 32); A good deed comes back a thousand fold
(AP: deed 3); When want comes in at the door, love flies out of
the window ~ When poverty comes in at the door, love goes up
the chimney (AP: love 102); If opportunity knocks, let her in
(AP: opportunity 4); Opportunity doesn ’t knock the door down
(AP: opportunity 12); Opportunity knocks but once ~ Oppor¬
tunity knocks but once, but temptation hammers incessantly
(AP: opportunity 16); Opportunity knocks for every man, but a
woman gets a ring (AP: opportunity 17); Opportunity never
knocks for persons not worth a rap (AP: opportunity 19);
When passion enters in at the foregate, wisdom goes out at the

284
 postern (AP: passion 16); Misfortune arrives on horseback but
departs on foot (AP: misfortune 3)
Going (together), walking, roaming, running, fleeing,
creeping, traveling, driving, tripping, following, flying etc.:
Gratitude and greed do not go together (AP: gratitude 2);
Pride and poverty go hand in hand (AP: pride 9); Idleness
goes in rags (AP: idleness 4); Pride goes before, and shame
follows after (AP: pride 15); A lie can go a mile before the
truth can put its boots on (AP: lie 3); Love goes where it’s sent
(AP: love 36); Pride goes forth on horseback grand and gay,
and comes back on foot and begs its way (AP: pride 16);
Beauty walks while angels sleep (AP: beauty 33); Folly and
beauty walk hand in hand (AP: folly 2); Virtue would not go
far if a little vanity walked not with it (AP: vanity 7); Ever let
the fancy roam; pleasure never is at home (AP: fancy 1);
Fancy runs most furiously when a guilty conscience drives it
(AP: fancy 4); A lie runs until it is overtaken by the truth (AP:
lie 8); Flee the pleasure that will bite tomorrow (AP: pleasure ‘
' 4); Love will creep where it cannot go (AP: love 82); Laziness
travels so slow that poverty overtakes him (AP: laziness 4); A
lie can travel round the world while the truth is tieing up its
shoestrings (AP: lie 4); If passion drives, let reason hold the
reins (AP: passion 7); Haste may trip up its own heels (AP:
haste 5); Fly pleasure and it will follow you (AP: pleasure 5);
Sorrow treads upon the heels of mirth (AP: sorrow 13); A lie
stands on one leg, truth on two ~ A lie only runs on one leg
(AP: lie 9)
Personifications of words and expressions:
Blame-all and praise-all are two blockheads (AP: blame-all);
Take-it-easy and live-long are brothers (AP: brother 6); Bury
can’t and you ’ll find will (AP: can 1); Can’t died in the corn¬
field ~ poor house (AP: can 2); Can’t is a liar (AP: can 3);
Can’t is a sluggard, too lazy to work (AP: can 4); Can t is un-
American (AP: can 5); Can t never could ~ Can t never did
anything; 1 don t want to will do less ~ I can t never did any¬
thing; I’ll try has done wonders (AP: can 6); Can’t was a
coward (AP: can 7); The three doctors Diet, Quiet, and Tem-

285
 perance are the best physicians (AP: doctor 17); It is better to
be a has-been than a never-was (AP: has-been); “If” is a big
stiff (A?: if 2)

Hitherto we used as the framework model of our observations the

restricted variant of the GCB that Lakoff & Turner called basic.
Historically, though, the basic was just the version that Lakoff &
Turner called extended and which also included the supernatural
level of gods, demons, angels, ghosts, etc. The variety of personi-
fiable entities also compels us to include this superhuman domain
in our observations as well, because proverbs do actually contain
words like God, devil, angel, etc., and so we have to deal with
their rhetorical nature. The link between the human and superhu¬
man is also one of the most important problems arising from the
GCB.
Perhaps the well-known “technical” synonyms for God in
many languages (for instance English King, Lord, German Herr,
Finnish Herra, Estonian Is(s)and, Russian Focnodb, etc., etc.) are
also etymological descendants of the GCB, i.e. the names of rep¬
resentatives of the highest rank of various degrees of social com¬
munities: State —» Feudal domain —>• Family, domestic household.
Of course these could be considered as phenomena of anthropo¬
morphism.

In proverbs both God and the devil are completely anthropomor¬

phic.
God is omnipotent; he sees and knows everything, and his will
governs everything. Nothing is accidental for him, though you
may not notice his presence at once: God’s mill grinds slowly, but
it grinds exceedingly fine. Therefore fear of the Ford is the begin¬
ning of wisdom.
God is generous, he always opens his hand himself and loves
the cheerful giver, he tempers the wind to the shorn lamb and
builds a nest for the blind bird, he fits your back to your burden
and if you have a mouth, God will help to feed it.
One should, however, not place all one’s hopes in God alone:
God sends every bird its food, but he does not throw it into the
nest; he promises a safe landing, but not a calm passage. God
helps only those who help themselves, he never helps him who

286
sits on his ass and waits, therefore you must trust in God and do
something, pray to God, but keep hammering.
God does not help haphazardly, and only puts food into clean
hands. And even if you are bad, God will grip you, but not choke
you.
Heaven is often just a metonymy for God: Heaven is above all
and will mend all. Heaven helps those that help themselves, keeps
those who keep themselves and protects the good man. The will
of heaven is mysterious and not easily discovered.
In any case, it is not easy to get to heaven: it is a place pre¬
pared for those prepared for it. Some people are too mean for
heaven and too good for hell. Not everybody who talks about
heaven will go there, and those who know all about heaven sel¬
dom get there.
As the Act of Creation originated from good intentions, the devil
has no place in the model of GCB, despite its abundant occur¬
rence in practically all folklores and religions. In proverbs and .
phraseology the devil is, as a rule, an anthropomorphized axio¬
logical antipode of God who often tries to spoil God’s good
deeds:
Where God has a church, the devil has a chapel (AP: God 26);
The devil hawks his wares within the house of God (AP: devil
19); God sends meat, and the devil sends cooks (AP: God)
The figure of the devil in proverbs is particularly vivid and
colourful.
The devil speaks, drinks and eats. Sarcasm is his language and
poetry is his drink.
The devil preys on people, setting nets and traps for them, like
bad companies and alcohol; gold is his fishhook, women are his
nets and a sweet voice is often a devil’s arrow that reaches the
heart; discouragement is another of his most valuable tools. The
devil is restless in his work; he never sleeps, is never idle; he is
master of all the arts.
One must avoid making deals with the devil: it you give him
an inch he will take an ell, and he that takes the devil into his boat
must carry him over the sound. It’s hard to keep out the devil, but
it is worse to drive him out. When the devil has already come, it is

287
too late to pray. Even speaking of the devil is dangerous: do it and
he will appear. You must be very cautious with the devil: when
fortune knocks at your door, the devil accompanies it.
The devil must be fought back with his own tools, or with fire.
You also can kill the devil by kindness, but actually one has few
chances of success, and therefore it is reasonable to give him his
dues, because he will get them anyway.
Where the devil cannot go himself, he sends his evil grand¬
mother or credulous children.
However, the devil is not as black as he is painted. He has a
bizarre, malicious sense of humour: he laughs when he sees the
biter bitten or when denominations fight. He is even in a sense
just, e.g. hates a coward and places pillows for a drunken man to
fall on.
The devil lives in hell.
The devil uses idle minds as his workshop and idle hands as
his tools.
Hell is populated with the victims of harmless amusements;
the road to hell is wide and paved with good intentions and its
streets are paved with promises; there is a large store full of good
intentions and sorry people. Despite that, it is never totally full,
there is always room for sinful newcomers, like thieves, liars,
lawyers etc.

When we are told something about God or godS or supernatural

beings in general, the problem “metaphor or metonymy?” arises
very often.
It seems that the ordinary contemporary person (I daren’t say
anything about postmodern persons) tends to understand many
metaphor-formed expressions about God or Jesus metonymically,
for example: God is love comes to mean ‘God is somehow con¬
nected with love, represents love, loves us’, etc., or the famous
lam the way and the truth and the life (John 14:6) comes to mean
something like ‘I am the one who shows you the right way and
speaks truth and gives you eternal life’.
I have elsewhere touched on the peculiar group of calendar
proverbs which I have termed “saint-personifications”, for in¬
stance the Estonian saying about the degrees of cabbage mellow-

288
ing, Laurits laotab lehti, Partel poorab paid [Lawrence spreads
the leaves, Bartholomew turns the heads], or Kadri hakkab kusele,
aga Andres pistab pulga ette [Catherine begins pissing, but An¬
drew stops her with a stick], Jaan viskab esimese jahe kivi vette,
Jaak teise ja Mihkel kolmanda [John drops the first cold stone in
the water, Jacob drops the second and Michael the third], and a
great number of others.
In that earlier “proverb period” of my life I have also often and
endlessly pondered the paradoxical question: do proverbs that
speak of God have a profoundly different “figurative structure”
for a religious person and for a non-believer.
As a matter of fact, the problem is not in the presence / ab¬
sence of some “materialized” image in the figurative part of the
proverb. Take, for instance, the saying God’s mills grind slowly
but exceedingly fine - hardly any reasonable believer would think
that God has some ontologically real buildings and equipments
like mills somewhere. Some Estonian and Finnish proverbs and
expressions expose God not only anthropomorphically, but also
extremely naturalistically:
Jummal tulo-oi suuhto sitalo ~ Jumal ei situ suhu ega Jeesus
ei kata ihu [God doesn’t come and shit in one’s mouth ~ God
doesn’t shit in one’s mouth and Jesus doesn’t cover one’s
body]; Mine Jumal a per set peksama ~ Jumala perse olgu pek-
samatta [Go and beat God’s ass ~ Make sure God’s ass is not
beaten]; Cf. also Finnish: Jumalan perse paukkuu (about thun¬
der) [God’s ass is shooting (thunder claps)]6
The problem is instead in the presence / absence of the ontologi¬
cally real fact of intentionality in the readings of these proverbs,
that is, in the presence / absence of the act of personification
therein. It is evident that in the cognitive theory of metaphor, the
general formula for personification is EVENTS ARE ACTIONS. In
the minds of ordinary people, however, human beings are the only
proper agents. In what sense we can speak of timeless, spaceless
and bodiless almighty spiritual beings as agents is for me a total
theological mystery. For non-believers these proverbs most likely
sound like propositions about events, and NOT actions — God will
be understood as a natural, material causality, fate, good or bad
luck, or the like - that is, metonymically again.7

289
 6. In lieu of a conclusion:
Division of labour between metaphor and truth
A couple of centuries ago the “division of labour” between phi¬
losophy and science on the one hand and rhetoric and poetry on
the other, was altogether different (and not as clear) as it is nowa¬
days. In The History of Science and Religion in the Western Tra¬
dition: An Encyclopaedia (2000), one can find Chapter 63 MAC¬
ROCOSM / MICROCOSM, written by John Henry from the Uni¬
versity of Edinburgh. Even in the 17th century it was seriously be¬
lieved that there was a systematic analogy between man (or “mi¬
crocosm”) and the universe as a whole (or the “macrocosm”). It
was also believed that there existed a real ontological analogy be¬
tween the organisation of the human body and human society, the
society and the “macrososm”, and so on. Henry (p. 344) writes:
The structure and organization of man, and even his life processes,
corresponded, therefore, to the structure, organization and natural
processes of the world. As Walter Raleigh (1552-1618) put it in his
History of the World (1614):
His blood, which disperseth itself by the branches of veins through
all the body, may be resembled to those waters which are carried by
brooks and rivers over all the earth, his breath to the air, his natural
heat to the inclosed warmth which the earth hath in itself...the hairs
of man’s body, which adorns or overshadows it, to the grass which
covereth the upper face and skin of the earth... Our determinations
to the light wandering and unstable clouds, carried everywhere with
uncertain winds, our eyes to the light of the sun and the moon, and
the beauty of our youth to the flowers of the spring which in a very
short time or with the sun’s heat dry up and wither away, or the
fierce puffs of wind blow them from the stalks.

And further, p 347:

One of the most famous examples of the use of the analogy between
the body and the body politic in the history of science is to be found
in the works of William Harvey (1578-1657), discoverer of the cir¬
culation of the blood. The first announcement of his discovery of
blood circulation, in his On the Motion of the Heart and Blood
(1628), drew upon entirely traditional analogies straight from the
standard view of the Great Chain of Being and its correspondences.
The heart was “the sun of the microcosm,” the sun was “the heart of

290
 the world,” and King Charles I (ruled 1625^19), to whom the book
was dedicated, was “the sun of his microcosm, the heart of his com¬
monwealth.”
And so on and so on.
However, only a couple of years ago Alexander Wendt (2004)
argued that states are persons in an entirely direct (philosophical,
ontological) sense, because all basic criteria for defining personal¬
ity or agency hold true for them too: they are intentional, they are
organisms (sic!), and they possess consciousness.
From here, direct links reach to the general vivid, sharp and
serious disputes around the very concepts of intentionality and
consciousness, including the notorious qualia, etc. - about their
contentfulness, the limits on their applicability to “lower” do¬
mains, for example, animal behaviour, but in so-called biosemiot¬
ics also to the plant kingdom, and also to social groups (via the
notion of so-called collective intentionality), and so on.
Or take the meaning of the expression to be awake, for in¬
stance. Our common sense understanding of it is simple: if we do
not sleep physiologically, we are awake in the literal sense, and
all of the mental “second order awakenings” (so-called religious
experiences, states of transfiguration and inspiration, etc.) are
counted as metaphors. Ernst F. Schumacher, however, in his
A Guide for the Perplexed, aims to convince us that the last type
of spiritual awakening is ontologically real, whereas our usual,
everyday state of consciousness should instead be qualified as
sleeping:
When we are acting or thinking or feeling mechanically, like a pro¬
grammed computer or any other machine, we are obviously not
awake in this [real] sense, and we are doing, thinking or feeling
things that we have not ourselves freely chosen to do, think or feel.
[-] When we are not awake in our attention, we are certainly not
self-aware and therefore not fully human; we are likely to act help¬
lessly in accordance with uncontrolled inner drives or outer compul¬
sions, like animals. [-] traditional wisdom, including all the great
religions, as mentioned before, has always described itself as ‘The
Way’ and give some kind of awakening as the goal. Buddhism has
been called the ‘Doctrine of Awakening’. Throughout the New Tes¬
tament, people are admonished to stay awake, to watch, not to fall
asleep. (Schumacher 1977: 80-81)

291
Finally I would like to say some words about the phenomenon of
the “spatialization of everything”, which seems to be a hot topic
of discussion in contemporary semiotics and elsewhere.
As Eve Sweetser (1990) and others have demonstrated, practi¬
cally all lexical devices for speaking about mental and abstract
things prove to be descended - overtly or at least etymologically
- from the domain of the physical world. In his seminal book
Body in the Mind (1987), Mark Johnson has investigated two
main types of Gestalts that constitute the basis of our metaphori¬
cal thinking and speaking - SPACE and FORCE.
Many abstract concepts are not explicitly represented in the
GCB model - time and space, generic and specific, causality, and
so on. But the GCB model itself is an excellent example of the
“spatialization of everything”. It is a hierarchy with vertical and
horizontal dimensions. It is a unity of continuity and discreteness.
And what is especially intriguing is that it conspicuously demon¬
strates the axiological markedness of space, particularly its verti¬
cal dimension, which is deeply rooted in the human mind in gen¬
eral. High and up are good, whereas low and down are bad. Be¬
low the “zero point”, however, superficial is bad, deep is good,
and so forth.
The axiological aspects of existence have so far been relatively
abandoned topics in the theory of metaphor. I am, however, deep¬
ly convinced that they are worthy of investigation and promise
auspicious results.

Notes

1. Lovejoy (1936: 59) argued that

“through the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century,
many philosophers, most men of science and, indeed, most educated
men, were to accept without question the conception of the universe as a
“Great Chain of Being,” composed of an immense, or - by the strict but
seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle of continuity - of an in¬
finite number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest
kind of existents, which barely escape non-existence, through “every
possible” grade up to the ens perfectissimum - or, in a somewhat more
orthodox version, to the highest possible kind of creature, between

292
which and the Absolute Being the disparity was assumed to be infinite -
every one of them differing from that immediately above and that im¬
mediately below it by the “least possible” degree of difference.”

2. From Encyclopaedia Britannica Online:

Great Chain of Being
also called Chain Of Being, conception of the nature of the universe
that had a pervasive influence on Western thought, particularly through
the ancient Greek Neoplatonists and derivative philosophies during the
European Renaissance and the 17th and early 18th centuries. The term
denotes three general features of the universe: plenitude, continuity, and
gradation. The principle of plenitude states that the universe is “full,”
exhibiting the maximal diversity of kinds of existences; everything pos¬
sible (i.e., not self-contradictory) is actual. The principle of continuity
asserts that the universe is composed of an infinite series of forms, each
of which shares with its neighbour at least one attribute. According to
the principle of linear gradation, this series ranges in hierarchical order
from the barest type of existence to the ens perfectissimum, or God.
The idea of the chain of being was first systematized by the Neopla-
tonist Plotinus, though the component concepts were derived from Plato *
and Aristotle. Plato’s “idea of the good” in the Republic, eternal, immu¬
table, ineffable, perfect, the universal object of desire, is fused with the
demiurge of the Timaeus, who constructed the world of becoming be¬
cause “he was good, and in one that is good no envy of anything else
ever arises.” Aristotle introduced a definition of the continuum and
pointed out various graded scales of existence. Thus, in the words ot
Plotinus, in his Enneads, “The one is perfect because it seeks for noth¬
ing, and possesses nothing, and has need of nothing; and being perfect, it
overflows, and thus its superabundance produces an Other.” This gen¬
eration of the many from the one must continue until all possible varie¬
ties of being in the descending series are realized.
The scale of being served Plotinus and many later writers as an ex¬
planation of the existence of evil in the sense of lack of some good. It
also offered an argument for optimism; since all beings other than the
ens perfectissimum are to some degree imperfect or evil, and since the
goodness of the universe as a whole consists in its fullness, the best pos¬
sible world will be one that contains the greatest possible variety of be¬
ings and so all possible evils. The notion died out in the 19th century but
was given renewed currency in the 20th by Arthur O. Loveioy (The
Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, 1936).

293
3. See, e.g., Lynskey (1945); Boas (1948); Randall (1963); Mazzeo
(1972); Hintikka (1975/76); Duffin (1980); Gram & Martin (1980); Beer
(1986); Gordon-Boumique (1987); Mahoney (1987); Oakley (1987);
Wilson (1987); Kelley (1990); Hahlweg (1991), and many others.

4. Here is a fragment of Sir John Denham’s (1615-1659? 1669?) poem

entitled Thames River.
O, could I flow like thee! and make thy stream
My great example, as it is my theme;
Though deep yet clear, though gentle yet not dull;
Strong without rage, without o ’erflowing full.
(Quoted and analyzed in I. A. Richards (1936: 121))
Generally, the poet’s mind is the target, and the river is the vehicle. In
the two last lines, however, these planes of meaning begin to alternate
and sway to and fro. In the third line, deep and clean are literally instead
attributes of the river (i.e. the vehicle), and the author’s mind continues
to be the target. Then, however, the oscillation between the two planes
begins. In though gentle, but not dull the roles of these planes are evi¬
dently changed - here the river is spoken about rather in terms of the
human mind. Richards says that here the river is being personified, as
well as in the following clause strong without rage. That is certainly
true, but the process seems to be even more nuanced. Metaphors evi¬
dently distinguish different levels of “mind”, and, folk-theoretically
speaking, the “intellectual mind” seems to be, to say, more distant from
the flesh level, and the “emotional mind” closer to it. Thus strong with¬
out rage as a whole seems to have a more complicated and multilevel
structure. The word strong is actually indefinite, in the sense that it cer¬
tainly denotes the physical level of something, but it is impossible to de¬
termine whether it is more densely associated with river or with human
being. Thus the clause strong without rage actually becomes structurally
altogether ambiguous - both the interpretation the Thames is strong
without rage (i.e. the personification of the river) and another interpreta¬
tion My spirit ~ intellect is strong without rage (i.e. the personification
of the author and his mind) seem equally acceptable. And finally, in the
very last clause, without o 'erflowing full, the metaphor returns to its ini¬
tial direction - depersonification - displaying some of the features of the
poet’s mind as the properties of a river.

5. Analogous dualities can evidently also occur in the case of personifi¬

cations. Neal Norrck (1985: 120), for example, when interpreting the
English proverb Fancy may bolt bran and think it flour as ‘Anthropo¬
morphic fancy may sift bran and think it flour’, explains it in the follow-

294
ing way: “Other formulations like “a person possessed of fancy” and “a
fanciful person” may sound better, but they fail to reflect the semantic
process which lead to them [i.e. anthropomorphization - A.K.], so I
stick to the more revealing if clumsier formulation”.

6. In ordinary language, God and the devil also display a strong affinity
for grammaticalization. God! is in many languages an interjection used
to express surprise or regret. Devil is in some languages a strong swear¬
word and is avoided. In some other languages, e.g. in the speech of some
male Estonians, kurat practically takes the place of comma. The “gram¬
maticalization” of swearwords and terms of abuse is generally well-
known and frequent. Take, for example, the following joke on the Rus¬
sian “indefinite article”.
Armenian Radio was asked: Should the Russian indefinite article
fijiaab be used before or after the headword?
Armenian Radio answered: the Russian indefinite article ojih/ib must
be used both before and after the headword.

7. Things are much worse if the metonymical reading is also excluded.

In Philip Wheelwright’s book Metaphor and Reality (1962: 149),,
there is a fragment from the lost play of Aeschylos, The Daughters of
Danae:
The pure sky [Ouranos] desires to penetrate the earth, and the earth
is filled with love so that she longs for blissful union with the sky. The
rain falling from the beautiful sky [Ouranos] impregnates the earth, so
that she gives birth to fodder and grain for flocks and man. [NB! Gaia is
here translated as ‘earth’]
Wheelright comments upon this as follows: “Nevertheless the pas¬
sage reflects a type of utterance that had be current in an earlier mytho-
poeic period, in which no linguistic and hence no clearly conceptual dis¬
tinction had yet been drawn between the physical sky and the divine
personage Ouranos.”
The situation is very difficult to understand for a person with a mod¬
em mindset. As there is no division into two plans of meaning, there is
also no reason to speak not only about personification or depersonifica¬
tion as such, but also about literal speech as such. We become totally
confused! Here we do not have a story about certain meteorological and
biological events figuratively expressed in terms of the sexual inter¬
course between the Greek gods. Nor is it a description of sexual inter¬
course between the Greek gods expressed figuratively in meteorological
and biological terms, or a literal expression in the usual sense. It is quite
simply a verbal output of mythological thinking.

295
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300
 Excursus

DIGGING ONE’S OWN GRAVE

Abstract: The paper aims to demonstrate that some points in the ex¬
plication of the figurative expression digging one’s own grave via
the concept of blending given by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner
are problematic: (1) Not understanding the consequences of one’s
deeds is an almost universal presupposition of and impulse or moti¬
vation for actualizing any utterance with a forewarning or gloating
content (e.g., proverbs), not the singularity characterizing just the
expression of grave-digging as such. (2) The inversion of causal and
temporal structure is not the case because of metonymic association
between the concepts of the grave and death, as a result of which
specific causal and temporal order loses any significance. Many syn-
onymous examples can be given in which the image refers to events
before the death, between the death and funeral, as well as those after
burial. (3) The source domain needs not to be restricted to natural
death and modem civilized funerals but should include also the cases
of violent deaths, e.g., the scenario of execution and the scenario of
hunting and trapping. Preliminarily, a very brief synopsis of the main
phases of development of cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor
and some favourite examples of blends, used also in previous works,
is provided.

Key words: metaphor, metonymy, blending theory, divided person

metaphor, idioms, proverbs

As we know, in Lakoffian cognitive linguistics the metaphor is

conceived as a mapping or projecting operation between two
“somethings”.
There are two kinds of such “somethings” - the larger and the
smaller. The larger ones are called domains, conceptual or experi¬
ential domains. Inside them there are smaller “somethings” called
schemas, scripts, frames, etc., which in the last ten years or so
have also been referred to as mental spaces.

301
 The main components connected by the operation of projec¬
tion or mapping are called the source and the target. The source is
about the same component as the vehicle in Ivor Armstrong Rich¬
ards’ rhetoric (1936): that is, the figurative component of the
metaphor. Target is the “overt” or “literal” component of the
metaphor, that is, the object which is characterized or conceptual¬
ized with the aid of figurative devices borrowed from the source
object. Its approximate counterpart in Richards’ rhetoric is the
tenor.
★ Sally is a block of ice - here Sally is the target and block of
ice is the source.
★ The rock is becoming brittle with age — this is John Michael
Reddy’s (1969) famous sentential metaphor that consists only
of the source component. The old professor of geology, here
the target of the metaphor, is totally removed from the text and
hidden into the context.
The development of views on the structure of metaphor in cogni¬
tive linguistics during the last twenty years or so has proceeded
through three phases.
★ Initially, it was conceived that the mapping simply involves the
source and the target and nothing else, and the mapping is
straightforward and direct.
★ Then, in the More than Cool Reason by George Lakoff and
Mark Turner (1989: 162 ff.), the third component was added - the
so-called generic-level schema. It is interesting to note that the
generic level was added just for the purpose of analyzing prover¬
bial metaphors, more specifically, the expression the blind blames
the ditch. The generic-level schema is something like a concep¬
tual common part of the source and the target and it intermediates
the transfer of information from the source to the target.
★ And, finally, the fourth component - the blend - was added by
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, who have since the middle of
the nineties developed their theory of conceptual integration, or
blending. Since then, some people deeply believe in its heuristic
capacities, while others deny it categorically. Only few research¬
ers have a relatively calm, neutral or indifferent attitude to it.
In the blending theory, the basic components of the metaphor
are now called mental spaces, not schemas, as before. The mental

302
space is not an exact counterpart of the schema, it aims to reflect
more flexibly and dynamically namely the online processes that
take place in human thought and communication. Their defining
nickname is “small conceptual packets”. The scope of the concep¬
tual integration is not restricted to metaphors, though it involves
metaphors as well. Actually, their spectrum is very wide — from
two-word collocations like brown cow or blue cap to highly com¬
pound constructions with much more than the usual four compo¬
nents, like the notorious Grim Reaper blend.
In cognitive metaphor theory the amount of analyzable em¬
pirical material is reduced to a quite small number of favourite
examples, reiterating tens or hundreds of times and wandering
from works to works again and again. There are the favourite ex¬
amples of blends as well.
One of them is the above-mentioned Grim Reaper, and another
the Surgeon-Butcher. (Some schematizations of blending struc¬
tures are quoted in Krikmann 2001: 46^49.) It is noteworthy that
the structure of the Surgeon-Butcher blend happens to be imag- ’
ined by different authors very differently. It is hitherto unclear
what exactly does this or that blend borrow from either of the two
basic spaces, in which way exactly does it manipulate and process
that information, and what exactly are the alleged operations of
integration, unpacking, backward projection and others.
Still, there exist other favourite and often reiterated examples
of blends:
★ the imaginary race between the ships Northern Light and Great
America //(in the years 1856 and 1993, respectively);
★ Arthur Koestler’s paradox of the Buddhist monk who one day
climbs to the peak of the mountain and the next day comes back
down and, taken logically under certain preconditions, should
meet himself somewhere in the middle of any of his trips;
★ the so-called counterfactual sentences, like If Bill Clinton were
the Titanic, the iceberg would sink.
There are many others as well (see also Krikmann 2001: 45-
46), but I would like to discuss, in more detail, only one of them -
the expression digging one’s own grave.

303
Fauconnier (1997: 168-171); Fauconnier and Turner (1998: 149—
151) claim that this expression cannot be analyzed without apply¬
ing the notion of the blend either. The basic essence of their view
is briefly as follows:
Superficially, what seems to happen here is a direct projection
from the specific domain of deaths, graves and burials to the more
abstract domain of failures and misfortunes, because the agent -
the “digger” - cannot predict the consequences of his/her own
deeds. But on closer examination one can find many paradoxical
inconsistencies between the source and the target.
★ The causal structure is wrong: foolish actions cause failures,
but grave digging does not cause death.
★ The intentional structure is also wrong: graves are being dug
purposely, not in sleep or by accident.
★ The frame structure is also reversed, that is, the roles of the
agent and the patient, and the sequence of events: people rarely
dig graves for themselves (prisoners, for example, are sometimes
forced to), and usually the graves are dug after someone’s death
rather than beforehand.
★ The internal event structure is also wrong: there seems to be a
correlation between the depth of the grave and the probability of
death, which does not actually hold.
Fauconnier and Turner suggest that in order to resolve these
paradoxes, the blending space must be construed. The blend will
inherit from the source domain the concrete structure of the grave,
digging and burials, but the causal structure, intentional structure
and the internal event structure must be taken from the target do¬
main, that is, from the domain of failures and misfortunes. In that
“Thru the Mirrow” kingdom all the curious events do actually
happen and the strange laws do hold. The existence of a grave
brings along death. The depth of the grave correlates with the
probability of death. In the blend it becomes possible not to un¬
derstand the consequences of one’s own actions. And so on.
An alternative attempt of explanation is offered by Ruiz de
Mendoza Ibanez (1998: 269-273). Its basic component is the so-
called divided person metaphor. According to Lakoff and John¬
son (1999: 267-289), the human personality is conceived as con¬
sisting two components - the subject that covers in principle all

304
the rational and controlled aspects of the human mind, and the
self that, respectively, covers all its emotional, spontaneous, wild,
uncontrolled aspects, and our mental and social activities bring
forth manifold conflicts between the two. I bypass Ruiz de Men¬
doza s interpretations and now try to propose some critical re¬
marks against the necessity for using the concept of blended space
in order to explain figurative expressions of the kind.

1. Not understanding the consequences of one’s deeds is an

almost universal presupposition of and an impulse or motivation
for actualizing proverbs. The universal aspiration of proverbs is to
guide and control somebody’s behavior. To give only one exam¬
ple ~ Do not spoil the old well if the new one is not ready — this
necessarily assumes that the addressee is not really able to predict
the consequences of his/her foolish actions and therefore his/her
behavior needs correction. Thus the blend would become a tool
with practically universal applicability, a panacea for whatever
diseases. Or to remember Matti Kuusi’s famous aphorism: The •
key that opens all the doors is not a key, but a picklock.

2. The inversion of causal and temporal structure. Neither

Fauconnier and Turner nor Ruiz de Mendoza remembers the me¬
tonymy. But Seana Coulson in her Semantic Leaps (1997: 239)
does: “a grave is metonymically associated with death” (cf. also
Coulson & Oakley 2003: 66). But if to assume here the co¬
presence of metaphoric and metonymic operations in processing
the source domain (or schema, or space), the concrete causal and
temporal order lose any importance. What remains important is
that the conceptual realization of the image belongs to the grim
and dark, axiologically negative domain of death. Exactly which
part of the scenario is realized - that before or that after death -
does not create any noise in understanding of the figure, simply
because the interpretation process will not reach these degrees of
precision. Take, for example, the following “alternative exam¬
ples”:
★ You are slowly killing yourself
★ It is a slow ~ lingering death
★ You seem to be searching for your death quite deliberately
~ on purpose

305
 ★ Well, order a coffin ~ your last rites!
★ You are making a coffin for yourself ~ a cross for your
grave
★ You are crawling into your own grave ~ coffin
★ Well, start walking towards the cemetery!
★ Well, you can bury yourself - you are burying yourself
★ You are placing a cross on your grave
★ Are you picking flowers for your grave?
★ You are making a wreath for your own grave
The expressions refer in a straightforward manner to natural death
and civilized funeral. They do not evoke any thoughts about the
identity of the object of burial - whether it is an alive human be¬
ing from the source domain, or a corpse, or a zombie from the
blend, and whether someone is already in the coffin (supposing
the burial involves the use of a coffin), or will he be really buried
or will he escape, will he be buried alive or dead, etc.
I would like to use the opportunity to thank, once again, my
dear and honored friend, Professor Wolfgang Mieder who pro¬
vided me with a lot of information concerning the notorious
Sargnagel ~ coffin nail which is also a junction of the metaphor
and metonymy (a metaphtonymy, as Louis Goossens would call
it). Obviously, the physical similarity of a nail and a cigarette and
the metonymic associative connection of both coffin and cigarette
and smoking with death have been sufficient preconditions for its
initial entrenchment in the phraseological tradition and for its
later extrapolation to new, mental, communicative and social ar¬
eas of application.

3. Expanding the source domain. Fauconnier and Turner, as

said above, restrict their area of observation to natural death and
modem civilized funerals. Still many fables, proverbs and phrases
have bom, grown and lived in much more rigorous, much less
civilized conditions. The world, nature and human life are de¬
scribed as a journey through a “danger landscape”, as a merciless
survival of the fittest. The environment is indifferent at its best, or
deliberately unfriendly, dangerous, and hostile at its worst. Com¬
passion is a rare emotion found only among the closest relatives.
All this summed up in a huge dangerous world, where even your

306
 children are awaiting your death and your mammon, your hus¬
band is violent and beats you, your wife is constantly ready to
cheat on you, your friends do not know you when you are in trou¬
ble, your masters are greedy and angry, your cattle is threatened
by wolves, your crops by flood, drought or insects, your house by
lire or storm, your life by plague, wars, bandits, predators, snakes,
crocodiles, whirlpools... To survive, one must be tough, he must
kill animals, and, if necessary, also people.
So we could try to extend the domain of death to the cases of
violent death as well. A violent death always involves an Agent,
the Killer. There are at least two scenarios that could expand the
list of possibilities to endanger ourselves.
The first one is the scenario of execution. Look at the
examples below:
★ You are building a gallows for yourself
★ You are making a noose for yourself
★ You are climbing the gallows yourself ~ of your own free
will
★ You are slipping ~ putting ~ your head into the noose
★ You are climbing onto the stake
★ You are deliberately putting your head on the block
The other - and in our case more important - is the s c e n a r i o
of hunting and trapping.
Coulson (1997: 239) mentions another important fact over¬
looked by Fauconnier and Turner - graves are a kind of holes, but
holes as such are dangerous - the deeper they happen to be, the
more dangerous they are. The digger of a grave is in danger (be¬
fore his supposedly natural death) just because he is located in the
grave, that is, in a pit, hole, in a potential trap.
It is not ruled out that the whole series of expressions of dig¬
ging one’s own grave originates etymologically in the biblical
proverb Whoso diggeth a pit shall fall therein (Ps. 7, 16; Prov. 26,
27; Eccl. 10, 8; Sir. 27, 27). The proverb is internationally well-
known (type H5d22 in Kuusi & Lauhakangas 2001): it is listed as
the ninth in popularity in Europe (see Paczolay’s “European
Proverbs” 1997: 77—82) and the first in Finnic common repertoire
(cf. Kuusi et al. 1985). Both holes and graves are represented in
the records of the proverb and in many languages and dialects one

307
and the same root may have both meanings (e.g., the Southern Es¬
tonian haud). This swarm of synonymous proverbs, in turn, di¬
verges to various directions: holes are replaced with other kinds
of traps, nets, fishing rods, etc., and further, to other kinds of ma¬
lignance, like poisoning, spells, curses, slandering, gossip, etc.
In the case of traps, of course, there are no inconsistencies in
the causal or temporal structure of the expression. Neither is the
intentional structure reversed in the biblical version: the hole is
meant for someone else and the digger falls into it by accident.
The focus of the danger is the hole as a trap itself, and the only
way to avoid the traps set by others or yourself when traveling
through the “danger landscape” is to have a good memory.

Comments
A paper presented at the 14th Congress of the ISFNR: Tartu, July 27,
2005.

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Proverbium 23 (1974), pp. 865-879.

★ The Great Chain Metaphor: An Open Sesame for Proverb Se¬

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In Estonian: Retoorilise, modaalse, loogilise ja siintaktilise plaani
seostest eesti vanasonades. Keel ja Kirjandus 1997, no. 4, pp. 232
-244; no. 5, pp. 327-343; no. 6, pp. 384-393.
★ Proverbs on Animal Identity: Typological Memoirs. Folklore:
An Electronical Journal of Folklore. Vol. 17 (2001), pp. 7-84
http://www.folklore.ee/folklore/vol 17/proverbs.pdf
In Estonian: Vanasonad loomade identiteedist (Tiipoloogilisi me-
muaare). Mdetagused. Vol. 12 (1999), pp. 52-86
http://haldjas.folklore.ee/tagused/nrl2/elukad.htm
Keel ja Kirjandus 2000, no. 1, pp. 18-24; 2000, no. 2, pp. 117-
132.

★ Imagery of Proverbs: The Great Chain of Being as the Back¬

ground of Personificatory and Depersonificatory Metaphors in
Proverbs and Elsewhere. 1st Interdisciplinary Colloquium of Prov¬
erbs. 1° Coloquio Interdisciplinar sobre Proverbios. Actas ICP07
Proceedings. Ed. by Rui JB Soares & Outi Lauhakangas. Tavira:
Rui Soares, 2008, pp. 29-68.

★ Digging One’s Own Grave. Folklore: An Electronical Journal

of Folklore. Vol. 35 (2007), pp. 53-60
http://www.folklore.ee/folklore/vol35/krikmann.pdf

.312
The eight articles included in this volume discuss the problems of
proverb semantics - aspects of their semantic indefmiteness (de¬
notative, modal and functional, theme-rheme structure, textual
variation), semanjic classifications of proverbs, the logical nature
of proverbs and possibilities of their logical analysis, relationships
of their various structural levels, syntactic typology of Estonian
proverbs, animal metaphors in proverbs, the rules that govern the
creation and comprehension of proverbial metaphors and the na¬
ive model of the Great Chain of Being as the conceptual frame¬
work for processing depersonificatory and personificatory meta¬
phors:
“...proverbial transfers seem to be not simply transfers “from the
left to the right” or vice versa, but specifically directed and orien¬
tated. The proverb tends, very predominantly, to explain the more
complicated through the more simple, the less known through the
better known; it usually presents, for example, the mental through
the physical, the ideal through the material, the social through the
biological, the abstract through the concrete, etc. The oppositions
‘non-human’ <-» ‘human’ and ‘natural’ ‘cultural’ seem to play
a leading role in these alterations or transcodings” (p. 29).

Arvo Krikmann (1939) is Senior Researcher at the Estonian Lit¬

erary Museum, Dept, of Folklore (Tartu, Estonia), editorial con¬
sultant of Proverbium: Yearbook of International Proverb Schol¬
arship. His areas of interest are paremiology, theory of figurative
speech, geographic distribution of folklore, jokes, humour theory.
He is co-editor of scholarly editions Eesti vanasonad I-V [Esto¬
nian Proverbs] (1980-1988], Proverbia septentrionalia (1985),
Eesti moistatused I—II [Estonian Riddles] (2001-2002), author of
the books Fraseoloogiline aines eesti vanimais grammatikates ja
sdnastikes [Phraseological material in the oldest Estonian gram¬
mars and dictionaries] (1986), Sissevaateid folkloori luhivormi-
desse [Introspections into minor genres of folklore] (1997), Inter¬
net Humour about Stalin (2004). Koestler, Raskin, Attardo ja tei-
sed: Lingvistiliste huumoriteooriate uuemaist arenguist [Koestler,
Raskin, Attardo and others: On the recent developments of lin¬
guistic theories of humour] (2004).