It is submitted that the from the facts mentioned in the aforesaid list of dates, it becomes clear that the

treatment given to the classified communities in the particular neighbouring countries has been
attracting the attention of successive governments but no government took any legislative measure and
merely acknowledged the problem.

that the existing regime for obtaining citizenship of India by foreigners of any country is untouched by
the CAA and remains the same. legal migration, on the basis of valid documents and visa, continues to
be permissible from all countries of the world including from the three specified countries.

as per Sections 5 & 6 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 [hereinafter referred to as the “1955 Act”], all
foreigners [irrespective of their religion] living in the said specified countries [or other countries] can
legally migrate to India and subject to fulfilment of conditions mentioned therein, apply for and get
Indian citizenship if found eligible. It is submitted that in light of the above, the CAA is merely a limited
legislative measure, circumscribed in its application which does not affect the existing legal rights or
regime concerning citizenship [falling outside the purview of specialized measure] in any manner.

I state and submit that equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution does
not mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application and that the legislature
no longer has the power of distinguishing and classifying persons or things for the purposes of
legislation. It is humbly submitted that the only requirement prior to making a particular classification or
a special legislation [as is in the CAA] is that the legislative classification must not be based on any
arbitrary classification and should be based on an intelligible differentia having a reasonable relation to
the object which the legislature seeks to attain. It is humbly submitted that if the classification on which
the legislation is founded fulfils the above said requirement, then the differentiation which the
legislation makes between the class of persons or things to which it applies and other persons or things
left outside the purview of the subject matter of legislation cannot be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the law.

equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution does not mean that all laws
must be general in character and universal in application and that the State is no longer to have the
power of distinguishing and classifying persons or things for the purposes of legislation. It is submitted
that the mere production of inequality is not enough to attract the constitutional inhibition because
every classification is likely in some degree to produce some inequality.

intelligible differentia that operates at the first tier of classification is persecution on the basis of religion
which cannot be said to be equated with the purported persecution of the communities, namely
Ahamadis, Shias, Bahaiis, Hazras, Jews, Atheists or Baloch communities

in case of permissible classification as is in the present one, mathematical nicety and perfect equality are
not required and if there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law ought not to be
condemned as discriminative, though due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a peculiar
situation some included in a class get an advantage over others.
legislature enjoys considerable latitude while exercising its wisdom taking into consideration myriad
circumstances, enriched by its experience and strengthened by people's will and as long as the
classification can withstand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, it cannot be questioned why one
subject was included and the other left out and why one was given more benefit than the other.

if the under-inclusiveness argument of the Petitioners is accepted, it would make any classification in
the second tier impermissible as every classification would fall short of including certain countries
wherein certain communities may be purportedly persecuted.

It is respectfully submitted that so far as the illustration of Sri Lanka is concerned, the Central
Government has separately and independently dealt with the said subject which has no comparison
with the issue in question. It is submitted that so far as the issues raised with regard to Rohingya
community is concerned, the said issue also has separate parameters as the said issue is also being dealt
with under a separate regime by the Union of India for which separate legal proceedings – totally
unconnected with the present proceedings - are pending and are being dealt with separately by this
Hon‟ble Court. It is submitted that the purported persecution of the Rohingya community from
Myanmar is more related to ethnic and linguistic discrimination which is to be differentiated from
persecution on religious grounds alone. It is further submitted that thousands of Rohingyas have come
into India mainly through Bangladesh in search of better economic opportunities. It is submitted that
Rohingyas are not on the same footing as the religiously persecuted minorities who have fled into India
from the particular neighbouring countries.

I state and submit that as per the existing legal regime in India, any person of any religion from any
country in the world can legally travel/migrate to India, satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 6
read with the Third Schedule or Section 5 of the 1955 Act and become an Indian citizen.

limited recognition of religious persecution in limited theocratic countries with a State Religion neither
violates the principles of secularism nor falls foul of the arbitrariness clauses

the standard for judicial review of legislation in India is the constitution and not on the basis of
international conventions.

it is submitted that the reliance on international conventions cannot be placed when the specific field is
occupied by domestic parliamentary law.

In this regard, it is submitted that India is neither a signatory to nor has ratified the 1951 Refugee
Convention or the 1967 Protocol. It is further respectfully submitted that the fundamental rights
provisions of the Constitution, in the context of this case articles 14 and article 21, cannot be interpreted
with reference to any international convention or treaty to which India is neither a signatory nor it has
ratified the same.

doctrine of incorporation of international law recognises the position that the rules of international law
are incorporated into national law and considered to be part of the national law only if they are not in
conflict with an Act of Parliament. It is respectfully submitted that in essence, the domestic courts
cannot say yes if Parliament has said no to a principle of international law.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution of India had expressed
hardship in drafting Article 5 when he stated as under:

"this Article refers to, citizenship not in any general sense but to citizenship on the date of
commencement of this Constitution. It is not the object of this particular Article to lay down a
permanent law of citizenship for the country. The business of laying down permanent law of citizenship
has been left to the Parliament, and as members will see from the wording of Article 6 (present day
Article 11) as I have moved, the entire matter regarding citizenship has been left to Parliament to
determine by any law it may deem fit".

It is submitted that the Petitioners allege that the CAA suffers from arbitrariness as much as it makes
31st December 2014 as cut-off date for inclusion as citizen via proposed Section 6B. It is submitted that
the said assertion is erroneous as the Petitioners ignore that the country does not have and has never
had an open ended provision for citizenship. It is submitted that the dates mentioned in the Constitution
in article 6 or the dates mentioned in Section 6A of the 1955 clearly represent that the Parliament or the
constitution makers have never intended the grant of citizenship or the criterion governing the
citizenship to be open ended. It is submitted that merely because one date is mentioned in a legislative
enactment and not some other date, does not mean that the said date is arbitrary.

Supreme Court in Clarence Pais v. Union of India held that ‘Historical reasons may justify differential
treatment of separate geographical regions provided it bears a reason and just relation to the matter in
respect of which differential treatment is accorded.’