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-Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4(b), 5 & 6---Terrorism, kidnapping or abduction for ransom,
possessing explosives---Offences mentioned under Entry No. 4 to Third Sched. of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997---Conviction for such offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Scope---Offence of abduction
or kidnapping for ransom under S.365-A, P.P.C. was included in Entry No. 4 of the Third Sched. to the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and kidnapping for ransom was also one of the actions specified in S.7(e) of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Abduction or kidnapping for ransom was a heinous offence but the scheme of
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 showed that an ordinary case of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under
S.365-A, P.P.C. was merely triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but if kidnapping for ransom was
committed with the design or purpose mentioned in cl. (b) or cl. (c) of subsection (1) of S.6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 then such offence amounted to terrorism attracting S.7(e) of that Act---PLD 2020 SC
61
-Nothing was available on the record to show that the accused wanted to create fear or insecurity or
terror in or around the Court premises---After shooting the deceased the accused did not offer
resistance and was arrested by the police along with the weapon of offence---Since the accused had
committed the offence to avenge the murder committed by the deceased, his action would not fall
under the ambit of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Conviction of accused under S. 7 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 was set aside, in circumstances. 2020 SCMR 78
Every act of violence triggered fear and panic with collateral impact on the surroundings; but this by
itself would not bring even the most violent act to fall within the mischief of "terrorism " as
contemplated by the anti- terrorism Act, 1997---Accused's conviction and sentence under S. 7(a) of the
anti- terrorism Act, 1997, was set aside, however his conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C and award of
death sentence consequent thereupon was upheld---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2019 SCMR
1362
Cell phone data confirmed conversation between the accused and the complainant, and there was
hardly any time or occasion for the family of victim to concoct or cook up a story on suspicions or
consultations---Investigative conclusions also pointed towards the accused---Complainant and his
brother, with no axe to grind, were cross examined at length, but no discrepancies were found in their
statements---No reason existed to suspect accused's identity or entertain theory of substitution---
Accused's guilt was proved to the hilt on the basis of chain of circumstances, well synchronized with one
another and intrinsically confidence inspiring---Accused had been rightly convicted and sentenced to
death given the brutality inflicted upon the abducted-child---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2019
SCMR 1330
S. 124-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss.
11 & 12---'Edict' or 'fatwa'---Person issuing an edict or fatwa, which harmed another or put another in
harm's way---Such person must be criminally prosecuted under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 and/or the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. PLD 2019 SC 318 SUO
MOTU CASE NO.7 OF 2017
S. 7---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4 & 5---Possessing explosives to carry out terrorist
activities---Suggestions and recommendations given by the Supreme Court for effective investigation of
terrorism cases and for prevention of such crimes recorded. 2018 SCMR 495 INTEKHAB AHMAD
ABBASI vs State
Ss. 302 & 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7(a) & 7(e)---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping for
ransom---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of ransom amount --- Bank notes of the
ransom amount were not marked or signed by any Magistrate, hence its alleged recovery by the police
becomes suspect---Accused was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt---Appeal was allowed,
conviction and sentence of accused were set-aside and he was acquitted of the charge. PLD 2018 SC
813 MUHAMMAD ABID vs State
S. 302(b)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6 & 7---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Qatl-i-
amd and terrorism---Accused was convicted by Trial Court and sentenced to death on six counts, which
was affirmed by High Court---Validity---Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court in order to
reappraise the evidence. 2018 SCMR 397 SUPREME-COURT MUHAMMAD ABBAS vs State
Ss. 364-A, 376, 377, 302(b) & 201---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Kidnapping or abducting a
person under the age of fourteen, rape, sodomy, qatl-i-amd, causing disappearance of evidence of
offence, act of terrorism---Voluntary and true confession of guilt---Accused allegedly kidnapped a minor
girl, where after he subjected her to sodomy and rape, before murdering her---When the charge was
framed by the Trial Court against the accused he had pleaded guilty as charged and on that occasion he
recorded a detailed confessional statement wherein he had admitted almost every aspect of the case
alleged against him---Despite pleading guilty to the charge and making of a confessional statement the
Trial Court decided to proceed with recording of evidence and during the trial statements of as many as
thirty two (32) prosecution witnesses were recorded and many other pieces of evidence were brought
on the record---Accused, in his statement recorded under S. 342, Cr.P.C. had once again admitted almost
all the vital pieces of evidence produced by the prosecution against him as correct and had once again
admitted his guilt unreservedly---Counsel for the accused had only prayed for some lenience to be
shown to the accused in the matter of his sentence and no argument had been advanced before the
Trial Court challenging the merits of the prosecution's case---In his memorandum of appeal filed by the
accused before the High Court once again only lenience in the matter of sentence had been prayed for
by the accused without questioning his convictions recorded by the Trial Court---Only during arguments
before the High Court the counsel for the accused had maintained that admission of guilt by the accused
before the Trial Court was a result of coercion but during such arguments he had not provided any detail
regarding coercion applied against the accused so as to extract a confession---Apart from the guilty plea
and confession of accused the CCTV footages, photographs, DNA tests and the medical evidence
brought on record proved that the confession made by the accused was not only voluntary but also
true---Guilt of the accused had been proved to the hilt---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed in
circumstances and leave was refused. 2018 SCMR 1372
S. 7(a)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 34 & 109---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Act of
terrorism, qatl-i-amd, common intention, abetment---Whether Anti-Terrorism Court had jurisdiction in a
case---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced by the Anti-Terrorism Court for an offence under
S. 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 read with Ss. 302, 109 & 34, P.P.C.---High Court remanded the
case to a court of ordinary jurisdiction for a de novo trial because, according to the High Court, the case
was not one of terrorism and, therefore, an Anti-Terrorism Court had no jurisdiction to try the same;
held, that while passing the impugned order the High Court had ignored some important decisions of
the Supreme Court, the Anti-Terrorism Court and of the High Court itself passed in the earlier stages of
present case---Soon after present incident took place the Supreme Court took suo motu notice of the
matter and remained seized of those proceedings under Art.184(3) of the Constitution till after a challan
was submitted by the local police before an Anti-Terrorism Court---Supreme Court had not only blessed
submission of the challan of the case before an Anti-Terrorism Court but it had issued detailed
guidelines as to how the case was to be tried by the relevant Anti-Terrorism Court and as to how such
trial was to be monitored by the Monitoring Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court vis-à-vis
cases of terrorism---Said suo motu proceedings were not challenged by any party through a review
petition---High Court in its impugned order did not make any mention of the suo motu proceedings of
the Supreme Court---Furthermore during the pendency of the trial of the present case before the Anti-
Terrorism Court one of the accused persons had filed an application seeking transfer of the case to a
court of ordinary jurisdiction, which application was dismissed by the Anti-Terrorism Court through a
detailed order---Said order of Anti-Terrorism Court was challenged by the accused before the High Court
through a revision petition, which was also dismissed through an elaborate order---Dismissal of revision
petition was challenged by the accused before the Supreme Court, which dismissed the petition for
leave to appeal at a time when the Anti-Terrorism Court had already concluded the trial and had
convicted and sentenced the accused persons---Said orders of the Anti-Terrorism Court, the High Court
and the Supreme Court were ignored by the Bench of the High Court that passed the impugned order---
Impugned order passed by the High Court remanding the criminal case to a court of ordinary jurisdiction
for a de novo trial as well as all the post-remand proceedings before the Trial Court were set aside by
the Supreme Court---Supreme Court directed that all concerned appeals and applications shall be
deemed to be pending before the High Court and the same shall be finally decided on their merits at the
Court's earliest convenience; that the accused persons convicted in the relevant criminal case by an
Anti-Terrorism Court should be retaken into custody as their admission to bail during the post-remand
proceedings was nullity in the eyes of law, and that the previous order of the Supreme Court putting the
names of the accused on the Exit Control List shall continue to hold the field till the time the main
matters remanded to the High Court were finally disposed of---Suo motu case was disposed of
accordingly. PLD 2018 SC 351
Ss. 302(b), 34, 337-F(iii), 337-F(v) & 337-F(vi)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd,
common intention, act of terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Occurrence was an incident of terrorism
in which firing had been resorted to and hand grenades had been hurled at a Rangers party resulting in
two deaths and five persons getting injured---Proceedings of the test identification parade showed that
the present accused persons had been picked up by the eye-witnesses with reference to the roles
played by them during the occurrence---Even during the trial the eye-witnesses produced by the
prosecution had pointed towards the present accused persons amongst the culprits who had actively
participated in the main incident---Ocular account of the occurrence had been furnished before the Trial
Court by as many as six witnesses out of whom two had the stamp of injuries on their bodies
vouchsafing their presence at the scene of the crime at the relevant time---Consistent ocular account
furnished by the said eye-witnesses had received sufficient support from the medical evidence---Guilt of
the accused persons had been established beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal to the extent of
conviction of accused persons was dismissed accordingly. 2018 SCMR 372
Ss. 302(b), 353, 186 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7(a), 7(b) & 7(h)---Qatl-i-amd, assault
or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, obstructing public servant in
discharge of public function, common intention, acts of terrorism---Appeal against acquittal---
Reappraisal of evidence---Accused and his co-accused allegedly exchanged fire with a police party, as a
result of which the co-accused and a police official lost their lives---According to the prosecution the
initial firing at the police had been resorted to by the accused and co-accused and through such firing
one member of the police force had been critically injured at the spot, then the question was as to why
the police in firing back chose co-accused as the only target---Site plan clearly showed that if the police
party wanted to target the accused as well then there was nothing to stop it from causing injuries to
him---Such circumstances indicated a real possibility that it was only the co-accused who had fired at the
police party and in response the police party had fired back at him and that accused had not fired at all
and surrendered before the police without causing any harm to anybody---Four crime-empties secured
from the place of occurrence did match with the pistol statedly recovered from the custody of the
accused at the time of his surrender but it could not be lost sight of the fact that the said pistol had been
recovered at the spot and it was not difficult for the police party to manufacture as many crime-empties
from the said recovered pistol as it wanted so as to strengthen its case against the accused---
Circumstances of the case clearly indicated that after surrender of accused some engineering had been
resorted to by the prosecution so as to cook up a story qua the accused's role and to bolster the same
through contrived circumstances---No occasion was found to interfere with the judgment of acquittal
passed by the High Court in favour of the accused---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed accordingly.
2018 SCMR 1590
Ss. 6 & 23---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to court of ordinary jurisdiction---Scope---
Personal enmity over property---Admittedly there was a dispute of a plot where the occurrence took
place---Prosecution's own case was that the complainant had filed a civil suit and on his application for
initiation of contempt proceedings against the accused persons, a bailiff of the Court was appointed---
Application of contempt of court and appointment of bailiff triggered the enmity which resulted in the
present occurrence---Allegedly five persons fired specifically at complainant's wife (deceased) hitting on
her legs, but till that time there was no allegation of creating terror and insecurity in the general
public---Subsequently, it was alleged that 26 persons, in order to create terror and insecurity in the
general public, made indiscriminate firing, but, such allegation was not supported from any source as
neither any crime empty was recovered from the place of occurrence nor anybody else received even a
scratch on his person due to said indiscriminate firing---Due to the alleged indiscriminate firing not a
single bullet hit on the walls of the plot in question which were 2.3 feet high---Furthermore, according to
the complainant party, two police constables, who were guarding the complainant, were present at the
place of occurrence, but it was not alleged by the prosecution that they were restrained by the accused
persons to discharge their duties or anybody fired upon them or threatened them---Bailiff of the court
and police constables, never claimed that they were fired at or they were threatened by the accused
persons, instead they were subsequently introduced as accused persons in the case for abatement---
Perusal of the allegations levelled in the FIR, the material so collected by the investigating officer and
other surrounding circumstances of the case, showed that the present case was not triable under the
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. PLD 2018 SC 178
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 148 & 149---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court
to court of ordinary jurisdiction---Prosecution alleged that nine nominated accused along with 5/6 other
persons resorted to indiscriminate firing as a result whereof nine persons from the complainant side
sustained multiple firearm injuries---Investigating officer, however, stated that only 11 empties of two
different bores i.e. .30 bore and .12 bore were recovered during inspection of the spot---FIR also alleged
that all the nominated accused were armed with multiple firearms but during investigation only .30 bore
pistol and a 12 bore gun were recovered at the instance of only one accused---Empties secured from the
spot and the recovered weapons were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for analysis and the
report of FSL was in the negative---All the five prosecution witnesses (some of whom were injured)
recorded their statements before the Magistrate under S. 164, Cr.P.C., wherein they by and large
exonerated the nominated accused persons by stating that they did not know as to who fired at them;
that none of the nominated accused fired at them nor they saw any weapon in the hands of any of the
nominated accused persons---Prima facie, it appeared from the facts of the case that altercation
between the parties occurred all of a sudden when the procession of the complainant side on winning
the election was passing in front of house of accused party and there was no prior 'object/design'---
Allegations levelled in the FIR, the material collected by the investigating agency during course of
investigation and other surrounding circumstances showed that present case was not triable by the
Anti-Terrorism Court---High Court had rightly directed the Anti-Terrorism Court to transfer the record of
present case to the court of ordinary jurisdiction---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed
accordingly. 2017 SCMR 533
S. 353---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(h)---Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13---Assault or
criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty, act of terrorism, possession of weapon
and ammunition without any valid licence---Reappraisal of evidence---Accused and co-accused persons
were alleged to have fired at a police party which resulted in the death of a police official---Trial Court
convicted the accused under S. 7(h) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 353, P.P.C and S. 13 of Arms
Ordinance, 1965 and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment, which sentence was upheld by the High
Court---Held, that sufficient evidence was available against the accused as he was apprehended from the
spot, and recovery of motorcycle as well as rifle used during the occurrence was effected from him---
Even otherwise material witnesses of prosecution were police officials who had no malice against the
accused for his false implication in the case---Appeal filed by accused to the extent of charges under S.
353, P.P.C., S. 7(h), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and S. 13 of the Arms Ordinance, 1965 was dismissed . 2017
SCMR 1845
Ss. 7(a), (b) & (h)---Murder of police official to resist arrest---Re-appraisal of evidence---Death sentence,
confirmation of---Accused was a proclaimed offender in many cases---Accused resisted his arrest by
police, and started firing which caused the death of a police official---Crime empties recovered from the
spot of occurrence matched with the weapon recovered from the accused---Five police officials
appeared as eye-witnesses and during their cross-examination they remained firm on all major
particulars of the case i.e. date, time and place of occurrence---Prosecution witnesses had no enmity
with the accused to falsely implicate him in the present case---FIR was promptly registered i.e. thirty
minutes after the time of occurrence, wherein accused was specifically nominated with a specific role---
Such promptly lodged FIR excluded any chance of false implication---Prosecution had proved its case
against the accused beyond any shadow of doubt---Death sentence awarded to accused was confirmed
in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. 2016 SCMR 28
Ss. 302(b) & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Qatl-i-amd, unlawful assembly, acts of
terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Death sentence, confirmation of---Five persons were brutally
murdered during broad daylight on a road---Accused was convicted for the occurrence and sentenced to
death---Validity---Scrutiny of evidence of eye-witnesses did not suggest any exaggeration rather not
assigning any specific role to the accused in the FIR reflected the truthfulness of their testimony when in
hustle and bustle of the occurrence which had been committed within a few seconds or minutes it was
humanly impossible to assign specific role and give detailed description of the same---Lodging of the FIR
in a straightforward manner in the fact and circumstances of the case ruled out any possibility of falsely
roping the accused persons---Testimony of both the eye-witnesses was confidence inspiring and from
the facts and circumstances of the case, they could not in any manner be considered to be chance
witnesses---Motive for the occurrence was fully established to the extent of accused who was involved
in another murder case of complainant's nephew and was allegedly extending threats to the
complainant party to effect compromise---Medical evidence corroborated the ocular account---
Recoveries had been effected which also corroborated the prosecution version---Parties were known to
each other and FIR was promptly lodged, which ruled out any possibility of substitution or consultation
to falsely rope in or involve the accused persons---Prosecution had fully succeeded in proving its case
against the accused---Death sentence awarded to accused was maintained---Appeal was dismissed
accordingly. 2016 SCMR 2152
S. 345(7)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b) & 338-E---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7(a) &
21-L---Qatl-i-amd, act of terrorism---Waiver or compounding of offence---Scope---Conviction and death
sentence recorded under S. 302(b), P.P.C. and S. 7(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Offence under S. 7(a)
of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was an independent one, which was non-compoundable , thus the
sentence awarded under said provision of law was independent to other sentences under S. 302(b),
P.P.C. etc., which may be compoundable in nature---In view of the bar contained in S. 345(7), Cr.P.C.,
conviction of an accused under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 would remain intact despite compromise in
other sentences in compoundable offence. 2016 SCMR 291
Ss. 345, 367(2) & (3)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 34 & 404---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of
1997), S. 7(a)---Accused charged with both compoundable and non-compoundable offences---Legal
error committed by Trial Court in not recording separate conviction and sentence for the non-
compoundable offence---High Court also failing to notice such error---Compromise between parties for
the compoundable offence---Effect---Conviction and sentence for the non-compoundable offence had to
be recorded separately and could not be implied---Matter of conviction and sentence for the non-
compoundable offence had become a past and closed transaction---Compromise between the parties
for the compoundable offence should not have been rejected in such circumstances. 2016 SCMR 1190
S. 345---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Qatl-i-
amd, common intention, act of terrorism--- Compromise application--- Maintainability--- Compromise
applications were filed by complainant/legal heirs of deceased during pendency of appeals---Offence
under S.302, P.P.C. was compoundable by legal heirs of the victim, whereas offence under S.7 of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997, had not been shown in the first and second column of table of S.345, Cr.P.C.---Such
offence was not compoundable under the provisions of S. 345, Cr.P.C., as provisions of said section,
could not be stretched too far by including therein a non-compoundable offence under the garb of
humanitarian grounds; or on the ground that accused persons belonged to Rangers Force---Manner, in
which brutal murder of the deceased was committed, caused sensation in society---Such offence being
against society, it could not be permitted to be compounded by an individual/legal heir of the deceased
on any score---Application filed for compounding of offence being without legal force, was dismissed, in
circumstances.
Ss. 302(b) & 34--- Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(1)(b) & 7(a)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of
1898), S. 345---Qatl-e-amd, common intention, act of terrorism---Compromise---Reappraisal of
evidence---Murder of unarmed person by members of law enforcement agency---Grievous and heinous
crime---Sense of fear or insecurity in the public---Accused and co-accused persons were members of a
law enforcement agency, and they had a quarrel with the deceased at a park---Deceased was
surrounded by accused and co-accused, whereafter one of the co-accused shouted "maromaro", as a
result of which the accused fired at the deceased---Deceased pleaded to be taken to hospital, but
accused and co-accused did not do the same, despite presence of an official vehicle at the spot---
Deceased consequently bled to death---Accused deliberately and wilfully shot the deceased at the
instigation of the co-accused persons and they let him bleed to death without offering him any
assistance---Such sequence of events abundantly displayed the common intention and object of the
accused and co-accused persons---Gruesome murder of deceased at the hands of members of law
enforcement agency certainly created a sense of terror, insecurity and panic in the minds and hearts of
those who witnessed the scene and the entire public which saw the video of the incident---Accused had
compromised with legal heirs of deceased but offence committed by him and co-accused persons under
S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was not compoundable ---Supreme Court however observed that
following the ratio in the case of Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (PLD 2014 SC 383), wherein sentence
of death imposed upon convict under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was reduced to imprisonment
for life in the presence of a compromise, the death sentence awarded to present accused should also be
reduced to imprisonment for life---Sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to co-accused persons
was maintained---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.
S. 345--- Penal Code (XLV of 1860),Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 148, 149 & 337-F(iii)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII
of 1997), Ss.6(m) & (n), 7(a), (c) & (h)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.188---Review of Supreme Court
judgment---Murder of police official while on duty---………………..---Regarding first count of death
sentence under S.302(b), P.P.C, accused entered into a compromise with legal heirs of deceased and
compensation had also been paid, but second count of death under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had
its own implications and was not compoundable under Ss.354(5) & (7), Cr.P.C---Compromise between
parties was accepted (only) to the extent of conviction under S.302(b), P.P.C and accused was acquitted
of said charge---Regarding death sentence under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, quantum of said
sentence could be examined in the present case due to its peculiar facts---Sentence of death awarded to
accused under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was converted into life imprisonment without extending
benefit of S.382-B, P.P.C, as the same was not allowed by Trial Court, High Court and the Supreme
Court---Review petition was disposed of accordingly.
---S. 7(e)---Appreciation of evidence---Abductee had rightly picked up all the three accused in the
identification parade and had also identified them in the Court---Demand of ransom by the accused and
payment of Rupees four Ins to them as such according to their instructions had been proved on record---
Offence under S.7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, being non-compoundable , any compromise between
the parties was of no consequence---Accused had not led any evidence to establish their friendship with
the abductee or regarding the complicity of the abductee himself in the crime---Entire ransom amount
had been recovered from accused who were arrested by the police from the house on the pointation of
abductee---Abductee had no motive for false implication of accused in the case---Incriminating
recoveries from the accused including the ransom amount, pistols with live cartridges, mobile phone
and motorcycle of abductee, had further connected the accused with the offence---Investigating Officer
in the peculiar circumstances of the case could not possibly join persons from the public in recovery
proceedings, even otherwise police, witnesses were as good witnesses as other witnesses---Recoveries
had corroborated the evidence furnished by the prosecution witnesses---Even if the recoveries had not
been proved in a case of kidnapping or abduction for ransom, the determining factor was the object
behind the crime---Conviction and sentence of accused were upheld in circumstances.
Schedule annexed to a statute was as important as the statute itself---Schedule could be used to
construe the provisions of the body of the Act---Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had to
be given its due importance and, first three paragraphs of the same were general in nature while the
fourth paragraph specifically described offences---In order to bring an offence within ambit of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 and the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court, nexus of such offence with S.6 of
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was a pre-requisite---
Paragraph 4 of the Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 categorically mentioned the offences which
would be tried only by the Anti-Terrorism Court---Offences in question were within the purview/ambit
of the paragraph 4 of the Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and were triable by the Anti-
Terrorism Court---Petitions were dismissed.
Preamble---Law did not make any distinction in the matter of appreciation of evidence in a case under
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or under normal criminal law---Credibility of witnesses had to be measured
with the same yardstick, whether it was an ordinary crime or a crime striking terror in society---Law did
not make any distinction either in leading of evidence in its assessment---Rule was one and the same,
that was intrinsic worth of testimony and the fact, that it stood the test of cross-examination---
Contradictory versions of the prosecution witnesses made before Anti-Terrorism Court and then before
court of ordinary jurisdiction, would shake the entire foundation of the prosecution case---By no stretch
of imagination, it was possible to reconcile the conflicting statements of the same prosecution witnesses
regarding the same event---Said contradiction would sufficiently furnish a clue to veracity of the
testimony of those witnesses, and shake their trustworthiness.
Preamble---Object---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was a special law purpose of which was to control
terrorism---Schedule offences were made non-compoundable.
Preamble & S.32---Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (XXII of 2000), Preamble & S.14---
Distinguishing features of the two enactments---Under. Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, courts acquire
jurisdiction if the offence is triable by them, whereas under Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000,
courts acquire jurisdiction if offenders are juvenile, irrespective of the nature of offence committed by
them--Provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, under its S.32 have the overriding effect over all other
laws including the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, whereas under S.14 of said Ordinance its
provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force.
Ss. 302(b) & 311---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Preamble & Ss.6(2)(g), 7(a)---Criminal Procedure
Code (V of 1898), S.345---Qatl-e-amd---Tazir after waiver or compounding of right of qisas in qatl-e-
amd---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was enacted for prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and speedy
trial of heinous offences-Said Act being a special law, private complainant or the legal heirs of the
deceased, had no right to compound the "scheduled offence" as those offences were mainly against the
State and not against individuals---Offences could not be compounded automatically by legal heirs, but
were always through the court; and the court could decline the permission to compromise the offence
by the legal heirs of victim---
Even the ordinary courts under S.311, P.P.C., could punish accused, if the offence had been
compounded, by the legal heirs, on the basis of "Fasad-Fil-Arz"---Not providing the right to compromise
the offence by the legal heirs of deceased, was neither violation of Islamic Injunctions; nor of any
fundamental rights.
2011 YLR 1319 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH : Syeda ZAHIDA RIZVI vs : THE STATE through D.S.P.
Preamble, Ss.2(t), 13, 17 & 21-M---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.182---Giving false information with intent
to cause public servant to use his lawful power to cause injury to another person---
whether mentioned in Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979; Offence of
Zina Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979; Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance,
1979; Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979; Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997; Anti
Terrorism Act, 1997; Penal Code, 1860 or any other law for the time being in force, can be challenged by
way of appeal or otherwise only before the Federal Shariat Court and no other court of criminal
jurisdiction is competent to entertain and adjudicate upon proceedings connected with Hudood
offences---Initiation of proceedings to quash First Information Report or pending criminal proceeding
related to Hudood matters are within the exclusive jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court in view of the
mandate of Art.203-DD of the Constitution---Remedy against grant or refusal of bail before or during the
trial of any of the above mentioned offences lies before Federal Shariat Court alone and no other court
has jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in such matters---Federal Shariat Court directed that
present declaration relating to Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006, The Control
of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 as well as Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 shall take effect as from 22nd June,
2011 by which date necessary steps be taken by the Federal Government to amend the impugned laws
in conformity with present declaration whereafter the impugned provision shall cease to be effective
and present judgment of the Federal Shariat Court will be operative as on 22-6-2011---Other items of
the Declaration become operative forthwith.
2007 PLD 571 SUPREME-COURT FAZAL DADvs Col.(Rtd.) GHULAM MUHAMMAD MALIK
---Ss. 302(b), 364-A, 382, 404, 441, 109 & 34---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Anti-
Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Preamble---Reappraisal of evidence---Last seen evidence---
Witnesses of last seen evidence and recoveries were quite independent and confidence inspiring---
Judicial confession recorded on last day of physical remand---Effect---Allegation against
accused/petitioner was that he, after kidnapping a minor girl, committed her murder---
Complainant (father of deceased) lodged F.I.R. against accused on the basis of suspicion and last seen
evidence---Trial Court/Special Court convicted accused and awarded him sentence of death on two
counts viz. under S.302(b), P.P.C. and 364-A, P.P.C.---Appeal filed thereagainst was dismissed by High
Court---Accused contended that last seen evidence did not have any evidentiary value; that recovery of
dead body on pointation of accused and golden ear-rings of deceased might not be sufficient to prove
charge of murder; that judicial confession of accused was manipulated by police by way of torture ,
hence, the same was of no value; that judicial confession of accused was recorded on last day of his
physical remand with police and such facts and circumstances of case might not justify capital
punishment, rather sentence of life imprisonment was to be sufficient to meet the ends of justice---
Validity---Witnesses of last seen
evidence and recoveries were quite independent and confidence -inspiring---Accused had not been able
to point out any , material discrepancy or contradiction in prosecution evidence to suggest any doubt
qua the credibility of evidence of recovery of dead body and other articles belonging to deceased at his
pointation---Witness of last seen evidence had no enmity, personal grudge or Malice against accused to
make false statement---Witnesses of recovery of dead body and ear-rings of deceased were entirely
independent and had no reason to make false statement against accused in a case of capital
punishment---Magistrate who recorded confessional statement of accused had categorically stated that
he recorded confessional statement of accused after completion of all formalities, providing sufficient
time to him to think over the matter before making confession---Perusal of statement of witnesses
together with confessional statement of accused would suggest that there was no clement of coercion,
undue influence or pressure rather record showed that confession was made voluntarily and was
truthful---Mere fact that confessional statement was made on last day of physical remand was not
indicative of any doubt regarding its voluntariness to exclude the same from consideration, instead it
was to ensure its voluntariness because accused was aware of the fact that he would not be again given
in custody of police and was being sent to judicial custody---
Accused had committed murder of a girl of minor age by way of suffocation and in a brutal manner,
therefore, he did not deserve leniency in matter of sentence---Petition for leave to appeal was
dismissed.
---Anti-Terrorism Act
Narcotic Substances
Act, 1997 and Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 to take cognizance and try the offences of said Acts in
respect of all the accused persons including major and minor---Scope and extent
---Principles.
State
(XXVII of 1997), Preamble---Provisions of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 to be read with other
laws including Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Principles.
---Preamble---Object and purpose of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, had provided
for prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters
connected therewith and incidental thereto.
QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN State vs
Jamadar
MUHAMMAD KHAN
---Preamble, Ss.6, 7 & 8---
Object to
promulgate Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was to control the acts of terrorism, Sectarian violence
and other heinous offences as defined in S.6 of the said Act and their speedy trials---Such offences
should have nexus with the object of the Act and should be covered by its Ss.6, 7 & 8.
2005 MLD 13
JUDGE, SIALKOT,
Malik
----Preamble & S.12---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was a special enactment and it had meaning and spirit of
its provisions---Special enactment needed to be taken in perspective of its own object and any
departure from same would be negation of its object and spirit.
----Preamble---Terrorism is a fast going phenomena ---Making laths and taking appropriate measures by
all civilized States within their Constitutional system to combat terrorism would be in larger public
interest.
----Preamble---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302(b) & 382---Trial by the Judge, Special Court, Anti-
Terrorism, is not vitiated merely because the accused were not charged or convicted under the
provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
2002 PLD
----S. 10(4)
---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 12 & Sched.-- Gang rape---Jurisdiction of
Special Court---Scope---Trial of scheduled offence under the provision of S.12 of Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997 is exclusively vested in the Court constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 ----Preamble---Object---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was brought into force for the
prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences for matters
connected therewith and incidental thereto.
the view of general public---Schedule annexed to a statute was as important as the statute itself---
Schedule could be used to construe the provisions of the body of the Act---Third Schedule to the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 had to be given its due importance and, first three paragraphs of the same were
general in nature while the fourth paragraph specifically described offences---In order to bring an
offence within ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court, nexus
of such offence with S.6 of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 was a pre-requisite---Paragraph 4 of the
Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 categorically mentioned the offences which would be tried
only by the Anti-Terrorism Court---Offences in question were within the purview/ambit of the paragraph
4 of the Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and were triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court---
Such plea was misconceived because there was no bar or hindrance to pass sentence upon a killer of
three human beings when chain of guilt was found unbroken and irresistible conclusion of guilt was
surfacing from evidence which was connecting accused with commission of offence without any doubt
or suspicion---If circumstantial evidence brought on record was of such nature then conclusion would be
in shape of conviction and no other conclusion would be drawn by any stretch of imagination in such a
case---For guilt of accused, penalty of death or life imprisonment would be a normal event---Evidence of
prosecution witnesses in the present case was found consistent and accused had not been able to shake
their credence, therefore, extra-judicial confession made before prosecution witnesses, whom accused
considered to be respectable persons for his assistance, could not be disbelieved when they deposed it
on oath before trial Court---Disclosure of offence from mouth of accused had led to other corroborative
and cogent evidence proving commission of offence by accused---Evidence available on file proved that
it was act of accused, who had committed heinous crime of murder of innocent baby and two ladies---
Such was tyrannous and callous actions of accused who had not only cut the throats of two ladies but
also a four months baby---Events and circumstantial evidence proved that accused was the person who
had committed cold-blooded offence of murder---
Supreme Court declined to interfere with the conviction and sentence of death awarded to accused---
Appeal was dismissed.
Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 ----Ss. 1(3) & 12---Anti-Terrorist Court, jurisdiction of ---Retrospectivity- -Offence
was committed prior to the promulgation of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but the trial of the case was
initiated in the Anti-Terrorism Court--Validity---Anti-Terrorism Court had no jurisdiction to try the
offence and the offender was liable only under the law existing at the time of commission of the offence.
Section 3
Ss. 4 & 5---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302/34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 3, 6, 13 [as
amended by Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance (XXXIX of 2011)] & 39(1)---Constitution of Pakistan,
Arts. 9 & 199---Constitutional petition---Double murder on allegation of siyahkari---
Conviction and sentence awarded to accused on 27-10-1999 by Special Court after his trial in absentia---
Order of Sessions Judge suspending such conviction/ sentence and directing fresh trial of accused on his
application made in November, 2010 under S. 5-A(7) of Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special
Courts) Act, 1975---Validity---Special Court was not in existence on the date of such application, rather
its successor forum i.e. Anti-Terrorism Court established under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was in
existence---Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 was repealed vide S. 39(1) of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but acts done under Act of 1975 were given due protection by S. 39(2) of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Accused had committed double murder on bald allegation of siyahkari in a
brutal manner by means of firing with kalashinkov---Such act of accused being a Scheduled offence fell
within ambit of S. 6(ii)(g) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and his case was exclusively triable by Special Court
constituted under S. 3 thereof---Neither law nor religion permitted so-called honour killing, which
amounted to murder---Such iniquitous and vile act of accused was violative of Art. 9 of the
Constitution---Present case was instituted under repealed Act of 1975, whereunder accused could be
punished by Judge of Anti-Terrorism Court, if prosecution succeeded to establish his guilt---High Court
set aside impugned order and directed Sessions Judge to transmit main case along with such application
to concerned Anti-Terrorism Court for its decision in accordance with law.
Section 6 of ATC
2015 PCrLJ 78
Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 365, 147, 149, 324, 458, 148 & 504---Anti-
Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6 & 7---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and
wrongfully to confine person, rioting, common object, attempt to commit qatl-i- amd, lurking house-
trespass or house breaking by night after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, rioting
armed with deadly weapon, intentional insult with intent to provoke
Court---
Scope---Police submitted report under S. 169, Cr.P.C. before the Judicial Magistrate
speaking---Validity---Magistrate had
manner---
Non-speaking orders were to be discouraged and court was to give reasons for
passing administrative as well as judicial order---Case was remanded to the Judicial Magistrate for
passing speaking order.
Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(e) & 7(e)---Kidnapping for ransom,
common intention, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---
Accused
persons being with muffled faces at the time of alleged occurrence, neither complainant nor any body
else could identify them---F.I.R., was lodged on the next day of occurrence, despite
levies check Post, was nearby the place of alleged occurrence---Statement of complainant had shown
that F.I.R. was lodged with consultation and was an afterthought---Such delay in lodging F.I.R., could not
be taken lightly, as it cast serious doubt in the case of the prosecution---No explanation was on record
with respect to inordinately lodging F.I.R.---Names of accused persons came in picture through the
supplementary statements of the complainant for the first time---Neither the Fard-e-Bayan, was reliable
nor the supplementary statement was worth credence, as the same had not been filed promptly---False
implication of accused persons, could not be ruled out of consideration in circumstances---Prosecution
story as narrated by the complainant, did not appeal to logic---Statement of prosecution witness, was
not worth credence, and it appeared that said witness had concealed the actual dispute between the
parties---All prosecution witnesses were closely related to each other, and one of them was closely
related to alleged abductee---Prosecution had failed to produce any independent witness to corroborate
the prosecution case---Accused persons could not be assumed to be culprits solely on the statements of
witnesses who were interested and were closely related to the alleged abductee---Recovery of abductee
was neither effected from possession of accused persons, nor on their pointation---No ransom amount
was paid for release of the abductee---
Alleged abductee, recorded his statement before the Investigating Officer after considerable delay after
his alleged release/recovery without any explanation, which created serious doubt about his abduction
by accused persons---Identification parade conducted by the prosecution was also of no avail to the case
of prosecution, as the complainant in the supplementary statement, had failed to give the description of
accused persons---While conducting the identification parade, the legal formalities, were not complied
with and followed by Judicial Magistrate---Statement of witnesses were not free from doubt as same
suffered from sufficient infirmities, dishonest improvements and contradictions---Prosecution had failed
to prove the charge against accused persons beyond any shadow of doubt---Trial Court while delivering
the impugned judgment, had failed to consider evidence available on record---Impugned judgment
passed by Special Court, was set aside and accused were acquitted and released extending them benefit
of doubt in circumstances.
2015 PCrLJ 611 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SAGEER AHMED alias BHAYA
2015 PCrLJ 611 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs SAGEER AHMED alias BHAYA
Ss. 302 & 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7(a)(e)---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13(e)---Qat-i-amd, kidnapping for ransom--- "Act of terrorism"--- Determination- --Grievance of
complainant was that Anti-Terrorism Court transferred the trial to court of plenary jurisdiction on the
ground that offences did not contain element of terrorism---Validity- --Complainant, during trial, had
categorically deposed that his son was kidnapped and ransom was demanded from him and his son was
murdered---After recording evidence, mere tentative assessment of Anti-Terrorism Court that it had no
jurisdiction was injudicious and contrary to law---No enmity existed between the parties, action of
accused resulted in striking terror and sense of insecurity among the people in a particular vicinity and it
amounted to create terror in business community---Anti-Terrorism Court had exclusive jurisdiction in
the matter as action of accused fell within the ambit of section 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---High
Court declared the order passed by Anti-Terrorism Court to be illegal and injudicious and was set
aside---High Court directed Anti-Terrorism Court to proceed in case under the provisions of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997, and decide the case in accordance with law---Revision was allowed in
circumstances.
Ss. 6 & 12---Sectarian killing---Anti-Terrorism Court, jurisdiction of---Scope---Sectarian killings were also
included in the definition of 'terrorism' contained in S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and, thus, an
Anti-Terrorism Court was possessed of the requisite jurisdiction to try a case of sectarian killing.
2015 PCrLJ 433 Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court SHER SULAIMAN vs DSP BABAR KHAN
Ss. 302 & 324---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),
Ss.132 & 200---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---
Private complaint---Dismissal of---Protection against prosecution---Private complaint filed by
petitioner/complainant was dismissed by Special Court on the grounds that it was not supported by
sanction as required by S.132, Cr.P.C. and that offence alleged against accused persons/respondents, did
not fall under Ss.6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Validity- --People whose relief cheques were not
cashed had gathered in the mob to protest---Accused persons, who were Police Officials, for dispersing
the mob of protestors opened fire, and two persons died and many others injured---Contention of
accused persons was that incident took place under compelling circumstances because the mob was
going to destroy public property in large scale; and fire was opened in good faith by them to abstain the
mob from taking the law
in hand---Validity---Version of accused persons that firing was opened under compelling situation, was
not enough to overlook the murder of two persons---Justice demanded that truth should be found out
so that no public servant dare to act going beyond his authority---
Section 132, Cr.P.C. was a protection against prosecution; and to take benefit under said section,
accused persons had to prove that the act complained of was done under circumstances mentioned in
that section---Accused persons must place the material and show circumstances before the court
justifying that mob was unlawful and the acts they did were purported to have been done while
dispersing the mob---Complaint was dismissed on the ground that same did not fall within the scope of
S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Complainant failed to prove that act done by accused persons fell
within ambit of S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but when court concluded that S. 6 was not attracted to
the matter and complaint was not triable by the Special Judge, then court was required to send the
complaint to the court of ordinary jurisdiction, which could give finding regarding applicability or non-
application of S. 132, Cr.P.C.---Revision was converted into appeal and was partially allowed by Chief
Court---
Impugned order of the Special Court was set aside, with the observation that S.6 of Anti- Terrorism Act,
1997 was not attracted to the matter---Special Court was directed to transfer the complaint to
Additional Sessions Judge concerned for its disposal in accordance with law, in circumstances.
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302, 324 & 34---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965),
S.13(d)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.345, Sched. Third, item No.4(iii)---Act of terrorism, qatl-
i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, common intention, possessing unlicensed arms---Appreciation of
evidence---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to Court of Session---Compromise, effect of---
Application of accused filed under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for transfer of his case from the
Anti-Terrorism Court to the Court of Session, was dismissed---Accused had committed murder of his real
sister with fire-arm inside the court room, which under item No.4(iii), of the Third Schedule, annexed to
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was Scheduled Offence, exclusively triable by Anti-Terrorism Court---
Contention was that complainant/husband of the deceased having entered into a compromise with the
family of accused, by consent, matter could be transferred to the Court of Session; and parties be
allowed to settle the matter in accordance with law---Validity---Accused was charged inter alia with an
offence under Ss.6 & 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which did not find place in any of the columns of
the Table appended to the provisions of S.345, Cr.P.C., detailing the compoundable offences---Allowing
prayer to transfer case from Anti-Terrorism Court on ground of compromise would literally mean
converting a non-compoundable offence into a compoundable offence, which was a total novel concept;
and not recognized by the law---Law had clearly limited the cases which could be compoundable/
compromised and did not provide any scope for converting a non-compoundable offence into a
compoundable, merely because the parties had entered into a compromise---Such an action would not
only frustrate the provisions of S.345, Cr.P.C., but would make all offences as compoundable which
would be against the public policy and beyond the competence of court, and could not be allowed---
issue, nor a court could be deprived of its jurisdiction for the convenience or at the request of the
parties---Accused had killed his sister on account of her free will marriage in the court room, where
justice was dispensed and people had confidence to be treated in accordance with law---Anti-Terrorism
Court, had rightly rejected request for transferring the case to the Court of Session, in circumstances.
(V of 1898), S.561-A---
Delay in
Accused
Appeal
was to be decided within 7 days and more than two years had passed---
be required to hear the appeal and dispose of, as there was tremendously heavy backlog of such appeals
filed earlier than that of accused---Accused remained in jail throughout the period ever since his arrest---
High Court treated the case of accused as one of hardship and suspended the sentence---Bail was
allowed in circumstances.
2014 PLD 547 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH AZHAR HUSSAIN RIZVI Vs State
Indiscriminate firing---Grievance of accused was that Trial Court under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997,
declined to transfer the case to court of ordinary jurisdiction---Validity---Wherever any action was taken
which created fear and insecurity in any section of people, such offence would fall within the ambit of
case as contemplated under S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Mob of 30 / 40 motorcyclists including
accused, while carrying dead body from hospital to graveyard, were indiscriminately firing throughout
the way-F.I.R. did not mention that firing was in retaliation of firing from any side---If there wax no firing
on funeral procession then there was no reason of making firing on the way to graveyard---Such firing
was only with the object of creating fear and insecurity in people, which would come within the
definition of "terrorism"---Trial Court on the basis of material available it her was justified in coming to
conclusion that case of accused was within the meaning of S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Trial Court
rightly dismissed application of accused for sending his case to ordinary Court---High Court declined to
set aside the order passed by Trial Court---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.324, 353 & 216-A---Attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, assault
or criminal force to deter public servants from discharging of his duty, harbouring
an offence to be either scheduled one or not, could not be treated as two separate acts, which were to
be performed by the court at different times---Court would take cognizance of a given offence, only
when it was without any doubt with regard to its jurisdiction to try the offence by examining the
material presented to it in terms of S.173, Cr.P.C.---Law had provided for one exception that a
Magistrate taking cognizance of offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session, would without
recording the evidence send the case to court of session for trial in terms of S.190(3), Cr.P.C.---Such
exception was entirely cognate with design contemplated under S.193, Cr.P.C.---Court was competent to
make up its mind as to whether the offence was scheduled one or not at the time of taking cognizance
of offence on the basis of material submitted to it in shape of challan---In case the court decided in
affirmative, it would proceed with the matter in accordance with law and it would not restrict the
jurisdiction of the court to hold otherwise at a subsequent stage, but the exercise of jurisdiction to
transfer the case to a regular court, could be resorted to by the court on the basis of new material
brought before it, either by prosecution or defence---Scheme of law in terms of S.23 of Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997, appeared to have enjoined upon the court to minutely examine all the material presented at
the time of challan---Impugned order appeared to have been passed in haste which did not reconcile
with the judicial norms and requirements of law---Court could have waited and postponed the decision
on the application of accused till the submission of challan to form its opinion that the offence was
scheduled one or not, instead of dismissing it in hasty manner---
Impugned order being not sustainable under the law, was set aside---Application of accused would be
deemed to be pending before the court, which would be decided afresh, evaluating the material
submitted to it.
Ss. 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6(2)(e)---Kidnapping for ransom, common
intention, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Unexplained delay of 55 days in lodging F.I.R.,
had created serious doubt; and it could be gathered that F.I.R. was lodged by the complainant after due
deliberation, negotiation, discussion and afterthought with sole object; and ulterior motive to get
accused persons convicted---Accused persons were not identified as culprits who had allegedly
kidnapped the complainant---Culprits who allegedly received ransom, were muffled faces---Prosecution
witness, who allegedly remained in contact with the culprits through mobile phone, and negotiated, and
settled the quantum of the ransom, had neither mentioned said mobile number in his statement,
recorded by the Police, nor disclosed in his evidence recorded before the Trial Court---Prosecution
witness, who allegedly made payment of ransom amount to the culprits, neither mentioned serial
numbers of currency notes, nor any identification marks were mentioned by the witness---Alleged
recovery of cash from the house of accused persons could not be believed---Prosecution witnesses had
introduced dishonest improvements in their statements during the trial, and made conflicting
depositions---Abductees, were not recovered from accused, nor any ransom money was proved to have
been demanded by him, or paid to him---No identification parade had been held for identification of
accused; and prosecution had failed to establish his nexus with the alleged episode---Place of captivity
was neither pointed out to the Investigating Officer, nor such
mashirnama was prepared---Such missing piece of evidence alone, was fatal dent to the prosecution
case, when the complainant had mentioned the place of captivity in F.I.R.---People of different castes
were residing adjacent to the place of incident, but none from the locality was examined by the Police,
or produced before the Trial Court to prima facie establish that the complainant was abducted---Series
of admissions and material contradictions, had made the prosecution story highly doubtful---
Prosecution had failed to bring guilt of accused persons to home, and charge could not be established
beyond any shadow of doubt---Impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court was set aside, accused
were acquitted from the charge and were released, in circumstances.
2014 PCrLJ 1052 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Vs UMER FAROOQUE JUDGE, ANTI- TERRORISM COURT,
MIRPURKHAS
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302, 324, 337-F(ii), 337-H(2), 364, 147, 148 & 149---
Impugned orders declining transfer of case to ordinary Court of Session were set aside, in circumstances.
Ss. 302, 149, 353, 324 & 404---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6(a)(b)---Qatl-e-amd, assault or
criminal force to deter public servant from discharging of his duty, attempt to commit qatl-e- amd,
dishonestly misappropriation of property and act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence- --Benefit of
doubt---Out of five accused persons, two were identified by the complainant, but complainant could not
give the features and figures of remaining three unknown accused mentioned in the F.I.R.---Source of
head light of the vehicle in the midnight was a weak type of evidence regarding seeing a person from a
distance of about one or two acres---Recovery of kalashnikov from the cattle pan of accused was quite
doubtful---Accused had also been acquitted from the case under S.13(e) of Arms Ordinance, 1965---
Identification parade of accused held after a considerable delay of about six days had lost its sanctity,
when such delay was not explained---Prosecution had examined in all 13 witnesses including the eye-
witnesses, but no tangible or unimpeachable evidence had been brought on record to prove the charge
against accused---Recognition of accused at the place of incident from a considerable distance, was
highly doubtful; and his identification by the prosecution witnesses after about 6 months, was also
doubtful---Many circumstances existed creating doubt in the prosecution case, accused was entitled to
be extended the benefit of doubt---Prosecution having failed to prove charges against accused beyond
reasonable shadow of doubt, impugned judgment was set aside, accused was acquitted from the
charges, and was directed to be released, in circumstances.
2014 PCrLJ 754 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE LORY VIE PIMENTEL SPECIAL JUDGE ANTI-TERRORISM
COURT NO.IV, LAHORE
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 265-D-
--Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Act of terrorism---Return of case to Regular
Court---Petitioner/complainant was aggrieved of the order passed by Anti-Terrorism Court, whereby
case was transferred to the court of regular jurisdiction---Validity---
Complainant was working as maid under an agreement in the house of accused and allegedly she was
maltreated and her mobile phone was also snatched---Such act could not be termed as an act of
"terrorism"---Before framing of charge Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court after having considered that facts of
the case did not satisfy ingredients of S.365-A, P.P.C. rightly passed the order of transfer of the case---
Petitioner failed to point out any illegality/infirmity in the order passed by Anti-Terrorism Court---
Petition was dismissed in circumstances.
S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 353, 109, 34, 427, 201 & 186---Anti- Terrorism Act
(XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6, 7 & 21(l)---Qatl-e-amd, attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, assault or criminal force to
deter public servant from discharge of his duty, abetment, common intention, mischief causing damage
to the amount of fifty rupees, causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information
to screen offender, obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions, acts of terrorism---Bail,
grant of---Further inquiry---Co-accused persons allegedly killed police officials and other deceased
persons---Allegation against accused was that he drove the co-accused persons to the place of
occurrence---Accused was only ascribed role of conspiracy in the F.I.R.---Occurrence was committed by
four unknown persons, but subsequently, complainant made supplementary statement indicating that
accused was driving the car in which the co-accused persons came at the spot and resorted to firing---
Accused was found innocent during investigation and in report under S. 173, Cr.P.C. his name was put in
Column No.2---One of the co-accused who was assigned a role similar to that of accused had already
been released on bail---Accused was also the complainant of an earlier case, wherein a deceased of the
present occurrence and his brother were nominated for the crime, therefore, probability of false
implication of accused in the present case could not be ruled out---Accused was no more required for
further investigation---Case was one of further inquiry---Accused was released on bail in circumstances.
Ss. 365-A, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7---Kidnapping for receiving ransom
amount, rioting, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Incident of kidnapping of baby aged about
4/5 years, had taken place in presence of her father and prosecution witnesses---Report was made by
the complainant to the Police without any loss of time, and the complainant had fully supported the
contents of F.I.R.---Accused was apprehended after
encounter between Police and accused in presence of Police Officials, and baby was got recovered from
possession of accused---All witnesses were subjected to cross-examination, but nothing had come on
record to discredit their evidence---Witnesses were natural and independent, who had no enmity with
accused---Merely claiming enmity with the complainant over a house, without bringing any evidence on
record in proof of such claim, was not sufficient to believe the plea of accused with regard to plea of
enmity with the complainant---Non- examination of one eye-witness, was not fatal to prosecution case,
as the prosecution was not required to examine each and every witness in the case---Quality and not the
quantity of the evidence would decide the fate of criminal case---Confidence-inspiring ocular testimony
of prosecution witnesses was also corroborated by the fact that accused was caught hold at the spot
along with pistol and kidnapped baby---In absence of any error or illegality in the impugned judgment
warranting interference by High Court, same was maintained and appeal was dismissed, in
circumstances.
S. 345--- Penal Code (XLV of 1860),Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 148, 149 & 337-F(iii)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII
of 1997), Ss.6(m) & (n), 7(a), (c) & (h)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.188---Review of Supreme Court
judgment---Murder of police official while on duty---Act of terrorism---
Statements of eye-witnesses (police officials) and recoveries made during investigation established that
deceased-police official was murdered when he was on official duty, and such findings were upheld by
the High Court and Supreme Court---Offence under S.353, P.P.C stood proved against accused as he
fired at and killed a police official, who was performing his official duty, therefore, offence under S.7 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was also established because murder of a police official without personal
enmity amounted to create terror and insecurity in the vicinity---Offence under S.6(2)(n) of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 also stood established as act of accused involved serious violence against a member
of police force---Regarding first count of death sentence under S.302(b), P.P.C, accused entered into a
compromise with legal heirs of deceased and compensation had also been paid, but second count of
death under S.7 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 had its own implications and was not compoundable under
Ss.354(5) & (7), Cr.P.C---Compromise between parties was accepted (only) to the extent of conviction
under S.302(b), P.P.C and accused was acquitted of said charge---Regarding death sentence under S.7 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, quantum of said sentence could be examined in the present case
due to its peculiar facts---Sentence of death awarded to accused under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997
was converted into life imprisonment without extending benefit of S.382-B, P.P.C, as the same was not
allowed by Trial Court, High Court and the Supreme Court---Review petition was disposed of accordingly.
2014 PLD 164 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH WAJID ALI Vs CIVIL JUDGE AND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE NO.1
Ss. 6 & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.503 & 506---Act of terrorism---Scope---Criminal intimidation---
Ingredients---Appreciation of evidence---"Action" as defined in subsection (2) of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997, if qualified the condition of involvement of the use of fire-arms, explosive, or any other
weapon, would fall within meanings of "terrorism"---In the present case, it was not alleged that any of
the person, forming mob, was armed with any weapon; alleged resistance, offered by the mob,
therefore, could not be an act of 'terrorism'---Simple threats, were not sufficient to constitute criminal
intimidation, within the scope of S.503, P.P.C., unless it was caused to a person to do an act, who was
not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act, which that person was legally bound to do---
Ingredients of criminal intimidation, being missing in the matter, Ss.6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997,
were not applicable in the matter.
Ss. 302 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(2)(m)(n), 7, 13 & 23---Qatl-e-amd, common
intention, act of terrorism---Dismissal of application for transfer of case from Anti- terrorism Court to
regular court by accused---Validity---Sufficient material had been collected to create a nexus between
the Scheduled offence allegedly committed by accused---Accused had launched an assault upon the
member of Police Force (S.H.O.) as to deter him from performing his official duties; and had committed
his murder---If such allegations were accepted as correct on the basis of material available on record,
'actus reus' attributed to accused would attract the provisions of S.6(2)(m)(n) of Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997---Accused being subordinate to deceased S.H.O., by such act of accused it had created sense of
insecurity in Police Officials---Anti- Terrorism Court had exclusive jurisdiction to try the case and had
rightly framed the charge against accused---No illegality or infirmity in the impugned order had been
pointed out and it was based upon sound reasons---Impugned order was maintained---Petition being
without any merit was dismissed, with direction to the Ante-Terrorism Court to proceed with the case
expeditiously, as provided in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
Ss. 324, 353, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13(d)---Attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, assault or criminal force to deter public servant from
discharge of his duty, rioting, act of terrorism and possessing
Nothing came on record to suggest that the Investigating Agency had motive to set up the witnesses to
depose against accused falsely---Truthfulness of the ocular testimony, could not be questioned on minor
contradictions or discrepancies---Police Officials were as good witnesses as any other citizen, unless any
mala fide was established against them---Deposition of the Police Officials, could not be brushed aside
simply on the bald allegation that they belonged to the Police department---Accused who had pleaded
that case against him was false, and had been registered due to inimical terms with the informer on the
dispute of a house, could not produce documentary proof to prove said plea---Counsel for accused, had
not been able to point out any misreading or non-reading of evidence or contradiction on material
particulars in the statements of the prosecution witnesses resulting into miscarriage of justice---
Prosecution had succeeded to establish its case and accused had failed to prove his innocence---
Prosecution having established its case against accused beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt, no
reason was available to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court in recording conviction
and sentence against accused.
NOOR
Ss. 23, 6 & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 148, 149 & 364---Application for transfer of case from
Anti-Terrorism Court to Court of Session, dismissal of---Evidence of complainant and prosecution
witnesses not recorded to determine nature of offence---Effect---Accused and co- accused persons
allegedly caused murder of three persons in front of their relatives after abducting them on gun-point---
Plea of accused that present case was one of previous enmity and personal vendetta between the
parties, therefore, offence alleged neither created any threat to a section of public or community nor it
created any sense of fear or insecurity in the society---Application of accused under S.23 of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 for transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to Court of Session was rejected---
Validity---Alleged offence was committed on a path during day time and allegedly reckless firing was
made with weapons of prohibited bore---Admittedly after submission of challan in Anti-Terrorism Court,
the prosecution could not examine the ocular, circumstantial, medical and expert witnesses nor any
other material was available to ascertain whether any panic, fear and insecurity had been created in the
minds of people, therefore at such premature stage severity and nature of alleged offence could not be
determined---Plea raised by accused might be agitated and decided after recording of evidence of
complainant and atleast two eye-witnesses/star witnesses by the prosecution and thereafter the
accused was at liberty to repeat the
application for transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to court of plenary jurisdiction---
Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(2)(a) & 7(a)---Qatl-e-amd, kidnapping
for ransom, common intention, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Both the witnesses had not
only rendered discrepant statements inter se, but also made some self- contradictory depositions---
Witnesses of last seen had made certain improvements in their statements, for which they were duly
confronted with their previous statements under S.161, Cr.P.C.---Evidence of last seen had been
fabricated by the Police so as to involve accused persons in the case, and create a linkage between them
and the crime committed---
Discrepancies and self-contradictory depositions of both the prosecution witnesses, had rendered their
statement worthless and incredible, which could not be given any weight---
Evidence of last seen, was the weakest type of circumstance, which could easily be manoeuvred by the
prosecution, wherever direct connecting evidence against an accused, did not come in their way---Law
required unimpeachable corroboration of such like evidence, but such particular piece of evidence alone
was untrustworthy and unreliable---Continuous chain of events, without any breach could, establish the
guilt of accused, based on circumstantial evidence, but in the present case, it appeared to be a ragged,
shaken and shabby situation which had dwindled the idea of building an uninterrupted chain by the
prosecution---Medical evidence hardly advanced the prosecution case in plausible terms---Prosecution,
in circumstances, had failed to prove the charge against accused persons beyond reasonable shadow of
doubt---Impugned judgment being unsustainable was annulled and conviction and sentence of accused
persons were set aside, they were acquitted of the charge and were directed to be released, in
circumstances.
2014 YLR 2534 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE ATIF ALI Vs SPECIAL JUDGE OF ATC-IV, LAHORE
Ss.302, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Qatl-e-amd, rioting armed with
deadly weapon, every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of
common object---Cognizance of cases by Anti-Terrorism Court---Determining factors---Demanding
Bhatta---Transfer of accused's case from Anti-Terrorism Court to court of ordinary jurisdiction---
Validity---Accused demanded Bhatta from deceased and on refusal murdered his father thereby
conveying message to complainant and people living in the area that if anyone refused accused's
demand would suffer the fate of deceased---Occurrence was bound to spread panic and feeling of
insecurity---Under S.6(k) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 demanding Bhatta was offence punishable
under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---
Demanding Bhatta constituted a scheduled offence which was triable by Anti-Terrorism Court
constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Cumulative effect of the contents of F.I.R., attending
circumstances and record of case would determine whether alleged offence fell
within purview of any of the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Act done by accused created a
sense of insecurity among people and was covered by Ss.6 & 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Trial
Court's order transferring accused's case to regular court having no cogent and plausible reasons, was
set aside.
2014 PCrLJ 1673 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH RAZI KHAN ALMANI Vs JUDGE, ANTI- TERRORISM COURT,
HYDERABAD
Ss. 302, 114, 109 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7 & 21-E--- Act of terrorism, qatl-e-amd,
abetment, common intention---Remand of case---Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court---
Applicant/Investigating Officer requested for grant of further remand of accused in Police custody, but
Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, instead of granting remand of accused in Police Custody, had granted
remand in judicial custody for 7 days---Applicant had filed revision against said order contending that
impugned order would affect the process of investigation of the case for the reason that more evidence
was to be collected with the cooperation and disclosure of accused and statement of his daughter---
Allegation was that court had shown special generosity to accused mainly on the reason that accused
being a Sessions Judge, court had paid accused due respect, though he had not complained bodily or
mental torture from the hands of Police---Impugned order, though neither could be challenged invoking
revisional jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., but it was an appropriate case where
extraordinary jurisdiction could be invoked under Art. 199 of Constitution---High Court converted
revision application as constitutional petition and held that remand could be extended, if the court was
satisfied that no bodily harm had been or would be caused to accused; provided that total period of
such remand would not exceed ninety days---Trial Court had failed to appreciate the request made by
applicant/Investigating Officer for grant of further Police remand---Impugned remand order, granting
remand of accused in judicial custody, instead of Police custody was illegal, arbitrary and against law;
which would affect the smooth investigation of crime---
Impugned order was set aside, with the direction to the Trial Court to decide afresh the request of
applicant on merits and in accordance with law after affording fair opportunity of hearing to both sides.
Transfer of case---Minor boy of 6 - 7 years was kidnapped for ransom, his mouth was tapped and was
put in jute bag, to keep him silent in order to avoid attention of people towards them, which resulted in
his death and subsequently accused threw his dead body in water channel---
Application of accused for transfer of case to Court of ordinary jurisdiction was dismissed by Anti-
Terrorism Court---Validity---Such barbarity had created fear, panic and sense of insecurity among people
of vicinity---Act of accused persons squarely fell within the ambit of "terrorism" attracting jurisdiction of
Anti-Terrorism Court in terms of S.6(1) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---
Trial Court had correctly assumed jurisdiction declining transfer of case to Court of ordinary
jurisdiction---Order passed by Trial Court was not perverse, nor suffering from any infirmity and it did
not require interference by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Ss. 435 & 439, Cr.P.C.
or inherent power under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., which could only be invoked in exceptional cased of
extraordinary nature and not in each and every case---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.
Community---Connotations---Act of accused persons though was (directed) against an individual yet its
impact had to be considered with surrounding circumstances---Complainant was member of business
community running business in a busy area---Ransom was demanded in such a way by accused persons
and the manner in which complainant was directed to proceed to a Chowk coupled with firing shots at a
public place and eight days time (dead line) for arrangement of ransom, might have spread sense of
terror, fear and insecurity in the vicinity complainant was running business---Complainant being
member of a particular
community (business community), prosecution case fell within ambit of Cls.(b) and (k) of S.6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 and the alleged offence was liable to be punished under S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997---In view of surge in heinous crimes, outlaws perpetrating such crimes had to be dealt with
drastically---Constitutional petition was dismissed.
Ss. 302(b) & 34--- Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(1)(b) & 7(a)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of
1898), S. 345---Qatl-e-amd, common intention, act of terrorism---Compromise---
Deceased pleaded to be taken to hospital, but accused and co-accused did not do the same, despite
presence of an official vehicle at the spot---Deceased consequently bled to death---
Accused deliberately and wilfully shot the deceased at the instigation of the co-accused persons and
they let him bleed to death without offering him any assistance---Such sequence of events abundantly
displayed the common intention and object of the accused and co-accused persons- --Gruesome murder
of deceased at the hands of members of law enforcement agency certainly created a sense of terror,
insecurity and panic in the minds and hearts of those who witnessed the scene and the entire public
which saw the video of the incident---Accused had compromised with legal heirs of deceased but
offence committed by him and co-accused persons under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was not
compoundable---Supreme Court however observed that following the ratio in the case of Muhammad
Nawaz v. The State (PLD 2014 SC 383), wherein sentence of death imposed upon convict under S.7 of
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was reduced to imprisonment for life in the presence of a compromise, the
death sentence awarded to present accused should also be reduced to imprisonment for life---
Sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to co-accused persons was maintained---Appeal was
disposed of accordingly.
S. 345---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(1)(b) & 7(a)---
Compounding of offence---Fasad-fil-Arz---Murder of unarmed person by members of law enforcement
agency---Victim begging for life and bleeding to death---Cruel and gruesome murder---Such murder
would amount to Fasad-fil-Arz within the meaning of S.311, P.P.C. hence there could be no question of
acceptance of any compromise between the parties---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.
Accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for five years---Validity---Delay of five days in
registration of F.I.R., was not explained, whereas Presiding Officer, who was complainant in the case, did
not report the matter to appropriate forum in accordance with law on the date of alleged incident---
Complainant stated in his evidence that he did not give name of accused persons at the time of
registration of F.I.R., nor he could identify accused produced in court to be the persons who committed
alleged offence---No incriminating material was recovered from accused nor any other evidence had
been produced by prosecution which could directly connect accused with alleged offence---Trial Court
had convicted accused under Ss. 6(2)(m) & h) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, without even recording any
finding as to whether alleged offence fell within the definition of terrorism or not---Accused persons had
no previous criminal record and they had made out a case for their release on bail by suspending
sentence awarded to them during pendency of appeal---Bail was allowed in circumstances.
Ss. 6(1)(b) & (c)---"Terrorism", meaning of---Scope---For an act to fall within the definition of "terrorism",
nexus of the actions of the wrongdoer must be to terrorize the public in general and to spread the sense
of fear and insecurity in the particular community or sect of people.
Ss. 6(2)(m), (n) & 23---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---"Terrorism", meaning
of---Scope---Exchange of fire with police contingent---Doubts regarding element of serious violence
against police---Accused persons, 17 in number, allegedly made indiscriminate firing upon a police
contingent, snatched an official rifle and ammunition, and used force and coercion to rescue one of the
accused from the police---Despite the fact that firing upon police contingent was made by 17 persons,
no police official received a single scratch---None of the accused received any fire shot injury at the
hands of police---Uniform of none of the police officials was torn---In presence of a reasonable police
contingent, it was not comprehendible as to how official arm and ammunition was snatched and as to
how accused persons managed to rescue one of theirs from the police---Element of involvement of
serious violence against police was lacking in such circumstances---Provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997, were not applicable in the present case---Case of accused persons was ordered to be transferred
from Anti- Terrorism Court to the court of plenary jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was allowed
accordingly.
Ss. 23 & 6(n)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 353, 186, 34---Application for transfer of case from
Anti-Terrorism Court to Sessions Court, dismissal of---Act of terrorism---Serious violence against
members of the police force---Scope---Accused persons had fired upon a police party with automatic
weapons in order to deter them from discharging their official duty---Accused persons submitted an
application under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 before the Anti- Terrorism Court for transfer of case
to an ordinary court, however the same was rejected on the basis that it was not essential that police
party received injuries during the occurrence but it was enough that they were intimidated from doing
their public duty and were refrained from discharging their lawful duties---Validity---Record showed that
accused persons had fired upon the police party and deterred them from discharging their official
duties---Empties of automatic weapons used by accused persons were recovered from the place of
occurrence---Act of accused clearly showed serious violence against members of police force and
created terror in the area---Offence clearly fell under S.6(n) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Anti-Terrorism
Court had rightly rejected application of accused persons for transfer of case---Revision petition was
dismissed accordingly.
Ss. 23 & 6(2)(e)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-A---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to
Court of Session---Act of terrorism---Scope---Business dealing between the parties---
Kidnapping for payment of a due amount---Accused persons were alleged to have kidnapped the alleged
abductee for ransom---Alleged abductee was later recovered by the police---Perusal of F.I.R., statement
of alleged abductee under S.161, Cr.P.C. and other material collected during investigation showed that
there was a business dealing between the parties, and cheques were issued by the complainant party,
which got dishonoured on presentation, therefore, ingredients of S.365-A, P.P.C. were not satisfied from
the material collected during investigation---Ordinary crimes like the present one, were not to be tried
under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Anti- Terrorism Court, while dismissing application of accused
persons for transfer of case, itself observed that three cheques had been issued by the alleged
abductee---Anti-Terrorism Court had no jurisdiction to try the present case---Revision application was
allowed with a direction to Anti-Terrorism Court to transfer the case to the Court of Session.
2013 PCrLJ 603 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE GHULAM FAREED Vs State
Occurrence neither reflected any act of terrorism nor it was sectarian matter and occurrence was result
of previous enmity between the parties---Accused was wrongly convicted under S. 7(a) & (c) of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997.
Ss.6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 386, 387, 506(2), 504 & 337-H(2)---Criminal Procedure Code
(V of 1898), 5.526---Act of terrorism, extortion by putting a person to fear of death, or of grievous hurt in
order to commit extortion, criminal intimidation and rash and negligent act---Application for transfer of
case to .regular court---Complainant had alleged in F.I.R. that two months prior to the incident, accused
had demanded `Bhatta' from him, but no F.I.R. of the incident was lodged---F.I.R. and other material
collected during investigation revealed that no offence triable under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was made
out, for the reason that element of striking of terror, or creation sense of fear and insecurity in the
people, or any section of the people was made out---Ingredients of extortion of money as defined in
S.6(2)(k) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, were not made out from the fact of the case---Anti-Terrorism
Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to try the case---Impugned order was suffering from illegality, and
was not sustainable under the law--Application was allowed by the High Court with direction to the Trial
Court to transfer the case to the Court of Session, having jurisdiction in the matter, in circumstances.
Ss. 6(2)(b)(k) & 7(c)(h)---Conviction in absentia---Accused persons against whom conviction had been
awarded in absentia; and accused who had been shown absconder, and whose case had been kept on
dormant, were not present before the Trial Court---No opportunity whatsoever to defend their case on
merits was provided to them---Impugned judgment also did not suggest that accused had deliberately
avoided the process of the court, or remained wilfully absent from the court---Conviction awarded to
accused persons in absentia, were set aside, and case was remanded to the Trial Court to decide the
same after providing them proper opportunity of being heard---Accused persons would surrender
before the Trial Court and would attend the court on each and every date---During the trial accused
persons would remain on bail; if they would misuse the concession of bail, Trial Court would be at liberty
to pass appropriate order in accordance with law.
S. 6---Terrorism---Scope---Whether particular act was act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object,
design and purpose behind the said act was to be seen and it was also to be seen as to whether the said
act had created sense of fear and insecurity in the public or in section of the public or community or in
any sect and where action resulted in striking terror or creating fear, panic, sensation, helplessness and
sense of insecurity among the people in particular area it amounted to "terror" and such action fell
within the ambit of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and shall be triable by Special Court constituted
for such purpose.
Ss. 23, 6, 7 & 8---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 354, 109, 216 & 34---Act of terrorism, qatl- e-amd,
assault to woman with intent to outrage her modesty, abetment, harbouring offender and common
intention---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to the court of ordinary jurisdiction---Application
for transfer of case of the accused was dismissed by the Special Court- --Validity---Offence was
committed on the road and by such act of the accused, young boy was shot dead by automatic weapon
over petty matter---Act of accused was designed to create sense of fear and insecurity and helplessness
in the minds of general public disturbing the tempo of the life and tranquility of the society and
provisions of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, were attracted and impact of such act terrorized
society at large by creating panic and fear in their minds---Presence of personal enmity would not
exclude the jurisdiction of Anti- Terrorism Court and neither motive nor intent for commission of offence
was relevant for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the Anti-Terrorism Court---Act of accused
created sense of helplessness and insecurity amongst the people of area where offence was committed
and did destabilize the public at large---Present case would fall within the jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism
Court---Order of the Trial Court did not suffer from any material irregularity or illegality and the same
was maintained.
Validity---Prosecution could not establish its case against accused without reasonable doubt---
silent about application of S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, whereas nothing had been observed by Trial
Court about gravity of alleged offence---High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to
accused by Trial Court and he was acquitted of the charge--Appeal was allowed in circumstances.
2013 PCrLJ 1808 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH ISHAQ ALI Vs State
S. 6---Act of terrorism, determination of---Perusal of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 revealed that Anti-
Terrorism Court had the jurisdiction to try the case, if an offence was made out with an intention to
strike terror in the public or in a section of public---Act should be designed to create a sense of fear and
insecurity in the minds of the general public---For determining whether an action fell under the ambit of
S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the averments made in the F.I.R. and allegations raised in such regard
were of prime importance---While examining such offence it was to be seen that the offence had a
nexus with the object of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 and was squarely covered under Ss. 6, 7 & 8 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---
Case was not triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court when any of the condition laid down in section 6 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were not fulfilled.
Ss. 6(i) & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 393 & 34---Qatl-e-amd, attempt to commit robbery,
common intention---Act of terrorism, determination of---Transfer of case from Anti- Terrorism Court to
Sessions Court---According to F.I.R. accused persons came to a shop with the intention to commit
robbery, and after failing they started firing at the deceased persons---
Case was transferred from Anti-Terrorism Court to Sessions Court on an application filed by accused
persons under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Validity---For determining whether an action fell under
the ambit of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the averments made in the F.I.R. and allegations raised in
such regard were of prime importance---F.I.R. categorically stated that accused persons stopped at the
front of the shop with an intention to commit robbery and when they were stopped, they started firing
upon the deceased persons---Present case pertained to robbery with murder committed for private
gains and offence was not committed with the design or purpose as contemplated under any of the
provisions of S.6 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997---Case had been rightly transferred from Anti-Terrorism
Court to Sessions Court---Revision application was dismissed accordingly.
S. 561-A---
Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.193, 384, 109 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997),
S.6(2)(k)---
application for---Trial Court had observed in its judgment that applicant/complainant and Mashir had
given false statements before the court and notices under S.193, P.P.C. were ordered to be issued
against them---Plea of the applicant was that Mashir had not filed separate reply to notice under S.193,
P.P.C., but he adopted the reply submitted by him, despite the fact that notice issued against the Mashir
had been withdrawn, while notice against him was still pending---Applicant had contended that he was
being insisted upon for personal appearance, which was discrimination on the part of the Trial Court---
Validity---No previous statement of the applicant was recorded on oath, in such circumstances, there
was nothing before the Trial Court which constituted an offence of perjury under S.193, P.P.C., against
the applicant---Notice issued to applicant/complainant, therefore, amounted to abuse of process of
court, which could not be allowed as High Court had powers under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of
process of court or to secure ends of justice---Show-cause notice under S.193, P.P.C., issued against
applicant, and proceedings emanating therefrom were quashed, in circumstances.
Ss. 302, 324, 337-H(2) & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7---Qatl-e-amd, attempt to
commit qatl-e-amd, causing hurt by rash or negligent act, act of terrorism, common intention---
Appreciation of evidence---Complainant had clearly stated that accused present in the court was not the
same---Prosecution witness had stated that S.H.O. had fired from his Kalashnikov at the deceased, who
died at the spot---Accused did not make any fire at the time of incident---Another prosecution witness
had also not implicated accused in the commission of the offence---Remaining evidence was formal in
nature and nothing incriminating was recovered from the possession of accused---Eye-witnesses of the
incident had not implicated accused in the commission of the offence---Trial Court had failed to
appreciate the evidence in accordance with the principle of law---Burden to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt rested on the prosecution, but it had failed to discharge the same---Prosecution
having failed to establish its case against accused, conviction and sentence awarded to them by the Trial
Court, was set aside and they were acquitted and released, in circumstances.
Ss. 302(b), 324 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13---Qatl-e-amd, attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, common intention, act of terrorism,
possessing unlicensed weapon---Appreciation of evidence---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 which was a
special law, would override the provisions of general law---Offence of murder had been provided in the
schedule of said special law, which was punishable with death---Fire shots received by the deceased and
injured, were from a high velocity fire-arm and not from a low velocity gun, such as a Repeater---
Statements of the prosecution witnesses, the recoveries, the motive and other facts of the murder of
deceased and the injuries, sustained by other four
persons, had proved case against accused to the hilt---Criminal case under S.13 of Pakistan Arms
Ordinance, 1965 was also proved against accused, his conviction and sentence was upheld and murder
reference made by the Trial Court to his extent was answered in affirmative---Benefit of doubt was
extended to co-accused and their sentence was set aside and they would be released.
Arrest of accused persons at the place of occurrence along with sophisticated weapons was proved
through trust-worthy evidence--- Prosecution witnesses/police-officials were cross- examined at length,
but defence failed to shake their credibility and veracity---Although one co- accused was acquitted by
Trial Court on basis of his plea of alibi, but present accused persons never claimed/agitated such
defence plea---Acquitted co-accused had not examined any witness in his defence nor produced any
document to substantiate his plea of alibi, therefore, prosecution case could not be made doubtful on
basis of acquittal of said co-accused---
Although private witnesses were not arranged, but in circumstances of the occurrence, it was neither
practical nor advisable to arrange private witnesses as it would have amounted to putting lives of private
persons in danger---Medical evidence was not in contradiction with ocular evidence---Prosecution
successfully proved the charge against accused persons through an unbroken chain of ocular, medical
and circumstantial evidence---High Court dismissed appeal of accused persons, and issued show-cause
notice to the acquitted co-accused to show as to why judgment of acquittal in his favour should not be
set-aside---Case was remanded to the Trial Court to consider acquittal of co-accused.
S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 344/34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997). Ss. 6(1)(b), 6(2)(b),
(g), (i), (m) & 7---Wrongful confinement for ten or more days, common intention, acts of terrorism---Pre-
arrest bail, cancellation of---Confinement of Judges of superior Courts---
Allegation against the accused, who was a former President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff,
was that he suspended the Chief Justice of Pakistan and 60 other Judges of superior Courts from their
positions and placed them under house arrest for a period of five and half months due to which they
were unable to perform their judicial functions---Perusal of F.I.R. clearly suggested that police did not
insert the sections of relevant law which were made out from the contents of the F.I.R.---Confining
Judges of Superior Courts and stopping them from performance of their duties was an act of terrorism---
Prima facie offence under S.7 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 was attracted to the present case---Police was
bound under the law to insert the sections of relevant law which contents of F.I.R. suggested---
According to investigating officer accused did not join the investigation, rather a telephonic message
was conveyed (by him) that material would be provided to court---Such act of accused was defiance of
court order and misuse of concession of bail---Accused failed to point out any mala fide on part of police
or complainant---Offence alleged fell within the prohibitory clause of S.497(1), Cr.P.C---Accused was also
a proclaimed offender and as such could not claim his normal rights-- -Accused was specifically
nominated in the F.I.R. and was also required for further investigation---Act of accused through which
Judges of Superior Court(s) were confined to their residencies shocked the entire nation more
particularly community of lawyers--- Such act of accused spread fear in the society, insecurity amongst
judicial officers, alarm in the lawyers community and terror throughout the country---Pre-arrest bail of
accused was declined accordingly.
Ss. 6(1)(b), 6(2)(b), (g), (i), (m) & 7---Act of terrorism---Scope---Confining Judges of Superior Courts and
stopping them from performance of their duties---Such an act was an act of terrorism as defined by
Ss.6(1)(b), 6(2)(b), (g), (i) & (m).
2013 YLR 1732 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH AMEER BUX alias GHOUS BUX alias GHOUSO BROHI alias
SUDHIR BROHI Vs State
in court---Effect---
Accused was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life for kidnapping
for ransom---Validity---Accused was identified in court, therefore, his presence at place of occurrence
and kidnapping abductee for ransom could not be disputed---Evidence of payment of ransom through
evidence of prosecution witness stood proved beyond any shadow of doubt- --Despite lengthy cross-
examination prosecution witness could not be shattered by defence---
Trial Court had rightly believed prosecution evidence, which was confidence-inspiring---High Court
declined to disagree with appreciation of evidence by Trial Court---Appeal was dismissed in
circumstances.
Ss. 6(2)(b)(k), 7(c)(h), 19(12) & 25---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.9 & 10---Act of terrorism---
Conviction in absentia---Options for accused---Accused had two options in law in case of conviction
recorded in absentia; firstly, to approach the Trial Court within the stipulated period with a request to
set aside his conviction recorded in absentia, in terms of S.19(12) of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 by
showing that he did not abscond deliberately from the court during the trial and secondly to surrender
before High Court by filing an appeal under S.25 of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 with a prayer to set
aside the conviction awarded in absentia; and to acquit him on merit or to remand the matter to the
Trial Court for fresh trial by setting aside impugned judgment.
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324/ 148/ 149/ 427/ 337-A(i)/ 337-F(iii)/ 337-L(2)---
Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, rioting with deadly weapons, causing
hurts---Constitutional petition---"Act of terrorism", determination of---Nexus had to be shown between
the act done and the objective or design by which the offence had been committed, to formulate an
opinion whether or not such offence could be termed an act of terrorism---In the absence of such
linkage it could not be held that the offence committed in the background of personal enmity or
vendatta, transmitting a wave of terror or fright or horror, was necessarily an act of terrorism---
Complainant and his co-witnesses had categorically stated during investigation that the accused
mentioned in the F.I.R. had a personal motive and grudge to commit the offence, therefore the crime
committed by them, regardless its repercussions, could not be dubbed an "act of terrorism"---Impugned
order passed by Anti- Terrorism Court transferring the case to the court of ordinary jurisdiction on the
application of
accused moved under S.23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was well-reasoned and based on relevant
law---Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine accordingly.
2013 PCrLJ 526 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH EIDAL KHAN METLO Vs IMAM ALI alias BALI
Ss. 6, 7 & 23--- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302/324/353/ 148/149---Anti-Terrorism Court, jurisdiction
of---Scope---Attack on a police picket located in a remote area whether an "act of terror"---Scope---
Accused persons had allegedly made an assault on a police picket, which resulted in the death of a
police official---Police picket was situated in a remote area with no public in its vicinity---Anti-Terrorism
Court allowed application of accused under S.23 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 and transferred the case to
the Court of Session on the basis that complainant and eye-witnesses had not mentioned that the firing
by accused persons created harassment, fear, terror and insecurity in the minds of the public---
Legality---While deciding applicability of Ss.6 & 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the phrase 'action'
carried more weight than the phrase "designed to"---Place of incident, in the present case, was a police
picket which was normally established in an area to ensure safety and security of the people of the
area---
"Action" i.e. manner of offence, in the present case, was an attack upon the police picket---Such action
leads to an alarming situation and impression upon the people that, if police officials and police posts
were not safe then what impact would it have on them---Such actions showed that there was
lawlessness and the public at large felt serious effects of insecurity, lawlessness and uncertainty as a
result---Present case was not one of private vendetta and accused persons deliberately and intentionally
assaulted the police picket with deadly weapons---"Action", taken by the accused persons in the present
case, could not be presumed to have remained unnoticed by the locality nor could it be said to be an
ordinary offence---Present case was a case of terrorism within the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism
Court---Impugned order of Anti- Terrorism Court was illegal and not maintainable---Revision application
was allowed accordingly.
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Application for transfer of case, dismissal of---Terrorism, act of---Proof--Duty of police---
Scope---F.I.R. was registered against the accused (Station House Officer) on the allegation that he had
illegally detained a person at a private place and at the time of recovery proceedings he used weapons
against the raiding Magistrate---Accused was aggrieved of cognizance taken by Anti-Terrorism Court and
sought transfer of the same to court of ordinary jurisdiction---Validity---Accused in violation of law kept
detenues in illegal custody at private place though he was under legal obligation to act strictly in
accordance with law, which prima facie proved that he acted contrary to law hence committed offence
of malfeasance by detaining private person in his custody---Accused also caused serious deterrence in
legal duty of Magistrate by making direct firing and snatched detenues from the custody of Magistrate---
Manner of offences committed by accused was sufficient to hold that prima facie he was guilty of
committing serious offence of terrorism---Police officers were always supposed to act in aid
of innocence as powers, jurisdiction and authority vested in them was never meant to exploit the same
and they had been entrusted sacred duty of creating a sense of security and peace among individuals
while creating a sense of terror and fear among criminals---Accused failed to make out a case where
interference of High Court was required and he even failed to point out any illegality in the orders
passed by Trial Court, which were otherwise legal, well justified and maintained under law--- Application
for transfer of case was dismissed in circumstances.
S.6---Terrorism---Components and constituents of terrorism detailed. The 'purpose', the motivation, the
'actus reus' and the 'mens rea' constitute the components of terrorism or an act of terrorism. An action
designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the government or the public or section of public or
community or sect or, if such an action is designed to create a sense of fear or insecurity in society in the
backdrop of religious, sectarian or ethnic cause, shall constitute an act of terrorism or a terrorist act. To
create fear or insecurity in the society through a crime is not by itself terrorism unless the motive or the
design or the actus reus or mens rea pre-exists for creating such fear or insecurity in the society. A
private crime resulting into fear or insecurity as a by-product, a fall out or an unintended consequence
of fright etc. cannot be termed as an act of terrorism. Mere gravity, heinousness, gruesomeness or
shocking nature of any offence, committed in pursuance of personal enmity or in settlement of personal
vendetta is not by itself sufficient to brand such crime as a terrorist act or an act of terrorism.
Ss. 384/ 386/ 506/ 511/ 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(1), 6(2)(k) &7---
Terrorism Court, dismissal of---Allegation against accused persons was that on several occasions they
entered a factory and demanded extortion money (bhatta) from its owner; that they threatened to
commit murder and set the factory on fire, and that they locked the factory by ousting its workers---
Contentions of accused persons were that they were members of a labour union and had been
implicated in the case due to enmity, and that offence alleged did not fall within the ambit of S. 6 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, therefore it should be transferred to an ordinary court---Validity---Statements
of witnesses under S.161, Cr.P.C. fully corroborated the version in the F.I.R.---Statements of prosecution
witnesses under S. 164, Cr.P.C. fully supported the main allegation regarding demand of extortion
money (bhatta) and consequences in case of non-compliance---F.I.R. reflected that accused persons duly
armed with weapons entered into the factory premises and demanded extortion money on several
occasions and also locked the factory by ousting its workers, which linked with the definition of
terrorism provided in Ss. 6(1) and 6(2)(k) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Acts alleged against accused
persons clearly created sense of fear or insecurity in the society---Accused persons had failed to
establish any previous enmity or private vendetta for implicating them in the present case---Neither any
application under S. 23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had been moved for transfer of case to an ordinary
court nor any application under S. 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. for quashment of proceedings, instead
accused persons had approached the High Court directly---
Sched, Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 336-B & 337-F(i)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.
199---Constitutional petition---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to the court of ordinary
jurisdiction---Application for transfer of case of the petitioners-accused was dismissed by the Special
Court---Validity---Offences mentioned in the Schedule to Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 should have nexus
with the objects mentioned in Ss. 6 and 7 of the Act---
Nothing had been brought on record to show that the occurrence created terror, panic or sense of
insecurity among people and the society---Even in F.I.R., got registered by the complainant, no
allegation of creating terror was levelled---Motive for the occurrence was enmity inter-se the parties
and for that reason, the application of S.7 of the Act which primarily required the spread of sense of
insecurity and fear in common mind was lacking---Occurrence took place in a room of a hotel which was
not a public place and the element of striking terror or creating sense of fear in the people or any
section of the people was not made discernible in the F.I.R.---
Case registered against the petitioners-accused was triable by the court of ordinary jurisdiction-
--Constitutional petition was allowed and S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was ordered to be deleted and
petition moved under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was accepted---Proceedings of the trial of the
case were ordered to be transferred to the court of ordinary jurisdiction.
S.497(2)---Penal Code MAT of 1860), Ss. 302/ 324/ 353/ 147/ 148/ 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of
1997), Ss.6 & 7--- Qatl-e-amd, attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, assault or criminal force to deter public
servant from discharge of his duty, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, acts
of terrorism---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Accused and. co-accused persons were alleged to have
fired at a police party which resulted in the death of a police official---Accused was implicated in the
case on the basis of identification parade and recovery of weapon---Name of accused did not transpire
in the F.I.R.-Identification parade was delayed by about 6 days, which had not been accounted for by the
prosecution---During identification parade accused raised the objection that witnesses had seen him
many times at the police station during his remand---Such objection of accused was noticed by the
Magistrate, therefore, possibility of accused having been shown to the prosecution witnesses before
conducting of identification parade could not be ruled out---Weapon was allegedly recovered from
accused after about 3 months of the incident and after 7 days of his arrest on his pointation---Recovery
of weapon from accused was also doubtful because the F.I.R. showed that all accused persons were
armed with Kalashnikovs but weapon allegedly recovered from accused was a pistol- -Challan had been
submitted against accused and he was no more required for further investigation---Case against accused
required further inquiry and he was allowed bail accordingly.
2012 PLD 469 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH HAZOOR BUX Vs State
Ss. 6 & 23---Transfer of case sought from Anti-Terrorism court to ordinary court---Accused and co-
accused (applicants) were alleged to have trespassed into the complainant's house in order to steal and
on facing resistance they killed the complainant's father and injured his brother---
Application under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to
ordinary court was dismissed by the Trial Court with the observation that accused persons committed
brutal murder which created panic and insecurity in the minds of the people of the vicinity---Validity---
Allegation in the F.I.R. was that three persons trespassed into the house of the complainant party in the
middle of the night and their ostensible intention was to steal---Accused and co-accused faced
resistance which led to firing---No allegation of firing in the air or at the villagers, so as to terrorize them
or the community, was put forward---No previous acquaintance existed between the accused persons
and the complainant---Present case was simple case of intended theft where one thing led to another
and two persons got murdered---No evidence was brought forward to satisfy the requirements of S.6(b)
of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997---Section 6(c) of the Act was not attracted in the present case---Revision
application was allowed, impugned order of Trial Court was set-aside and application under S.23 of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 was allowed with directions to the Trial court to transfer the case to the Court of
Sessions Judge, who might either himself proceed with the case or might transfer it to any Additional
Session Judge competent to try the offence.
State
Ss. 4 & 5---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7(b)---Attempt to cause explosion, making or
possessing explosive, and act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Accused was already in custody
since 3rd October, 2002 and alleged arms and ammunition were said to have been produced by him
after a delay of 12 days which also made the recovery highly doubtful---
Accused had juxtaposed his case in the Trial Court and was able to prove the mala fides of the Police
that just to teach lesson to the family, both the brothers were booked in the false case, and showed the
gravity of the crime foisted upon them; the hand grenade, fuses of rocket launcher and KK with 20 live
bullets by arresting and showing them terrorists---Father of accused succeeded in getting the possession
of his plot from Police forgetting that it was a Police Station and ordinary citizens in such circumstances
had to face the consequences---Arms and ammunition, were not sealed at the spot and Police produced
the property in the Trial Court in unsealed condition---Investigating Officer had also admitted in cross-
examination that the K.K. was without number, in such circumstances, besides the other contradictions
that the complainant had mentioned in the F.I.R. and the memo of seizure that the arms were secured
from the open plot in front of the house of accused, but mashirs deposed otherwise, which spoiled the
case of the prosecution---Where the prosecution itself had failed to prove its case, impugned judgment
resulting in 7/8 years' R.I. for accused, was sheer mockery and amounting to slaughtering the innocent
citizens---Prosecution having failed to prove its case, against accused, impugned judgment was set aside,
accused was acquitted and released, in circumstances.
2012 YLR 1938 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE ASRAR AHMED KHAN Vs SPECIAL JUDGE, ANTI-
TERRORISM COURT, FAISALABAD
Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Obstruction in public way, public nuisance, nuisance after injunction
to discontinue, attempt to commit Qatl-e-amd, assault or criminal force, mischief by fire or explosive
substance, criminal intimidation, obstruction public servant in discharge of public functions, rioting with
deadly weapon and unlawful assembly---Constitutional petition---
Transfer of case to regular court---Anti-Terrorism Court vide impugned order had refused to transfer the
case to regular court---Validity---Accused petitioner and other accused persons while armed with fire-
arms had allegedly not only blocked a chowk, but had also made firing and pelted stones on police
employees---Astonishingly, none of the police officials or any other member of the District
Administration, present at the place of occurrence, had received a single injury---Investigating Officer
could not collect any crime empty from the spot---Ten or eleven unknown persons mentioned by
complainant as accused had not been brought as accused in the case till date---Sectarian hatred falling
within the ambit of S.8(d)(i) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was not involved in the case of accused and
only terrorist activity had been alleged against the persons mentioned in the crime report---Facts of the
case in stricto sensu did not
attract the provisions of any section of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, including S.6 thereof---
Anti-Terrorism Court, therefore, was not justified in rejecting the application of accused moved under
S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, especially when while disposing of the bail petition of accused it had
been observed that according to the Investigating Officer the case seemed to be doubtful---Impugned
order was, consequently, set aside with the direction to Anti-Terrorism Court to transfer the case to
ordinary court for its trial afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Prosecution did not contest the grounds raised by the accused in the present bail application---
Case under section 497(2), Cr.P.C. had been made out and accused persons were enlarged on bail.
S. 497(2) & (4)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302, 148 &149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6 &
7--- Qatl-e-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Accused was
alleged to have been holding a 'danda' at the time of occurrence and allegedly rounded the complainant
party and assisted the co-accused in perpetrating the attack---Accused was named in F.I.R. but his mere
presence at the spot with no overt act played by him was a factor requiring further probe as to his
involvement---Commencement of trial by itself was not a bar to the grant of bail provided facts and
circumstances permit as S. 497(4), Cr.P.C was very much clear in stating that bail can be granted even
before the pronouncement of the judgment---Accused was enlarged on bail, in circumstances.
S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6 & 7-
--Kidnapping or abduction for extorting property, valuable security etc., common intention, acts of
terrorism---Bail, grant of---Accused and co-accused persons allegedly abducted the complainant's son
(abductee) for ransom---Abductee was voluntarily released and recorded his statements under Ss.161 &
164, Cr.P.0 on basis of which accused was arrested---Name of accused did not transpire in the F.LR.---
Abductee did not disclose the name of accused in his statements under Ss. 161 & 164, Cr.P.C---No
identification parade was conducted---No incriminating article was recovered from possession of
accused- No ransom had been paid to anyone---Only piece of evidence against accused was statements
of prosecution witnesses under S. 161, Cr. P. C whereby they implicated the accused---Said statements
under S. 161, Cr. P. C could be considered at time of trial as they had no evidentiary value at bail stage---
Challan against accused had been submitted and he was no more required for further investigation---
Ss. 6(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 379---Theft---Illegal connection with main supply pipeline---Word
"disrupt" occurring in S.6(2)(i), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is synonymous to word 'disorder', 'distract',
interfere with' 'upset', 'abstract', 'distort', 'damage', 'sunder' etc.
2012 PCrLJ 1735 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE SHEHZAD ASIF RAZA Vs SPECIAL JUDGE ANTI-
TERRORISM COURT
Ss. 6, 7 & 8---Act of terrorism, determination of---Essentials---In order to determine as to whether the
offence would fall within the ambit of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it is essential to look into the
allegations levelled in the F.I.R., the record of the case and the surrounding circumstances---Court was
also to examine that the ingredients of the alleged offence had nexus with the object of the case as
contemplated under Ss.6, 7 and 8 of the said Act---Motivation, object, design and purpose behind the
act are also to be seen for determining its nature of terrorism, besides having been created by it a sense
of insecurity in the public.
S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 379---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6(2) & 7---
Theft, acts of terrorism---Bail, refusal of---Theft of gas---Illegal connection with main supply pipeline---
Accused had allegedly made illegal connection with the main gas pipeline and was supplying gas to
households in the area in return of a fixed monthly bill---Bail application of accused had been dismissed
twice by Trial Court---On application of the accused's mother, re- inquiry of the case was conducted,
after which three sections of P.P.C were deleted from F.I.R. and only S.379, P.P.C remained---Accused
applied for bail again, after said deletion of sections but his bail application was refused---Validity---
Damaging supply line of a national resource/asset in connivance with officials of the Government
department, thereby causing huge loss, was not an ordinary offence, rather it was serious in nature and
grievous in consequence---Case against accused was a delicate and sensitive matter and came within the
definition of a terrorist act, attracting the provisions of S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act 1997---Bail petition of
accused was dismissed.
Neither motive nor intention for commission of the offence was relevant for the purpose of conferring
jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court and it was the act which was designed to create sense of
insecurity and/or to destabilize the public at large, which attracted the provisions of S.6 of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997---Accused's act created sense of insecurity
amongst the co-villagers---Order of High Court being well reasoned, Supreme Court dismissed accused's'
petition and refused leave to appeal.
Conviction and sentence awarded to accused on 27-10-1999 by Special Court after his trial in
absentia---Order of Sessions Judge suspending such conviction/ sentence and directing fresh trial of
accused on his application made in November, 2010 under S. 5-A(7) of Suppression of Terrorist Activities
(Special Courts) Act, 1975---Validity---Special Court was not in existence on the date of such application,
rather its successor forum i.e. Anti-Terrorism Court established under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was in
existence---Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 was repealed vide S. 39(1) of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but acts done under Act of 1975 were given due protection by S. 39(2) of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Accused had committed double murder on bald allegation of siyahkari in a
brutal manner by means of firing with kalashinkov---Such act of accused being a Scheduled offence fell
within ambit of S. 6(ii)(g) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and his case was exclusively triable by Special Court
constituted under S. 3 thereof---Neither law nor religion permitted so-called honour killing, which
amounted to murder---Such iniquitous and vile act of accused was violative of Art. 9 of the
Constitution---Present case was instituted under repealed Act of 1975, whereunder accused could be
punished by Judge of Anti-Terrorism Court, if prosecution succeeded to establish his guilt---High Court
set aside impugned order and directed Sessions Judge to transmit main case along with such application
to concerned Anti-Terrorism Court for its decision in accordance with law.
2012 PCrLJ 178 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN Haji ALLAH NAZAR Vs SPECIAL JUDGE ANTI-
TERRORISM COURT-II, QUETTA
Ss. 6, 7 & 28---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 427/109, 447, 147, 148 & 149---Mischief causing damage to
the amount of five lac rupees, criminal trespass---Transfer of case to ordinary court-- -Offences against
accused were of simple nature like trespass or damage to a property of the opponent, which were
punishable not more than two years---Record had shown that a dispute of personal nature existed
between the parties for the determination of ownership of leased area---For cases of terrorism, falling
under Ss.6 & 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, there must be not only Scheduled Offence under S.6 of
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but also mens rea for creating intentional sense of terror or fear or
insecurity in the society---Cases having background of personal enmity and taking private revenge, did
not fall within the ambit of Ss.6 & 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Special Judge, was not justified to
reject application of accused for sending matter to the Court of Sessions Judge---Order of Special Judge
was illegal as matter in question was within the domain of the regular courts---Cases were ordered to be
withdrawn from the court of Special Judge and transferred to the court of Judicial Magistrate concerned
for disposal in accordance with law, in circumstances.
terrorism---Appreciation
of evidence---Prosecution version,
seemed to be
absolutely true
reasons---Prosecution evidence
was consistent,
Medical evidence, recovery of firearm from the possession of accused, positive report of Ballistic Expert,
corroborated the ocular account---Accused claimed that he had been booked in the case not because he
had committed any offence, but because he had embraced Islam---
Stand taken by the defence was not acceptable for the reasons that prosecution evidence had proved
the fact that accused had fired upon deceased and injured prosecution witnesses; that as a consequence
of the firing made by accused, two persons sustained bullet injuries and died instantaneously, whereas
two prosecution witnesses sustained bullet injuries; that motive as set up by the defence, was neither
plausible nor probable; that despite weakness of motive, defence had failed to prove the motive so
agitated---Stance of defence, in view of overwhelming evidence, baseless, preposterous and nothing
more than a cobweb---Accused, in the light of material on record had committed the preplanned, wilful,
intentional and cold- blooded murder of two innocent, harmless and helpless persons, beside causing
the firearm injuries to two prosecution witnesses---Appeal filed by accused was dismissed, in
circumstances.
Ss. 302(b) & 324---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7---Qatl-e-amd, attempt to commit qatl-e-
amd and terrorism---Sentence, enhancement of---Intention---Scope---Trial Court had proposed lesser
punishment on the ground of lack of mens rea---Criminal intention must exist to constitutie a
crime---"Intention" did not imply or assume the existence of some previous design or forethought but
could be proved by or inferred from the act of accused and circumstances of the case---Continuous firing
by accused who was an educated person and fully aware of the consequences of his act, was reflective
of his intention---Unprovoked act of firing by accused on the vital part of deceased persons, led to
irresistible conclusion that accused intended to cause the death of the victims---Evidence produced by
the prosecution was straightforward, confidence-inspiring, cogent, consistent, unimpeachable,
unshaken and had brought home the charge against accused to the hilt---Evidence did not suffer from
any infirmity---In such state of affairs it was beyond imagination to conclude that no 'mens rea' or
intention was on the part of accused---Conclusion of the Trial Court regarding non-availability of "mens
rea" or lack of intention to commit the murder of deceased persons having no basis and foundation, was
rejected in circumstances---No reasons existed which could justify a sympathetic, a lenient or
concessional treatment for accused---In absence of any mitigating and extenuating circumstances
justifying the imposition of lesser punishment, sentence of life imprisonment awarded to accused was
converted to that of death sentence.
2012 PCrLJ 154 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT-NWFP ZAKIR HUSSAIN alias KAMI Vs THE STATE through A.-G.
KPK
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302, 148/149---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---
State
Ss. 302(b) & 311---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Preamble & Ss.6(2)(g), 7(a)---Criminal Procedure
Code (V of 1898), S.345---Qatl-e-amd---Tazir after waiver or compounding of right of qisas in qatl-e-
amd---Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was enacted for prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and speedy
trial of heinous offences-Said Act being a special law, private complainant or the legal heirs of the
deceased, had no right to compound the "scheduled offence" as those offences were mainly against the
State and not against individuals---Offences could not be compounded automatically by legal heirs, but
were always through the court; and the court could decline the permission to compromise the offence
by the legal heirs of victim---
Even the ordinary courts under S.311, P.P.C., could punish accused, if the offence had been
compounded, by the legal heirs, on the basis of "Fasad-Fil-Arz"---Not providing the right to compromise
the offence by the legal heirs of deceased, was neither violation of Islamic Injunctions; nor of any
fundamental rights.
Ss. 6(2)(d), 6(2)(ee), 7(b)(ff), 17, 23 & 25---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.507---Telegraph Act (XIII
of 1885), S.25-D---
of terrorism that involves use of explosives by any devise including bomb blast, criminal intimidation by
anonymous communication---Accused contended that Anti-Terrorism Court was not competent to
convict him of non-scheduled offence as provisions of S.17 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 were not
attracted in his case---Validity---Offences under S.6(2)(d) and S.6(2)(ee) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were
not proved against the accused---Only offence proved against accused was that of criminal intimidation
under S.507, P.P.C. which was not a scheduled offence---Anti-Terrorism Court was empowered to try a
non-scheduled offence only
along with/in addition to scheduled offence(s) at the same trial under S.17 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997
which did not empower an Anti-Terrorism Court to try non-scheduled offence when said court was not
trying a scheduled offence---Under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 Anti- Terrorism Court was bound to
transfer the case of non-scheduled offence to any court having jurisdiction to try such offence---Once
Anti-Terrorism Court had formed the opinion that the only offence proved against the accused was
criminal intimidation under S.507, P.P.C., the court should not have proceeded to convict the accused of
the offence as S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 did not confer jurisdiction on said court to pass judgment
on non-scheduled offence---
Mere commencement of trial was not a ground to decline transfer of case under S.23 of Anti- Terrorism
Act, 1997---Impugned judgment being. without jurisdiction and nullity in the eyes of law, could not be
maintained---Constitutional petition was, therefore, converted into special Anti-Terrorism-appeal--No
limitation would run against the judgment of Anti-Terrorism Court on the ground that such judgment
was passed without jurisdiction---Appeal was allowed; impugned judgment was set aside and case was
remanded to the Anti-Terrorism Court for transfer to the Court of Session for trial in accordance with
law.
S. 302(b)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7 & 21-H---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13(d)---Qatl-e-amd, terrorism and possession of arms---Appreciation of evidence---
Identification of accused immediately after the occurrence being not possible, his name did not appear
in the F.I.R.---Substitution of two empty shells, was not possible which was found from the scene and
were sealed in the presence of witness for onward transmission- --Statements of witnesses recorded
under S.161, Cr.P.C. as well as the statements recorded by competent Judicial Magistrate under S.164,
Cr.P.C., did not suffer from any defect---All the possible legal formalities were completed before
recording of such statements---Such statements were voluntary and true---Identification parade was
conducted by a very competent and impartial Assistant Commissioner fulfilling all the formalities of the
identification parade in presence of witnesses, who deposed in favour of the prosecution and their
statements had not been shattered by the defence---Such fact had provided strong inference against
accused and proved the case against him and said piece of evidence was a strong link in the commission
of offence---Defence had failed to bring on record any circumstances whereby it could be considered
that accused had been involved in the case due to mala fide intention other than the motive put forward
by the prosecution---Prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of accused---Judgment of
conviction and sentence passed against accused was based on fact; and nothing was available to
indicate that judgment passed by the Trial Court was based on any error of law or was opposed to well
established principles of judicial approach; or it could in any manner be characterized as unjustified---
Sentence of death was rightly and carefully awarded to accused, which did not admit of any interference
by Chief Court.
Ss. 302/324/34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7 & 23---Constitu-tion of Pakistan, Art. 199---
Qatl-e-amd, attempt to commit qatl-e-amd and act of terrorism---Constitutional petition- --Anti-
Terrorism Court had dismissed the application of the accused petitioner moved under S.23 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 for transfer of the case to the court of ordinary jurisdiction- --Validity---Complainant
had stated in the F.I.R. that the assailants after identifying his brother had made firing on his vehicle,
which showed their clear intention to do away with only his brother and not the others who could not
be saved due to their accompanying with the target of assailants in the same vehicle-Although the F.I.R.
did not reflect the names of the accused persons, yet the incident was the result of enmity and personal
vendetta, as was apparent from the supplementary statement made by the complainant before the
police, wherein he had categorically narrated all the facts clearly suggesting that the incident had taken
place due to previous enmity---Occurrence in the case had neither reflected any act of terrorism, nor
any sectarian matter, instead the murders had been committed owing to previous enmity between the
parties---Occurrence, therefore, could not in any manner be declared falling within the ambit of S. 6 of
the Anti-Terrorism Act, I997---Anti-Terrorism Court had committed an illegality while passing the
impugned order assuming the jurisdiction to try the offences---Impugned order was consequently set-
aside and the case was transferred to the court of ordinary jurisdiction for trial in accordance with law---
Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
S.6--- 'Terrorism'--- Words "designed to"---Connotation---Words "designed to" used in S. 6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997, means the object, motive or purpose behind the act and not the consequential
effect created by such act.
Ss. 6, 7 & 8---Determination as to whether an offence falls within the ambit of S.6, Anti- Terrorism Act,
1997---Guide lines---Motive and object both make a path for guideance in order to determine whether
the offence falls within the domain of Anti-Terrorism Act or not---Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997 reflects two words, namely, "designed to" and "action" and from the interpretation of both these
words one can draw an inference that whether the offence falls within the ambit of terrorism or not---
Intention of the Legislature is very much clear from the words "designed to" and "action" and both the
words have great impact on each other in order to constitute an action as act of terrorism---From the
meaning of simple word "action" it is very different to deduct that the action of a person was an act of
terrorism without the word "designed to" which means object behind the action---If the brutality of the
act of a person is declared terrorism, then every murder case will fall within the definition of terrorism,
as seen from any angle the murder is always committed in a brutal manner---Definition of terrorism,
thus, is incomplete without the words, "designed to" which means the object, motive or purpose behind
the act and not the consequential effect created by such act.
Ss. 302/324/34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6/7/21-H---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13(d)---Qatl-e-amd, attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, terrorism and recovery of arms---
Appreciation of evidence---F.I.R. had been lodged well in time and contents of F.I.R. disclosed the names
of the injured, the deceased and that of the witnesses---F.I.R. also disclosed the type of the weapons
used in the offence---Narration of the F.I.R. regarding the facts of the case had been put forward in a
very natural manner and was confidence inspiring---
During the cross-examination, minor improvements had been brought on record, which were not of the
intensity to shatter the veracity of the said witnesses---Was very natural for the witness in the dark to
identify an individual from headlights of vehicle---Accused as well as the witness belonged to the same
locality and question of mistaken identity did not arise---Injured witness in his examination in the Trial
Court had fully supported the prosecution case---Other two witnesses had fully deposed against accused
persons and the role played by them as well as the arms used for the commission of the offence by
accused persons, were identified---Two very important recovery witnesses had proved the recoveries of
the weapon used by accused---
Both witnesses were impartial Police personnel who did not belong to the locality and did not have any
axe to grind---Preparation of the recovery memos did not suffer from any infirmity---
Recovered empty shells had matched the weapons of offence used which had proved against accused---
Incident was a result of sectarian hatred between the parties as many a case had occurred within the
vicinity of the complainant and accused party---Murders and attempted murders had occurred in the
past---Statements of the witnesses, examined backed up by the motive and weapons of offence proved
against the accused---Sentence awarded to accused by the Trial Court, was upheld, in circumstances.
Ss. 6 & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 147, 148 & 149---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13(d)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.561-A---Qatl-e-amd, terrorism and possessing
unlicenced arms---Quashing of order, application for---Police, after conducting investigation submitted
challan in Anti-Terrorism Court for trial, but Judge vide impugned order returned the police papers to
Investigating Officer for submitting challan before the court having jurisdiction as according to opinion of
Judge, Ss. 6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 did not attract in the case---Validity---While deciding,
whether challan was to be entertained or not, Trial Court had failed to consider the true perspective of
S.6 of Ant-Terrorism Act, 1997 and in a slipshod manner returned the challan on the effortless notion
that it was a case of previous enmity, which was not the sole criterion to decide---Had the court while
passing the impugned order considered the gravity and seriousness of the violent act and atrocity, it
might have expressed the different view---In order to find out the severity of charge, whether S.6 of
Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 would apply or not, it was expedient to look into the allegations levelled in the
F.I.R. by the complainant---Depiction of incident had clearly deduced and figured out that
three persons had been murdered brutally in the daylight at the shop situated in the market---
Shop was bolted from inside, even then accused persons had climbed on the roof of the shop and
broken the roof and viciously murdered three persons---All accused persons were alleged to have made
heavy aerial firing to create harassment and terrorism---Three persons had been brutally murdered in
the daylight in the shop situated in the market, had an overall impact of creating a sense of fear or
insecurity in the society; and risk to safety of the public and frightened the general public, thereby
preventing them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business and disrupted
civil life---Applicant had attached the photos of broken roof of the shop and the bodies of victims lying at
the hospital which portrayed dreadful and terrible state of affairs; and the niceties of incident
committed in a manner which unquestionably and undoubtedly amounted to terrorism as enumerated
in S.6 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997---Impugned order was set aside with the direction to Investigating
Officer' to submit the challan in the Anti-Terrorism Court concerned.
S. 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7---Abduction for extorting property, valuable
security etc. and terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of alleged abductee, itself appeared to
be doubtful in view of glaring contradictions and discrepancies available in the evidence of two
prosecution witnesses---Prosecution, in circumstances, had not proved the case against accused---Main
charge was against father of alleged abductee who was a natural guardian, but he was acquitted by the
Trial Court, on whose alleged pointation alleged abductee was recovered---Trial Court had found that no
direct evidence was available on record to connect the father and his co-accused with the commission of
offence---Accused was convicted due to circumstantial evidence on the sole ground that alleged
abductee was recovered from his otaq, which was totally doubtful in view of evidence of two
prosecution witnesses---Mother of alleged abductee never appeared in the court despite bailable
warrants, for recording evidence who received telephonic calls from the kidnappers for the demand of
ransom---Father could not be held liable for kidnapping his own son being a natural guardian---
Prosecution having failed to prove its case against accused beyond reasonable doubt; impugned
judgment was set aside and accused was acquitted of the charge and was released, in circumstances.
S. 10(3)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 354-A & 452---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 6(b)---Zina-
bil-Jabar, assault or use of criminal force to woman and stripping her of her clothes and house
trespass---Reappraisal of evidence---Solitary statement of prosecutrix---Marks of violence, absence of---
Accused was convicted and sentenced by Trial Court for imprisonment for 20 years and the same was
maintained by High Court---Contention of accused was that there were no marks of violence found on
the body of prosecutrix, therefore, benefit of doubt
should be extended to him---Validity---Veracity of prosecutrix's statement was the inherent merit of her
statement because corroborative evidence alone could not be made a base to award conviction---
Contention of accused was in oblivion of thy' fact that rape was proved on the basis of cogent and
concrete evidence including medical evidence---Marks of violence were not essential to establish factum
of Zina-bil-Jabar---Supreme Court after keeping defence version in juxtaposition, declined to take into
consideration the same as it was baseless---
Merely on the basis of a petty matter nobody would like to stigmatize her innocent daughter for her
entire life which would have a substantial bearing on her future---Supreme Court declined to interfere in
the conviction and sentence awarded to accused by the Courts below---
2011 SCMR 1644 SUPREME-COURT Syed ARSHAD ALI SHAH BUKHARI Vs State
S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324/392/395---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6 & 7---
Attempt to commit Qatl-e--amd, robbery and dacoity---Bail, grant of---Case of further
inquiry---"Robbery" and "Dacoity"---Distinguished---Innocence of co-accused---Stolen property, non-
recovery of---Four out of eight accused persons nominated in F.I.R. were declared by investigating
agency to be innocent, reducing number of culprits to less than five, thus instead of S. 395, P.P. C., only
S. 392, P.P. C. could be attracted---Even provision of S. 392, P. P. C. did not find support from the
circumstances as it had been alleged in F.I.R. that some mobile phone sets were snatched away by
culprits from two members of police party but during investigation no such mobile telephone sets had
been recovered---No independent proof of any violence against any member of police force
endangering life or property of any member of police force was available---Prima facie it was doubtful at
bail stage as to whether provisions of S.6 read with S. 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, were attracted or
not---Bail was allowed.
prosecution witnesses in his statement under S.154, Cr. P. C. ---Evidence of said witnesses could not be
taken into consideration, in circumstances---Evidence on record did not satisfy accepted requirements
of safe administration of criminal justice---Accused, in circum-stances, were entitled to benefit of
doubt--Impugned judgment of court below was set aside, accused were acquitted of the charge and
were released, in circumstances.
2011 PCrLJ 1022 Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court ASADULLAH alias SHAKIRULLAH Vs State
Ss. 6 & 7(h)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 149---Act of terrorism---Scope---To bring an offence within the
ambit of terrorism, it was necessary that threat was used to design to coerce and intimidate or overawe
the government, public, community or sect; or if the act was made to create a sense of fear or insecurity
in society or the purpose was to advance a religious,
sectarian or ethnic cause; and the action involved firing or serious risk to safety of Public; or to frighten
the general public by burning vehicles etc., or extortion of money (Bhatha); or the threat was designed
to serious interfere with or seriously disrupt communication system; or public utility service; or it
involved serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force him to discharge or to
refrain from discharging his lawful duty; or involved serious violence against a member of the Police
force or public servant---Prosecution story in the present case was that accused persons were fighting
with each other and prosecution had not claimed that accused were disrupting any communication
system or were violent against the Police force; or any public servant present at the place of occurrence;
or that panic had been created at the spot resulting into sense of insecurity among the public---Accused
were not armed with any kind of weapon at the time of occurrence-Accused in circumstances, could not
be presumed to be in a position to use threat in order to create panic or sense of fear or insecurity in the
society at large, it could not be termed as terrorism---Even an action which resulted into some terror,
could not be equated with terrorism, while it was not intended so, because an action would amount to
terrorism, if it was projected with the mens rea of creating panic or insecurity---Parties had come to
persue their matters, pending before the High Court; as it appeared that at the spur of moment
something happened culminating fight between them, which was not premeditated, nor its object was
designed to create fear and insecurity in the society at large; or any community for that matter---
Accused had not committed the offence falling within the ambit of S.7(h) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, in
circumstances.
Ss. 6, 7 & 28---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302(b)/34 & 324---Qatl-e-amd and attempt to commit qatl-e-
amd---Terrorism---Transfer of case front court of ordinary jurisdiction to court of Special Judge, Anti-
Terrorism Court---Application for---Case was sought to be transferred from the files of Sessions Judge to
court of Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, on the grounds that accused were absconding; that the
offence had been committed on main road; that incident had created severe fear and panic in the area
and that the offence was an act of terrorism and fell within the ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---
Validity---Offence alleged to have been committed by accused persons, was with the motive to kill the
victims by firing with Kalashnikov---Act was committed on a highway on basis of past enmity existed
between both the parties as per contents of F.I.R. ---Intended action though had caused loss of life and
caused hurt, but only that fact would not constitute an offence to bring same within the purview of
terrorism and it was to be established, that alleged act created any sense of insecurity in general; or
even to a particular section of society; or threat or sense of fear had been created due to the same---In
the present case, though one person had lost his life and other sustained serious injuries, but ingredient
required for forming an offence under S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which was intimidation or
overawe, either the government or section of public, was missing---Application for transfer of case was
dismissed, in circumstances.
Ss. 386, 387 & 388---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6(1)(k)---Offences of extortion of money,
which can also be considered as bhatta, is covered by Ss.386, 387 & 388 of P.P.C. and falls within
definition of "terrorism" given in S.6(1)(k), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Such crime can be controlled by
applying said laws strictly.
2011 YLR 2929 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH SHERAL Vs SAJAN alias SAJOO
Offence- in the cases fell within the ambit of Ss.6 & 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the right forum
to adjudicate the offence, was the Anti-Terrorism Court and not the Sessions Court- --Transfer
application was allowed and Sessions Judge was directed to immediately transfer the case to Anti-
Terrorism Court which was directed to conduct the proceedings of the case expeditiously.
Ss. 6 & 7---'Terrorism'---Ordinary criminal assault and physical violence to a victim would not fall within
the purview of 'terrorism' as defined in S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---To take cognizance under the
Act, it would remain incumbent upon the court to examine impact of alleged violence and also to see as
to whether alleged criminal act was designed to create a sense of terror, fear and insecurity in the mind
of general public creating panic in the society---
Existence of said parameters, was vital to bring the offender within the purview of the offences under
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
probable and plausible reasons of their presence at the time and place of occurrence---
Testimony of both the witnesses bore intrinsic value and inherent worth of truthfulness and were safely
reliable---Despite searching cross-examination upon both the witnesses, nothing material elicited in
favour of the offence---Medical evidence produced by the prosecution, had furnished sufficient
corroboration to the ocular account---Accumulating appraisal of the confidence inspiring ocular account
having corroboration of the medical evidence, had led to conclusion that prosecution had sufficiently
established the charge of commission of rape with minor victim against accused---Subsequent conduct
of accused in fleeing away from the place of occurrence along with his shalwar having sight of the
witnesses, also indicated his guilt---
Charge under S.7(1) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, both the witnesses had not uttered even a single word
in their examination-in-chief with regard to striking off any panic, terror, fear or insecurity in the public
or locality in result of the alleged occurrence---Single statement of one witness that after the incident of
molestation there was panic all around the area, was neither reliable nor confidence inspiring---Said
solitary statement of the witness lacking inherent worth without any further corroboration was totally
insufficient to prove the charge that alleged occurrence resulted into striking terror, fear or sense of
insecurity among the public in the relevant vicinity attracting S.7(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---
Provisions of Ss.6/7 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997, being not attracted at all in the peculiar circumstances
of the case, to that extent appeal of accused was accepted and accused was acquitted in the charge
under S.7(1) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Arraignment of accused in the charge under S.376, P.P.C. had
been established to the hilt---Defence side had failed to create any dent or doubt in the prosecution
evidence with any speck of material---No reason existed to take exception to the conviction of accused
under S.376, P.P.C. as judged by the Trial Court---Accused was unmarried young person aged about 24
years, having no criminal history of involvement in any case of like nature---Since accused was not a
habitual offender, chances of his rehabilitation, could not be ruled out---
Keeping in view the tender age of accused with genuine hope that he could come up as a useful member
of the society, taking lenient view, maintaining his conviction under S.376, P.P.C. his sentences were
modified and reduced to 20 years R.I., accordingly.
S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.384, 109 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 6(1)(k)-
Extortion and terrorism---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Names of Mashirs did not appear in the very
F.I.R. in which the complainant was shown to have proceeded from Police Station to the place of alleged
incident as per the directions of the Police---No Mashirnama was prepared at the spot in respect of the
recovery of the cash allegedly received by accused and recovered from his possession---Mashirnama in
question had shown that accused was first taken from the spot towards the Police Station where such
Mashirnama was prepared---
Complainant also admitted on a query that both Mashirs were his subordinates---Alleged demand of
"Bhatta" made by accused from the complainant on Mobile Phone, also needed further inquiry---
Accused being entitled to the concession of bail, was admitted to bail, in circumstances.
Ss. 6 & 7---"Terrorism"---Meaning and applicability---Word 'Terrorism', inter cilia would mean the use or
threat of action, where use or threat was designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the government
or the public; or a section of public or community; or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in
society; and would create a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of public; or was designed to
frighten the general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful
trade and daily business; and disrupt civil life---Section 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 has its own
independent applicability and interpretation and all acts of `terrorism' in relation thereto were to be
seen on the touchstone of S.6 which has provided and defined in detail the meaning of 'terrorism'---
Legislature has neither provided any immunity nor relaxation that in case of previous enmity the case
would not be tried by the Anti- Terrorism Court, but again the criteria to judge was the gravity of
offence; and its modus operandi, whether it created a sense of fear or insecurity in the society; and
created a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of the public; or was designed to frighten the
general public; and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily
business; and disrupt civil life---Striking off terror was sine qua non for the application of provisions of
S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 which could not be determined without examining the nature, gravity
and heinousness. of the alleged offence, contents of F.I.R., its cumulative effect on the society or a group
of persons--- "Terrorism " would mean the use or threat of "action" where the action would fall within
the meaning of subsection (2) of S.6 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997; and would create a serious risk to the
safety of the public; or a section of the public; or was designed to frighten the general public---Such
action would amount to 'terrorism' as enumerated in S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
2011 MLD 1212 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH Dr. SOHRAB KHAN Vs SPECIAL JUDGE, ANTI-TERRORISM
COURT
S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.324/147/148/149 & 425---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997),
Ss.6/7---Attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, mischief---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Only allegation against
accused in the F.I.R. was that he was found present at the place of incident, beyond that nothing was
alleged against him---Other 17 co-accused named in the same crime had already been granted bail---
Accused, in circumstances, was not only entitled to grant of bail on merits, but also on the rule of
consistency---Interim pre-arrest bail already granted to accused, was confirmed, in circumstances.
Ss. 302/324/34--- Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6/7/21-H---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13(d)---Qatl-e-amd, attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, terrorism and
S. 302(b)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7 & 21-H---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13(d)---Qatl-e-amd, terrorism and possession of ' arms---Appreciation of evidence---
Confessional statement of accused---After the amendment in S.21-H of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997
whereby a proviso had been added to the section, legislature had made it mandatory that statement
under said section would be admissible in evidence, which had to be read with the provision of S.6 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Act of terrorism, attempt to commit qatl-e-amd, mischief
committed after preparation made for causing death for hurt, house-trespass after preparation or hurt,
assault or wrongful restraint, criminal intimidation, causing hurt, abetment---Constitution petition---
Transfer of case by Anti-Terrorism Court to Regular Court for trial---Validity---Motivation, object, design
or purpose behind an act had to be assessed to label the same as a terrorist act---Two groups of
Advocates had clashed with each other in a full house session of District Bar Association with the agenda
of discussing the probabilities of dismembering certain Members of District Bar Association, which was
purely a personal agenda and had nothing to do with any design to commit the act of 'terrorism'---
Receipt of injuries by a few during the occurrence was, at the most, an aftermath of the brawl between
the two groups of Advocates and by no stretch of imagination the occurrence contained in the F.I.R. or
in the private complaint could be termed as an act of terrorism---Anti-Terrorism Court had rightly
concluded on sufficient reasons that the occurrence did not fall within the mischief of terrorism as
defined in section 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and had termed the same as a purely indigenous
trouble, haunting affairs of the District Bar Association---Impugned order of transfer of case to the Court
of Area Magistrate did not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of the record---Constitutional
petition was dismissed in limine in circumstances.
S.497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.365-A, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6/7---
Kidnapping or abduction for extortion---Bail, grant of---Bail had been sought by accused on the ground
of hardship and delay in conclusion of the trial---Accused was arrested on 5-11-2004 and since then he
was in custody---High Court by its order directed the Trial Court to decide the matter preferably within
three months, but that order passed by the High Court had not been complied with---Inordinate delay in
prosecution amounting to abuse of process of law, could be treated as sufficient ground for grant of
bail---Alleged abductee sworn his affidavit in which he exonerated accused from commission of offence
of abduction---Statement of the abductee should be given proper weight while deciding the matter of
kidnapping for ransom---Accused, in circumstances, had succeeded in making out a case for grant of
bail---
S. 365-A---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S.13(d)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997),
Ss.6(2)(e) & 7(e)---Kidnapping for ransom---Appreciation of evidence---Abductee being a principal victim
had given a very comprehensive account of the incident---Cross-examination conducted by the defence
against the said witness could not shatter his evidence---Such cross- examination could not even show
any specific defence plea on the basis of which one could assume that said witness had been challenged
thereby in such process of evidence or he deposed falsely against accused for any ill motive or vested
interest, either within himself or because of his family---Other witnesses who were father and uncle of
the victim had also supported the case and cross-examination conducted against them could not bring
any fruitful result to the defence---Defence theory that came to light, for the first time in the process of
cross-examination that there was business rivalry between the brother-in-law of the complainant and
accused, due to which accused had falsely been involved in the case, being an after-thought, was good
for nothing---Rest of the witnesses, were official ones who also, had supported the case to their
respective extent and their evidence was also left un-shattered in the cross-examination conducted by
the defence against them on the point of kidnapping---
Certain irregularities committed by the Police in process of investigation, could hardly have an adverse
effect to the extent that on the basis of which the court could take an independent view that the case of
prosecution as to kidnapping was doubtful---Prosecution witnesses were trustworthy and confidence
inspiring in all respect---Charge of kidnapping for ransom as framed against accused, stood well proved
beyond shadow of any reasonable doubt---Conviction and sentence awarded to accused for offence of
kidnapping by the Trial Court needed no interference at all---Case regarding the recovery of the T.T.
pistol from accused, however, was not open to be safely held as proved up to the required standard of
law-Evidence on record did not support that the said weapon was recovered by the Police from accused
at the relevant time---Impugned judgment of conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court under
S.365- A, P.P.C., was maintained with benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C., whereas conviction and sentence
awarded to accused for the offence under S.13(d) of West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, was set aside
in the interest of justice.
2010 YLR 1817 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH MUHAMMAD SADIQ THE STATE through Prosecutor
General Sindh
Ss. 302 & 377---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6---Qatl-e-amd, unnatural offence and terrorism---
Accused were bailed out and their application filed under S.265-K, Cr.P.C. was also allowed by the Trial
Court observing that it was not a case for cancellation of bail and that case was not to by tried by Anti-
Terrorism Court---Validity---Case of prosecution was in four parts; firstly, minor boy was abducted;
secondly unnatural offence was committed with him; thirdly, he was murdered; and lastly his body was
concealed in bag and was thrown in Ganda Nala in order to destroy the evidence---Offences in the case
definitely covered definition of S.6 of Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997---Ordinary Court, in circumstances had
no jurisdiction to try the case---
Order passed by the Trial Court was set aside with the direction to file the report before the Anti-
Terrorism Court having jurisdiction.
Ss. 6, 7 & 23---Explosive Substances Act (XI of 1908), Ss.3, 4 & 5---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),
Ss.435, 439 & 561-A---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199---Possession of heavy material of
explosive substance---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to regular court---
Accused who were found carrying heavy material of explosive substance, had disclosed that they had
been given a task for explosion and that they were on the way to implement their plans---Application
filed by accused under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for transfer of their
case from Anti-Terrorism Court to ordinary/regular court, had been dismissed by the Anti- Terrorism
Court---Validity---Neither revisional jurisdiction under Ss.435/439, Cr.P.C. nor jurisdiction under S.561-A,
Cr.P.C. could be invoked to challenge and impugn an order passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court;
however, that would not close the chapter---If no adequate remedy was available or provided under
law, High Court could always use its constitutional authority under Art.199 of the Constitution---
Discretion was always available with High Court to treat any application or proceedings, in appropriate
cases, as application under Art.199 of the of Constitution---High Court, in the present case, treated
revision petition as constitutional petition and decided the same ---Prima facie, from the statement of
accused, it appeared that attempt to explode explosive substance was admitted---Order passed by Anti-
Terrorism Court, whereby application for transfer of case to ordinary court was dismissed, could not be
taken exception to in circumstances.
Ss. 302(b)/324/34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6/7---West. Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of
1965), S.13---Qatl-e-amd and attempt to commit qatl-e-amd---Terrorism and possession of arms---
Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Fire shots received by the deceased and injured were from
a high velocity fire-arm and not from a low velocity gun such as a Repeater, which was a shotgun for
hunting birds---Spot inspection was conducted well in time which gave no time to the prosecution to
plant empties of any other calibre and also sealed the chance of inclusion of any other innocent person
as accused---Benefit of doubt could be extended to two co-accused out of three as the opening of fire
shots by said two co-accused was a far fetched probability and their involvement could be a result of the
sectarian hatred whereby the maximum number of persons of the other sect could be put to task---Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 which was a special law provided for the offences committed under S.6 of said Act,
would override the provisions of general law as the offence of murder had been provided in the
schedule of Special Law wherein the offence was punishable with death---In the light of the statements
of the prosecution witnesses, the recoveries, the motive and the other circumstances of the case,
prosecution had proved the fact of murder of the deceased and injuries sustained by four other
persons---Prosecution had proved its case to the hilt against the accused---Case under S.13 of West
Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 was also proved against said accused; his conviction and sentence was
upheld and murder reference to his extent was answered in affirmative, however benefit of doubt was
extended to other two accused persons and their conviction and sentence were set aside and they could
be released.
S. 302/34---
of 1997), Ss.6/7---
1965), S.13---
Qatl-e-amd---Terrorism
and possession
of arms---Appreciation of evidence---
Benefit of doubt---Accused had been implicated for commission of offence along with two
other persons, who had been assigned equal roles without any difference---One of the prosecution
witnesses had stated that she saw the accused opening fire shot at the deceased and did not charge the
other accused persons---Another prosecution witness had also improved his statement recorded under
S.161, Cr.P.C. regarding dying declaration of deceased wherein accused had been nominated as
assailant---Statement of another witness was recorded 23 days after the occurrence who had stated
that he saw the accused running away from the place of occurrence after hearing the fire shots---
Statement of said witness was not confidence inspiring in the light of his delayed statement under S.161,
Cr.P.C.; he was not an eye-witness of the occurrence, but he had stated that he saw one person lying in
the channel after firing of shots-- -Said witness had not mentioned the presence of other witnesses at
the spot---Good prima facie case did not exist against accused for his conviction on the basis of other
material placed on record---Original report of Fire Arms Expert was not placed on record but a photo
copy of the same was found in the file and number of the pistol mentioned therein was different as
shown in the recovery memo.---Prosecution, in circumstances, had failed to prove its case beyond any
reasonable doubt and statements of prosecution witnesses were not worth relying- --While giving
benefit of doubt to the accused, his conviction and sentence, was set aside and he was directed to be
released.
S. 302(b)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6/7---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965),
S.13---Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009, Art.60(13)---
Impugned judgment of Chief Court was set aside and that of the Trial Court was restored to meet the
ends of justice.
2010 GBLR 118 SUPREME-APPELATE-COURT-GILGIT THE STATE through Advocate- General Vs ASIF
AHMED
S.497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302/324/34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6/7-- -Qatl-e-
amd, attempt to commit qatl-e-amd causing terrorism---Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-
Governance) Order, 2009, Art.60(13)---Bail, cancellation of---Parties had agreed on not arguing the
application on merits, if Trial Court was directed to conclude the trial within two months---Charge in the
case had been framed without any delay, but trial could not be concluded due to some unavoidable
circumstances and ultimately bail had been granted to accused---Prolonged delay in conclusion of trial
was misuse of process of law and courts and also injustice to the parties---Trial Court was directed to
conduct day to day trial, avoid adjournment without compelling reason, adopt coercive measures for
attendance of witnesses and conclude the trial within two months---In case of default, complainant or
the State could move a fresh application for cancellation of bail against the accused before the Trial
Court for decision on merits---Petition was disposed of accordingly.
S. 6---Terrorism---Meaning---"Terrorism" means the use or threat of "action" where the "action" falls
within the meaning of sub-section (2) of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and creates a serious risk to
safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed to frighten the general public and thereby
prevents them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts civil
life.
Ss. 302, 342, 201, 337-A(i), F(i), 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7 & 23---
Apart from three persons from the rival party two passersby lost their life, while 12 others suffered
firearm injuries---Such was neither a private nor an isolated place where there was no risk for general
public-Result of the occurrence itself had shown that apart from the deceased and injured passersby
there must be many more who must have felt a sense of insecurity as a result of occurrence---Prima
facie, it could not be presumed before recording of evidence, for the purposes of determining
jurisdiction of the court that the act was not one of terrorism---In the present case, death of two
passersby and injuries to 12 others, prima facie indicated that apart from them many others were also
present at the time of occurrence, which must have created sense of insecurity in the general public---
Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.
Son of the complainant had allegedly been killed in the incident by stepping on a mine---Case thus fell
within the definition of "terrorism" as contained in S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and was triable
by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court---Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, being not applicable to
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, by virtue of S.32 thereof, reference of Trial Court to Schedule II of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1898, in the impugned order, was misplaced---Order of the Trial Court having the
powers of Anti-Terrorism Court directing the transfer of the case to the ordinary Court of competent
jurisdiction was, consequently, set aside with direction to Trial Court to proceed with the trial itself in
accordance with law---
2010 YLR 139 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE NOOR JAHAN Vs JUDGE ANTI- TERRORISM COURT
BAHAWALPUR
Ss. 380/447/148/149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7 & 23---Criminal Procedure Code (V of
1898), Ss.156 & 159---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199---Constitutional petition---Petitioner
lodged F.I.R. for offences under Ss. 380/447/148/149, P.P.C. read with Ss. 6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997---During investigation eight accused persons were arrested and
when their remand papers were presented before the Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, he directed the
deletion of Ss.6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Anti-Terrorism Court had given findings of non-
commission of terrorism after recording the statements of the witnesses, which would bring out that no
element of terrorism or panic was created by accused---Words used in S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997,
were very much clear on the point that court could pass order after taking cognizance of an offence at
the relevant time---Court, at the time of passing of impugned order, had not taken cognizance of the
offence and no sufficient material was available on record to delete the offence---Impugned order, in
circumstances was premature which was set aside with direction to decide the matter after taking
cognizance of the offence with application of judicial mind after recording some evidence.
2009 PCrLJ 573 NORTHERN AREAS CHIEF COURT ITRAT HUSSAIN Vs State
S. 497---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6/7/21(D)(4)---Bail, grant of---Accused had been arrested
soon after the occurrence in January, 2005---After his arrest the trial could not be concluded within a
reasonable time due to non-availability of Anti-Terrorism Court's Judge for a considerable period---
When the trial came close to pronouncement of judgment, one of the alleged absconding accused in the
same case was arrested---Ultimately, the Judge had no option except to re-start the trial, pending
judgment against accused---Accused, in circumstances, had to wait for conclusion of trial against the
newly arrested accused---No provision existed in the relevant or general law that judgment could
partially be announced against those who had faced trial---Plea of hardship, in circumstances found
existed in favour of accused---Co--accused, who had been attributed similar role, had already been
released on bail by Chief Court---Rule of consistency demanded that accused too was entitled for the
same treatment.
Ss. 6(2)(e), 19(12) & 25--Conviction in absentia, remedy for---Two options were available, in law, to a
person convicted in absentia; he could request the Trial Court to set aside his conviction under S.19(12)
of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 by showing that he did not abscond and could also file appeal under S.25
of the said Act---Filing of application under S.19(12) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was not an
indispensable condition for filing appeal under S.25 of the Act--Powers of the Appellate Court were
wider than the powers of the Trial Court in the matter of setting aside conviction in absentia---Trial
Court, after setting aside the conviction, would proceed to try accused in his presence; while the
Appellate Court after setting aside the conviction could remand the case to the Trial Court for fresh trial
or could even acquit him on merits---If a case was fit for acquittal on merits, it would be futile to conduct
fresh trial---If a person convicted in absentia was entitled to acquittal on merits, he could not be forced
to undergo the botheration of trial---Under S.25 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, nothing was to suggest that
a person convicted and sentenced in absentia, could not file appeal without first making application
under S.19(12) of said Act.
Ss. 6, 7 & 8---Determination as to whether an offence falls within the ambit of S.6, Anti- Terrorism Act,
1997---Essentials.
S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.427, 448, 452, 506, 147 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997),
Ss.6, 7 & 21-D(iv)---Bail, refusal of---Complainant was Chowkidar of the Library, which the student had
forcibly occupied---Complainant was quite an independent person and he was not a police personnel---
Serious efforts were made for the restoration of possession peacefully- --Accused was the person who
was Incharge of Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafza and all the students of said Madrasa were under his control
and they were ready to go to any extent in compliance of his order and as such he was in commanding
position---Situation, which was created at the time of occurrence, had created a panic/insecurity in the
people of area---Window pans were broken during that occurrence and loss was caused to the library,
which was a public property-- -Whole area where said library was situated, was presenting a picture of
'No go area' and people of that area were feeling sense of insecurity, and they could not even purchase
the things of daily use and all that had made the case, falling under the purview of S.6 of Anti- Terrorism
Act, 1997---Contention of counsel for accused that S. 452, P.P.C. did not fall under the prohibitory clause
of S.497, Cr. P. C. had no force---Each case should be decided on its own merits---Even bail could be
refused in the case which did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr. P. C. ---Principle of
consistency was also not applicable in the case, as the cases in which bail had been granted, were
different from the present case, on facts and merits---
Deeper appreciation of evidence could not be made while hearing the bail application, but only
tentative assessment of material collected by the prosecution against accused, could be made--
-Accused had been implicated in the case, on the basis of supplementary statement made by Chowkidar
of the Library, who was a relevant person---No mala fide or ill-will had come on record, to falsely
implicate accused in the case, question of false implication did not arise---
Challan in the case had been submitted before the court of competent jurisdiction---Accused having
failed to make out the case for bail, his bail application was dismissed.
Immediate indulgence was solicited from R.P.O. concerned for assigning investigation of the case to an
officer not below the rank of D.S.P.---Keeping in view the gravity of offence Court directed that case be
challaned after honest investigation to Anti-Terrorism Court as provisions of Ss.6 & 7 of Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997, appeared to be attracted.
Contention of counsel for accused persons that one of co-accused was found and let off, had no force as
said co-accused had been shown as absconder in the charge-sheet-Deeper appreciation of material at
bail stage was deprecated---Bail application was dismissed, in circumstances.
2009 PCrLJ 346 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Rana SHAHBAZ RIAZ Vs SPECIAL JUDGE, ANTI-TERRORISM
COURT, FAISALABAD
Bazar in front of Jamia Masjid in which murder of three innocent persons had been committed allegedly
by the accused persons by firing with kalashnikovs and the complainant had also been injured , which
must have caused shock, fear and insecurity among the people of the vicinity---If no crime empty was
recovered from the place of occurrence at the time of spot inspection by the police, it could not be said
that firing was not made and that occurrence had not taken place---All three deceased persons had
received three to seven injuries on their persons and complainant had also sustained two fire-arm
injuries on his person---Impugned order was set aside in circumstances.
S.4---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(1)(c), (n), (2) & 7(h)---Appreciation of evidence---
One of prosecution witnesses had stated that on hearing explosion he found accused running from the
place of occurrence who was apprehended by other Police Officials---Other prosecution witness had not
supported the case of said witness---Accused could not be held guilty for causing explosion without any
other evidence on record connecting accused with the commission of offence, merely on . the ground
that he was seen running away---Conviction could only be based on tangible evidence implicating
accused in the commission of offence beyond any shadow of doubt, because it was natural for the
people to leave hurriedly the place where explosion occurred---Suspicion howsoever strong could not
take place of legal proof---
Ss.468/471---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), Ss.13/14---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997),
Ss.6 & 7---Appreciation of evidence---Terrorism---Scope---Scope of terrorism had been explained in
various clauses of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Action which created a serious
risk to 'safety of public was terrorism under clause (i) of subsection (2) of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997---Transportation of a huge quantity of illicit arms and ammunition, could be, by no stretch of
imagination, for any lawful activities, peaceful purpose or welfare of the public---Only conclusion which
could be drawn was that such transportation involved serious risk to safety of public which was already
under wave of extreme terrorism---Occurrence, in the present case, took place at a place where many
disinterested persons were present around who were not cited as witnesses of recovery---People did
not co-operate and did not consent to be cited as witnesses of recovery; in terrorism and narcotics
cases, because it invited annoyance of people relating to drug mafia and terrorists which they could not
afford to face---Police witnesses; in such circumstances, were good witnesses, unless mala fide was
established against them---In the present case, statements of police witnesses were neither
contradictory nor infirm, nor having any inherent flaw---Statements of prosecution witnesses' relating to
recovery in the case, were consistent on material points and intrinsically rang true---Said witnesses were
rightly relied upon by the Trial Court---Accused was acquitted for offence under Ss.468/471, P.P.C. and
S.14 of West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, but conviction of accused under S.7(h) Anti- Terrorism Act,
1997 as well as under S.13 of West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 was maintained.
MUHAMMAD ISMAIL
S. 526---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302 & 324/34---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965),
S.13(d)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6---Transfer of case---Scope---Act of terrorism and
jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court---If an offender with an intention to strike terror in the people or any
section of the people etc. would commit scheduled offence, then only he would be subject to
jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court---In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within
the ambit of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it would be essential to have a glance over the allegations
made in F.I.R., record of case and surrounding circumstances---Whether a particular act was an act of
terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design and purpose behind such act was to be seen---Whether
said act had created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public or in any section of public or community
or in any sect---
Offence alleged in the present case had taken place because of the previous enmity and private
vendetta---Facts of the case revealed that alleged sprinkling of the spirit on the person of the victim was
within the boundary walls of the house of applicant and was not in public---Element of striking terror for
creating sense of fear and insecurity in the people or any section of the people was not made discernible
in the F.I.R. and for that matter on the record of the case as a whole---Application for transfer of case to
the Anti-Terrorism Court filed under S.526, Cr.P.C. was dismissed, in circumstances.
Ss.324, 506, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6 & 7---Constitution of Pakistan (1973),
Art.199---Constitutional petition---Quashing of F.I.R.---Petitioner had sought quashing of F.I.R. or in the
alternate deletion of S.324, P.P.C. and S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 on the ground that from the plain
reading of the F.I.R., no case under the said provisions was made out and said sections had been added
only with a view to magnifying the offence and making the same non-bailable---On prosecution's own
showing, the Golf Course in question was being constructed at a far off place away from residential area
and the main road---Apart from that if murderous assault had been launched in the manner as alleged in
the F.I.R., then some damage ought to have been caused---F.I.R., mentioned that petitioners/accused
and their co-accused, who were carrying dangerous fire-arms, had resorted to firing, but strangely
enough no physical harm, whatsoever, had been caused by such firing---Case did not attract the
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---No statement was on record of any of the foreign or
Pakistani workers, who had allegedly been scared away to support the claim of prosecution---
Applicability of S.324, P.P.C. also did not appear to be made out for the simple reason that no harm was
caused, though petitioners were allegedly armed with formidable weapons---Neither S.7 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 nor S.324, P.P.C. was applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.
----S. 10(4)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6(b)---Capital punishment, awarding of---Duty of Court
stated. The Courts of law are expected and required to decide the cases on the basis of evidence
adduced, without being overawed by emotions and sentiments. Nevertheless, extraordinary care and
caution is to be taken while dealing with the offences of grave nature, attracting capital punishment,
which could not be awarded unless charge against the accused is proved by leading absolutely credible,
trustworthy and unimpeachable evidence.
definition of "serious" provided by S.2(w) of the said Act---Impugned order, therefore, did not call for
any interference---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.
Ss.6 & 7(c)---Terrorism---Case against accused was not a case of terrorism but of police encounter and
police had given the occurrence the shape of terrorism---Provisions of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997, being not applicable, accused were acquitted of the charge under S.7 (c) of the said Act---
Appeal was disposed of accordingly.
Ss. 324 & 353---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.7 (c) & 6---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),
S.561-A---Appreciation of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---One accused had not filed an appeal
challenging his convictions and sentences passed by Trial Court and High Court while exercising its suo
motu jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr. P. C. had also dealt with his case---
Occurrence had taken place because of police encounter---Accused were named in the F.I.R. and they
had caused eight injuries on the person of a police officer who had supported the prosecution case and
his statement was corroborated by another prosecution witness---False implication of accused was out
of question due to non-existence of any enmity between the police officials and the accused---No
specific injury had been attributed to any of the accused---
Convictions of accused under Ss. 324, P.P.C. and 353, P.P.C. were, therefore, maintained, but their
sentence under S. 324, P.P.C. was reduced from 10 years' R.I each in circumstances.
Ss. 302(b) & 395---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(i), 7 & 6(3)---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance
(XX of 1965), S.13(e)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Name of accused did not appear in
the F.I.R., lodged after an unexplained delay of six hours---Accused was arrested after two months
whereafter identification parade had been conducted through witnesses under the supervision of Naib
Tehsildar who had conducted investigation as well---
Conviction and sentences of accused were urged to have been based on no evidence and rather on
inadmissible evidence, which could not be treated as inclusive warranting a sentence on capital
charge---Leave to appeal was granted to accused for reappraisal of the evidence in order to ascertain
whether the principles for safe administration of criminal justice, as laid down by Supreme Court, were
fully adhered to.
by the complainant---Case of accused who had clean past rested on a lower pedestal than that of
terrorists and sectarian criminals who killed innocent persons either to weaken the State or to cause
damage to the parties of the rival sect---Terrorists or the sectarian killers did not have any personal
grudge or motive against the innocent victims---In the present case admittedly a feud existed between
the parties over a piece of land prior to the occurrence---No independent evidence was available on
record to show that the act of accused led to striking of terror among the masses---Site plan had denied
the claim of the complainant that the occurrence had taken place in a "Bazaar" which was heavily
populated---Criminal cases should be tried and decided by the Courts having plenary jurisdiction until
and unless extraordinary circumstances existed justifying the trial of the case by special Courts---
Impugned order did not call for any interference---Leave to appeal was declined to complainant
accordingly.
2008 PCrLJ 1706 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE Hafiz MUHAMMAD SALEHEEN Vs SPECIAL JUDGE ANTI-
TERRORISM, RAWALPINDI
Ss. 6(1)(b), 7 & 28---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.337-A(iii), 147 & 149---Constitution of Pakistan (1973),
Art.199---Constitutional petition---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to Court of Session---
Persons who were stated to have initiated occurrence, had come to offer their prayer, at the spur of
moment were enraged by the word of caution by the complainant/petitioner to them in the matter of
reciting `Kalma' loudly while other people were still offering their prayers, which ultimately led to scuffle
resulting in injuries recorded under S.337-A(iii), P.P.C. to some persons---Section 6(1), P,P.C. did not
refer to a design and intention to coerce and intimidate a particular sect---Design and intention was
further clarified by the definition of word `sectarian' and `sectarian hatred' as given in S.2(u)(v) of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997---Such an intention or design was not apparent on the face of the F.I.R.---
Ss. 302, 324, 353 & 354/34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(2)(a), (m) & 7---
Appreciation of evidence---No motive was available for the murder in the case---No independent
witness from the locality was examined to prove the prosecution case through reliable and confidence-
inspiring evidence---Eye-witnesses were interested witnesses and had motive to implicate accused---
Ocular account was not confidence-inspiring and trustworthy---
Shaky evidence of the eye-witnesses could not be relied upon for recording the capital punishment,
when their evidence was not corroborated by independent and reliable source---
In absence of clear and straightforward evidence, doubtful narration of the prosecution witnesses did
not carry weight to record conviction---Accused and co-accused, after being arrested, were not put to
identification parade, though they were produced before the Magistrate for remand purpose during
investigation---Police party was not in a position to identify the culprits at the time of the occurrence--
Later when statement of the complainant
under S.154, Cr.P.C. was recorded, he had given the names of accused involved in different dacoity
cases, but no description of accused or that of co-accused was available on record---
Injured could not be conveniently held that he sustained fire-arm injury at the hands of accused for two
reasons; firstly that he being not traceable could not be examined; secondly that none of the
prosecution witnesses had come forward to support the prosecution case to the extent of injury
sustained by the injured---Even Doctor was not examined---Testimony of the police officials could not be
the basis of the evidence---Arrest of accused was highly doubtful and from the circumstances a
reasonable doubt could be drawn that defence evidence could be most probable---Impugned judgment
of the Trial Court, awarding conviction and sentence to accused was set aside, in circumstances and
accused was ordered to be released.
Ss. 302(b) & 395---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6(i), 7 & 6(3)---West Pakistan Arms Ordinance
(XX of 1965), S.13(e)---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)---Name of accused did not appear in
the F.I.R., lodged after an unexplained delay of six hours---Accused was arrested after two months
whereafter identification parade had been conducted through witnesses under the supervision of Naib
Tehsildar who had conducted investigation as well---
Conviction and sentences of accused were urged to have been based on no evidence and rather on
inadmissible evidence, which could not be treated as inclusive warranting a sentence on capital
charge---Leave to appeal was granted to accused for reappraisal of the evidence in order to ascertain
whether the principles for safe administration of criminal justice, as laid down by Supreme Court, were
fully adhered to.