Oposa vs Factoran Yes.

Petitioner-minors assert that they represent

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan
Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to:
           1.       Cancel all existing Timber
Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
           2.       Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising
new TLAs;
their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and
for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm
and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as
the future generations.

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises.” They alleged
that they have a clear and constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity
as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders
to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he
holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint on the following grounds:

           1.       Plaintiffs have no cause of action

against him;

           2.       The issues raised by the plaintiffs

is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the
government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action

in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?”

HELD:
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC
against several government agencies, among
them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of
the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically PD
1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that
petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay
and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete
plan of action for the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
respondents, ordering the defendant-
government agencies to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay.
Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152
relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
Apart from raising concerns about the lack of
funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning
of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which
can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed
the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is
it limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents?
Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay?
RULING:
Issue 1:
PD 1152 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to
upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on
the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical
legal provision specifically prodding petitioners
to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to
keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and
clear as humanly as possible.
Issue 2:
Yes, petitioners may be compelled.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste
disposal is set forth not only in the Environment
Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter
as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste
disposal system cannot be characterised as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to
public functionaries to act officially according to
their judgment or conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective
charters would yield to the conclusion that these
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter
of statutory obligation, to perform certain
functions relating directly or indirectly to the
cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are
precluded from choosing not to perform these
duties.
The petition is DENIED

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo
Reyes
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo
Reyes, G.R. No. 180771 (April 21, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases
challenging the legality of Service Contract No.
46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co. (JAPEX).   The service contract
allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the
Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic
surveys and drilled one exploration well.  The
first petition was brought on behalf of resident
marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by two
individuals acting as legal guardians and
stewards of the marine mammals.  The second
petition was filed by a non-governmental
organization representing the interests of
fisherfolk, along with individual representatives
from fishing communities impacted by the oil
exploration activities. The petitioners filed their
cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began
drilling in the strait.  In 2008, JAPEX and the
government of the Philippines mutually
terminated the service contract and oil
exploration activities ceased.  The Supreme
Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of
review.
In its decision, the Supreme Court first
addressed the important procedural point of
whether the case was moot because the service
contract had been terminated.  The Court
declared that mootness is “not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case.”  Id., p. 12.  Due to the alleged
grave constitutional violations and paramount
public interest in the case, not to mention the
fact that the actions complained of could be
repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach
the merits of the case even though the particular
service contract had been terminated.  Id.
Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the
petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed them
down to two: 1) whether marine mammals,
through their stewards, have legal standing to
pursue the case; and 2) whether the service
contract violated the Philippine Constitution or
other domestic laws.  Id., p. 11. 
As to standing, the Court declined to extend the
principle of standing beyond natural and juridical
persons, even though it recognized that the
current trend in Philippine jurisprudence “moves
towards simplification of procedures and
facilitating court access in environmental cases.”
Id., p. 15.  Instead, the Court explained, “the
need to give the Resident Marine Mammals
legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws.”  Id., p. 16-17.
The Court then held that while SC-46 was
authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil
extraction, the contract did not fulfill two
additional constitutional requirements.  Section 2
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a
service contract for oil exploration and extraction
to be signed by the president and reported to
congress.  Because the JAPEX contract was
executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and
not reported to the Philippine congress, the
Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp.
24-25.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract
violated the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which
generally prohibits exploitation of natural
resources in protected areas.  In order to
explore for resources in a protected area, the
exploration must be performed in accordance
with an environmental impact assessment (EIA).
The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic
surveys before any EIA was performed;
therefore its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34.
Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area,
and exploration and utilization of energy
resources can only be authorized through a law
passed by the Philippine Congress. Because
Congress had not specifically authorized the
activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that
no energy exploration should be permitted in
that area.  Id., p. 34.