DAREMAS, Georgios. The ‘Lebenswelt’ of the state in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.

Hegel-
Jahrbuch, 2006, n. 1, p. 335-339.

“My aim is to bring forward several conditions that the Philosophy of Right illuminates as
>healthy< relations that guarantee the political stability of the rational state. Such conditions
permeate the Lebenswelt, the internal constitution of the State's socio-political life and they
ought to contribute to the cohesiveness of the political whole by counteracting its proneness
to societal disease.”

Para Hegel, a estabilidade é um dos principais valores e toda atividade deve contribuir para sua
preservação. No caso do estado, o valor da estabilidade estaria encarnada no princípio
monárquico ao representar a unidade da totalidade orgânica do Estado. Isso vem sendo
erroneamente interpretado como uma defesa da monarquia como forma de governo. Em
Hegel, a monarquia está ligada à soberania, a uma autoridade política universal, e não a
formas contingentes de autoridade política.

Nem toda nação é ou foi um Estado. Mesmo as que são um Estado, nem todas são a
atualidade de um Estado racional. Isso só foi possível após o surgimento do princípio cristão,
que generalizou um senso de liberdade interna e consciência subjetiva. O Estado racional é um
tipo específico de Estado, aquele que encarna a Ideia do Estado. Seu conteúdo concreto é a
unidade da liberdade objetiva e liberdade subjetiva. A liberdade subjetiva é a capacidade de
exercer sua vontade para perseguir fins particulares, estabelece relações contratuais e estar
em segurança nas suas posses. A liberdade objetiva é o estabelecimento de uma
institucionalidade estatal – 335 – que atingiu universalidade, que promove a preservação do
Estado ético como seu fim último.

“For such a unity to be realised, the political state must have arrived at the knowledge and the
praxis of respecting the autonomy of civil society and providing the sociopolitical guarantees
that permit subjective freedom< to blossom. Political authority should absolutely desist from
surveilling, disciplining and commanding citizens' lives like Fichte's »mechanical State« was
meant to do.”

Há uma relação recíproca entre as liberdades. A vontade subjetiva dos indivíduos deve
reconhecer a necessidade da existência objetiva das instituições políticas que garantem sua
particularidade. Desse ponto de vista, o Estado é um conjunto de meios para a persecução de
fins particulares. Se fosse apenas isso, colapsaria em razão dos conflitos particularistas que se
tornariam endêmicos. Para isso, é necessária uma forma mais elevada, quando a consciência
geral do povo percebe que deve realizar/ter (“posit”) o Estado como um fim-em-si-mesmo
(não como um fim subjetivo) e como um fim-para-si-mesmo (realiza-lo autoconscientemente,
ao invés de através da coerção) .

“If this is done self-consciously, then such positing is free and renders the actualization of such
State, ethical. >Subjective< and >objective< freedom coincide in the unity of State via
universality. The individual will and the objectivity of political institutions must have been
raised to >concrete universality< expressed as the rule of laws, universal in character and
because of that rational in content (§ 317). From an ethical-practical point of view this unity of
the two principles of freedom implies that »[t]he modern State does not confine its citizens in
its organization; it is their organization.« (WEIL)”

“Since the State is the self-conscious communal bond of all, it follows that membership in the
State emerges as a duty (§ 258). It connotes a triple obligation: a) not to desert it, b) to defend
it above all else, and c) to assume public responsibilities in regard to it. This duty as ethico-
political is the highest of all and it can be called the republican duty par excellence.” Nesse
sentido, os direitos estão fundados nos deveres e não o contrário, pois sem os deveres (em
relação ao Estado) não há organismo político capaz de garantir direitos. O Estado começa a se
degradar quando os interesses particulares do indivíduos são vistos ou tratados como fins
últimos do Estado (PR273, 258). – 336 – Nesse caso, há um conflito sem fim pela apropriação
dos recursos universais da sociedade pelos particulares. Qualquer senso de comunidade
política desaparece e as regras do mundo social se tornam caprichos (PR200). Essa é a
prevalência da sociedade civil sobre o estado político. No caso inverso, a liberdade subjetiva
seria subjulgada um estado despótico mecânico destruiria a vida ética.

Para promover a reconciliação, são necessárias instituição de mediação, como a família e

corporação, que atuam como fundação para o Estado e para a confiança e disposições dos
indivíduos em relação ao Estado.

“They are the pillars on which public freedom rests« (§ 265). Corporations as intermediary
associations guarantee the stability of the ethical organism by connecting civil society to the
political state. They are agencies of political socialization and of public oversight of »misuse of
power« (§ 301).

“Another crucial condition for stability concerns the empowerment of citizens. The socio-legal
regulation of institutional life should ensure for citizens »an occupation and activity directed
towards a universal end within a corporation.« (§ 264) An obligatory requirement of universal
employ ability is introduced for the »organischer Staat«.” – 337

“A last crucial condition is the sedimentation of the trust bestowed by citizens upon the State.
Patriotism is the political disposition that upholds the bond of the members of political society
in their togetherness. This disposition must become habitual (§ 268). Habituation to the
mundane existence of the State, e. g. living in safety »has become second nature, [...][though]
it is solely the effect of particular institutions.« (§ 268A) The institutional interdependence of
citizens assumes the immediacy of custom. Instead of the false impression that the state is
held together by force, »what holds it together is simply the basic sense of order which
everyone possesses.« (§ 268A) A unifying material and symbolic social order internalized by
citizens exists unconsciously. It is a social mechanism hidden from their self-understanding,
revealed only in national catastrophes or when the survival of the State is at stake. Optimality
of the political state makes citizens acquiesce in the pursuit of their particular endeavors while
maintaining the ethical life of the »organic state«.”

A monarquia é o momento que garante a estabilidade geral da totalidade orgânica. Nesse

sentido, não é uma forma de governo, pois o Estado racional contém todas as formas de
governo: a um (monarquia como fonte única da decisão final), alguns (aristocracia no corpo
técnico e especializado que trata com conhecimento objetivo dos assuntos do governo) e
muitos (pertencimento universalizado à comunidade).

“The internal articulation of these elements is the manifestation of Reason's unfolding in its
moments of differentiation from simple unity (the many as natural substantial will) to self-
divided opposition (the several as both a particularity opposed to the universality of »the many
as all« (§ 301) and at the same time the several as possessors of truth in-itself) to the sublation
of the opposition in a higher unity. The one embodies the reconciliation of the few and the
many in the concrete individuality of the monarchy. But this >concrete individuality< is subject
to the universal character of the laws (enacted in the legislative body) that prescribe the frame
of action of monarchy on behalf of the whole (§ 285).”

“Here emerges the most crucial link which grounds the ultimate stability of the Lebenswelt of
the political state. The unity of the State rests in the union of the »divided powers« in an
individual whole. A condition of stability I encapsulate as: self-subsistence of the whole in
interdependence. But a different condition is also necessary to provide for the stability of the
whole. Specifically, each power is itself the totality »since each contains the other moments
and has them active within it, and [...] all of them [...] constitute [...] a single individual whole.«
(§ 272). It is not only oneness that contains triplicity within itself but each element of the
triplicity incorporates its double other as an in-itself oneness. It is the twin bond of entailment
of the double other in each totality that constitutes the organic whole as a totality of totalities.
I encapsulate this as: dependent wholes in a self-subsistent independence. Monarchy as an
objective locus in the Lebens welt of the State is distinguished from the monarch as a
contingent persona. It is not the monarch who generates monarchy as sovereign power but
monarchy itself that necessitates its representation in the particular incumbency of an
individual. It is as public office not as person (§ 279) that the monarch commands »the ultimate
decision«.” – 338

“Thus the monarch as public function resolves the political clashes between government and
parliamentary opposition especially if they are immobilized by a destabilizing deadlock. The
triangulation of the organic members of the political state in order to be successful, i . e .
stable requires the ultimate subordination of the moments under the supreme one but the
latter must itself be subordinate to the whole that consists of itself and its double other. Hegel
thinks out an elaborate architectonic of the Lebenswelt of the State which in order to be
rational it must secure immanently the conditions that provide for its stability in its socio-
historical becoming.” - 339