African American Philosophy

and the African Diaspora

(RE-)DEFINING
RACISM
A Philosophical
Analysis

Alberto G. Urquidez
African American Philosophy and the
African Diaspora

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Department of Philosophy
Howard University
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 Alberto G. Urquidez

(Re-)Defining Racism
A Philosophical Analysis
Alberto G. Urquidez
Bowdoin College
Brunswick, ME, USA

African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora

ISBN 978-3-030-27256-2    ISBN 978-3-030-27257-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9

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para mis padres, Elena y Elias, por su amor,
sacrifcio y todo lo que han hecho por mí
 Acknowledgments

I would not have completed this project without the support of my family.
My parents, Elena and Elias Urquidez, taught me more than I could ever
express in words, including that I must go to college. Mamá, siempre lle-
varé tu amor y la memoria de mi padre en mi corazón. Les agradezco por todo.
I am grateful for all the love and support of my family, both inside and
outside the U.S. border. I cannot mention everyone by name, so I provide
an incomplete list of family members I’d like to thank for their support
and love throughout the years: Joel, Gavy, Sam, Martha, Milu, Licha,
Lizzy, David, Lupe, Jaime, Lola, Pancho, Ángel, Stevie, Ricky, Meli, Olga,
Junior, Yin, Javier, Nando, Pati, Carmen, Lucha, and my wonderful neph-
ews, Ayden, Eli and Oziel. To every family member  listed here and
every one not listed here, thank you for your support.
My wife, Marielynn Herrera-Urquidez, has endured much and has sac-
rificed even more. You have been involved in every aspect of this project
from day one, and you have been involved in so much more. You deserve
more than this brief mention for your undeserved patience, extended love,
and sincere belief in me and my work. I love you!
I am honored and fortunate to have collaborated with excellent schol-
ars throughout my academic career. Among them, I extend my thanks and
gratitude to Jacoby Carter, Jorge Garcia, Clevis Headley, Rod Bertolet,
Chris Yeomans, Daniel Smith, Daniel Kelly, Patrick Horn, Masahiro
Yamada, Dorothy Stark, and Charles Mills. A special thanks is due to my
dissertation advisor, mentor, and friend, Leonard Harris, for his critical
support throughout the years, and for nurturing my ideas during my grad-
uate years.

vii
viii  Acknowledgments

I have learned and profited much from the friendship and philosophical
acumen of my friends and colleagues. I mention here only a few: Rocky,
Justin, Jacob, Chris, Loreley, Shawn, Morgan, Jaime, Bernard, Charlie,
Orlando, Tony, and Mario.
I am grateful to the entire team at Palgrave Macmillan and Springer for
their support and patience with me, throughout the writing and produc-
tion process. Finally, I could not have made it this far without the financial
support and invaluable resources afforded me by the Academic
Advancement Program (AAP) at UCLA and the McNair Scholars Program
at Claremont Graduate University (during my undergraduate years), and
the Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellowship and the Dissertation
Fellowship at Phillips Exeter Academy  at Purdue University (during
my graduate years).
This book is a substantial reworking and extension of my dissertation
work. As a result, some of this material has benefited from the comments
of audience members at various academic venues. Material from Chap. 6,
“Re-defining ‘Philosophical Analysis’: Not Descriptive Analysis, or
Conservatism, but Pragmatic Revisionism,” was presented at the North
American Society for Social Philosophy (2017) and the Florida Philosophical
Association (2017). Material from Chap. 8, “Racial Oppression and
Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia on Racist Belief,” was
presented at the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (2015).
Chapter 8 is a reworking and extension of my paper “Jorge Garcia and
the Ordinary Use of ‘Racist Belief’” in Social Theory and Practice (2017).
Chapter 5 incorporates some ideas from “What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do”
in Journal of Value Inquiry (2018). Chapter 6 is an edited version of
“A Revisionist Theory of Racism: Rejecting the Presumption of
Conservatism,” Journal of Social Philosophy (2020).
 Contents

1 Introduction: Summary of the Argument  1

1.1 Problematizing the Concept of Racism  1
1.1.1 Racism and the Concept of Racism  1
1.1.2 Competing Conceptions of Racism  4
1.1.3 A Methodological Intervention  7
1.2 Racism’s Janus-Faced Character: The Necessity/
Contingency Divide  9
1.2.1 Three Theoretical Problems 10
1.2.2 Necessity and Contingency 11
1.2.3 Accidental and Essential Features 13
1.2.4 “Reverse Racism” and Language-Game
Contestation 15
1.2.5 Racism as a Sociocultural Concept 16
1.3 An Antiracist Ethic: Racism from the Eyes of the Victim 18
1.3.1 The Primacy of A Priori Analysis 18
1.3.2 Valuing the Victim’s Perspective 19
1.4 A Normative-Pragmatic Pluralism 24
1.4.1 Trading in Ontology for Pragmatism 25
1.4.2 Rethinking the Categorial Plurality of Racism 28
1.4.3 Beyond Wittgenstein: From Descriptive to
Prescriptive Grammar 29
1.5 Chapter Summaries 32
References 36

ix
x  Contents

Part I Racism Without Ontology  39

2 The Problem of Definition: Toward a Conventionalist

Framework 41
2.1 Introduction: On the Question “What Is Racism?” 41
2.1.1 The Philosophical Question 41
2.1.2 Metaphysical Analysis 47
2.2 Grammar and Philosophy: A Conventionalist Approach 55
2.2.1 Meaning, Use, Understanding 56
2.2.2 Explanation of Meaning 61
2.2.3 Wittgenstein’s Normativism 75
2.3 Conclusion: The Aim of This Book 85
References 86

3 Re-defining “Definition”: An Argument for

Conventionalism 91
3.1 Introduction 91
3.1.1 Scope of the Chapter 91
3.1.2 Terminology: “Proposition,” “Sentence,” “Rule-­
Formulation” 92
3.2 The Many Sides of Convention: Recasting Metaphysical
Predicates as Facets of Convention 94
3.2.1 The Empirical Side of Convention 95
3.2.2 The Non-Empirical Side of Convention107
3.3 A Priori Analysis129
3.3.1 Normative Descriptions of Grammar129
3.3.2 Criticisms of Grammar133
3.3.3 Grammatical Approaches136
3.4 Empirical Analysis137
3.4.1 In Defense of Empirical Approaches to Racism137
3.4.2 Beyond Realism and Constructivism142
3.4.3 Conventionalism as Naturalistically Plausible146
3.5 Conclusion152
References153
  Contents  xi

4 Re-defining “Meaning”: Defending Semantic Internalism

over Externalism157
4.1 Introduction157
4.2 The Case for Externalism158
4.2.1 Some Key Concepts159
4.2.2 Putnam’s and Kripke’s Arguments164
4.3 Resisting Externalism: An Internalist Account of
Conceptual Change169
4.3.1 Rival Intensions: Empirical Discoveries as
Pragmatic Reasons169
4.3.2 The Pirahã: A Living Counterexample175
4.3.3 Are the Pirahã Wrong/Confused?179
4.3.4 The Arbitrariness of Grammar182
4.4 Are Definitions Descriptive in Addition to Being
Normative?187
4.4.1 Descriptive and Normative Uses of Sentences188
4.4.2 A Measure that Measures Itself?190
4.5 Conclusion195
References196

Part II Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement 197

5 Re-defining “Disagreement”: Rationality Without Final

Solutions199
5.1 Introduction: From Ontology to Linguistic Norms199
5.2 Stage-Setting for a Theory of Disagreement200
5.2.1 Normative and Prescriptive Disagreement200
5.2.2 A Mere Difference in Word Use?202
5.3 Metalinguistic Negotiation205
5.3.1 Non-Descriptive Disagreement205
5.3.2 Pragmatic Advocacy209
5.3.3 The Need for a Stipulative Definition of “Racism”212
5.4 Negotiation and Rationality216
5.4.1 Blum and Glasgow’s Disagreement216
5.4.2 Contested Rationality221
5.4.3 No Final Solutions: On Problems-to-Cope-With227
5.5 Conclusion229
References230
xii  Contents

6 Re-defining “Philosophical Analysis”: Not Descriptive

Analysis, or Conservatism, but Pragmatic Revisionism233
6.1 Introduction233
6.2 Framing the Prescriptive Question236
6.2.1 Descriptive and Normative Analysis236
6.2.2 Unpacking Conservatism/Revisionism238
6.2.3 Metaphysical and Pragmatic Considerations241
6.3 Agnosticism as Default Position245
6.3.1 Doxastic Inertia or Instability?245
6.3.2 Instability and Pragmatic Considerations248
6.4 Two Arguments for Revisionism255
6.4.1 Conceptual Inflation Argument256
6.4.2 Political Morality Argument264
6.5 Conclusion268
References270

Part III Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Racism 273

7 Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive Theory of Racism:

Toward an Oppression-Centered Account275
7.1 Introduction275
7.2 The Moral Condition278
7.2.1 A Necessary Value: Advance Nonwhite Interests278
7.2.2 Legitimate Need and Historical Usage: The Racial
Oppression Approach291
7.3 The Explanatory Condition298
7.3.1 Racism as Sociocultural Phenomenon298
7.3.2 Criteria and Vagueness305
7.3.3 Racism as Open Texture and Unfolding Process310
7.4 The Resolution Condition316
7.5 Conclusion319
References320

8 Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique

of Jorge Garcia on Racist Belief325
8.1 Introduction325
8.2 Garcia’s Theory: Two Senses of “Racism”330
  Contents  xiii

8.2.1 Garcia’s Core Essentialism331

8.2.2 Infection and Characteristic Racism332
8.3 Paternalism and the Primary Sense335
8.3.1 Two Pictures of Paternalism335
8.3.2 Garcia’s Revisionist Proposal338
8.4 Ideology and the Primary Sense341
8.4.1 Ideology’s Role in the Racial Structure342
8.4.2 Ideology, Social Function, and Intuition344
8.4.3 Ideology and the Ideological Role of Virtue348
8.4.4 Ideology and Political Morality351
8.5 The Secondary Sense as Wrong Explanation355
8.5.1 Blum’s Objection and Characteristic Racism355
8.5.2 The Wrong Explanation356
8.5.3 Moral Grounds for Condemning Intrinsically
Wrongful Beliefs359
8.6 Conclusion362
References364

9 Coda367
9.1 Going Forward from Here: On the Feasibility of
Negotiation367
9.2 Three Paradigms of Racial Oppression370
9.3 Going Forward from Here: Implications and Future
Research378
References381

Bibliography383

Index395
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Summary of the Argument

1.1   Problematizing the Concept of Racism

1.1.1  Racism and the Concept of Racism

This book is not about racism, but about the concept of racism. Racism is
an empirical reality, a lived experience. The concept of racism is the nature
of this reality, the nature of this lived experience. This distinction requires
elaboration.
All of us are familiar with discussions like these: Does racism still exist?
Is racism worsening? Is so and so a racist? Activists participate in discus-
sions about what to do about racism; how to live with and survive racism;
how to combat, subvert, and resist racism. Some examples will drive the
point home: What are some of the ways in which well-intentioned indi-
viduals unwittingly participate in racism? How do whites, as a group, ben-
efit from racism? What policies, laws, and social practices are racist? What
is being done to reduce or mitigate racism? What recourse is available to
victims of racist discrimination (in the workplace, in the classroom, etc.)?
Scholars interested in racism’s history, causes, and expressions partici-
pate in theoretical conversations: What are the causes of racial inequality?
What are the psychological mechanisms of racist cognition? How has rac-
ism corrupted this or that institution? What are the short- and long-term
effects of racism, for this or that racial group? Where did racism come
from—how did it evolve, and from what? And so on.

© The Author(s) 2020 1

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_1
2  A. G. URQUIDEZ

These are all worthwhile and important questions. Many of them can
be described as conceptual in some sense of the term. For instance, a
respectable sense of “conceptual” applies to the historian’s interest in
mapping the development of the idea of racism; it similarly applies to the
historian’s interest in parsing the conceptual differences between Medieval
manifestations of religious antisemitism and twentieth-century manifesta-
tions of race-based antisemitism. As I use the term “conceptual” neither
of these inquiries into racism count as conceptual investigations, for they
take a particular understanding of racism for granted. Indeed, all of the
aforementioned questions presuppose a conception of racism. By “presup-
pose” I mean that a prior understanding of racism is required in order for
the above questions to be intelligible. Empirical theories that inquire
about racism’s origins, development, and history only make sense because
the term “racism” has been assigned a meaning in the context of these
inquiries; it is this meaning which makes observations, recommendations,
and predictions about racist phenomena possible.
As I use the term, a conceptual investigation into racism is one that
investigates the question “What is racism?” How might such an investiga-
tion proceed, and why is it important to theorize the concept of racism?
We can get a grip on these and related questions by reflecting on two
things: the object of racist ascriptions and the phenomenon of conceptual
disagreement. Let us start with the former.
What is the proper object of a racist ascription? That is, what do we
single out for condemnation when we call something “racism” or “rac-
ist”? As it turns out, there are many such things. For the terms “rac-
ism” and “racist” are applied to various categories of entity: persons,
institutions, behaviors, speech, policies, societies, and much more is
called racist. But do “racism” and “racist” mean the same across all
categories; for example, when applied to persons and institutions?
Interesting issues arise in thinking about the relationship of individual
racism to institutional racism. If “racist” applies to persons, can mem-
bers of subjugated racial groups be racist or is it only members of dom-
inant racial groups that can be racist? If institutions can be racist, do
they become racist only when they are corrupted by the individuals
running them, or are there structural causes of institutional racism? A
conception of racism provides answers to these and related questions;
it resolves puzzlement concerning the meaning of “racism.”
 1 INTRODUCTION  3

The second thing that motivates the distinction between philosophical

theories (which investigate the concept of racism) and empirical theories
of racist phenomena is the former’s interest in resolving conceptual dis-
agreement. It is not difficult to imagine one’s beliefs about racism being
challenged. When this occurs, one is forced to ask: How are we (how am I)
to decide which conception of racism is correct? Some examples will quickly
illustrate the point:

• Example 1: Suppose I assert: implicit racial bias is racist. I suspect

that many would reject this proposition, even while many others
would accept it. How do we decide which position is correct? The
answer largely depends on just what precisely racism is.
• Example 2: What if when I recommend a race-conscious policy to
mitigate racism, it is immediately shot down or criticized on the
grounds that it is racist? The dismissal of race-conscious policies is
commonly reported by supporters of affirmative action and propo-
nents of reparations for Native Americans and American Descendants
of Slaves (ADOS). A common argument holds that, because affirma-
tive action wrongfully discriminates on the basis of race, it cannot be
implemented, not even to correct for historical injustices that were
committed at the behest of white supremacy. Is affirmative action,
then, racist? If it is, that is partly because we have adopted a certain
definition of “racism.” (Perhaps this is the definition that racism is
the differential treatment of people, based on race.)
• Example 3: Is the criminal justice system racist? Many have argued
that it is, yet many others disagree.
• Example 4: If a teacher, with no ill intent, calls on a black Haitian
student to “provide the black perspective to the class,” some would
call this racist; others wouldn’t.
• Example 5: If a store manager monitors his Latino customers more
closely than his white customers, some would call his practice racist;
others wouldn’t.

A concept of racism should provide resources to address such contro-

versies. Let us consider how a concept of racism might help us settle the
question in our last example: whether the manager’s racial profiling prac-
tice is racist. This will afford me the opportunity to introduce some com-
peting conceptions of racism.
4  A. G. URQUIDEZ

1.1.2  Competing Conceptions of Racism

Some defenders of the manager’s racial profiling practice might argue that
it is justified if it is motivated by “good business,” that is, if the manager’s
desire to protect his profits requires him to monitor those groups that are
most likely to shoplift from his store. On this perspective, if he sincerely
believes that Latino customers are predisposed to shoplifting, and if he has
a “rational” basis for believing this (perhaps he appeals to statistical data),
then his practice is not racist (even if his belief about Latinos proves to be
false). What are we to make of this argument? What information is perti-
nent to assessing this case? Addressing these hard questions is precisely the
kind of thing a concept of racism can be good for.
Most people, I suspect, would want to know the store manager’s inten-
tions. The manager appeals to evidence, yet his profiling practice might
not be motivated by good business alone. He may have other (more nefar-
ious) motivations at work, which he conceals. Or perhaps, he is selective
about the evidence he is willing to consider. Perhaps his selection bias is an
unconscious one, a function of his aversion to, his fear of, or his contempt
for Latinos. If his belief about them is improperly motivated, Jorge Garcia
and others argue, then and only then should we call it racist; otherwise we
shouldn’t.1 This argument presupposes what philosophers call a volitional
account of racism, one that defines racism in terms of the agent’s will,
including her intentions, motives, and emotions. In other words, voli-
tional accounts focus on the internal mental states of individuals, the non-
cognitive ones that are thought to drive action.
Others might argue that information about people’s intentions and
feelings is not always pertinent or useful in deciding whether a case involves
racism. For instance, some, like J. Angelo Corlett, might argue that the
manager’s profiling practice is racist if it involves racially discriminatory
conduct, which is objectionable in virtue of harming Latinos and treating
them unfairly.2 Let us call this a behavioral approach to racism, because it
defines racism in terms of action and its consequences.
Others would identify the manager’s belief as the source of the prob-
lem. Beliefs matter because they enter into cognition; that is, they inform
how an agent thinks, reasons and acts. They guide behavior even when
they happen to be false, for example. Because false beliefs may have unde-

1
 Garcia (1996). See also Gordon (1995).
2
 Corlett (2003. chap. 4).
 1 INTRODUCTION  5

sirable effects, such as harming others, one might think that it is wrong to
form beliefs irresponsibly (in an irrational manner). So, racism might be
defined in cognitive terms, as harboring certain kinds of ungrounded and
false beliefs, fallacious forms of reasoning, and the like. Anthony Appiah
and Michael Dummett adopt hybrid approaches which incorporate behav-
ioral and cognitive components.3
Focusing on the social consequences of faulty cognition some scholars
take the cognitive approach a step further. A socially sophisticated version
of the cognitive approach is called the ideological approach to racism. It
asserts that practices like racial profiling are racist because they perpetuate
invidious racial stereotypes about racially oppressed groups, attitudes that
contribute to a condition of group vulnerability to certain harms. Tommie
Shelby argues that when invidious racial stereotypes are widely distributed
throughout society, it is not just the specific individuals targeted that are
harmed, but the entire racial group to which they belong. A widely dis-
tributed racial ideology about Latinos can function to stigmatize them,
that is, brand them as criminals before they have had a chance to do any-
thing wrong (or not!). Many have observed that this experience is not
particularly uncommon in the Latino community, for they, along with
other racial minorities, have histories of stigmatization as thugs, gang-
bangers, illegals, and so on (recall Donald Trump’s “Mexicans are rap-
ists”). The manager in our example contributes (unwittingly, perhaps) to
a social structure wherein Latinos do not have full access to the rights and
privileges afforded to more privileged racial groups.
Consider some of the privileges people generally take for granted (or
should be able to take for granted) in our society. Everyone supposedly
has the right to feel comfortable in their day-to-day lives (doing normal,
everyday things). Yet, some Latinos think twice about entering certain
spaces. If I go to such and such restaurant, are people going to stare at me
while I eat? If I enter this neighborhood, am I likely to be followed, harassed,
and viewed with suspicion? If I go to this college or if I take this job, will
people view me as the “diversity hire” (code for: “He didn’t earn his place
here”)? And how does this affect my conduct: when I enter that restaurant;
walk through that neighborhood; interact with my academic colleagues?
The above examples illustrate vulnerabilities to certain types of discomfort
and insult. We can easily imagine more troubling scenarios (think of how

3
 Appiah (1990); Dummett (2004).
6  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the stereotype “Mexicans are rapists” impacts people’s lives under the
Trump administration). Is it racist for a business or institution to implement
practices that, though arguably useful for some legitimate purposes, exacer-
bate the burdens imposed on historically disadvantaged racial groups? Aside
from ideological/stigmatization accounts of racism, there are institutional/
structural accounts. These theories are variously defined. One popular defi-
nition holds that racism is “a practice that is itself free of racial bias but in its
implementation has a disproportionately negative effect on subordinate
racial groups.”4 By this definition, the store manager’s profiling of Latinos
may be thought to be racist because it harms Latinos disproportionately,
quite irrespective of whether the manager harbors racial bias or not.
Some people might be more sympathetic to an account of racism that
appeals to the notions of autonomy and respect. Hence some argue that
treating Latinos as potential thugs in the way the manager does is disre-
spectful to the targeted individuals. One way to flesh out this idea is to
elucidate the concept of a person. Persons are rational, autonomous agents.
An agent is someone capable of making her own decisions and using her
capacity to reason to decide between right and wrong. To strip a person’s
autonomy away from her, to deny her the ability to reason and make deci-
sions, is to treat her as though she were a lesser form of human being: a
humanoid, perhaps, incapable of exercising reason, self-control, and moral
virtue. In light of this, racism might be defined as racial disrespect, where
disrespect is understood to mean wrongfully denying or stripping away a
person’s dignity. Hence, the problem with the manager’s profiling practice
might be that it is disrespectful to Latinos who enter the store.
Another way to develop this intuition is to focus on dignitary harm.
This type of harm involves an assault on an individual’s personhood that
effectively produces a sense of wounded dignity, inferiority, and stigma.
Everyone agrees that the use of a racist epithet (like “spick” and “nigger”)
conveys a message of inferiority, but proponents of dignitary harm argue
that words are unnecessary to convey harmful messages. Certain acts and
practices—like rape, violence, chattel slavery, planting a Confederate flag,
and enshrining racial segregation into law—are powerful ways of commu-
nicating the message of white supremacy and nonwhite inferiority. What is
more, individual intent may not be necessary for racism, for the assault in
question may be unintended yet avoidable and foreseeable. In that case,
dignitary harm will be the result of a callous form of negligence or lack of
concern. Bernard Boxill and Clevis Headley argue that dignitary harms,

4
 Blum (2002, 22).
 1 INTRODUCTION  7

whether intentional or unintentional, involve an assault on personhood

that merits the label racism.5 Let us call these and similar approaches to the
definition of “racism” the respect/dignity approach.
The preceding discussion is little more than an incomplete survey of the
various conceptions of racism on offer. One way to try and reconcile these
conceptions—the volitional, behavioral, cognitive, ideological, institu-
tional/structural, and respect/dignity approaches—is to argue that they
capture different aspects of racism. But the challenge for this position is
that they often compete with one another. That is to say, these approaches
are all controversial: acceptable to some but not to others. I use them here
to illustrate the difference between a conversation about racism and a con-
versation about the concept of racism.
A definition of “racism” is the core of a theory of racism. For now let
us speak loosely as follows: A theory of racism specifies the nature of racism,
the kind of thing racism is, the limits of its various forms and manifesta-
tions, and the interrelations of its various forms and manifestations (e.g.,
points of commonality and points of differences between them).6
Conceptual discussions of the sort I have in mind are distinctly philosophi-
cal. Philosophy, in my view, is that branch of understanding that, among
other things, concerns itself with “What is X?” questions, that is, questions
about the nature of a thing (including the question: What does it mean to
talk about a nature?).

1.1.3  A Methodological Intervention

My book aims to answer the question, “What is racism?” It aims to pro-
vide a theory of racism. However, confusion surrounding this question
makes it necessary for me to start with a more basic question: How do we
decide the correct way to settle the question “What is racism?” Should we,
for example, articulate our theory via a priori analysis or via empirical anal-
ysis? How do we determine the proper object of a racist ascription (the
proper referent of “racism”)? How do we resolve disagreement about

5
 Boxill (1992, 82–85); Headley (2000, 233–236).
6
 One of the questions I take up early in the book is what it means to talk about the nature
of a thing. Unlike other philosophers who speak of the “nature” of racism, I do not start with
the assumption that this nature is given by the world. The alternative to this view is the posi-
tion that the nature of racism is given by us, by the practice of the community of speakers
that apply this term.
8  A. G. URQUIDEZ

what things are racist? To what extent should the theory of racism rely
upon ­commonsense thinking about what is called racism? To what extent
should it rely on empirical information about racial phenomena and lived
experience (e.g., historical and sociological facts)? My primary focus (in
Parts I and II) will be on methodological issues about the nature of this
question, which set the stage for a theory of racism (in Part III).
Why is a conceptual discussion of racism necessary (urgent) at this time?
I suspect there are many answers to this question. But a simple answer
runs as follows. There is a pressing need to interrogate this concept
because the nature of racism is hotly contested—not just by scholars, but
by lay people. Donald Trump, for example, sees nothing wrong with
(nothing racist about) asserting that many white supremacists and their
sympathizers are “very good people.” Moreover, these disagreements are
not purely intellectual. They are politicized. They are also emotionally
charged. All of this attests to the importance of the concept. It is a testa-
ment to the fact that we do a lot with it. It is precisely because of this
fact—because so much hangs in the balance—that the question “What is
racism?” is much more than an academic exercise.
The discussion about “what racism is” too often seems motivated by
self-interest and bad faith, by an unwillingness to listen to those who dis-
agree with one. These days discussions of race and racism are difficult to
have, in part because they are so emotionally charged, in part because
much is at stake in these discussions, and in part because the individual’s
lived experience and the way it links up with social reality are extremely
complex and difficult to navigate. These are all different kinds of difficul-
ties, and all, in their own ways, pose various obstacles and barriers to a
serious conversation about racism. One of the best mediums for having
this conversation is a book-length treatment of the topic, such as this, one
where the analysis and theory of racism can be articulated in a transparent,
sustained, and rigorous manner.
So this book, as I have said, develops a theory of racism in the course
of intervening in various methodological disputes. My approach to these
conversations is somewhat idiosyncratic when judged from the view-
point of most of my philosophical colleagues, for I appeal to Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. I argue that his insights about
the nature of language bear ­significantly on methodological issues in the
theory of racism, and that these insights have been neglected and
underutilized.
 1 INTRODUCTION  9

My primary, though not my only, audience is the philosopher of race.7

My basic contention—that approaches to the theory of racism need to be
reconceptualized—makes it necessary to interrogate the question “What is
racism?” It is my contention that this question has been misunderstood by
philosophers of race, in large part due to linguistic confusions.
This makes it appropriate for me to echo Hilary Putnam’s words: it may
seem strange that a book with the title (Re-)Defining Racism deals as
much or more with issues in the philosophy of language as it does with the
ethical, social, and political dimensions of racism. But this is no accident.8
For—again, echoing Putnam—the sub-disciplines of philosophy com-
monly known as “philosophy of language” and “philosophy of race (and
racism)” interlock, and their subject matters often overlap—or so I intend
to demonstrate in this book. I draw from resources in Wittgensteinian
philosophy of language, in my effort to reframe one of the central prob-
lems in the philosophy of race: how best to define the word “racism.”

1.2   Racism’s Janus-Faced Character:

The Necessity/Contingency Divide
In the remainder of the preface, I will lay out some of the major themes of
the book and the conclusions I arrive at. We have seen that, because there
are many competing theories of racism, it is necessary to dive into meth-
odological discussions about how best to analyze racism. Here too one
finds disagreement among scholars.

7
 The philosophers I am most critical of are metaphysicians and metaphysically minded
scholars. I defend a pragmatic approach to the theory of racism over and against a metaphysi-
cal approach. One of the most common objections to pragmatic theories is that they unjustly
trade in the question of truth (“what racism is”) for the question of prudence (“what
works”). Having encountered this reaction from colleagues working in the theory of racism,
it became clear that, in order to get theorists of racism to take pragmatic approaches seri-
ously, I would have to challenge the metaphysical framing of the question “What is racism?”
they take for granted. See Sect. 1.4 below (and Part I) for my critique of the metaphysical
approach to racism.
8
 Putnam begins his book thus: “It may seem strange that a book with the title Ethics with-
out Ontology deals as much or more with issues in the philosophy of logic, and the philosophy
of mathematics as it does with ethics, but this is no accident. For I believe that the unfortu-
nate division of contemporary philosophy into separate ‘fields’…often conceals the way in
which the very same arguments and issues arise in field after field” (2004, 1).
10  A. G. URQUIDEZ

1.2.1  Three Theoretical Problems

Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 of the present chapter discuss the central theo-
retical issues I grapple with in this book. I begin by sketching each theo-
retical concern:

• First, scholars contest whether racism should be investigated empiri-

cally or non-empirically. A non-empirical analysis (otherwise known
as “traditional conceptual analysis” or “a priori analysis”) is one that
proceeds by reflecting on commonsense intuitions about what is
called racism. The idea is that the best way to get a grip on what
racism consists in is to consider cases where the term does and does
not apply; these “intuitions” are then used to construct a definition:
one that states the core of racism in a way that is consistent with
commonsense thinking and everyday linguistic practice. The opera-
tive assumption of this methodology is that the correct way to think
about racism roughly corresponds to the way a competent speaker
of English thinks about it. By contrast, those who favor empirical
analysis are skeptical of commonsense thinking. These scholars
argue that “racism” is a politicized and emotionally charged tool,
that the term is widely contested and used in incompatible ways. For
these and other reasons, it is argued that the term should be defined
by reference to how experts within the relevant social sciences think
about racism. The idea is that expert conceptions are superior to
everyday conceptions of racism.
• Second, scholars contest the nature of racism’s negative valence. Everyone,
including the scholar, agrees that racism has a negative valence: that
racism is (presumptively) “bad” or “objectionable” in some sense or
other. But in what sense is racism “bad”? Is racism a type of character
flaw or vice? Is racism an epistemic or cognitive flaw? Is racism an
unfair arrangement of society or political injustice? The contestedness
of racism’s negative valence makes it necessary to discuss its nature.
• Third, scholars contest whether racism has a single nature, whether
there is one or several racisms. Monists argue that the terms “racism”
and “racist” have a single meaning, one that is capturable in a sin-
gle definition. This definition is usually conceived as an analytic
definition, one that lays down necessary and sufficient conditions
for the application of the term. By contrast, pluralists argue that it
 1 INTRODUCTION  11

is impossible to accommodate everything that is legitimately called

racism in a single definition of the term. Instead, they argue, we
should settle for multiple definitions; or perhaps we should recog-
nize that the concept of racism is unified by “family resemblances”
rather than characteristic features: these are features that apply
across many paradigmatic cases but fall short of applying to all cases.

In addition to tackling the basic methodological problems of how to

determine the proper referent of “racism” and how to address disagree-
ment about racism, my book tackles these three theoretical concerns: the
debate over empirical and non-empirical approaches, the debate between
monists and pluralists, and the debate over the nature of racism’s negative
valence. Let us consider each of these, in turn.

1.2.2  Necessity and Contingency
In this section, I explain my strategy for answering the debate between
empirical (a posteriori) and non-empirical (a priori) approaches. In my
view, the debate is sometimes framed in a misleading way. For it is not the
case that empirical and non-empirical approaches are mutually exclusive or
incompatible. I argue that, in fact, both are necessary for grasping racism’s
nature. To illustrate, I will briefly discuss one of the central confusions that
is an important theme of Chaps. 2 and 3. The question “What is racism?”
poses a conceptual challenge that cuts across the necessity/contingency
divide. Such a challenge makes the task of analyzing racism exceptionally
difficult. I will explain the distinction by starting with Wittgenstein’s
favorite analogy, the game of chess.

Necessity  Chess is a rule-governed activity and the rules are necessary for
playing the game. Consider the powers of the “king.” Its powers partly
“make up” the game of chess but it immediately loses them as soon as the
game is done. Outside the activity of playing chess, the king is just a piece
of wood (or plastic). The abilities of the king, during a game in play, might
be called its normative power. By “normative power” I mean the ability to
compel behavior in the sense of regulating and orienting conduct. For
example, players of the game are obligated to move pieces according to
the rules of the game. We hold individuals accountable if they fail to do so:
so there are “permissible” and “impermissible” moves. Where does this
normative power come from? Clearly, the normative powers of each piece
12  A. G. URQUIDEZ

stand over and above the powers of the material objects that are used as
pieces. Neither the methods of physics or chemistry, for example, can
uncover the normative powers of the physical object that we call “the
king.” Wittgenstein argues that the reason why rules which license permis-
sions, prohibitions, and obligations dissolve when the game is not in play
is that these powers are derivative. Rules derive their normative power
from the practice they regulate and make possible. Only in the activity of
chess can one speak of what moves are “possible” or “necessary,” of how
things “are” or “must” be, of how one “has” to or “cannot” move.

Contingency  Let us turn next to the contingent side of chess. This is the
empirical, the sociohistorical side of chess.9 Consider these historical inves-
tigations into chess: how did the game (or how did particular rules of the
game) evolve; why were the pieces named as they were; what broader
social purposes did the game serve; and so on. To study chess as a contin-
gent phenomenon is to study it naturalistically, as a product of sociocul-
tural forces or the laws of nature.
Studying the contingent side of chess is very different from studying
its necessary side. For example, most people who know the game do not
know the answers to questions about the game’s historical development.
By contrast, people who know the game know it as a normative practice.
To study chess as a normative phenomenon is to study its necessary prop-
erties. Consider the question: What counts as “good strategy” in chess?
The study of good strategy in chess requires a normative inquiry into
chess. It involves the study of rule-­governed behavior, of conduct that
counts as “making a move,” as playing the game. It presupposes the par-
ticipant’s for the rules, which determine what moves are permissible and
impermissible, required and optional, and so on. One might call this the
study of chess from the insider’s perspective, as it were. To study it this
way is precisely not to study it as a cultural product, as an expression of
human ingenuity, creativity, evolution, historical circumstance, and the
like. It is to study it as something timeless and fixed.

We have now identified two ways of studying human practice: as neces-

sary and as contingent. At this point, one might be wondering: What does

9
 For further discussion about the nature of contingency and its relation to necessity, see
Chap. 3.
 1 INTRODUCTION  13

the necessity/contingency distinction have to do with racism? The answer

is simple: what is true for the concept of chess is true for all concepts,
including the concept of racism.
The concept of racism, like any other concept, has its necessary and
contingent sides. The study of racism’s contingent side can provisionally
be distinguished from the study of its normative side. Philosophers tend to
focus on the necessary side of concepts. They may want to know, for
instance, what the word “racism” means, what things are properly called
racist, and what criteria should be used to resolve controversial and bor-
derline cases. These concerns are connected with the question of racism’s
nature. Philosophers interested in analyzing racism’s nature sometimes
limit their respective theories to racism’s necessary side. That is, they
ignore its contingent side, eschewing it as irrelevant to their investigation.
Just as one need not investigate the history of chess in order to learn the
meaning of “chess” (i.e., how to play the game), it might be thought that
one need not investigate the history of racism in order to learn the mean-
ing of “racism.” I think this is mistaken. For unlike the nature of chess,
racism’s necessary side is deeply bound up with its contingent side.

1.2.3  Accidental and Essential Features

To see why that is so, let us start with the philosopher’s distinction between
a concept’s accidental and essential features. Racism’s accidental features
are those that do not define its nature. Racism’s essential features are those
that do. Consider this feature of the concept of racism: “The concept of
racism came into existence after the idea of race was invented.” Assuming
this to be a historical fact, it is a fact about the concept of racism that is not
important for understanding what racism is (for knowing how to use the
term “racism”). The same is true for this next proposition: “The concept
of racism was not created until the early 20th century.” A competent
speaker of English need not know when the concept of racism came into
existence in order to know how to use the term “racism.” So, again, this
is an accidental feature of the concept of racism.
Consider next the following feature: “Racism is a racial phenomenon.”
Here we have stumbled upon an essential feature of the concept of racism.
It is impossible to make sense of the term “racism” (what it means) with-
out reference to the idea of race. For purposes of this book, I define “race”
as follows: “[race is] a concept that attaches social meaning to visible
14  A. G. URQUIDEZ

inherited physical characteristics, continental origins, and biological

ancestry.”10 Similarly, it is impossible to know what “racism” means with-
out knowing that this term is used to condemn. For the feature “Racism
is morally objectionable” is an essential feature of the concept of racism.
With the above in mind, I now submit that philosophical analysis is
deficient to the extent that it fails to recognize that the concept of racism
is Janus-faced. By this I mean that some of the contingent features of this
concept are essential (rather than accidental) features of racism.11 One
example of this is: “Racism is and is likely to remain a hotly contested
concept, the content of which changes over time as sociohistorical condi-
tions change.” If I am correct that this contingent fact about the concept
of racism is an essential part of its meaning, then one must understand
some aspects of the concept’s contingent side, and not just its necessary
side, in order to understand the nature of racism. (Said differently, rac-
ism’s contingent and necessary sides dynamically interact with one
another.) I do not mean that one must understand every contingent fea-
ture of racism to understand its nature. What I mean is rather that some of
racism’s contingent features are partly constitutive of its necessary side, of
what I shall call the grammar of the term.
This peculiar fact about the concept of racism can be illuminated by con-
sidering an important type of language-game we play with the word “rac-
ism.” A language-game is a rule-governed activity involving the use of a
word or expression. For instance, “Shut up!” used as a command to silence
someone and used as a reaction to a funny joke are two different language-
games we “play” with this expression. What makes these language-­games
different is that the expression “shut up” means differently in each context
of application. By focusing on different language-­games, we can better
understand how an expression like “shut up” (or “racism”) can mean differ-
ent things relative to contextual differences in the two cases. Let us now
consider a peculiar fact about the grammar of “racism.” Distinct language-
games with the word “racism” sometimes compete with one another in the
sense that participants of one language-­game with “racism” allege that par-

10
 This definition is from Shelby (2016, 23).
11
 Things get tricky here (see Chap. 3). The sense in which a feature of racism is essential,
in my view, is that it is or ought to be treated as unassailable (non-negotiable). Contingent
facts about racism’s history need not inform the grammar of “racism,” from a strictly logical
perspective (see my discussion of the arbitrariness of grammar). However, my claim is that,
from a normative-pragmatic perspective, they ought to inform the grammar of “racism”
given our moral-representational needs.
 1 INTRODUCTION  15

ticipation in the other language-game with “racism” is racist. In such cases,

the two language-games cannot simply be said to be different, for it is clear
that they are parasitic on one another and thus compete over which is “cor-
rect.” Let us call this the problem of language-game contestation.

1.2.4  “Reverse Racism” and Language-Game Contestation

The phenomenon of language-game contestation is exhibited in the
debate over the possibility of reverse racism. The term “reverse racism”
came into prominence in the 1970s in response to race-conscious policies
designed to correct past racial injustice. Affirmative action is the paradig-
matic example of a race-conscious policy alleged to involve reverse racism.
This policy involves giving preferential treatment to historically disadvan-
taged racial groups, in an effort to right the wrongs of past racism whose
effects continue to disadvantage members of these groups today. Antiracists
who support race-conscious policies are sometimes met with the objection
that such practices are racist because they involve “discrimination” based
on race. These race-conscious policies are sometimes characterized as
“reverse racism,” meaning that they involve unfair racial discrimination
against whites, the dominant racial group (hence the “reversal”).12
Proponents of race-conscious policies reply that invoking race as a crite-
rion within the context of policy is necessary to repair the harm inflicted
upon victims of past racism, largely carried out with the use of law and
policy. Sometimes, these proponents charge their reverse racism critics
with racism on the grounds that appropriating the term “racism” to
oppose antiracist efforts is a form of racism. Some even go further, impugn-
ing the motives of the opposition; here it is argued that the term “reverse
racism” is deliberately and cynically used by whites, in bad faith. The rea-
son why whites oppose corrective racial measures, it is argued, is that they
are fighting to hold on to privileges accrued to them as a consequence of
institutionalized racism. Clearly, then, the question of whether reverse rac-
ism is a legitimate form of racism is a case of language-game contestation.
For it is an example of using the term “racism” to condemn or criticize a
competing use of the term. The disagreement at issue—between those
who call the practice of alleging reverse racism racist and those who

12
 The underlying premise of the reverse racism critique is sometimes called the colorblind
principle: a racist-free society is one that is colorblind, one where no distinctions based on
race are made (especially in matters of policy).
16  A. G. URQUIDEZ

espouse that reverse racism is a legitimate form of racism—is both gram-

matical (about the correct meaning of “racism”) and ethical (questioning
the motives, interests, and ethical ideals of the opposing side).
Clearly, a more in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of language-game
contestation would be worth pursuing. However, I will not attempt to do
so here. For I want to focus on an important theoretical implication of the
phenomenon of language-game contestation. Consider the proposition:
“The very notion of reverse racism is racist.” What does “racist” mean
here? To understand the meaning of “racist” in this sentence it is necessary
to understand something about the historical legacy of racism: the ways in
which antiracist efforts have been historically resisted and stymied by
whites; the ways in which the term “racism” is politicized; the ways in
which the discourse about racism has been co-opted and cynically applied
by some individuals for political gain in the debate about racial equality. A
person who does not fully understand these (contingent) historical compo-
nents of the grammar of “racism” and “racist” will not be able to properly
apply and understand these terms in many contexts of application. Hence
they will be incapable of understanding the nature of the alleged racism in
the expression, “The very notion of reverse racism is racist.” The ordinary
use of “racist” within this context of application (within the practice of
language-­game contestation) requires knowledge of the history of the
idea of racism in a way that language-games involving many other terms
(like the term “chess”) do not. The term “chess” has a history, but the
term does not signify or connote that history, nor does one need to know
it to know the meaning of this term in normal contexts of application. The
same cannot be said about the term “racism.” This, then, captures what I
mean when I say that the concept of racism is Janus-faced: it is necessary
to understand racism’s contingent side if one wishes to understand its
necessary side.

1.2.5  Racism as a Sociocultural Concept

My claim that racism’s contingent side is grammatically significant pro-
vides support for my contention that racism is essentially a sociocultural
concept. A sociocultural concept is one that signifies a social phenomenon,
understood in terms of its temporal properties. For example, the game of
chess is a social phenomenon and an expression of our culture, but “chess”
is not for that reason a sociocultural concept. For the concept of chess
does not characterize this phenomenon as a temporally extended reality.
 1 INTRODUCTION  17

Rather, it characterizes it as a normative reality and, hence, as an atemporal

reality. Similarly, “culture” is not a sociocultural concept in some (non-­
academic) contexts of use. Consider the expression, “That is part of his
culture.” Outside of academic contexts, the term “culture” is understood
as a fixed set of norms that make some actions permissible and others
impermissible. So the norms in question are not understood in terms of
their temporality. By contrast, “gender,” “race,” and “racism” are socio-
cultural concepts within the humanities and social sciences (though not
always in everyday thinking). For they are normally used to signify “socially
constructed” realities. I propose with respect to the concept of racism that
it be conceived as a sociocultural concept: one that signifies a temporally
extended social relation—between an oppressed group and an oppressor
group. Moreover, this temporal relation is to be understood dynamically,
as an unfolding (and hence, an evolving) process. The oppressed-oppres-
sor relation is one that changes over time as political and other social
conditions change. Racism changes in connection with changes to a wide
range of alterations, including alteration of a community’s subjective and
intersubjective attitudes, its prevailing moral code, its laws and policies,
and so forth. Such changes condition the nature of the oppressed-oppres-
sor relation. My argument here is normative rather than descriptive: that
is, I argue that racism should be conceived as a sociocultural concept, not
that racism is currently conceived as a sociocultural concept. (For I recog-
nize that often it isn’t so conceived, especially outside of academic
contexts.)
I can now present the important theoretical upshot of my argument: If
the political contestedness of “racism” informs the grammar of this term, then
philosophical theory cannot restrict itself to traditional forms of conceptual (a
priori) analysis. The conceptual analysis of racism must be informed by
empirical (a posteriori) analysis of racism’s contingent features, including
the political role of the idea of racism. My argument in support of the
Janus-faced character of racism—of incorporating empirical considerations
in the theory of racism—is meant to unravel the debate over whether rac-
ism’s nature should be investigated a priori or whether it should be inves-
tigated empirically. I contend that both ought to be treated as necessary
and as mutually supportive theoretical practices. Analysis of the nature of
racism must not ignore the temporal character of racism because some of
its temporal features are (or should be) constitutive of its nature. In short,
the proposition “Racism is a sociocultural phenomenon” is on a par with
other essential features of racism, including those expressed in the propo-
18  A. G. URQUIDEZ

sitions “Racism is a racial phenomenon” and “Racism is morally

objectionable.”13 My argument in support of conceptualizing racism as a
sociocultural phenomenon is further developed in Chaps. 3 and 7.

1.3   An Antiracist Ethic: Racism from the Eyes

of the Victim

1.3.1  The Primacy of A Priori Analysis

Having laid out my position that racism is a sociocultural phenomenon
and that the theory of racism should be informed by empirical analysis,
I want to impress upon the reader that I have nowhere said that philo-
sophical theory should prioritize the empirical over the non-empirical.
On the contrary, I believe that theory should privilege a priori analysis
in at least one important respect. Namely: Every theory of racism neces-
sarily ­presupposes a set of substantive moral values. I illustrate this in
Chap. 5 via my argument that the concept of racism is constituted by
incompatible grammatical norms. As an example, I contend that
“Racism is racial disrespect” and “Racism is serious racial disrespect”
are two guiding norms in much contemporary usage of the terms “rac-
ism” and “racist.” These norms, however, are likely to generate incom-
patible judgments in many cases, depending on which of these norms
one chooses to apply. If a phenomenon is racially disrespectful, some
will be inclined to call it racist while others will deny this (since those
who define “racism” as seriously objectionable may not take this wrong
to be particularly serious). And it will be impossible to resolve the dis-

13
 I am not the first philosopher to posit that racism is a sociocultural concept. I have been
influenced by Clevis Headley’s (2000) defense of this claim. It is notable that Alain Locke
once wrote: “All philosophies are in ultimate derivation philosophies of life and not of
abstract, disembodied ‘objective’ reality; products of time, place and situation, and thus
systems of timed history rather than timeless eternity…. But no conception of philosophy,
however relativist, however opposed to absolutism, can afford to ignore the question of
ultimates or abandon what has been so aptly though skeptically termed the ‘quest for cer-
tainty.’” (1991, 34). Not only does Lock recognize the sociocultural character of concepts,
he clearly recognizes the Janus-faced character of concepts. He also seems to recognize the
inherent difficulty in reconciling these aspects: How do we reconcile a concept’s contingent
and necessary features when they seem to be in tension? For Locke, the challenge is to rec-
ognize the full contingency and temporality of a phenomenon without losing sight of the
“question of ultimates.” For a discussion of some parallels in Wittgenstein and Locke’s phi-
losophies, see Richard Jones (2013, 131).
 1 INTRODUCTION  19

agreement by appealing to commonsense thinking about racism, since

both incompatible judgments fall under the heading of “commonsense
thinking.” Said differently, in order to resolve the empirical disagree-
ment (about the particular case) it is logically necessary to resolve the
deeper conceptual disagreement (about the nature of racism).
What this argument suggests is that philosophical theory requires a
theoretical norm (or condition of adequacy) on the basis of which to
choose between competing incompatible norms. If the concept of racism
is constituted by incompatible definitions of “racism,” then an external
norm is necessary to choose between them. In Chap. 6, I argue that the
question of whether philosophical theory should be predicated on ordi-
nary usage or not depends on which external values we bring to the table.
However, whatever overarching norm is brought to the table, it will not
be grounded in experience. By this I don’t mean that the value cannot
emerge from the analysis of empirical facts; nor do I mean that one’s value
will be completely detached from the facts. Rather, I mean that insofar as
one privileges the saliency of some empirical facts over others, the selec-
tion process will be intrinsically value-laden. Certain facts must be valued
as important, and the value which measures this importance will be taken
for granted as necessary and non-negotiable. Hence the ultimate founda-
tion for a theory of racism must be an a priori basis, a set of values that is
brought to empirical analysis, rather than a set of values that is determined
by empirical analysis. (The overarching norm is akin to a standard of mea-
surement, not to that which is measured.)

1.3.2  Valuing the Victim’s Perspective

With that, the starting point I defend on a priori grounds (in Chap. 7) is
that the definition of “racism” must be defined from the victim’s
­perspective. This raises the question: How should the “victim’s perspec-
tive” be conceived? I argue for conceptualizing the victim’s perspective in
collectivist terms. By this I mean that the perspective at issue ought to be
that of the victimized racial group. I further contend that group victimiza-
tion should be understood in political terms rather than personal terms,
that is, as an issue of injustice and oppression. Finally, I contend that racism
is helpfully viewed as a condition of vulnerability.
The first thing we need to sort out is the appropriate type of morality.
This is important to the theory of defining “racism,” because the primary
20  A. G. URQUIDEZ

(though not the only) role of the concept of racism is moral evaluation.14
The term “racism” has two moral functions: (1) to assign personal blame
and (2) to express social criticism. We can call this (as I do in Chap. 7)
racism’s moralist concern. Is racism primarily “wrong” in that it involves a
kind of personal wrongdoing, a character flaw perhaps? Or is it primarily
“wrong” in that it involves a kind of social injustice or unfairness in the
organization of society? Let us consider each moralist concern, in turn.
Personal blame usually implies that an agent or group is responsible
for an action. Blame is in order when reparation is in order: that is, when
the offender commits a harm that requires her to right the wrong she has
committed; when the harmed party has a right to be made whole.
Responsibility may take on various forms. A perpetrator may be held
responsible in a manner suitable to the context. Blame/responsibility
may involve legal sanctioning, verbal reproach, social rebuke, social
ostracism, placing a mark on one’s record, and so on. Blameworthy con-
duct and speech, when it is repetitive and deliberate, often signals a
deeper characterological flaw in the agent. Hence issues of personal
moral responsibility are often tied to notions of vice and virtue, sincerity
and intent, knowledge and justified belief, rationality and irrationality,
and awareness and autonomy (free will and control). Let us call this fam-
ily of moral phenomena—consisting of ascriptive functions of “racism”
that link up with practices of individual blame and responsibility—
personal morality.
By way of contrast, what I am calling social criticism (in a somewhat
idiosyncratic use of this term) is the expression of disapproval for inade-
quacies of political will and response, inequities in results and outcomes,
and unfairness and injustice in the organization of both formal and infor-
mal institutions, companies and industries, and agencies and societies.
Although social criticism may be directed at individuals or groups of indi-
viduals, it is also possible to criticize the structure of society. My focus will
be on the latter, namely, structural or organizational injustice. Although I
do not believe that racism’s moralist concern should be limited to “social

14
 Some scholars argue that racism is best construed as a social-explanatory concept. The
idea is that the concept of racism tracks a distinct kind of social phenomenon (say, racial
inequality), such that the point of calling something racist is not to condemn the phenome-
non but to explain it (why it exists, persists, or recurs). Though I do not deny that the con-
cept of racism has explanatory power, the view I defend is that racism is first and foremost a
moral concept.
 1 INTRODUCTION  21

criticism” in the restricted sense of injustice (which excludes issues of

personal moral responsibility), it is this restricted sense that I have fore-
most in mind when I employ the term “criticism.” The ascriptions of “rac-
ism” that most interest me are those that express criticism directed at
policy, law, social praxis, cultural norms, and the like. Whereas the goal of
an ascription of blame is to provide a reason for holding an agent/s
responsible for personal/collective wrongdoing (for something one ought
not have done), the goal of expressing social criticism (as I use this term)
is to provide a reason for abandoning, replacing, restructuring, or regulat-
ing an institution or social pattern. Let us call this family of moral
­phenomena—consisting of ascriptive functions of “racism” that link up
with practices of social criticism—political morality.
One important question in determining the nature of racism is whether
“racism’s” negative moral valence should be construed in personal rather
than political terms, or vice versa. Here and in Chaps. 7–8, I explain why
racism should be primarily (though not exclusively) conceived in political
terms. Some scholars argue that racist ascriptions should be restricted to
issues of personal morality, that is, to the condemnation of agents. These
proponents argue that blame is the primary if not the only legitimate func-
tion of the term “racism.” However, I reply that expressing social criticism
is a historical function of this term. So, the suggestion that “racism”
should be permitted to perform only one part of its historical function
seems unwarranted. Given the deleterious effects of many non-intentional
acts, institutionalized racial inequality, and the like, it is perfectly reason-
able to insist that “racism” be able to encompass both moral functions, to
blame and to criticize.
I further contend that the most important moral concern facing victims
of racism today is structural and systemic injustice. After all, racism targets
racialized individuals: persons who are targeted in virtue of group mem-
bership. The groups themselves are often targeted because they are
despised or viewed with disgust or contempt, perceived as inferior, menac-
ing, threatening, and so forth.15 As Charles Mills and others argue, center-
ing the theory of racism on issues of personal responsibility limits racism’s
scope to the conduct of isolated individuals and groups. This often results

15
 A focus on “groups” over “individuals” need not be conceived in metaphysical terms. I
think of groups in pragmatic terms: to focus on the group is to focus on the set of shared
needs that certain individuals have, the patterned harms and lived experiences that tend to
recur, and the social structures that produce these repetitions of experience.
22  A. G. URQUIDEZ

in conceptualizing racism as a pathological phenomenon: an atypical and

deficient person. This is objectionable, however, because racism (­ conceived
as unjust racial inequality) is a normal feature of society. Furthermore, rac-
ism is not the kind of thing that only a “crazy” white supremacist or racial
bigot participates in.16 Conceiving of racism as an anomalous or outlier
phenomenon fails to explain the set of racialized harms and injustices
experienced by historical victims of racial oppression. Moreover, as propo-
nents of institutional racism have long argued, the harm accrued as a result
of structural-systemic patterns tends to be larger in scale and more persis-
tent, making the structural/institutional all the more urgent and pressing
a concern from a moral perspective.17
The theorist of racism must be willing to assume a controversial stance.
She must be willing to defend her proposed definition on normative
grounds. I defend the following desideratum for a theory of racism: The
concept of racism should be defined in the interests of (what is commonly
called) an “antiracist” agenda. By this I mean that the term “racism”
should serve the interests of people of color, as they are the historical vic-
tims of the legacy of white supremacy. This is laid down as an adequacy
condition for any theory of racism: a definition of “racism” that does not
accord with this value is not one worth having. This value is fundamental
and non-negotiable, as I argue in Chap. 7. It is, therefore, an a priori start-
ing point for the theory of racism.
With this value in place, Part III lays down the following essentialist
definition: “Racism is racial oppression.” Paradigmatic types of racial
oppression include white supremacy’s classic expressions: racial slavery,
racial segregation, racial apartheid, as well as the “new racism” of race-
neutral or colorblind oppression. I conceive of racial oppression as the
heart of racism, the output (effect) resulting from a wide range of inputs
(causes). My essentialist account is pluralist in that it recognizes several
causes of racial oppression. For purposes of moral representation, I pro-
pose classifying contributing causes of racial oppression under three cate-

16
 See Mills (2003, 39–40; see also 59–61).
17
 As Sally Haslanger explains: “Persistent institutional injustice is a major source of harm
to people of color. Of course, moral vice—bigotry and the like—is also a problem. But if we
want the term ‘racism’ to capture all the barriers to racial justice, I submit that it is reasonable
to count as ‘racist’ not only the attitudes and actions of individuals but the full range of
practices, institutions, policies, and suchlike that, I’ve argued, count as racially oppressive”
(2004, 122).
 1 INTRODUCTION  23

gories and mechanisms of white supremacy: racial injustice, racial

dehumanization, and racial viciousness. Each paradigm of racial oppres-
sion is objectionable in its own right, independent of its link to racial
oppression. For example, one does not need to show that an instance of
racial viciousness is a contributing cause of racial oppression in order to
properly condemn it. Nonetheless, each paradigm’s characteristic connec-
tion to racial oppression, and not just its morally objectionable status,
makes it criterial for racial oppression. Stated differently, I propose three
distinct definitions which collectively constitute the driving causes and
objectionable core of racist oppression.
What these three constitutive elements of racial oppression define for
us is a condition of vulnerability. If racism is racial oppression, then racism
involves a social relation: the oppressor who oppresses the oppressed.
This is a relation of domination and subjugation. Hence it is possible to
analyze each relata. The domination/subjugation relation produces a
condition of vulnerability for racism’s historical victims: racialized sub-
jects are disposed to the vicious deeds of others, dehumanization and
unjust treatment. For racism’s beneficiaries, this relation produces a con-
dition of access to opportunity, humanization and unearned advantage.
Because this way of organizing a society is unfair—since some suffer
undeservedly while others benefit undeservedly from that suffering—­
racism (racial oppression) is first and foremost morally objectionable on
grounds of racial injustice.
Clearly much more needs to be said in elaborating my oppression
approach to racism. Although I will have some more to say about it in
Part III, I do not develop a fleshed out account of racial oppression in this
book. For example, I leave the notion of “contributing cause” of racial
oppression unanalyzed. My reason for this is that I have my work cut out
for me as things stand. Before I can turn to the task of debating the nature
of racism with my philosophical colleagues, I must first explain to them
why I reject many of their starting presuppositions. My central aim in this
book is to insist that philosophers of race re-examine and re-define their
approach to the theory of racism—for example, to focus on what racism
ought to be rather than “what racism is.”
Part of this involves theorizing conceptual disagreement. Scholars of
racism are (wittingly or unwittingly) engaged in articulating pictures of rac-
ism that have moral and sociopolitical implications, that uphold some val-
ues over others. These values may or may not be consonant with an
antiracist agenda. Competing pictures of racism should not be self-serving.
24  A. G. URQUIDEZ

I hope that my own account speaks to the real need for the term “racism.”
There is a logic to normative argumentation, even if that logic starts from
fundamental values. We need to reclaim the concept of racism because it is,
and has been, under attack; because the term “racism” is highly overused;
and because the concept is often hijacked for political gain at the expense of
the interests of people of color for whom the concept ought to be deployed.
Defining “racism” from the victim’s perspective means that we must
squarely identify the oppressor group: white people. This doesn’t mean
that all white people intend to oppress, but that they often contribute to
racism (often unconsciously) and that whites contribute insofar as they
belong to the class of people that Charles Mills calls “white beneficiaries”
of racism, regardless of their intentions and motives.18
I presume that the community of philosophers that I engage in con-
versation about how best to define “racism” is a community of antiracist
scholars with whom fruitful discussion on the matter can be made. I also
presume that the arguments we present to one another are generally given
in good faith. I take this to be a condition that makes entering into rational
philosophical debate possible, valuable, and resolvable (see Chap. 5). The
task of defining “racism,” in my view, is dialectical and dialogical, an issue
of metalinguistic negotiation, but also of social criticism, as I explain below.

1.4   A Normative-Pragmatic Pluralism

The final debate I want to touch on in these prefatory remarks is the dis-
pute over how many racisms there are. Here we need to distinguish the
claim that racism has plural manifestations from the claim that there are
several racisms. Let us call the latter ontological pluralism. Every theorist
acknowledges what Lawrence Blum calls the categorial plurality of racism.
This is the fact that “racism” is properly applied to several categories of
entity: persons, attitudes, behavior, institutions, and so on. Racism’s plural
manifestations lead some scholars to conclude that no single definition of
“racism” can accommodate all the categories it applies to. Hence the ques-
tion arises whether there is a single racism (the nature of which can be
expressed in a single definition), or whether there are several such racisms.
The ontological monist contends that there is exactly one racism, which
ranges over every applicable category of entity, while the ontological plural-
ist contends that there are several racisms, none of which ranges over every
applicable category of entity.

18
 Mills (1997, 11).
 1 INTRODUCTION  25

1.4.1  Trading in Ontology for Pragmatism

Where does my account of racism fit into the monist-pluralist debate? The
account I defend is morally monistic, for I claim that racism’s fundamental
badness consists in one thing; racism is, for me, a certain kind of injustice.
However, my account is neither ontologically monistic nor ontologically
pluralistic. For the ontological framing of this dispute rests on conceptual
confusion. The terms “racism” and “racist” are applied to many kinds of
thing, but it does not follow that racism is a kind of thing. I argue that
there is no such thing or kind as racism itself. In making this argument I
draw directly from Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Definitions of
“racism,” in my view, are not descriptions of anything. Hence they are not
descriptions of racism. According to Wittgenstein, a definition is the
expression of a grammatical rule. The definition “Racism is racial oppres-
sion” does not describe the world. Instead, it provides a rule for represent-
ing phenomena in the world. It is a rule for representing phenomena
as racist.
Definitions of “racism” are rules of moral representation. Rules of rep-
resentation, for Wittgenstein, are analogous to the rules of a game. “The
king moves one square at a time” is not a description of reality. To be sure,
it is properly called the “description of a game,” but this simply pushes the
question back: What does it mean to describe a practice or activity?
Contrast descriptions of the game of chess with the following descriptions
of chess: “He made a terrible move; it is only a matter of time until he
loses the game.” “He castled at just the right moment.” These are what
we normally call “descriptions of chess.” To describe chess is to describe
something that happened, a temporally extended phenomenon that might
have been otherwise. Genuine descriptions of chess are descriptions of a
game in play (or a game that has been/will be played). By contrast, to
describe the practice of chess as such is not to describe a game in play, but
to provide the rules of chess. But Wittgenstein urges us to look at what we
do with words. Hence if we wish to understand what it means to talk
about “a description of practice,” we must look to what we do with this
expression. So what is it exactly that we do with the sentence “The king
moves one square at a time”? We use it to provide a rule for the use of the
word “king” in chess. But what is the function of a rule?
Rules, unlike descriptions, are standards of correctness. “The king
moves one square at a time” is used to correct misuses of certain pieces in
the game, and it is used to teach someone how to move certain pieces in
26  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the game. Rules, in other words, govern and guide behavior; they deter-
mine permissible and impermissible moves in a practice; they determine
obligations and prohibitions; and so forth. Rules are essentially normative,
action-guiding. The rules of chess are constitutive of the game of chess.
These constitutive rules make the game possible. Rules are conventions,
which are the building blocks of practices, institutions, and cultures.
My contention is that definitions of “racism” are analogous to the rules
of chess in that they are standards of correctness. To define a practice is not
to describe reality, but to prescribe reality. It is to lay down a rule of repre-
sentation, a rule for the correct use of a term. Defining “racism” is an
intrinsically normative endeavor. What is the upshot of this argument for
the theoretical task of defining “racism”? Does the philosopher state the
existing representational practice or does she instead construct the norma-
tively correct practice?
Is the goal of theory to describe what the existing representational prac-
tice is? Or is the goal of theory to prescribe what the practice ought to be?
As I argue in Part II, the goal of theory is to prescribe reality rather than
just describe it (this makes our philosophical task an ameliorative analysis).
My argument for this can be crudely sketched as follows. The concept of
racism is constituted by incompatible definitional norms. Hence we can-
not hope to resolve existing disagreement about racism by reference to
existing linguistic practice. For to appeal to existing linguistic practice is to
leave the disagreement where it is (at an impasse). Hence theory must
move beyond describing the current state of definitional disagreement to
prescribing what the definitional norm ought to be.
The goal of philosophical theory is normative rather than ontological,
and prescriptive rather than descriptive. The warrant it must ultimately
attain is pragmatic rather than epistemic. The goal is not to define “what
racism is” in the ontological sense (for there is no “racism-as-it-is-in-itself”
to discover), but to define “what racism is” in the normative sense of
­providing a rule for correctly applying the word “racism.” Our project
aims to define how the word ought to be used for purposes of moral rep-
resentation. (The expressions “what racism is” and “what racism ought to
be” are synonymous in our ameliorative context.) This approach is prag-
matic because the argument for privileging one competing definition over
its rivals is that it is more useful for attaining the valued moral-­
representational end. The theorist must, therefore, articulate the value of
racist representation; she must answer the question, “What is the point of
 1 INTRODUCTION  27

representing things as racist?” In addition, the theorist must explain why

her favored definition better meets this value than rival alternatives.
My critique of the metaphysical approach to racism is developed in
Chaps. 2 and 3. A significant upshot of my pragmatic approach is that it is
mistaken to think that the natural and social sciences disclose racism’s
essence to us. (Hence I take issue with semantic externalism in Chap. 4.)
Talk about “what racism is” remains within language (a representational
norm) and does not exit language. The philosopher’s question “What is
racism?” may not be equivalent to the question “How is the word ‘racism’
used?,” but it surely is equivalent to the question “How should the word
‘racism’ be used?” A Wittgensteinian approach to prescriptive grammar
starts from the presupposition that grammar is arbitrary in that it is not
responsible to reality. Definitions are rules that we lay down in order to
make our language-­games possible, and we are free to decide which gram-
matical conventions to lay down. I thus call my Wittgenstein-inspired
approach to the theory of racism conventionalism. One important tenet of
conventionalism is that grammar is arbitrary and hence open to revision.
If grammar is arbitrary, what is the role of empirical considerations?
First, empirical considerations matter to the theory of racism, not as epis-
temic reasons that make some definitions true and others false; they matter
as pragmatic reasons that make some definitions good and others bad to
have. In other words, empirical considerations are pragmatic rather than
epistemic considerations. Second, empirical considerations matter to the
theory of racism because racism ought to be conceived as a sociocultural
phenomenon, an unfolding process. That is, we care about incorporating
new information about racial phenomena into our theory of racism. For
instance, the discovery of implicit racial bias is significant to the theorist of
racism who values social justice and racial equality, because implicit bias is
a potential impediment to achieving racial justice. New scientific informa-
tion, in conjunction with certain values, prompts theory to ask whether
the concept of racism should be extended to cover the new phenomenon.
This is a pragmatic logic rather than an epistemic one. Extending the con-
cept of racism to cover implicit racial bias would exhibit the “unfolding”
of the concept; it would exhibit the sense in which racism is a “process”:
namely, this scientific discovery prompts the collective question of whether
to extend the concept. So although grammar is arbitrary in the sense that
it is up to us, we for good reason allow ourselves to be guided by new
information in updating sociocultural concepts.
28  A. G. URQUIDEZ

1.4.2  Rethinking the Categorial Plurality of Racism

My pragmatic pluralism provides an alternative framing of the problem of
accommodating the categorial plurality of racism. The philosophical task
before us is no longer one of identifying racism’s fundamental location
(the most basic category of entity to which racism belongs). For we have
said that, on conventionalism, definitions of “racism” are not descriptions
of an object, but expressions of rules. Stated differently, the word “racism”
in the sentence “Racism is racial hatred” is not the name of an object; it
does not name, for example, a psychological phenomenon (something “in
the head” or “in the mind”). For the sentence is not used to describe the
world, but to provide a rule for representing things (as racist) in the world.
What is more, the issue of whether there is one racism or several is also
rejected as confused. To be sure, we can ask whether a unified account of
racism is possible; whether it is possible to come up with a definition that
accommodates the whole of what is called “racism” and “racist.” However,
positing a univocal account of the ordinary usage of “racism” and “racist”
is very different from positing a univocal account of racism itself, where
the latter is thought to be some language-independent object or kind.
Conventionalism is consistent with a univocal account of ordinary usage,
but not with a metaphysical account of racism itself (for there is no such
thing as racism itself, on conventionalism). Conventionalism denies that it
makes sense to talk about racism, independent of how the terms “racism”
and “racist” are used, so it also denies that there is exactly one (or two or
three or…) such racism(s).
Conventionalism, we have seen, dissolves the metaphysical framing of
the location problem. The theorist of racism no longer need worry about
how many racisms there are and where they are fundamentally located (is
racism a kind of attitude, behavior, practice, etc.). Yet, after this confusion
has been dissolved, the theorist still needs to determine which conception
of racism is the prescriptively correct one. I propose that racism be con-
ceived in functionalist terms. By a functionalist account of racism, I mean
what Luc Faucher and Jorge Garcia call “output-based” and “input-
based” accounts of racism. Whereas the latter defines “racism” in terms of
a certain cause, the former defines “racism” in terms of a certain effect.
Racial oppression is an effect that emerges from a multiplicity of causes,
and so what makes racial oppression racist has more to do with this unjust
effect than with the nature of any one particular cause. By defining “rac-
ism” as racial oppression, different categories of entity are viewed instru-
 1 INTRODUCTION  29

mentally, as causally related to racial oppression. In this way, various

categories of entity are or become infected with racism in virtue of their
social role of causing, sustaining, or perpetuating racial oppression. The
most significant of these are instances of racial viciousness, racial dehu-
manization and, above all, racial injustice.
Tommy Curry has recently proposed viewing racism in a functionalist
way, in his award-winning book, The Man-Not.19 I briefly discuss his defi-
nition of “racism” in Chap. 9. Racism, in his view, is a kind of group vul-
nerability. His account is thus consistent with my contention that racism is
a kind of vulnerability, conceived in relational terms. My normative-­
pragmatic argument is also consistent with some recent attempts to align
the discussion of racism with what Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin calls the
“pragmatic aim” for the philosophical theory of racism. This aim, he
explains, is to theorize racism in a way that contributes to the goal of
eliminating or at least mitigating racism.20 Leonard Harris had already
provided a defense of this contention in his 1998 article, “The Concept of
Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept.”21 The stipulation that a the-
ory of racism have practical significance is an a priori posit that reflects the
value and point of having the terms “racism” and “racist” in the lexicon.
The reason why we need these terms is that victims of racial oppression
find it absolutely necessary to criticize forms of racial domination and
white privilege, which contribute to the subjugation of nonwhites. The
language-games we play with these words are practices we cannot afford
to give up.

1.4.3  Beyond Wittgenstein: From Descriptive

to Prescriptive Grammar
This book is an exercise in applied Wittgensteinian philosophy. It is not an
attempt to vindicate Wittgenstein’s work per se, though it does attempt to
justify the application of Wittgensteinian philosophy of language to axiol-
ogy, or what I call normative philosophy. I attempt a reconstruction of his
philosophy of language in the first two chapters, though always with an
eye toward issues in the theory of racism.

19
 Curry (2017).
20
 Mitchell-Yellin (2018, 57).
21
 Harris (1998). I assess his argument in Chap. 3.
30  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Giving each side of the necessity/contingency divide its proper due has
been the most demanding intellectual challenge that I faced in writing it,
and I am not certain that I have always succeeded. So I can only echo
Wittgenstein in lamenting this fact, which the careful reader will surely
recognize as a leitmotif of my monograph: “Not empiricism and yet real-
ism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing.”22
The reader may find it helpful to know the author’s source of inspira-
tion for this monograph, which grew out of a certain tension as I grappled
with Wittgenstein’s later work, principally his Philosophical Investigations.23
Unpacking this tension will perhaps help explain some of the peculiarities
of my monograph.
The tensions I’ve had in writing this book are the precipitate deposits
of an earlier tension. Those of us (those few of us) who draw inspiration
from Wittgenstein’s work in normative philosophy feel, on the one hand,
the pull of Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophy is a purely descriptive
practice. Having felt this pull myself, I believe it to be extremely useful in
dissolving (certain kinds of) conceptual confusion. Thus I echo
Wittgenstein in affirming that many philosophical problems are “deep dis-
quietudes,” as he called them—by which he meant functions of linguistic
misunderstandings. Yet, I have always felt, as other Wittgensteinians have,
that some philosophical problems involve more than this. I have in mind
here the pressing practical concerns that coalesce in what philosophers call
normative concepts (moral, social, and political concepts). The resolution
of this tension can be stated thus: Wittgenstein was right about certain
philosophical problems being the expressions of conceptual confusion,
but wrong about this being the case for everything that is called “philo-
sophical problem.” He thought that all philosophical questions betray
confusion—and was wrong about this, for only some do.
With this background in place, the knot I have struggled to untie is
this: How can it be that our grasp of the concept of racism both is and is
not a deep disquietude? That is, how can it be that the philosophical prob-
lem—“What is racism?”—is a function of conceptual confusion, on the
one hand, and not a function of conceptual confusion, on the other? How
can it be a legitimate question and a confused one, simultaneously? This
sums up my puzzlement.

22
 Wittgenstein (1983, p. 325 / Part VI, 23).
23
 Wittgenstein (2009).
 1 INTRODUCTION  31

Philosophically, part of the problem with the concept of racism is that

we don’t have a clear understanding of its grammar. What is lacking is an
overview, a surveyable representation, of the concept. However, another
part of the problem—and the much more important part of the problem,
in my way of thinking—is a distinctly normative difficulty: one that calls
for a decision about how the term “racism” ought to be used. I have dis-
cussed this two-tiered problem, above, so my remarks here will be brief.
Within the philosophical theory of racism there is much misunder-
standing about the special difficulties that the concept of racism poses, and
this creates a cloud of confusion surrounding the kind of inquiry needed
to solve the problem of definition. This is why I think some Wittgensteinian
analysis—“Philosophy leaves everything where it is”24—is called for. For
by leaving the grammar of “racism” and “racist” where it is, perspicuous
descriptions of said grammar can reveal, among other things, the heavy
contestation of the concept, along with the incompatible norms that partly
constitute it. I claim in this book that once the descriptive task is over—
once we have cleared away the dustbins of confusion (increasingly exacer-
bated by contemporary theory)25—what is brought into clear view is the
task that lies before us. That task, as theorists-driven-by-certain-political-­
values, is one of making prescriptive determinations about how the term “rac-
ism” ought to be used. In other words, what is rendered perspicuous is that the
question “What is racism?” is not a metaphysical question about an ontologi-
cal nature: an essence given independent of our linguistic practices and
moral values. Rather, what this question is about is how the word “racism”
ought to be used: a norm given by the values and interests that inform the
legitimate use of this term. Moreover, and more importantly, Wittgensteinian
therapy reveals that theorists of racism sometimes hide behind a veil of ontol-
ogy. They do this whenever they pretend their theories of racism are mere
descriptions that are neutral on controversial normative matters, so that it is
unnecessary for them to enter the political space of conceptual contestation.
A philosophy that “leaves everything where it is” can take us some dis-
tance; we can achieve clarity about the normative challenges facing theory.

24
 Wittgenstein (2009, §124).
25
 I do not claim to dissolve all or even most conceptual confusions surrounding the con-
cept of racism. Nor do I claim to provide a surveyable representation of the concept of rac-
ism, as that would be a purely descriptive task (e.g., to show that racism is a focal concept
rather than a family resemblance concept) and my interest in the concept is primarily pre-
scriptive. Most of the conceptual confusions that are discussed in this book are those related
to the problem of how best to conceptualize a moral-philosophical approach to racism.
32  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Having done so, it will have run its course and no longer prove useful
beyond this limit. For prescriptive theory involves prescriptive judgment.
In the context of choosing the best or most appropriate definition, the
decision called for assumes the form of a “should” claim. This, in turn,
seems to call for prescriptive analysis of the kind Haslanger describes as
“ameliorative analysis” (or what others call “conceptual engineering”).26
Philosophy, then, should leave the concept of racism where it is when
it is tasked with the goal of clearing away confusions that are rooted in
linguistic misunderstanding. And part of this is what is going on in the
theory of racism, or so I argue in the first three chapters of this book.
But once the confusion is cleared up, we see perspicuously what it is we
have been trying to ask all along in repeatedly stating to ourselves, “But
what is racism, really?” Any Wittgensteinian philosopher who says it is
confused to ask this question (because of linguistic misunderstandings)
will not, cannot, be taken seriously. There is a substantive problem here,
one that does not dissolve with the dissolution of our confusions. But the
Wittgensteinian too is right that conceptual clarity (the clearing away of
confusions rooted in linguistic misunderstandings) can help us see what this
problem amounts to. Conceptual clarity reveals the work that remains to
be done: prescriptive decision-making about how best to articulate the
concept of racism. In Chap. 5, I call the nature of prescriptive disagree-
ment about racism “metalinguistic negotiation.” The meaning of racism
is a negotiation in the sense that it is up to us, as individuals and as a
linguistic community, to set the limits on this term.

1.5   Chapter Summaries

The book comprises nine chapters, divided into three parts. Part I: Racism
Without Ontology (Chaps. 2, 3, and 4) articulates Wittgenstein’s picture of
language, his semantic account of grammar and meaning, and other
important notions in his philosophy of language.
Chapter 2, “Introduction: Toward a Conventionalist Framework,”
explains the significance of later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language for
analyzing racism. It begins with a discussion of three approaches to the
question “What is racism?”: metaphysical, descriptive, and prescriptive anal-
ysis. It then turns to the metaphysical approach, which currently dominates
philosophical theorizing about racism. Scholars that in many respects

26
 Haslanger (2012). I briefly discuss her approach in Chap. 1.
 1 INTRODUCTION  33

advance vastly different conceptions of racism—for example, Leonard

Harris, Clevis Headley, Tommie Shelby, and Jorge Garcia—all take the
metaphysical approach for granted. For the metaphysician, the meaning of
“racism” is the object which this word stands for, and a definition of “rac-
ism” is an ontological description of this object. I call these presuppositions
into doubt. The bulk of the chapter lays out and defends an alternative set of
presuppositions, rooted in Wittgenstein’s conventionalist picture of lan-
guage, grammar, and meaning. My chief conclusion is that an explanation
of racism is not the description of an ontological reality but the expression
of a rule of representation. The upshot is that the problem of defining “rac-
ism” need not be construed as a debate about an ontological nature. It can
instead be construed as a debate about determining the most normatively
defensible representational practice.
Chapter 3, “Re-defining ‘Definition’: An Argument for Conventionalism,”
builds on my Wittgensteinian contention that the meaning of “racism” is its
use, when it is used in accordance with the rules for its proper use. I argue
that this conventionalist picture of meaning best accounts for two sets of
seemingly incompatible intuitions in the theory of racism. Definitions of
“racism,” like definitions generally, have contingent and necessary features.
Some theorists stress the contingent side of definition: the word “racism”
had an origin in time; the term was invented to serve specific purposes; and
its meaning has been modified over time. Others, by contrast, stress the
necessary side of definition: racism is a racial phenomenon; and racism is
always wrong. Some of racism’s contingent and necessary features can seem
incompatible given further assumptions. For instance, if the meaning of
“racism” evolves, then it seems false that racism has an essential nature.
Because there are oppositional pressures originating from each side of this
conceptual divide, it can seem incoherent to theorize racism from both a
priori and a posteriori perspectives. This has led some philosophers to pick
one side over the other; hence, it has been a source of contestation among
theorists of racism. However, I maintain that there is truth in both sets of
intuitions, for each describes different aspects of linguistic convention. After
reconciling these intuitions under the banner of conventionalism, I go on to
dissolve conceptual confusion in Clevis Headley’s constructivist and
Leonard Harris’ realist approaches to racism.27 I ultimately conclude that

27
 In addition to characterizing his approach as “constructivist,” Headley (2000) variously
describes his approach as “empirical,” “sociocultural,” “naturalistic,” and “institutionalist.”
Harris (1998), by contrast, describes his own approach as “objectivist” and “realist.”
34  A. G. URQUIDEZ

empirical and a priori approaches to racism are compatible when prop-

erly regarded.
Chapter 4, “Re-defining Meaning: Defending Semantic Internalism
over Externalism,” considers the objection that conventionalism’s picture
of meaning is predicated on a debunked Wittgensteinian semantics. It
thus considers the dominant approach to semantics in the philosophy of
language, semantic externalism. This approach holds that the meaning of
a referring expression (a kind term) is the kind to which it refers, where a
kind is a language-independent essence. The essence of a kind term is
thought to be the “internal nature” of the objects falling under its exten-
sion. Moreover, this internal nature is thought to be discoverable by the
relevant science. Wittgenstein’s conventionalism, by contrast, provides an
internalist rather than an externalist semantics, because it posits that gram-
mar is arbitrary (a matter of convention) and thus not responsible to the
facts. If this is correct, then there is no essence of racism for science to
discover. I argue that Kripke and Putnam’s seminal arguments for exter-
nalism can be used to support conventionalism; hence they do not dem-
onstrate the plausibility of externalist semantics over internalist semantics.
I conclude that Wittgensteinian semantics should not be rejected on the
basis of standard arguments for externalism.
Part II: Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement (Chaps. 5 and 6) explores
the nature of philosophical disagreement about the concept of racism, in
light of Wittgensteinian semantics.
Chapter 5, “Re-defining ‘Disagreement’: Rationality Without Final
Solutions,” challenges the widespread assumption that disagreement
about the nature of racism is disagreement about a matter of fact. This
assumption is surely false if conventionalism provides the correct picture
of meaning and definition. On conventionalism, disagreement about the
correct definition of “racism” is disagreement about a norm. That is, dis-
putes about “what racism is” are part of an ongoing process of “metalin-
guistic negotiation.” The object of this negotiation is a norm, a
representational practice. And the method of negotiation consists of prag-
matic advocacy in support of a picture about what the term “racism”
ought to mean. I also defend, at some length, the contention that meta-
linguistic negotiations can be rational.
Chapter 6, “Re-defining ‘Philosophical Analysis’: Not Descriptive
Analysis, or Conservatism, but Pragmatic Revisionism,” considers the
question “How should the word ‘racism’ be used?” I argue that answering
this question requires that philosophical theory start from a substantive
 1 INTRODUCTION  35

value. One such value has been explicitly proposed by some and widely
presupposed by others. This is the norm that commonsense thinking
about racism must be preserved by an adequate philosophical definition of
“racism.” I call this the presumption of conservatism. I develop a framework
for assessing this presumption and consider the work of Lawrence Blum,
Joshua Glasgow, Jorge Garcia, Tommie Shelby, and others. I conclude
that the moral status of ordinary usage is problematic, because, among
other things, it reflects an individualistic conception of racism that serves
white interests. Therefore, prescriptive theory ought to adopt a pragmatic
revisionist approach to racism. Such an approach is one that aims at defin-
ing “racism” to meet a particular purpose, accepting along the way, where
necessary, substantive revisions and extensions of ordinary usage.
Part III: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Racism (Chaps. 7, 8, and 9)
develops a normative-pragmatic framework for articulating a moralist the-
ory of racism, predicated on Wittgensteinian semantics.
Chapter 7, “Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive Theory of Racism:
Toward an Oppression-Centered Account,” articulates criteria for a pre-
scriptive theory of racism and introduces an oppression-centered theory of
racism. I propose three adequacy criteria. First, prescriptive theory ought
to accommodate usage of “racism” that corresponds to the legitimate
need we have for the convention. Second, the explanatory condition holds
that a theory of “racism” should seek to explain one form of racism in
terms of more basic forms, viz. those that most closely meet the need for
the convention. Third, a theory of racism should, as much as possible,
resolve practical problems prompted by ordinary usage of “racism,” and
should avoid generating any practical problems of its own. My case for
defining “racism” as racial oppression is made by reference to these three
criteria. Along the way, I repudiate Tommie Shelby and Charles Mills’
arguments against moralist accounts of racism and draw from my oppres-
sion theory to illustrate how it might be used to show that implicit racial
bias and white privilege are racist phenomena.
Chapter 8, “Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique
of Jorge Garcia on Racist Belief,” assesses the most influential recent
­theory of racism—Jorge Garcia’s volitional account—in light of the crite-
ria articulated in the previous chapter. My central criticism, developed
throughout the chapter, is that the term “racist belief” has at least four
meanings relative to four distinct contexts of application. Three of these
four uses escape Garcia’s volitional analysis. What is more, all of these uses,
including Garcia’s volitional use, correspond to a contributing cause of
36  A. G. URQUIDEZ

racial oppression. Consequently, I conclude that my oppression approach

to racism better accommodates ordinary usage of “racist belief” than does
Garcia’s analysis. As my argument unfolds, I develop a pragmatic case for
retaining each kind of racist belief, including a novel theory of intrinsically
racist belief.
Chapter 9, “Coda,” closes with a brief summary of the main conclu-
sions of the book. It points to avenues for further research and adds some
additional details to my prescriptive proposal that racism is (should be
defined as) racial oppression.

References
Appiah, K. Anthony. 1990. Racisms. In Anatomy of Racism, ed. David T. Goldberg.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race.
Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Boxill, Bernard. 1992. Blacks and Social Justice. Rev. ed. Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield.
Corlett, J.  Angelo. 2003. Race, Racism & Reparations. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Curry, Tommy J. 2017. The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre and the Dilemmas of
Black Manhood. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Dummett, Michael. 2004. The Nature of Racism. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael
P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 27–34. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Garcia, Jorge L.A. 1996. The Heart of Racism. Journal of Social Philosophy 27:
5–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00225.x.
Gordon, Lewis R. 1995. Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism. Atlantic Highlands:
Humanities Press International.
Harris, Leonard. 1998. The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested
Concept? The Centennial Review XLII (2): 217–232.
Haslanger, Sally. 2004. Oppressions: Racial and Other. In Racism in Mind, ed.
Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 97–123. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
———. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Headley, Clevis. 2000. Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the
Individualist Perspective. Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (Summer): 223–257.
https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00043.
Jones, Richard A. 2013. The Black Book: Wittgenstein and Race. Lanham:
University Press of America.
 1 INTRODUCTION  37

Locke, Alain L. 1991. Values and Imperatives. In The Philosophy of Alain Locke:
Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris, 31–50. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Mills, Charles W. 1997. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
———. 2003. ‘Heart Attack’: A Critique of Jorge Garcia’s Volitional Conception
of Racism. The Journal of Ethics 7 (1): 29–62. Special Issue: “Race, Racism, and
Reparations”.
Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin. 2018. A View of Racism: 2016 and America’s Original
Sin. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1). https://doi.org/10.26556/
jesp.v13i1.253.
Putnam, Hilary. 2004. Ethics without Ontology. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Shelby, Tommie. 2016. Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform. Cambridge:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1983. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Rev ed.,
ed. Georg H. von Wright and Gertrude E.M. Anscombe and trans. Gertrude
E.M. Anscombe. Cambridge: MIT Press.
———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Abbreviated PI.
 PART I

Racism Without Ontology

 CHAPTER 2

The Problem of Definition: Toward a

Conventionalist Framework

2.1   Introduction: On the Question

“What Is Racism?”
2.1.1  The Philosophical Question
The problem of definition, of defining the word “racism,” is succinctly
­captured in the question “What is racism?” Unsurprisingly, philosophers
disagree about how to answer it. Disagreement is so prevalent that Tommie
Shelby posits the following “second-order question”: How should first-­
order disputes about the meaning of the terms “racism,” “racist,” and
other cognates be resolved? “[W]hat must be established to demonstrate
the correctness or superiority of a particular account of racism.”1 What,
in other words, constitutes proper methodology with respect to theoriz-
ing racism? In this first chapter, and the next, I begin to reflect on these
questions.
The form of words “What is racism?” can be used to express differ-
ent questions. Consider the question of the linguistic novice or non-
competent user of the term “racism.” Think, for example, of the child
who puts this question to her parent. In language-learning context
what the child requests is an everyday explanation, or a set of such
explanations, for applying the word “racism” correctly. An everyday

1
 Shelby (2014, 58).

© The Author(s) 2020 41

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_2
42  A. G. URQUIDEZ

explanation is one that specifies what, on conventional usage, can and

cannot be called “racism”—that is, the conditions or criteria for cor-
rectly applying the term in one’s linguistic community. Everyday par-
lance permits the gloss that the child acquires the requisite knowledge
of racism when she masters the application of the term in accordance
with conventional norms.
Prevailing trends in the philosophy of language would caution against
this everyday wisdom. For they would argue that the kind of knowledge
one acquires through education and the mastery of linguistic techniques—
namely, the ability to participate in the various language-games we play
with the word “racism”—is not, first and foremost, knowledge of the phe-
nomenon of racism, but of a linguistic convention. In other words, these
philosophers believe that knowledge of the word “racism” must be distin-
guished from knowledge of racism itself. The child who knows how to use
the term “racism” knows what it conventionally refers to; however, it is a
further question whether what the term conventionally refers to is the
phenomenon of racism. Or, to articulate the worry in semantic terms: it is
a further question whether the true meaning of “racism” is to be identified
with the conventional meaning of “racism.” I call this the skeptical worry.
The skeptical worry is premised on the idea that questions about ontol-
ogy (“What is racism?”) and questions about language (“How is the word
‘racism’ used?”) are clearly distinct and that, consequently, the relation-
ship between them is in need of investigation. In particular, whether the
nature of racism is fully (or even partly) expressed in everyday usage of the
term “racism” needs to be established. For it might turn out that everyday
usage is mistaken. As Shelby worries in his well-known critique of Jorge
Garcia: “But ordinary usage, no matter how broad or entrenched, is not
morally infallible. There are many condemnatory thick concepts that have
dubious moral content (e.g., ‘fornication,’ ‘slut,’ ‘shack up,’ ‘fag,’ even
‘nigger’). …[I]t simply is not reasonable to allow ordinary usage to deter-
mine substantive moral questions.”2 Shelby is advancing the normative
judgment that philosophers should not resolve substantive moral ques-
tions by reference to ordinary usage. However, as will be shown below, his
normative judgment is grounded in a metaphysical assumption: that con-
ventional usage of the term “racism” might not track the true meaning of
this term, which is determined by the real nature of racism.

2
 Shelby (2002, 412).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  43

When the philosopher asks “What is racism?” clearly she is not asking
the child’s question, for although the child and the philosopher’s ques-
tions are identical in sentential form, the questions expressed in each
instance are different. Each question, for example, springs from a differ-
ent set of needs or concerns. The child, when she masters the conven-
tional meaning of “racism,” acquires the capacity of linguistic
competency—the ability to form meaningful sentences with the word
“racism,” to understand other people’s application of the term, and to
think and converse intelligibly with others about (what is called) racism.
But this is not what the philosopher masters or hopes to master in finding
an adequate answer to the question, “What is racism?” For one thing, the
philosopher who raises this question already has such abilities and raises
it in the face of having them. For another, the possibility of raising the
philosophical question presupposes linguistic mastery over the use of the
word “racism.”
What, then, does the philosopher hope to gain by asking “What is
racism?”? The answer will largely depend on the context in which the
question is raised and the purpose for raising it. One problem that
prompts the question is vast disagreement about what racism is in moral
and sociopolitical discourse. Philosophers of racism have largely focused
on this context, and not without reason. The aim of moral-philosophical
analysis is to articulate a definition of “racism” that is well suited for
purposes of moral representation. This presupposes that “racism” is a
moral term, a term of moral criticism. This differentiates it from subjec-
tive terms, like “gross,” which fail to carry normative weight. If some-
thing is called  racist, the normative valence invoked is not a mere
subjective disapproval. The normative valence of “racism” (its critical
function) also should be distinguished from the valence of “bad,” and
similar such notions, which are critical, but not in the way “racism” is.
To complain that something is bad, in many circumstances, is not to
appeal to a ground for correction (“He’s dressed badly”). Other exam-
ples include terms like “fat” and “colored person.” These terms
often have negative connotations, but they are not critical terms per se.
If something is racist, however, then what is wrong is essentially objec-
tionable and stands in need of correction. The critical aspect of “rac-
ism,” in other words, belongs to its meaning, to the essence of how we
use it. The question for theory thus becomes: How can the term “rac-
44  A. G. URQUIDEZ

ism” be defined, so as to meet our need for moral criticism, in the face
of disagreement about what it means in normative contexts? This is what
I call “the moral context,” which is the focus of this book.
One approach to the question “What is racism?” has it that it should be
settled by reference to the fact of the matter—the nature of racism itself.
Below, I call this a metaphysical approach to the philosophical question.
The main goal of this chapter, and the next, is to challenge this approach
by undermining one of its central presuppositions. In Part I, I argue that
what the philosopher hopes to gain by raising the question “What is rac-
ism?” is a theory and definition of the word “racism” which is useful for
certain practical ends. The philosophical question is internally related to a
set of challenges, and the relation is such that answering it is tantamount
to proposing something of a solution to them in the form of an explana-
tion or definition. I do not claim that the practical challenges I discuss in
later chapters (e.g., the problems of overusage and moral disagreement)
are the only ones posed by the philosophical question. For outside the
moral context I am interested in there may be other theoretical problems
and endeavors connected with it. For instance, social scientists might
debate the nature of racism for purposes of explaining certain social phe-
nomena. In such a context, the moral problems that interest me are
unlikely to be salient, for the aim of defining “racism” for social scientific
purposes may be far removed from moralist concerns, such as the problem
of moral disagreement. Scholars concerned with these issues may have 
little reason to worry about how everyday folk use the term to meet
their purposes.
Manuel Vargas believes it is important to distinguish three different
approaches to conceptual analysis: metaphysical, diagnostic, and prescrip-
tive.3 Vargas uses the concept of responsibility to illustrate:

One question is what we might call metaphysical in the broad sense: ‘What
is the nature of responsibility?’ Other questions include [the diagnostic
question]: ‘What do we think about responsibility?’ and [the prescriptive
question:] ‘What should we think about responsibility?’ In principle, we
might offer different answers to each of these questions, although they will
presumably overlap in various ways.

3
 Vargas (2005, 402).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  45

Vargas’ three approaches to philosophical analysis roughly map on to

Sally Haslanger’s (despite her use of different terminology). She writes:
“There are at least three common ways to answer ‘What is W?’ questions:
descriptive, conceptual and ameliorative.”4 I explain each of these, in turn.
One of the major aims of this book is to argue that something like Vargas’
prescriptive question and Haslanger’s ameliorative approach provide the
proper framework for theorizing racism.
On Haslanger’s terminology, conceptual analysis (descriptive analysis,
on my terminology) provides an analysis of our ordinary concept of X,
that is, the prevailing conception of a given community. Some analysts
turn to their own  conceptual intuitions to analyze X; others rely on
“folk” intuitions and turn to empirical methods.5 In either case, an
assumption is made that what is said about X is the source of our concept
of X. Descriptive analysis (metaphysical analysis, on my terminology), by
contrast, provides an analysis of X itself, that is, the object which the
ordinary concept purports to track.6 The difference between conceptual
and descriptive approaches is that the object of descriptive analysis is
X itself, whereas the object of conceptual analysis is the ordinary concept
of X. The third approach—ameliorative analysis—differs from the latter
approaches by being unapologetically normative. Ameliorative analysis
(normative analysis, on my terminology) articulates the concept of X
that is best suited to meet the legitimate goals or purposes for such
a concept.7
As aforementioned, I leave open the possibility that “What is racism?”
might be used to express other philosophical questions. However, for
purposes of this book, I suppose that Vargas and Haslanger provide a
more or less comprehensive analysis of the sentence “What is X?” within
the ­context of philosophical theory. In this book, I use the following

4
 Haslanger (2012, 367).
5
 Haslanger’s conceptual question roughly corresponds to Vargas’ diagnostic question.
The major difference is that, for Vargas, diagnostic analysis is preliminary to prescriptive
analysis. The point of diagnosing ordinary usage is to determine whether it ought to be
conserved or revised.
6
 Haslanger’s descriptive question corresponds to Vargas’ metaphysical question.
7
 Haslanger’s ameliorative question roughly corresponds to Vargas’ prescriptive
question.
46  A. G. URQUIDEZ

terminology in discussing three types of philosophical analysis, each of

which has a distinct conceptual aim8:

Approaches to Conceptual Analysis

1. Metaphysical Analysis. This philosophical project asks what X itself

is—independent of the prevailing concept of X—and may be a
priori or a posteriori; it is a priori if it looks to conceptual intu-
itions alone as the means of disclosing the true nature of this
entity;  it is a posteriori if it looks to scientific disciplines as the
source of true descriptions of this entity (Vargas’ metaphysical
analysis; Haslanger’s descriptive analysis)
2. Descriptive Analysis. This philosophical project asks what our ordi-
nary concept of X is (or what the ordinary meaning of the term “X”
is) (Vargas’ diagnostic analysis; Haslanger’s conceptual analysis9)
3. Prescriptive Analysis. This philosophical project asks what our con-
cept of X ought to be (or what the meaning of the term “X” ought
to be); for instance, the analyst might begin by asking what legiti-
mate purposes we have (if any) for applying the concept X, and
which concept of X works best for achieving said purposes (Vargas’
prescriptive analysis; Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis)10
8
 Philosophers may wonder and disagree about whether these three philosophical method-
ologies should be described as “conceptual analysis.” Frank Jackson’s account of conceptual
analysis, for example, seems to leave no room for normative analysis. For my part, I see no
reason to adopt a narrow view of conceptual analysis. For a defense of this position, see David
Plunkett’s (2011) argument that Jackson’s representationalist conception of “conceptual
analysis” is objectionable for leaving out normative approaches that provide expressivist anal-
yses of normative concepts.
9
 I invoke the term descriptive here in order to remain neutral with respect to the aims of
descriptive analysis. This makes it similar to Haslanger’s use of the term. For instance, in con-
sidering the example, “What is knowledge?” she writes: “Following a conceptual approach,
one is asking: What is our concept of knowledge? and looks to a priori methods such as intro-
spection for an answer. Taking into account intuitions about cases and principles, one hopes
eventually to reach a reflective equilibrium” (2012, 367). I don’ find the term “conceptual”
helpful here, for the term is generally used in reference to all three approaches (and others). I
thus prefer the term “descriptive,” which is more consistent with philosophical usage. See, for
example, Anil Gupta (2015, section 1.4) on “descriptive definitions.”
10
 Haslanger demonstrates her normative approach by providing analyses of race and gen-
der. She prefaces her arguments with a methodological remark: “I’ve cast my inquiry as an
analytical—or what I here call an ameliorative—project that seeks to identify what legitimate
purposes we might have (if any) in categorizing people on the basis of race or gender, and to
develop concepts that would help us achieve these ends” (2012, 366).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  47

A major task of this book is to assess each of these approaches. I ultimately

defend approach 3. Approach 1, metaphysical analysis, is assessed and
rejected in Part I (the first three chapters). Approach 2, descriptive analysis,
is assessed and rejected in Part II (Chaps. 4 and 5). Approach 3, prescrip-
tive analysis, is defended in Parts II and III (Chaps. 6, 7 and 8). I begin,
then, with what I take to be the dominant approach to the philosophical
analysis of racism, viz. metaphysical analysis. My aim in this chapter and the
next is to argue that the approach rests on a dubious ontological presup-
position. To assess it, I offer a Wittgenstein-inspired analysis of some core
concepts in the philosophy of language: definition, meaning, and language.

2.1.2  Metaphysical Analysis
My reason for beginning with an appraisal of metaphysical analysis is that
this seems to be the dominant approach in the philosophy of racism. To
demonstrate this, I will briefly cite textual evidence from some leading
philosophers in the field. These philosophers vehemently disagree about
substantive and methodological questions, but nonetheless agree that
philosophical theorizing about racism is essentially a metaphysical
enterprise.
Consider Tommie Shelby’s depiction of what I call the philosophical
question. “The first question [‘What is racism?’] is conceptual,” he writes.
“The aim is to articulate, as precisely as we can, just what we are, or should
be, referring to when we call something ‘racism.’”11 Taken out of context,
this passage seems initially to speak against a metaphysical interpretation.
For he describes the philosophical question as “conceptual” rather than
metaphysical. Further, his follow-up sentence recognizes descriptive and
prescriptive analyses as legitimate approaches to “What is racism?”—for he
writes that philosophical theory focuses on “what we are, or should be,
referring to when we call something ‘racism’” (my italics). Finally, he
seems to leave out any reference to metaphysical analysis. So is my charac-
terization wrong?
If Shelby were expressing his sympathies for descriptive and prescriptive
analysis in this passage, he would hold that all that is needed to settle the
conceptual question are adequate answers to the descriptive and prescrip-
tive questions. The idea would be that once philosophers have determined
how the term “racism” is and/or ought to be used (how we do and/or

 Shelby (2014, 58).

11
48  A. G. URQUIDEZ

should think about racism), there would be nothing left for metaphysical
analysis to investigate, nothing of significance that might enhance our
understanding of racism’s nature. This reading is only prima facie plausible
if the quotation is taken in isolation. Taken within the broader context of
the passage, things look different.
What the above interpretation ignores is the broader textual context in
which Shelby makes these remarks. It also ignores what he says elsewhere
(which I discuss below). His aim is neither to conflate descriptive and pre-
scriptive approaches to philosophical analysis, nor to suggest that one or
both of these approaches suffice to resolve the philosophical question. His
aim is rather to group these approaches together, as possible ways of
answering the philosophical question, so as to distinguish them from
attempts to settle two different racism-related questions. To place the
above remarks in context, this passage states that there are three funda-
mental questions in the philosophy of racism:

. What is racism?
1
2. What makes racism objectionable?
3. And what is the appropriate practical response to racism?

The first thing to observe here is that Shelby does not use the term
“conceptual question” to contrast with “metaphysical question,” but to
contrast with “non-conceptual questions.” For Shelby, (2) and (3) are
not conceptual but practical questions (the former being a moral ques-
tion, the latter being a political one). Theories that address these ques-
tions, therefore, are normative approaches. In other words, Shelby’s use
of  “conceptual question” assumes a non-committal stance on whether
the conceptual question is metaphysical or not. The point of this pas-
sage is to convey to the reader that standard approaches to philosophi-
cal analysis—metaphysical, descriptive, and prescriptive—are competing
approaches to one and the same question, (1). He is here offering a neu-
tral description of the state of the field, thereby evincing recognition of
several competing approaches to (1).
If the above passage by Shelby reflects his neutral description of
approaches to question (1)—“What is racism?”—the question remains as
to what his own considered position involves. Which of my three
approaches does Shelby himself favor? He seems to favor metaphysical
analysis. For him, definitions of “racism” are ontological assertions. To
defend this claim, I present evidence of Shelby’s considered position. In an
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  49

earlier paper, he states that philosophers should determine the correct ref-
erent of “racism” prior to explaining what makes racism wrong; that is,
philosophers should settle question (1) before moving on to question (2).
This recommendation seems to be predicated on the logical contention
that question (1) logically precedes question (2). In making this point he
seems to endorse metaphysical analysis as the proper approach to “What
is racism?”:

I want to suggest an alternative to both the “thick concept” and “stipula-

tive” approaches, one that takes place in two distinct parts. In the first, we
make use of the behavioral sciences (including psychology and history) to define
the concept of racism in a morally neutral way. Our reconstruction of the
concept should illuminate the history, structure, psychological mechanisms,
and social consequences of the phenomenon. Once we have properly identi-
fied its referent, we can then offer our moral evaluation, but without ante-
cedently assuming that everything that is properly called “racism” on our
theoretical account will turn out to be immoral. (My italics)12

Whereas ordinary usage reflects the prevailing conception of racism, the

behavioral sciences determine the concept of racism. The suggestion thus
seems to be that racism is an ontological entity that exists independent of
the prevailing conception. For example, racism on the ordinary conception
is always wrong, but racism itself might not be, at least not in every instance.
That Shelby favors a metaphysical analysis of racism explains why it is mis-
guided, on his view, to make normative judgments about racism prior to
settling question (1). For the moral status of racism partly depends on what
racism consists in. This further explains why, for Shelby, ordinary usage of
“racism” is not to be trusted. Recall, Shelby was previously quoted (in Sect.
2.1.1) as saying that ordinary usage is not morally infallible. Apparently,
what makes ordinary usage fallible is the possibility of correspondence fail-
ure: the current referent of the word “racism” (as it is ordinarily used)
might not correspond to the metaphysical fact of the matter (i.e., facts
about racism itself). So his claim about the logical priority of question (1)
seems to be motivated by the skeptical worry (the worry that the conven-
tional meaning of “racism” and the true meaning of “racism” might diverge).
Haslanger, who is sympathetic to Shelby’s ideological approach to rac-
ism, has recently endorsed his methodological claim that the “empirical
question” (“What is racism?”) is logically prior to “normative questions”

 Shelby (2002, 413). I removed Shelby’s original italics from this passage.
12
50  A. G. URQUIDEZ

about racism. She thus seems to endorse metaphysical analysis over and
against ameliorative analysis (despite the fact that she endorses ameliorative
analysis for theorizing race).13 Perhaps more surprisingly, Shelby finds allies
among those who reject important aspects of his approach. Jorge Garcia
rejects Shelby’s substantive theory of racism, for, among other things,
Shelby offers a “political morality” analysis of racism, while Garcia offers a
“personal morality” analysis. This disagreement notwithstanding, Garcia
shares Shelby’s preference for a metaphysical approach to defining “racism.”14
Garcia uses the term “conceptual analysis” in a way that maps on to what I
call “metaphysical analysis” and argues that this is the correct approach—to
the exclusion of various alternatives, including pragmatic approaches:

The appropriate objective of conceptual inquiry into racism is to explicate

its nature. VAR [Garcia’s acronym for his Volitional Approach to Racism] is
an ontic claim about racism’s reality, its essence and nature, undertaken
through examining our discourse to identify the assumptions and insights
behind it. It is not a mere proposed definition of a word, a question of
whether “racism is morally wrong by definition.” Rather, the issue is
whether, given what we find racism to be, it can sometimes be other than
immoral. Such an account must answer to common sense but also, contrary
to what Glasgow suggests, can and should be used to correct (“revis[e]”)
minor inconsistencies in usage and clarify cases where we are unsure what to
say.15 It is “useful” chiefly in illuminating reality and extending our under-
standing. Its chief goal is not to advance a political agenda (as in Haslanger16),
nor to guide social change (as in Blum17), nor to help craft public policy (as
in Corlett18). Nor, contrary to Glasgow’s insouciance, is it legitimate for

13
 Haslanger (2017, 1–2). “I embrace this invitation and, more specifically, seek to under-
stand the social phenomenon of racism: what it is and how it works, as a precursor to the
normative questions raised in (a-c).” Her account of racism, as it happens, leaves room for
normative critique, largely because of how she conceives of racism: as a kind of social practice
that involves distortive beliefs and attitudes. In this way, she can claim that the philosopher is
both a kind of “social critic” and a kind of empirical analyst, one who is concerned with rac-
ism qua empirical phenomenon. I too endorse Shelby’s claim that the theorists of racism
should be viewed as social critics in, more or less, his sense.
14
 In his own words: “The problem is that my philosophical interest is not in the linguistic
issue of how to ‘define’ the English term ‘racism,’ but rather in the questions of racism’s
essential nature, that in which it consists, and its moral status” (Garcia 2011, 261).
15
 Glasgow (2009).
16
 Haslanger (2012, 2004).
17
 Blum (2002).
18
 Corlett (2003).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  51

people deliberately to extend words beyond their proper and recognized

application simply to advance.19

An important methodological difference in Shelby and Garcia’s

­conceptions of metaphysical analysis is that Garcia maintains that the
nature of racism can be determined a priori, whereas Shelby thinks it
must be determined by reference to the behavioral sciences. For Garcia
ordinary usage of “racism” roughly discloses the underlying nature of
racism. His approach is a priori in that ordinary usage is determined, not
by examining empirical data about “what people say” or “would say”
about particular cases, but by examining his own intuitions about par-
ticular cases (and perhaps also what he thinks people do or would say
about particular cases). Shelby, by contrast, favors the use of empirical
data; and because he is suspicious of ordinary usage, he favors social sci-
entific approaches that are not wedded to conserving ordinary usage.
These differences notwithstanding, Garcia concurs with Shelby that some
version of metaphysical analysis is the correct approach.
Other metaphysical approach sympathizers include Leonard Harris and
Clevis Headley, as I discuss in Chap. 3. Joshua Glasgow develops a non-­
metaphysical theory of racism. What he offers, he claims, is a descriptive
theory, an account of how the term “racism” is ordinarily used.20 After
developing this account, he suggests that ordinary usage might be mis-
taken. He writes:

First, recall that focusing on the ordinary concept allows that we can deploy
the term ‘racism’ in an incorrect manner. … Second, I don’t mean to deny
that semantic externalism and the possibility of erroneous description might
have a role to play: we can have false beliefs about the nature of racism, and
various experts, including social theorists, might be able to shine a unique
light on its nature and meaning.21

19
 Garcia (2016, 229–230). He offers a similar criticism of Appiah’s (1990) approach to
racism. “My project is not in this way ‘rationally [to] reconstruct’ racism in its intellectually
strongest form the better to critique it. Rather, I am to capture, albeit in more precise form,
what people, Black and White, are getting at in their ordinary talk about racism” (Garcia
1997, 20).
20
 See my evaluation of Glasgow’s approach in Urquidez (2018), and Chap. 5.
21
 Glasgow (2009, 92–3).
52  A. G. URQUIDEZ

This passage comes at the end of his paper. In effect, he is reminding

the reader that his proposed definition of “racism” aims to describe what
racism is for most people (the prevailing view), not what racism is in itself.
To determine the nature of racism itself (independent of how people think
about it), he says, it may be necessary to turn to “semantic externalism.”
That is, it may be necessary to let the experts within the relevant social
sciences determine what racism really is. Consequently, he is more suspi-
cious of ordinary usage than Garcia seems to be, since he does not neces-
sarily disagree with Shelby’s claim that ordinary usage may be metaphysically
misleading.
It is thus safe to conclude that several philosophers of racism are either
sympathetic to metaphysical analysis or explicitly engaged in it. These phi-
losophers would say that Shelby’s question (1)—the philosophical ques-
tion, as I have termed it—logically precedes his questions (2) and (3).
Philosophers like Shelby, Garcia, Harris, Headley, and Glasgow are sympa-
thetic to the view that the ordinary concept of racism is responsible to
some standard outside of ordinary usage. This approach entails a distinc-
tion between ontology and semantics, and I take this to be the reason why
philosophers like Vargas and Haslanger distinguish the metaphysical and
descriptive questions. For semantics is thought to track the prevailing con-
ception of racism and not necessarily racism itself. Metaphysical questions
are about reality; semantic questions are about language and common-
sense thinking. With that, I now turn to an evaluation of metaphysical
analysis, which I pursue by rejecting its fundamental premise.
The basic premise of metaphysical analysis is this assertion:

Ontological Presupposition: The term “racism” in an explanation of racism

names something real (an object or kind). This object or kind—call it racism
itself—is thought to have reality outside of how we conceive of racism in
linguistic representation. That is, the nature of this reality is not determined
by how the word “racism” is used, but by facts about racism itself. Call this
the language-independence thesis. The point of philosophical theorizing—
the point of articulating a definition of “racism”—is to specify the nature of
this entity, so as to assess whether (and in what ways) our linguistic represen-
tations of racism accurately depict it. With the nature of racism itself on
hand, philosophical theory can justify the correct explanation of racism.
Whether the nature of racism itself is specifiable by reference to linguistic
intuitions (as per Garcia) or discoverable by the relevant social science/s (as
per Shelby, Haslanger, and Glasgow) is debatable; whether racism itself is a
transhistorical and unchanging essence, or whether it is an immanent and
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  53

evolving nature is debatable. But what is settled on the metaphysical

approach is that the word “racism” names something real, something that
does not depend on linguistic representation for its existence.

The ontological presupposition may lead (and, I believe, has led) many a
philosopher to adopt several auxiliary propositions that are intuitively
and/or plausibly linked to it. I consider three auxiliary propositions that I
challenge directly in this book. My contention is not that endorsing the
ontological presupposition commits one to all or any of these auxiliary
propositions. My claim is rather that it makes such propositions plausible
and natural, so natural in fact that one might take them for granted with-
out consciously endorsing them. In such cases they function as pretheo-
retical assumptions.
The logic of the first auxiliary proposition is as follows. If racism is an
ontological entity, as Garcia holds, then the question “What is racism?” is
best analyzed as “What is the nature of this entity?” Thusly understood,
the aim of theorizing racism is thought to consist in providing an accurate
description of its nature. (I intend for my use of “metaphysical analysis” to
be neutral on the question of whether racism itself is best understood as a
transcendent or transhistorical essence or whether it is best understood as
an empirical and sociohistorical entity, such as a social practice.22) This in
turn can naturally lead to the conviction that the proper aim of philosophi-
cal analysis is to provide the true definition of “racism,” this being the
description that corresponds to the objective fact of the matter. In this way
we arrive at the first auxiliary proposition:

(a) An adequate philosophical definition of “racism” is a description of a

mind-independent entity called racism itself.

Furthermore, if racism is a mind-independent entity, then the meaning of the

word “racism” is plausibly conceived as the referent of this term (the object
or kind it stands for). This opens the possibility of investigating this kind
apart from how the word “racism” happens to be used within a given society.
So, among other things, the ontological presupposition, in conjunction with

22
 For two critical discussions of racism as a transhistorical and unchanging entity, see
Garcia (1997, 8–10) and Headley (2000). Both philosophers reject the notion of racism as
transhistorical and unchanging, but for very different reasons. I discuss Headley’s assessment
of transhistorical approaches to racism in Chap. 3.
54  A. G. URQUIDEZ

proposition (a), renders semantic externalism a natural and intuitively plau-

sible theory of meaning. In this way we arrive at the following contention:

(b) The reality to which the term “racism” refers is best construed as a natu-
ral or social kind whose essence is given by its internal nature; therefore,
only an externalist semantics (a certain mode of metaphysical analysis) is
capable of specifying the nature of this entity.

Finally, if racism is a real entity, and if the proper goal of philosophical

analysis is to provide a true description of this entity, then philosophical
disagreement about the nature of racism must consist in disagreement
about a matter of fact. In this way we arrive at the following contention:

(c) Genuine disagreement about “what racism is” is disagreement about a

matter of fact. This alone does not settle which facts are pertinent in resolv-
ing this disagreement. But it posits that there must be such facts.

In contrast to claims (a), (b), and (c), which I reject, I will argue that
there is no such thing as racism itself. The implication of my argument,
however, is not that racism is not real, but that the reality of racism is given
by our representations of racism (i.e., by our linguistic conventions).
Consequently, I defend the following theses:

(a∗) An adequate philosophical definition of “racism” is not a description of

a real entity, but an expression of a linguistic norm or rule for the use of the
word “racism” and its cognates.
(b∗) The term “racism,” as it is used in a definition of “racism,” does not
refer to an entity; therefore, we do not need an externalist semantics to
specify the nature of this entity. We should instead analyze the meaning of
“racism” by reconstructing and evaluating (ordinary and non-ordinary)
usage of “racism,” i.e., by doing conceptual justice to the pragmatic struc-
tures that underlie ordinary usage.
(c∗) Disagreement about “what racism is” is not disagreement about a mat-
ter of fact, for it is not descriptive disagreement about whether an entity
exists or about the nature of such an entity. Rather, the contestation in ques-
tion is normative disagreement about a linguistic convention. The disagree-
ment is also prescriptive, for it is disagreement about what the linguistic
convention ought to be.
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  55

I defend the first claim in this chapter and the next. I defend claim (b∗) in
Chaps. 2 and 3. And I defend claim (c∗) in Chap. 4. My aim in this first
chapter is to provide a preliminary defense of contention (a∗) over and
against contention (a). That is, I begin making the case against the onto-
logical presupposition. In the remainder of this chapter, I develop a
Wittgenstein-inspired approach to Shelby’s second-order question: How
should first-order disputes about the meaning of “racism” be resolved?

2.2   Grammar and Philosophy: A Conventionalist

Approach
This book taps underutilized resources in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy
of language to address fundamental theoretical issues in the philosophy of
racism. Accordingly, I engage Wittgensteinian scholarship, on one hand,
and philosophy of racism scholarship, on the other. As the literature on
Wittgensteinian philosophy is vast, I focus on strands that are compelling,
both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as defensible philosophy of
language. I call this selection of his philosophy conventionalism. Section
2.2 discusses some pertinent elements of the Wittgensteinian picture of
language. Section 2.3 develops the conventionalist framework.
I begin by distinguishing descriptive and normative propositions. A
descriptive proposition is one that describes. I will elucidate this notion by
considering some examples: empirical, norm, and metaphysical descrip-
tions. An empirical description describes a matter of empirical fact (“He
went to the bank”). A norm description is a special subset of empirical
description: it involves the description of human practice and normativity.
“The word ‘bank’ has four letters in it” is an expression used to describe a
linguistic norm. Another kind of norm description is what I will call a nor-
mative description. This is the statement and clarification of a norm—the
kind used in theory and conceptual analysis. Another type of norm descrip-
tion is a norm-existence statement. This is a sociohistorical or anthropo-
logical statement of a norm—a statement to the effect that a norm exists
(or has existed) or is in force. A norm-existence statement may be historical
(“R was the rule in the 18th century”). A metaphysical description is a
putative (but misguided) description of ultimate reality (on the analogy of
empirical description). Descriptive propositions have in common that their
truth or falsity is determined by facts about the natural world and our forms
of life. Additionally, empirical and normative descriptions are contingently
true or false, for they might have been otherwise.
56  A. G. URQUIDEZ

By way of contrast, a normative proposition is one that is used to lay

down a rule. The central claim of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language is
that grammatical propositions are a subset of normative propositions. “A
bachelor is an unmarried male” is an example of a grammatical proposition.
“Racism is racial disregard” is another. If the Wittgensteinian analysis of
these propositions is correct, then definitions of “racism” lay down norms
for using words, including norms of description. Because grammatical
propositions are not descriptive, they cannot be analyzed as descriptions of
how words are used. Statements describing our conventions—such as
statements about how “racism” is used, about which definitions of “rac-
ism” are in force, about how the word originated, about how it was used in
the past, and about how it has evolved and is evolving today—are not
grammatical propositions, in Wittgenstein’s sense of the term. The analysis
that follows is meant to capture the central features of grammatical propo-
sitions. Additional details will be provided in subsequent chapters.

2.2.1  Meaning, Use, Understanding

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language starts from a fundamental picture
of language. That picture can be summed up as follows: To speak a lan-
guage is to do something, namely, to participate in a rule-governed activity
(metaphorically, we can gloss what a speaker does with a linguistic expression
as “making a move in a language-game,” where a language-game is a rule-­
governed practice that involves the use of words). The rules of this linguistic
activity are expressed in everyday explanations of what words mean. Ordinary
explanations of words are expressions of standards of semantic correctness. The
minimal unit for making a move in a language-game is a sentence. This
brief statement specifies the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language
that I will refer to as “conventionalism.”23 Stated differently, I give the

23
 Wittgenstein calls his approach to philosophy grammatical. Although I sometimes
invoke the term to refer to a philosophical approach, I prefer the term “conventionalism” for
a few different reasons. First, by centering the debate on conventionalism rather than gram-
matical analysis, one shifts the discussion away from Wittgenstein toward a general position
in the philosophy of language. This is where the debate should be, in my view. Hence we
should debate conventionalism’s commitment to normativism, independent of whether we
accept this or that other thesis from Wittgenstein. This is the way a lot of Glock’s work pro-
ceeds, and my approach is an attempt to model his, in this respect. Second, the term “gram-
matical” is most properly reserved for that which relates to grammar. I will generally use this
term in connection with Wittgenstein’s view of grammar. (For him, “grammar” has narrow
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  57

label “conventionalism” to a set of doctrines in the philosophy of language

that reflect Wittgenstein’s views on: language, explanation of meaning,
meaning, rules, and related concepts. Conventionalism is a central feature
of Wittgenstein’s methodology (his so-called grammatical approach), but
it can be discussed independent of Wittgenstein’s other commitments.
Evidence of Wittgenstein’s conventionalist commitments can be found in
various places, including his Philosophical Investigations,24 some of which
will emerge throughout this discussion. I defend conventionalism in Part
1 of this book and presuppose it in Parts 2 and 3.
The most fundamental notion in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language
is succinctly summarized in the elegant slogan, “meaning is use.” A more
illuminating formulation, which Wittgenstein provides, is that for a large
class of cases, though not all, the meaning of a word (or of a linguistic

and broad uses. Most broadly, it refers to the set of rules governing  the use of language,
including syntactical norms. More narrowly, the term refers to a subset of these rules: gram-
matical propositions (explanations of meaning).) Third, as I point out in Chap. 3, there are
different kinds of grammatical analysis that are Wittgensteinian or Wittgenstein-inspired.
Given Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic use of the term “grammatical analysis,” the term is gener-
ally thought to entail commitment to other aspects of his philosophy, such as his view that
philosophy is purely descriptive. But “grammatical analysis”—that is, the analysis of gram-
matical rules and rule-formulations—need not be restricted to pure description. Hence I
prefer the term “conventionalism” to describe my own position.
24
 See, for example (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (2009, §198–199; §355).
For a defense of applying the label “conventionalism” to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy,
see Yemima Ben-Menahem (1998). See Glock (2005, 2008, 2018) for a defense of con-
ventionalism against some recent objections. I treat “conventionalism” as the name of a set
of doctrines, principally a conception of meaning and definition. In this regard, it links up
with certain conceptions of necessity and meaning. For example, Robert Brandom (2000,
45–77; see also 1994) offers an expressivist view of necessity that fits well with conven-
tionalism. In the context of Wittgenstein studies, conventionalism is sometimes thought
to be a view in the philosophy of logic and mathematics. It is here connected with Michael
Dummett’s objections to Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following (his so-called full-blooded
conventionalism), as developed in his review of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations
of Mathematics (1959). It is also connected with discussions of Wittgenstein’s so-called rule-
following paradox (made famous by Kripke’s (1972) skeptical reading of Wittgenstein).
For discussion about how Wittgenstein’s view differs from Dummett and Kripke’s readings
of Wittgenstein, see Hacker’s Witgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy
(1996). For a helpful parsing of various interpretations of Wittgenstein’s account of gram-
matical norms, see Richard Amesbury’s “Norms and Normativity: Between Regulism and
Regularism” (2005, 65–85). (He also helpfully brings Rorty, Derrida, and Habermas into
the conversation—philosophers  whose works are not typically thought to be relevant to
issues in the philosophy of language.)
58  A. G. URQUIDEZ

expression) is its use in the language.25 What does Wittgenstein mean by

“use”? The type of use he has in mind is use, as given by grammar; that is,
normative as opposed to descriptive use.26 Hence, ungrammatical uses do
not count as uses that Wittgenstein recognizes, for they are like “moves”
in a chess game that do not conform to the rules (we reject them as viola-
tions). Baker and Hacker elaborate:

The sense in which the rules of chess describe the game of chess is that they
specify how the game is to be played. That is not part of natural history — for
natural history would have to include all the misuses and misapplications of
rules (cf. MS 110 (Vol. V), 65). It is a normative description  — like the
description of a legal system. To be precise, grammar (in Wittgenstein’s
extended sense) states, rather than describes, the rules of language.27

Wittgenstein identifies meaning with use, but does not give either term
a precise meaning. His view about meaning is not a theory of meaning, but
an observation about the normal use of the term “meaning.” His claim is
that “meaning” and “use” mean the same on normal usage—though only
for a large class of cases. He is evidently singling out one of several uses of
“meaning” for a select purpose.28 Wittgenstein’s interest in the concept of
meaning is connected to his aim in philosophy, which is to foster under-
standing (which Baker and Hacker helpfully distinguish from knowledge).
The concept of meaning is internally related to two other concepts,
understanding and explanation. Wittgenstein identifies three criteria of
understanding, that is, grounds for ascribing understanding to a person,
for attributing to her a grasp of the meaning of an expression. A competent
25
 Wittgenstein (2009, §43.) Baker and Hacker comment: “Wittgenstein observed that
‘meaning’ is a primitive concept (LW I, §332). And that is surely correct—it is not a sophis-
ticated technical term for linguistic theorists, but an unsophisticated non-technical term for
language-learners who do not understand an utterance or word. The form ‘What does “W”
mean?’ belongs to it. So too do the forms ‘“W” means a V that is F’ and ‘“W” means the
same as “V”’. But when the concept is expanded to include other words that do not fit into
such standard forms, strains are manifest, and difficulties and indeterminacies emerge”
(2005, 154). See their essay “Meaning and Use” (in 2005) and James Conant’s “Wittgenstein
on Meaning and Use” (1998) for expositions of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning.
26
 This term is from D. Z. Phillips (2005, 67), who attributes it to James Conant.
27
 Baker and Hacker (2005, 147).
28
 Wittgenstein recognizes the limitations of his description of “meaning.” For example,
the terms “meaning” and “use” sometimes come apart, and they do so in different ways. For
a detailed exposition, see section 4 of Baker and Hacker’s “Meaning and Use” in Volume 1
of their commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (2005, 152–158).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  59

speaker understands an expression in her language if she knows how to use

it in relevant contexts (use criterion); if she can say—that is, explain—what
she means by her use of it in relevant contexts (explanatory criterion); and
if she can respond appropriately to others’ use of it in relevant contexts
(response criterion).29 This suggests that understanding is primarily a matter
of what we do (an ability) rather than of inner processes (in the mind or
brain). Correct explanation minimally involves providing examples of the
proper use of a term or pointing to a suitable sample if available.
Wittgenstein also spoke of what I will call speaker entitlements.30 If S
understands an explanation of meaning, she is entitled to: (1) apply the
corresponding term when its grounds of application obtain (for the expla-
nation provides a priori knowledge of its grounds); (2) substitute one
equivalent expression for another (legitimacy of substitution); and (3)
exhibit her understanding of a term by using it, explaining it, and respond-
ing appropriately to its use by others (criteria of understanding).31
It might be objected that Wittgenstein’s criteria of understanding are
subject to obvious counterexamples. First, don’t we sometimes use an
expression correctly that we’re unable to explain? The answer, of course,
is that we do. However, if one knows a word one is unable to explain on
some occasion, that is because one can normally explain it. Wittgenstein
does not hold that correct use and correct explanation never come apart,
only that they normally converge. Indeed, we have criteria for saying that
one “forgot” the meaning of a word. These criteria are not satisfied by
someone who never remembers how to use it. A second counterexample
points to the defective explanations that competent speakers sometimes
provide. I might provide poor examples in explaining a family resem-
blance term or point to poor samples in giving an ostensive definition.
Alternatively, one might leave an important aspect of use unmentioned.
A competent speaker, however, will normally be able to see and correct
these mistakes. Wittgenstein acknowledges defeasible criteria of misunder-

29
 For detailed exposition and defense of Wittgenstein’s account of understanding mean-
ing, see Baker and Hacker’s essay on the topic (“Understanding and Ability”), in Wittgenstein:
Understanding and Meaning, Part 1: Essays (2005), especially section 6. Many of my argu-
ments in this section and the next draw heavily from two essays in this volume, “Explanation”
and “Meaning and Use.”
30
 Baker and Hacker (2009, 50–52)
31
 For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s account of “criteria” and grounds of application, see
Peter Hacker’s “Criteria” in Volume 3 of his commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations (1990).
60  A. G. URQUIDEZ

standing: (a) the inability to explain a word; (b) the incorrect explanation
of a word; and (c) the inability to apply a correct explanation one is able
to give. In such cases, one’s “incorrect use will [normally] defeat the sup-
port given by his correct explanation to the assertion that he understands
the word.”32
Another objection points to the fact that competent speakers may know
how to use closely related, often intersubstitutable, word-pairs—like
“nearly” and “almost,” “small” and “little,” and “shut” and “close”—
without being able to explain the subtle differences in their grammar.
Baker and Hacker reply that these cases do not establish lack of under-
standing. The internal relations between understanding, meaning, and
explanation do not require of a person who understands an expression that
he be able to give an overview of its use, “only that if he has used an
expression on a given occasion and cannot explain what it means in that
context of use, then he does not understand what he said or, other things
being equal, what the expression thus used means.”33 First, they point out,
it is giving a correct explanation that is a criterion of understanding, not
giving a synopsis of use. To satisfy this criterion, it is not necessary to be
able to explain, say, how “close” differs in meaning from “shut.” If one
provides an accurate explanation of the former, that is sufficient for under-
standing. Second, the inability to provide a particular (kind of) explanation
does not establish the inability to explain. We must not forget that most
terms are variously explicable, often via different kinds of explanation
(e.g., defining “apple” by analytic definition and by example). That a per-
son cannot explain a word one way does not show she cannot explain it
another way. Her ability to do so satisfies a criterion of understanding.
Baker and Hacker point out that we should also budget for occasional
forgetfulness. One may simply not have thought of an explanation. Yet, if
another person prompts one by suggesting an explanation, and if one
responds sincerely “Yes, of course. I should have thought of that,” this
may be sufficient.
It might be objected that the Wittgensteinian view of understanding
denies the significance of expertise. It suggests that experts cannot know the
real meanings of words, that they can’t know more than ordinary folk. To
this I reply that the idea that scientific experts know the real meanings of
words (by virtue of uncovering the internal or hidden natures of the kinds
denoted by referring expressions) presupposes an externalist semantics—a

32
 Baker and Hacker (2005, 41).
33
 Baker and Hacker (2005, 42).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  61

position that I reject in Chap. 4. Knowledge that water is H2O is not a cri-
terion of understanding the word “water” in most contexts of use. Similarly,
knowledge of a term’s etymology and/or history usually is not relevant to
understanding its normal meaning. The fact that Oziel fails to know that
petroleum is extracted from rock strata does not count as evidence against
his knowing the meaning of “petroleum.” If Oziel knows that petroleum is
a substance that is used to produce fuel for vehicles, if he can describe the
substance’s outer properties (its black color, liquid form) in circumstances
where one encounters it, and if he is able to use this information in the con-
text of communicating with others, then he knows the (ordinary) meaning
of “petroleum.” Yet, it might be replied that there are contexts where such
expertise is relevant to understanding; more generally, knowing the distinc-
tion between two closely related terms is salient in many contexts (e.g.,
academia, science, law). The Wittgensteinian reply to this worry is that nor-
mal and special contexts must be distinguished. In special contexts where
one cannot explain “W,” this provides evidence of one’s failure to under-
stand “W” in that context. This is perfectly compatible with understanding
the ­normal use of “W.”

2.2.2  Explanation of Meaning

2.2.2.1 Grammatical Rule and Grammatical Proposition

Wittgenstein’s conception of linguistic meaning presupposes the existence
of rules. What is a rule? As it turns out, this is the wrong question to ask.
For it makes us expect the wrong kind of answer. First, it leads down the
rabbit hole of searching for the term’s referent, as though it were some
kind of physical object or substance. Second, it encourages a reductionist
account, the reduction of the normative to the non-normative. Rules can-
not be non-normatively defined without distorting the concept rule. Does
this mean we cannot say what kind of thing a rule is? We can say the kind
of thing it is, but only by invoking normative notions that are more or less
synonymous with it. Hence, a rule can be said to be a standard of correct-
ness (a measure, a convention, etc.), but this account, apart from not
being particularly illuminating, does not break free from the normative
space we are trying to elucidate by means of the definition; in other words,
the account is circular.
62  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Baker and Hacker provide an illuminating account of rules, one that is

functionalist rather than descriptive or referential, for instead of telling us
what a rule or standard “consists in,” they tell us the sorts of things we do
with standards. They describe six significant roles or functions. The roles of
explanations of meaning are special in that they antecede moves in a lan-
guage-game, for they are conditions of the possibility of making such moves.
These “normative practices” constitute the normative space within which
linguistic activities and the practices they constitute take place. Baker and
Hacker’s account also resists the temptation to analyze rules independent of
their connection to explanations of meaning. For although we distinguish
between a rule (the standard of correctness) and a rule-formulation (the
form of words which is the expression of the rule), the two are internally
related. Their account can be summed up as follows: A rule is a standard
that is used in: teaching the meanings of terms; defining actions, generating
forms of description, and determining the a­pplicability/inapplicability of
corresponding characterizations of behavior (e.g., chess rules define the act
of castling, generate the form of description “He castled,” and determine
the applicability/inapplicability of characterizing someone as having cas-
tled); explaining or giving reasons for people’s behavior (e.g., “He stopped
because the light was red”); predicting people’s behavior (e.g., “He just
made the shot, so the other team will get the ball now”); justifying and criti-
cizing people’s actions (e.g., “She did something wrong in lying (for lying
is wrong)”); and participating in various forms of linguistic and extra-lin-
guistic evaluation (e.g., “This act is illegal because it is a felony,” “This argu-
ment is logically valid because it has the form of modus ponens”).
Wittgenstein took an interest in “normative practices” because he
thought they were key to unraveling the mystery of how linguistic mean-
ing is possible. Rules make it possible for language users to do the multi-
plicitous things we do with language. For instance, we ask questions, issue
commands, give prayers, make requests, assert how things are, greet one
another, express our feelings, question each other, engage in conversation,
lay down moral imperatives and prohibitions, and so forth. All of these
practices (language-games) involve speaking and hence, using words in
accord with rules for proper use. That these practices are rule-governed is
evidenced by the fact that there are correct and incorrect ways to partici-
pate in them. Thus, there is no such thing as greeting someone after talk-
ing to one for 20 minutes, except perhaps as a joke.
Wittgenstein’s analysis of grammatical rules was developed to explain
how linguistic meaning is possible. His reflections on grammar are
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  63

s­ cattered throughout his later writings (especially in The Big Typescript).34

He uses the term grammar to signify everything that is necessary for
sense, and this includes, not only syntactical rules, but rules for using
words. Hence, it includes the lexicon, for lexical entries specify rules for
the correct use of lexica. Grammar rules are what is essential to under-
standing the meaning of an expression. As conditions of sense, grammar
rules are essential for comparing a proposition to reality.
A grammatical rule is to be distinguished from a grammatical proposi-
tion. A grammatical rule is a standard of correctness, a rule for the proper
use of a word. A grammatical proposition is the expression of a rule for the
proper use of a word. When emphasizing the sentential structure of a
grammatical proposition, we can call it a rule-formulation. A rule-­
formulation is a sentence (a form of words) that is used to express a rule;
but it should be stressed that an expression counts as a rule-formulation
only insofar as it is used to provide a rule. “The table is red” is a sentence
that can be used to describe an object or to lay down a rule for the correct
use of “red.” Suppose that I am talking to S over the phone and S asks me
what color the table is, to which I reply “The table is red.” Here I use the
sentence “The table is red” to describe, so the sentence is not a rule-for-
mulation in this context. If instead I teach someone the word “red” by
stating that the table is red, I use the same sentence to lay down a rule; so
it is a rule-­formulation here.
The broader concept at work in Wittgenstein’s account of grammar is
what is called “an explanation of the meaning of a word” (or explanation

34
 Wittgenstein’s earliest and most systematic account of grammar is provided in The Big
Typescript (2013, pp. 184–212; see also The Blue and Brown Books, 1958). (One should also
consult his account of philosophy and philosophical problems, since this sheds light on his
account of grammar qua method (Philosophical Grammar, p. 300–318.)) Even in The Big
Typescript, no detailed exposition is given of what grammar as such consists in. The primary
aim of his analysis is directed at answering objections and dissolving confusions about the
notion of grammar. Some important aspects of grammar that emerge from this discussion are
the necessity of grammar and its arbitrariness (i.e., epistemic unjustifiability). Baker and
Hacker gloss a section in Philosophical Grammar thus: “Wittgenstein was inclined to charac-
terize grammar very generally as all the conditions, the method, necessary for comparing the
proposition with reality (PG 88). It incorporates any rules for using expressions that have to
be determined antecedently to questions of truth and falsehood. Since explanations of mean-
ings of words are standards for their correct use, all explanations of word meaning fall into
grammar” (2009, 61). However, they also recognize that Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians
often use the term “grammar” in a narrow sense: to refer to explanations of meaning. That
is normally how I use it.
64  A. G. URQUIDEZ

of meaning, for short). To understand what we call the meaning of a word,

he argued, we should look at what we call, in the ordinary practice of
speaking the language, an explanation of its meaning. Wittgenstein’s
account of grammar can be conceived as an elucidation of the meaning of
“explanation of meaning.” Explanations of meaning are expressions of
rules, for they provide rules for correctly applying the terms they explain.
Explanations are commonly given in response to requests for explana-
tions of meaning (e.g., “What does this word mean?”). For instance, the
word “rain” would ordinarily be explained thus: Rain consists of drops of
water that fall from the sky. This statement might look like a description,
but Wittgenstein writes: “The description of how a proposition is verified
is a contribution to its grammar.”35 “Asking whether and how a proposi-
tion can be verified is only a special form of the question ‘How do you
mean?’ The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition.”36
Generally, to know the meaning of a word “W” is to know the correct
answer to the question “What is W?” in normal contexts of application, for
“[e]ssence is expressed in grammar” which “tells what kind of object any-
thing is.”37 Wittgenstein observes that “What is W?” and “What does ‘W’
mean?” often have the same use. At the outset of this chapter I provided
the example of the linguistic novice’s use of “What is racism?” The child
uses this sentence to ask something different from what the philosopher
asks. The correct answer to the child’s question is an everyday explanation
of how the term is used.
Dictionary entries (and analytic definitions more generally) are para-
digms of explanations of meaning. But, of course, there are various kinds
of explanation of meaning, and, for Wittgenstein, there is no one privi-
leged form of explanation, since different explanations may be better
suited to different purposes. Our language recognizes various definitional
forms of explanation: ostensive definition, stipulative definition, analytic
definition (by necessary and sufficient conditions; by a disjunction of indi-
vidually sufficient conditions), and so on. It also recognizes non-defini-
tional forms of explanation: contrastive and comparative explanation,
explanation by example, explanation by using the target term in a sen-
tence, and so on. Many of these forms of explanation can be invoked, in
different situations, to explain the meaning of “racism.”

35
 Wittgenstein (2013, p. 207).
36
 Wittgenstein (2009, §353)
37
 Wittgenstein (2009, §371, §373).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  65

Baker and Hacker argue that certain features of the institution of expla-
nation have to be in place for explanation to succeed in its normative role,
that is, for language to exist. Explanations of meaning must be public and
immanent. They are public in that they are intelligible to all (there are no
private languages). They are immanent in that they are accessible to us
and surveyable by us. If explanations were not public and immanent, they
could not fulfill their role as standards of correct use and could not clarify
what a speaker meant. Similarly, explanation has to end at some point—it
cannot go on forever—otherwise understanding would not be achieved
and the purpose of explanation would be defeated. At the end of explana-
tion is consensual action. A linguistic community agrees about the correct
and incorrect applications of terms, and where there is vagueness or con-
testedness (as I argue is the case with racism in Part II), this too must be
part of the agreement of how an expression is employed. A linguistic com-
munity must, for the most part and most of the time, agree in its explana-
tions of meaning for language to be possible.

2.2.2.2 What Grammatical Knowledge Is and How It Is Acquired

Grammatical knowledge consists in the ability to use words, according to
the rules governing their use. This is knowledge-how rather than
knowledge-­that. The ability to use a word is criterial for knowing it.
Abilities are exhibited in behavior and presuppose the mastery of tech-
niques. For to be able to use a word is to have mastered the technique(s)
for applying it in appropriate circumstances. There is then something I am
able to do, some action (or inaction) I am able to perform, which exhibits
my understanding of the word. In addition, I have the ability to explain
my behavior, give my reasons for so acting, and thus justify by intentional
conduct by reference to a grammatical rule. A third ability that I have if I
have grammatical knowledge is the capacity to understand others, and this
too is manifest in my behavior. For I react appropriately to what others say
(nodding my head, for instance) and respond appropriately to their com-
ments, requests, commands, assertions, and so on. An appropriate response
is not necessarily one that agrees with or is conducive to the desires of my
conversation partner; rather, it is one that manifests understanding of what
the other says. Hence, disagreement may also exhibit linguistic competence.
How does one acquire grammatical knowledge? Wittgenstein makes a
genetic observation. This observation should not be confused with a
genetic theory of language learning. His observation is that we are not
born with innate linguistic competence, but acquire competence through
66  A. G. URQUIDEZ

a process of mastering the techniques of employing words. Knowledge of

grammar rules is initially a function of linguistic training, later a matter of
teaching. Explanation—as a medium of education and learning—is linked
to teaching and training. Training involves the mimicking of behavior,
repetitive behavior (drilling), and the cultivation of natural dispositions
and reactions. Training lays the foundation of explanation and rule-­
following, for the result of training is mastery of the basic aspects of lan-
guage. Teaching, by contrast, presupposes a background of proper training
and involves a teacher’s citing rule-formulations to lay down standards of
correct use, and correcting the pupil’s mistakes. What is learned through
teaching is a technique for applying the word thus learned.
The notion that grammatical knowledge consists in an ability is closely
linked to Wittgenstein’s view that meaning is use. For my understanding of
a word (what it means) is exhibited in my following a rule. Obeying a rule
is a custom.38 Customs are constituted by recurring actions, behavioral
regularities. The difference between accidentally according with a rule and
non-accidentally obeying/following a rule is that, in the latter but not in
the former, one’s conduct intentionally accords with the rule. Intentional
action is brought about by learning the uses of words through explanations
of meaning, culminating in the mastery of various techniques of
employment. To have mastered a technique is to know the “whens,”
­
“hows,” and “whys” (the reasons) of performance exemplifying rule-fol-
lowing behavior.39
How can one determine whether a behavior is an instance of rule-­
following? After all, couldn’t one merely pretend to know? Wittgenstein
answers that there are criteria for pretending to know just as there are
criteria for knowing. Moreover, the former presupposes the latter. This
does not mean there are no ambiguous or borderline cases. Whether the
criteria for pretending to know are satisfied or not in some particular case
may be indeterminate and one may be unsure. Nevertheless, there would
be no such thing as “pretending” to follow a rule if there were no standard
for actually following it. How does one know or learn what the correct
technique for the application of a term is? Correct technique, as we have
said, is exhibited in what a competent speaker of the language says and
does with language.

38
 Wittgenstein (2009, §199).
39
 Wittgenstein (2009, §150).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  67

The teacher is a competent speaker of the language. A competent

speaker is one who knows what is called “an explanation of meaning,”
who cites explanations of meaning as reasons and who participates in the
various normative practices described above. Another source of grammati-
cal standards is the lexicon. Indeed, the lexicon is a product and statement
of what competent speakers of the language call such and such (as lexica
state the prevailing uses of words), and is generally a reliable source of
such information. This is why teachers direct pupils to the d ­ ictionary.
Through it, pupils learn paradigmatic forms of grammatical explanation,
especially analytic definition.
José Medina provides a compelling argument against a popular view
which holds that Wittgenstein’s considered view is that language learning
is inessential to grammar.40 For Medina, the education brought about by
the social interaction of teacher and pupil came to be viewed by
Wittgenstein as essential to the normativity of meaning. This shift in
Wittgenstein’s thought was brought about by his attempt to explain the
possibility of rule-following, the result of which is a naturalized or genetic
account of rule-following.41 I will not get into the details of his argument
here, but I highlight it to underscore the importance of teaching and the
role of the teacher on Wittgenstein’s account. What I want to emphasize
here are the necessary presuppositions that make language learn-
ing possible.
One of Wittgenstein’s interests in describing teaching contexts was
to highlight the presuppositions and contingency of linguistic compe-
tence. First, grammatical explanations presuppose a background of prior
understanding and partial linguistic competence. This background has
its foundations in brute training (the acquisition of elementary linguis-
tic skills). This is important for reminding philosophers that language
is not grounded in reason. Training does not involve giving reasons to
justify doing what the learner is trained to do. Rather, it aims to incul-
cate habits, dispositions, and tendencies. Wittgenstein’s assertion that
training is the foundation for teaching is important for explaining how

40
 The standard view is rooted in Wittgenstein’s explicit remarks that the learning process
is inessential to grammar. For we can imagine that an individual is born with the innate ability
to use language, full-blown. What matters to grammar, to understanding the meaning of a
term, is not how this knowledge is acquired but one’s ability to use language. For being able
to use a term (and not being able to explain its history) is what is called “understanding the
word.” That this position remained his considered view is disputed by José Medina (2002).
41
 Medina (2002, ch. 6).
68  A. G. URQUIDEZ

we are able to understand explanations of meaning. To understand the

ostensive definition “This is (called) red,” one takes significant linguistic
training for granted. One must already know what color terms are, for
example. Understanding the difference between object terms and color
terms, substances and predicates, is grammatical knowledge. The con-
nection between teaching and explanation sheds light on the normativ-
ity of grammar by elucidating Wittgenstein’s claim that explanations of
meaning “belong to grammar,” that is, are foundational to all subse-
quent learning. These grammatical foundations are various, for we have
seen the various normative purposes grammar rules, hence the multiple
functions of explanations of meaning.
Second, training does not occur in a vacuum, but against a back-
ground environment that conditions language acquisition. The possibil-
ity of teaching and learning words depends on regularities in nature and
patterns in human behavior and reactions. Wittgenstein identifies three
“framework conditions” that condition the human ability to learn a lan-
guage: (i) nature: the natural order of things consists of very general
facts and regularities; (ii) human nature: humans have natural discrimi-
natory abilities and reactions, such as the ability to retain information, an
instinctive tendency to mimic behavior, and other shared instincts; and
(iii) forms of life: linguistic practices are invariably embedded in, and are
partly constitutive of, human cultures, so languages have histories and
emerge and evolve as sociohistorical contexts evolve. Wittgenstein uses
these observations to argue against attempts to justify one grammar over
another by reference to the facts. His argument from contingency holds
that if a human culture should change as a result of radical shifts in its
sociohistorical context, or if the natural word (including human nature)
were radically different than it actually is, the grammar of a linguistic
community would be radically different. Our existing concepts would be
rendered useless and hence, we would develop new needs and corre-
sponding concepts to get along. Paying attention to linguistic training,
then, emphasizes the contingency of our concept-scheme. Because lan-
guage is contingent upon a background of prior and partial understand-
ing, on the one hand, and on framework conditions, on the other, the
examination of teaching contexts is a reminder of how malleable and
context-sensitive our concepts are.
Baker and Hacker emphasize two points in connection with the intra-­
linguistic functions of explanation of meaning. First, its role in teaching
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  69

presupposes that the learner is able to frame questions of the form “What
does X mean?” or “Does he mean X by Y?” Language cannot be taught
to very young children by means of citing explanations, since they have
not yet mastered the basics of language. Later in life, when teaching by
explanation is possible (when the child has mastered elementary skills of
language), most teaching is not done by means of explanations but by
means of examples and exemplification. Second, the use of explanations
of meaning to correct and avert misunderstanding also takes basic com-
petence for granted. Explanations of meaning are characteristically pro-
vided to answer questions, unclarities, and doubts about meaning, and to
resolve misunderstandings about meaning. So the pupil must be able to
frame questions, express unclarities and doubts, and manifest misunder-
standings. All of this is done with language and thus presupposes the
mastery of language. Baker and Hacker thus concur with Wittgenstein
that the ability to give and understand explanations of meaning presup-
poses considerable linguistic competence to get a grip. These intra-lin-
guistic functions of explanations of meaning underscore the kinship of
the normative and the contingent, the dependency of “how things should
be” upon “how things are.”

2.2.2.3 Explanation of Meaning and Explanation of Racism

The established use or custom with the term “racism” poses an interesting
test case from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Consider, for instance, that
the grammar of racism is hotly contested. This is evinced by the fact that
different people provide different—even incompatible—definitions of
“racism,” that there is much misunderstanding about what racism is, and
so forth. So it might be objected that at least two Wittgensteinian ideas are
called into question. First, if agreement in explanations of racism is essen-
tial to the intelligibility of “racism,” does the contestedness of the concept
undermine this condition? And, if so, is contemporary usage of “racism”
meaningless? Second, what are the implications of Wittgenstein’s notion
that the ability to give and understand explanations of “racism” presup-
poses a background of mastery of intra-linguistic techniques of applying
this term? For if understanding what “racism” means presupposes that our
linguistic community shares a variety of techniques of application, then
that these techniques often conflict would seem to suggest that no one
really understands what it means.
Preliminary responses to these objections are as follows. First, it must
be recognized that, as things stand, there are multiple criteria governing
70  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the application of the term “racism.”42 Not all definitions of ­“racism” are
incompatible. Hence the premise that there cannot be (in Wittgenstein’s
sense) agreement in definitions of “racism” because the concept is con-
tested is overstated. Of course, there is not uniform agreement in the
application of, say, the term “institutional racism,” but there is much
agreement about what is criterial for the application of this term. For
instance, de jure segregation and racial slavery are criterial for institutional
racism (and for racism generally), as is racial discrimination in employment
hiring. What is more, for most contested aspects of racism’s grammar,
there are sub-communities of competent speakers who share a common
conception. And though other sub-communities of competent speakers
may disagree, they may nevertheless learn and understand the meanings of
those with whom they disagree. A case in point is the proud racist, who
knows that racism is wrong (on conventional usage), although she rejects
this proposition. Her rejection of this proposition does not prevent her
from understanding or even using the term in its standard sense.
This leads me to my second point. The shared understanding of racism
that exists, in my view, establishes an internally contested, vague and open-
ended concept of racism. Although I think that the concept of racism
should, to a degree, be vague and open-ended, the degree to which it is
currently so is normatively problematic. There seems to be no one analytic
definition of the term that everybody recognizes as correct, though there
are many uses of “racism” and “racist” that are widely recognized, even if
contested by others. Often, though not always, people are capable of
understanding what others say when they call something racist. We can
often figure out how other people are using the term by seeing what exam-
ples they point to and by requesting explanations. Racial disrespect is one
analytic definition that governs ordinary usage. Racial hatred, another;

42
 So, for example, racism is said to be the belief that some races are inferior and others
superior; it is identified with racial hatred, contempt, and other attitudes, and it is said to be
a system of institutional norms which perpetuate racial inequality. Moreover, any social sys-
tem or form of society historically founded on racial slavery, racial segregation, white suprem-
acy, that continues to harbor inequalities that resulted from that history are called “racist.”
Many specific act types such as job discrimination based on race, racially motivated violence
(e.g., lynching), racial slurs, and certain racial epithets are all said to be racist. Moreover,
individuals employ “institutional racism,” “implicit racism,” and similar terms, in ways that
are widely accepted by large segments of the linguistic community. Finally, many paradig-
matic explanations and examples cut across the entire linguistic community.
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  71

racial injustice, another. And so forth. The problem, as I see it, is not that
the contestedness of the concept renders the concept of racism confused
and unintelligible. Rather, the problem is that the contestedness of racism
undermines the point of representation. Said differently, people normally
seem to ­understand what others say by their use of “racism,” though they
may reject such applications. (See Part II (especially Chap. 6) for further
discussion of these issues.)

2.2.2.4 The Significance of Explanation of Meaning for Philosophy?

I now discuss some of the implications of Wittgenstein’s conventional-
ism. First, it directs analytical attention to the fact  that the concept of
racism is bound up with moral practice, for usage of the term is correlated
to a moral-­representational need or set of such needs. The term “racism”
is designed to criticize whatever it describes. Conventionalism thus
encourages investigation into the normative practices surrounding the
way we come to learn and apply this term, the needs it fulfills for us,
and so forth.
Another implication of conventionalism is that explanations of racism
(of what racism is) are not descriptions of racism. As I discuss below, there
is nothing over and above our understanding of racism and our explana-
tions of what it is that can be pointed at as its meaning (for the meaning
of “racism” is not the object it stands for, but the set of rules governing its
proper use). In the next chapter I discuss the implications of this argument
for the nature of philosophical analysis. For instance, I consider what it
means to say that a grammatical proposition is true, and how and in what
way it might be possible to talk about justifying or criticizing competing
definitions.
A third implication of conventionalism is that the philosophical ques-
tion “What is racism?” is not a request for an empirical or metaphysical
description. Consider a philosophical example of a “What is W?” question
discussed by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations: “What is
imagination?” This example sheds light on the significance of his concep-
tion of grammar for his approach to philosophy.

One ought to ask, not what images are or what goes on when one imagines
something, but how the word “imagination” is used. But that does not
mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question of what imag-
ination essentially is, is as much about the word “imagination” as my question.
72  A. G. URQUIDEZ

And I am only saying that this question is not to be clarified—neither for

the person who does the imagining, nor for anyone else—by pointing; nor
yet by a description of some process. The first question also asks for the
clarification of a word; but it makes us expect a wrong kind of answer.43

It is natural to think that “What is imagination?” is about a language-­

independent  psychological reality. If one thinks thus, one will contrast it
with the question “How is the term ‘imagination’ used?”, that is, a question
about language. To answer the one, in that case, is not to answer the other.
Wittgenstein rejects this dichotomy. He holds that these questions are inter-
nally related and logically equivalent in a philosophical context. If this is
right, then tackling the second question is tantamount to tackling the first.
Why does Wittgenstein believe that the question “What is imagina-
tion?” makes us expect the “wrong kind of answer”? He seems to have in
mind the confusion of taking the surface-grammar of the sentence for its
actual grammar. The term “surface-grammar” signifies the form or appear-
ance of a sentence. For on the surface, the question appears to be about
reality. If we uncritically accept this appearance, our analysis will begin
with the supposition that “imagination” is the name of something real
(say, a mental process), and that the aim of philosophical inquiry is to
provide the correct description of this object. If, however, explanations of
words provide rules for their definienda, then the meaning of “imagina-
tion” is not an object but the role of this term in the language.44 To under-
stand the meaning of “imagination” is to understand its role in the
language-games that are played with it.
Similarly for the question “What is racism?” This is not a metaphysical
question, a question about what racism is in itself. It is a question about
language stated in the material mode. Philosophical analysis has two pos-
sible options here. “What is racism?” could analyze the request for a defini-
tion descriptively: “How is the word ‘racism’ used?”? Alternatively, it could
analyze the question prescriptively: “How should the word ‘racism’ be
used?” or “What is the best use of this term?” I defend the latter approach
for the analysis of racism in Part II. To arrive at this point, however, I must
first assess the metaphysical interpretation. If my discussion and defense of

43
 Wittgenstein (2009, §370).
44
 As Wittgenstein explains in The Blue Book: “Studying the grammar of the expression
‘explanation of meaning’ will teach you something about the grammar of the word ‘mean-
ing’ and will cure you of the temptation to look about you for some object which you might
call ‘the meaning’” (1958, 1).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  73

the core elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language are plausible,

we already have some reason to doubt the correctness of the metaphysical
interpretation. That being said, my first central argument against meta-
physical analysis is developed in Chap. 3. There the conventionalist picture
of definition is contrasted with descriptivism.
Medina provides a related but nevertheless instructive account of the
descriptivism-­conventionalism distinction:

On Wittgenstein’s view, there is a crucial distinction between symbolic rules

and propositions with a descriptive content: the latter can be deemed true or
false; the former are norms of representation which cannot be subject to
semantic evaluation (cf. e.g., Lectures 1932–35, p. 90). The failure to rec-
ognize this crucial distinction gives rise to a descriptivist view of rules.
According to this view, the rules of a symbolism express a special kind of
truth: a truth that can be asserted but not denied. Against this view,
Wittgenstein argues that if a proposition cannot be denied it cannot be
asserted either: it is a convention that we lay down. He emphasizes that the
grammatical statements that constitute the foundations of a propositional
system or calculus are not fact-stating propositions, but symbolic conven-
tions: “A basic rule of a system […] can only be laid down, but not asserted,
or denied” (PR §163).45

45
 Medina (2002, 112). I should note that although I employ the terms “conventional-
ism” and “descriptivism” in a way that is analogous to Medina’s discussion of these terms,
Medina goes on to argue that Wittgenstein’s “conventionalism” ultimately fails (103). He
argues that Wittgenstein was a conventionalist in the early 1930s who eventually worked his
way beyond it, abandoning it in favor of a practice-based conception of rules. “Note that
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on what is ‘natural’ for us constitutes a rejection of his earlier con-
ventionalism. He now underscores that the starting point of a rule-governed practice is not
a set of conventions, a list of rules, but a consensus of action. There are indeed rule-gov-
erned practices that are established by arbitrarily stipulated conventions; but for these con-
ventions to yield a normative practice, they have to be set in tune with what is ‘natural’ for
us (cf. RFM I.116). And, for Wittgenstein, both nature and nurture play a role in setting
the ‘natural limits’ of our understanding. For, as we shall see, what is ‘natural’ for us is
determined both by our unlearned, automatic responses (e.g., crying out in pain) and by
our learned techniques (counting as we do, for instance, is natural for us ‘though not for
everybody in the world’; LFM p. 243)” (214, n. 206). I take my use of “conventionalism”
to be consistent with Medina’s “practice-based conception of rules,” because I employ the
term differently than he does. Wittgenstein’s conventionalism, as I understand it, is not a
mere rule-based account of normativity (similar to Brandom’s view), but one that is deeply
interwoven with our practices and forms of life. In rejecting conventionalism what Medina
wants to rule out, it seems, is the notion that grammar is a matter of individual decision, as
opposed to a matter of practice. This repudiation is consistent with my approach to conven-
tionalism, as I explain below.
74  A. G. URQUIDEZ

To say that we cannot assert grammatical propositions is not to say that we

cannot utter sentences taken to express grammatical rules. We can and do
utter them. The claim is rather that one cannot perform the speech act of
assertion (or representation) via the use and utterance of a grammatical
sentence. For to use a grammatical sentence is not to assert anything about
reality, but to lay down a rule. Similarly, Medina is not denying that gram-
matical sentences cannot be said to be true. We can and do say that, for
example, it is true that bachelors are unmarried. The point is, rather, that
we need clarity about what it means to call a grammatical sentence true.
For it does not mean that a description corresponds to reality.
Descriptivism is the view that explanations of meaning are descrip-
tions, whether of reality or of linguistic practice. Conventionalism, by
contrast, holds that explanations of meaning are expressions of rules. As
Medina explains:

According to Wittgenstein, it is a descriptivist view of rules that has led phi-

losophers to “confuse two different things, a law of nature and a rule which
we ourselves lay down” (Lectures 1932–35, p. 83)… But statements that
express symbolic rules and statements that express laws of nature should be
distinguished because they play radically different roles: the latter describe
facts of nature, whereas the former do not concern how the world is but
how it ought to be described (cf. Lectures 1932–35 p. 84). The descriptivist
view of rules leads to the conflation of symbolic rules and natural laws and,
consequently, to the assimilation of all science to natural science, imposing
the logic of empirical research on all scientific endeavors and thus distorting
the purely “grammatical” nature of logic, mathematics, and geometry
(cf. Lectures 1932–35, pp. 51ff).46

Although Medina believes that the conventionalism Wittgenstein sub-

scribed to in the 1930s is a position he eventually gave up in favor of a
“practice-based contextualism,” a careful reading of Medina suggests that
what Wittgenstein gave up, if he is right, was not the view that definitions
are conventions in the sense that they are expressions of rules, but that they
are conventions in the sense that they are products of decision. It is only by
assuming that linguistic conventions are created via human decision that
conventionalism seems objectionable. Medina is right that some concepts
are not established via human decision and so are not conventions thus

46
 Medina (2002, 112).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  75

defined.47 But that is not the sense in which I invoke the term “conven-
tion.” A grammatical convention is a rule for the use of an expression that
is given by everyday explanations of meaning, that competent speakers
understand and appeal to as standards. This view, as far as I can tell, is
perfectly consistent with what Medina calls “Wittgenstein’s mature view,”
that “what is thinkable and expressible in language can only be contextu-
ally determined: it depends, in each case, on the techniques available in
our practices (cf. RFM I.116; LFM p. 69).”48

2.2.3  Wittgenstein’s Normativism
I have attempted to lay out the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of lan-
guage which is essential to my subsequent inquiries in this book. To be
sure, some key aspects (like his account of the arbitrariness of grammar)
have yet to be discussed. These will be taken up in Chaps. 2 and 3, where
I build on the foundation lain here. In what remains of the present chapter
I address briefly Wittgenstein’s brand of normativism, so as to distinguish
it from Robert Brandom’s inferentialism.

47
 Medina also rejects the standard view that Wittgenstein was committed to the autonomy
of grammar thesis.  I am inclined (pace Medina) to agree with Baker and Hacker that
Wittgenstein remained committed to the arbitrariness of grammar thesis, post-1930.
Moreover, even if Medina is correct on the historical point, I do not see why a Wittgensteinian
ought not subscribe to the autonomy of grammar thesis.
48
 I agree with Medina that language is essentially social in the sense that it requires a learn-
ing process that involves a competent teacher. He develops this position  by articulating a
“contextualist” view of communal agreement. “In Wittgenstein’s contextualist view the
agreement of the community is not the foundation or the ultimate ground of normativity; it
is simply part of the requisite background against which we use language and follow rules.
The upshot of Wittgenstein’s arguments is that language use and rule following cannot take
place in a vacuum; they are situated activities which require a context: an important part of
this context is the agreement in action of the members of a community of speakers or rule
followers; another important part consists in what Wittgenstein calls ‘very general facts of
nature’ (e.g., PI p. 230). Community agreement and facts of nature play a very similar role
in Wittgenstein’s view” (2002, 189). I think this is close to Wittgenstein’s position than
more canonical expressions of the “community view” of rule-following, for example,
Norman Malcolm’s Nothing is Hidden (1986). For an application of Wittgenstein’s later
thought to sociopolitical concepts, which takes a version of the community view to be essen-
tial, see Peg O’Connor’s Oppression and Responsibility (2002).
76  A. G. URQUIDEZ

2.2.3.1 Wittgenstein’s Normativism

Because Wittgenstein holds that “meaning is use” and gives the notion of
“use” a normative interpretation, he is committed to the normativity of
linguistic meaning. As such, his approach to semantics has aptly been
described as normativist. This places his semantic account in the same
camp with non-Wittgensteinian normativist positions of which Robert
Brandom’s inferentialism seems to be the closest parallel. Normativist
positions are united on the following front: they assert that meaning is
essentially normative.49 Jaroslav Peregrin, a proponent of Brandomian
inferentialism, provides a helpful description of this semantic approach:

What I take as characteristic of this approach is the view that meanings are
roles which are acquired by types of sounds and inscriptions in virtue of their
being treated in accordance with the rules of our language games, roughly
in the same way as wooden pieces acquire certain roles by being treated in
accordance with the rules of chess. It follows—inter alia—that (i) a mean-
ing is not an object labeled (stood for, represented …) by an expression; and
that (ii) meaning is normative in the sense that to say that an expression
means thus and so is to say that it ought to be used in a particular way.50

Boiling down normativism to its fundamental tenets: (a) “the meaning

of an expression is linked to its ‘role’ or function,” and (b) this “role or
function is in turn conferred by rules.”51 What is distinctive about the nor-
mativism of inferentialism is its focus on a subset of rules governing the use
of words, namely, rules governing communication. This contrasts with
Wittgenstein’s normativism which holds that all rules governing the use of
words that are necessary for sense and understanding are constitutive of lin-
guistic meaning. Hans-Johann Glock explains: Wittgenstein’s normativism
accepts “the idea that the meaning of an expression is constituted by the
rules for its correct use,” but is distinguished by this idea: “the notion of
meaning ought to be clarified by reference to other pertinent notions. The

49
 For a helpful introduction to normativism, see Daniel Whiting’s “What is the Normativity
of Meaning?” (2016).
50
 This is from Peregrin’s “Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning” (2012b, 76).
The literature on normativism is vast. For a general introduction to normativism, see Glüer
(2018). For book-length defenses of inferentialism, see Peregrin’s Inferentialism: Why Rules
Matter 2014 and Brandom’s Making it Explicit (1994). For briefer introductions and
defenses, see Peregrin’s essays (2012a) and “What is Inferentialism?” (unpublished), as well
as the introduction to From Rules to Meanings (Koreň and Kolman 2018).
51
 Peregrin (2014, 2).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  77

meaning of an expression is both what an acceptable explanation of mean-

ing explains and what a competent speaker understands.”52 Thus, in addi-
tion to syntactical rules, all explanations of meaning (and not just those
that enter into inferences) constitute linguistic meaning. This latter brand
of normativism is the one that provides the inspiration for my own approach.
Normativism—of both the Brandomian and Wittgensteinian varieties—
stands opposed to inferential role semantics and to representationalism in
the philosophy of language. Inferential role semantics agrees with the nor-
mativist idea that meaning is a function of the use or role of an expression.
Specifically, it analyzes semantic content in terms of the causal “role of an
expression within inferences actually carried out by speakers or thinkers.”53
By providing a causal interpretation of the role of expressions this position
stands opposed to normativism’s fundamental claim that meaning is nor-
mative. Hence, Brandom and Peregrin’s objection that inferential role
semantics fails to capture the “oughtness” of explanations of meaning. For
them, to explain what a word means is not to describe a causal process, but
to express a normative attitude.54 Normativism is also opposed to represen-
tationalism, which Peregrin explains thus: “A word, it is often claimed,
stands for – or represents, or expresses – its meaning, and the reason it can
do so is that we humans are simply symbol-mongerers: we have the peculiar
ability to let one thing stand for another.”55 Two elements of representa-
tionalism stand out. First, representationalists tend to stress homo sapiens’
representational power/s—that is, our psychological or mental ability—to
map the meanings or contents of sentences onto the representational con-
tents of thoughts.56 Second, representationalists tend to view semantic/
conceptual content in terms of a world-language connection. As Glock
explains: “The negative motivation behind ‘use theories’ [i.e., normativist
theories] is the failure of referential (‘Fido’-Fido) conceptions of meaning,
according to which the meaning of an expression is an object for which it
stands.” Thus, normativists maintain that “even in the case of referring
expressions, their meaning is not the object they stand for,”57 for, again, the
meaning of an expression, on normativism, is its use or role.

52
 Glock (2018, 63).
53
 Peregrin (2012b, 76, note 2). Proponents of inferential role semantics include
Boghossian (1993), and Fodor and Lepore (1993).
54
 For normativist criticisms of inferential role semantics, see Peregrin (2012b, 2014).
55
 Peregrin (2014, 1).
56
 See Koreň and Kolman (2018, 3).
57
 Glock (2018, 65).
78  A. G. URQUIDEZ

One objection to normativism is that the alleged normativity of mean-

ing boils down to a nebulous use of the term “correct,” one that suppos-
edly is not reducible to “true.” Paul Boghossian argues that the proper
way to analyze “correct use” is to offer a deflationary account: it is correct
to apply e to x is synonymous with e holds true of x. To this objection Glock
replies by offering a Wittgenstein-inspired account of semantic correctness
and incorrectness. He begins by reminding us that Wittgenstein’s account
of meaning holds that meaning is not a matter of how words are in fact
used, but of how they ought to be used; hence, what is semantically rele-
vant is the correct use of an expression. And correct use is provided by the
rules that lay down how it is to be used.58 After offering some critiques of
inferentialism, Glock provides four examples of statements exhibiting dif-
ferent types of mistake with respect to saying something. Only the first of
the following mistakes is semantic (i.e., confused thought):

1. Semantic mistake: I am mindful not only of our preserving executive

powers for myself, but for my predecessors as well. (Statement by
George Bush—misuses either “preserve” or “predecessor”)
2. Syntactical mistake: You teach a child to read, and he or her will be
able to pass a literacy test. (Statement by George W. Bush—“her” is
the wrong pronoun)
3. Social mistake: I know that I cannot win this seat (Statement by a
political candidate—is linguistically correct, and may also be factu-
ally correct, but is a social gaffe).
4. Factual mistake: Iraq is capable of deploying weapons of mass destruc-
tion within 45 minutes of an order by Saddam Hussein. (Statement
by Tony Blair—syntactically and grammatically correct, but false)

This brief list illustrates different kinds of mistake: linguistic (1–2), social/
pragmatic (3), and factual mistakes (4). Only semantic mistakes result in
confusion of the kind that precludes understanding of what is said (i.e.,
generates a confused thought). Boghossian is, therefore, wrong to con-
flate semantic conditions with truth conditions, because doing so fails to
appreciate that

Some uses of words are mistaken solely because of what these words mean,
irrespective of any other facts, syntactic rules or social expectations.

58
 Glock (2018, 74).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  79

Conversely, one can apply a word in a way which is semantically correct—

based on a proper understanding of its meaning—without applying it cor-
rectly in the sense of saying something true, namely if one errs about
pertinent facts.59

As a further illustration, Glock contrasts two mistakes in the employ-

ment of the word “drake.” His aim is to show, yet again, that semantic
mistakes are not reducible to factual mistakes. To know the meaning of a
word is not to know something about what is true, but to understand how
a term should be used, the conditions under which it is to be applied.
Consider three uses of “x is a drake”:

1. S applies “drake” to x, a male duck, thinking that x is a male

duck. [True]
2. S applies “drake” to x, a female duck, thinking that x is a male
duck. [False]
3. S applies “drake” to x, a male duck, on grounds other than that x is
a male duck. [Semantic confusion]

In case (1), the application of “drake” is semantically correct and the

assertion true. In case (2), the application of “drake” is semantically cor-
rect and the assertion false. And, in case (3), the application of “drake” is
semantically confused because the criterion of application is grammatically
incorrect. The lesson here is the same as before: semantic mistakes are not
identical to factual mistakes. Precisely because (3) is a semantic mistake, it
is bound to generate misunderstanding and confusion, which is what the
Wittgensteinian would expect in respect to semantic mistakes (given that
meaning is internally related to understanding). It thus seem that the nor-
mative use of “correctness” is not reducible to some non-normative use
of the term.
Glock extends his argument by linking the notion of “correctness” to
positive evaluation, and “incorrectness” to negative evaluation. His aim
here is to show that “correct use” means something more than “x satisfies
certain conditions.” For merely satisfying certain conditions lacks the nor-
mative component conveyed by the term “correct,” namely, that it is good
that x satisfies those conditions. One might think that for something to be
correct is for it to meet some acknowledged standard. In that case, to say

 Glock (2018, 75).

59
80  A. G. URQUIDEZ

that x is correct is to say nothing more than that x meets such a standard—
the implication being that whether x’s meeting said standard is good or
bad falls beyond the scope of what is said in calling it correct. Glock thinks
this view mistaken. He writes:

We also characterize x as meeting a standard of positive evaluation. The

term ‘correct’ is not purely descriptive or factual, but evaluative. What is
more, unlike other evaluative terms, for example, ‘good,’ it carries the fur-
ther implication that failure to meet the standard is not just undesirable, but
provides grounds for intervention. After all, the verb ‘to correct’ means: to
set right, rectify, or amend. Applying the terms used in the standard may be
purely descriptive, but applying the term ‘correct’ is not. And to call some-
thing incorrect is not only to evaluate it negatively; if something is incorrect,
then one has grounds for correcting it.60

He contrasts several examples to illustrate:

. Glock is not wearing a cap and gown.

1
2. Glock is not dressed correctly.
3. Glock is dressed badly.
4. Glock had to change his dress, because it was incorrect.
5. Glock didn’t have to change his dress, because it was correct.

Consider the first four propositions. Do any of them mean anything other
than “Glock failed to meet a certain standard”? Glock rejects (1) on the
grounds that failing to wear a cap and gown is not intrinsically good or bad.
He rejects (3) on the grounds that “dressed badly” is usually understood to
evoke a subjective aesthetic preference (thus lacking the relevant normative
force). Next, Glock argues that cases (2) and (4) are good candidates for
statements that carry normative force. His focus is not on the use of these
sentences, but on the sentence-meaning alone. This poses a problem for
case (2), for we cannot determine by virtue of the sentence-meaning alone
(without reference to a particular context) that an evaluative component
exists. However, in the case of (4), it is clear from the “because” that,
Glock not only fails to meet a certain acknowledged standard, but that he
was wrong not to meet it (as evidenced by the fact that he was made to

60
 Glock (2018, 76).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  81

correct his behavior). That is, the operative norm in this scenario (whatever
it might be) prescribes that he should have met this standard. For the same
reason, example (5) also has normative force, and here we get a positive
evaluation.

2.2.3.2 Demarcating Semantic Rules

We have seen that normativists agree that representationalism is a dead-­
end project, yet they disagree about various other things. For example,
inferentialists would likely object to the picture I have been painting of
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language—his assertion that meaning is
internally related to explanation and understanding, for example. Another
point of disagreement—the one to which I now turn—concerns the
proper way of demarcating semantic and non-semantic content. How, for
example, are we to distinguish semantic rules from pragmatic rules, syn-
tactic rules, psychological rules, idiolect rules, legal rules, et cetera? How
does the Wittgensteinian distinguish semantic and non-semantic rules?
What follows is the Wittgensteinian way of drawing the distinction, in
light of what we’ve covered above.
Glock argues that the key to differentiating semantic and non-semantic
rules lies in the following passage, in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical investi-
gations: “‘The meaning of a word is what an explanation of its meaning
explains.’ That is, if you want to understand the use of the word ‘mean-
ing’, look for what one calls ‘an explanation of meaning.’”61 This passage
is thought to philosophically unilluminating. The first putative problem is
that the account of meaning seems trivial, uninformative. To this problem
Glock replies that there is something important about this passage, trivial
or not. Its message is that meaning is nothing other than, nothing over
and above, what is explained by an explanation of meaning. That is, mean-
ing “does not have an existence independently of being explained and
understood.”62 The second putative problem with this passage stems from
the position that meaning does not exist anywhere, that meaning is not an
object. If meaning is nothing over and above what is both understood by
a competent speaker and explained by an explanation of meaning, then the
Wittgensteinian account of meaning is circular. Glock replies to this

61
 Wittgenstein (2009, §560).
62
 Glock (2018, 70).
82  A. G. URQUIDEZ

­ bjection by employing a method of clarification that he calls—following

o
P. F. Strawson—connective analysis.63
I will present Glock’s connective analysis of this quoted passage in order
to shed light on the distinction between semantic and non-semantic rules.
In “Semantics: Why Rules Matter,” Glock aims to defend a Wittgenstein-­
inspired normativism as a viable alternative to inferentialism. Unlike the
inferentialist who identifies meaning with rules of communication, the
Wittgensteinian holds that “the meaning of general terms is determined
by rules specifying conditions of application explained and understood by
competent speakers.”64 His aim is thus to unpack “Wittgenstein’s idea that
the notion of meaning ought to be clarified by reference to other perti-
nent notions,” specifically, the principles of explanation of meaning and
understanding of meaning:

Meaning-Explanation (ME): The linguistic meaning of an expression e is

what the explanation of e (as opposed to an explanation of the phenom-
ena e refers to or applies to) explains.
Meaning-Understanding (MU): The linguistic meaning of an expression e
is what a competent speaker or user of e (as opposed to someone who
knows everything about the phenomena e refers to or applies to) under-
stands by e.

These two connective principles are grammatical, for they essentially

unpack the ordinary concept of meaning while remaining within its nor-
mative parameters; that is, they illuminate the internal relationship of
meaning and explanation in the first case, and meaning and understanding

63
 Against the charge of circularity, Glock contends that circular explanations of a concept
are perfectly acceptable, provided they are apt and thus illuminating for the purposes at hand.
Connective analysis does not attempt to reduce the meaning of a concept-term to some
external notion (reductive analysis). Nor does it aim to specify the object supposedly signified
by this term in the misguided effort to “break down” the phenomenon into its basic con-
stituents (atomistic analysis). Instead, connective analysis provides “the description of the
rule-governed use of expressions, and of their connections with other expressions by way of
implication, presupposition, and exclusion. Connective analysis need not result in defini-
tions; it can rest content with elucidating features that are constitutive of the concepts under
consideration, and with establishing how they bear on philosophical problems, doctrines,
and arguments. ‘Only connect’: Strawson transposes E. M. Forster’s maxim for the under-
standing of human life to the understanding of our conceptual framework (see Strawson
1992, 17–19; 1995, 15–17)” (Glock 2018, 72).
64
 Glock (2018, 63).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  83

in the second. The significance of these illuminations lies in their relevance

for philosophical discussions of semantics.
Glock readily acknowledges the circularity of this analysis: “The attempt
to single out semantic rules appeals to conventions that can only be sepa-
rated from other rules governing language by presupposing the notion of
meaning.”65 Yet, such circularity is not vicious or otherwise objectionable,
for the aim is not to break free from the circle of semantic normativity, but
to illuminate it for purposes of motivating a non-inferentialist brand of
normativism.

What is to be avoided is not explanatory circles as such, but only those that
are too narrow or unilluminating for other reasons. The circles—in turn
interconnected—summarized by ME and MU, respectively, are not of this
kind. They shed light on the problematic notion of meaning by reference to
notions that do not invite reification and which seem to be less confusing in
philosophical contexts. Both of them also highlight normative dimensions
of the concept of meaning of the kind that normativism (whether inferen-
tialist or not) is keen on.66

ME and MU illuminate the distinction between semantic rules governing

the use of an expression and other use-governing rules. For instance, the
semantics of “Alberto” and “Professor” are (arguably) the same, yet these
terms do not have identical uses, for there are cases (such as courtrooms)
where the use of one of these terms is appropriate and the other is not.
Glock also points out that entries in standard lexica divide the explanans
into semantic rules  and other rules concerning the term explained
(explanandum). The semantic rules given in the explanans confer semantic
conditions for the application of the explananda, whereas other rules con-
cerning the explananda do not. In a good dictionary, for example, non-
semantic rules are often specified in parentheses in order to distinguish
them from semantic rules.

Some of these will be syntactic or morphological, for example, “(adj.).” But

others will specify features of use that qualify as pragmatic, for instance,
“(colloq.)” or “(pej.)” or “(anc.).” Even a parenthesis of that kind, how-
ever, falls way short of specifying specific rules concerning the impropriety
of “cop” in a legal context. This is another respect, therefore, in which fol-

 Glock (2018, 71).

65

 Glock (2018, 72).

66
84  A. G. URQUIDEZ

lowing up our apparently stale truism is illuminating: lexica provide a

­well-­established, clear, and generally reliable, though by no means fail-safe,
way of distinguishing semantically pertinent from other features of use.67

Wittgenstein’s grammatical remark concerning the meaning of “meaning”

is, therefore, illuminating, in spite of its circularity.
Turning next to the normative nature of MU, this principle asserts that
the meaning of an expression is what is understood or known by a com-
petent speaker of the language. Aside from linking the notion of under-
standing to the notion of meaning, Glock has little to say about it in this
essay.68 However, I have expressed much about this relationship in pre-
ceding sections. Hopefully, I have managed to illuminate the notion of
understanding meaning by characterizing it as an ability, by linking it to
training and learning, by elucidating its relationship to explanations of
meaning, and so on. As we’ve noted, Baker and Hacker observe that
Wittgenstein provides three criteria for knowing/understanding the
meaning of a word: (a) the ability to use it; (b) the ability to explain it;
and (c) the ability to respond appropriately to its use by others. Glock is
thus correct that “competent speakers, users, or uses are those satisfying
certain standards,” viz. the standards specified by the explanations of
competent speakers. To determine whether rules governing the use of an
expression are semantic, simply determine “whether a speaker needs to be
familiar with them to count as a competent user, in the sense of knowing
what e means.”69
Wittgenstein’s account of understanding supports his contention that
linguistic meanings are not hidden and do not require the theoretical
knowledge of experts. Meanings are public, open to view, as we have
said. The account also implies that, for any competent speaker of a
­language—call this person S—if S uses a word “W” in a context of use
C, then S normally has the ability to produce an everyday explanation of
what “W” means in C. This positions was defended in a previous section,
so I will not dwell on it here.
To sum up, for the Wittgensteinian, linguistic meaning is a correlate
of two things: explaining the meaning of a word and understanding the

67
 Glock (2018, 70).
68
 Glock does, however, reflect on this issue elsewhere. See his entries on “Understanding”
and “Explanation” in his A Wittgenstein Dictionary (1996).
69
 Glock (2018, 71).
 2  THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  85

meaning of a word. ME and MU, which merely unpack the quote from
Wittgenstein (above), identify two ways of distinguishing semantic and
non-semantic rules of language use: (1) semantic rules are those fur-
nished by explanations of meaning, such as those provided by our diction-
aries; (2) semantic rules are those that competent speakers of the natural
language employ in virtue of their linguistic competency. As previously
argued, (1) does not entail that only lexical entries are capable of provid-
ing semantic rules, for there are a diversity of forms of explanations of
meaning, and many of them—for example, ostensive ­definition—will
not be found in the dictionary. They are acceptable by the lights of con-
dition (2), that is, by being  representative explanations of com­
petent speakers.
I conclude that the Wittgensteinian account of meaning can be
defended against the charge that it offers no criteria for distinguishing
semantic and non-semantic rules of use. The dictionary normally provides
an obvious, accessible, and concrete authority on semantic content—its
defeasibility and occasional error notwithstanding—such that on normal
occasions, if a speaker’s explanation of meaning is incompatible with what
it says, the individual (and not the dictionary) is likely confused. At the
same time, dictionary entries can be checked against the practice of com-
petent speakers.

2.3   Conclusion: The Aim of This Book

In Sect. 2.1, I specified three interpretations of the philosophical question
“What is racism?” I began my evaluation by expressing my intention to
begin with the metaphysical interpretation. According to it, definitions of
“racism” are competing descriptions of an ontological reality called racism
itself. This entity supposedly has language-independent existence. In the
next two chapters, I engage—and ultimately reject—the metaphysical inter-
pretation of “What is racism?” I focus on this approach because many recent
theorists of racism outright endorse or presuppose metaphysical analysis as
the correct approach, as I documented in this chapter.
This approach presupposes a certain conception of definition (or expla-
nation of meaning) which stands opposed to conventionalism, namely,
descriptivism. In this chapter, I have defended an alternative conception of
explanation of meaning that constitutes a crucial aspect of conventional-
ism. My contention was that it is possible and plausible to conceive of defi-
nitions of “racism” (and other explanations of meaning) as linguistic
86  A. G. URQUIDEZ

conventions. If this is correct, then the term “racism,” as used in the con-
text of a definition, is not the name of a social or empirical object, and is
not the name of a transcendent entity either, for it is not the name of
anything. Rather, the term has a different role in the context of definition.
A definition of “racism” is a standard of linguistic correctness. Such a stan-
dard directs our attention to the role that the grammar of “racism” plays
in our lives as well as the corresponding normative attitudes that inform
those practices. If Wittgenstein’s conventionalism provides the correct
picture of language, then descriptivism distorts the concepts of meaning,
understanding, and explanation of meaning. It is thus necessary to correct
such distortion in theory.

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———. 2005. The Normativity of Meaning Made Simple. In Philosophie und/als
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———. 1996. Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy.
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 CHAPTER 3

Re-defining “Definition”: An Argument

for Conventionalism

3.1   Introduction

3.1.1  Scope of the Chapter
Conventionalism is the name of the family of doctrines clustered around a
normativist conception of meaning, sketched in Chap. 2. This chapter
continues my prima facie defense of conventionalism. My claim is that
conventionalism plausibly analyzes definitions of “racism” because it
accommodates intuitions that are otherwise difficult to reconcile (Sect.
3.2). These are empirically based intuitions about the sociohistorical char-
acter of definition, on the one hand, and a priori-based intuitions about
the apparent metaphysical properties of definition, on the other. On the
one hand, definitions appear to have a temporal character: they are socially
constructed, have an origin in history, and evolve over time. These contin-
gencies incline some scholars to say that racism is an unstable entity, a
sociocultural phenomenon. On the other hand, definitions of “racism”
seem to be necessary and universal truths. For instance, it seems it is a
necessary truth that racism is always wrong. Empirically and a priori-based
intuitions have sometimes served as the basis for competing empirical and
a priori approaches to racism.
I focus on these two classes of properties because of their importance
for philosophy generally and because of their indispensability to the
­philosophy of racism. This chapter demonstrates the ­compatibility of these

© The Author(s) 2020 91

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_3
92  A. G. URQUIDEZ

intuitions, and hence the compatibility of empirical and a priori approaches.

In Sect. 3.3, I argue that although the theoretical standoff between a pri-
ori and empirical approaches seems irreconcilable, it is not in fact so. A
conventionalist approach (a view of meaning and definition) goes a con-
siderable way toward demonstrating that the two approaches provide
complementary analyses of linguistic  convention. To cut through this
methodological stalemate, the nature of a priori and empirical analyses
must be reconceptualized, for when viewed aright we find that both play
important roles in the theory of racism. Roughly speaking, a priori analysis
focuses on the values and norms that constitute our conceptual scheme.
Empirical analysis focuses on the facts, processes, conditions, and conse-
quences that bear on these norms, and so have the potential to disrupt and
re-tool our conceptual scheme. I close Sect. 3.3 by arguing that conven-
tionalism provides a naturalistic account of definition’s seemingly meta-
physical predicates. This virtue renders the conventionalist picture of
definition more plausible than the descriptivist alternative.
The analysis that follows can be classified as connective analysis, on the
model of P. F. Strawson (discussed in Chap. 2). My main argumentative
strategy involves contrasting uses of “contingent,” “true,” “arbitrary,” “a
priori,” “necessity,” “universality,” and “justification” in two contexts: the
descriptive and the normative. My conclusion is that, properly under-
stood, these notions mean differently in these contexts. Understanding
the grammar of these notions in relation to the contexts of everyday dis-
course and grammatical/a priori analysis paints a rich, integrated picture
of the manifold nature of human convention. I contend that the norma-
tive is the primary domain of the conceptual.

3.1.2  Terminology: “Proposition,” “Sentence,”

“Rule-Formulation”
Throughout this book, I employ technical terminology that may be confus-
ing if left unexplained. I will thus explain it here. I use the term “proposi-
tion” to signify an element of a complex. Following Wittgenstein’s use of the
term (as explicated by Glock), I define a proposition as a complex involv-
ing the use of a linguistic form (including a one-word sentence) on a particu-
lar occasion to say something.1 Propositions, then, are comprised of three

1
 Glock rightly points out that Wittgenstein took proposition to be a family resemblance
concept. That is, Wittgenstein rejected the claim that propositions display a general form. Be
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  93

things: a linguistic form S, a use of S, and what is expressed by the use of S. As

I use the term “proposition” throughout this book, I will not always men-
tion every element of this complex; indeed, I will sometimes use “proposi-
tion” to signify an element of this complex. The context of use should make
clear how I mean it to be understood, that is, the emphasis I wish to place.
For instance, if I write The proposition that it is raining is true, I am emphasiz-
ing that what is expressed by the use of the sentence “It is raining” on a par-
ticular occasion obtains. Alternatively, if I write The proposition ‘It is raining
outside’ is a description, the context makes clear that the emphasis is on the
form of words (the sentence) that can be used in normal contexts to express
a descriptive proposition. In the first example, what is expressed or asserted
belongs to the foreground; the sentence and its use belong to the back-
ground. In the second example, the sentence belongs to the foreground; its
use is implicit in the foreground but not mentioned; and what it expresses
belong to the background. In both cases, all three constitutive elements are
essential to the practice of saying something (i.e., to the “move” of asserting
a proposition in a language-game).
The reason for bringing these elements together as a complex is to
bring into view that speaking is an activity wherein the notions of speaking,
sentence, use, among other notions (such as technique of application) are
internally related. To elaborate further, a sentence is a linguistic form that
is internally related to grammatical rules that constitute those language-
games wherein the sentence has a use. Wittgenstein calls it the minimal
unit for making a move in a language-game (for saying something mean-
ingful). Furthermore, a string of words does not count as a sentence by
virtue of having any particular structure, but by virtue of being used on an
occasion to perform an intelligible linguistic act. For example, “Shame!”
and “Ouch!” count as significant sentences for Wittgenstein (for they can
be used to say something), despite their consisting of exactly one word. I
will mostly focus on the contrast between grammatical propositions (sen-
tences used to perform the speech act of laying down a rule for the use of
an expression) and empirical propositions (sentences used to perform the
speech act of describing/reporting/representing/depicting reality).
Sentences can be used to express various kinds of propositions—for
example, a description on one occasion of use,  a grammatical rule  on
another occasion. I also distinguish between a rule-­formulation and the

that as it may, Glock holds that Wittgenstein employs a technical sense of “proposition” for
purposes of his philosophical investigations. His technical usage “is at odds with what we
ordinarily call a ‘proposition’ or ‘sentence’” (Glock 1996, 318).
94  A. G. URQUIDEZ

rule it expresses. A rule-formulation is a form of words (sentence) that is

used to lay down a rule for the correct use of words. “Racism is wrong,”
“Bachelors are unmarried,” and “Red is a color” are rule-formulations.
That is, they are rule-formulations on just those occasions where they are
used to lay down a rule for the correct use of “racism,” “bachelor” and
“red,” respectively. It is impossible to determine by the form of a sentence
alone whether it is a rule-formulation or a descriptive sentence. For it is
the use of a sentence that determines this. Take the sentence “This is red.”
This form of words can be used to describe an object’s color or to express
a rule for the correct use of “red.” When the latter obtains, the form of
words “That is red” is a rule-formulation; when used to describe, it is a
descriptive sentence. The rule, by contrast, is expressed by the rule-formu-
lation on a particular occasion of grammatical  use. I will often speak
loosely  for the sake of convenience. Consider: The sentence “Racism is
wrong” is a rule-formulation that expresses a rule for the use of “racism.”
This statement is cumbersome and pedantic. Moreover, it is cleaner
English to simply state: “Racism is wrong” is a rule for using “racism.”
(The simpler form may generate confusion. For example, one might inter-
pret the simper sentence to mean that the sentence “Racism is wrong” is a
rule, which is mistaken. It is not the sentence but what it expresses that
is a rule.)

3.2   The Many Sides of Convention: Recasting

Metaphysical Predicates as Facets of Convention
I will go through several properties commonly attributed to grammatical
propositions2 and explain how Wittgenstein recasts them as facets of con-
vention.3 In each case, it will be shown that the form of a sentence is mis-
2
 Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker agree with Glock (see note 1) that proposition is a family
resemblance concept. They defend this claim by pointing out that Wittgenstein identified
significant differences between propositions (2009, 245–246). He offered different analyses
of logical propositions (tautologies), arithmetical propositions (“2+2=4”), ordinary gram-
matical propositions (e.g., “Red is a color”), metaphysical propositions (“Only my present
experiences are real”), hinge-empirical propositions (“The world has existed for many
years”). When I speak of Wittgenstein’s views on grammatical propositions throughout the
book I am referring to his views about ordinary grammatical propositions and metaphysical
propositions.
3
 I draw heavily from Baker and Hacker, who, in my view, are preeminent authorities on
Wittgenstein, as evidenced by their four-volume commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations. In this chapter, I draw mostly from Volume 2, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar
and Necessity (2009).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  95

leading as to its function. The most common mistake and most fundamental
source of misunderstanding is confusing a norm of description with a
description. Wittgenstein cautions: “Don’t confuse a rule for the use of
the word A with a sentence in which the word A is used.”4 “All bachelors
are unmarried” looks like “All bachelors are smart” but the latter is a
description whereas the former is a norm.5 This version of the is/ought
distinction—the distinction between a descriptive proposition (a descrip-
tion of X) and a normative proposition (a rule for the use of the word
“X”)—is foundational to the following discussion. Although I discuss
grammatical propositions generally, my aim is to illuminate (analytic) defi-
nitions of “racism.”

3.2.1  The Empirical Side of Convention

3.2.1.1 Contingency as the Mark of Culture

We feel that some propositions are necessarily true while others are contin-
gently true. Contingent propositions are those that might be true or false,
depending on the facts. Classic examples of contingent propositions include
empirical judgments. For instance, whether the proposition that it is raining
outside (at time t and place p) is true is contingent on the weather (at t/p).
Contingent propositions and their negations are internally consistent (i.e.,
entail no contradiction). For there is no way to tell whether a contingent
proposition is true or false in advance of experience. Hence the only way to
tell whether it is raining is to get clear on the fact of the matter. A contingent
empirical proposition is true if things are as the proposition depicts them as
being, and false otherwise. For this reason, Hume describes contingent
claims as “matters of fact.”
Many grammatical propositions seem also to be contingently true. Some
examples include: “The king moves one square at a time,” “Bachelors are
unmarried men,” and “One meter is the length of the Standard Meter
Bar.” We call them contingent because things could have been otherwise

4
 Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript (2013, p.  187). See Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics (1983) and Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of
Mathematics, Cambridge 1939 (1989, lectures 25–26) for an account of the differences
between empirical descriptions and grammatical (normative) propositions. Many of the
points discussed below are from these sources.
5
 It may seem as though there is something about each sentence that entails a difference
in kind. In fact, it is the use of these sentences that accounts for the distinction, as I argue
in Chap. 4.
96  A. G. URQUIDEZ

than they actually are. The rule for the chess king might have been that the
king moves two squares at a time; the term “bachelor” might have signified
unmarried women; and the Standard Meter Bar, which we’ve selected as
the standard for “one meter,” might have had a length of eighty inches.
The proposition that bachelors are unmarried appears to be true in a way
that is similar to the proposition that bachelors are smart. Namely: the
truth of both seems to be contingent on the facts. Had we adopted the
norm that bachelors are married, the proposition that bachelors are unmar-
ried would have been false. Thus to describe these definitions as contingent
is to say that they might be (or might have been) otherwise. A norm—and
just about everything else—is contingent in the sense that it might be dif-
ferent than it is.
I take this to be a standard way of thinking about grammar. A mere
convention is thought to be a contingently true definition or rule, one
that is perhaps true by stipulation. By contrast, a convention that is
thought to be more than a mere convention, one that is called a neces-
sary definition or rule, is thought to be grounded in the facts, in reality.
For example, “Red is darker than pink” or “Humans are animals” are
called necessary truths. I find this account  misleading, if left unquali-
fied. It is just as misleading to say that grammatical propositions (such
as definitions) are contingently true6. In both cases, clarity is needed
about what precisely these predications do and do not entail. For exam-
ple definitions are not contingent on the definition provided above, since
definitions are not made true by the facts. Normally, outside of philo-
sophical contexts,  we do not speak of the definition of “bachelor” as
contingent though we recognize it to be revisable. Indeed, we deny that
this is the case. We say that the truth of this proposition does not depend
on any facts about the marital status of bachelors, for the truth is ana-
lytic (true by definition). Further, anyone who thought she could
potentially refute the proposition that bachelors are unmarried by refer-
ence to a body of facts (empirical evidence) would be confused about
the meaning of “bachelor.” It is not a discovery, observation, or opinion
that bachelors are unmarried, but a rule that they are. In this way, it differs

6
 “We characterize innumerable logical, grammatical and mathematical propositions as
true. Wittgenstein did not deny this platitude; nor did he try to persuade us to stop saying
this. For ‘philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language… It leaves
everything as it is’ (Philosophical Investigations, §124). What he did, as always, was to press
us to examine what we mean by such truth predications” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 270).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  97

from the proposition that bachelors are smart, which would be contin-
gently true (if it were true); for whether bachelors are smart or not
depends on facts about the intellectual faculties of bachelors. However,
the truth of the definition that bachelors are unmarried is not contin-
gent on an analogous set of facts. It is a necessary truth.
We must therefore distinguish different ways that a proposition might
be said to be “contingent.” It might be called contingent in the sense that
its truth depends on human decision and practice. Grammatical proposi-
tions, unlike empirical propositions, are contingent in that they are conven-
tions, and it is for that reason that their truth does not depend on empirical
facts, but on human practice. Conventions, of course, can be changed or
abandoned. To call the definition of “bachelor” into question is to call the
practice or convention into question (as I argue below). Let us then distin-
guish, as Wittgenstein does, between contingency/necessity in a gram-
matical system and contingency/necessity of a grammatical system7:

1. Necessity outside the system: A rule is necessary if it must hold for every
community (sempiternal). A rule is contingent if it need not hold for
every community (e.g., if it could be otherwise).
2. Necessity inside the system: A rule is necessary if it is constitutive of and
essential to a practice. A rule is contingent if it is not constitutive of
or essential to a practice.8

Wittgenstein argued that grammar is arbitrary—that is, not justifiable by

reference to reality—and that, consequently, there is no such thing as neces-
sity outside a system. Thus, outside the English language (i.e., within some
other language), there may or may not be a rule about what counts as red.
Outside our grammatical system, our grammatical norms become contin-
gent. Thus far, then, I have posited that, outside a system, grammatical
propositions are never necessary, but always contingent in that (i) they
depend on human practice and decision for their truth; and that (ii) they need
not hold for every society, since a community can adopt a different gram-
matical system. I will briefly discuss some arguments for this position below.

7
 Wittgenstein states: “We must distinguish between a necessity in the system and a neces-
sity of the whole system” (Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, 1975, XXV, p. 341).
His example is that 25 × 25 = 625 is what we call a necessary result of mathematics, a para-
digm of necessity.
8
 I qualify this position below. Calling rules “necessary” is misleading, since it might lead
to the idea that there are “superhuman” (language-independent)  facts that are true in all
possible worlds. Rules, or rather grammatical propositions, are only necessary in a system.
Outside the system, rules are contingent.
98  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Here I want to focus on what contingency and necessity amount to inside a

grammar system.
Within a grammatical system we distinguish between contingent and
necessary truths. Contingent truths are true empirical, representational,
and descriptive propositions. They are those that individuals assert, posit
as hypotheses, provide evidence for, and so on. These truths, because they
are contingent, depend on the facts, on how the world is, for their truth.
And, of course, it is trivially true that if the facts go one way, they might
have gone some other way. Necessary truths are propositions that are con-
stitutive of the grammatical system. They are not representations in the
system but norms of representation. These norms may be represented
within the system (or outside it), but they cannot be epistemically evalu-
ated from within the system of which they are constitutive. A grammatical
proposition may be evaluated as useful or useless, good or bad, but not as
(epistemically) true or false. For the conditions of (epistemic) truth and
falsehood are provided by the system, by grammatical propositions. What
is more, to evaluate a proposition is to provide evidence or epistemic rea-
sons for it. These are reasons for thinking a proposition is true independent
of a community’s values, form of life, and decision to adopt it. But what
evidence or epistemic reasons can be provided to establish that a rule must
be laid down, must be followed? A grammatical proposition is made true
by its being laid down as the rule. Grammatical truth is a function of
human decision, and is invariably rooted in a community’s values, inter-
ests, and so on.
If the rules of a system are necessary, constitutive of it, then does that
mean that they cannot be modified or abandoned? The rules themselves,
as we have said, are not necessary but contingent in that they are conven-
tions; hence they are in principle revisable. And to say this is to make the
point stated previously that rules are human creations that are contingent
upon human practice. This is a claim about a grammar system, not a claim
about contingency or necessity in the system. We should not speak then
about necessary rules, but about necessary truths, that is, propositions
that are constitutive of a system. A proposition that is necessary in a system
is a constitutive norm. Can it be abandoned? Yes, but doing so changes the
practice, the language-game in question, just as changing the rules of
chess changes the meaning of “chess” and, with it, the practice of chess.
And this is, of course, the point of designating a rule “constitutive,” for it
defines the practice in question.
What does it mean to call a grammatical proposition “true”? One might
think that a grammatical proposition is true if and only if it governs or is
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  99

in force; that is, grammatical propositions are norm-existence statements.

But this is misguided. Grammatical propositions are not norm-existence
statements, though we are liable to conflate the two. “A bachelor is unmar-
ried” and “It is a (current) rule of English that bachelors are unmarried”
are not equivalent. The former is constitutive of a representational prac-
tice; as such, it functions as a standard of conduct, providing a rule for the
correct use of “bachelor.” The latter is (normally used as) an empirical
description or temporal statement about an existing practice. Grammatical
propositions, in other words, are normative propositions, not descriptions
of reality. Unlike a grammatical proposition, the assertion that a gram-
matical norm exists or obtains (e.g., “R is in force”) is a description the
truth or falsity of which depends on the facts. One feature of norm-exis-
tence statements is that they are temporal, for whether a norm exists,
obtains, or is in force depends on historical facts (e.g., the origin of a norm
and how long it has existed).9 They are connected with cultural or anthro-
pological matters more generally. “The king moves one square at a time”
and “Throughout the 19th century the king has moved one square at a
time” are not analogous, for the latter may shed light on some interesting
aspect of a society whereas the former is used to lay down a chess rule.
Similarly, “In the early 20th century, English speakers introduced the term
‘racism’ to signify a system of beliefs about racial superiority and inferior-
ity” is a norm-­existence statement about the grammar of “racism.” It can
be used to illuminate an important shift in social attitudes toward the so-
called “science of race.” This is unlike “Racism is a system of beliefs about
racial superiority and inferiority,” which is not (normally used as) an
empirical description with a temporal component, but a rule for the use of
“racism,” a standard of linguistic conduct.10
What, then, does it mean to call a grammatical proposition true? We
speak of “true” and “false” definitions, but it is unclear what purchase
these terms have on conventionalism. I answer that sentences that have
the form of metaphysical (“Red is a color”), ethical (“Racism is wrong”),
and empirical (“Water is H2O”) descriptions are often used as normative
propositions. Adding “it is true that” to these sentences does not funda-
mentally alter their normative function. To say that red is a color is to lay
down a standard for the correct use of “red,” and in so doing one tacitly
endorses this standard as the correct norm. Uttering “it is true that...”

9
 Baker and Hacker (2009, 278).
10
 The rules of grammar are conditions of sense, the conditions under which such and such
can be (meaningfully) said.
100  A. G. URQUIDEZ

does not change the semantic function (which is to lay down a rule), but
merely shifts emphasis onto the speaker’s endorsement of the rule. This is
analogous to the relationship of “It is raining” and “It is true that it is
raining.” Both are normally used to make empirical assertions. Indeed,
they are used to say the same thing. As Wittgenstein explains, “p” and “It
is true that p” normally mean the same. In conversation with Waismann,
he qualified this position by noting an important difference in the use of
these forms of words. Although these two propositions have the same
semantic content (or, as he would put it, say the same thing), the corre-
sponding sentences are not used in the same circumstances.11 For instance,
if someone expresses doubt about my assertion that p, I might reassure
one by asserting that it is true that p. To assert that p is both to express that
p and my attitude of affirmation that p.12 The addition of “it is true” to the
expression does not modify the semantic content of p. However, it may
shift the emphasis away from p to the speaker’s affirmation that p. Hence,
assertions that include the expression “it is true that…” are prominently
used to reassure others that p. Something similar applies to grammatical
propositions.13

3.2.1.2 What We Affirm and What We Do with What We Affirm

It might be said that there are different kinds of truth, but this can be
misleading. It does not seem to be the case that the meaning of “truth”

11
 See Baker and Hacker (2009, 271).
12
 Truth is not predicated of grammatical rules, but of rule-formulations, that is, state-
ments of rules. “The question before us, however, is what it means to call definition true.
Although we do not ascribe truth-values to a rule, we have no qualms at all about ascribing
truth or falsehood to the statement of a rule – as when we say that it is true that the chess king
moves one square at a time, or that it is false that the prime minister presents his cabinet to
the president on the third Monday after winning an election – rather, it is the third Wednesday.
(This is comparable to our not ascribing truth or falsity to a fact, but only to a purported
statement of a fact.) So there is nothing anomalous about holding that arithmetical equations
are rules – that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is the statement or expression of a rule – and that it is true that 2
+ 2 = 4” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 278). Baker and Hacker seem to be correct here. We speak
of chess rules being correct—as when we insist that a rule has been violated (“No, that rule
is incorrect, the correct rule is…”)—but not ordinarily about their being true (“This is the
true rule”) or facts. Instead we say that it is a fact (or it is true) that R, which is akin to saying
“You must not go to the store!” The “it is true that” might be called pleonastic, but it serves
a rhetorical function similar to that of the emphatic “must.”
13
 Descriptivism, as I explain below, is a theory of definition which holds that a definition
is a description.
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  101

changes from one kind of proposition to the next. Rather, what changes
across different kinds of propositions—say, from empirical to grammatical
propositions—is what we are affirming (as true) and what we do with what
we thus affirm. As Baker and Hacker explain: “The moot question is: what
differences are there between such truth-ascriptions (LFM 68–70)? In
particular, what is it that we are affirming, and what different kinds of
things do we do with what we thus affirm?”14 What we affirm in the case
of an empirical assertion is a description of reality. What we affirm in the
case of a grammatical proposition is a rule for describing reality. And what
we do with an empirical assertion are such things as provide evidence for
another claim, provide relevant information to an interested party, give
testimony, et cetera. What we do with grammatical propositions is alto-
gether different, for grammatical propositions play various normative roles,
roles constitutive of our language-­games, such as correcting misuses and
misunderstandings of words, teaching the meanings of words, et cetera.
Consider rule-formulations of the form “Racism is X.” What we nor-
mally do with such forms of words is assess behavior, attitudes, institutions,
and so on, according to a standard of correct moral representation, for the
word “racism” is ordinarily and primarily used to condemn. The use of
“racism” to condemn is often a move in the language-game of moral blame
that presupposes a rule (like “Racism is X”). In other cases, the term “rac-
ism” is used to criticize social arrangements. When I apply the term “moral
representation,” I do so broadly to encompass both modes of condemna-
tion, individual wrongdoing and social criticism. (I will return to this dis-
tinction in Chap. 7.)

3.2.1.3 The Arbitrariness of Grammar

The contingency of linguistic norms is connected with an important aspect
of grammar that Wittgenstein calls the arbitrariness of grammar.15 This

14
 Baker and Hacker (2009, 270–71).
15
 See, for example, chapter 56 of Wittgenstein’s The Big Typescript (2013, pp. 184–188).
His view is most worked out in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1983) and his
Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics (1989). For helpful expositions of Wittgenstein’s
account of arbitrariness, see, in addition to the previously cited references, Hacker’s “The
Arbitrariness of Grammar and the Bounds of Sense” (2000) and Michael Forster’s
Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar (2004).
102  A. G. URQUIDEZ

thesis asserts that no language-independent standard justifies the adoption

of one grammatical norm over any other. There is no court of appeal out-
side of human practice that can underwrite grammar, for every rationally
compelling reason to adopt one rule over another presupposes a gram-
matical system. Nothing outside the language of community C can logically
compel its members to adopt rule R (if it is considering R) or retain R (if
R is already in force). Thus, the fact that things might be otherwise implies
that a community is able to adopt/give up a norm, but not that it should
(or should not) do so.
One reason for thinking the arbitrariness thesis true is that it is consis-
tent with how we come to adopt and affirm grammatical rules. Grammatical
rules are taught to us, not via argumentation and empirical evidence, but
via training and explanations of meaning, which we learn to follow blindly.
A competent speaker initially serves as our teacher, and a person who reg-
ularly challenged the teacher would be incapable of learning the language.
Training, the foundation for the teaching of language via explanations of
meaning, is a process of non-ratiocinated drilling, whose foundation lies in
instinctual reactions, like mimicking behavior. Thus every step of the
developmental process is non-rational, in the following sense: language-
acquisition is not justified by evidence or argumentation, for it is a matter
of blind enculturation. By the time the pupil is able to consult the lexicon
and ask questions like “What is the meaning of X?” and “Does he mean Y
by X?” he has reached maturation and has mastered a significant portion
of the language. Only then is he able to request reasons, develop argu-
ments, and provide rational justifications.
The theses of the arbitrariness and revisability of grammar are contro-
versial. For although philosophers might agree that no language-­
independent logic underwrites definitions like “Bachelors are unmarried”
and “One meter is the length of the Standard Meter Bar,” some metaphy-
sicians argue that there are rational grounds for holding certain grammati-
cal propositions: say, “Red is a color” or “Honesty is good.” However, it
seems to me that any attempt to justify our color scheme will necessarily
fall back on our practices, on what is significant to us. Hence, it would
simply presuppose what it aims to prove. Similarly for “Honesty is good.”
On conventionalism, definitions are contingent in the sense specified
above, and so are unjustifiable by reference to facts external to linguistic
practice. Yet, this view is compatible with maintaining that we have rea-
sons for adopting these human constructs, even if they are internal to our
language, to our forms of life. What is denied, then, is not rationality tout
court, but a language-­independent rationality that transcends all human
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  103

practices. The freedom that characterizes our ability to adopt whatever

conventions we like is not a limit that is incompatible with the existence of
immanent reasons, internal to language.
If grammar is unjustifiable by a putative correspondence between gram-
mar and the facts, what kinds of reasons qualify as good reasons for justify-
ing grammar? These are sociocultural considerations broadly construed to
include scientific, aesthetic, moral, and other practical considerations. A
sociocultural consideration counts as a reason if it appeals to the interests,
desires, and goals of the linguistic community. These historically condi-
tioned factors constitute pragmatic or prudential reasons for adopting the
grammatical norm. The norm is then said to be pragmatically justified,
and this simply means that it satisfies the corresponding need (vis-a-vis the
community’s forms of life). We have, for example, representational needs.
Definitions of “bachelor” and “racism” are norms of representation. They
are justified by reference to our linguistic community’s need to represent
things as bachelors and racist, respectively. Grammar rules are means to
ends; they are adopted because of their utility for achieving such and such
purposes. For example, moral terms (and their definitions) are adopted
because of the need to condemn and hold individuals accountable. This
implies that if our morality should change, or if our representational needs
should change, our moral terms and definitions would also change. It is,
therefore, important to distinguish the pragmatic justifiability of grammar
from the contingency of grammar. The latter implies, among other things,
that every grammar rule is open to revision.
It might be objected that the arbitrariness of grammar diminishes the
significance of grammar. For instance, if “Racism is wrong” is contingent,
then this seems to undermine the deep importance of this rule. The rule,
in effect, is rendered pointless or unimportant. This objection is misguided.
Conventionalism does indeed assert that this is an “arbitrary” convention,
but it invokes the term in Wittgenstein’s technical sense.
It is a mistake to equate contingency and revisability with diminished
value.  No one would say that the norms of the U.S. Constitution are
“arbitrary” in the sense of being pointless or unimportant simply because
they are contingent and revisable. (On the contrary, we take the revisabil-
ity and unfixed nature of the Constitution to be one of its greatest
strengths.) There are reasons why we adopt some norms and reject others.
Those that are laid down are not arbitrarily selected (even if they are “arbi-
trary” in Wittgenstein’s sense), for they serve important purposes and
meet important needs for us. Moreover, although it is true that we could
104  A. G. URQUIDEZ

replace the norm that racism is wrong with the norm that racism is good,
this in itself is not a reason for rejecting or revising a grammar rule (any
more than it is a reason for adopting a grammar rule). The potential revis-
ability of grammar norms is just that, the potential to do so. Whether that
potential should be realized or not depends on our needs and forms of life.
The point then is this: That definitions are essentially revisable does not
imply that they ought to be revised. Whether we ought or ought not revise
them depends on the values and practices of our linguistic community, on
whether our linguistic norms fulfill their purposes in light of those values.
It is also important to recognize something important about the gram-
mar of moral terms. A large segment of morality is, from a grammatical
perspective, a subjective and intersubjective matter. For instance, many
linguistic communities permit dissent regarding matters of the heart,
including many moral concerns. People in our society are not seriously
permitted to dissent from the view that lying is wrong, but they are per-
mitted to debate permissible exceptions to this rule. They are free to
debate politically charged issues such as abortion, even if they are not free
(from within grammar) to outright reject the prominent values that under-
lie this debate (the values of sanctity of life and the freedom to make
choices about one’s body).16 Similarly, we do not take seriously arguments
in favor of the claim that racism is good, but we nonetheless debate
whether implicit bias is racist, what the conditions of institutional racism
are, what constitutes unjust discrimination, and so forth. Notice that
Wittgensteinian grammar speaks against the objection that Wittgenstein’s
philosophy is conservative. The objection has it that Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophy precludes the possibility of challenging any and every grammatical
norm. However, we may retain Wittgenstein’s insights about the nature of
language without retaining his conception of philosophy. Every grammar
rule is logically open to dispute. This is permissible even on Wittgenstein’s
view, provided that the arguments made presuppose a grammar. What can-
not be done is to argue against an entire grammatical system (language), all

16
 People in our community are not free (from within our grammar) to decide that the
values of human life and freedom of choice are misguided. What people are free to decide is
what exceptions to this rule should be permitted, and how and whether they apply in the
abortion debate. Pro-lifers do not generally argue that the freedom to do what one wants
with one’s body is not a legitimate value. Rather, “pro-life” proponents argue that there are
limits to doing what one wants with one’s body. Similarly, “pro-choicers” do not reject the
claim that human  life is sacred. Rather, they argue for qualifying this notion.  For  further
discussion, see Amesbury (2005, chap. 6).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  105

at once. For one must use language to do so. To do that, in other words,
would be to argue from within some alternative grammar. This may seem
impossible because Wittgensteinians make statements like “Such and such
cannot be said” (as in, “Racism is good” cannot be said in our language,
except as an expression of racism). But such assertions, on the part of the
Wittgensteinian, are grammatical observations. What is meant is that one
cannot say that racism is good and retain the moral apparatus that militates
against this norm; endorsing racism amounts  to abandoning our
moral grammar.
To preserve the need to criticize grammar we can distinguish internal
and external grammatical criticisms. External criticisms are those that chal-
lenge what I call basic grammatical propositions like “Slavery is racist,”
“Racial lynching is racist,” “Racism is wrong,” and so forth. People who
contest these basic grammatical norms (white supremacists, perhaps) are
condemned as racist. Since I start from the position that these basic prop-
ositions about racism are non-negotiable, I do not take external criticisms
of the grammar of racism seriously in this book. For to challenge these
basic propositions—though one could do so given the arbitrariness of
grammar—would call other fundamental aspects of grammar into doubt.
We would, in effect, have to significantly revise our moral grammar as a
whole. Basic notions like “goodness” and “badness” would have to be
revised to render them consistent with racist values—and I, for one, reject
such a proposal (and here I am speaking in the first-person, as one who
endorses the foundational core of a progressive moral grammar). That
being said, I take seriously the ability and need to critically assess grammar
from an internal perspective. Internal critiques of grammar start from a set
of basic grammatical propositions about racism and proceed to argue for
or against non-basic aspects of racism’s existing grammar. A non-basic
aspect of grammar is a widely contested aspect, such that rival grammatical
norms are partly constitutive of the concept in question.
Consider,  for purposes of illustration, the explanation that racism is
essentially race-based discrimination. Many philosophers would reject this
behavioral account of racism. One objection might be that discriminatory
behavior presupposes discriminatory attitudes; hence, racism should be
conceived as an intention, emotion, or some other such attitude. Others
might develop a nonattitudinal view of racism, and might seek to accom-
modate racial discrimination that way. And so forth. One of the aims of
this book is to discuss the conditions under which internal forms of gram-
matical critique should be pursued. I argue that non-basic grammatical
explanations of racism are assessable by reference to the underlying repre-
106  A. G. URQUIDEZ

sentational need. Even if the concept of racism is essentially contestable,

we are not precluded from bringing conceptual resources to bear on which
norms to adopt and which to reject. There can be good reasons for prefer-
ring some linguistic norms over others, even if such reasons are immanent
(internal to our moral grammar).
Grammars exist for the myriad of reasons that other sociocultural phe-
nomena exist. To illustrate, grammatical explanations of racism may be
compared to social norms. Like gender norms, the norm that racism is
wrong is in a certain manner of speaking made true by social convention,
even if no individual or committee decided that this should be the rule.
What manner of speaking is that? Like gender norms, the rule that racism
is wrong is a function of agreement in practice, that is, established moral
practice. The grammar of social terms is immanently rather than transcul-
turally objective, even while being contested, for the representational prac-
tice is established. Objectivity here concerns the fact that a practice is the
norm, not that it ought to be endorsed. Even where a social norm ought
to be endorsed, there is no transcultural standard that determines this fact,
no extra-grammatical fact that logically settles which definitions ought to
be adopted; hence, it is epistemically unjustifiable because facts/reality
always underdetermine which norms ought to be adopted.
The contingency of “Racism is wrong” is evident in its sociohistorical
character. After all, there have been times when this was not the estab-
lished norm. A definition is a practical tool that linguistic practitioners
adopt to serve their linguistic interests, including their interest in moral,
social, and political representation. These interests/purposes/needs fur-
nish pragmatic reasons for adopting/retaining the norm. The contingency
of definition is revealed in the historical fact that it is subject to evolve as
sociohistorical conditions change. Finally, it is revealed in the anthropo-
logical fact that language is constitutive of, and deeply integral to, human
culture. For instance, the practice of explaining the meaning of the chess
king is interwoven with our peculiar desire to invent and play games,
which is of course bound up tightly with other aspects of our culture.
Similarly, the practice of defining “racism” is interwoven with the practices
of assigning moral blame to individuals, social description and explanation
of racial phenomena, and so on. As constitutive rules of our language-
games, grammatical rules make the “moves” of these games possible.
The contingent character of grammatical propositions is, roughly speak-
ing, synonymous with its cultural character. This has far-reaching implica-
tions. For instance, in order to appreciate why a culture adopts the
grammatical norms it adopts—in order to see the pragmatic justification it
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  107

has for its forms of life—we must appreciate the contingencies surrounding
its choices. What forms of life characterize this culture? What practical pur-
poses does its language serve? What pragmatic reasons (immanent justifica-
tions) do  its practitioners offer to justify their forms of life? What is the
history of this culture and how have its norms changed/evolved? Answering
these questions will speak to the needs that a culture has for adopting these
norms—for example, “The king moves one square at a time,” “Bachelors
are unmarried men,” and “One meter is the length of the Standard Meter
Bar”—as opposed to others. Changes in immanent conditions are the dif-
ferences that make a difference as far as concept-­formation and concept-
change are concerned (“Despite the fact that things might have gone
differently with them, things went this way, because…”).

3.2.2  The Non-Empirical Side of Convention

So far I have tried to show that conventionalism bears a direct relationship
to the a posteriori. This by itself does not fully address the objection that
conventionalism does not seem to be capacious enough to accommodate
full-blown empirical analysis or considerations. I thus return to this objec-
tion in Sect. 3.4.1. In this section, I turn to the a priori side of convention.
For given my account of grammar, some philosophers will no doubt worry
that conventionalism is incapable of accommodating a priori analysis,
which concerns itself with “a priori truths,” otherwise known as meta-
physical truths. My aim is to demonstrate how conventionalism deflates
the notion of “metaphysical truth.”
I offer an account of the manifold structure of the a priori—necessity,
universality, logical priority, truth and justification—arguing that each ele-
ment is a facet of grammatical convention. I first consider the notion that
some definitions are necessary and universal. In doing so, I consider the
notion that some definitions have the character of depth and unpack the
source of said depth. I then consider the notion that definitions are or ought
to be justifiable. Here I consider epistemic and pragmatic justification.

3.2.2.1 Necessity and Universality

Kant famously held that the mark of the conceptual is our talk of necessity
(and universality).17 Wherever necessity is expressed in human judgment,

17
 For discussion of the similarities and difference in Kant and Wittgenstein’s philosophies,
see Hacker (1986).
108  A. G. URQUIDEZ

therein lies a clue that we are dealing with something a priori. An a priori
truth is sometimes defined as a proposition that is and must be true at all
times and/or true independent of experience. These propositions are char-
acterized by the logical “must.” This is the “must” that asserts “Things
must be thus-­and-­so,” “This is how things must be.” What are we to make
of the apparent a priori nature of definitions, the appearance of metaphysical
truth? Wittgenstein observed that the logical “must” is associated with a
picture of necessity: immovability. This picture feeds into the thought that
so-­called a priori truths are metaphysically significant, that they reflect objec-
tive reality which is independent of human practice. This a priori reality is
sometimes conceived as the (firm and unchanging) structure of the world,
which makes objective metaphysical judgments possible. What is imagined
is that immovable facts somehow make definitions true. Metaphysicians
have a bag full of similes for expressing the aforementioned intuitions. We
say that “Necessary truths carve reality at the joints,” that “Necessary truths
are those propositions that are true in all possible worlds,” and so on. A
priori truths are thought to be analogous to empirical descriptions in that
both are conceived as descriptions of reality. The difference is then said to
consist in this: empirical descriptions are thought to describe physical reality
and so are contingently true, whereas metaphysical descriptions are com-
monly thought to describe the structure of reality and so are necessarily true.
Conventionalism disrupts the traditional conception of the a priori. If
definitions are mere conventions, then they are not descriptions of the
most basic features of reality (since they are not descriptions), and they are
not immovable (since grammar is not immutable). The conventions of
grammar, like all conventions, are human creations and are subject to
change. Our evolving grammatical practices are not privileged in the rel-
evant sense and so can no longer be viewed as reflections of objective real-
ity. If all of this is correct, however, in what sense are they a priori? In what
sense can we attribute something like the property of immutability to them?
A norm is immovable in the following sense: we do not allow it to be
moved or unhinged.18 Necessity here corresponds to our attitude. We rely
on our definitions when we condemn, criticize, and correct violations. For
example, we assert that racism is wrong and cling to this norm; we hold

18
 The mathematical “must,” he says, is “the expression of an attitude towards the tech-
nique of calculation, which comes out everywhere in our life. The emphasis of the must
corresponds only to the inexorableness of this attitude both to the technique of calculating
and to a host of related techniques” (Wittgenstein 1983, VII.67, p. 430).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  109

fast to it in the face of transgressions. Like an immovable rock, our norms

withstand the assault of transgressors; the norm remains for us a standard
of correctness. Its necessity is thus a testament to its governing role in our
lives. This form of necessity is not unique to definitions that have the form
of metaphysical or ethical descriptions, but is the same for all definitions.
We say, for instance, the king cannot move more than one square at a time
because this violates the rule. We say that she cannot be a bachelor because
only men can be bachelors. And we say that this color cannot be red,
because red is that color. In all three cases, the necessity of the proposition
consists in our unwavering and immovable commitment to a rule. It thus
makes sense to assert, Racism is necessarily objectionable, but the necessity
here consists in our immovability, and thus reflects an aspect of our cul-
tural disposition.
The necessity of linguistic norms does not consist in the fact that it is
logically impossible to revoke their governing power, their “essential char-
acter,” for it is always possible for us to alter our forms of life (to adopt
new norms). (Our norms do not have an “essential character” in that
sense.) Rather, their necessity consists in the fact that we do not revoke
their governing power, that they are essential to our lives. But how can
definitions be both necessary and contingent? Is this not a logical contra-
diction? Two points need to be kept in view:

1. We need not retain the grammatical norms we have adopted

(contingency)
2. We must retain our grammatical norms, despite the fact that we are
not logically compelled to do so (necessity)

This pair of truisms invites the question: Why do we (feel we must) retain
grammatical norms if we do not have to? The answer to this question reveals
something important about grammatical norms. We retain them because of
their importance to our lives; indeed, because they are constitutive of our
lives. Their importance is not just any importance. It is the kind that can only
be expressed in terms of necessity. Thus the contingent nature of our norms
is internally related to their necessity. This requires explanation.
As standards of correctness, linguistic rules have a regulative function.
They are partly constituted by the exclusive function of ruling out certain
forms of behavior and the inclusive function of ruling in different behav-
ior. Our linguistic norms thus circumscribe the scope of possible/accept-
able human conduct by prescribing some practices and forms of life from
110  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the endless possibilities available to us.19 Adopting certain norms as ours

entails the exclusion of several others that are incompatible with them.
Now, our adoption of these norms to the exclusion of others is a contin-
gent matter; we might have adopted different norms. Yet, though we
might have adopted different norms, and though we can revise them, it is
crucial that we have not done so. We have not done so because our norms
are essential to our forms of life. And our holding fast to them reflects
their unique place in our lives: their constitutive role. The very fact that we
might live otherwise constitutes the contingency of our linguistic norms,
and our refusal to live otherwise constitutes their necessity in our lives.
Contingency and necessity condition one another. One might say that the
necessity and contingency of our norms are two sides of the same coin
(two aspects of convention).
This way of thinking about the necessary/contingent divide is linked to
the discussion of contingency in the previous section. Grammar rules are
contingent in the sense that our practices might be otherwise, but they are
not otherwise because practices are brought into existence for specific
(sociocultural) reasons. From within our language, of course, grammatical
truths are not contingently true due to their constitutive role. This explains
why the norm that bachelors are unmarried is necessary rather than con-
tingent. We hold fast to it, with unwavering commitment.

19
 Anthropologists tell us that there are various color grammars. Reflecting on alternative
forms of representation underscores the importance of our own color grammar in our lives,
as well as the importance of  alternative color  grammars in other cultures. It thus comes
natural for us to say that we reject these alternative color systems. This anthropological use of
“exclusion” must be distinguished from the kind of “exclusion from grammar” that Baker
and Hacker have as the focus of their discussions on their work on necessity (though see
2009, 320–338 for an exception). They argue that sentences like “Red is not a color” or
“Some bachelors are married” are excluded from grammar in the sense that they are use-
less; that is, they do not express genuine possibilities of sense that are currently included by
our grammar. If the former were a norm of representation, for example, it would license the
absurd inference: “That box is red, therefore it is colorless.” This form of words is currently
nonsense (though perhaps we could introduce an entirely novel practice to render it intelli-
gible). By contrast, “exclusion” in the anthropological sense is a form of incommensurability
in forms of life. Prescriptive (critical) grammar, it might be said, is in the business of contem-
plating, articulating, and critically evaluating “excluded” grammars in this anthropological
sense.
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  111

We see, then, that conventionalism captures the empirical intuition that

explanations of “racism” are sociohistorical phenomena, and the a priori
intuition that explanations of “racism” are necessary, insofar as they are
partly constitutive of our sociocultural forms of life. If this is correct, then
our linguistic norms are not merely necessary and contingent, they are
necessarily both. Necessity and contingency are two facets of grammatical
conventions. The confusion is to think that the terms “necessary” and
“contingent” are oppositional. Once it is appreciated that the necessity of
our norms does not consist in metaphysical or logical necessity, it becomes
easier to see that their contingency is an important part of what makes
them valuable to us. Their contingency is arguably a condition of the pos-
sibility of their necessity (i.e., of their being necessary for us), for it is we
who (for contingent sociohistorical reasons) care about whether norms are
followed or violated, and this is hardly a trivial matter. The value we attach
to them compels us to ascribe the language of necessity to them (“must,”
“cannot,” etc.). So, alas, we can revise our linguistic norms—and many
philosophers would argue that some of them ought to be revised. But
insofar as they are our norms, it follows that it is their necessity for our
lives that best explains why we have not (yet) done so.
Consider next the feature of universality, predicated of so-called “meta-
physical truths.” Like analytic truths, “Every event has a cause” and
“Racism is wrong” strike us as universal. What does their universality con-
sist in? By “universal” one might simply mean the same as “necessary,”
that is, immovable. If this is what “universal” means, then my analysis of
necessity applies here. But there is something else it might mean. Let us
begin by noting that universality, like necessity, is a mark of the a priori.
Recall the distinction between the necessity of a system and necessity in a
system. One of the implications of the arbitrariness of grammar is that no
grammatical system is necessary. This forces us to conclude that every
grammatical system is contingent. So like the notion of necessity, the
explanation of universality must be located within a grammatical system.
What is it about grammar that inclines us to call it “universal”? And uni-
versal, as opposed to what?
A proposition like “Racism is wrong” is universal in that we apply it
universally, and this means across sociohistorical contexts and hence across
cultures. “Slavery is wrong and racist” is a grammar rule devised by and for
the interests of anti-racists. To be clear, however, the rule is not “Racial
slavery is wrong and racist for anti-racists,” for that would mean that anti-
racists give racists a pass, and only condemn someone for slavery when she
professes anti-racism. (“It’s wrong for you to betray your own values like
112  A. G. URQUIDEZ

that!”) Nor is the rule “Racial slavery is wrong and racists for us” where
“us” signifies a certain community or subset of such a community (e.g.,
U.S. society). For that would mean that anti-racists give racists of different
societies (or of different sociohistorical contexts) a pass on racial slavery.
To be sure, exception-clauses may be built into the rule, but if the rule is
universal then it applies universally, to all peoples, places and times, such
that the universal aspect of this norm defines the scope of its application.20
The universal scope of this norm is evident in the fact that we condemn
racist slaveholders a priori and without taking into account conditions of
their psychology, et cetera. Further the fact that our moral grammars are
contingent—that is, the fact that things could be otherwise than they in
fact are—does not change this feature of our application. We do not
eschew the necessity of our moral grammar simply because we can, or
because other cultures disagree with us. Moral grammar for us is, to use
the Kantian term, a categorical imperative. The feature of universal scope
is distinctive of many (though by no means all) moral norms. We have now
distinguished: necessity in a system—conceived as the constitutive and
essential nature of rules—and the universal scope of a rule—conceived as
the transhistorical use of an ethical standard across cultures and sociohis-
torical contexts. None of these uses of “universality” imply that a system
of grammar is universal tout court (for that could only mean that every
human society subscribes to our moral grammar, which of course is false);
indeed, the very notion of a universal grammar (in the sense we have been
discussing) seems confused. For even if every human society shared a com-
mon grammar system, it would still be logically possible for any such soci-
ety to replace it with a different grammar system.

3.2.2.2 Logical Priority

The notion of “the a priori” is complex, so I offer a tripart analysis. I dis-
tinguish between the elements of necessity, logical priority, and truth.
Grammatical conventions like “Red is a color” and “Racism is wrong”
intuitively strike us as necessarily true and as having metaphysical real-
ity. We have already explained this first element, so it is to the remaining
two that I now turn. Each of these elements generates illusions that rein-
force the others; I focus on the following illusions:

20
 For further discussion, see Richard Amesbury’s “Agreeing to Disagree: Toward a More
Capacious Conception of Tradition” in Morality and Social Criticism (2005).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  113

• The necessity and metaphysical priority of grammatical propositions

gives rise to the illusion that (some) grammatical norms are
­unassailable (true in all possible worlds) and that they are the most
general truths (constitutive of the world’s metaphysical structure).
• The truth of grammatical propositions gives rise to the illusion that
some are true and justifiable in the way empirical propositions are
(i.e., true in virtue of corresponding to reality, and hence are epis-
temically justifiable). Said differently, some grammatical propositions
are thought to be synthetic rather than analytic truths.

I first tackle the notion of logical priority before turning to the

notion of truth.
As aforementioned, we are inclined to distinguish between the contin-
gency of norms like (1) “Bachelors are unmarried” and the necessity of
norms like (2) “Red is a color.” The former seems not to be true in all
possible worlds, the latter seems to be true (or at least, is a plausible can-
didate for being true) in all possible worlds. The divide between (1) and
(2) is characterized by the notion of depth: the latter seems to disclose a
deeper truth about reality compared to the former. To refer to those defi-
nitions that strike us as having the character of metaphysical depth, I use
the term deep conceptual norms. To refer to those definitions that strike us
as lacking this depth, I use the term superficial conceptual norms. It seems
that deep conceptual norms play a special (metaphysical) role within our
conceptual scheme. It might also seem that their truth is a function of
something essential—either to the world, human experience, or some-
thing outside of experience—for otherwise they would be revisable, which
strikes us as wrong since revisionary definitions would simply be false.
Whatever the nature of the justifier may be, it seems that deep conceptual
norms disclose something fundamental about the structure of the world.
Conventionalism can account for our feeling of depth with respect to
certain conceptual norms, but the analysis it provides has the consequence
that this depth is illusory, for its account cuts across grammar. Grammar,
as Wittgenstein says, is “flat” in the sense that no aspect of grammar is
superior to any other; there is no hierarchy of grammatical rules.
114  A. G. URQUIDEZ

The feeling that the propositions that racism is wrong and red is a color
have depth is a shadow of the logical priority of grammar.21 Many philoso-
phers of language already accept the proposition that meaning logically
precedes truth. A sentence must be meaningful in order to be true or false.
Conventionalism takes this assertion seriously, and runs with it. The
­apparent metaphysical depth of grammatical propositions corresponds to
the fact that grammar precedes the empirical world in one important sense.
It provides a system of linguistic standards for what can and cannot be
meaningfully said about the world. Grammar precedes experience in that
it determines what counts as experience, for grammatical rules are condi-
tions of sense. To know whether the proposition that it is raining is true or
false, one must check the facts. To know whether it makes sense, one must
know the meanings of the constituent words (among other grammatical
rules of English). And to know the meanings of these words (“it,” “is,”
“raining”) is to know the rules governing their proper use. Knowledge of
grammar is prior to knowledge of matters of fact. I have to be able to use
language before I can be in a position to describe the world, correctly or
incorrectly; otherwise, I will not understand the description. My knowl-
edge of grammar, however, is a priori because it is not justifiable by refer-
ence to the facts. It is a precondition of epistemic justification. For instance,
the grammar of “raining” determines what counts as rain. Knowledge of
this grammar is a precondition for determining the truth value of certain
propositions concerning the weather.
The term a priori literally translates, “what precedes experience.” Let us
call this element of the a priori its logical priority. Jaroslav Peregrin, a fel-
low normativist (of the inferentialist variety), provides a succinct statement
of common arguments in support of what he calls, following Wilfrid Sellars
and Robert Brandom, “material validity.” This notion presupposes the

21
 In Lecture XV of Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein used the term
“shadow of reality” to refer to the realm of possible results or applications that are generated
by a grammatical rule. “We multiply 25 X 25 and get 625. But in the mathematical realm 25
X 25 is already 625.” Similarly, in Euclidean geometry, a straight line can be drawn between
any two points, but, according to Frege, “in fact the line already exists even if no one has
drawn it. The idea is that there is a realm of geometry in which the geometrical entities exist.
What in the ordinary world we call a possibility is in the geometrical world a reality. In
Euclidean heaven two points are already connected. This is the most important idea: the idea
of possibility as a different kind of reality; and we might call it a shadow of reality”
(1975, p. 144–145).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  115

logical priority of definitional rules. Peregrin asks us to contrast the fol-

lowing inferences:

1. X is P
If X is P, then X is Q
X is Q
2. X is a dog
X is an animal
3. Lightning now
Thunder soon

Logicians would recognize (1) as a valid inference rule, but some would
recognize (2) as an invalid inference rule. A more charitable reading of
(2) would have it that it is valid, but only because we see that it implicitly
contains a second premise, Every dog is an animal. Peregrin argues that this
is mistaken. (2), without the additional premise, is no less a valid inference
rule than (1). Where they differ is in the type of validity at issue. Whereas
(1) is formally valid, (2) is materially valid. One argument against the stan-
dard (enthymeme) account, already expressed by Lewis Carroll’s regress
objection,22 is that, even in (1), it could be argued that an additional premise
must be added before it is possible to accept it as valid. The missing premise
in (1) might be E: If anything has a certain property, and whatever has this
property has a certain other property, then the thing in question has the other
property.23 Upon adding E to argument (1), the same line of objection could
be raised, yet again.  For  we might continue to feel that there is a “gap”
between the premises and the conclusion of the argument, so that we must
repeat the procedure of adding a further conditional premise to our argu-
ment, ad infinitum.
According to Peregrin, what is going on is that our feeling that there
is a “suppressed” premise is a shadow of the fact that we want our infer-
ence rule to be explicit rather than implicit. This feeling (if left unchecked)
generates the requirement that every “premise” (inference rule) must be
made explicit, thereby leading to an infinite regress. But Peregrin
observes that logicians do not accept that (1) is invalid for failing to
explicitly state E:

 Lewis Carroll (1895).

22

 He credits Bertrand Russell (1914, 66) with providing this rule.
23
116  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the additional premise [i.e., E] is not necessary [in (1)], because for the infer-
ence to hold it is enough that the meaning of if…then… [in premise 2] be
fixed; of course, when talking about inferences we assume the context of a
specific language, with the meanings of its expressions fixed. But by the same
token we can vindicate the original inference [i.e., (2)]: for it to hold, we
need nothing more than the meanings of dog and animal be fixed. Let us
follow Sellars (1953)24 and call these ‘extra-logical’ inferential rules material.25

If we do not need an additional rule in the case of (1), then we do not

need it in the case of (2). For the meanings of the constituent terms of the
premises are always taken for granted. Our language “fixes” the meanings
of the signs of each argument.
The Wittgensteinian spin on Peregrin’s argument, which he might not
accept, is that the material rules in question are grammatical rules. These
rules, moreover, are logically prior to empirical descriptions in that they
are conditions of sense. Consider the grammatical proposition “Bachelors
are unmarried men.” This definition is prior to “S is a bachelor” in that it
is a condition of sense that makes the empirical description intelligible. No
one, of course, is tempted to view the definition of “bachelor” as a deep
metaphysical truth. On the contrary, it is universally recognized to be an
superficial (and revisable) convention. Kant, however, who introduced the
notion of ­analyticity, thought that many other grammatical propositions
(which he failed to recognize are grammatical explanations rather than
descriptions), like “Every event has a cause,” are synthetic rather than
analytic. He thought this because he was taken in by the apparent meta-
physical depth of these sentences, a character that, for him, differentiates
them from arbitrary conventions (analytic truths).
Wittgenstein, by contrast, delves more deeply into the nature of this
analyticity. From “S is a bachelor” we immediately infer (without the need
to check experience) that “S is an unmarried man.” This argument is valid
but does not require the suppressed premise “Bachelors are unmarried
men,” because understanding the premise of this argument presupposes
understanding the meaning of “bachelor.” The definition of “bachelor” is
not a premise at all, but a convention: an inference rule which licenses a
transformation, from the empirical proposition “S is a bachelor” to the

24
 Wilfrid Sellars (2007).
25
 Peregrin (2014, 26).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  117

empirical proposition “S is an unmarried man.”26 What applies to superfi-

cial conventions applies to deep conventions, also. That is, there is no
metaphysical depth, no metaphysical priority, only logical priority. The
reason why we think that “Every event has a cause” is a metaphysical
proposition is that we conflate the necessity of the proposition with the
shadow of depth, and necessity, we have seen, is a function not of the con-
tent of grammar rules per se, but of our unwavering commitment to them
and of their importance in our lives. As Wittgenstein put it, corresponding
to the depth expressed in the language of necessity is “the deep need for
the convention.”27
If the Wittgensteinian analysis is correct, then it applies to grammar
rules governing the use of “racism.” “Racism is wrong” and “Racist phe-
nomena are wrong,” for instance, are conditions of sense, for they are pre-
supposed by meaningful usage of the words “racism” and “racist.”
Grammar rules, such as these, must be in place prior to the meaningful use
of these words. It is in this sense that grammatical rules are a priori: they
logically precede the truth or falsity of descriptions of racism. Definitions
establish conceptual connections, connections that obtain without the need
to check experience. A linguistic convention can be a rule only if it forges this
sort of conceptual connection. Glock puts the point this way: linguistic
rules “antecede experience” in the innocuous sense that they are conditions
of sense. The point can also be put thus: “Racism is wrong” is an inference
rule—a pattern of inference—that licenses valid material inferences. To call

26
 Wittgenstein’s account of the a priori is extremely difficult to penetrate, or at least it has
been for this author. My understanding is my own, but it has been shaped by many. I will
mention a few influences. First, Glock’s illuminating discussion of grammatical propositions
as conditions of sense. Second, Brandom’s discussion of Kant and Wittgenstein on necessity,
and his discussion of Wilfrid Sellars (1994, chap. 1; see also 2000). Third, Wilfrid Sellars’
“Inference and Meaning” and other essays in the collection In the Space of Reasons: Selected
Essays of Wilfrid Sellars (2007, 3–27) lays the foundation for expressivism through an account
of material inference rules. Fourth, Amesbury’s helpful discussion  and extension of
Brandom’s analysis of material validity into the ethical and religious domains (2005, chap.
4). Fifth, Baker and Hacker’s analysis of Wittgenstein’s account of necessity in “Grammar
and Necessity” (2009). Finally, Jose Medina’s (2002) explication of Wittgenstein’s views of
normativity, necessity, and teaching. For a more concise discussion of Wittgenstein’s account
of grammar, see Hacker’s “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism” (2012),
Conant’s “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use” (1998). Rundle’s critical essays on grammar
are lengthier, but helpful (1990, the various chapters on meaning).
27
 Wittgenstein (1983, I.§74).
118  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the argument valid is another way of stating that the inference holds apart
from experience—that is, it follows by definition, as a matter of convention.
The logical priority of our definitions is a reflection of their conven-
tional nature. A definitional norm must be in place—in force—prior to our
being able to use words in meaningful ways. For to use a word in a mean-
ingful way is, inter alia, to use it in accordance with a rule. That is, a rule
for the use of a word must be laid down as the norm before one is able to
follow it. The norm must “come before,” because it alone ­provides the
conditions of what it does and does not make sense to say. It is only
because we have standards of linguistic correctness that we are able to
make empirical judgments, both true and false. Our linguistic norms make
empirical description possible (they are preconditions of truth). If we did
not take the “truth” of certain norms for granted, empirical judgments
would not make sense. And this simply means that we would not have the
corresponding representational practice. Note that the point I am making
is not that grammar (language) precedes nature, but that it precedes
understanding. Without a grammar for “racism,” that which is called rac-
ism might still result in consequences we would condemn as “wrong,”
“bad,” “unjust,” “harmful,” and so on (provided we retained the gram-
mar for these other terms). But, without a grammar for “racism,” our
condemnations would lack the unity and understanding provided by the
concept of racism. Our understanding would be limited.
Let us now consider Peregrin’s final example. Peregrin extends the
notion of material validity thus: “The recognition of (3) as an inferential
rule requires, moreover, recognition of the fact that inferential rules need
not be indefeasible: (3) is obviously a paradigmatic case of a ceteris paribus
rule. This goes against the tradition that something deserves the name
inferential rule only if it is ‘bulletproof’.”28 Peregrin’s observation is inter-
esting, because something similar arguably applies to some inferences we
make about racism. Consider this materially valid argument:

. Milu’s action is racist.

1
2. Therefore, Milu did something wrong.

Does this argument have an enthymeme? Is it missing the premise “Racism

is wrong”? The Wittgensteinian answer is that an enthymeme has not
gone missing. For if one understands what is said by premise 1, one

 Peregrin (2014, 27).

28
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  119

thereby understands that Milu did something wrong. In other words,

conclusion 2 follows immediately and without further ado from the fact
that Milu did something racist—for “doing something wrong” is part of
what it means to say that a racist action was performed. The terms “rac-
ism” and “racist,” we might say, are thick ethical terms that wear their
negative valence on their sleeve. The individual who does not understand
that doing something racist is wrong does not fully understand what the
word means. This individual would be incapable of fully understanding
premise 1; a fortiori, she would not fully understand the argument. It is
plausible, therefore, to construe “Racism is wrong” not as a premise in the
argument, but as an inference rule that licenses the transformation of
empirical statements, from “Milu acted racist” to “Milu did something
wrong.” The premise and conclusion would then be conceptually con-
nected, not by truth, but by grammar—by an arbitrary convention and
“inference-ticket.”
What determines the normative content (negative valence) of “racist,”
in the above argument? Clearly, it is the term’s definition, the linguistic
rule governing the term’s proper use. But the precise nature of grammar
rules is often contested where social terms are concerned. For instance,
one way to resist the above argument is to judge that there are exceptions
to the rule that racism is always wrong. We can imagine someone argu-
ing that cases of implicit bias, though racist, should not be condemned for
involving wrongdoing if the agent is unaware of her bias, for one should
not be held responsible for conduct that is not under one’s control. I do
not agree with this argument, but it is not entirely implausible, so let us sup-
pose it to be sound. In that case we have reason to treat “Racism is wrong”
as a ceteris paribus rule, akin to “Lightning causes thunder” and “Lying is
wrong.” That is, we can hold this inference pattern to be valid “under
normal conditions,” even while recognizing that it admits of many
exceptions.
Given the “innocuous” account of necessity and logical priority pro-
vided herein, we can expel the intuitions mentioned at the outset of this
section: namely, that some definitional norms are unassailable (in the
sense that they are true in all possible worlds) and that they are meta-
physical truths (about the ultimate structure of the world). The depth of
“Racism is wrong” is a function of our attitude of steadfastness in respect
to it. The norm corresponds to our attitude, not to truth. This attitude
of  necessity reflects the fact that this norm is partly constitutive of our
concepts of racism and morality. That is, it corresponds to a deep need for
120  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the convention, as is evident from its role in moral practice. It is the

necessity of this norm for our moral form of life that makes it unassailable
for us. Moreover, the generality of the norm corresponds to the scope of
its application, for “Racism is wrong” governs (virtually?) every moral
language-game we play with the word “racism.” At the end of the day,
however, we are still dealing with a logically revisable human convention,
its necessity, generality, and logical priority notwithstanding.

3.2.2.3 Justification and the Arbitrariness of Grammar

Grammatical Propositions as Reasons

Language users have a need to justify the claims they make and
Wittgensteinians have rightly pointed out that the role of grammatical
propositions in the context of justification is the role of reasons for saying/
doing things. Normally, there is no need to justify grammatical norms, for
their role is primarily that of justifiers, that is, conditions of sense that
license empirical descriptions. It is important that grammatical norms are
normally not called into question, for if they regularly were this would
undermine their normative status. Their normative status is elucidated by
our discussion of logical priority. An argument of the form “X is racist, so
X is wrong” is made possible in part by the inference rule “Racism is
wrong,” which logically antecedes these propositions and is therefore
taken for granted. As D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce argue:

Within our society, it is taken as a matter of course that a man should tell the
truth rather than lie… People do not normally assert that lying is bad; they
assert that a particular act is bad because it involves lying. Here, however, it
is apparent that lying is not itself the subject of a prescriptive judgement, for
the reference to lying serves as a justification, and implies that to condemn
an act as lying does not itself need to be justified. Thus it is just because in
general we do not have to justify a condemnation of lying that we can on a
particular occasion condemn a man for telling a lie.29

I can justify my judgment that he did something wrong by explaining that

he told a lie. Were I pressed to explain why telling a lie justifies my judgment,
I should reply, “Because lying is wrong.” If this explanation is called into
question, then I have exhausted my reasons and my justification comes to an

 Phillips and Mounce (1970, 8).

29
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  121

end. Wittgenstein writes: “‘Have I reasons?’, the answer is: my reasons will
soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.”30 Baker and Hacker
argue that this claim from Wittgenstein acknowledges that grammatical
propositions are justifiers that are not themselves subject to justification31:

What he wrote was that my reasons will soon give out, not that I have none.
But when I have given my reasons, I need not and typically do not have rea-
sons for holding the reasons I have given to be reasons. For I will quickly
reach bedrock, exhaust all justifications, and say ‘This is simply what I do’ or
‘This is what is called doing thus-and-so.’ [PI 217] But this does not mean
that I have no justification for what I do. On the contrary, I cite the rule I am
supposed to be following as a justification. It is the pattern for my actions.32

But what about the rule itself? Many encounter frustration with
Wittgensteinian philosophers on precisely this point. For how can it be
that grammar is unjustifiable? Wittgenstein’s claim that justification comes
to an end is, fortunately, misleading.

Epistemic Justification
The truth of an empirical proposition is justified by reference to facts
about the world. By “facts about the world” I mean evidence for a proposi-
tion of the following form: the evidence verifies or confirms the truth of a
proposition, independent of what I or anyone else may think, as one that is
true to the facts (as corresponding to them). Because it makes sense to
ascribe the predicates “true” and “correct” (and “false” and “incorrect”)
to grammatical propositions, we overlook subtle differences in the applica-
tion of these predicates to empirical and grammatical propositions. In par-
ticular, we fail to question whether the methods of verifying empirical
truths are appropriate for establishing definitional truths. We take for
granted that epistemic justification is the appropriate form of justification
for both. Consequently, many philosophers find it problematic that, on
conventionalism, grammatical rules are said to be unjustifiable this way. I

30
 Wittgenstein (2009, §211).
31
 The terminology of “justifier”  (that which justifies), which contrasts with  “justified”
(that which is justified) is my own gloss on their view. The terminology is from Robert
Brandom (1994).
32
 Baker and Hacker (2009, 97).
122  A. G. URQUIDEZ

will first explain why I reject epistemic justification. I will then explain why
it is misleading to say that grammar cannot be justified; that is, I will
explain the sense in which grammar is justifiable.
It is perfectly licit to say that it is true that racism is bad, so we assume
that this statement must be true in virtue of conforming to a fact about the
real nature of racism itself. But we have a difficult time pointing to the fact
in question, to the object, racism itself. We thus posit a world of moral
facts and locate the badness of racism within that world. (I use the term
“world” broadly to signify any domain of facts, including Platonic worlds,
transcendental worlds, etc.) This impulse is even greater when it comes to
grammatical propositions that more strikingly resemble empirical facts
than moral propositions. Propositions like (a) “Racism is the belief that
the dark races are inferior and the white races superior,” (b) “Racism is
racial hatred/contempt/disregard,” (c) “Racism is racial oppression,” and
(d) “Racism is a sociocultural reality” strike us as descriptions of matters of
fact. Propositions (a) and (b) look like descriptions of human cognition or
mental states (and may give the impression that “racism” is a natural kind
term). Propositions (c) and (d) strike us as descriptions of social reality and
human practices (and may give the impression that “racism” is a social
kind term). We are thus inclined to locate the reality of racism within the
natural world—physical nature and society. If one has proclivities toward
third realms, one may be tempted to locate any of these definitions in a
nonnatural world. In any case, we think that philosophical theory has
before it a social or ontological task: to posit and account for a moral, nat-
ural, social or metaphysical fact.
Wittgenstein, however, rejects the idea that it is possible to justify gram-
mar in a language-independent manner that shows it to be superior to
alternative grammars. There are no epistemic criteria for assessing whether
some particular community (e.g., a culture very distant from ours) has got
the “right”/“correct” grammar. Hacker helpfully elucidates Wittgenstein’s
arguments for the arbitrariness of grammar—for the claim that grammar
cannot be justified by reference to reality.33 I have already mentioned one
of these objections. Namely, that any attempt to justify grammar will
either be question-begging or lead to an infinite regress. To give a justifi-

33
 Wittgenstein (2009, §§491–497). “The rules of grammar may be called ‘arbitrary’, if
that is to mean that the purpose of grammar is nothing but that of language. If someone says,
‘If our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts’ – it should be asked
what ‘could’ means here” (§497).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  123

cation of grammar is to use language; hence, any proposition offered as a

justification of grammar must itself have a grammar. “If it has the same
grammar as that which it purports to justify, the justification begs the
question. If it has a different grammar, then (a) it determines different
concepts and so cannot be about the same thing, hence is irrelevant; and
(b) that grammar too will stand in need of justification. So any attempt at
grounding grammar in reality will launch us upon an infinite regress of
justifications.”34
Why, then, do philosophers believe it is possible to provide an epistemic
foundation for definitional norms? The desire to justify definitions on
epistemic grounds stems not from careful reflection on the ways in which
we do justify actual norms, but from misleading similarities across different
kinds of propositions (as just discussed), along with other sources of con-
ceptual confusion. This includes the philosophical mindset of epistemo-
logical skepticism. The worry is that if we cannot justify our norms by
reference to the facts, then we cannot know them to be true. Once we
allow skepticism to creep in, our beliefs and practices suddenly seem shaky
and we feel that we must concede that we have no good reason to accept
our grammatical beliefs. We then feel that the only way to reply to the
skeptic is to meet the skeptical challenge head on, on her own terms, by
providing good epistemic reasons.
The skeptical worry does not arise on conventionalism for the simple
reason that definitions are not descriptions, but expressions of linguistic
norms. If one is a competent speaker of the language, one need not worry
that one does not “know” whether one’s grammatical proposition is true,
as opposed to false. For a grammatical proposition  never expresses a
description, but a rule for the use of “racism.”
On conventionalism, to know a grammatical proposition is to know the
rule it expresses; this consists in the ability to follow it and explain it to
others. So, there is no epistemic gap between one’s knowing a rule and
one’s knowing whether it is true—these are one and the same. If I am able
to use a word, then I know what it means. There is no further question as
to whether this meaning is the “right” one. Said differently, grammatical
knowledge is knowledge-how rather than knowledge-that, so it is not the
proper target for traditional skepticism. Second, a false grammatical prop-
osition would either be a meaningless form of words or an alternative
norm of representation (which belongs to a different grammatical system).

 Hacker (2000, 76).

34
124  A. G. URQUIDEZ

So, again, the skeptical worry does not arise. The only skeptical worry that
makes sense in this context is an immanent one. We can imagine a new
linguistic practice being touted as superior to the prevailing practice, the
former being parasitic on the latter. (For example, my account of language-­
game contestation, discussed in Chap. 1.) Here we might be skeptical of
the “truth” of the prevailing form of life, and wonder whether we might
be better off living differently. This kind of worry may be legitimate, and
resolving it may require appealing to empirical considerations,  but it is
akin to an existential dilemma that calls for a decision; it is not amenable
to epistemic justification, as I argue below.
Another source of confusion stems from the fact that epistemic justifica-
tion is possible with respect to descriptions of grammar. The description of
a definition is correct (true) just in case it corresponds to actual linguistic
practice. A philosopher, for example, might ask a purely descriptive ques-
tion: What is the prevailing linguistic norm (or set of norms) concerning
contemporary usage of “racism”?” There are correct and incorrect answers
to what the actual grammatical norms of a linguistic community are, for
example, facts about how the word “racism” is used. The pertinent fact is
not a natural fact, like a fact about the shape of the earth, but a social fact,
and more specifically a linguistic fact. Hence it is possible to justify descrip-
tions of ordinary usage on epistemic grounds. The correct answer to the
question “How is ‘X’ used?” is a norm-existence statement. A norm-exis-
tence statement, we have seen, is a description about linguistic practice.
The correct norm-existence statement accurately describes how a word is
used by competent speakers of the language. The statement is false if it fails
to correspond to actual linguistic practice. It is true if it so corresponds.
Since verification and falsification hold the key to the door to knowledge of
the true proposition, epistemic justification gets a foot in the door here.
The methods used for establishing true grammatical descriptions are
the wrong ones for establishing the normative superiority grammar. One
cannot marshal empirical evidence to show that a grammatical rule is nor-
matively correct. That is simply the wrong method for this purpose. For
the evidence that is necessary to show that a proposition is descriptively
correct merely establishes that a certain rule is in force, whereas what is
needed is an argument for the normative correctness of said norm. To see
this, consider the most common way of establishing the correctness of a
definition: namely, appeals to authority. Appeals are made to dictionaries,
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  125

reference books, or experts in a relevant field. What these authorities prove

is that a definitional norm captures prevailing linguistic practice. Indeed,
the relevant authority might be oneself if one is a competent speaker of the
language and the term in question is known by one. When it comes to
non-technical  vocabulary, a competent speaker’s explanation of a word
suffices as a criterion of meaning. This, of course, makes perfect sense as
soon as one reflects on the fact that language is a practice; hence grammar
is something  taught by means of training and, later, by explanations of
meaning supplied by a competent speaker of the language. However, if
one calls the regularity into question by challenging its normative creden-
tials, then no appeal to authority will resolve the dispute. That I use the
word “racism” in accordance with the norm that racism is racial oppres-
sion is not a reason for thinking that this endorsement is morally legiti-
mate  any more than the fact that there are two genders expressed in a
language is a good reason for thinking that this representational practice is
morally legitimate.
A true description of grammar says something about what a communi-
ty’s practices are. For to describe grammar is to describe an important seg-
ment of social reality, thereby legitimating  important aspects about its
cultural milieu. The justification, then, is always internal to the communi-
ty’s grammar. This might seem to give rise to an is/ought gap.  Our
inability to establish the superiority of one grammar over alternatives
reflects an important aspect of human convention. Grammars are estab-
lished by being created, constructed, laid down, not by being proved.
Since they are essentially created to meet the needs of the community
that creates them, any justification of a grammar necessarily presupposes
its values, interests, and rationales. We must therefore turn to the topic of
pragmatic justification.

Pragmatic Justification
If grammar is unjustifiable by reference to reality, does this mean that it is
unjustifiable tout court? No, for grammar is not arbitrary in the sense that
we lack reasons for employing our grammatical rules. As previously argued,
our reasons are, inter alia, socioculturally conditioned needs for represen-
tation. These reasons are our values. Before developing this account fur-
ther, I will begin by discussing the role of empirical considerations in
justifying grammar. For if grammar is unjustifiable by reference to reality,
126  A. G. URQUIDEZ

one might think that this renders empirical considerations moot. This is
misguided.
Grammar is conditioned by empirical facts. We adopt the explanations
of meaning we adopt, not based on arbitrary or random selection, but
(partly) based on facts. Wittgenstein observes, for instance, that the nat-
uralness of techniques of employment serves as the “foundation” for
(laying down) certain grammatical rules. Techniques of measurement
are one example of this. It might appear that our grammatical rules are
tailored to “fit the facts,” so that any other grammatical rule would be
wrong. But the “fit” between a grammatical rule and the fact it fits is
pragmatically  mediated by our needs, interests, and so on. Hence the
“fit” in question does not make the techniques true, but useful for
achieving the ends in question. Moreover, as argued elsewhere, these
facts do not somehow connect grammar to reality, nor is grammar a rep-
resentation of anything.
Despite the fact that empirical considerations condition grammar,
theory must place certain core values in the driver’s seat. It is this that
gives the question “What justifies a norm of representation?” new (non-­
epistemic) meaning. As Hacker explains, “a system of rules which is
simple, convenient, and easily taken in is pragmatically justified. One
can give reasons why it is preferable to alternatives. But the justifying
reasons do not make the rules right or correct. They make them
useful.”35 The pragmatic justification of a definition consists in demon-
strating that it satisfies a need for a certain kind of representational prac-
tice. Moral needs, of course, are not usually justified by reference
to aesthetic considerations (though Hacker thinks they play a role in the
context of science). Nor do we normally appeal to considerations  of
utility and efficiency, though we occasionally do. For we usually appeal
to facts about what causes harm and suffering, and we are usually guided
by  deeply held moral convictions, like honesty, respect, fairness,
and so on.
Aside from moral and aesthetic considerations, other non-epistemic
considerations include existential, social, and political considerations. For
instance, I argue that “racism” should be politically defined, in a way that
serves the interests of nonwhites given the present sociohistorical context.
Theoretical considerations are also brought to moral grammar.  One

35
 Hacker (2000, 78).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  127

example of this is the desire to undertake a consistent way of living; that is,
a desire to live in a way that is consistent with a certain set of moral and
other value commitments. The desire to attain (wide or narrow) reflective
equilibrium is well-known in moral and political philosophy, for example.
Finally, to provide just one more example, the desire to articulate a defini-
tion may stem from the need to resolve substantive and persistent concep-
tual disagreement. All of these values may be articulated in normative
arguments to provide good pragmatic reasons for adopting one defini-
tional  norm over another. Hence we are concerned with normative-­
pragmatic justification. Pragmatic justification explicitly links definitional
norms to the needs and importance we attach to practices.36
A consequence of this approach is that pragmatic justification is always
immanent. By this I mean that justification must be internal to grammar
and so must presuppose a set of taken-for-granted values. Pragmatic rea-
sons are considerations that make something good to have. What a linguis-
tic community considers “good to have,” however, is not something that
is determined by facts alone. It is conditioned by human values, interests,
and goals. Unlike epistemic reasons, pragmatic ones bear on how things
should be relative to a set of values, aims, and forms of life. It thus follows
that pragmatic justification always presupposes a background—a culture
with certain forms of life and multifarious values—from which the adop-
tion of a definitional norm can be shown to be reasonable. The back-
ground explains why the representational need arises in the first place. The
need makes it reasonable to adopt the corresponding linguistic practice.
Definitions, for the Wittgensteinian, are tools that are valued as means
rather than as ends in themselves. For they are constitutive of linguistic
practices that are interwoven with the rest of our lives. Pragmatic justifi-
cation thus goes well with Wittgenstein’s conception of language as a
kind of practice, and his view of meaning as use. Wittgenstein’s account
of grammar can account for extensions of grammar and conceptual
change. A norm of representation implies a need for the convention, as in
the case of moral representation. When a new moral need arises, a prag-
matic reason exists to extend moral grammar. Moral grammar is thus
conditioned by empirical facts—facts about human harm, suffering, et
cetera—even if these facts always underdetermine our decisions. Hence

36
 Baker and Hacker tackle further objections to the arbitrariness of grammar in their essay
“Grammar and Necessity” (2009, 334–338).
128  A. G. URQUIDEZ

an important aspect of pragmatic justification is a perspicuous under-

standing of the empirical conditions that prompt a need for moral repre-
sentation. These considerations form the basis for advancing pragmatic
arguments for adopting and ranking competing forms of moral represen-
tation. I thus hold that the theory of racism must start from a set of ante-
cedent values and a picture of the aim of racist representation. It is
necessary, in other words, for theory to go beyond “what is the case” (the
facts) into the normative domain of “what ought to be the case.”
Moral vocabulary matters because moral representation matters. The
grammar of “racism” modifies and is modified by our non-racial vocabu-
lary. The grammar of “racism” is interwoven with the grammar of “injus-
tice,” “unfairness,” “wrongdoing,” and so on. So one implication of the
Wittgensteinian view is that any revision to the grammar of “racism” will
have implications for the grammar of our basic moral vocabulary. For
instance, if all persons are inherently equal, and if certain races are rele-
gated to the status of beasts, then either these races are not persons or else
there is an implicit rule that determines which human races count as per-
sons. The interwovenness of grammar with our lives shows that modifying
a given concept is a matter of modifying other concepts with which it is
internally connected within our conceptual scheme. Conceptual schemes,
moreover, are internally related to forms of life. Our concepts may be
conditioned by the facts, but they are ultimately guided by our values. For
various forms of life are possible on the facts, as a cursory survey of cultural
anthropology reveals.  The mere reference to facts will never settle our
conceptual questions. A priori analysis is thus primary in that it alone starts
with our values and argues from them toward a conclusion about the
nature of correct representation.
To sum up, we have seen that although conventionalism about “rac-
ism” may be incompatible with epistemic justification, it remains compat-
ible with pragmatic justification. I began by arguing that the inability to
justify definitions by reference to “the facts” is no limitation on conven-
tionalism, for this “inability” reflects the fact that it makes no sense to speak
of conventions being made true by “the facts.” The legitimate demand for
justification should be distinguished from the distorted demand of phi-
losophers who insist upon epistemic grounding as the only legitimate
form of justification. Wittgenstein’s commitment to the autonomy of
grammar does not rule out the possibility of justifying particular gram-
matical propositions in the only sense for which it is possible to request a
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  129

justification. Namely, for any definition we can always ask: Is it useful?

What need does it satisfy? What are our guiding values? And so on.37

3.3   A Priori Analysis

3.3.1  Normative Descriptions of Grammar

Having now explained the empirical and non-empirical sides of conven-
tion, I now turn to the question of what conventionalist semantics entails
for philosophical analysis. In this section, I consider the nature and scope
of a priori analysis. I present and criticize the orthodox (therapeutic) read-
ing of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and defend what I call prescriptive
grammatical analysis. In the next section, I build on this theoretical pic-
ture to accommodate a version of empirical analysis within its scope.
Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is a practice that “leaves everything as it
is.” By “everything” he means our grammar or conceptual scheme.
Philosophy thus investigates our conceptual scheme without recommend-
ing revisions or changes to it. He also maintains that philosophy does not
seek to explain, prove, or justify our conceptual scheme. So philosophy,
for him, is descriptive rather than revisionist, and non-­explanatory rather

37
 It might be objected that Wittgenstein resisted every form of justification of grammar,
including pragmatic forms of justification. For example, he says that unlike the practice of
cooking, which is justifiable by reference to the goal of producing good-tasting food, lan-
guage cannot be  analogously justified by any putative purpose (e.g., communication)
(Wittgenstein 2013, pp. 185–186). Glock (1996, 47) explains this as follows: the relation-
ship between language and communication is conceptual, whereas the relationship between
cooking and producing tasty food is instrumental. An activity of producing edible food is
called “cooking” however poorly the food may taste. By contrast, an activity of making
sounds and gestures would not be called “language” if these activities did not facilitate any
form of communication. Language, then, cannot be justified by reference to its purpose,
because communication is partly constitutive of language. However, another way to look at
this is that communication is the reason for the invention (and continued use) of language.
Wittgenstein’s point, of course, is that such justification is circular. In the same way, it is
circular to say that our reason for laying down the rule “Racism is wrong” is the need to
condemn certain instances of racial harm. This is an internal rather than an external justifica-
tion of grammar. But it is not for that reason irrational or unreasonable. Internal justifications
are useful in drawing attention to the empirical and pragmatic foundations of grammatical
needs. Wittgenstein’s elucidations of mathematics shed light on our values and human
nature: “This calculus, say the theory of numbers, does not show what wonderful properties
God has given to numbers, but what properties He has given to us and to things, with the
result that this calculus is useful, interesting, and easily carried out with our writing materials”
(2013, BT p. 188).
130  A. G. URQUIDEZ

than explanatory. Some Wittgensteinians thus describe his conception of

philosophy as “a priori” and “non-cognitive.” This emphasizes the fact
that its aim is not to teach us new information, but to enhance our under-
standing of the conceptual framework that we employ. Understanding is
enhanced by the dissolution of conceptual confusions that stem from our
lack of reflection upon the web of conceptual connections that, for most
ordinary purposes, we are never called to untangle, clarify, and reflect upon.
For instance, as a competent speaker, I know how to use the words
“close” and “shut” but my knowledge of these grammars does not nor-
mally call on me to distinguish their meanings. Hence, I might be at a loss
to do so. Similarly, I know the grammar of “time” if I know how to use
and respond appropriately to statements like “Look at the time,” “What
time is it?”, and so on. Yet, I might be at a loss to explain the grammar of
“time,” in a general way, so as to dissolve confusions about time: “What
is time?”, “Is time travel possible?”, “How is time related to space?”, and
so on. For Wittgenstein, such questions are expressions of confusion.
What distinguishes confusions about time from the confusion about the
grammatical difference between “shut” and “close” is that the former set
of confusions is distinctly philosophical. Grammarians may be interested
in, even puzzled by, the subtle differences between “shut” and “close,”
and the task of clarifying these differences may be a difficult endeavor
(if looking at the problem afresh), but the puzzlement is patently non-­
philosophical. For it does not tempt us into positing metaphysical entities,
third realms, psychological processes, and other metaphysical boogeymen
that Wittgensteinians are keen on destroying. In actuality, the two sets
of confusions are of the same kind, according to the Wittgensteinian, for
both are products of misunderstandings of the ordinary usage of words
and both are therefore resolvable by the careful scrutinizing of language.
Philosophical and non-philosophical confusions are distinguished, not by
a difference in kind, but by a difference in interest.
This, then, is a brief depiction of what has come to be called the thera-
peutic reading of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Philosophy, he says, is a
kind of therapy, a way of letting the fly out of the fly-bottle. Philosophical
problems, for the most part, are dissolved rather than resolved, for they
were never legitimate problems to begin with. The problem, at its root, is
that we fail to grasp the grammatical complexity of our conceptual scheme.
I classify Wittgenstein’s therapeutic conception of philosophy (conceptual
analysis) as kind of pure description, for his approach is non-prescriptive
and anti-revisionist. It is not the only type of descriptive philosophy on
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  131

offer. For some purely descriptive projects may be more ambitious than

Wittgenstein’s therapeutic conception. Pure description, for instance, may
purport to describe ordinary usage without revising it, without commit-
ting to the claim that ordinary usage is in good normative standing. This
non-therapeutic iteration of pure description is Joshua Glasgow’s aim for
his own approach, for example. I thus view Wittgenstein’s purely descrip-
tive approach to philosophy (what he calls “grammatical analysis”) as one
iteration of descriptive analysis. Descriptive analysis contrasts with norma-
tive analysis (e.g., Sally Haslanger’s ameliorative approach) and metaphysi-
cal analysis (e.g., Tommie Shelby’s ideological theory). In my view,
Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical analysis is unjustly limiting
when it comes to addressing many philosophical problems that are
prompted by the analysis of ethical, social and political concepts. My aim
in this section is to explain why that is so.
Let us begin with Hacker’s distinction between two Wittgensteinian
uses of the term “grammar”:

Grammar, qua discipline, is a normative description (and investigation) of

language (BT 191v, 192v)—in the sense in which jurisprudence is (among
other things) the normative description of the laws of the land. A normative
description is a statement of, and a clarification of, rules. It no more lays
down rules that determine what makes sense than jurisprudence lays down
laws determining what is legal. It is a descriptive activity (hence unlike pre-
scriptive jurisprudence). Grammar, qua object, of grammatical investigations,
consists of sense-determining rules of a language. What belongs to grammar
in this sense is everything required for determination of meaning, for com-
paring a proposition with reality—hence for understanding.38

In normative description, the philosopher describes grammar. Grammatical

reminders state grammatical rules, tell us what they are. These reminders
are then used to clarify concepts and criticize philosophical theories. For
example, a philosopher might state: “Racism is wrong” or “It is true that
racism is wrong.” Within the context of normative description, the phi-
losopher’s statement is not the expression of her endorsement of the rule
(i.e., no prescriptive judgment is involved here). (For the philosopher’s
grammatical reminder might be a reminder of a rule that belongs to a foreign
grammatical system.) The aim of providing grammatical reminders is
therapeutic. The aim of providing grammatical reminders is therapeutic.
38
 Hacker (2012, 4–5).
132  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Consider, for example, Mills’ view that theory must establish that racism
is wrong rather than presuppose it, and that in order to establish racism’s
necessary wrongness it must first establish the referent of “racism.” Qua
Wittgensteinian therapist, I might argue that Mills is misguided, because
he ignores the grammar of “racism.” I might remind him that “Racism is
wrong” is a rule rather than a true or false description. No object corre-
sponds to a rule, hence there’s nothing for the philosopher to discover.
The therapeutic lesson is that there is no such thing as discovering the
referent of “racism” prior to establishing the normative status of racism. (I
make the case for these claims in Chap. 7.)
The therapist’s grammatical reminders are descriptions of grammar.
Within this philosophical practice, the practice of normative description, a
sentence of the form “It is true that racism is racial oppression” or “Racism
is racial oppression is the rule” is functionally equivalent to a norm-exis-
tence statement. Such propositions function as true or false descriptions of
actual grammar. To assert that a grammar rule is true  in this context
involves no prescriptive judgment (no prescriptive endorsement of a rule),
for although we call it a “normative description” in the sense that the
object of one’s description is a norm, it remains a description for all that.
Stating or citing a rule does not necessarily commit one to endorsing it,
for, again, the grammatical norm stated may belong to a grammatical sys-
tem one rejects. It is a true or false predication that depends on facts about
the actual grammar for its truth-value.
Descriptive grammatical analysis, normative descriptions, is inappropri-
ate in the context of ethics and social and political philosophy, where the
philosopher makes a shift away from the practice of descriptive analysis
toward that of prescriptive analysis. Normative prescription, or what I will
call prescriptive grammar, is a kind of normative analysis that makes philo-
sophical recommendations to conserve, adopt, modify, or eliminate gram-
matical rules (i.e., linguistic/representational practices). Normative
prescription does not “leave everything as it is” and, therefore, falls out-
side the scope of what Wittgenstein considers philosophy. This is what
differentiates it from descriptive grammatical analysis. Both prescriptive
and descriptive grammar share the same object of investigation, the “sense-
determining rules of language,” but they differ with respect to their aims,
and they often differ in their attitude toward established grammar. For
prescriptive grammar has the potential to be critical, in a way that descrip-
tive grammar cannot be.
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  133

3.3.2  
Criticisms of Grammar
In this section, I explain why Wittgensteinian therapy (by itself) is unwar-
rantedly limiting within normative (moral, social, and political) philosophy.
I claim that although therapy is not completely impotent within normative
philosophy, it is not the primary mode of analysis for grappling with many
philosophical problems that are characteristic of the ethical and politi-
cal domains.
The time is long overdue for Wittgensteinian philosophy to make con-
ceptual space for a new approach to normative analysis—a characteristi-
cally Wittgensteinian one. This is as much an expansion of so-called
“ordinary language philosophy” as it is an expansion of normative analysis.
To being, I part ways with traditional Wittgensteinians who maintain that
philosophy must leave grammar where it is, in every domain of philosophy,
including the normative domain which deals with moral, social, and politi-
cal problems.39 Paul Johnston, for example, has written two  books on
ethical problems from an orthodox Wittgensteinian perspective. I find
much of what he says in those books valuable and helpful for dissolving
conceptual confusions within Anglophone ethical philosophy. However,
he maintains, from first to last, that “since grammatical points advance no
claims, it makes no sense to deny them or reject them as wrong. The only
possible grounds for objection to them would be if they failed to offer an
accurate account of the concepts they purported to describe.”40
Notwithstanding his correct point that “grammatical points advance no
claims,” I still find his remark misguided—and I say this as someone who
accepts the distinction he is aiming to defend in the broader context of

39
 This point is increasingly being conceded by Wittgensteinian scholars. Hacker, for exam-
ple, writes: “I am inclined to think that this [Wittgenstein’s] conception [of philosophy] is at
odds with the tenor of his highly naturalist and historicist approach to the problems of phi-
losophy. One would have expected him to favour a broadly Aristotelian and Humean
approach to ethics, and to have approved of the endeavours of his pupil Georg Henrik von
Wright in his great book The Varieties of Goodness. Be that as it may, it seems to me that when
one turns from theoretical philosophy to practical philosophy, new factors come into play.
Although conceptual clarification and logical cartography certainly have their place in the
domain of ethics, legal and political philosophy, rational debate about how we should live our
lives, about what is of intrinsic value in our lives, and about what kinds of laws are appropriate
for free people living under the rule of law at a given stage in history are surely licit subjects
for philosophers to discuss. These subjects have been part of the task of philosophy ever since
its inception with Socrates, and woe and betide us if we relinquish it” (2015, 51).
40
 Johnston (1989, 146).
134  A. G. URQUIDEZ

this passage (namely, the distinction between grammatical remarks and

descriptive statements, the latter being “substantive”).
The point Johnston is making is that a “grammatical point” cannot be
false in the way an empirical proposition can be false. For grammatical
remarks are expressions of norms rather than descriptions. To call a gram-
matical remark true is normally to endorse and lay down a grammar rule.
So it is not analogous to asserting it is true that it is raining, where the
truth or falsity of this proposition is determined by how the world is.
Glock puts the point this way:

[Wittgenstein’s] point is that for a necessary proposition to be about some-

thing and to be true is toto caelo different from what it is for an empirical
proposition to be so (AWL 154; LFM 114, 250-1; PI §251). The role of a
grammatical proposition like ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is not to make a
true statement of fact about bachelors but to explain the meaning of ‘bach-
elor’. We do not verify it by investigating the marital status of people identi-
fied as bachelors, and its denial displays not factual ignorance but linguistic
misunderstanding. Most importantly, it excludes not a genuine possibility,
but only a NONSENSICAL form of words.41

I have no objection to Johnston’s point that a proposition like “Red is a

color” is not true based on the facts. It is no more made true by how the
world is than “Bachelors are unmarried” is made true by how the world is.
Nevertheless, he is wrong to assert that it is incoherent or non-­philosophical
to subject grammar to criticism. A possible ground for objecting to a gram-
matical proposition is that it ought not govern, independent of whether it in
fact governs. To call the norm “wrong,” “incorrect,” or “untrue” would
then carry normative force: it should not prevail as the norm. Granted,
rejecting existing grammatical norms is only possible (only makes sense)
against a background that envisions a different or modified version of a
practice. Yet, even in the limit case involving a radically novel practice, if
such a practice is described to a sufficient degree, and its connections to
the rest of our lives explained, then it is perfectly coherent to recommend
the adoption of alternative representational practices.
In ordinary language, for instance, “Racism is good” might be described
as grammatically incorrect. So one might be tempted to say that it is mean-
ingless or makes no sense. But this would be mistaken. To see this envision

 Glock (1996, 132–133).

41
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  135

what it would be like for this to be a widely accepted grammatical rule. We

could easily imagine an alternative conception of morality, a moral form of
life different from our own. Consider the proud racist who asserts that
racism is good. This example may be extreme, but it exists in some corners
as a means of resisting and protesting the prevailing grammar. We need
not turn to imaginative forms of life to understand what it would be like
for “Racism is good” to be the norm, for we already know what forms of
life governed by it have in fact looked like, provided we know something
about the history of racism. It might be objected that most racists would
object to the use of the epithet “racism” to describe their values, and this
might be correct. But that is so only because of the stigma associated with
the term, because of the high political cost of being openly racist in our
society. That is precisely why my example centers the proud racist  as
opposed to the secret racist. The proud racist would happily accept the
term “racism” as a description of her views, provided that the term were
modified to connote moral goodness. What the proud racist contests is the
evaluative  content of the concept of racism, not its descriptive content.
Said differently, she accepts that racism currently means something that
is morally objectionable, but argues that it should not mean this.
It might be objected that to imagine an alternative use of “racism” merely
introduces a new practice, and so does not in any way undermine the origi-
nal practice. But this is mistaken. The racist’s use of “racism” to signify
something morally good is deliberately parasitic on ordinary usage of the
term. It is an unordinary usage of the term in most contexts where it is
deployed. Yet, the proud racist isn’t confused, because she is well aware that
her usage is incompatible with existing linguistic practice. Indeed, that is her
reason for so using it, since by doing so she thereby makes a political state-
ment. Johnston’s mistake is to assume that all disagreement about concepts
must be descriptive; for only then can he maintain that philosophy’s attempt
to meddle in such disputes is conceptually confused and incoherent.
However, I argue in Chap. 5 that this is mistaken, that it is plausible that a
substantial amount of everyday disagreement about what is racist presup-
poses latent prescriptive disagreement about what racism is. I further argue
that prescriptive disagreement is rationally resolvable, and that normative
philosophy has a substantive role to play in its resolution. Prescriptive gram-
mar, then, is in the business of critical grammatical advocacy. Unlike the
proud racist, however, who would like to revise grammar to achieve nefari-
ous racist ends, I aim to prescribe grammar to achieve antiracist ends.
136  A. G. URQUIDEZ

3.3.3  Grammatical Approaches
What I am proposing is the following division between Wittgensteinian
philosophy, otherwise known as grammatical analysis.

• Descriptive Grammatical Analysis. A method within conceptual

analysis (specifically, descriptive analysis) that provides normative
descriptions of grammar—that is, clarifications of concepts and the
dissolution of conceptual confusion—for the sake of resolving philo-
sophical problems.42 The theoretical assertion that a grammatical
proposition is “true” is a grammatical reminder of how a word is
used. What it signifies is that a certain grammatical rule is the cur-
rent/prevailing linguistic norm within some particular language-
game. (This approach is governed by the desideratum that
“philosophy leaves everything as it is,” i.e., this practice is committed
to the ideal of pure description, on the assumption that the problem
it aims to resolve is of the form “I don’t know my way about,” i.e.,
conceptual confusion.)
• Prescriptive Grammatical Analysis. A method within conceptual
analysis (specifically, normative analysis) that provides normative pre-
scriptions of grammar—that is, prescriptions to the effect that gram-
mar should be conserved, revised, eliminated, or extended—for the
sake of resolving philosophical problems. The theoretical assertion
that a grammatical proposition is “true” is a grammatical prescrip-
tion. What is prescribed is that a certain grammatical rule should be
the prevailing linguistic norm, independently of whether or not it is.
(This approach is not governed by the desideratum that “philosophy
leaves everything as it is,” rather,  it is in the business of critically
assessing the normative status of grammar, on the assumption that
the problem it aims to resolve is about how to live, rather than the
expression of conceptual confusion.)

Corresponding to these two domains of grammatical analysis are two dis-

tinct uses of the term “true,” as applied to grammatical propositions. We
can illustrate this with the definition “Racism is wrong.”

42
 P. F. Strawson calls this method “connective analysis.” See Chap. 2 for discussion.
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  137

• Descriptive Grammatical Truth. The assertion “It is true that racism

is wrong” is (used as) a descriptive theoretical judgment about what
the prevailing linguistic practice is. What the proposition expresses is
a description of prevailing linguistic practice: namely, that the lin-
guistic norm that racism is wrong is the prevailing linguistic norm
within a linguistic community.
• Prescriptive Grammatical Truth. The assertion “It is true that racism
is wrong” is (used as) a prescriptive theoretical judgment about what
the linguistic practice ought to be, independently of what the pre-
vailing practice happens to be. What the proposition expresses is a
prescriptive endorsement (a claim about how things should be):
namely, that the linguistic norm that racism is wrong is pragmatically
justified and therefore ought to govern within a linguistic community.

We thus see that whereas descriptive grammatical truth is a matter of a

grammatical norm governing or being in force, prescriptive grammatical
truth is a matter of it possibly, potentially, and ideally governing. Prescriptive
grammar is critical in a creative sense that is uncharacteristic of descriptive
grammar. We can bring this out by contrasting two uses of the term “criti-
cal.” Descriptive grammatical analysis is critical of philosophical theories,
arguments, presuppositions, explanations, hypotheses, and theses. By contrast,
prescriptive grammatical analysis is critical of grammar itself, existing rep-
resentational practices, and forms of life. To criticize grammar in this way
presupposes some alternative grammar, form of life, et cetera. To reject a
grammatical proposition, like “Racism is wrong” or “Red is a color,” is to
defend an alternative form of life. Prescriptive grammatical analysis is criti-
cally creative insofar as it is concerned with imagining how things could
and should be, not merely for the sake of better understanding and appre-
ciating our prevailing forms of life, but for the sake of potentially improv-
ing our lives—that is, envisioning, constructing, and implementing new
forms of life.

3.4   Empirical Analysis

3.4.1  In Defense of Empirical Approaches to Racism
The aim of this section is to argue that empirical analysis is relevant to the
picture of philosophical theory sketched above, what I called prescriptive
grammatical analysis. It is particularly relevant for the theory of racism. It
138  A. G. URQUIDEZ

is relevant, I argue, because we ought to conceive of racism as a sociocul-

tural phenomenon. People concerned about social justice have a stake in
viewing racism’s forms and manifestations as unstable and evolving phe-
nomena, where these grammatical  shifts are functions of shifts in social
and political circumstances.
The cultural or anthropological nature of grammar and its compatibil-
ity with the contingent nature of definitions of “racism” is well suited to
empirical approaches to racism. To see why and how, I turn to the debate
over proper methodology in the theory of racism. This debate largely
revolves around whether philosophical analysis should be empirical or a
priori. Sally Haslanger defends the former. She writes,

an adequate understanding of racism cannot be achieved a priori, but

depends on a close analysis of historical examples where race is a factor in the
explanation of injustice. Philosophical tools are important, especially at
points where the analysis becomes normative, but work done by historians,
social scientists, legal theorists, and literary theorists is invaluable in reveal-
ing the sometimes subtle ways that injustice is woven through our social life.43

Clevis Headley similarly states:

racism best qualifies as a sociocultural phenomenon. This means that any

proper philosophical analysis of racism should assimilate the model of a critical
philosophical analysis of other sociocultural phenomena, such as nationalism
and sexism. Hence, instead of employing an a priori philosophical method of
analysis, we can adopt a naturalistic approach and utilize information from the
social sciences, sociology, history, law and economics, and so forth in an effort
to understand the nature of certain sociocultural p ­ henomena. But we should
acknowledge that an appeal to naturalism in the context of sociocultural phe-
nomena does not entail a complete rejection of a priori analysis or of its valid-
ity in this or any other context. The point is simply that the validity of certain
sociocultural concepts depends on whether we can define these concepts in
terms of specific cultural, social, or historical practices. The main objective is
to connect sociocultural concepts with human practices…44

Conventionalism is compatible with empirical analyses of racism, because

it asserts that grammatical propositions are conventions, human-made,

43
 Haslanger (2004, 98).
44
 Headley (2000, 223–224).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  139

sociohistorical creations. That a subset of scholars endorse an empirical

methodology, of course, does not automatically mean they are or would
be on board with conventionalism. For example, conventionalism lends
itself to the controversial thesis that explanations of racism are essentially
contestable,45 but empirical theorists might reject this. Furthermore,
empirical theorists might insist that grammatical norms are defensible on
theoretical grounds, and not merely on practical grounds, or that the
grammatical system of one culture can be objectively established as supe-
rior to that of another, thereby rejecting the arbitrariness of grammar the-
sis. These factors notwithstanding, conventionalism is one way of justifying
an empirical approach to racism. The argument I develop below (and
throughout this book) is meant to speak to both a priori and empirical
theorists.
The anthropological nature of grammar will likely be less welcomed by
philosophers who reject a posteriori approaches to racism. Perhaps the
most compelling argument against empirical analysis as a mode of meta-
physical analysis is that the question “What is racism?” is conceptual rather
than empirical. Andrew Valls forcefully presents this argument in defense
of Jorge Garcia’s theory of racism:

Whether implicit beliefs or all racial ills should be considered racism are
separate questions—and they are conceptual questions, not (directly)
answerable by reference to empirical data. Conceptual and ethical argument
should certainly be informed by the relevant empirical data, but as the case
of racism suggests, empirical evidence by itself cannot decide conceptual or
ethical issues. Hence it is unclear how, even in principle, empirical studies
can show a view like Garcia’s to be incorrect. For all of their richness and
interest, the psychological findings discussed by Faucher and Machery
­cannot by themselves tell us how best to understand and use the term “rac-
ism.” After all the data are in, the moral and conceptual questions related to
racism remain open.46

Valls is correct that “conceptual questions [are] not (directly) answerable

by reference to empirical data.” For as I’ve argued in this and the previous
chapter, it is essential that we separate conceptual/grammatical questions

45
 Unfortunately, I do not have the space to defend this thesis here, though see my
paper, “Racism as an Essentially Contested Concept” (unpublished manuscript).
46
 Valls (2009, 478–479). For Faucher and Machery’s critique, see (2009); for Garcia’s
reply see (2011).
140  A. G. URQUIDEZ

from empirical/descriptive questions. But while it is true that the empiri-

cal is ultimately subservient to the conceptual (for reasons I explain below),
this does not suffice for ruling out empirical analysis, at least not as Headley
defines it. As we saw above, empirical analysis, for him, starts from the
presupposition that “racism” ought to be defined in terms of cultural,
historical, or social practices. Crucially, this theoretical prescription may be
viewed as a conceptual point. When Headley claims that racism is a
sociocultural phenomenon, I read him, charitably, as recommending that
we ought to  view it as such. He argues that there are good conceptual
reasons for doing so, for many theorists would like to explain such empiri-
cal phenomena as the persistence of racial inequality. However, once we’ve
adopted the methodological norm that racism should be analyzed as a
sociocultural phenomenon, we have answered Valls’ objection. His ques-
tion is: How can empirical studies, even in principle, show a view of racism
to be right or wrong? The answer is: by assessing the degree to which our
existing concept is consistent with the conceptual limit that racism is a
kind of social reality. The limit on analysis is that any recommended defini-
tion of “racism” should be compatible with what we know about the social
role of racial phenomena.47
But why, even if racism is a sociocultural phenomenon, must we turn to
empirical analysis? I want to propose that empirical analysis becomes con-
ceptually significant under either of two conditions. First, empirical analy-
sis may be necessary to better understand (and refine) an existing concept.
For example, ignorance about the etiology, mechanisms, and empirical
ramifications of the phenomena identified with racism gives philosophical
theory good reason to engage in empirical inquiry to remove said igno-
rance. (For instance, a h­ istorical understanding of race that reveals it to be
the tool of white supremacy across time and place may give theorists a
reason to define “racism” in terms of white supremacy.) Second, empirical
analysis becomes relevant if the existing concept is not (or is no longer) useful
(or not as useful as it could be). For instance, if a concept is introduced to
serve goal Y and if it ends up serving goal Z as a byproduct, then there
may be good reason to revise or eliminate the concept. Moreover, if a
concept C is introduced to achieve goal Y, but instead of achieving Y it
undercuts it by virtue of legitimating or bringing about some antithetical
concept Z as a byproduct, then C is not just useless but harmful. (Think,

 Chapter 7 delves more deeply into the “explanatory condition,” as I there call it.
47
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  141

for example, of “reverse racism” and the arguably racist effects of this
discourse.)
By calling racism a sociocultural concept, Headley draws attention to
the fact that changes in the broader society might make it prudent to
modify it from time to time. Here empirical investigation could uncover—
as in the case of the sociohistorical shift from the “old racism” to the “new
racism”—empirical facts that furnish good pragmatic reasons to modify
the existing concept. Valls seems to acknowledge this point when he
implicitly distinguishes “direct” and “indirect” forms of empirical rele-
vance. He does not explain what he means by these terms, but if empirical
data might be “indirectly” relevant to conceptual matters, as Valls allows,
then this seems to open the door to empirical analysis. Valls cannot rule
out a priori the significance of empirical analysis without first arguing
against Headley’s conceptual point that racism is best construed as a socio-
cultural phenomenon. And the considerations Headley draws from in his
“Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualistic
Perspective” suggest that there is utility in adopting this conceptual limit.
Since I discuss the significance of such shifts in social and political circum-
stances elsewhere in the book (see my discussion of ideology in Chap. 8), I
will not attempt to defend this contention here. My point is simply that
there is a practical interest in viewing the concept of racism in sociocultural
terms. For instance, the concept of r­ acism has, in my view, been correctly
described as chameleonic (subtly adaptive), scavenging (opportunistically
in  search of  more optimal ­ configurations), open-textured (empirically
modifable), and politicized (serving different interests).
It might be objected that, even if empirical analysis is relevant for set-
tling empirical questions about the concept of racism qua sociocultural
phenomenon, it is not clear that it is relevant for settling conceptual ques-
tions about it qua moral concept. So we need to ask: Is empirical analysis
useful for moral representation? Arguably, it is. We can build on Headley’s
defense of empirical analysis by recalling one aspect of the contingency of
definitions of “racism.” Definitions are contingent in that we need not
adopt or retain them if they become useless or impracticable for represen-
tational purposes. The utility and prudential value of a definition is contin-
gent upon facts. Empirical facts are, therefore, morally significant because
they bear on the need for specific forms of moral representation and for
conceptual change. For instance, the ramifications of the effect of implicit
bias on human thought and conduct may not be fully appreciated given
current knowledge. Empirical investigation may reveal it to be much more
142  A. G. URQUIDEZ

harmful than scholars have so far anticipated. Should this prove to be the
case, this could seriously modify our understanding of racism (i.e., give us
good reason to revise our conception). Thus, in Chap. 7, I argue that the
harms of implicit bias support political over personal accounts of racism’s
badness. If a sociocultural concept is to track radical shifts in sociocultural
conditions, it may be necessary for it to undergo shifts of this sort. The
adoption of new cultural modes of living, changes in political and legal
dynamics, and scientific discoveries and technological advancements could
give rise to new representational needs, including the need to revise exist-
ing grammatical explanations of racism.
In short, inquiry into the nature, effects, and significance of racial phe-
nomena—for the sake of assessing our representational practices along
these lines—gives empirical theorists license to challenge the prevailing
conceptual standards. Whether a concept remains morally significant for
our own day is, for the conventionalist, a practical matter, which cannot
be resolved independent of our needs for the kind of representation at
issue. Before moving on, I should emphasize that, for reasons expressed
in Sect. 3.2.2.3 (the discussion of epistemic and pragmatic justification),
a priori analysis has primacy over empirical analysis. For at the end of the
day we must decide what is to be called “racism” on the basis of our needs
and goals for the concept. “The limit of the empirical—is concept-
formation.”48

3.4.2  Beyond Realism and Constructivism

To illustrate the compatibility of empirical and a priori approaches, as well
as the priority of the latter, consider Leonard Harris’ arguments in “The
Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept?” and “What,
then, is Racism?” In both articles, Harris provides a framework for catego-
rizing competing and incompatible approaches to racism. The first cate-
gory consists of social constructivist approaches to racism, which roughly
map on to empirical approaches that define “racism” as the name of a
shifting and unstable complex of intersubjective and cultural components.
His second category consists of objective realist approaches, which roughly
map on to a priori approaches that define “racism” as the name of an
enduring and stable social essence. According to Harris, these approaches

 Wittgenstein (1983, IV 29, p. 237).

48
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  143

converge on the question of whether the term “racism” names something

real (everyone agrees that it does). Where they diverge is on the question
of what it is that is named by “racism.”49 The question implied by his
framework then is this: Is “racism” the name of an enduring and stable
social essence, or is it the name of a shifting and unstable social complex?
To specify what is named by “racism” is to specify the nature of this reality.
In “The Concept of Racism,” Harris argues that there is currently no
value-free way to decide the question of what “racism” names. This is not
necessarily due to the fact that there is no objectively correct answer to it.
Rather, it is due to the fact that the evidence necessary for settling it is cur-
rently underdetermined. For there are a host of empirical/metaphysical
issues that theory cannot yet settle, such as the question of what races are
and whether they exist. Hence he thinks that the controversy cannot be
settled by appeal to epistemic considerations, only by appeal to pragmatic
ones. The argument here is as follows. While theory progresses slowly, with
little hope for a consensus in the near future, racially subjugated peoples
­continue to suffer and cannot wait on theory to discover the correct defini-
tion of “racism.” Hence, argues Harris, theory must render its decision
based on pragmatic argumentation.
It might be objected that we should remain agnostic about the nature
of racism until the relevant  controversies are settled. Harris finds this
response inadequate, because the need to adopt a conception of racism is
practically urgent. Hence  we cannot wait on definitive answers to out-
standing metaphysical and methodological issues  to decide how best to
think about racism. Said differently, the dispute over racism is a “burningly
practical” concern (to borrow a description from Charles Mills), as
opposed to a mere scholastic riddle to occupy an idle hour.50 This consid-
eration leads Harris to reason that philosophical theory should turn to
pragmatic considerations in resolving the realist-constructivist dispute.51

49
 The realist, according to Harris, treats the word “racism” as a “metaphorical noun,”
which names a “‘thing’ of social reality” (1998, 217). The constructivist treats the noun
“racism” as a “metaphorical predicate” or “floating attribute” which names “a phenomenon
of predication” (1998, 218).
50
 See Mills (1998, 17).
51
 “Why, and what, institutional rules and practices perpetuate human misery require
explanations of group behavior. These explanations direct us in suggesting solutions that are
at least reasonable to consider. Thus assuming that there are no ontologically stable, endur-
144  A. G. URQUIDEZ

For Harris, pragmatic considerations favor realist over constructivist defi-

nitions, because the latter are pragmatically undesirable: they provide
unstable/evolving definitions of “racism” rather than stable/enduring
definitions. For example, stable/enduring definitions provide unchanging
and objective moral criteria for identifying phenomena as racist. In “What,
then, is Racism?” Harris defends realism thus:

It is objective criteria of what exists, across contexts, that I suggest we use to

decide what situations count as racist. …[I]n the absence of adequate infor-
mation about whether a situation is racist—and it is arguable that we rarely
have adequate information—appeal to stable definitions has advantages that
subjective [i.e., constructivist] definitions lack. Stable definitions offer, for
example, criteria we can use to evaluate changes, such as whether the condi-
tions creating racial misery are increasing or decreasing.52

Given that stable/enduring definitions are generally more desirable than

unstable/evolving definitions, there is good pragmatic reason to endorse
a realist definition over a constructivist one. So realism has the upper hand
in the dispute. While we wait for the evidence to come in, realism is the
pragmatically justified default position.
Harris’ realism/constructivism framework is incomplete, for it leaves no
room for the conventionalist approach to the definition of “racism.” On
conventionalism, there is no language-independent fact about what racism
is, and the noun “racism” does not name any kind of entity in a philo-
sophical definition of the term. Definitions of “racism” are not competing
descriptions of a language-­independent reality, as Harris’ framework sup-

ing, and causing group agents, we use heuristic categories to account for why, and what, rules
and practices sustain human misery” (Harris 1998, 228).
52
 Harris (1999, 447). In “The Concept of Racism” he puts it this way: “Even if racism is
considered an indeterminate concept, best understood as a predicate, we must decide when
we are faced with an instance of a racism, among the infinite variety of racisms. That is, when
we are, for heuristic and practical purposes, required to act in an endurantist fashion—when
an object is wholly present at a single moment—we are entrapped. We are entrapped in mak-
ing moral decisions about persons as if their race was a stable category. We are compelled to
proceed as if the definitions we use for when a person is black or white, for example, are
stable. We know that Who is Black in America is defined by the one drop rule—one drop of
sub-Saharan African ancestry makes a person black. This definition is peculiar to a certain
period in American history and has little to do with the myriad of ways races are defined in
other parts of the world. When prejudice occurs, it affects enduring persons living under
social definitions of their identity, contrived, real, or strictly limited to a particular commu-
nity” (1998, 227).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  145

poses. Said differently, Harris’ framework tacitly presupposes a descriptiv-

ist conception of definition, which holds that definitions of “racism” are
descriptions of an ontological entity, racism itself. If conventionalism is
correct, however, then descriptivism is false, and “racism” is not the name
of anything. A fortiori, Harris’ realist-constructivist framework collapses.
A different line of objection is that conventionalism provides a superior
approach to both objective realism and social constructivism. In particu-
lar, it provides a superior approach by Harris’ own pragmatic orientation.
To resolve the realism-constructivism dispute, Harris tacitly relies on the
following principle: Given that evidence does not settle disagreement over the
correct approach to racism, theorists should endorse the one that provides the
most useful criteria for purposes of moral assessment and other theoretico-­
practical purposes. Although Harris’ pragmatic argument eschews epis-
temic considerations, it does not jettison them as insignificant or irrelevant.
Rather, his argument is that epistemic considerations currently underde-
termine the correct answer to the question “What is racism?” (much in the
same way that William James’ “The Will to Believe” argues that epistemic
considerations often underdetermine momentous questions about ulti-
mate reality). By providing conceptual space for epistemic considerations,
Harris allows for the possibility that, once the evidence is in, realism might
need to be reconsidered. The evidence could ultimately reveal that realism
had always been mistaken, and realist theories might have to give way to
constructivist theories. If the evidence ultimately vindicates constructiv-
ism, then it is simply a fact that “racism” names an unstable entity and that
this fact leaves theory with heuristically deficient categories for moral and
theoretical purposes.
Conventionalism, which also prizes pragmatic reasons, has the advan-
tage of not having the above problem, for it leaves no conceptual room for
epistemic reasons. We only have pragmatic considerations to argue from.
To be sure, empirical considerations enter into the equation on conven-
tionalism. But empirical considerations do not function as epistemic rea-
sons within the conventionalist framework. Rather, they enter the analysis
as pragmatic reasons for judging that one definition is more useful than its
rivals. Conventionalism creates the conceptual space needed to lay down
normative criteria that meet our practical purposes, and if new evidence
comes in, we are free to update our grammatical prescriptions.
My critique of Harris’ argument highlights the priority of a priori
analysis over empirical analysis. Harris is right to insist that we start from
146  A. G. URQUIDEZ

our values—from the conceptual problems that prompt the question

“What is racism?” The value Harris starts from—the need to address
burningly practical concerns about race—is laid down a priori. It enters
theory as a condition of sense, and hence as a presupposition of philo-
sophical inquiry. That philosophical theorizing about racism should start
from the a priori conviction that a definition of “racism” ought to meet
a need for moral representation is one I accept. For the very need that
prompts philosophical inquiry into “racism’s” meaning is the same need
that explains the etiology of the term “racism” (and its corresponding
grammar) in the first place. The term “racism” was coined precisely to
meet a burningly practical need, the need to condemn invidious forms of
racial cognition.
My critique of Harris illuminates the significance of empirical analysis. For
although empirical analysis is not always designed to generate moral criteria,
it may be useful for other practical purposes. For instance, a constructivist
approach that studies the subtle changes in conceptions of racism relative to
changes in sociohistorical conditions can enhance our understanding of pat-
terns of racist phenomena. Empirical approaches can uncover phenomena
like implicit racial bias, which might then lead us to question established
notions of moral responsibility, among other things. What conventionalism
enables philosophers to do is focus on practical problems without the need to
pay homage to some putative metaphysical essence—a putative reality that
may constrain our theoretical endeavors in ways that retard progress. (So
here I express another disagreement I have with Harris. Harris seems to
assume that constructivist accounts of racism, which treat racism as an evolv-
ing and contingent phenomenon, are always undesirable because they pro-
vide unstable categories. This seems false, as Headley’s discussion in
“Philosophical Approaches to Racism” argues. Headley convincingly—even
decisively—demonstrates the virtues of contingent empirical accounts.)

3.4.3  Conventionalism as Naturalistically Plausible

At this point, it might be objected that the viability of the metaphysical
project turns on the nature of meaning and definition. This objector
would maintain that, if the metaphysician shares a burden of proof, then
so does the conventionalist. What reason then is there to think that the
ontological presupposition is false and the conventionalist presupposition
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  147

is true? Why think that definitions of “racism” are expressions of linguistic

norms as opposed to descriptions of reality?
Conventionalism does, I concede, have a burden of proof. In an effort
to meet this burden I have analyzed (in this and the previous chapter) the
ordinary use of “explanation of meaning.” Explanations of meaning bear
all the characteristic marks of conventions. First, they are not used to
describe, but to prescribe. That is, they are ordinarily used as standards of
correctness—in teaching, in correcting misuses of words, and so on.
Second, seemingly metaphysical features of definitions can be recast as
features of conventions (or our attitudes toward them). This latter point
is deflationary in that it demystifies seemingly fantastical features of defi-
nitions. What appear to be magical features are quite mundane upon
reflection, for they are not unique to definitions of color terms, moral
terms, et cetera. What is true for the definition of “racism” is true for the
definition of “bachelor,” for example. My account might therefore be
described as naturalistic. This is a virtue, because it analyzes the unfamil-
iar in terms of the familiar. No one thinks that the truth of “Bachelors are
unmarried” is determined by the objective fact to which this definition
corresponds. But the temptation to think thus is strong when one consid-
ers definitions that are more significant to our lives. My argument is that
there is no corresponding object in either case, for explanations of mean-
ing provide rules for the proper use of terms. The importance of seem-
ingly ­metaphysical definitions lies not in their ability to disclose ultimate
reality, nor in their transcendent or transhistorical character, but in their
normative role.
We can better appreciate the naturalistic import of conventionalism by
assessing an important argument in Headley’s “Philosophical Approaches
to Racism.” Here Headley identifies a priori analysis with atemporal/tran-
shistorical analysis. He draws on this  contention to argue in support of
empirical-naturalistic approaches to racism. He writes:

Many philosophers assume that employing an a priori method entails defin-

ing a concept by providing the necessary and sufficient conditions govern-
ing the application of that concept. Moving from semantics to ontology, the
above view requires that every concept claim an essence. This basic philo-
sophical approach treats a concept as a self-creation capable of a certain self-­
subsistence while existing in total independence of human thought and
148  A. G. URQUIDEZ

action. However, in the case of the concept of “racism,” any a priori

approach will be deficient. Of course, I am not denigrating the legitimacy of
traditional philosophical approaches to semantic and ontological issues
involved in the definition of concepts and in the identification of their refer-
ents. What I am claiming, however, is that these traditional approaches are
not fully applicable to sociocultural concepts or, rather, to temporal con-
cepts. A sociocultural concept names a phenomenon whose nature requires
apprehension in time, hence the need to appeal to historical, cultural, and
social factors. Racism as a phenomenon is the product of human actions,
beliefs, perceptions, and the like. As such, it claims no autonomous onto-
logical status but is, rather, a social construction, one that is dependent
upon human beliefs, practices, goals, values, and so forth. Thus, any effort
to treat racism as an abstraction will prove unhelpful.53 Headley
(2000, 243–44)

According to Headley, whereas a priori approaches are best suited to ana-

lyze transcendent (atemporal) concepts like beauty and good (his exam-
ples), they are less than ideal for analyzing historical (temporal) concepts
like sexism and racism.54 The main reason for this is supposedly that atem-
poral concepts have transhistorical and unchanging essences and a priori
analysis is best suited to analyze such essences. By contrast, temporal
­concepts have historical and changing natures and empirical analysis is best
suited to analyze them. Like Harris, Headley believes that it is the lan-
guage-independent nature of the phenomenon in question that deter-
mines whether it is best analyzed by a priori or empirical methods. The
difference between Headley and Harris is that the former takes “racism”
to name an empirical and sociohistorical entity, rather than a transhistori-
cal one. A priori analysis is misguided in the case of racism because it mis-
characterizes the object of analysis.
Again, one virtue of conventionalism is that it retains Headley’s nat-
uralistic intuition without endorsing Headley’s distinction between

53
 Headley (2000, 243–44).
54
 Headley writes: “Accordingly, I contend that it is not the case that any plausible philo-
sophical analyses of racism should follow the model of an a priori philosophical analysis of
nonnatural metaphysical notions, such as the Good in ethics or Beauty in aesthetics. Schmid
[(1996)] does not say that he intends to treat racism as similar to these notions. However, he
suggests that genuine acts of racism tend to share a common essence of an intention to harm.
In suggesting this, he follows the method of defining a concept by isolating its intrinsic fea-
tures. I disagree with Schmid’s strategy since, on my view, racism best qualifies as a sociocul-
tural phenomenon” (2000, 223).
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  149

“natural” and “nonnatural” entities. Beauty and Good are, for him,
examples of nonnatural (transcendent) objects that correspond to our
concepts beauty and good, respectively. By contrast, Headley takes the
natures of sexism and racism to be bound up with social practices that
are constantly in flux. The nature of a “natural entity” is thought to be
discoverable by empirical and historical accounts of our social practices.
Consider how a conventionalist theory of the terms “beauty” and
“good” would proceed. Conventionalism would reject Headley’s claim
that these terms name nonnatural entities. First, these concepts do not
come from the heavens or some supernatural realm, but are humble
terms in our language just as much as “table,” “apple,” “sit,” and so on.
Headley would hold that, although these concepts are human creations,
what is named by “beauty” and “good” is something that is not created
but objectively and universally present. But this too can be challenged
by the conventionalist.
There is no need to posit the existence of nonnatural entities, for
nonnatural entities are superfluous posits on conventionalism. Definitions
of the terms “beauty” and “good” would not be analyzed as descriptions
of transcendent entities, but not because they are descriptions of natural
entities. Rather, they would not be analyzed as descriptions at all, but as
expressions of rules for the correct use of these terms. Headley’s distinc-
tion is thus rejected. Conventionalism is compatible with Headley’s claim
that the concepts sexism and racism can be empirically investigated, in
spite of the fact that it rejects their identification with natural entities, dis-
coverable by the social sciences. “Maleness is a gender,” for example, is
not ordinarily used to describe a social reality, but to provide a rule for
using the terms “maleness” and “gender.” “Gender is a social construct”
is something that we can and do say, but this proposition is grammatical
rather than empirical. It expresses a rule for the use of “gender” (within
certain theoretical contexts), not a description of social reality. That is, it
is a rule for representing social reality (for purposes of social analysis).
Acknowledging this does not require treating social terms like “gender”
and “beauty” as the names of objective social realities.
The rejection of natural entities named by our grammatical proposi-
tions does not imply that we cannot (or should not) look to experience in
determining whether and how to revise our linguistic norms. There may
be good reason to look to experience in analyzing them. That our defini-
tions of “sexism” and “racism” are not descriptions of social objects await-
150  A. G. URQUIDEZ

ing empirical discovery should not be confused with the claim that we
cannot (or should not) draw on empirical considerations in developing
critical-normative judgments about these concepts. For that is precisely
what prescriptive grammatical analysis involves. Ironically, Headley’s natu-
ralism is not “naturalized” enough, as it were, for his framework retains
conceptual space for the transcendent (for supposedly a priori concepts
like beauty).
This last point alludes to a further argument. By providing a method of
analysis for the semantics of terms that do not posit ontological entities as
meanings, conventionalism provides an alternative to metaphysical analy-
sis that is more naturalistically plausible. A metaphysical monist posits rac-
ism itself as an ontological entity; a metaphysical pluralist posits multiple
ontological entities. The conventionalist posits none. Thus, by the princi-
ple of simplicity, the conventionalist analysis is, other things equal, more
plausible than any metaphysical approach that presupposes descriptivism.
Stated differently, metaphysical theories that proceed on the presupposi-
tion that there is such a thing as racism itself owe us an argument for this
claim. Thus far no such argument has been attempted.
Philosophers like Garcia, Shelby, and Mills assert that we must first get
our ontology in order before we can move on to consider normative ques-
tions concerning racism. We must first explain what racism is, we are told,
before we move on to normative explanations of why racism is wrong (e.g.,
Shelby and Mills) and how best to tackle racism (e.g., Garcia and Shelby).
The kernel of truth in these assertions is that meaningful discourse about
racism necessarily starts from an understanding of racism. (Grammar is
logically prior to these practical concerns.) From this, however, it does not
follow that a proper understanding of racism consists in knowledge of a
language-independent essence or nature. How do philosophers like Garcia,
Mills, and Shelby know that propositions like “Racism is racial hatred” and
“Racism is racial ideology” purport to describe the nature of racism? To
know this, one must know at least two things: first, that “racism” is the
name of an object; second, that a definition of “racism” is a description of
this object. But why think these things? Why start from the presupposition
that “racism” must be the name of an object (and a definition of this term
a description of this object) when we don’t have to?
A final objection I will briefly stave off is discussed by Glock. He claims
that a normativist account of meaning is precisely one that is ­nonnaturalistic.
After all, he observes, one prominent objection to normativist claims, like
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  151

Hume’s assertion that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is,” is that

they transform normative entities into mysterious, ineffable, or supernatu-
ral ones.55 Glock himself, however, observes that there are different ways
to think about naturalism. What normativism challenges is not naturalism
per se, but one way of understanding naturalism. Specifically, it challenges
the reductionist tendency among naturalists to reduce rules and normativ-
ity to causal relations and processes. This sort of reductionism is confused,
however, for the only way to make sense of normative activities (like play-
ing games) is by reference to non-reducible normative notions (like the
rules of a game). There is no such thing as giving a causal account of chess,
although one could elaborate the causal relations that make a game like
chess possible (e.g., explanations of how wooden pieces are made, the laws
of physics that make the movement of pieces possible, the psychological
and biological mechanisms that make intentional action possible, etc.).
Normativism’s corrective to the reductionist brand of naturalism is this:
although normativity occurs within the causal world order (and thus pre-
supposes scientific processes and phenomena as preconditions of norma-
tivity), normativity is a distinctly human phenomenon; that is, it is properly
explained in terms of the anthropological and cultural character of human
beings, which is a sui generis component of the natural world.

55
 “Normativism, generally speaking, is the view that human thought and behaviour differ
from inanimate nature and the behaviour of ‘mere’ animals in that they are subject to norms
or rules, standards which prescribe and evaluate. Such norms have always appeared a threat
to naturalism, since they seem to defy reduction to the causal regularities recognized by the
natural sciences. They have also inspired attempts to avoid both epistemological naturalism
and ontological supernaturalism, attempts which range from the hermeneutic thinkers of the
eighteenth century to contemporary analytic philosophers like Brandom, McDowell, Putnam
and Hacker. The basic idea is that human beings are special not because they are connected
to a reality beyond the physical world of space, time and matter (a Platonist third realm or
Cartesian soul substances, for example), but because they can only be adequately understood
from a normative perspective alien to the natural sciences. For this reason, there is knowledge
outside of natural science, knowledge of language and logic, for example, even though it does
not deal with supernatural entities” (Glock 2005, 219). Hacker has also recently criticized
the narrowness of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, arguing that he should have
endorsed something like a “broadly Aristotelian and Humean approach to ethics” (2015, 51,
quoted above). In a note, he says that by “naturalist” he does not mean Quinean scientific
reductionism. Presumably that is because he endorses a normativist naturalism, similar to
Glock’s position.
152  A. G. URQUIDEZ

3.5   Conclusion
My aim in this chapter has been to provide an analysis of definition that
rivals the descriptivist position, presupposed by metaphysical analysis.
Whereas descriptivists hold that philosophical definitions of “racism” are
descriptions I have argued that they can be analyzed as norms. My argu-
ment has proceeded in two parts. These parts, along with an explication of
the relationship of empirical and a priori analysis, and with the arguments
of the preceding chapter, provide a sustained argument for the conven-
tionalist picture of meaning. First, I articulated a conventionalist analysis
of some of the most prominent features of definitions, features that incline
philosophers to treat them as descriptions of ontological entities. These
seemingly metaphysical predicates—“necessity,” “a priority,” “universal-
ity,” et cetera—which commonly get applied to definitions can be recast as
predicates of linguistic conventions.
Second, I argued that conventionalism is superior to descriptivism,
because it provides a naturalized account of the so-called “metaphysical”
side of definition. By accommodating the salient predicates commonly
thought to ground a metaphysical conception of definition, conventional-
ism posits fewer ontological entities than descriptivism. In particular, con-
ventionalism posits no ontological entities whatever, for it views definitions
as mere expressions of norms. Third, I argued that conventionalism has
additional virtues such as dissolving several confusions that lead some phi-
losophers to believe that a priori and empirical approaches to racism are
fundamentally opposed or incompatible. In the case of Harris and Headley,
we saw that their commitment to metaphysical analysis makes it natural for
them to adopt a descriptivist conception of definition which generates
conceptual confusion.
Headley’s empiricist leanings lead him to emphasize the contingency
of grammatical propositions. His interest in the contingent side of
­definition—the ways that definitions are created and the conditions under
which they evolve—is manifest in his assertion that definitions of “racism”
describe constructed, temporal, evolving, sociocultural phenomena. This
emphasis leads him to argue that a priori approaches are committed to
“nonnatural entities” and empirical approaches to “natural entities.”
However, no such distinction is sustainable or needed on conventional-
ism, for definitions are not descriptions of anything. By contrast, Harris’
interest in the evaluative function of definition leads him to emphasize the
necessity of grammatical propositions, their a priori and atemporal nature.
 3  RE-DEFINING “DEFINITION”  153

He is confused to think that a realist approach is needed in the theory of

racism, in order to preserve the stable and persisting properties of objec-
tive definitional standards. Conventionalism preserves objectivity by writ-
ing it right into conventions themselves, for conventions are not mere
regularities, patterned behaviors, but standards of correct use. The special
character of these standards is their logical priority as concept-forming
conditions of sense. In actuality, then, contingency and necessity are two
sides of grammatical convention. Grammar is contingent from one per-
spective, necessary from another.
Pace Headley and Harris, the key to appreciating the sociohistorical
and a priori character of definitions is to recognize that they are conven-
tions. To be sure, my account leaves many questions and objections unan-
swered. I discuss some of these in the next chapter.

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———. 2000. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge,
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 CHAPTER 4

Re-defining “Meaning”: Defending Semantic

Internalism over Externalism

4.1   Introduction
The problem of definition is the problem of how best to answer the philo-
sophical question “What is racism?” Manuel Vargas and Sally Haslanger’s
analyses of “What is X?” questions identify three possible interpretations
of this question, codified in three  corresponding approaches.1 Though
there are differences in their respective framings, they more or less con-
verge on three candidate interpretations:

1. The Metaphysical Interpretation. What is X itself, independent of the

prevailing concept of X? (It may turn out that correct method for
specifying X’s nature requires looking to the insights of the rele-
vant science.)
2. The Descriptive Interpretation. What is our ordinary concept of X?
(or what is the ordinary meaning of the term “X”?)
3. The Normative Interpretation. What should our concept of X be?
(or what should the meaning of the term “X” be?)

Chapters 1 and 2 were primarily concerned with arguing for a negative

thesis: interpretation (1) is misguided. My aim in the present chapter is to
extend my critique of metaphysical analysis. For although I articulated a
plausible alternative to metaphysical analysis, I did not there discuss the

1
 See Vargas (2005); Haslanger (2012).

© The Author(s) 2020 157

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_4
158  A. G. URQUIDEZ

metaphysical approach known as semantic externalism (henceforth,

­externalism). Externalism is one way to vindicate metaphysical analysis as
an adequate interpretation of, and approach to, “What is racism?” Its cen-
tral claim is that the meaning of a referring expression is the kind it picks
out. So it is first and foremost an important rival to Wittgensteinian
semantics. Indeed, it is credited with being the most compelling semantic
theory on offer. To be sure, externalism is not the crude doctrine that is
the object of Wittgenstein’s assault in Philosophical Investigations, for its
central claim is not that the meaning of a word is the object it stands for,
but the kind it stands for. Further, the doctrine does not claim that all
words have a meaning of this type, but that only referring expressions do.
With these modifications, and a sophisticated mode of argumentation,
externalism offers a conception of linguistic meaning that is said to be
more plausible than the conventionalist conception of meaning. One
important implication of this theory is that it legitimizes the metaphysi-
cal project.
A defense of Wittgensteinian semantics requires that something be said
in respect to externalism. Replying to the externalist’s objections, I believe,
will strengthen its plausibility. It will also occasion the opportunity to
address additional, as yet unanswered questions and clarify some significant
aspects of conventionalism. I present the externalist thesis in Sect. 4.2 and
articulate it as an objection to the Wittgensteinian approach. In Sects. 4.3
and 4.4, I present my reply to externalism’s main line of ­argument—con-
ceptual change—and explain this phenomenon in good internalist fashion.
Section 4.5 considers and replies to the objection that my arguments are
undermined by descriptivism’s contention that sentences like “Water is
H2O” seem to express propositions that are descriptive and normative. I
reject this proposal along with the notion that the descriptive character of
such propositions opens them up to epistemic assessment.

4.2   The Case for Externalism

Conventionalism is the view that explanations of meaning—particularly,
definitions—are expressions of grammatical rules. As such, they are not
descriptions of reality, but norms of description. These grammatical rules
are thought to be constitutive of linguistic meaning. In this section, I dis-
cuss Kripke and Putnam’s arguments for externalism and explain why con-
ventionalism is incompatible with the externalist account of meaning.
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  159

4.2.1  
Some Key Concepts
Externalists believe that the meaning of a referring expression is the kind
it signifies, a kind with an empirically discoverable internal nature.2 The
term internal nature denotes the internal properties of a kind that are
constitutive of its essence. These features are “hidden” in the sense that
they are not readily observable and hence are not reflected in everyday
explanations of the kind. They are, however, discoverable via scientific
examination. An example is the internal nature of water, which I discuss
below. A kind is an ontological category that ascribes a language-­
independent essence to objects (“stuffs”) that fall under it. A kind is
language-­independent in that it exists independent of our linguistic prac-
tices. By language-dependence, then, I mean a phenomenon whose reality
depends on the set of everyday explanations that are taken to define it. By
identifying meanings with internal natures, we supposedly move beyond
the domain of language, into the domain of ultimate reality, which is dis-
closed by science.
The internal nature of kinds may be thought to be given by the world
(in the case of natural kinds) or social practice (in the case of social kinds).
Sally Haslanger gives expression to an externalist view of the former when
she discusses naturalized epistemology as an approach to the semantics of
“knowledge”: “On a descriptive approach3 [to the analysis of knowledge],
one is concerned with what kinds (if any) our epistemic vocabulary tracks.
The task is to develop potentially more accurate concepts through careful
consideration of the phenomena, usually relying on empirical or quasi-­
empirical methods.”4 Consider next social kinds. An ontologist sympa-
thetic to externalism might take the question “What is racism?” not as
equivalent to a question about language but as equivalent to “What social
kind does the term ‘racism’ refer to?”

2
 Hanseung Kim (2008) observes that the term “semantic externalism” is ambiguous
between two views: meaning externalism and content externalism. The former holds that
meaning is determined by what is external to a language user and goes against the view that
meaning should be founded on a subject’s ideas. The latter holds that the contents of a sub-
ject’s mental states are at least partially determined by facts in the external environment in
which the subject is situated. “Putnam’s historic Twin Earth thought experiment is supposed
to present a strong case for both versions of semantic externalism.” My own usage of the
term “semantic externalism” picks out the first view, meaning externalism, though I would
modify the internalist position that meaning should be founded on a “subject’s ideas.”
3
 Haslanger uses the term “descriptive approach” to signify semantic externalism.
4
 Haslanger (2012, 367).
160  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Michael Levine believes that the true meaning of “racism” is a social kind
the nature of which has yet to be fully explicated by social science (his hunch
is that “racism’s” real meaning falls under the jurisdiction of psychoanaly-
sis). Tommie Shelby also defends externalism, but his recommendation
is that philosophers defer to a different subset of social scientists, namely,
those who investigate racial ideology, for he favors sociological accounts
of racism. Externalism, then, identifies kinds with l­anguage-independent
phenomena.5 The assumption regarding most social kinds  seems to be
that they are not linguistically constituted. Going forward, I will reserve
the term kind for any putative essence that unifies a group of stuff and is
thought to partly constitute the meaning of a term “W” (so that the real
meaning of “W” is partly non-linguistically constituted).
Wittgensteinian semantics grounds linguistic meaning in ordinary
usage, externalism grounds it in stuffs. Yet the latter pays homage to ordi-
nary usage. Haslanger, for example, states that an externalist about knowl-
edge starts from paradigms of knowledge. The previously quoted passage
continues as follows: “Scientific essentialists and naturalizers, more gener-
ally, start by identifying paradigm cases—these may function to fix the
referent of the term—and then draw on empirical (or quasiempirical)
research to explicate the relevant kind to which the paradigms belong.”6
Identifying paradigms is conceptually laden. How does the epistemologist
determine which knowledge attributions count as paradigms? She might
look internally, that is, rely on introspection. In that case, she relies on
intuitions grounded in her familiarity with usage of the term “knowl-
edge.” If instead she looks to the intuitions of others—whether “folk” or
“expert” intuitions—she relies on their familiarity with usage of “knowl-
edge.” It might be objected that one need not rely on intuition at all, for
one might instead rely on empirical inquiry. But even here, linguistic com-
petence invariably guides the philosopher in employing her empirical
methods. Linguistic competence is necessary for identifying the object of
empirical inquiry. For instance, the epistemological naturalist knows that

5
 On externalism, kinds generally pick out language-independent phenomena. But must
every kind be language-independent? Perhaps not, for we can at least imagine possible excep-
tions. Suppose one is interested in the meaning of “linguistic representation.” It might be
argued that this term requires an externalist semantics. Plausibly, this term signifies a social
kind: the linguistic practice of using terms to represent phenomena. On this view, the real
meaning of “linguistic representation” consists of a social convention. Hence externalism is
consistent with the claim that the meaning of some terms is language-dependent.
6
 Haslanger (2012, 367).
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  161

inquiry into the nature of knowledge will not be found by empirically

examining the internal nature of cats or cabbages. Linguistic competency
sets limits by guiding the employment of empirical methods toward the
right kind of object. Without such guidance, the application of empirical
methods is blind and arbitrary. It thus seems that no empirical analysis of
the essence of knowledge can escape the starting point that many
philosophers call “linguistic intuition.” Haslanger concedes this point
­
when she states that ordinary usage “fixes” the reference of a term.
A different but related argument points in the same direction. Consider
the skeptical objection to metaphysical analysis. The metaphysician believes
that the real definition of “knowledge” might differ from the conventional
definition of “knowledge,” for whether they are the same or not is said to
be a matter of fact (which depends on whether conventional usage corre-
sponds to the real meaning of this term). This implies that empirical
inquiry can potentially expose the incorrectness of ordinary usage. How
then does one know whether the “paradigms” provided by the ordinary
use of “knowledge” correspond to knowledge itself? What evidence is
there to think that ordinary usage discloses (or not) the nature of knowl-
edge? How does the philosopher wishing to give primacy to experience
know that her empirical methods, even if they track a kind of empirical
reality, track the relevant one? Again, how does the externalist rule out this
possibility that the term “knowledge” might be the name of an animal?
How do we know we have not been misusing the term all this time?
Such epistemological worries are silly. The externalist can reply that this
form of skepticism is absurd because it relies on some idiosyncratic use of
“knowledge,” one that is completely detached from ordinary practice. This,
however, suggests that ordinary use sets constraints on what we can and
cannot say. These constraints make it the case that it is an absurd objection
to a theory of knowledge that the term “knowledge” might turn out to be
the name of an animal. Unless the philosopher aims at developing a novel
concept of knowledge that has little if anything to do with what is cur-
rently called “knowledge,” paradigms must invariably fix the object of
analysis to a significant degree, and to the extent that they do, the meta-
physician relies on ordinary use to determine what is and is not a paradigm.
Ordinary use is thus essential to externalist analysis, but only in the
sense that it fixes the reference of a referring expression without determin-
ing the meaning of said expression, for as we have seen, meaning is identi-
fied with the internal nature of paradigms. Thus, if we apply this approach
to the philosophical analysis of “racism,” commonsense understandings of
162  A. G. URQUIDEZ

racism must lead the investigation by fixing the reference of “racism.” For
these paradigms are preliminary to empirical or quasi-empirical methods
of inquiry.
The Wittgensteinian approach to conceptual analysis is misguided, if
externalism is correct. By identifying meaning as use, the Wittgensteinian
position implies that linguistic meaning is not dependent on the external
world, but on linguistic practice and human convention.7 The aim of this
chapter is to critically assess the case for externalism (what Haslanger calls
the “descriptive approach”). Although this theory of meaning has been
discussed widely in the philosophy of language, my focus will be on two
mutually supporting arguments: the loci classici of Hilary Putnam and
Saul Kripke. Both defenses turn on thought experiments that appeal to
modal intuitions.
As we have seen, externalism is the thesis that the meaning of a refer-
ring expression is determined by the kind it refers to. Putnam famously
divided the meaning of a term into two constituents: intension and exten-
sion. An alternative way of introducing the intension-extension distinc-
tion, according to Putnam, is to say that we use the term “meaning” in
two distinct ways, to refer to the intension of a term and to refer to the
extension of a term. The intension of a term is the complete set of rules
governing its proper use at a given time. The extension of a term is the
complete set of objects it picks out at that time.
Against this backdrop, two questions present themselves: What is the
precise relationship of intension to extension, and which of these aspects
has semantic priority? Internalists and externalists diverge on these ques-
tions. The internalist takes the intension of a term fully to determine its
semantic content, whereas the externalist denies this, holding that external
facts make a significant contribution to semantic content. Putnam famously
defended externalism. Where does Wittgenstein fall on this spectrum? I
will briefly explain why the Wittgensteinian approach to meaning falls on
the intensional side of the divide.
As discussed in Chap. 2, Wittgenstein’s use of the term “use” in the
judgment “meaning is use” is a normative notion, not a descriptive one. If
the philosopher interested in the meaning of “X” were to describe actual
use of this term, her description would encompass both the correct and

7
 See Chaps. 1 and 2. For helpful discussions of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning, see
Conant’s “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use” (1998) and Baker and Hacker’s “Meaning
and Use” in Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (2005).
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  163

incorrect uses. But a description of the incorrect uses is not what

Wittgenstein has in mind when he exhorts philosophers to “look and see”
how words are used. His comparison of the use of a word to the use of a
piece in a game is a worn but helpful analogy. Just as one describes a game
by describing its rules (rules for the use of its pieces), so too does the phi-
losopher describe language by describing the rules for the use of words.
To describe the game of chess is to state its rules, and to state its rules is to
state how the game is to be played. This is a normative description, like a
description of the steps in a recipe or a legal system.8 Wittgenstein’s refer-
ence to the use of a word, then, is a reference to use which accords with what
is regarded as correct explanation.9 Correct explanations are ordinary, pre-
vailing linguistic conventions. The complete set of grammatical explana-
tions governing the use of a term is synonymous with what Putnam calls
the “intension” of that term. Moreover, these linguistic norms are “arbi-
trary” or “autonomous,” which means they are unjustifiable by reference
to reality.10 This, in turn, means that the “correct explanation” of a term is
contingent, revisable, and subject to change. For example, that which
counts as correct explanation of meaning today might prove to be incor-
rect explanation tomorrow. The salient point is that the community’s pre-
vailing linguistic convention is what determines the correctness or
incorrectness of an explanation. Wittgenstein is an intensionalist because
meaning, for him, is a function of “arbitrary” linguistic norms, not
language-­independent empirical facts (such as those disclosed in scientific
discoveries).
On externalism the empirical is primary in that linguistic meaning is
not a matter of convention, but a matter of fact; further, the relevant fact
of the matter is not a transcendent object, but an immanent one (mean-
ing must be some type of real kind). Semantic externalism has been widely
influential and applied to so-called natural and social kind terms. In the
philosophy of race, the theory has been applied to the term “race.” More
recently, Levine and Joshua Glasgow have suggested that theorists of rac-
ism should consider extending this approach to the term “racism.”
Levine, for example, appeals to externalism in replying to an objection
8
 Baker and Hacker (2005, 147).
9
 Baker and Hacker (2005, 153).
10
 For a helpful analysis of Wittgenstein’s account of the autonomy of grammar see Michael
Forster’s Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar (2004). See also Hacker’s “The
Arbitrariness of Grammar and the Bounds of Sense” (2000), and his “Grammar and
Necessity” (2009).
164  A. G. URQUIDEZ

from Jorge Garcia (though he does not go so far as to articulate an exter-

nalist theory of “racism”). He compares the semantics of “racism” to that
of “water”: “Suppose one discovers a substance that is just like water in
every way except that its chemical makeup is other than H2O. Is it water
nevertheless? Well, that depends upon one’s views of the semantics of
various kind terms. It is one of the preeminent metaphysical and modal
questions in recent years.”11 Levine is alluding to Putnam’s well-known
argument that the term “water” has an externalist semantics. The seman-
tic content of “water,” Putnam argues, is determined by external (chemi-
cal) facts about the kind picked out by the term; H2O is the unifying
essence that constitutes the stuffs (objects) we call “water.” Levine is
careful to say that the term “racism” is akin to the term “water,” as
opposed to saying that these terms belong to the same kind. For he says
that “water” is a natural kind term, whereas “racism” might not be; in
particular, he suspects that “racism” is a social kind term. For him, “rac-
ism’s” kinship with “water” consists in the fact that both terms have an
externalist semantics.

4.2.2  Putnam’s and Kripke’s Arguments

Putnam introduced his famous thought experiment in his seminal paper,
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’”12 He asks us to imagine the existence of a
planet, Twin Earth, which is just like our planet, Earth, only there’s an
exception: what is called “water” on Twin Earth does not have the chemi-
cal consistency of H2O, but a complicated chemical structure that Putnam
abbreviates XYZ. This substance looks and tastes just like water, nourishes
the body just like water, falls from the sky just like water, and so forth.
Prior to discovering that the stuffs picked out by “water” consisted of XYZ
on Twin Earth, Twin Earthians did not define this term as XYZ. Putnam
asks whether, upon discovering the chemical structure of these stuffs,
Twin Earthians would revise their definition of the term. If so, this seems
to confirm that the meaning of this term is partly determined by external
facts about the internal nature of these stuffs. With respect to Earthians,
Putnam asks what they would say about the Twin Earthian use of the term
“water.” Would they be inclined to say that the Earthian use of this term

11
 See Levine (2004, 89–90, including notes 12, 13 and 14).
12
 Putnam (1975).
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  165

means the same as theirs, given the similarities in both practices? Or would
Earthians be inclined to say that there are two distinct uses? If the latter,
argues Putnam, this would seem to confirm externalism. For the only sig-
nificant difference in these two uses is given by the extension, not the
intension of the term.
Putnam speculated that Twin Earthians, upon discovering that their
water consists of XYZ, would likely revise the definition of “water” to
“Water is XYZ.” Furthermore, he thought that they would not stop at
saying that this term means differently today than it did prior to the empir-
ical discovery; they would regard the new definition as the correct one.
Putnam went on to speculate that Earthians would reason similarly: they
would not simply say that the old and updated definitions were different,
but that the updated definition of “water” is the correct one. It thus seems
that empirical facts partially determine the meaning of referring expres-
sions. The meaning of “water” on Earth appears to be responsible to
empirical facts about the stuffs it picks out there, and the meaning of
“water” on Twin Earth seems to be responsible to empirical facts about
the stuffs it picks out there. Additional confirmation comes from a further
speculation. Putnam asserts that Earthians and Twin Earthians would say
that the term “water” means differently on Earth than on Twin Earth,
because the terms pick out different stuffs, H2O and XYZ, respectively.
What makes this intuition important is that where two intensions are iden-
tical and only extensions differ, it seems it must be the extension that
determines meaning.
Kripke also provides a well-known argument for externalism. He begins
by considering the proposition “Gold is yellow.” That gold is yellow is, of
course, a received rule for the use of the term “gold.” As such, it belongs
to the intension of “gold.” Kripke then asks:

Could we discover that gold was not in fact yellow? …Suppose there were
an optical illusion which made the substance appear to be yellow; but, in
fact, once the peculiar properties of the atmosphere were removed, we
would see that it is actually blue. Maybe a demon even corrupted the vision
of all those entering the gold mines…Would there on this basis be an
announcement in the newspapers: ‘It has turned out that there is no gold.
Gold does not exist. What we took to be gold is not in fact gold.’?13

13
 Kripke (1972, 118).
166  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Kripke’s analysis raises several questions. If confronted by the fact that the
stuffs called “gold” were not in fact yellow, as we mistakenly thought,
would we continue to refer to said stuffs as “gold”? How committed are
we to the intension of “gold” in the face of empirical surprise? He claims
that were we to reject the proposition “Gold is yellow” in the face of new
empirical information, this would provide evidence that the proposition is
a posteriori. If instead we were to insist upon the truth of “Gold is yellow”
in the face of this new information, this would suggest that the proposi-
tion is a priori. The question raised by these modal considerations seems
to be this: Can definitional truths be overturned by experience? Kripke
thinks they can:

It seems to me that there would be no such announcement. On the con-

trary, what would be announced would be that though it appeared that gold
was yellow, in fact gold has turned out not to be yellow, but blue. The rea-
son is, I think, that we use ‘gold’ as a term for a certain kind of thing. Others
have discovered this kind of thing and we have heard of it. We thus as part
of a community of speakers have a certain connection between ourselves and
a certain kind of thing. The kind of thing is thought to have certain identify-
ing marks. Some of these marks may not really be true of gold. We might
discover that we were wrong about them. Further, there might be a sub-
stance which has all the identifying marks we commonly attributed to gold
and used to identify it in the first place, but which is not the same kind of
thing, which is not the same substance. We would say of such a thing that
though it has all the appearances we initially used to identify gold, it is not
gold. Such a thing is, for example, as we well know, iron pyrites or fool’s
gold. This is not another kind of gold. It’s a completely different thing
which to the uninitiated person looks just like the substance which we dis-
covered and called gold. We can say this not because we have changed the
meaning of the term gold, and thrown in some other criteria which distin-
guished gold from pyrites. It seems to me that that’s not true. On the con-
trary, we discovered that certain properties were true of gold in addition to
the initial identifying marks by which we identified it.14

Putnam’s and Kripke’s arguments are similar, but not of the same kind.
Oswald Hanfling, an ordinary language philosopher, helpfully explains the
difference between Putnam’s and Kripke’s argumentative strategies:

 Kripke (1972, 118–119).

14
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  167

In the first [Putnam’s argument], a word is applied, in accordance with its

intension, to things which are really different in nature. Here we are to say
that the word does not have the same meaning throughout, even though
this is not known to those using the word. In the second kind of case
[Kripke’s argument], the real nature of the objects is the same, but the rel-
evant intensions differ from one time to another. This time we are to say that
the meaning remains the same, in spite of changes of intension. In both
cases, meaning is determined by the real nature of things and not by
intensions.15

We are now better positioned to appreciate the function of ordinary

usage on externalism. As we have seen, ordinary usage is relevant for fixing
the reference of a referring expression, but not for determining the meaning
of that expression. If ordinary usage fixes a term’s reference, does this
entail that the meaning of that term can never change? Is Putnam, for
example, committed to the belief that “water” must always signify H2O on
Earth? If so, this seems wrong. For Earthians might stop using the term
“water” in the way that they do, excising it from their lexicon. Alternatively,
Earthians might modify the term’s meaning in a radically novel way (e.g.,
to signify a newly invented sport), introducing some other word to signify
water. This objection is misguided, however. For externalism does not
imply that we cannot change the definitions of words if all this means is
that a word that signifies X is no longer used to signify X. What external-
ism implies is that once the reference of a word has been fixed, the meaning
of that word is no longer entirely up to us. To fix the reference of a term
is to fix the set of objects (stuffs) it picks out; that is, reference fixing
amounts to fixing the term’s extension. Once this is done, it becomes pos-
sible for science to investigate the internal nature of the stuffs it picks out,
that is, the essential features of these stuffs that are not perceptible in our
everyday encounters with them. Externalism implies that there can be hid-
den meanings that fall outside the purview of what competent speakers of
the language know or employ in their use of words. For the same reason,
philosophers of language are in no position to determine the real mean-
ings of words. It is scientists who get the final say, for internal properties
of stuffs (hidden natures that translate into meanings) fall under their
jurisdiction.

 Hanfling (2000, 223).

15
168  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Semantic externalism has far-reaching ramifications. For instance, it

has important implications for the relationship between the analytic/syn-
thetic distinction and the necessary/contingent distinction. I shall not
discuss these ramifications. Yet there are a few points I want to emphasize
in ­relation to the semantics of “racism.” First, an externalist semantics
for “racism” implies that the meaning of this term is responsible to an
external reality. This external reality may be mind-dependent or mind-­
independent, depending on the ontological status of the kind. But the
point is that the nature of the referent of this referring expression is deter-
mined by its internal nature rather than by our linguistic norms. Second, if
externalism is true, then there is a just basis for the skeptical worry. Given
that “hidden facts” about a term’s referent have semantic significance, it
becomes possible that some members of a linguistic community (or the
entire linguistic community) might be mistaken about the true meaning
of said term—or, stated differently, the established and widely adopted
definition of the term might be mistaken. Notice also that facts about
the extension of a term can confirm (and disconfirm) the correctness of
the prevailing intension of the term. In the case of “water,” the chemical
structure of the corresponding stuffs—H2O—might have disconfirmed
pre-scientific understandings of that term. Some scientists, for instance,
might have speculated that water had a different chemical structure; they
would have been wrong. Meaning is disclosed by empirical facts. The
implication is that meanings are public entities in the sense that they are
objective and discoverable by the scientific community. Given externalism,
science can make important semantic-significant discoveries. What science
revealed in the case of water (what we discovered) was that H2O is, and
always has been, a constitutive feature of the true meaning of “water.” The
word “water” means H2O, despite the fact that H2O was not always part
of the term’s intension.
Given the threat of semantic externalism for my argument, I now turn
to an examination of this rival theory of meaning. I argue that the argu-
ments in favor of externalism do not conclusively establish its credentials.
So-called evidence of conceptual change, in the case of “racism,” need not
be interpreted as evidence that the meaning of “racism” is determined by
the internal nature of the stuffs picked out by this term. For we can tell a
plausible alternative story of the conditions that generate conceptual
change that is consistent with the semantic thesis that meaning is the use
of a word within the context of a rule-governed practice.
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  169

4.3   Resisting Externalism: An Internalist Account

of Conceptual Change

One way to think about semantic externalism is as a sophisticated defense

of the claim that the meaning of a word is the “object” it stands for. As
such, it stands in opposition to Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning and his
conventionalist conception of definition. His claim that an explanation of
a word (or what it means) is the expression of a rule for the correct use
of that term implies that explanations like “Water is H2O” and “Racism
is morally bad” are human conventions. For these are not descriptions
of water and racism, respectively, but rules for the correct use of “water”
and “racism,” respectively. Putnam’s and Kripke’s arguments against
Wittgensteinian semantics strike many philosophers as persuasive, even
decisive. What has the Wittgensteinian to say in reply to them? I argue
that it is possible to accept the terms of Putnam’s and Kripke’s thought
experiments without affirming their conclusions.
One problem with viewing “racism” as a kind term is that the corre-
sponding set of paradigms does not seem sufficiently uniform and stable.
That is, the internal nature of the various stuffs picked out by “racism”
varies widely from one context and category of entity to another. In addi-
tion, the intension of this term is widely contested. In the next chapter I
argue that considerations that shed light on the contestedness of racism,
such as the fact that the term is widely incompatibly used, call into ques-
tion the ability of paradigms of racism to fix the reference of “racism” (i.e.,
to specify a stable kind). A more plausible analysis suggests that the gram-
mar of “racism” is constituted by incompatible norms. In the present
chapter, I set this objection aside in order to evaluate Putnam’s and
Kripke’s arguments for externalism.

4.3.1  Rival Intensions: Empirical Discoveries

as Pragmatic Reasons
When scientific inquiry brings the internal natures of stuffs to light, a deci-
sion on the part of the linguistic community may be made to revise the
prevailing definition. It is undeniable that scientific discoveries have com-
pelled entire linguistic communities to revise their norms. Externalists
interpret this tendency as confirmation that the meaning of a referring
term is partly determined by the (hidden nature of the) object it stands
for. But the logic of this reasoning rests on a questionable presupposition.
170  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Externalists accept this premise: that the meaning of “W” is partly deter-
mined by external facts about Ws is evidenced by the fact that a linguistic
community chooses to update the meaning of “W” to reflect this new informa-
tion. For example, the scientific discovery that certain stuffs consisted of
H2O prompted conceptual change. Our linguistic community responded
to this information by revising the concept of water, by adopting “Water
is H2O” as the correct definition. Putnam interprets this communal
response as evidence that chemical facts about the stuffs falling under the
extension of “water” partly determine the meaning of this term. Similarly,
the discovery of the atomic structure of gold led to the modification of the
definition of “gold.” Kripke argues that this communal reaction to the
empirical discovery carries evidential significance: it confirms the hypoth-
esis that external facts determine linguistic meaning.
My aim in this section is to reject the premise that conceptual change
predicated on scientific discovery must be or is best interpreted as confir-
mation of externalism.16 In developing my argument, I offer an alternative
explanation of this human reaction to scientific discoveries. If the ten-
dency in our culture to go along with the findings of science counts as
evidence for externalism, then the tendency in non-Western societies to
find no inspiration in scientific findings for effectuating conceptual change
in their cultures provides counterevidence against externalism. For it sug-
gests that there is no logical necessity in relying on science to update one’s
grammar, and no unreasonability in affirming non-scientific grammars
that are well suited to non-scientific cultures and societies. The fact that
we are reluctant to give credence to this kind of counterexample shows
that we are imposing a double standard. The tendency of scientific cul-
tures is to view non-scientific cultures with contempt, to criticize their
eschewance of science and technology as regressive, primitive, misguided.

16
 The externalist might object to my framing of the internalist/externalist disagreement as
a dispute about “conceptual change” or “a change in concepts.” As Glock explains, external-
ists might object that “the idea that cases in which scientists adopt new criteria for the appli-
cation of a term like ‘angina’ amount to cases of conceptual change is wrong because it
implies that we are no longer talking about the same thing” (1996, 95). Thus instead of
speaking of “conceptual change” sparked off by empirical discoveries we may speak of “con-
ception change” sparked off by empirical discoveries. This avoids begging the question
against the externalist’s assertion that it is only human understanding (our conception) that
changes as a result of empirical discovery, for the reality of angina (the concept) remains the
same, on externalism. What I argue below is that Putnam and Kripke’s arguments for posit-
ing a real entity which corresponds to the “concept” of a thing are unpersuasive.
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  171

My analysis below exposes this double standard as unwarranted. In doing

so, it underlines the pragmatic nature of conceptual change. My alterna-
tive explanation of conceptual change is not only consistent with the the-
ory of conventionalism, it is also plausible and, I believe, more respectful
of non-scientific cultures.
Empirical discoveries result in new information and sometimes this new
information influences our linguistic practices. But the factors that influ-
ence conceptual change are not monolithic: they are not all of one kind. It
is an open question how best to construe the nature of this influence, and
the influence may well change from one situation to the next. Thus, the
first thing to point out, following Glock, is that:

The idea that [the] revisability [of concepts] rules out a distinction between
conceptual and empirical role amounts to a fallacy. The fact that a Prime
Minister can be relegated to an ordinary Member of Parliament does not
entail that there is no difference in political status between the Prime
Minister and a Member of Parliament. By the same token, the fact that we
can deprive certain propositions of their conceptual status does not show
that they never had such a status in advance of the conceptual change.
Changes of the conceptual framework can themselves be motivated by theo-
retical considerations ranging from new experiences over simplicity and
fruitfulness to sheer beauty.17

Concept revisability can also be motivated by non-theoretical consider-

ations, considerations more conspicuously grounded in cultural values, as
I argue below.
The discovery that a certain substance, that we pick out by the term
“water,” consists of H2O  did in fact influence our linguistic communi-
ty’s  decision to revise the definition of “water.” It created newfound
knowledge of the internal properties of the stuffs picked out by the term
“water.” This, in turn, created a new set of possibilities, an extension of
our choices about how best to use the term. Hanfling argues that these
incompatible choices are “rival intensions.” In the following passage, he
emphasizes the choice that sometimes emerges from scientific discoveries:

Putnam is mistaken in treating the issue as one of intension versus extension:

it is really about rival intensions. If the visitors from Earth judge that the
ordinary qualities constitute the intension of ‘water’, then they will not

17
 Glock (2003, 88).
172  A. G. URQUIDEZ

report a difference of meaning; but if they judge chemical structure to be of

overriding importance, then they will report as predicted by Putnam. The
choice would probably depend on the context in which ‘water’ was to be
used. But either way, the issue is not about intension versus extension, but
about ordinary versus scientific intensions. Putnam thinks that the latter
would always prevail, but while they might do in some contexts, there is no
reason to think that it would be so in general.18

Following Hanfling, I will talk about rival intensions. When new inten-
sional possibilities emerge we are confronted with a choice between differ-
ent concepts. This is why Hanfling calls them rivals. In the case of “water,”
we chose to modify and expand its intension rather than retain the existing,
unmodified intension.
Hanfling’s claim that there is no way to know in advance what rival
intension a linguistic community would choose (in Wittgenstein’s practice-­
centered sense) seems to suggest that (newly discovered) scientific facts
underdetermine a community’s decision. He writes, for instance, that
“there is no reason to think that it [the decision to adopt the scientific
intension over and against the ordinary intension] would be so in gen-
eral.” If a genuine choice to extend, revise, or retain a grammatical norm
presents itself, then there must be other considerations besides scientific
facts that factor into the decision-making process. These extra-scientific
considerations are essential for deciding between rival intensions. What,
then, is the nature of these non-scientific considerations? I want to suggest
that the various considerations that are relevant to choosing between rival
intensions are best characterized as pragmatic. A scientist who prefers one
theory over another, based on nothing more than simplicity or beauty,
invokes a pragmatic consideration, for simplicity or beauty makes one the-
ory good or better to have over its rival. If I am right that these consider-
ations play a primary role in the decision-making process, then the
fundamental form of justification at issue is pragmatic, not epistemic. In
what follows I will discuss pragmatic considerations that, while encom-
passing aesthetic preference, go well beyond personal preferences, taking
us into the social domain.
If Hanfling is right that collective human decision is involved in adopt-
ing one rival intension over its rivals, what does this collective decision
depend upon? Hanfling does not say in precise terms. He simply states

18
 Hanfling (2000, 226).
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  173

that the choice may “depend on the context in which ‘water’ was to be
used” and that “there is no reason to think that it [scientific intensions]
would [always prevail].” A community’s “collective decision” is expressed
in its practice, and that decision will likely be based on its broader cultural
values and forms of life. For consider the objection that Putnam should
not be as certain as he is that Twin Earthians would modify their use of
“water” in the wake of the discovery of XYZ. After all, it might be argued,
how can we know what this hypothetical community would do? To this
Putnam might reply that his assurance is plausible, and I am inclined to
agree with him because of how he sets up his thought experiment. It is
precisely on this point, however, that pragmatic considerations enter the
conversation.
Recall, Putnam posits that Twin Earthians have virtually identical forms
of life to those of Earthians. The high degree of sameness in the lives of
Earthians and Twin Earthians entails that Twin Earthians share the same
set of value commitments as Earthians. In particular, the discovery that a
certain kind of stuff consists of XYZ already presupposes a globally con-
nected set of international communities defined by technological advance-
ment, global capitalism, and scientific domination of virtually every aspect
of society and life. The attitudes of most human communities are charac-
terized by positive attitudes toward science, given their dependency on
scientific knowledge for the reproduction of daily existence. These atti-
tudes are further conditioned by the understanding of science’s potential
futural contributions to human society. Initially, those who would insist
upon adopting the definition “Water is XYZ” will be those who made the
discovery, that is, members of Twin Earth’s scientific community. These
are individuals whom society recognizes as having the authority and know-­
how to make such determinations, in part because it is widely known that
such information (about water or just about anything else) might become
scientifically and technologically significant. So, since the broader society
values and benefits from scientific and technological advancements which
depend upon the information of an expert community, it seems likely that
it would defer to these experts as to the nature of water.
Stated differently, in a society where scientific discoveries are viewed as
“progress,” and where the fruits of science are highly valued in the struc-
turing of society, there is a practical stake in adopting concepts which
track scientific facts. Under these circumstances, given the ability to
choose between a scientific and non-scientific concept of water, the
broader community is likely to adopt the scientific concept over its rival.
174  A. G. URQUIDEZ

The reasons will be that doing so is necessary for the development and
continuation of its forms of life, which includes the  perpetual synthesis
and integration of scientific information. Scientific inquiry will thus be
highly valued in this society. Scientific results enter not just into scientific
practices, like the setting up experiments and the constructing of hypoth-
eses. They enter into the interpreting of evidence, the justification of pol-
icy and regulation, the construction of physical structures and tools, and
the structuring of society. In short, societies whose forms of life are partly
constituted by science are antecedently defined by values and interests that
make it rational for them to adopt procedures of concept-formation and
concept-­modification that rely on scientific findings. Science is instrumen-
tally valuable to societies whose livelihoods and notions of progress are
bound up with technological advancement. This is not an argument for
the “truth” and epistemic justification of scientific concepts. It is an argu-
ment for their utility and pragmatic justification for a certain set of life-
styles and cultural livelihoods.
My argument makes room for the kind of Foucauldian and critical
perspectives that, for example, feminist epistemologists have made use of
in recent decades. An advanced scientific society cannot exist apart from
power relations. Gatekeepers of knowledge are essential in establishing
social processes, along with criteria for determining what counts as
knowledge. This, in turn, raises sociological issues concerning who gets
to decide the meaning of the term “water” (the scientific community?).
It also raises moral issues concerning who ought to decide. These are
issues worth exploring, but I would like to set them aside, for they are not
directly relevant to the argument I am making. The claim I am defending
is a claim about what a society sympathetic to and dependent upon scien-
tific discovery is likely to be find intuitively obvious, plausible, common-
sensical, and so forth, in regard to the meanings of terms. I am suggesting
that to the extent that the meaning of “water” is responsible to reality
(scientific discovery), it is we who make it so. (And this is, of course,
another way of saying that it is not responsible to science, but to human
choice or convention.)
Hanfling’s argument suggests that scientific facts are relevant to our
lives, but not in the way Putnam and Kripke believe. The relevance of
scientific facts to our lives is evinced in the fact that upon discovering them
we are sometimes led to a choice, not however between competing descrip-
tions of reality (e.g., the nature of water), but between competing prac-
tices and/or forms of life. When faced with the choice between rival
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  175

intensions, the final decision will obviously depend upon beliefs about
what is true. For example, it will involve the belief that the stuffs picked
out by the term “water” consist of H2O, as well as the belief that defining
water as H2O is useful for science. However, the choice itself—whether to
adopt rival intension I1 or rival intension I2—is not itself a matter of what
is true, but about what is useful. Putnam thinks that the decision to modify
and update our concept of water was the correct decision and that choos-
ing otherwise would have been incorrect. What makes an intension that
includes “Water is H2O” correct and an intension that does not include it
incorrect, on his view, is that only the former corresponds to the fact that
water is H2O. But one can accept the fact that a certain kind of stuff (that
we call “water”) consists of H2O without adopting the definition “Water
is H2O” in one’s intension of “water.” One has an interest in making this
discovery definitional (concept-forming) if one wishes to manipulate sub-
stances and explain various other phenomena. These manipulations and
explanatory ambitions are connected with a technologically advanced
society’s dependence on a capitalist mode of production, scientific
advancement, technological development, and so forth. All of this makes
it “unreasonable” for us to resist the scientific intension. But what reason
is there to think that it is objectively (transhistorically) unreasonable? If a
society does not share the aforementioned values and vision for itself, then
it may not be unreasonable at all.

4.3.2  The Pirahã: A Living Counterexample

Rather than comparing “Water is H2O” on Earth to “Water is XYZ” on
Twin Earth, it is more instructive to situate the former definition within
two very different societies, both of which exist in the actual world. So
let us consider the Pirahã, an Amazonian tribe. Pirahãs are notorious for
resisting religious conversion and cultural assimilation, including efforts to
adopt our modern ways of living. While the Pirahã have been exposed to
western technologies, such as photography and video, they are not inter-
ested in mastering the techniques necessary to reproduce these technolo-
gies, even as they derive utility from them. Thus, they may engage in trade
for, say, motorized boats, matches, or clothing, and they may be willing
to  learn some basic  operations so as to put them to use. But they are
unwilling to engage in long-term maintenance of sophisticated machinery
(even when taught to do so), since that would require that they alter their
day-to-day practices and cultural identity, which they are unwilling to do.
176  A. G. URQUIDEZ

The Pirahã simply refuse to modify or give up their cultural practices to

master the production of such technologies.19
The Pirahãs subscribe to an empiricist epistemology that partly explains
these peculiarities. That is, they subscribe to what linguist and cultural
anthropologist Michael Everett calls the immediacy of experience principle:

This principle states that formulaic language and actions (rituals) that
involve reference to nonwitnessed language and actions (rituals) that involve
reference to nonwitnessed events are avoided. So a ritual where the principal
character could not claim to have seen what he or she was enacting would
be prohibited. Beyond this prohibitive feature, however, the idea behind the
principle is that the Pirahãs avoid formulaic encodings of values and instead
transmit values and information via actions and words that are original in
composition with the person acting or speaking, that have been witnessed
by this person, or that have been told to this person by a witness. So tradi-
tional oral literature and rituals have no place.20

This empiricist epistemology explains why Pirahãs are non-religious, even

while claiming to believe in spirits. They have no creation myths (or,
indeed, any folktales or fiction21), and they reject belief in God and other
religious deities on grounds of lack of experience; that is, on grounds
that they have not personally witnessed such entities or heard about them
from anybody who has. They believe in spirits, as they believe in the
objects perceived in dreams, because they claim to witness these entities,
either by perceiving them directly (which means that they consider dream
experiences to be real) or by inference (e.g., seeing something move in
the bushes).
This empiricist epistemology is relevant to my argument because it con-
stitutes the basis for the Pirahã’s grammatical exclusion of scientific expla-
nation. If the only way to “transmit values and information [is] via actions
and words that are original in composition with the person acting or
speaking, that have been witnessed by this person, or that have been told
to this person by a witness I can know,” and if the community in question
19
 For a short, popularized introduction to Pirahã culture and grammar, see Daniel Everett
(2008). One of the aims of the book is to document the author’s repudiation of Noam
Chomsky’s theory of generative grammar. Although never mentioned, the book is very
much in keeping with Wittgenstein’s account of grammar (this despite the fact that Everett’s
use of the term “grammar” diverges from Wittgenstein’s idiosyncratic use).
20
 Everett (2008, 84).
21
 Everett (2008, 133–134).
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  177

is scientifically illiterate and lacks any and all interest in science, then such
a community will be closed off to knowledge about hidden internal
natures. So it is not just that they will lack an interest in science. It is also
that as they have no use for scientific literacy (in their culture), they cannot
be in a position to have a stake or interest in adopting a scientific grammar
for “water” or any other term.
Further, Everett argues that the immediacy of experience principle pre-
cludes the Pirahã from making high-level abstractions and generalizations.
For example, the Pirahã lack a sophisticated arithmetical grammar. Yet,
without sophistication, scientific knowledge will be virtually impossible.
This limitation is not due to any cognitive deficiency, of course, but to a
sociocultural limit. It is a matter of convention, as Everett explains:

Since abstractions that extend beyond experience could violate the cultural
immediacy of experience principle, however, these would be prohibited in
the language. …The Pirahã language and culture are connected by a cultural
constraint on talking about anything beyond immediate experience.
Declarative Pirahã utterances contain only assertions related directly to the
moment of speech, either experienced by the speaker or witnessed by someone alive
during the lifetime of the speaker.22

Given the Pirahã’s brand of empiricism, and given the fact that the
chemical structure of water can be known only by persons who have
undergone sophisticated training in the relevant scientific practices—
practices which the Pirahã lack—their form of life precludes them from
adopting the definition “Water is H2O.” They could not in any meaning-
ful way adopt it and simultaneously retain important aspects of their cul-
ture. For one thing, the concept-forming nature of the definition requires
a serious interest in science, but we have seen that they are unwilling to
take up such interests, since they refuse to prioritize forms of life anti-
thetical to theirs. Even if they should come to understand what  this
expression means, say, on the basis of teaching, this information would
only be known to the limited few who patiently sat through the teaching.
In all likelihood, the information would not be transmitted to many
Pirahãs, as it would be useless information for them. Within a generation
or two, no one in the community would continue to understand or
believe that water is H2O.  Finally, even if the information were widely

 Everett (2008, 131–132).

22
178  A. G. URQUIDEZ

transmitted among Pirahãs, it would be misleading to describe this is a

“conceptual shift” in Pirahã thought. For the fact that water has a certain
chemical structure would not be concept-­forming for them; it would not
be hardened into a linguistic norm, since it would not enter into any
Pirahã practices. There is, of course, the possibility that they would come
to convert to a scientific culture, but short of that I submit that even if
they were to assert that water is H2O (as a factual claim), the sentence
would fall short of being a definitional norm. This is true even if they
were to regularly utter and transmit it to others. In order to function as a
definition it would have to be adopted as a norm of representation, which
means there would have to be a normative point in doing so. The only
way in which this sentence would appear in their lives in any meaningful
way is that, from time to time, someone would utter a cryptic sentence
like “That water consists of H2O” (cryptic, i.e., from their perspective).
Without deep appreciation for science it seems that such a “definition”
could be nothing other than cryptic.
Is the Pirahã conception of water which does not include among its
intension that water is H2O incomplete or mistaken? I reject this. What do
“complete” and “incomplete” mean here? Their concept of water (which
presumably isn’t radically different from our own everyday, non-scientific
concept) would obviously be inadequate for scientific purposes and for any
others that presuppose science. But this does not render their concept
inadequate or incomplete for them, for it is completely adequate for their
purposes and forms of life. Conceiving of water as H2O is unnecessary for
having a concept of water that is well suited for everyday purposes. Their
concept is useful for expressing their attitudes (desires, intentions) about
water and for integration into their forms of life (for drinking water, gath-
ering water from the river, taking shelter from the rain, fishing, and so on).
The conventionalist view of definition can be brought in to make sense
of the preceding discussion. Concepts, on conventionalism, can be more
or less useful, but not true or false (at least not in the relevant sense).
Putnam believes that external (scientific) facts are relevant to semantics
because they can make true certain intensions and make false others. But
the idea that external facts make true certain definitions and make false
others is one that is rejected by conventionalism. The proposition that
definitions are true or false descriptions (the view I called “descriptivism”)
is one that needs to be argued for, but is not argued for in Putnam’s paper.
Moreover, I have argued against this claim in previous chapters. If conven-
tionalism is true, then explanations of meaning (such as “Water is H2O”)
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  179

are not true or false descriptions, but expressions of linguistic norms. A

fortiori, scientific facts are not in the business of making definitions true or
false. So, if Hanfling is right that the rivalry sparked off by scientific dis-
coveries is one between competing intensions and not between intension
and extension, then his position confirms conventionalism. For a rivalry
between competing intensions is one that is settled by human decision
(laying down a convention), based on what is beneficial or useful, not by
facts about the external world.

4.3.3  Are the Pirahã Wrong/Confused?

Against my  argument it might be objected that, to the extent that the
Pirahãs reject or resist the proposition that water is H2O, they are simply
wrong in their understanding of water. This objector would  insist that
their definition is at best incomplete and at worst (partially) false. After
all, to the extent that they fail to understand this proposition (because they
have no knowledge or interest in understanding chemistry), they are igno-
rant of a true empirical fact. For, again, on externalism, external facts
about the nature of water are partial determiners of the meaning of the
word “water,” independent of whether anyone knows them. I would con-
cede to the objector that the Pirahãs are ignorant of chemistry (and vari-
ous other scientific facts). Furthermore, I would concede that their willful
ignorance and lack of interest on such matters separates their community
from ours in ways that might incline some within our own ranks to judge
that they are “wrong.” But these concessions do not get us to the heart of
the matter.
I have argued that their rejection of the definition “Water is H2O” does
not show that they are wrong in the sense that they believe something
false about water, for definitions are expressions of norms and so are nei-
ther true nor false representations. One might instead argue that they are
“wrong” in the sense that they do not share the right value commitments
and forms of life. And here we could have a normative debate about
whether that is correct. But the possibility of that debate is quite different
from the position that they have a false belief in the way that believing it is
raining outside might be false. Putnam assumes without argument that if
empirical facts about a term’s referent matter to us in ways that prompt the
revision of the term’s linguistic norms, then those facts make true certain
linguistic norms and make false others. This assumption ignores the fact
that scientific discoveries, and empirical facts more generally, matter to
180  A. G. URQUIDEZ

linguistic communities in ways that are non-epistemic. Empirical facts

matter to us when they have the potential to influence our lives. Were this
not so, all empirical facts would be concept-forming, but clearly only some
are. Moreover, the variety of ways that non-epistemic influence might
obtain is multifarious. The set of facts that become important for a com-
munity largely depends on its forms of life.
Generally, we can say that empirical facts matter to us and ought to
matter to us, because they often condition behavior and definitions have
regulative implications. Certain practices are made possible by adopting as
a norm the definition “Water is H2O.” The significance of these practices
for our lives gives us good pragmatic reason to adopt it as part of the
intension of “water.” But which empirical facts ought to matter to us and
how they ought to matter and condition our grammar will depend on our
forms of life. The Pirahã provide a living counterexample to the claim that
our scientific definition of “water” is and must be the correct definition,
because science says so. It is not at all obvious that they are irrational for
failing to adopt this definition—despite the fact that the stuffs falling
under the extension of what they call “water” consists of H2O. Our dis-
agreement with the Pirahã, if there is one, is a disagreement in form of life,
not in empirical judgments. We must distinguish empirical judgments
about the internal consistency of certain stuffs (which may be true or false)
and normative judgments about which empirical facts should be gram-
matical for a community  (which is a normative  and cultural issue).
Normatively, I see no reason to think that the Pirahãs are rationally obli-
gated to update their intension/s of terms like “water” in their language
(so as to get right with the world, as it were). Suggesting otherwise strikes
me as an ethnocentric, offensive, and dangerous imperialist proposal. I am
inclined to reject it as conceptual imperialism. A more basic logical objec-
tion, however, is this: Whether a community should transform an empiri-
cal fact into a grammatical norm is not a matter of whether that norm is
“true” or “false,” but a matter of whether it is useful or not for that culture.
It may be objected that I cannot help myself to conventionalism as a
basis for  defending Pirahã culture, for all definitions and intensions  on
conventionalism—including theirs—are arbitrary and logically indefensi-
ble from a transcultural perspective. This is true. But it is true on
Wittgenstein’s use of “arbitrariness” which signifies the unjustifiability of
grammatical rules by reference to reality. The arbitrariness of grammar
­thesis is perfectly compatible with defending a culture on practical grounds.
My defense, in other words, does not spring from conventionalism per se,
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  181

but from the moral grammar of my own community. Conventionalism

does not entail that competing or incompatible grammatical accounts of
“water” are “arbitrary” in the sense that choosing between them is a trivial
matter. It is no more trivial than adopting one state constitution over
another is trivial. For science-dependent societies like ours the scientific
intension of “water” is hardly trivial. Indeed, its significance is linked to
our society’s broader commitment to science and technology. For it is this
that is at stake in the questioning of scientific grammar. My claim is that
something similar applies to the Pirahã.
Glock raises a similar line of objection against the Putnam–Kripkean
argument. He does not deny that, in the case of gold, an empirical discov-
ery prompted a substantive change in the definition of “gold.” What he
denies is what is taken to be entailed by the conceptual change, namely, that
the discovery somehow confirms the truth of the adopted scientific defini-
tion. He resists the idea that a scientific discovery is simultaneously a dual
discovery: a semantic discovery (discovery of the “real meaning” of “gold”)
and an ontological discovery (discovery of the “real essence” of gold).
Following Wittgenstein, Glock argues:

We sometimes change the CRITERIA for the application of words. But this
amounts to conceptual change sparked off off by an empirical discovery, not
to a discovery of ‘the real meaning’ (Z 438). Putnam objects that this
ignores the fact that we now know more about gold than before. Wittgenstein
could reply that we know more about gold, that is, about the atomic consis-
tency of a certain stuff, without knowing more about the meaning of ‘gold’.
The latter is determined by our EXPLANATION of meaning, which speci-
fies criteria that must be fulfilled by anything we call ‘gold’. And we distin-
guish between UNDERSTANDING the term and having expert chemical
knowledge. But even if science does not discover meanings, we, for good
reasons, change certain concepts in accordance with its findings, and to this
extent language is not autonomous. One might further claim that the new
concept is simply correct, since it corresponds to objective features of a stuff
(gold). However, that stuff has an indefinite number of objective properties.
These could all be used to define different concepts, which may be more or
less useful, or have more or less explanatory power. But that is not a matter
of corresponding to reality.23

 Glock (1996, 46–47).

23
182  A. G. URQUIDEZ

There are a lot of gems in this passage. Empirical discoveries can, and
occasionally do, result in a sort of decision, but the decision is always a
communal or societal one. The decision to revise an existing concept, or
to stipulate a new concept, must be a widely accepted decision (one mani-
fest in practice). Wittgenstein describes this unique kind of “decision” as
“agreement in definitions” or conceptual agreement. Conceptual agree-
ment, however, presupposes shared values and practices; agreement in
definition is “agreement in form of life.” Consider the case of gold. The
communal “decision” involved taking the atomic consistency of a certain
stuff to mark a defining (grammatical) feature of “gold.” Glock rightly
reminds us that pragmatic considerations led our linguistic community to
prioritize certain features over others. Our ability to choose which aspects
of a scientific discovery are grammatically salient exhibits our autonomy in
the decision-making process. For example, Glock observes that the stuffs
falling under the extension of “gold” have several hidden properties that
might be taken up as part of the intension of “gold.” Yet we do not give
every one of these objective properties equal weight. For our decision is
not an arbitrary one, but one guided by certain social and scientific inter-
ests. We might have valued other features of the substance, for example,
features common to both gold and fool’s gold. Had these commonalities
been particularly significant for us, for our forms of life, the empirical dis-
covery with respect to gold might have led to a different decision. We
might have decided that what we now call “gold” and “fool’s gold” belong
to the same kind. Had our collective decision gone this way, the distinction
between “gold” and “fool’s gold”—as distinct kinds of substances—would
not have arisen. So, despite what one might think we are not blindly guided
by science; empirical discoveries do not determine conceptual decisions, we
do. Again, this element of grammatical decision-making reflects our auton-
omy in choosing which aspects of scientific discoveries are grammati-
cally salient.

4.3.4  The Arbitrariness of Grammar

What are we to make of Glock’s contention that “even if science does not
discover meanings, we, for good reasons, change certain concepts in
accordance with its findings, and to this extent language is not autono-
mous?” Does this concession undermine Wittgenstein’s arbitrariness of
grammar thesis? No. Baker and Hacker explain the sense in which gram-
mar is not arbitrary for Wittgenstein:
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  183

We have argued that grammar pays no homage to reality. It is not answer-

able to reality in the currency of truth. But grammar can be said to be
‘responsive to reality’ in the following sense: that were the world different in
specifiable ways, certain features of our form of representation would no
longer be useful. So too, if human nature were different, parts of our gram-
mar might no longer be usable. And if we had a different grammar we would
say and do quite different things (cf. ‘Agreement in definitions, judgements
and forms of life’, pp. 215–18).24

The kind of justification Wittgenstein rejects is epistemic justification.25

There are no facts that make grammatical propositions (explanations of
meaning) true or false. For grammatical propositions are expressions
of rules, which are brought into existence by us. The sense in which gram-
mar is not arbitrary is that framework conditions mediate “features of our
form of representation.” The conditioning at issue is pragmatic. Were very
general facts about the world different from what they actually are; were
human nature radically different from what it in fact is; or, were we mem-
bers of radically different cultures, our grammatical norms would “no lon-
ger [be] usable.” Empirical facts constrain grammar in that they make some
linguistic norms more or less useful, harmful, and so on.
Hence when we assert that human nature and the laws of physics pre-
vent human communities from adopting certain grammars, we must dis-
tinguish logical and pragmatic forms of “prevention.”

Is the logic of our language then constrained by the facts? In one sense,
this is obviously so. Far from denying it, Wittgenstein affirmed that
concept-­formation is empirically conditioned. We do not play board
games with pieces that are too heavy to lift or too small to pick up, nor do
we play card games with cards differentiated by markings that are not
readily discriminable. If these are to be called ‘constraints upon games’,
then there are indeed analogous constraints upon grammar. …But such
constraints are mischaracterized as ‘constraints upon the logic of our lan-
guage’. Rather are they constraints within which our languages evolve
and within which we construct our notations. These constraints do not
make logic or grammar answerable to facts of nature. Nor do they force
us to recognize something as making sense which does not in fact make

24
 Baker and Hacker (2009, 339).
25
 Wittgenstein also rejects the possibility of justifying grammar tout court, that is, by refer-
ence to the facts, or to a single purpose or social function of language. Though see my
account of pragmatic justification in Chap. 3.
184  A. G. URQUIDEZ

sense, or conversely to exclude forms of words from use as being senseless

which do in fact make sense. Such constraints on concept-formation do
not impugn the autonomy of grammar (any more than comparable con-
straints upon the game of chess could bring it about that we accept cer-
tain moves as licit in chess which are in fact illicit, or prohibit certain
moves that are permissible).26

Consider empirical constraints on human nature. Some of our conven-

tions regarding emotional expression in bodily reactions may prove unal-
terable if it is an empirical fact that, say, facial expressions of anger are fixed
aspects of human nature. In that case, it would be fruitless to adopt this
partial definition of “anger”: “Anger is characteristically expressed in smil-
ing.” This constraint is pragmatic rather than logical. If it were logical, it
would be impossible to adopt this definition. But that is not the sense in
which we “cannot” adopt it. Rather, the sense in which we cannot do so
is that doing so would render the term “anger” impracticable for our cur-
rent purposes and perhaps potentially harmful. Or take a different exam-
ple: If one values a technologically advanced society, then one ought to
define “water” in accordance with scientific discoveries. Nature thus
imposes limits in the sense that it furnishes pragmatic reasons for either
adopting or rejecting a grammatical rule. The logical openness of our
norms does not imply that there are no limits on the revisability of grammar.
Aside from the pragmatic limits that nature furnishes upon grammar,
Wittgenstein noted that there are pragmatic limits furnished by sociohis-
torical facts. Such limits are those imposed by cultural forms of life of
specific human communities. Arguably, for instance, our commitment to
science makes it irrational for us to reject the scientific (post-1800s) defini-
tion of “water.” An opposing corresponding limit applies in the case of the
Pirahã. Their unwillingness to accept this definition and, with it, the
authority of science is not mere stubborn unwillingness, but sociocultural
unwillingness. Sociocultural facts about a human community constrain
grammar when they are essential to its form of life; when fundamentally
altering them would result in a loss of identity or fundamental values. The
salient point here, again, is that the limits in question are pragmatic rather
than logical. Although Pirahã grammar is logically revisable, sociohistori-
cal facts about their culture rule out this possibility, that is, render it
incompatible with their “non-scientific culture.” There is no necessity to

 Baker and Hacker (2009, 214).

26
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  185

any society’s continuing its cultural way of living. And sometimes sociohis-
torical facts (e.g., conquest) undermine existing forms of life.
The established values and practices of a cultural community typically
lead it to view its own grammar as superior to others. This is understand-
able, for habit, tradition, and the enculturation of children into the cul-
ture’s forms of life render its ways of living more intuitive, easier to learn
or employ, and more useful to members of the community given its shared
values and practices. The community simply cannot—and from an internal
perspective, should not—accept our definition of “water” given that it
wishes to retain its cultural identity. The line separating natural and socio-
cultural limits does not seem to be a sharp distinction. Nevertheless, it
seems that both the world and our sociocultural practices make certain
grammatical rules pragmatically undesirable, as adopting them would be
useless, counterproductive, dangerous, or harmful to their culture.
Grammar is always immanently justifiable to insiders: that is, insiders can
provide reasons for why they do things as they do. This is a kind of prag-
matic justification.
This gives us what we need to reply to one possible objection to
Wittgenstein’s arbitrariness thesis. It might be said that grammar cannot
be arbitrary—that is, unjustifiable by reference to empirical facts—because
grammar may be justifiable by reference to the naturalness of linguistic
norms. The idea is that some of our concepts (and corresponding prac-
tices) appear to be grounded in what we find “natural,” as opposed to
novel concepts that strike us as “unnatural” and thus incorrect or mis-
guided. Consider, for instance, alternative mathematics. To take a simple
example, consider the practice of “counting by two.” Most of us would
find it natural to continue the series “2, 4, 6, 8, 10,…” with “12, 14,
16,…” and unnatural to continue the series with “14, 18, 22…”. Does
the naturalness of what we call “counting by two” establish that forms of
counting that do not conform to this “natural” pattern are mistaken?
Baker and Hacker consider and reject arguments of this sort, that is,
arguments from what is “natural.” Their objection implies that such argu-
ments conflate the natural and the correct.

That it is natural for us, in our culture, to continue the pattern ‘2, 4, 6, 8, 10,
12, 14’ as we do, that this needs little training, that the progression is readily
surveyable and not typically confusing, and so forth, is not what makes it
correct. Rather, that we find it natural is what makes it reasonable for us to
‘make it correct’. What is natural for most of us is the foundation for a tech-
186  A. G. URQUIDEZ

nique. ‘Before the calculation was invented or the technique fixed, there was
no right or wrong result’ (LFM 95). Is it equally ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ for
us to extend the series ‘−2’, according to the formula a0 = 1000; an+1 = an − 2,
beyond 0 (namely: +2, 0, −2, −4 . . .)? One might indeed say that it is, for
our schoolchildren have no difficulty in doing so. But educated people in
early modern Europe found it most unnatural – after all, they might have
said, one cannot have less than nothing. What is, in this sense, natural today
may have been altogether unnatural in other times or in other cultures.27

If Baker and Hacker are correct, the conflation of naturalness with correct-
ness is objectionable on several grounds. First, what is taken to be natural
and unnatural is a relative matter. That which is unnatural is always so from
certain perspectives, for persons at particular points in history, for particular
cultures, and so on. Second, the argument from the naturalness of certain
grammatical norms fails to recognize that we sometimes adopt linguistic
conventions that are unnatural. These we may adopt when the utility of
such norms outstrips their lack of intuitiveness. It also fails to appreciate
what we might describe as the “foundational” role of naturalness. What we
take to be natural reflects habitual practice and established attitudes. As
Baker and Hacker argue, although the naturalness of a rule should neither
be equated with its correctness nor thought to be the inevitable cause of
our adopting it, naturalness may be an important pragmatic consideration
in our decision. This last objection is crucial, for it points to an alternative
and non-epistemic form of justification. The sense in which naturalness
“grounds” our counting practices is not that it makes the practice correct,
but that it makes it efficient and useful for us. A different kind of counting
practice would not be incorrect; it would simply be useless, unintuitive, and
problematic for our purposes. It may serve other purposes perfectly well.
I thus conclude: That something strikes us as “natural” is a poor reason
for thinking that grammar is justifiable in the sense of being correct or
superior to alternative grammars. It is better conceived as a ground for
pragmatic justification as Glock explains:

Norms of representation cannot be metaphysically correct or incorrect. But

given certain facts—biological and socio-historical facts about us and ­general
regularities in the world around us—adopting certain rules can be ‘practical’
or ‘impractical’ (AWL 70). Provided that the world is as it is, people who
employed alternative scientific paradigms, ways of calculating or measuring

 Baker and Hacker (2009, 329; see also the discussion on 341f).
27
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  187

for purposes similar to ours, would have to make adjustments which would
eventually collapse under their own weight. Drastic changes in certain facts
could render rules not only impractical but even inapplicable (RFM 51-2,
200; RPP II 347—9; see FRAMEWORK).28

Given our forms of life and the value we place on science, it would be
“impractical” for us to decide to treat fool’s gold as a kind of gold. For
there are significant empirical differences between what is called “gold”
and what is called “fool’s gold.” Notably, the former is indestructible,
unlike its iron pyrite counterpart, and this difference has practical signifi-
cance for us. If we should decide to treat gold and fool’s gold as the same
kind of substance, several unwelcome practical consequences, connected
with our socioeconomic practices, would ensue. For instance, the latter,
being shatterable makes for a poorer economic currency. This social fact is
one practical consideration that speaks in favor of treating these stuffs as
distinct kinds of substance. Arguably, considerations such as these, given
our forms of life, give us good reason to place the sort of value we place
on the internal natures of stuffs. What we have then is a pragmatic reason
for distinguishing gold and fool’s gold.

4.4   Are Definitions Descriptive in Addition

to Being Normative?

I have argued that it is dubious to treat the premise that conceptual change
sparked off by scientific discoveries is evidence for externalism. I now turn
to an objection to the conventionalist argument I have been developing.
This descriptivist objection challenges the conventionalist thesis that defi-
nitions are not descriptions, but conventions. Consider the proposition
that water is H2O. This proposition strikes many as both descriptive and
normative, for the chemical structure of water seems to be a fact, a descrip-
tion of reality, that has normative implications (particularly, for science).
The fact that the stuffs called “water” share a chemical structure is some-
thing that had to be discovered. This, however, implies that a fact about the
essence of water preceded both our conception of water and the intension
of “water.” What, then, is wrong with holding this proposition to be a
norm of linguistic correctness and a description of reality (a true descrip-
tion, as it turns out)?

 Glock (1996, 49–50).

28
188  A. G. URQUIDEZ

4.4.1  
Descriptive and Normative Uses of Sentences
The sentence “Water is H2O” looks like an empirical description, and
moreover, we sometimes use it as such. It can be used to describe the
internal consistency of a certain kind of stuff, and it can be used to define
the term “water.” These days, it seems that the primary scientific use of
this sentence is not descriptive, but normative. A liquid that satisfied all of
our everyday explanations of water, but did not satisfy our scientific expla-
nations—did not have the requisite chemical structure—would not be
called “water.” Considered as a descriptive statement, the claim that the
chemical structure of water (a certain kind of stuff) is H2O is an empirical
truth. Do these considerations show that the proposition that water is
H2O is both descriptive and normative? Wittgensteinian semantics distin-
guishes the use and sentential form of a sentence. This distinction is rooted
in Wittgenstein’s account of saying something. For it is not our sentences
that say (or assert) things; it is we who make assertions by means of employ-
ing sentences. On this view, the form of the sentence is semantically sec-
ondary, for what matters primarily is use.
One and the same type-sentence can play different roles in a language-­
game (descriptive and normative roles), but it cannot play them simulta-
neously, according to the Wittgensteinian. For the Wittgensteinian, the
normative and descriptive components of sentences like “Water is H2O” is
explained thus:  some  empirical discoveries have normative implications.
These implications only obtain once we have “hardened” an empirical fact
into a norm of representation. When this occurs there will be two distinct
uses of a sentence: its use to make a descriptive judgment on some occa-
sions and its use  to make a  normative judgment on others. Baker and
Hacker invoke the use/form distinction thus:

the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions…cannot be

drawn for type-sentences without regard to their particular employments.
For a sentence that was once used as a defining grammatical proposition
may cease to be so used (e.g. ‘an acid turns blue litmus paper red’), and
conversely what was once used to express an empirical proposition may now
have hardened into a rule (e.g. ‘Water consists of H2O’).29

29
 Baker and Hacker (2009, 249). The expression “hardening of a rule” is a taken from
Wittgenstein’s remark in On Certainty: “It might be imagined that some propositions, of the
form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical
propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  189

The Wittgensteinian distinction between form and use can be supported

by considering sentences like “This is red.” This sentence may be used to
describe an object or to express a rule for the use of the term “red,” and
whether it is one or the other seems to depend on context of use. I might
use this sentence to describe, as when I report to a blind person the color
of an object. I might instead use it to provide an ostensive definition of the
term “red,” as when I teach a novice to the language the meaning of
“red.” Whether it is a description or a linguistic rule depends on context
of use. The upshot, however, is that using it one way immediately pre-
cludes using it the other way.30
Baker and Hacker offer additional arguments against the “simultaneity
thesis,” as we might call it. Their most important argument appeals to their
analysis of Wittgenstein’s account of the Standard Meter Bar in Paris (hence-
forth, Bar). The Bar is a sample used in an ostensive definition to provide a
standard of what it means to call something “one meter.” They write:

The distinction [between the use of a sentence to express an empirical prop-

osition and its use to express a grammatical proposition], however, is exclu-
sive. There is no such thing as an utterance which simultaneously makes a
grammatical statement (expresses a rule of grammar) and makes an empiri-
cal statement. To say that the standard metre is a metre long is not to make
a true or false statement about the length of the standard metre bar but to
give a definition  – and therefore to express a grammatical proposition
(PI §50; see Exg. and the essay in Volume 1, Part I, ‘The standard metre’).
But, as just noted, it may be unclear, or even indeterminate, on some
­occasion or other of the use of a sentence, whether it is being used to express
a grammatical proposition or to make an empirical statement.31

fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. . . . But I distinguish between the
movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not
a sharp division of the one from the other . . . And the bank of that river consists partly of
hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now
in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited” (1969, §§96–9).
30
 When “This is red” is used as a standard for the correct use of “red,” the object one
points to is a sample of red (see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2009, §16). That
is, the object one points to is not described as red, but is the standard on the basis of which
other things are to be described as red (and not red). Baker and Hacker provide a helpful
discussion of Wittgenstein’s account of ostensive explanation and its connection to his phi-
losophy (see “Ostensive Definition and its Ramifications,” 2005, 81–106). More on this
below.
31
 Baker and Hacker (2009, 258–259).
190  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Many philosophers will not find the above arguments convincing. For one
thing, they seem theoretically loaded, presupposing the Wittgensteinian
conception of grammar. The salient question  thus seems to be whether
some of our sentences simultaneously have descriptive and normative func-
tions, or whether these functions  map on to descriptive and normative
uses. In other words: Can a sentence be used to express both a description
and a normative judgment on a single occasion of use? It seems intuitively
plausible that the sentence “Water is H2O” might be used to express a
description and a norm, so  why should we follow Baker and Hacker in
holding that a sentence cannot be used to express a proposition that simul-
taneously describes reality and lays down a linguistic norm?

4.4.2  A Measure that Measures Itself?

Kripke offers a powerful reply to Wittgenstein’s assertion that that which
measures cannot be that which is measured. If his objection succeeds, then
the simultaneity thesis seems vindicated. He explains his puzzlement about
Wittgenstein’s description that the Bar is neither one meter long nor not
one meter long:

Wittgenstein says something very puzzling about this. He says: ‘There is one
thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter long nor that it is not
one meter long, and that is the standard meter in Paris. But this is, of course,
not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar
role in the language game of measuring with a meter rule.’ This seems to be
a very ‘extraordinary property’, actually, for any stick to have. I think he must
be wrong. If the stick is a stick, for example, 39.37 inches long (I assume we
have some different standard for inches), why isn’t it one meter long?32

Wittgenstein’s seemingly paradoxical statement that the Bar is “neither

one meter long nor not one meter long” seems incoherent, for it seems to
imply that the Bar has no length. After all, it seems every physically and
spatially extended object must be one meter long or not. Otherwise, it is
not a physically and spatially extended object. But the Bar is such an
object, so it must have a length—for example, one that can be measured
in inches. Hence it must be possible to determine whether or not it is one
meter long. If we deny this, then our talk about the Bar (i.e., of an extended

 Kripke (1972, 54).

32
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  191

object) seems incoherent. Something like this thought  seems to be the

fundamental source of Kripke’s worry. Wittgenstein’s argument, however,
does not have this absurd implication.
To demonstrate where Kripke goes wrong, I will first unpack
Wittgenstein’s argument and then proceed to address Kripke’s  worry.
Consider the sentence:

(1) The Bar is one meter long

If the goal in applying (1) is to provide an ostensive definition, then the

aim is to provide a rule for the correct use of the expression “one meter.”
Wittgenstein’s argument can be presented as follows:

“What Measures” Language-game: There is a language-game that involves

measuring objects in meters. This language-game is possible in part because
there is a standard of correct measurement. Where the Bar functions as this
standard, it is a sample. The role of (1) in this context is to provide a rule for
the use of “one meter.” Since the Bar is that which determines the length of
“one meter,” it is not itself measured; hence there is no such thing as mea-
suring and discovering the Bar’s length in this language-game. Said differ-
ently, the very moment one measures the Bar’s length (whether in inches or
some other unit of measurement), one ceases to play this language-­
game. When one utters sentence (1) in this language-game, what one says is
that the Bar is the standard of “one meter,” i.e., one does not describe the
bar’s length but lays down a rule.

Notice that nowhere in the above argument was it claimed that the
Bar has no length. On the contrary, its length is essential to the language-­
game, for it is the standard against which measurement takes place.
Obviously the fact that we ordinarily play a normative language-­game
with sentence (1) does not mean that it is impossible for us to play a
descriptive language-game with it. There may be an occasion where one
asserts (1) and thereby describes the length of the Bar. This constitutes
a different language-game.

“What is Measured” Language-game: Imagine that one is genuinely unfamil-

iar with the Bar’s length. One is interested in determining what its length is
and wants to do so using meters as one’s unit of measurement. One then
proceeds to do exactly that, measure the Bar, and as a result of this “experi-
ment” one concludes that the Bar is one meter long. Here one uses sentence
(1) to provide a true description. However, in order to describe the length of
192  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the Bar, one must have a standard for determining what counts as “one
meter.” Let us suppose that this standard is another object, a sample other
than the Bar. (For one cannot measure the length of the Bar against itself to
discover that it is one meter.) So on this language-game we succeed in mea-
suring the length of the Bar, but we do so at the expense of presupposing
some other sample as the standard of measurement, and now this other stan-
dard has the unique property that it is incapable of being measured in this
language-game.

In “What Measures,” the Bar has the property of not being measured; a

fortiori, the Bar is not discovered to be (via measurement) one meter long,
but for the same reason it is not discovered to be not one meter long (e.g.,
two meters long). In the second language-game, the Bar is measured
against some other standard, call it B, so it is B that has the property that
it is not (measured as) one meter long nor as some other length. So in
either language-game, something must have the unique property of not
having a length that is measured. Is this property “extraordinary”?
Wittgenstein rejects this. For it is not a supernatural property assigned to
it by God. It is a property that characterizes the object’s role as a standard.
With this background in place we can now turn to Kripke’s objection.
He argues that since it is possible to measure the length of the Bar using
some unit of measurement outside of the metric system, we can determine
(and hence measure) the length of the Bar. He proposes inches as the unit.
He then argues that the result of measuring the Bar in inches is that it is
39.37 inches. Hence it makes sense to use the following proposition as a
description:

(2) The length of the Bar is 39.37 inches

His point then is that even if the Bar is a standard of measurement, a

standard for measuring in meters, it is  still possible to  measure the Bar
using a different unit of measurement (i.e., a different standard). Indeed,
we might extend this thought further by arguing that once we have mea-
sured the Bar in inches we can now come to discover new information:

(3) One meter is equivalent to 39.37 inches

Does this argument refute Wittgenstein’s claim that the Bar turns out
to have a length since it clearly has a length in inches? Does his argument
undermine Wittgenstein’s claim that what is measured cannot simultane-
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  193

ously be that which measures? If Kripke is right, then the Bar can be both
a measure and what is measured, simultaneously.
Kripke’s objection turns on more than one misunderstanding. First, as
Baker and Hacker point out, Wittgenstein never denies (as Kripke seems
to assume) that the Bar has a length. Clearly, the Bar must have one at all
times given what is ordinarily called “a bar” or “a stick.” (“Every bar has
a length” is a rule.) The concept length plays a role in all language-games
involving measurements of the kind under consideration. Further, it is
necessary for the Bar to have a length if it is to function as a sample, that
is, a standard of measurement. For other objects cannot be measured
against the Bar unless they are measured against the length of the Bar.
Kripke confuses Wittgenstein’s claim that we cannot measure the length of
the Bar in “What Measures” with the absurd claim that the Bar ceases to
have a length in this language-game. The reason why we cannot measure
its length in this language-game is not that it stops having one, but that its
role precludes us from measuring it. In “What Measures” we are not mea-
suring the Bar, but using it to measure other things. Given that we are not
measuring it (in this practice), we cannot describe or assert the results of
our having measured it (without speaking nonsense).
What about Kripke’s claim that Wittgenstein is wrong to assert that we
cannot measure the Bar, for we can measure it in inches? It is clear that this
is a case of smoke and mirrors. Wittgenstein’s comment is about a very
specific language-game, the “What  Measures” language-game. What
Kripke does is introduce a new language-game, one that involves a unit of
measurement that is foreign to the practice under consideration. In effect
he is trying to get Wittgenstein to commit to something that he explicitly
denies in stating his position, namely, that the property of not being one
meter long nor not one meter long is an “extraordinary property.” For it
would be an extraordinary property, indeed, if the Bar could magically
retain this property across all language-games, including those where the
Bar is not used as a measure! Of course one can measure the Bar in inches,
but then one is no longer (at that time!) measuring it in meters (just as one
cannot in that case use it as a standard to measure something else). There
is no such thing as measuring a thing in meters and inches at the same
time. (Though there is, of course, the related but different language-game
of converting inches to meters and vice versa; yet,  that too is not the
language-­game under consideration.)
194  A. G. URQUIDEZ

The objector, however, might continue: “Even if Kripke is confused, I

still don’t see why a sentence cannot be used both to describe reality and
lay down a norm.” Baker and Hacker offer the following explanation (in
addition to the ones previously given).33 They ask us to consider the fol-
lowing argument:

. Y is the same length as X.

1
2. The length of X is one meter.
3. ∴ the length of Y is one meter.

This is a logically valid argument, and premises 1 and 2 are empirical

descriptions. However, let us change the terms of the argument. Suppose
that X is the Bar and that its role in the argument is that of a standard.
Then premise 2 of the argument is no longer an empirical description, but
the expression of a rule. Hence, premise 2 is redundant and might as
well drop out of the argument, since it is now presupposed as a grammati-
cal proposition (an inference rule). This illustration depicts, in a visual way,
that what was originally a premise and empirical description in one argu-
ment—premise 2—vanishes or disappears (in a way analogous to what we
get in Russell’s analysis of “The King of France is bald”) in the new argu-
ment, which now looks as follows:

. Y is the same length as the Bar.

1
2. ∴ the length of Y is one meter.

The vanishing of the sentence “The Bar is the length of one meter” is now
explicit in this rendition. What explains its disappearance? Clearly it is the
role of the proposition as an inference rule. Precisely because it has this
role, it vanishes as a descriptive premise in the argument. Hence, a propo-
sition cannot simultaneously be a descriptive and grammatical proposi-
tion without incoherence. And what is true for this grammatical proposition
is true for all grammatical propositions, including “Water is H2O.” Insofar
as this sentence is used to express a rule, the expression of a pattern of
inference, it cannot be used descriptively, as the expression of an empirical
proposition. The role of a premise is very different from that of an
inference rule.

 Baker and Hacker (2005, 198–199).

33
 4  RE-DEFINING “MEANING”  195

4.5   Conclusion
We can now conclude that in Levine’s discussion of semantic externalism
(and his allusion to Putnam) we do not find reason to conclude that the
meaning of “racism” is the kind it stands for; or that the grammar of “rac-
ism” is (in the relevant sense) responsible to reality. The arguments of this
and the previous chapters demonstrate that semantic externalism is predi-
cated on dubious assumptions. It presupposes descriptivism as against
conventionalism, for example. It also interprets conceptual change sparked
off by scientific discovery as evidence for externalism. This latter claim,
however, can be reinterpreted as evidence that science is significant to
our culture. I have argued that the scientific value of defining and updat-
ing so-called “natural kind terms” in accordance with scientific findings
does not consist in tracking reality. We are not brought closer to ultimate
truth by adopting one grammar over another, for grammars are not ahis-
torical and culturally independent phenomena. Our own society’s gram-
matical dependence on science is not epistemically grounded in some
objective, natural, or factual foundation; that is, it is not epistemically jus-
tifiable by reference to “ultimate reality.” Rather, our society’s grammar is
grounded in the cultural values of “advanced Western societies,” which
both value and depend on technologies, production and economic prac-
tices, and the authority of scientific expertise.
In defending these claims, I have admittedly not shown that semantic
externalism is fundamentally misguided, only that its arguments are not
compelling. Admittedly, I have not shown that the word “racism” cannot
have an externalist semantics, only that it need not have such a semantics
and that a plausible alternative exists (one that is arguably more desirable).
The Wittgensteinian account of grammar, including its contention that
meaning is use, provides a plausible philosophy of language that should be
taken seriously in the theory of racism—at least as seriously as semantic
externalism.
In the next chapter, I consider a couple of more objections to the con-
ventionalist portrait I have been painting. My primary aim, however, is to
argue for reformulating ordinary language philosophy as a philosophical
practice that concerns itself with prescriptive grammar and not just descrip-
tive grammar. In the theory of racism I argue that the former should be
viewed as the primary formulation of the philosophical question “What
is racism?”
196  A. G. URQUIDEZ

References
Baker, Gordon P., and Peter M.S. Hacker. 2005. Wittgenstein: Understanding and
Meaning, Volume 1 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical
Investigations. 2nd ed. (extensively revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
———. 2009. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volumes 1 and 2 of an
Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (extensively
revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Conant, James. 1998. Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use. Philosophical
Investigations 21 (3): 222–250.
Everett, Daniel L. 2008. Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: Life and Language in the
Amazonian Jungle. New York: Vintage Departures.
Forster, Michael N. 2004. Wittgenstein and the Arbitrariness of Grammar.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Glock, Hans-Johann. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. The Blackwell Philosopher
Dictionaries. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
———. 2003. Analyticity, Apriority and Necessity. In Quine and Davidson on
Language, Thought, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacker, Peter M.S. 2000. The Arbitrariness of Grammar and the Bounds of Sense.
In Wittgenstein: Mind and Will: Part I: Essays, Volume 4 of an Analytical
Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Hanfling, Oswald. 2000. Philosophy and Ordinary Language Philosophy: The Bent
and Genius of Our Tongue. 1st ed. London: Routledge.
Haslanger, Sally. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kim, Hanseung. 2008. Review of Sanford Goldberg (Ed.), Internalism and
Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:
An Electronic Journal. 6 Aug 2008. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/internalism-
and-externalism-in-semantics-and-epistemology/. Accessed 15 Feb 2018.
Kripke, Saul A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Levine, Michael P. 2004. Philosophy and Racism. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael
P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 78–96. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’. In Language, Mind, and
Knowledge, ed. Keith Gunderson, vol. 7, 131–193. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Vargas, Manuel R. 2005. The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility. Philosophical
Studies 125: 399–429.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1969. On Certainty, ed. Gertrude E.M.  Anscombe and
Georg H. von Wright and trans. Gertrude E.M.  Anscombe and Denis Paul.
Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans. Peter M.S. Hacker
and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
 PART II

Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement

 CHAPTER 5

Re-defining “Disagreement”: Rationality

Without Final Solutions

5.1   Introduction: From Ontology

to Linguistic Norms

This book’s primary concern is with addressing the contestedness of rac-

ism. It is more specifically concerned with conceptual disagreement, for it
is evident that much disagreement about racism is conceptual.1 Thus far,
I have said little about the nature of conceptual disagreement. In this
chapter I explore some of the implications of conventionalism for address-
ing conceptual disagreement about racism.
Part I developed a prima facie case for a Wittgenstein-inspired conven-
tionalist semantics. It also defended the plausibility of employing such an
approach in the service of articulating a serviceable definition of “racism.”
In Chap. 2, I argued that definitions of “racism” can be plausibly analyzed
as grammatical rules. In Chap. 3, I argued that conceiving of definitions as
conventions enables us to accommodate otherwise incompatible intu-
itions about definitions of “racism.” Constructivists tend to stress the
sociohistorical features of concepts, while conceptual analysts tend to
stress their a priori features. I argued that the a priori features of defini-
tions are normative facets of our linguistic norms (facets that link up with
our normative attitudes and our techniques of application) whereas the

1
 For a discussion of conceptual disagreement about racism from a social science perspec-
tive, see Etienne Balibar’s “Racism Revisited: Sources, Relevance, and Aporias of a Modern
Concept” (2008).

© The Author(s) 2020 199

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_5
200  A. G. URQUIDEZ

sociohistorical features of definitions are facets of the anthropological or

cultural character of our linguistic norms. In Chap. 4, I argued for the
superiority of internalist semantics over externalist semantics. Arguments
aiming to show that conceptual change sparked off by scientific discoveries
is evidence for externalism can be resisted by reinterpreting the “evidence”
as confirmation of the fact that scientific information is deeply embedded
in our conceptual scheme and, hence, our forms of life.
Part II extends the conventionalist framework by defending a couple of
theses. First, conceptual disagreement about racism is normative in two
distinct ways. First, it is about linguistic norms, as I’ve argued in previous
chapters. Second, disagreement about our linguistic norms is prescriptive
rather than descriptive. It concerns what the linguistic norm ought to be;
this means that  the question at issue is not “How is the word ‘racism’
used?” but “How should the word ‘racism’ be used?” I further contend
that we need to adopt a pragmatic approach to the prescriptive question.
Such an approach ultimately leads me to defend revisionism in the theory
of racism, as against conservatism. Rather than affirming that the prescrip-
tively correct use of “racism” is the one that best conforms to common-
sense thinking about racism, we ought instead affirm that the prescriptively
correct use is the one that recommends some substantive revisions to com-
monsense thinking.

5.2   Stage-Setting for a Theory of Disagreement

5.2.1  Normative and Prescriptive Disagreement

It is standardly assumed that disagreement about the nature of racism is
factual disagreement. This assumption is plausible if one takes the cor-
rect answer to the philosophical question “What is racism?” to be the
description of an object. In the previous three chapters, I argued that
this assumption is mistaken. I defended a more plausible analysis of the
philosophical question. The correct answer to it is not a description of
racism, but a rule for describing racism, that is, a rule for the correct use
of the term “racism.” I called this position conventionalism. This position
stands opposed to the descriptivist view that explanations of meaning—or
that a subset of explanations of meaning—are descriptions of matters of
fact. The dispute between conventionalists and descriptivists is captured
in the following question: What are philosophers disagreeing about when
they disagree about the nature of racism? For descriptivists, the object of
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  201

disagreement is a matter of fact, the nature of a partly mind-dependent or

mind-independent object. Conventionalists deny this. The two positions
can be articulated thus:

Factual disagreement: definitional disagreement is about a matter of fact;

that is, the object of disagreement is an entity or kind. (Descriptivism)
Normative disagreement: definitional disagreement is about a matter of
value; that is, the object of disagreement is a linguistic norm.
(Conventionalism)

My aim in this chapter is to extend the conventionalist paradigm by

giving it a critical-prescriptive edge. The thesis I defend in this chapter and
the next is that the philosopher’s interest in raising the philosophical ques-
tion is not just normative, but prescriptive. Philosophical interest in the
nature of racism is not merely concerned with what Wittgenstein calls
“normative description.” The aim is not merely to understand the existing
concept of racism; that is, to describe the prevailing grammatical rule.
Rather, philosophical interest aims also to prescribe what that grammatical
rule ought to be, that is, to defend a substantive proposal about how we
should think and talk about racism. Definitional disagreement about rac-
ism is both disagreement about a norm and disagreement about what this
norm ought to be. We need, then, to distinguish descriptive and prescrip-
tive forms of disagreement, defined thus:

Descriptive disagreement: contestants disagree about what the prevailing

definition of a term is; philosophical analysis aims to endorse the descrip-
tively correct definition.
Prescriptive disagreement: contestants disagree about what the definition
of a term ought to be; philosophical analysis aims to prescribe or recom-
mend the prescriptively correct definition (independent of what the pre-
vailing definition happens to be).

Where prescriptive disagreement is at issue, the fundamental question can

be articulated in any number of ways. Here are some examples. What should
the meaning of term “W” be, all things considered? What is the best concept
to employ for such and such a purpose? Sally Haslanger has termed this
approach “ameliorative analysis,” while others, like Manuel Vargas, term it
“normative analysis.” It is important for the conventionalist to draw a distinc-
tion between normative and prescriptive disagreements, as I’ve done above.
202  A. G. URQUIDEZ

This is important not merely to appreciate that there can be more than one
way for the fact/value distinction to emerge. It is important also for drawing
distinctions within conventionalist approaches to conceptual analysis.
Wittgensteininans have traditionally set aside the prescriptive question, for
example. Following Wittgenstein’s dictum that philosophy leaves grammar
where it is, many Wittgensteininans believe that merely describing our exist-
ing concepts is sufficient for resolving all substantive philosophical problems.
I disagree with this position. What is true is that conventionalism is not neces-
sarily committed to prescriptive analysis, even though it is necessarily commit-
ted to the position that conceptual disagreement is normative (for
conventionalism entails that definitions are expressions of linguistic norms). It
is a further question on conventionalism whether disagreement about, say, the
nature of racism is disagreement about what its nature is or ought to be.
My contention in this chapter and the next is that the contestedness of
racism, among other things, makes it necessary for philosophers to take a
stance on how the term ought to be used. Since I have defended the con-
ventionalist picture of definition in previous chapters, I take it for granted
in the argument that follows.

5.2.2  A Mere Difference in Word Use?

My argument can be framed as a response to an objection to prescriptive
or pragmatic theories of racism. Conceiving of the object of disagreement
as a convention, we are told, misrepresents the point of the dispute; for we
are told that contestants take themselves to be disputing the nature of real-
ity, a matter of fact, not a linguistic norm. Jorge Garcia expresses this senti-
ment when he rejects the social constructivist argument that, because
racism is an evolving phenomenon, it is impossible to analyze racism in
terms of a single, stable, unchanging essence. He writes:

It has become fashionable these days among scholars of racism to insist there
is no nature or essence or definition of the phenomenon because it is so varied
across times and places. Some social scientists even claim that White people
and Black ones use the term differently, the former seeing it as a matter of
individual beliefs and actions and the latter as a system of power and oppres-
sion. However, I think this disagreement, whatever the racial demographics
of its contestants, should be seen as a dispute over what is racist and, per-
haps, over what racism itself is. Note that if it is seen as a mere difference in
word use, the substantive disagreement between these camps seems to vanish. It
would be nice if our differences could so easily be erased, but any position
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  203

that claims they can be should rightly raise our suspicion that it is missing
what is important. (my italics)2

If the correctness of a definition of “racism” is a mere matter of convention,

then something of fundamental importance is supposedly lost, according to
Garcia. But what, exactly? This lost “importance” seems not to be practical,
but ontological. That is, the important thing for Garcia is the object of dis-
agreement. This is supported by the fact that if a stable ontological object is
traded in for an unstable convention, then the “substantive” element of dis-
putation miraculously “vanishes.” This interpretation is confirmed by
Garcia’s claim, elsewhere in the same paper: “Our task is to figure out what
it is in virtue of which something belongs to the class of racisms, that is, to
determine what racism consists in.”3 Presumably, this passage is suggesting
that there is some language-­independent essence that racism consists in, and
that the aim of the philosopher is to discover what that essence is.
By claiming that prescriptive disagreement misses the object of dis-
agreement, he identifies legitimate disagreement with disagreement about
the “nature or essence or definition” of racism. By equating “definition”
with “essence” and “nature,” Garcia appears to presuppose descriptivism,
the thesis that ­philosophical definitions of “racism” are descriptions of the
nature or essence of racism. From this it follows that construing substan-
tive disagreement as anything other than factual constitutes illegitimate
disagreement. This way of distinguishing “legitimate” and “illegitimate”
disagreement entails the rejection of Wittgenstein’s conventionalist con-
ception of definition, along with his grammatical approach. After all, I, as
a Wittgensteinian, side with those “fashionable” scholars who insist that
there is no nature or essence of racism, but not because I think there are a
plurality of such essences (i.e., several ontological entities). Rather, I deny
that the term “racism” in explanations of racism is the name of an onto-
logical entity, for explanations of racism are not descriptions of anything.
The conventionalist who endorses a definition of “racism” is not endors-
ing a description, but laying down a norm for a specific purpose. Garcia’s
objection to this approach is that it reduces a legitimate ontological dis-
pute to a mere verbal dispute—that is, an illegitimate dispute.
In Chap. 3, I discussed a related worry—which I attributed to Leonard
Harris—that originates in the conviction that metaphysical analysis is the

2
 Garcia (1999, 13–14).
3
 Garcia (1997, 6).
204  A. G. URQUIDEZ

appropriate methodology in theorizing racism. It might seem that if the

object of disagreement is an arbitrary linguistic norm (as opposed to an
objectively existing entity, racism itself), then there can be no univocal,
non-relative answer to the question, “What is racism?” If a linguistic con-
vention is what we are after in addressing disagreement about racism, then
one potential strategy for resolving it is to gather interested parties
together to negotiate the linguistic norms surrounding the use of “racism”
and thereby negotiate what the nature of racism will be. (In fact, this is the
position I defend in Sect. 5.2.) The relevant parties to the dispute should
then get together to decide, as a collective, how best to conceive of racism,
for moral representational purposes. The notion of negotiation implies
variability in potentially correct answers and also implies that whatever is
negotiated is correct by virtue of being normative for the collective. Yet,
from a metaphysical perspective, this proposal seems absurd. What sense
does it make to posit negotiation as the appropriate method by which to
resolve disagreement about the nature of a thing? Natures, ontologically
conceived, are not the kind of thing that can be negotiated. Hence, the
idea of negotiation makes sense only where the object of disagreement is
a norm rather than a thing. That is, it makes sense on conventionalism,
but not on descriptivism. Moreover, if disagreement about the nature of
racism is something that can be negotiated, how can there be objectively
correct and incorrect answers to the question “What is racism?”
I will tackle these objections in the course of articulating a theory of
legitimate disagreement about “the nature of racism” consistent with
conventionalism. If conventionalism is a view about the nature of mean-
ing and definition, the present chapter offers a more praxis-centered con-
ception of conventionalism. It is more praxis-centered in that it holds that
disagreement about “what racism is” (alternatively, “the nature of rac-
ism”) must be resolved in one’s life, in a decision about how to live.
Moving towards a praxis-centered conception enables the conventionalist
to answer the metaphysician’s objections. It will allow me to argue that
although definitional disagreement is “merely verbal” in the sense that it
is strictly about how best to talk about racism (how best to represent rac-
ism in the world), it is not “merely verbal” in some pejorative sense (e.g.,
a normative decision is not trivial, unimportant, or rationally indefensi-
ble). For a decision about how to talk about racism determines how we
live (beginning with our representational practices).
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  205

5.3   Metalinguistic Negotiation

David Plunkett and Tim Sundell’s “Disagreement and the Semantics of
Normative and Evaluative Terms” seeks to undermine an intuitive form of
reasoning, namely, “the argument from (a) the premise that an exchange
between two speakers expresses a genuine disagreement to (b) the thesis
that those speakers mean the same things by the words they use in that
exchange.”4 They cite R.  M. Hare as an example of a philosopher who
defended such reasoning. The idea seems to be that, even if two speakers
disagree about the referent of the disputed term, they must share a con-
ception of its meaning, for shared meaning is a condition for the possibil-
ity of disagreement. The argument here is that, otherwise—if our speakers
had radically different conceptions of the meaning of “X”—they would be
disagreeing about nothing of substance. At best, their disagreement would
be about a mere label: is “X” the proper label or should one be using some
other term? Their disagreement would be purely verbal and would there-
fore be illegitimate (so the argument is reminiscent of Garcia).
Suppose that S asserts “X is good” and P asserts “X is not good.” It
appears that S and P are disagreeing about something. It is natural to think
that if their disagreement is legitimate (non-confused), the word “good”
must mean the same on each assertion. Plunkett and Sundell deny that the
word “good” must mean the same in order for it to be possible for S and P
to disagree. The assumption that “good” must mean the same for disagree-
ment to be possible is false. It is at least conceivable that the word “good”
might mean one thing for S and another for P without it being the case that
S and P are talking past one another. For Garcia, however, this is mistaken. If
“good” does not mean the same, then the disagreement between S and P
“vanishes” on account of a mere difference in word use, for there is then
nothing about which they disagree. Plunkett and Sundell develop an argu-
ment that undermines the necessity presupposed by this logic.

5.3.1  Non-Descriptive Disagreement
Plunkett and Sundell distinguish factual and prescriptive disagreement by
means of several examples (I present two). Although their examples are
not designed to generalize to all explanations of meaning (since they do
not seem to accept Wittgenstein’s analysis of explanations of meaning),

4
 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 2).
206  A. G. URQUIDEZ

my employment of them will be filtered through a conventionalist frame.

For their first example, we are asked to consider the sentence “Feynman is
tall.” Plunkett and Sundell contend that this sentence need not be used to
convey new information concerning Feynman’s height. Instead, it might
be used to convey information about “a certain contextually supplied stan-
dard.” This is a context-relative standard for the correct use of “tall.” In
their example, it is a standard for social practices involving judgments of
height within a particular region or country. Suppose

[y]ou ask me what counts as tall in my country. “Well,” I say, “around here,
…” and I continue by uttering [“Feynman is tall.”] This is not a descriptive
use in the usual sense. … All I have done is given you guidance concerning
what the prevailing relevant standard for tallness happens to be in our com-
munity; in particular, that standard must be no greater than Feynman’s
maximal degree of height.5

They go on to show that individuals might disagree about this standard:

Suppose that another party to the conversation might simply object and says
“no, Feynman is not tall”. Just as the original utterance conveyed informa-
tion not about Feynman’s height but rather the appropriate usage of ‘tall’,
so too would the ensuing dispute be a matter not of factual disagreement
over Feynman’s height, but rather opposing views about the contextually
appropriate usage of ‘tall’. Barker uses ‘metalinguistic’ to refer to the type of
sharpening use at play here. Accordingly, we call the corresponding disputes
over the correctness or appropriateness of those types of usages metalinguis-
tic disputes.6

Notice that the metalinguistic dispute has normative and descriptive com-
ponents. It is normative in that it is about a norm. It is descriptive in that
there is a fact about what the current norm happens to be, that is, a fact
about what is considered “tall” in this specific country or region. Plunkett
and Sundell elaborate:

[T]here are antecedently settled facts about the linguistically relevant fea-
tures of the conversational context, facts which are at least partially indepen-
dent of the intentions—or at least the very local intentions—of the parties
to the conversation. … If a disagreement should arise over that information,

5
 Barker (2002, 1–2); quoted in Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 14).
6
 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 14).
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  207

as it does in our extension of Barker’s case, then the disagreement is a factual

one about which of two or more competing characterizations of the shared
conversational context is most accurate. However, not all cases of metalin-
guistic usage fit this profile.7

Plunkett and Sundell rightly observe  that a speaker may be wrong

about  what the prevailing norm is  or about which of several prevailing
norms happens to be the appropriate one, for the context in question.
Hence “Feynman is tall” may be a correct standard in one region  and
an incorrect standard in another. Despite the local character of the
­contextually supplied context Plunkett and Sundell are interested in, I
believe their analysis generalizes to other cases of definitional or concep-
tual disagreement.
Consider the definition of “bachelor.” Here too it is possible for indi-
viduals to disagree about what the actual linguistic norm is and there are
right and wrong answers to the question “What does ‘bachelor’ mean?”
For instance, the term “bachelor” normally denotes an unmarried man;
anyone who thought it denoted an unmarried man (or a married or
unmarried woman) would be confused. Yet, in a special but familiar con-
text, the term “bachelor” may denote something slightly different: the
unmarried man (at the bachelor party) who will soon marry. What we
seem to have, then, are two definitions of “bachelor”:

• A bachelor is an unmarried man

• A bachelor is the unmarried man who has been singled out for spe-
cial attention because he is getting married soon

The latter definition corresponds to utterances like “Where’s the bache-

lor?” (uttered at a bachelor party). At a bachelor party, there may be several
bachelors in the first sense but only one of them (typically) is the bachelor
in the second sense. It is possible to conflate the general use of “bachelor”
(to refer to an unmarried man) with the special use of “bachelor” (to refer
to the unmarried man who will marry soon). I might mistake Eli, a bach-
elor in the general sense of “bachelor,” for Ayden, the bachelor in the spe-
cial sense of the term; that is, I might apply the contextually wrong standard.
If, on the basis of employing the wrong standard, I should enter into dis-
agreement with someone who employs it in a different sense, the dispute

7
 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 14).
208  A. G. URQUIDEZ

could be easily and objectively resolved by clarifying the context of use (i.e.,
by reference to the correct contextually supplied standard).8
In the above quote, Plunkett and Sundell mentioned that not all cases
of metalinguistic  disagreement fit the profile of factual disagreement.
What they want is a case of metalinguistic disagreement that cannot be
resolved by reference to an empirical fact about prevailing social practice
(and, more specifically, the contextually established linguistic norm). To
identify a normative dispute of this sort—one that does not presuppose an
antecedently established norm—Plunkett and Sundell ask us to consider
Oscar and Callie’s exchange. These individuals are cooking chili together.
On tasting their creation, the following conversation ensues: Oscar asserts,
“That chili is spicy,” and Callie objects, “No, it’s not spicy at all.”
Plunkett and Sundell call this form of disagreement “metalinguistic
negotiation”9 to highlight the fact that antecedent facts about linguistic
practice (by themselves) cannot settle some disputes about linguistic
norms—namely, prescriptive disputes. They write:

In this case, it is much less natural to think that there is some antecedently
settled, objective fact of the matter about the contextually salient threshold
for “spiciness.” Rather than advancing competing factual claims about some
independently determined threshold, it seems most natural to think of
Oscar and Callie as negotiating what that threshold shall be.10

Hence, the following definition of metalinguistic negotiation:

We use the term metalinguistic negotiation to refer to this second type of

metalinguistic dispute—those disputes wherein the speakers’ metalinguistic
use of a term does not simply involve exchanging factual information about

8
 This point is acknowledged by Plunkett and Sundell, for their account is meant to apply
to many “context-sensitive expressions” (2013, 16).
9
 The term “metalinguistic statement” is sometimes used to signify a statement about lan-
guage. For example, “The word ‘red’ is used to signify a color that is darker than pink.” I do
not limit my use of “metalinguistic” to explicit statements about language. As Glock points
out, grammatical propositions “expressing a linguistic rule need not be a metalinguistic state-
ment about the employment of words, or contain expressions of generality. Rather, they
depend on whether an expression has a normative function on a given occasion” (1996,
324). After all, “Red is darker than pink” and “The king moves one square at a time” are not
explicitly about the words “red” and “king,” respectively, and yet they function as norms
governing the use of these terms.
10
 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15).
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  209

language, but rather negotiating its appropriate use. We think that metalin-
guistic disputes of this latter type are common. Indeed we think such usages
extend well beyond the kitchen, to disagreements about what should count
as “tall” during our basketball draft, or “cold” in our shared office, or “rich”
for our tax base. In any such case, speakers each assert true propositions, but
they express those true propositions by virtue of the fact that they set the
relevant contextual parameters in different ways.11

Might it be that many conceptual disputes about ethics, aesthetics, and other
areas of life, are disputes about terms “in search of a meaning,” as opposed
to disputes about terms that have an antecedently settled meaning?12

5.3.2  Pragmatic Advocacy
Plunkett and Sundell’s argument shows that individuals can disagree about
the correctness of a linguistic norm when no fact of the matter is at issue.
Such disputes are made possible by the set of common interests, goals, and
concerns that prompt the dispute in the first place. The term “negotia-
tion” underscores the fact that in arguing over the correct definition, a
shared set of interests, goals, and concerns sets limits on what counts as an
acceptable negotiation:

Why are such exchanges perceived as disputes, when the speakers fail to
assert inconsistent propositions? Because in addition to asserting those
propositions—in fact via their assertion of those propositions—they also
pragmatically advocate for the parameter settings by virtue of which
those propositions are asserted. The claim that one “spiciness” threshold
is preferable to some competing “spiciness” threshold is very much the
kind of thing over which two speakers can disagree.13

To “pragmatically advocate” in favor of certain “parameter settings” is to

defend a contested standard or definition on grounds of its benefit or utility

11
 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 3).
12
 This felicitous phrase is Georg Henrik von Wright’s: “Philosophic reflexion on the
grounds for calling a thing ‘x’ is challenged in situations when the grounds have not been
fixed when there is no settled opinion as to what the grounds are. The concept still remains
to be moulded and therewith its logical connexions with other concepts to be established. The
words and expressions the use of which bewilder the philosopher are so to speak in search of
a meaning” (1967, section 3).
13
 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15–16).
210  A. G. URQUIDEZ

for meeting a certain end. The idea, then, is that what contestants in the
dispute share is not a conception of the meaning of the contested term, but
the need to settle the definitional dispute via the selection of a standard. The
need at issue in Oscar and Callie’s dispute is to determine what counts as good-
tasting chili. The chili might be more enjoyable to Callie if it were “spicier”;
hence, Callie’s assertion would be an attempt to negotiate the appropriate
standard for this purpose. Now, it might be objected that since taste is subjec-
tive, there can be no objectively correct definition of “good chili.” But this
ignores the ­contextual parameters at play in their dispute. If Oscar and Callie
were making two batches of chili, they could easily make each according to
their own taste; then no dispute would arise. The dispute arises, because they
are making only one batch, and they need to arrive at a consensus about what
counts as good chili for purposes of creating the most enjoyable meal for
both individuals, given their different tastes; perhaps, the “sweet spot,” as it
were, is the middle ground which both parties can accept. There can be an
objective standard in this context if the standard is determined not by Oscar
or Callie’s subjective taste, but by their objective agreement about what
counts as good chili for this particular purpose. Each individual’s subjective
taste, however, constitutes a parameter around which negotiation occurs.
Plunkett and Sundell rightly observe that negotiable standards are
often contextualized, and their line of argumentation lends itself to
extending their analysis to more socially significant contexts. After all, the
very idea of negotiation implies that the standard of objectivity is a socially
mediated notion, since it requires consensus among two or more negotia-
tors. Consider their explanation of why the dispute over the meaning of
“spicy” is not a trivial matter:

Why would Oscar and Callie consider it worth their time to engage in such
a disagreement, when they already agree on what the chili actually tastes
like? Why engage in a dispute over how to use a word? The answer is the
same as before: it is worth engaging in such a dispute because how we use
words matters. For Oscar and Callie, as for many of us, an agreement
amongst all the cooks in the kitchen that the chili can be described as “spicy”
plays an important role in collective decision-making. In particular, it plays
an important role in decision-making about whether to add more spice. This
may have nothing at all to do with what is analytic about “spicy”. Rather, it
derives from sociological facts about how people in kitchens act when their
creations earn that label. Why should Callie have to refrain from further
seasoning when the chili cannot even be described as “spicy”?14

 Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15).

14
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  211

The significance of Oscar and Callie’s dispute is determined by the signifi-

cance of the practice of eating tasty food. This is a reminder that practices
have a point. The surroundings of the practice contribute to its justifica-
tion. Practices are internally related to the needs and the desires they satisfy.
The right kind of reason for participating in a practice bears on the need for
the practice. This point is reminiscent of Leonard Harris’s contention that
pragmatic considerations should have primacy in establishing a definition
of “racism.” Empirical considerations are significant, not as epistemic rea-
sons, but as pragmatic reasons. Empirical considerations assume a prag-
matic role in arguments for and against adopting definitions. Empirical
considerations are valuable to us because of their bearing on matters of
importance to us. In one sense, it is not necessary that any human practice
exist. Yet, we speak of what “must” be the case, what is “necessary” to
exist, and what is “needed.” The game of chess, driving in traffic, and the
legal court system do not have to exist. These are practices that we want to
exist. These are practices that, given certain ends and interests, we need to
exist. In the same way, representational practices involving racist ascriptions
are morally important and are, arguably, morally necessary. This necessity
bespeaks the need for a definition of “racism,” and hence the need for
metalinguistic negotiation over the meaning of this term.
It also bespeaks against the notion that negotiating a definition of “rac-
ism” denigrates the conceptual project of defining “racism,” that negotia-
tion somehow trivializes it by reducing the debate to one about “mere
words.” Negotiating the meaning of “racism” should not be thought to
trivialize substantive disagreement about racism. Nor should disputation
about racism be thought to be less important than factual disputation
simply because what is at issue in the former case is a convention. If con-
ventionalism about definition is correct, if disagreement about racism is
disagreement about a convention, and if the disagreement in question is a
kind of metalinguistic negotiation, then Garcia may be correct or incorrect
in observing that disputes about the proper use of “racism” are not mere
disputes about word use. He is incorrect if he assumes that normative
disagreement about word use is illegitimate and that only factual disagree-
ment is legitimate. However, his assertion can be interpreted in a way that
renders it correct. Legitimate “verbal disputes” always have an extra-­
linguistic flavor, in that they have practical ramifications. It is misleading,
for instance, to say that the dispute about chili is merely about language,
as  though the pragmatic parameters that frame it and the interests that
rationalize it and  give it its significance are not empirically mediated.
212  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Although the dispute about how best to define terms is representational,

how we represent things in the world is interwoven with the rest of our
lives. Again, the linguistic dispute about the word “chili” is interwoven
with the practice of cooking chili, with satisfying the contestants’ own
tastes and/or those of their customers, with selling chili at their restaurant
and making a living, and so on.
Because non-linguistic concerns, empirical factors, enter into the
parameter settings of metalinguistic negotiations, the negotiation process
may be  mediated by sociohistorical and intersubjective considerations.
Suppose Oscar and Callie are chefs and co-owners of the same restaurant.
They have a common interest in producing chili that will satisfy custom-
ers’ tastes but disagree about whether the chili is spicy. Their judgments
about the “spiciness” of the chili are attempts to negotiate the appropriate
level of spice for the sake of pleasing customers. Here the correctness or
incorrectness of Oscar and Callie’s judgments will depend on the demo-
graphic of the customer, on intersubjective agreement (to the extent that
it exists). This renders sociological information about customer tastes rel-
evant to the parameter settings in this case. Such information may be help-
ful and yet inconclusive, for the customer base may be a diverse population
that lacks a relatively uniform conception of spiciness. Nevertheless, once
the normative standard gets fixed, its objectivity is thereby fixed. So the
point here is that the objectivity of the norm does not necessarily entail the
most optimal standard possible, for there may be no such standard. There
may be no “final solution” in the sense of a rationally univocal and incon-
testable standard. Negotiation no more guarantees such a standard than it
guarantees a universal, immutable and transhistorical standard of “spici-
ness.” Their negotiated definition can be objective, even while being
socially and (inter)subjectively mediated, contingent, and locally specific.
The empirical and sociocultural character of a negotiated standard may
give it a kind of openness, yet it may be reasonable for all that.

5.3.3  The Need for a Stipulative Definition of “Racism”

If the dispute over defining “racism” is necessarily a matter of negotiation,
then it seems that a stipulative definition is necessary to resolve the dispute.
To better appreciate this point, it will be helpful to clarify the notion of
stipulative definition.
In ordinary language, to “lay down a definition” can mean the same as
“stipulating a definition.” For instance, “He laid down the rule” might
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  213

mean the same as “He stipulated the rule.” Both expressions are ambigu-
ous. First, they might signify the creation of a new rule; second, they
might signify the appeal to (and hence, the endorsement of) an already
existing rule.15 I highlight three important aspects of stipulative definition:

(a) In stipulating a rule the intentional decision is made by the agent to

create or modify a rule. (The agent may be an individual or group.)
(b) In stipulating a rule the agent stipulates  the content of the

rule (including its grounds of application and technique of
employment).16
(c) The stipulation of a rule entails the speaker’s endorsement of the rule.

One of the tasks of philosophy is to articulate a stipulative definition

where this would be helpful in resolving some conceptual problem or
other. When I speak of the need for theory to stipulate a definition of “rac-
ism,” I have in mind a stipulative definition that is consistent with some or
all of the above three conditions. The definition I shall “stipulate” is one
that involves the modification/revision of an existing norm. I do not think
it is necessary to construct an entirely new definition, from scratch, in
order to resolve the conceptual problems associated with the problem of
defining “racism.” (I argue this in the next chapter.) The question I would
like to consider is whether and under what conditions it is rational to

15
 Rules must be followed intentionally, but intentionally following a rule does not imply a
conscious decision to follow a rule; nor does it imply the presence of the rule in one’s mind
as one follows it. “Although rule-following presupposes a regularity in behaviour, this does
not distinguish it from natural regularities like the movement of the planets or human acts
which happen to conform to a rule unintentionally. If an agent follows a rule in Фing, the rule
must be part of his reason for Фing, and not just a cause. He must intend to follow the rule.
However, this intentionality is only virtual. He does not have to think about or consult the
rule formulation while Фing, it is only required that he would adduce it to justify or explain
his Фing” (Glock 1996, 324–325).
16
 To commit oneself to grammatical rule is simultaneously to commit oneself to a tech-
nique of application. This technique determines the range of possible applications. It follows
from this that although grammatical rules themselves may be arbitrary, their application is
not. (See Lectures 1930–32, p. 58.) The stipulation of a rule always involves, implicitly or
explicitly, the positing of an explanation of meaning (e.g., a rule-formulation) that deter-
mines the range of possible applications. It further follows from this view that, once a gram-
matical rule (an explanation of meaning) is established, what counts as the correct application
of the rule is no longer a matter of individual or collective decision, for the normative force
of the rule is given by the practice and not by the attitudes of individuals as such.
214  A. G. URQUIDEZ

stipulate a definition of “racism” in an attempt to resolve a conceptual

dispute. I suggest that it is sometimes rational to do so if the practice con-
forms to the structure of problem-­solving, that is, has something like the
following structure: one or more individuals have the need for a rule; they
deliberate about which convention would best address the need at issue;
they make a decision to institute said rule and stipulate it as the rule.
Whatever definition we arrive at in the case of racism must be defended
by reference to the need for the definition; that is, pragmatic advocacy will
prove essential to the theoretical task. The stipulation should be grounded
in the critical evaluation of ordinary usage of “racism.” Among other
things, this involves consideration of which uses ought to be eliminated,
which ought to be preserved, and which ought to have primacy over oth-
ers. Prescribing the elimination of some uses and adopting others amounts
to stipulating a definition (or a set of definitions) of “racism.” This brings
me to one of my reasons for adopting Plunkett and Sundell’s model of
disagreement-as-­metalinguistic-negotiation. Negotiation is often, though
not always, connected with the following: critical back-and-forth dialogue,
rational deliberation, giving up and getting some of what one wants from
a representational practice, conserving and revising established usage,
drawing from shared ideas and values. Among the background of (hope-
fully) shared ideas are fundamental values guiding the determination of
content (such as the norms of antiracism and to define “racism” from the
perspective of the victim), as well as conversational values, like mutual
trust, mutual respect, the presumption of good-faith criticisms, and empa-
thy. The definition I propose in Part III—that racism is racial oppression—
should be understood as a contribution to the conversation about what
racism ought to be. It is a contribution to our collective and ongoing
negotiations.
Yet, it might be objected that the practice of resolving disagreement
about racism via a stipulative definition of “racism” is irrational, unreason-
able, or confused. Garcia criticizes “purely conceptual” approaches to rac-
ism that proceed by stipulative definition. He writes:

David Theo Goldberg says that those addressing the nature of racism have
proceeded in one of two ways: “There are two basic ways to get at the mean-
ings of socially significant terms: The first is purely conceptual: to stipulate
definitions largely a priori on the basis of what the terms ought to signify…”
As for the “first way,” stipulative definitions can be useful, but not when the
term for which a meaning is stipulated is the one whose meaning one is
investigating. It would be silly merely to stipulate a meaning which we
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  215

decide a priori that the term ‘racism’ ought to have. On what could such a
normative judgment be based?17

Let us consider the two objections Garcia registers in this quote. His first
objection is that stipulative definitions are not useful “when the term for
which a meaning is stipulated is the one whose meaning one is investi-
gating.” He seems to assume that “investigating” the meaning of a term
necessarily consists in describing its current or ordinary meaning. We
have seen that this is not necessarily true. What Garcia overlooks is that
many disagreements about racism—for example, Blum and Glasgow’s,
which I discuss below—are disputes about what “racism” should mean.
It only seems “silly” to stipulate the meaning of a term that one is inves-
tigating if the aim of the investigation is to describe (in order to endorse)
its prevailing meaning. If, instead, the aim is to critically examine that
meaning, then normative analysis may well terminate in a stipulative
definition that improves upon the established definition. Garcia is, there-
fore, wrong to reject Goldberg’s “first way” of approaching socially sig-
nificant terms. Stipulating a definition can be a reasonable way of
resolving some philosophical problems. Indeed, it seems essential to
resolving disputes that require a decision.
As to the second part of Garcia’s objection, he rhetorically asks: “On
what could such a normative judgment be based?” There is a perfectly
respectable answer to Garcia’s question. The philosophical judgment to
adopt a stipulative definition of “X” could be based on pragmatic consider-
ations that address the practical problems raised by ordinary usage of “X.”
Perhaps Garcia overlooks this obvious response because he presumes that
all disputes about “what racism is” are factual disagreements. In that case,
he is guilty of overlooking philosophical problems that take on the form of
substantive prescriptive disagreement (i.e., metalinguistic negotiations).
Garcia seems to imagine that a stipulative decision would have to be
based on arbitrary fiat, or perhaps on speculation over a matter of fact.
That this is wrong, however, is evident from the fact that a definition
might be justified or unjustified by virtue of whether it fulfills the need for
which the term was coined—what Wittgenstein calls “the deep need for
the convention.” In the case of definitions of “racism” it is plausible that
the reason for inventing this term is to satisfy one or several moral needs.
Therefore, to the extent that any definition of “racism” fails to satisfy an

 Garcia (1997, 5). Garcia’s quote is from Goldberg (1992, 544).

17
216  A. G. URQUIDEZ

important moral need, it may be wise to abandon, moderately reform, or

substantially revise it. Its correctness is to be measured not by means of
epistemic justification, but by means of pragmatic justification.
I’ve now argued that conceptual disagreement about racism—disagree-
ment about the correct definition of “racism”—can be legitimately con-
ceived as a kind of metalinguistic negotiation. Or, rather, it can be
conceived as a kind of metalinguistic negotiation within the context of
moral–philosophical analysis, where the aim of analysis is to provide a phil-
osophically defensible definition for moral purposes. When philosophers
dispute “what racism is” (within this moral–philosophical context), their
proposed definitions do not provide factual information about racism;
instead, they give expression to competing representational practices and
corresponding needs. If philosophers  are attempting to negotiate what
racism ought to be, it is possible to make sense of disagreement about rac-
ism’s nature without presupposing a language-­independent entity, racism
itself, as Garcia seems to suppose we must.

5.4   Negotiation and Rationality

I have argued that it is perfectly respectable to analyze conceptual dis-
agreement as a kind of negotiation. However, to show that metalinguistic
negotiation is a respectable enterprise is not to establish, in the particular
case of conceptual disagreement about racism, that this particular
­disagreement is best construed as an instance of metalinguistic negotia-
tion. I aim to defend this contention in this section. My chief example is
the dispute between Joshua Glasgow and Lawrence Blum. These philoso-
phers disagree about whether it is racist for a high school teacher to call on
one of his students, a black Haitian student, to provide “the black perspec-
tive” to the class. I contend that their dispute is best construed as prescrip-
tive. I draw from my analysis of metalinguistic negotiation. I then extend
this analysis by applying John Kekes’ conception of rational disagreement
to their dispute.

5.4.1  Blum and Glasgow’s Disagreement

Is it racist for a teacher to call on a black student to provide “the black
perspective” to the class? This question might strike us as factual. It either
is or is not racist, depending on the correct standard. But this standard is
precisely what is in question for Blum and Glasgow. Their disagreement
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  217

about this case is predicated on a conceptual dispute concerning the nature
of racism. Glasgow, for instance, argues that because the teacher’s conduct
is racially disrespectful it should be considered racist. He starts from the
definition,  “Racism is racial disrespect.” He endorses this definition
because he thinks it is reflected  in ordinary usage.18 Blum agrees with
Glasgow that the teacher’s action is racially disrespectful, but denies that
the act is racist, because he thinks that racial disrespect is not a serious
enough racial ill to merit an ascription of racism.19 Blum, unlike Glasgow
starts from the intuition that racism is seriously morally objectionable.20
He then reasons that since virtually everything that goes wrong in the
racial domain is condemnable as racist on ordinary usage, including rela-
tively non-serious racial ills, ordinary usage must fail to convey the proper
meaning of “racism.” For Blum, to accept contemporary usage is to accept
the conflation of racial ill and racism, and he thinks there is good practical
reason for wanting to preserve this distinction; namely, preserving this
distinction allows us to preserve the moral opprobrium connoted by the
term “racism.” Said differently, condemning the teacher’s act as racist con-
tributes to the inflatedness of the concept and, consequently, diminishes
the term’s condemnatory force. For this reason, Blum advocates turning
to a more refined definition of “racism,” one that deviates from much
contemporary usage. He proposes defining the term disjunctively, “Racism
is either racial antipathy or racial inferiorization.”21
Glasgow understands his dispute with Blum to be descriptive. That is,
he thinks that he and Blum disagree about how the term “racism” is used,
rather than about how it ought to be used. As such, he takes it to be legiti-
mate for him to appeal to ordinary usage (the prevailing definition) to jus-
tify his contention that the teacher’s action is r­ acist. However, he is confused
on this point. Even if we were to concede to Glasgow that racism, on ordi-
nary usage, is racial disrespect, ordinary usage cannot be invoked  as the
standard for resolving his disagreement with Blum. For Blum’s proposed
definition (“Racism is racial inferiorization or racial antipathy”) does not
aim to capture commonsense thinking about racism. Its aim is not to
describe ordinary usage, but to prescribe what it should be. The goal of

18
 Glasgow (2009, 92).
19
 Blum (2002, 55–57).
20
 Blum (2002, 2).
21
 Blum (2002, 8).
218  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Blum’s definitional project is to resolve the set of practical problems associ-

ated with inflated usage of “racism.” And for this he thinks it best that he
develop a pragmatic argument in defense of a stipulative definition.22 Stated
differently, Blum quite self-consciously is engaged in a revisionist project,
for he thinks the prevailing concept of racism is normatively awry. His dis-
agreement with Glasgow is not descriptive, but prescriptive.23 His argu-
ment for his proposed definition is that it resolves the inflation problem,
the problem of overusage of “racism.” His theory is an attempt to provide
a pragmatic justification of the prescriptively correct use of “racism,” inde-
pendent of prevailing usage.
Glasgow, as we have said, takes it that his own conception of racism is
superior to Blum’s. This follows from the fact that he lays it down as a
standard in resolving his dispute with Blum about the teacher. His argu-
ment is that the teacher’s action is racist because it is racially disrespectful.
In advancing this argument he tacitly endorses the prevailing norm, so he
seems not to be arguing in a purely descriptive mode. If he were making a
purely descriptive point, his judgment that Blum’s assessment of the
teacher’s action is wrong would not carry normative weight. In that case
he would merely be observing that Blum’s judgment “The teacher’s act is
not racist” fails to conform to the prevailing definition of “racism.” I take
it, however, that his assertion that Blum’s assessment of the situation as
“incorrect” is meant to carry normative weight. Evaluative terms like
“wrong” and “incorrect” typically entail grounds for intervention. Hence
to call something—say, the use of a word—incorrect does not simply mean
a use that fails to conform to a standard, but a use that stands in need of
correction because it fails to conform to a standard. Glasgow, then, cannot
be said to be entering this dispute as a neutral observer. He is tacitly argu-
ing from a substantive prescriptive position, namely, a conservative posi-
tion. The norm he takes for granted is that prescriptively correct uses of
“racism” conform to the rule supplied by ordinary usage. If he were not
arguing from a conservative position, he would not be in a position to
resolve his dispute with Blum. Consequently, the most plausible reading
of their disagreement is that it is not about what the prevailing definition
of “racism” is, but about what it ought to be. Blum and Glasgow’s dis-
agreement can therefore be plausibly understood as a metalinguistic nego-

 Blum (2004, 76).

22

 This is a crude summary of my argument in “What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do” (2018).

23
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  219

tiation over the best normative definition of “racism.” It is analogous to

Oscar and Callie’s dispute about spiciness.
Metalinguistic negotiation involves advocacy on behalf of a possible lin-
guistic standard. We have thus far encountered two kinds of advocacy that
can be invoked to defend and criticize competing linguistic standards. One
approach is to follow Glasgow in appealing to a conservative strategy: one
might seek to demonstrate that the content of the actual concept should be
preserved as much as possible. The conservative might defend this strategy
by appealing to the virtue that the ordinary definition will strike most peo-
ple as “natural” since it corresponds to commonsense thinking. The upshot
of this line of argumentation is that conservative definitions have an upper
hand in disputes about what racism is that revisionist definitions must over-
come by means of special justification. A different kind of strategy is to
follow Blum in appealing to a revisionist strategy: one might seek to dem-
onstrate that the content of the prevailing concept is normatively problem-
atic; that, to invoke Blum’s example, the concept is inflated because the
concept-term is overused. Here it is incumbent upon the revisionist to
articulate the virtues of modifying much commonsense thinking, as Blum
attempts to do. That it is possible to defend and contest ordinary usage in
these ways shows that it is possible and potentially fruitful to think about
conceptual disagreement about racism as a kind of metalinguistic negotia-
tion. Garcia is thus wrong in claiming that there is something odd or mis-
guided about the idea of pragmatically advocating on behalf of competing
stipulative definitions.
It might be objected that arguing for and against a definition on prag-
matic grounds fails to preserve the integrity of reason in the deliberation
process. How can there be rational disagreement about racism when the
standard of racism is one that is determined by negotiation? Given any two
competing definitions of “racism,” if our only means of deciding between
them is to participate in a negotiation process, what aspect of this method
justifies the assertion that the selected definition is the normatively correct
one? Is the issue a mere matter of persuasion? Is it simply a matter of yelling
the loudest or delivering the most persuasive rhetoric? And what assurance
do we have that the negotiated definition is not a mere reflection of group
interests, circumstances, and power dynamics? How are we to choose
among competing norms? For example, by what rational method can we
resolve Blum and Glasgow’s definitional disagreement? Each p ­ hilosopher’s
attempt to negotiate the meaning of “racism” appeals to a definitional stan-
220  A. G. URQUIDEZ

dard that the other philosopher rejects. It is unsurprising, therefore, that

each normative proposal is met with resistance from the other side.
These considerations suggest that a comprehensive discussion of the
method of negotiation is in order. What follows is an attempt to touch on
some of these questions, while setting others aside for later chapters. Still,
others will not be addressed at all, as this is not the proper place to discuss
the literature on the nature of reason and rational disagreement. My aim
in this section is modest. I aim to motivate the notion that it is prima facie
plausible to view metalinguistic negotiation as a type of rational deliberation
process. Disagreement is rational if and only if there is a way to establish a
correct answer. For if no correct answer is possible, then there can be no
incorrect answer, either, and the disagreement proves futile. I argue that
this basic condition is satisfiable on the negotiation approach.
A salient question that needs to be addressed here is: What is the shared
need, the contextually determined purpose, that might be invoked to
establish a contextually determined standard of correctness? If we can iden-
tify the need for a definition of “racism,” we could then appeal to this stan-
dard as a basis of rational resolution. Although I do not attempt to specify
the particular standard here (see Chap. 7), I defend the rationality of the
logic of negotiation. I do so by appealing to arguments presented in John
Kekes’ essay on essentially contested concepts. My proposal is not meant
to be an iron-clad, comprehensive theory of rational disagreement. Indeed,
it is little more than my crude reflections about such a theory, reflections
that obviously require further elaboration and refinement. My hope is that
it will generate a critical discussion. My argument’s main upshot is a prima
facie plausible way of making sense of rational disagreement without the
postulation of ontological entities. Before turning to this discussion, I will
simply mention the following point: rational resolution need not be pos-
sible in every imaginable situation or context in order for the problem of
defining “racism” to be a metalinguistic negotiation. For as I’ve argued,
metalinguistic negotiations are invariably contextual, predicated on specific
needs and purposes. Hence there may not be a general answer to the ques-
tion: How should racism be conceived for moral purposes? Though I think
a general answer to this question can be given, the question I am interested
in is a more general one: What is it about the procedure or practice of
metalinguistic negotiation that makes it rational?
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  221

5.4.2  Contested Rationality
Kekes provides an account of the logic of normative disputes that I
draw on for my argument. In his “Essentially Contested Concepts: A
Reconsideration,” Kekes analyzes disputes that have the following fea-
tures: (a) they are not reducible to “public occasions upon which the
participants flaunt their prejudices”24; (b) they are not predicated on
conceptual confusion25; (c) they can go on indefinitely; and (d) they
are rational (i.e., rationally resolvable).26 Kekes’ term for concepts that
satisfy these (among other27) conditions is essentially contested concepts.28
His paper is an attempt to explain how such concepts are possible.
Roughly, the logic used in resolving disputes of this kind is that of prac-
tical problem-­solving. Kekes offers his problem-solving account of ratio-
nality as an alternative to what I call “final solutions” rationality.
A common way to think about rationality affirms that rationality is con-
cerned with final solutions. This is certainly the way many philosophers
think about rationality in relation to “solving” philosophical problems. A
final solution is an all-things-considered solution to a problem that uniquely
and definitively ends the problem, once and for all; it is the uniquely correct
solution and so reigns supreme over the various candidates. The implica-
tion, then, is that every rational person who objectively weighs the evidence
will arrive at the same solution. That is, any person who does not arrive at
this solution is mistaken and, perhaps, unreasonable. The logic of final solu-
tions rationality does not entail that d
­ isagreement will not continue. It sim-
ply entails that beyond the rational limit, to continue objecting and
disagreeing with the argument is to engage in irrational behavior, for reason

24
 Kekes (1977, 72).
25
 Kekes (1977, 75–76).
26
 Kekes (1977, 84–86).
27
 Kekes thinks that there are six necessary and sufficient conditions for essentially con-
tested concepts: “I regard the following six [conditions required for a concept to be essen-
tially contested] as necessary: first, the concept must signify a type of voluntary and
goal-directed activity; second, the concept must be used appraisively and the debate stems
from conflicting appraisals; third, the participants in the debate must share a need and a goal,
and the aim of the debate is to find the best way of satisfying the need and of achieving the
goal; hence, both the existence of the debate and its resolution are in the interest of the
participants; fourth, the type of activity signified by the concept must be internally complex;
fifth, the importance of the elements comprising the internally complex type of activity must
be variously assessable; hence the use of the concept is modifiable; sixth, the debate about the
correct use of the concept must be capable of rational resolution” (Kekes 1977, 86).
28
 The concept and term were originally introduced by Gallie (1956). Kekes presents his
analysis as a modification of and improvement on Gallie’s account.
222  A. G. URQUIDEZ

has marked the end of the dispute. Metalinguistic negotiation seems to

eschew final solutions rationality. For it entails that there is no unique way
of ending a problem. A negotiation is by definition open to any of several
answers being “correct,” for the correct answer is the one arrived at through
a conversational process of garnering consensus, and there is no a priori
formula or  predetermined route that such  a conversation must assume.
Furthermore, it is always possible that upon negotiating a solution to a
problem participants in the dispute might change their minds and overturn
the established decision (for circumstances may change, giving them reason
to re-negotiate the prevailing standard). Consequently, it is impossible to
construe any negotiated solution to a problem as a “final” solution, since
there is no guarantee that a solution cannot be revisited, questioned, changed.
Metalinguistic negotiations are contingent by virtue of their practical nature;
hence, they are subject to change.
Kekes offers a conception of rationality that rejects final solutions, for
he is concerned with establishing the possibility of rational resolution for
essentially contested concepts. These are concepts for which rational resolu-
tion can continue indefinitely. The term is somewhat misleading, since it is
ambiguous between two positions. If the term “racim” refers to a concept
the correctness of which it is always possible to contest on rational grounds,
then racism is arguably an essentially contested concept. However, to say
that the concept of racism is “essentially contested” in this sense is not to
say that it will be or must be contested. Rather, it is to say that it is essentially
open to rational contestation. The objector, then, is right that conceptual
disagreement may go on indefinitely despite the possibility of arriving at
a rational resolution. What I argue is that although rational disagreement
is always possible, this fact about many normatively contested concepts
does not undermine Kekes’ claim that such disputes—and the negotiations
people arrive at through collective deliberation—are nonetheless rational.
Kekes’ argument relies on the concept of “internal complexity.”29 The
term signifies that a practice comprises several constitutive rules that are
variously assessable. He argues that the possibility of assessing these rules
in incompatible ways provides the condition for both rational disagree-
ment and rational resolution. Consider the question: What does “winning
in basketball” consist in? Winning might be defined differently by different

29
 “By this [“internal complexity”] I mean that the activity must comprise many elements,
each of which plays a role in the performance. An element contributes to the internal com-
plexity of the activity if without it the activity could not be what it is. So internal complexity
is due to necessary, and not merely to accidental, elements involved in normal performance”
(Kekes 1977, 79).
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  223

individuals, despite the fact that every participant of the practice agrees
about all the rules (save, of course, rules about what counts as winning).30
Contestation of what it  means to “win” at basketball will, of course, be
motivated by specific interests or problems. But what makes disagreement
possible here? For Kekes, disagreement is made possible by the fact that the
practice is “internally complex”—that is, comprising several constitutive
rules that are open to various value assessments. For instance, basketball
consists of the following elements: rules about how the ball must make its
way into the basket; rules governing proper defensive techniques; rules
governing proper ball handling and passage; rules governing proper
rebounding techniques; and so on. Given this internal complexity, observ-
ers of the game can provide alternative rankings and assessments of the vari-
ous elements.31 For example, one person might rank teamwork, rebounding,
and good defense over and above scoring the highest number of points,
while another person might rank the latter element over and above every
other element. The possibility of alternative rankings is determined by a
complex system of rules which give rise to various strategies for meeting the
objectives of scoring the highest number of points while preventing the
opposing team from doing the same. Notice that although basketball has
two main objectives, they do not necessarily determine the meaning of the
terms “winner” and “winning.” The multiplicity and significance of the
rules of basketball makes the existence of incompatible ranking systems—
and hence disagreement about ranking systems—possible.32
Even if the constitutive rules of a practice are fixed/determinate, Kekes
maintains that the inflexibility of the rules does not preclude the possibility
of prescriptive disagreement. For example, it is easy to imagine how
­disagreement about the nature of basketball may be prescriptive rather
than descriptive. It is prescriptive if it is predicated on competing ranking

30
 I am not suggesting that the concept winning in basketball is normally contested. It is
not. My point is that the concept could be contested due to its internal complexity. Indeed,
there are times when the concept is contested: e.g., when a referee makes a bad call which
costs the “losing” team the game; or, when children play for fun, without keeping score, and
the team with the highest number of points claims victory.
31
 A “ranking,” as I use the term, is one of several possible evaluative hierarchies of a con-
cept’s internal elements. Consider Kekes’ fifth necessary condition: “The importance of the
elements in an internally complex activity instantiating an ECC [essentially contested con-
cept] must be variously assessible” (Kekes 1977, 80).
32
 “Modification is possible,” writes Kekes, “because various elements can be ranked in
different hierarchies. Internal complexity and the various assessibility of the elements guaran-
tee the openness of ECCs [Essentially Contested Concepts] and their openness makes the
activities modifiable” (1977, 81).
224  A. G. URQUIDEZ

systems that express or imply a prescriptive judgment of the form: This

ranking system is the normatively correct one (as in: this ranking ought to
define “winning at basketball”). After all, contestants to this dispute might
acknowledge that, according to the official rules of the NBA (or the
NCAA, etc.), the formal winner and loser of a game is determined by the
final scores of each team, and yet their dispute might persist, for theirs
need not be a dispute about what the prevailing standard of winning is,
but about what it ought to be. Two or more individuals may disagree
about who the “real” winners are if they apply different ranking systems,
for these systems function as competing criteria for determining winning
and losing (independent of which team is considered the formal winner).
What, then, makes rational resolution possible? Kekes argues that it is
the shared set of values—namely, the constitutive rules of the game—that
make resolution possible. For everyone agrees that such-and-such rules
are to be followed; hence, every participant can see the value in each rank-
ing system. But there is a further component: the practice as a whole has
a point or purpose, which every participant also values. Here I am not
referring to the internal objectives of a practice (e.g., scoring the highest
number of points), but to the point of the practice as a whole; that is to
say, to its role within a broader social context or form of life. Is the goal of
playing basketball, for instance, for participants to pass the time doing
something fun? Is it to entertain a crowd? Is it to test the athleticism and
skill set of each team? Is it to participate in a fun form of exercise? And so
on. The overall point of the practice may vary from one situation to the
next, and this point may make a substantial contribution to the pragmatic
parameter ­settings within which disagreement about “winning” and “los-
ing” takes place. Consequently, to the extent that participants agree on
these parameter settings, they share an interest in resolving the dispute.
This interest in conjunction with a high degree of agreement in practice is
the condition for rational resolution, on Kekes’ account.
Kekes’ analysis shows how the conjunction of common interest and
agreement in definition makes rational resolution possible, despite the fact
that disagreement can go on indefinitely and that there is no practice-­
independent standard of correctness. We can illustrate the model by apply-
ing it to Blum and Glasgow’s dispute. Both philosophers see the value in
the practice of classifying individual conduct as racist, because they agree
about the objective of this representational practice. The point of classify-
ing behavior as racist is to satisfy a moral need. There is a moral need to
condemn objectionable racial behavior and to hold individuals that exhibit
such behavior morally accountable for it. What gives rise to this need is the
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  225

fact that objectionable forms of racial behavior produce undesirable

results: harm, suffering, offense, inequality, and death, to name just a few.
Antecedent agreement regarding the undesirable nature of these results
establishes a shared need in condemning forms of racial conduct that pro-
duce these results  as “morally wrong.” The moral concept of racism is
predicated on this moral need, which confers upon contestants a common
interest in resolving their disagreement.
Moreover, the fact that they agree about the point of calling something
racist makes it possible for them to appreciate the argument of the oppos-
ing side. Blum appreciates that the high school teacher’s action is a kind of
racial wrong by virtue of being racially disrespectful. Glasgow likewise rec-
ognizes that not all instances of racial disrespect share the same moral
valence, for some are more morally problematic than others. In recogniz-
ing these facts, these philosophers reveal their agreement on several points,
including the following: (i) racism is a racial phenomenon and (ii) racism is
wrong and should be condemned. This agreement determines a trivial defi-
nition of the general practice in question: Racism is (a kind of)  racial
wrongdoing. Kekes argues that normative disputes about the correct mean-
ing of a term are rational inasmuch as they conform to a common, albeit
trivial, general definition such as this. The idea is that conceptual disagree-
ment about the nature of racism is predicated on agreement about the
domain that limits the number of candidates over which contestants can
disagree.  Although contestants agree about the domain, they disagree
about how to rank its constitutive elements; but it does not follow that the
ranking possibilities available to contestants are endless. Thus any of several
ranking systems might be used to characterize the domain, while many
other ranking systems will be excluded  by it. The shared domain deter-
mines which ranking systems are potential contenders that can be adopted,
as each system conforms to the same generic definition. This is a substantial
contribution to the possibility of rational agreement and disagreement.
In the case of Glasgow and Blum’s dispute, a more refined defini-
tional standard might be presupposed as a condition of their disagree-
ment. For Blum and Glasgow agree that the high school teacher’s action
is racially disrespectful and that racial disrespect is a form of racism. For
Glasgow, racial disrespect is always racist; for Blum, it is only sometimes
racist. What Blum would add is that racial disrespect must be seriously
objectionable in order to be racist. We thus have two competing defini-
tions: Racism is racial disrespect (Glasgow) and Racism is serious racial
disrespect (Blum). Glasgow calls the former Disrespect Analysis (DA), so
we might term Blum’s analysis Serious Disrespect Analysis (SDA).
226  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Arguably, then, Blum and Glasgow’s disagreement is predicated on the

shared definition, DA.  DA, in other words, can be understood as the
domain of racist phenomena over which Blum and Glasgow agree, the
condition that makes their disagreement about what precisely racism is
possible. Their disagreement thus turns on a qualification of this defini-
tion. Glasgow holds that racial disrespect is necessary and sufficient for
racism, whereas Blum holds that is necessary but not sufficient for rac-
ism. What is taken for granted in this dispute is the shared presupposi-
tion, which constrains their dispute: the possibility of defining “racism”
in this general way shows that Blum and Glasgow, by and large, agree
about the domain of racism.33 Because Blum and Glasgow’s acceptance
of something like this definition expresses a common value that reveals a
common interest in resolving their dispute, it provides a necessary con-
dition for rational resolution. For a common interest in resolving their
disagreement gives these contestants an interest in negotiating, a reason
to seek consensus.
One of the virtues of Kekes’ account of rational normative disagreement
is that it draws attention to the conceptual domain that is shared and pre-
supposed by opposing parties to that dispute. What the analysis underlines
is Wittgenstein’s insight that legitimate disagreement always rests on shared
agreement. Although scholars vehemently disagree about which end ought
to be prioritized, shared agreement consists in the fact that scholars on all
sides can see the normative importance and significance of the opposing
views. What we have, in other words, is a set of constitutive rules that are
variously assessable and, hence, can be variously ranked. All scholars agree
that “racism” signifies a racial phenomenon, that it is a term of moral
reproach, and that racism is a morally objectionable phenomenon, objec-
tions to moralized approaches to racism, notwithstanding. Rational resolu-
tion does not preclude competition among different ranking systems. To
develop an adequate prescriptive definition of “racism” it is necessary that
we argue our way toward a ranking system.

33
 For as Kekes observes: “Of course, such generalities irresistibly call forth the Socratic
questioner hiding in each philosopher. However, my point is not that these generalities
should be left unquestioned, but that they define a domain upon which the questioning must
be concentrated. The disputes and controversies have a common subject and it is that subject
that ECCs signify” (Kekes 1977, 76).
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  227

5.4.3  No Final Solutions: On Problems-to-Cope-With

Conventionalism opens the door to the possibility of pessimism concerning
the problem of definition—of deciding how best to represent things as rac-
ist. If definitions are expressions of normative standards, then they are by
their very nature action-guiding, and to adopt or recommend a definition
is to endorse or recommend living one way rather than another. The rec-
ommendation to live one way rather than another—to follow this rule
rather than that one—is teleological/purposive. The aim is to resolve,
avoid, or mitigate a certain practical problem. If, however, the practical
problem is life-encompassing, complex, and essentially unavoidable, it may
be that no representational norm will be capable of addressing every rele-
vant aspect of the problem. In that case, choosing one form of representa-
tion over another may entail that some aspects are represented while others
go unrepresented. For instance, if we choose to represent racism as serious
racial disrespect (as Blum might suggest), this may mean that relatively
“non-serious” forms of racial disrespect must go unrepresented as racist.
Another possibility is that some of what is called institutional racism will be
deemed non-racist, since not all instances of institutional racism involve
racial disrespect. Adopting one definition of “racism” over another for
moral purposes might be necessary even in the face of these limitations.
Hence a rational community may be forced to make decisions about the
best way to live and it may be that whatever decision it ultimately makes
will determine a normatively imperfect or less than ideal form of
representation.
This seemingly pessimistic way of construing the problem of racist rep-
resentation resonates with Kekes’ analysis of rational resolution:

A feature of these [practical] problems is that solving them does not

remove the problems. Solution, in this case, consists in finding a way to
cope with the situation, to develop a workable, consistent attitude; the
solution is always a modus vivendi. Most problems are not like these: nor-
mally, finding a solution leads to the disappearance of the problem. Proving
a theorem, scaling a mountain, making one’s way in a literal or metaphori-
cal maze, understanding an argument, a person, a joke, are problems only
until a solution is found. But having decided, say, that nature is neither
good nor bad, but neutral, or that a certain amount of solitude is necessary
for one’s well-­being, or that respecting other people’s dignity is often
more important than helping them, does not remove the problems that
228  A. G. URQUIDEZ

these decisions solve. The solution consists in adopting a way of coping

with them. I shall call these two kinds of problems “problems-to-cope-
with” and “problems-to-remove.”34

The problem of defining “racism” is a problem-to-cope-with rather than a

problem-to-remove, though the Kekesian language here is somewhat mis-
leading. It might be objected that racism is a problem to remove rather
than a problem to cope with. Calling racism a problem to remove signals
the hope that racism might one day come to an end, for if racism is not
inevitable there is hope that a final solution might eradicate racism. Others,
such as self-described “racial realists,”35 may be inclined to describe racism
as a problem to cope with. For these scholars believe that the prospect of
ending racism is not a real possibility but mere wishful thinking. So one
might wish to reserve the terminology of “problem to cope with” and
“problem to remove” for competing views about whether ending racism
is possible.
The debate over whether racism is a permanent feature of society is
not the proper place to locate Kekes’ terminology. To apply the Kekesian
phrase “problem to cope with” to racism is not to assert that it is impos-
sible to remove racism. A problem to cope with, for Kekes, is an existential
condition—a problem of living predicated on a set of social condi-
tions. These conditions will typically be ongoing and likely to persist in
the near future, but the Kekesian isn’t committed to their permanence or
inevitability. Problems to cope with are conditions people are “thrown
into” and so are unavoidable, insofar as the condition persists. While such
problematic conditions persist, they are problems that can only be
addressed by cultivating a consistent attitude and practice of coping.
Of course, such problems might one day go away and might one day be
removed, just as an oppressive regime might someday meet its end. But
the point is that so long as the problem endures, one is forced to address
it, and this can be done only by choosing to live a certain way. Racism,
at least for its victims, is clearly a problem to cope with in this sense.
And  as long as the problems of racial wrongdoing, injustice, and so
forth, endure, so too will the problem of racist representation endure.

34
 Kekes 1977, 87–88.
35
 I use the term “racial realist” here in connection with a particular school of critical race
theory associated with the work of Derrick Bell (1992a; 1992b). According to Bell, racial
realism is, among other things, the position that racism is a permanent feature of society. For
discussion and defense of this thesis, see Tommy Curry (2009).
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  229

As Leonard Harris reminds us: “We can, and must, decide how to treat
social wholes enduring long enough to suffer across generations. Ethnic
groups, classes, and categories such as woman, homosexual, or aborigi-
nal people, for example, have histories and forms of immiseration associ-
ated with their existence.”36

5.5   Conclusion
The preceding has been an exercise in what Alexis Burgess and Plunkett
call “conceptual ethics.”37 In light of contemporary philosophy’s “heavy
workload,” which is to say its heavy focus on descriptive projects, they write,

it may come as no surprise that comparatively little has been written on the
nature or methodology of semantic and conceptual prescriptions. As we
underscore in the present paper, however, claims about how one ought (or
would do well) to think and talk are nearly as ubiquitous in philosophy as
their descriptive counterparts, not to mention their prevalence in ordinary
discourse. For reasons to be elaborated shortly, we might call such norma-
tive and evaluative issues about representation “conceptual ethics.”38

Conceptual ethics is the field of philosophy that concerns itself with the
range of normative and evaluative issues about representational choices
and changes, such as those discussed in relation to racism. For example,
conceptual ethics concerns itself with the internalist–externalist debate
over semantic content. “The textbook externalist thinks that our social
and natural environments serve as heavy anchors, so to speak, for the
interpretation of our individual thought and talk. The internalist, by con-
trast, grants us a greater degree of conceptual autonomy.”39 What makes
this a debate within conceptual ethics is that internalism and externalism
offer competing answers to the following question: How should we think
about conceptual choice and conceptual engineering?
The issue of properly characterizing the nature of definitional disagree-
ment about racism is a problem for conceptual ethics. Analyzing defini-
tional disagreement as a kind of negotiation is one position in this field:

36
 Harris (1998, 228).
37
 Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, b).
38
 Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 1091).
39
 Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 1096).
230  A. G. URQUIDEZ

David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have argued that many normative disputes
about ostensibly first-order, object-level questions  – e.g., Is this painting
beautiful? – are in fact more plausibly understood as disagreements about
how to use language in the context at hand; negotiations about which con-
cept a word like “beautiful” will express.40 Indeed, Peter Ludlow has recently
suggested that almost all linguistic communication involves this kind of
negotiation.41 Both views hold that many such disputes are mediated prag-
matically, without ever rising to the level of overt assertion and argument,
and thus that speakers are often unaware they are effectively engaging in
conceptual ethics. If something like this story were right, then presumably
we would do better to make these disagreements explicit, address them wit-
tingly, and adjudicate them with greater care (at least when the disagree-
ments arise in the course of philosophical inquiry).

If disagreement about the meaning of “racism” is prescriptive rather than

descriptive, then the task before theory is this: What features of the con-
cept of racism and of the parameter settings within which conceptual dis-
agreement occurs are relevant for resolving the dispute? In the chapters
that follow, I take Burgess and Plunkett’s advice seriously, offering an
explicit articulation of the parameter settings that “pragmatically mediate”
the problem of definition, for moral-philosophical purposes.

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———. 1992b. Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism.
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Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m Not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race.
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 Plunkett and Sundell (2011).

40

 The authors cite Peter Ludlow’s “The Dynamic Lexicon” (unpublished manuscript).
41
 5  RE-DEFINING “DISAGREEMENT”  231

———. 2004. What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do? In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael
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———. 2013b. Conceptual Ethics II. Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1102–1110.
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———. 1999. Philosophical Analysis and the Moral Concept of Racism. Philosophy
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Urquidez, Alberto G. 2018. What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do. Journal of Value
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———. Racism as an Essentially Contested Concept. unpublished manuscript.
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Oxford: Blackwell.
 CHAPTER 6

Re-defining “Philosophical Analysis”: Not

Descriptive Analysis, or Conservatism,
but Pragmatic Revisionism

6.1   Introduction
The question “What is racism?” is a request for a definition of “racism.”
In the previous four chapters, I defended conventionalism, the view
that definitions of “racism” are mere expressions of linguistic norms.
Conventionalism implies that competing answers to the question “What
is racism?”—that is, competing definitions—are normative disputes about
linguistic representation. Language is a practice, and disputes about the
proper use of “racism” are interwoven with moral practices. Such disputes
are not factual. Definitions of “racism” are not true or false descriptions of
racism, for they are not descriptions at all. Just as the definition “Bachelors
are unmarried” is not a true or false description of bachelors but a rule of
representation, so too “Racism is racial oppression” is not a true or false
description of racism, but a rule of representation.
The normative nature of definitions of “racism” makes disagreement
about the concept difficult to resolve. For the upshot of conventionalism
is that we cannot straightforwardly turn to the social sciences to settle our
dispute. If disagreement about “what racism is” is disagreement about
which convention ought to be deployed, the proper grounds for defini-
tional justification cannot be a straightforward appeal to “the facts.” This
does not mean, of course, that empirical facts are useless. Rather, this
means that they are not the final court of appeal. Definitional justification

© The Author(s) 2020 233

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_6
234  A. G. URQUIDEZ

must be grounded in a representational need; the facts will then be

appealed to vis-à-vis this need. Empirical considerations are significant to
the degree that they are conducive to “racism’s” moral-critical function.
That being said, identifying the moral-representational need for the term
“racism” would likely be contested.
How, then, do we resolve substantive normative contestation about what
our linguistic representational need is? If we cannot appeal to “the facts,”
what standard ought we appeal to? The previous chapter showed that, as a
general matter, rational resolution of definitional disputes is possible via a
process of negotiation. Practically speaking, however, how do we resolve
representational disputes when contestation is largely about which represen-
tational needs matter or which are most important? In this chapter, I bring
some preliminary reflections to bear on these questions. The first thing to
say in this regard is that we cannot hope to resolve representational disagree-
ment apart from affirming a substantive value—whether  it be a moral or
political stance about what we want racism to be. This is necessary because
proper usage of “racism” is hotly contested—not just among scholars of
racism, but among everyday folk. The need to resolve such disagreement
makes it necessary to assume a value-­laden picture of racism. To propose a
definition of “racism” is tacitly, if not explicitly, to commit to a value—or so
I have argued in the previous chapter and continue to do so here.
Even if the goal of defining “racism” is not to resolve substantive dis-
agreement within the public domain, but within the confines of one’s own
private thinking, it is necessary to take up a normative stance. For there are
many pictures of racism on offer, and they often serve different interests.
Selecting a picture from the many currently on offer may be done more or
less reflectively or unreflectively. Philosophy is in the business of making
these normative reflections explicit. My aim in this chapter is to argue
against a common assumption among analytic philosophers. This is the
assumption that, in the debate over how best to think about racism, ordi-
nary usage should be privileged in some way or other. I call this view
conservatism, though it is important to recognize important qualifications
and subtleties, which I discuss below. The presumption of conservatism, as
I will call it, seems to be the default position in theorizing racism. This
principle holds that conservative theories are, other things equal, superior
or preferable to revisionist theories. This presumption is by no means triv-
ial, as it crucially frames one’s approach to the theory of racism.
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  235

The presumption of conservatism is a procedural norm, one that does

not provide specific content to the term “racism.” Indeed, it does not lay
down a specific moral-representational need. Instead, it lays down a pro-
cedure that sets a limit on how theorists arrive at a legitimate definition.
Nevertheless,  conservatism entails a value judgment which supports the
status quo (whatever it happens to be) and thus stands opposed to the
revisionist’s values, whatever those happen to be. Whereas conservatives
start from the value that ordinary usage is in good normative standing,
revisionists start from the value that ordinary usage is not in good norma-
tive standing. A preliminary to adopting a substantive representational
value is to assess the orientations of conservatism and revisionism. In this
chapter, I ask: Which of these positions, if any, should be adopted as the
default position? The normative framework I develop here supports an
agnostic starting point that will lay the groundwork for a prima facie
defense of a revisionist theory of racism. My agnostic contention simply
states that both conservatives and revisionists share equal burdens of
proof. They are two poles on the same normative continuum, offering
opposing answers to a common normative question (Is current usage of
“racism” normatively correct or normatively awry?). Consequently, both
approaches require positive argumentation. I call this position the pre-
sumption of agnosticism and argue that it is the appropriate default posi-
tion. I then provide arguments against the normative status of ordinary
usage. My arguments proceed from the value that theories of racism can
be assessed by reference to whether they promote white or nonwhite
interests. White-interest serving usage of the term “racism” in philosophi-
cal inquiries into racism undercuts that point of a theory of racism.
I begin, in Sect. 6.2, by clarifying our two competing approaches. I
then move on, in Sect. 6.3, to provide a general argument for the pre-
sumption of agnosticism and against the presumption of conservatism. In
Sect. 6.4, I explain how my framework might be invoked to defend the
revisionist approach. Here I focus on Lawrence Blum’s so-called inflation
or “overusage” argument; I also outline a family of political arguments
against ordinary usage. My basic argument is that ordinary usage reflects
an individualistic conception of racism, which serves white interests.
However, a political conception of racism would be more useful for those
who are called “racism’s historical victims.” Therefore, ordinary usage
should be revised to reflect a political conception of racism.
236  A. G. URQUIDEZ

6.2   Framing the Prescriptive Question

6.2.1  Descriptive and Normative Analysis

As discussed in previous chapters, following Manuel Vargas1 and Sally
Haslanger,2 I distinguish three different approaches to philosophical anal-
ysis. The primary aim of the preceding chapters has been to show that the
first of these approaches, metaphysical analysis, is misguided in the case of
racism, for the term “racism” in a philosophical definition is not the name
of an ontological entity, racism itself, as there simply is no such entity. This
leaves us with the remaining two approaches—descriptive and normative
analysis. In the previous chapter, I suggested that descriptive analysis is
incapable of resolving interesting cases of disagreement, because interest-
ing cases of disagreement are predicated on objections to ordinary usage.
I elaborate this point in what follows.
In his “Racism as Disrespect,” Joshua Glasgow develops a theory of rac-
ism that he characterizes as “descriptive.” He explains the difference between
descriptive and normative analysis in three passages, two of which are:

I don’t mean to deny that we also might want to use and unpack the term
‘racism’ in a way that deviates from ordinary usage but that serves various
pragmatic or liberating ends. But investigating what our terms refer to and
exploring what they could and should refer to are attempts to paint two differ-
ent pictures. DA [his “Disrespect Analysis”] is an analysis of the former variety.3
Perhaps we’d be better off if we reserved the term ‘racism’ for a different set
of social ills than what it currently covers; perhaps not. In either case,
though, a focus on what it currently covers is the constraint by which any
descriptive analysis must abide.4

1
 As discussed in Chap. 2, Vargas identifies different approaches to conceptual analysis:
metaphysical, diagnostic, and prescriptive: “One question is what we might call metaphysical
in the broad sense: ‘What is the nature of responsibility?’ Other questions include [the
diagnostic question]: ‘What do we think about responsibility?’ and [the prescriptive ques-
tion:] ‘What should we think about responsibility?’ In principle, we might offer different
answers to each of these questions, although they will presumably overlap in various
ways” (2005, 402).
2
 Haslanger writes: “There are at least three common ways to answer ‘What is W?’ ques-
tions: descriptive, conceptual and ameliorative” (2012, 367). Her approaches roughly map
on to Vargas’ approaches. See Chap. 2 (Sect. 2.1) for further discussion.
3
 Glasgow (2009, 93).
4
 Ibid.
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  237

Note Glasgow’s sharp distinction between descriptive and normative proj-

ects. The former, he says, aims at “investigating what our terms refer to,”
“what a term currently covers.” What it does not do is enter the unique
terrain of normative analysis, which explores “what [our terms] could and
should refer to.” Normative analysis, unlike descriptive analysis, is in the
recommendation business, for example, the recommendation of revisions to
ordinary usage to serve “various pragmatic or liberating ends.”
Given Glasgow’s sharp distinction, the descriptive analyst must not rec-
ommend revisions to ordinary usage, for doing so automatically places her
in the normative camp. This is most evident in the second passage, where
Glasgow posits a “constraint” on descriptive analysis the violation of which
defeats the theorist’s pretension to be merely describing. Violation of this
constraint entails a slide into normative analysis. We can therefore call it
the normative neutrality constraint: “[T]he constraint by which any
descriptive analysis [of ‘racism’] must abide,” says Glasgow, is “a focus on
what it [the term ‘racism’] currently covers.” This constraint ostensibly
renders Glasgow’s account of “racism” purely descriptive.5 For the descrip-
tive analyst is precluded from endorsing any standard of correct usage,
including the following normative judgments: (i) the term “racism” should
refer to what it currently refers to (conservatism); (ii) the term “racism”
should not refer to what it currently refers to (for the term should be
revised or eliminated) (revisionism); (iii) radical or novel uses of the term
“racism” should be introduced into linguistic practice (revisionism). Pure
description cannot address the question “How should the term ‘racism’ be
used?” for it restricts itself to the question “How is the term ‘racism’ used?”
As will be shown below, descriptive theories of racism fail to address the
normative concerns that prompt the philosophical question “What is rac-
ism?” For given that they are limited to what is currently said about rac-
ism, they are normatively ill equipped to grapple with normative problems.
To better see this, we need only remind ourselves that the term “racism”
is hotly contested. There is disagreement about what is and what is not
racist, as well as conceptual disagreement about what racism itself is. In
addition, there is methodological disagreement about whether, for exam-
ple, the presumption of conservatism is justified. Most theories of racism
seek to resolve disagreement at some or all of these levels. Purely d­ escriptive

5
 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is also purely descriptive  (Philosophical Investigations,
2009, §109, §124). Hence it too is governed by the normative neutrality constraint. I dis-
cuss Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy in Chap. 3.
238  A. G. URQUIDEZ

theories, however, cannot engage this broader debate. They can be indi-
rectly normatively useful—for example, in dissolving conceptual confusion
or diagnosing substantive problems with ordinary usage (say, by uncover-
ing internal inconsistencies). However, once the current concept is clari-
fied and our understanding is freed from confusion, our conceptual
disagreements remain where they are. What is more, the question of
whether theorists should start from a presumption of conserving ordinary
usage or from some other presumption remains unsettled. The only way
to resolve our conceptual and methodological disputes is to abandon pure
description. Hence, the need for prescriptive analysis.

6.2.2  Unpacking Conservatism/Revisionism
Conservatism posits a definition that purports to accommodate ordinary
usage and endorses said definition as prescriptively correct. I take the the-
ories of Anthony Appiah, Jorge Garcia, Michael Dummett, Thomas
Schmid, Paul Taylor, and, arguably, Joshua Glasgow, to be conservative in
this sense.6 Conservatives hold that a theory of racism should seek to con-
serve ordinary usage of “racism” and its cognates. Garcia gives expression
to this adequacy condition: “Among other things it should count in favor
of an understanding of racism if it does, and count against it if it does
not…conform to our everyday discourse about racism, insofar as this is
free from confusion.”7 I call this desideratum, or any modified version of
it, Ordinary Usage Condition (OUC).
Formulations of OUC typically specify two things: first, that ordinary
usage ought to be conserved (the preservationist aim); second, whether
and to what extent refinements to ordinary usage are permissible and at
what cost, if any (the reformist aim). For example, Garcia qualifies OUC
by permitting modest refinements when such changes “stand continuous
with past uses of the term ‘racism’, or involve a change of the term’s
meaning that represents a plausible transformation along reasonable lines

6
 K. Anthony Appiah, “Racisms” (1990); Jorge L.  A. Garcia, “The Heart of Racism”
(1996); Michael Dummett, “The Nature of Racism” (2004); Thomas Schmid, “The
Definition of Racism” (1996); Paul Taylor, Race: A Philosophical Introduction (2004); and
Joshua Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect” (2009). Appiah’s case is an interesting one, because
he draws from ordinary usage but does so to develop the most rational reconstruction of
racism. His approach still qualifies as conservative, because ordinary use is a constraint or
limit of his so-called rational reconstruction.
7
 Garcia (1997, 6).
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  239

of development.”8 For most philosophers of racism, the preservationist

aim is only one among several desiderata for a theory of “racism,” so it is
to be expected that competing conservative theories might prioritize
OUC differently relative to other desiderata. Consider, for example,
Glasgow’s formulation: “other things equal, the more that an analysis can
accommodate ordinary usage, the better.”9 His formulation differs from
Garcia’s in that it treats all revisions of ordinary usage as costly: “Some
defenders of rival views will perhaps see revising ordinary usage as an
acceptable by-­product of other concerns or commitments. Such moves are
understandable, but I maintain that those revisions nonetheless count as a
cost of those views.”10 In my view, it is the preservationist aim that is the
heart of conservatism. For suppose we include the reformist aim as essen-
tial to conservatism. Then any theory that endorses a definition which
purports to capture the whole of ordinary usage, without introducing any
reforms, cannot be conservative precisely because it fails to recommend
reforms. This result is counterintuitive.
The opposing view to conservatism is revisionism. Revisionism is the
desideratum that a theory of racism should revise ordinary usage of “rac-
ism” and its cognates in order to achieve some important end. Whether
that end be practical (e.g., to rehabilitate racial discourse) or ontological
(e.g., to get at the real nature of racism), the revisionist purports to have
good reasons for wanting to revise ordinary usage; which is to say, for tak-
ing ordinary usage to be problematic. Revisionists are committed to
rejecting OUC as desideratum. But this negative thesis has a positive
upshot. Revisionists prescribe that normative analysis be governed by
some standard other than the prevailing one. That is, they are committed
to three methodological claims: (i) OUC should not govern normative
analysis; (ii) a methodological standard other than OUC—call it N—
ought to govern, instead; and (iii) a definition that conforms to N entails
revisions to ordinary usage.
Charles Mills explains revisionism as the claim “that because of some
scientific discovery, or conceptual insight, or other comparable innovation

8
 Ibid.
9
 Glasgow (2009, 65). Earlier I characterized Glasgow as committed to descriptive analysis
(i.e., pure description), so it might be argued that this desideratum is not an adequacy condi-
tion for normative analysis. I argue against this contention in “What Accounts of ‘Racism’
Do” (2018).
10
 Glasgow (2009, 65; see also 80).
240  A. G. URQUIDEZ

it needs to be realized that everyday usage is misleading.”11 Revisionist

theories satisfy Manuel Vargas’ criterion of “paradigmatic revisionism”: “A
theory is for our purposes paradigmatically revisionist if it prescribes
something other than what it diagnoses. [A ‘diagnosis’ is, roughly, a
descriptive theory.] …[T]o determine whether a theory is revisionist or
not in the paradigmatic sense, we need only determine whether its diagno-
sis and prescription are the same or different.”12 One implication of Vargas’
analysis is that a theory that prescribes any changes to ordinary usage is
revisionist, independent of whether those changes constitute radical revi-
sions or modest reforms. I take Lawrence Blum and Tommie Shelby to be
proponents of paradigmatic revisionism.13
I can now frame the central question of this chapter. Drawing on prag-
matic considerations of types (i) and (ii), my chapter works its way toward
an answer to the following: Is the prevailing conservative default assump-
tion—that existing usage of “racism” and “racist” should be preferred—­
justifiable or not?14 I juxtapose the conservative view that existing usage is
the appropriate starting point for a theory of “racism” with the agnostic
view that the proper starting point is to assess the normative status of
existing usage in light of all relevant considerations. On agnosticism, the
view I defend, all substantive theories of racism posit a norm that stands in
need of justification. The normative considerations adduced in this chap-
ter are rooted in the need to resolve practical difficulties prompted by
ordinary usage. My argument is as follows:

(a) The default assumption that conserving existing usage should be

preferred is unjustified, because
(b) there is reason to doubt whether existing usage is in good norma-
tive standing, and, indeed, there is prima facie good reason to
revise existing usage.

My case against conservatism is not definitive by any means. Rather, the

definitive case is against the presumption of conservatism—the position
that the philosophical analysis of racism should start from the presumption
11
 Charles Mills (2003, 32).
12
 Manuel R. Vargas (2005, 403).
13
 Lawrence Blum, “Racism: Its Core Meaning” (2002); Tommie Shelby, “Racism,
Moralism, and Social Criticism” (2014). I take Charles Mills (2003) and Andrew Pierce
(2014) to be revisionist sympathizers.
14
 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for stating the question this way.
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  241

that ordinary usage is to be conserved. Whether the philosopher ought to

adopt this (or any other) desideratum about ordinary usage depends on
the normative status of ordinary usage. The problem of defining “racism”
is inextricably linked to a normative question. That is, “What is racism?”
invariably brings us into contact with “How should the word ‘racism’ be
used?” Among other values,  we must consider whether ordinary usage
should be conserved or revised, if only because conservatism is still a dom-
inant position in the literature. The idea, then, is to open the door to
revisionist theories, to establish a neutral playing field that invites revision-
ists to defend non-conservative definitions by providing a more compre-
hensive analysis of the normative status of ordinary usage.

6.2.3  Metaphysical and Pragmatic Considerations

Because conservatism and revisionism are prescriptive theories, they share
in common their rejection of the normative neutrality constraint.
Moreover, we have noted that conservatism is typically presumed the
proper default position. This might lead one to think that conservatism
has strong credentials. We should thus query: On the strength of what
argument do philosophers presume that conservatism is the correct default
position? What, in short, makes a theory that preserves ordinary usage
preferable to one that revises it?
One possible answer, subscribed to by some conservatives, is that ordi-
nary usage tracks racism itself. This position presupposes a distinction
between metaphysical and pragmatic considerations. Metaphysical
­considerations bear on racism’s real nature, either because they provide a
reason for believing that a certain entity exists, or because they specify the
referent of the term “racism.” Pragmatic considerations bear either (i) on
the pragmatics and communicative success of everyday usage or (ii) on the
moral and sociopolitical status of racial discourse, more generally.
Following Garcia,15 one might think that our best bet at specifying the
nature of racism is to turn to our linguistic intuitions about what we mean

15
 In “The Heart of Racism” Garcia (1996) defends a theory of racism on the grounds that
it better accommodates ordinary use than rival accounts. He has since clarified that his theory
of racism is not a purely descriptive one, but a metaphysical theory. “What we seek to discover
is what, in applying the term [“racism”], we are saying about the things to which we apply it.
To find this out in light of the origins of the term ‘racism,’ and to sort out various inconsisten-
cies and misunderstandings in the ways people use it, is the most promising path to discover-
ing what racism is” (1997, 6). See also the passage quoted in the next paragraph.
242  A. G. URQUIDEZ

by the word “racism.” This is a kind of metaphysical defense of conserva-

tism over revisionism, because the premise is that our intuitions are suit-
able for extrapolating information about racism’s nature.
Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin has recently argued that a theory of racism
ought to adopt the “pragmatic aim,” which posits that theories of racism
should be assessed according to whether they contribute to the project of
ending or mitigating racism.16 Mitchell-Yellin thus lays down a pragmatic
type (ii) consideration. His paper does not completely eschew metaphysi-
cal considerations, but is exceptional in arguing that metaphysical analysis
ought to be curbed by pragmatic constraints. Other metaphysicians may
downplay the significance of pragmatic considerations on grounds of irrel-
evance, and some argue that pragmatic considerations are potentially dis-
tortive of philosophy’s proper task. Consider, for instance, Garcia’s
objection to Glasgow’s claim that the normative approach to the defini-
tion of “racism” is a legitimate philosophical project:

[T]he [philosophical] issue is whether, given what we find racism to be, it can
sometimes be other than immoral. Such an account must answer to com-
mon sense but also, contrary to what Glasgow suggests, can and should be
used to correct (“revis[e]”) minor inconsistencies in usage and clarify cases
where we are unsure what to say. It is “useful” chiefly in illuminating reality
and extending our understanding. Its chief goal is not to advance a political
agenda (as in Haslanger), nor to guide social change (as in Blum), nor to
help craft public policy (as in Corlett). Nor, contrary to Glasgow’s insouci-
ance, is it legitimate for people deliberately to extend words beyond their
proper and recognized application simply to advance. (My italics)17

This passage expresses Garcia’s opposition to normative analysis. So it is

likely that he would reject Mitchell-Yellin’s claim that the pragmatic aim
is essential to the project of defining “racism.” He would argue, instead,
that philosophical analysis has a metaphysical but not a pragmatic aim.18

16
 Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin, “A View of Racism: 2016 and America’s Original Sin” (2018,
see 57–60). Sally Haslanger has also endorsed this position. See her “Racism, Ideology, and
Social Movements” (2017, 4).
17
 Garcia, “Racist Disrespect in Moral Theory: Dialogue With Glasgow” (2016, 229–230).
18
 This is not to say that Garcia thinks metaphysical analyses have no pragmatic value; on
the contrary, he has argued that the correct metaphysical definition of “racism” (his voli-
tional theory) has normative significance, for he thinks that only by understanding racism in
volitional terms can we hope to put an end to the problem of racism (see Garcia 1999,
18–20; and 2004, 51–55). The pragmatic significance of his theory notwithstanding, Garcia
thinks theory gets things wrong if it allows pragmatic considerations to guide it.
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  243

(Another noteworthy point that emerges from this passage is that Garcia is
a conservative, but he thinks revisions to ordinary usage may be necessary
to correct “minor inconsistencies in usage” and clarify controversial cases.)
As previously mentioned, metaphysical considerations will not play a
role in the analysis that follows, for I have previously argued that meta-
physical analysis is bankrupt. However, even if metaphysical analysis were
a legitimate philosophical project, I think there is something fundamen-
tally misguided in Garcia’s claim that only metaphysical considerations are
relevant to the philosophical analysis of racism. Metaphysicians of the
Garcian brand start from the premise that our intuitions reflect the nature
of racism. But what is the argument for this claim? The mere intuition that
ordinary usage captures racism’s essence is not an argument against the
skeptical worry (discussed in Chap. 2); for it does not establish the reli-
ability of ordinary usage. What is needed is an argument that establishes
the relevance of semantics for ontology. To my knowledge, no such argu-
ment has been provided by Garcia or anyone else.
On the face of it, it might seem plausible that, other things equal, meta-
physical considerations, which bear on the nature of racism itself, should
be privileged over pragmatic considerations. Yet, if my criticisms of meta-
physical analysis are unconvincing, metaphysical accounts of racism should
take  pragmatic considerations seriously. For metaphysical  theories often
recognize, as they should, that ontology is only one of the aims of theory.
Most seem to have practical and metaphysical aims. For example, Mitchell-
Yellin’s approach appears to be metaphysical and pragmatic. Garcia gives
us no reason to think that this sort of hybrid approach is mistaken.
Garcia’s impatience with pragmatic considerations is therefore unwar-
ranted. In this chapter, I discuss two pragmatic reasons for rejecting
the normative status of ordinary usage. There are many pragmatic consid-
erations one might propose for consideration, but I focus on the two that
are most salient in the literature; each corresponds to a different type (i)
and (ii) consideration. In Sect. 6.4, I consider whether  ordinary usage
illicitly reflects a group-interest bias. Suppose, for example, that ordinary
usage reflects a volitional conception of racism, which, it turns out, favors
the political interests of whites.19 In that case, the social function of the

19
 This is a view that one occasionally comes across in the literature. The argument for this
view typically relies on polling data. Consider a CNN poll cited by Andrew Pierce (2014,
35). The poll, conducted by Opinion Research Corporation (2006), “shows that black
Americans are more than twice as likely as white Americans to say that racism is a ‘very seri-
ous’ problem.” This may reflect the fact that whites and blacks have different conceptions of
244  A. G. URQUIDEZ

current grammar of “ ­ racism” provides a moral consideration against ordi-

nary usage—assuming, of course, that it is wrong to define this term in a
way that favors the interests of whites (i.e.,  those who have historically
perpetrated and benefited from white supremacy). A second consideration
is Blum’s argument that contemporary usage is too unstable to lend itself
to a single conception of racism. He explains that the instability of “rac-
ism” is a function of the term’s overusage in moral discourse, which con-
tributes to the deterioration of its moral-condemnatory force. Drawing on
these considerations, I argue for the relevance of non-metaphysical, prag-
matic considerations in settling the prescriptive question, in favor of revis-
ing ordinary usage.
Philosophical attitudes to ordinary usage matter for at least two rea-
sons. First, if one believes that ordinary usage of “racism” is legitimate,
perhaps because one thinks it expresses what racism really is, this will likely
function as a guiding principle in one’s theory of racism, and revisions to
ordinary usage will be viewed as suspect, costly (Glasgow), or misguided
(Garcia). This, in turn, means that revisionist theories of racism, like Blum
and Shelby’s, will be ruled out or disadvantaged from the start. Second,
attitudes toward ordinary usage are important because they may have ethi-
cal, social, and political implications. For suppose for a­ rgument’s sake that
individualistic conceptions serve the political interests of whites and insti-
tutionalist conceptions serve the interests of persons of color. Suppose
further that Garcia is right that his volitional definition best captures
everyday usage. Then one of the ramifications of Garcian conservatism is

racism. For if one views racism in intentionalist terms, racism may be thought to be on the
decline (as most persons disavow racism, view it as morally wrong, and deny that they harbor
racist attitudes). Many believe this to be the dominant view among whites. By contrast, if
most blacks tend to have an institutionalist conception of racism, then the persistence of
unjust racial inequality suggests that racism is well and alive today rather than on the decline.
A survey conducted by Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox (2012, 51–57) confirms that there
are significant differences between whites and non-whites on issues of racial discrimination
and diversity. On one interpretation of this data, the reason why whites and blacks differ in
their views about the existence of “racial discrimination” is that blacks view racial discrimina-
tion as linked to racism, whereas most whites might not make this connection. Hence it is
arguable that whites and blacks have different conceptions of racism. (I am indebted to an
anonymous reviewer for bringing the Jones and Cox survey to my attention.) For general
discussion of differences in racial attitudes, see Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s discus-
sion of racism in Racial Formation in the United States (1994, 69–76).
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  245

that the metaphysically correct approach to racism entails a political

endorsement of an individualistic conception that serves white interests.
Hence, philosophical attitudes matter for two reasons: for the scope/lim-
its of philosophical analysis and for the practical ramifications and political
interests they promote.

6.3   Agnosticism as Default Position

Is conservatism the correct default position or not? This can be reframed
as the question: Should OUC be taken as presumptively correct or not? In
this section, I consider and ultimately reject an argument for conservatism
that originated in the theory of moral responsibility.

6.3.1  Doxastic Inertia or Instability?

One argument for the presumption of conservatism which has been dis-
cussed outside the philosophy of race, is the argument from “doxastic
inertia.” Kelly McCormick attributes this argument to Vargas:

principle of conservatism: we should abandon our standing commitments only as

a last resort and, when we abandon them, there is pressure to limit the scope of
revision as much as possible. That is because widespread revision of our beliefs
will likely have a large impact on the stability of our overall doxastic commit-
ments. We greatly value the stability of these commitments, and so, in lieu of
significant pressure to revise them, they have a kind of “doxastic inertia.”20

Note that, for McCormick, the principle of conservatism is a normative

principle, for it is a claim about when it is permissible to abandon our
“standing commitments.” Furthermore, her argument for this principle
is also normative. Her argument is that revising our standing commit-
ments would likely destabilize our overall doxastic system and that it is
bad to do this; therefore, we should refrain from revising our standing
­commitments. Extending this argument to the theory of racism, the
claim would be that revising commonsense thinking about racism would
likely destabilize a valued system of doxastic belief. I will assume that this
valued system consists of our moral beliefs, and more specifically our

 Kelly McCormick’s “Revisionism” (2017, 115).

20
246  A. G. URQUIDEZ

e­valuative commitments within the racial domain. Revisions, on this

argument, should be pursued only as a matter of last resort.
Whatever the merit of this argument in the context of theorizing “moral
responsibility,” I think it fails in the context of theorizing “racism.” The
argument assumes that the term “racism” currently has a stable meaning
and that this meaning is connected to our system of doxastic beliefs in
ways that might undermine the system if revisions are introduced. This
assumption is hardly obvious and is itself part of what is in question by
raising the prescriptive question in the first place. Many ethical terms are
contested, but “racism” is heavily contested in ways that many ethical
terms are not.21 Though there are paradigm cases of racism that everyone
agrees to, there is more than one way to analyze or explain them. Take, for
example, the truism that race-based slavery is wrong. Philosophers all
agree on this point, but they disagree about why it is racist. The evidence
of incompatible usage discussed below (in my discussion of Blum) is con-
sistent with this point. Some folk call race-based slavery racist because it
involves oppression (thereby meeting an injustice criterion of racism),
while others might call it racist because it fails to respect the autonomy of
individuals (thereby meeting some individualist or disrespect criterion of
racism). More generally, we know that the term “racism” is contested
along several dimensions, including: it is disputed by scholars and ordinary
folk alike; people contest which categories of entity can be racist (whether
racism is an individual or institutional phenomenon; whether it is an atti-
tudinal or behavioral phenomenon; etc.); people contest which groups of
people can be racist, and why; and people contest whether racist phenom-
ena merit severe moral opprobrium or not, and whether racism is
always wrong.
In light of such considerations, the following rule of thumb seems cor-
rect. When a concept-term is heavily contested (with respect to its descriptive
and normative content), one of the aims of philosophical analysis is to deter-
mine whether the term has a stable object as its referent (i.e., whether the
method of pure description can be used to elucidate the nature of the putative
object). Even if one is merely concerned about the question “What is
21
 Leonard Harris has considered whether racism is an essentially contested concept. See
Harris’ “The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept?” (1998). He argues
that it is not essentially contested, but his grounds for thinking this are pragmatic. See my cri-
tique of Harris’ argument in Chap. 3. For a different kind of argument that racism is  an
essentially contested concept, see my “Racism as an Essentially Contested Concept” (unpub-
lished manuscript).
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  247

r­acism?” a precondition for settling it is that the term “racism” have a

stable meaning to begin with (as opposed to several meanings or an unsta-
ble meaning). In cases of heavy contestation, a normative theory can shed
light on whether a stable meaning exists for the theorist to conserve.
Suppose, for example, that commonsense thinking about racism is inter-
nally inconsistent, unstable, and tenuous. Then prescribing a correct use
of “racism” will establish a stable meaning by positing a consistent and
fixed definition. Furthermore, if the referent of “racism” is unstable, then
revising existing usage will likely not undermine the stability of our overall
doxastic system. On the contrary, retaining commonsense thinking about
racism might contribute to the inefficiency and instability of said system.
Hence, the presumption of preserving existing usage is unjustifiable in
cases of heavy contestation.
Something like this argument has not gone unnoticed. Consider
Shelby’s objection to Garcia:

Nowadays, as Garcia himself correctly points out, the term “racism” is so

haphazardly thrown about that it is no longer clear that we all mean, even
roughly, the same thing by it. Some even complain that the term is fast
becoming (or has long since become) a mere epithet, with strong emotive
force but little or no clear content. This doesn’t mean the concept is no lon-
ger useful, but it does suggest that we need to clearly specify its referent
before we can determine whether the relevant phenomenon is always morally
problematic. This will require some philosophical reconstruction, which may
diverge, even radically, from ordinary usage. Until such a reconstructive proj-
ect is completed, though, we should remain agnostic about whether every
instance of “racism” is immoral, for our best reconstruction may show that
many of our pretheoretic moral convictions are unfounded or inconsistent.22

What Shelby adds to the aforementioned discussion is an explanation of

the cause of doxastic instability. The explanation is that the term “racism”
is widely overused (“haphazardly thrown about”) and, as such, “it is no
longer clear that we all mean, even roughly, the same thing by it.” This
claim is not original to Shelby, as he seems to have taken it from Blum
and/or Robert Miles. Since this is an important claim for the revisionist, I
discuss it below in Sect. 6.4. For now, however, we can observe that if this
claim is justified, then conservatives owe us an argument, not merely for

 Shelby (2002, 412).

22
248  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the claim that ordinary usage tracks racism itself, but for the claim that
ordinary usage is relatively stable and unified. Without such an argument,
positing OUC in the context of prescriptive analysis begs the question
against revisionism.

6.3.2  Instability and Pragmatic Considerations

The argument that revising current usage threatens to destabilize our sys-
tem of doxastic beliefs is objectionable on another ground, as well. In order
to know the consequences of revising ordinary usage, one must know the
normative status of ordinary usage, but this cannot be known independent
of prescriptive analysis. The conservative is right to demand that the revi-
sionist provide good grounds for revising current usage; she is also right to
demand that the revisionist explain why revising ordinary usage would
likely not destabilize our doxastic system. These concessions rightly signal
the burden on the shoulders of the revisionist. But they signal the burden
on the shoulders of the conservative, also: for it must be shown that intro-
ducing revisions would (likely) cause doxastic destabilization. That is to say,
we do not yet know what costs and benefits might accrue from revising ordi-
nary usage if we have not yet carried out a philosophical analysis of ordinary
usage. The costs and benefits of revising ordinary usage are (pragmatic)
considerations the conservative must be aware of in order to advance a war-
ranted claim about what is likely to follow or not from introducing revi-
sions. But the conservative who starts from a conservative default position
has not carried out any such analysis. She simply assumes without argument
that certain negative doxastic consequences would ensue. Since, on this
starting point, we do not yet know the normative status of ordinary usage—
as this is precisely what, according to the agnostic, we ought to figure
out—starting from the conservative default position begs the question
against the revisionist. Our conservative argues as if  the destabilization
worry is not contingent upon the actual effects of revising concepts. Since
the destabilization argument assumes that destabilization would occur, it is
incumbent upon the conservative to provide the grounds for this asser-
tion.23 But once the conservative satisfies this burden, her conservative

23
 Ultimately, the worry that revising ordinary usage would destabilize our system of
doxastic beliefs amounts to an intuition, an unsubstantiated claim, that I do  not share.
There seems to be no widespread intuition about doxastic inertia. For instance, consider
Joshua Knobe and John M. Doris’ intuition in their “Responsibility” (2010): “Of course,
most plausible views will lie somewhere on the continuum between extreme conservativism
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  249

“starting point” ceases to be a default position, as the starting point is now

justified. Thus the presumption of conservatism begs the question against
the revisionist. Conservatism cannot be presumed; it must be established—
it cannot be justified by sheer stipulation.
In light of the failure of the doxastic inertia argument for the presump-
tion of conservatism, a different argument might be presented instead. It
might be argued that some of our commonsense semantic intuitions ought
to be treated as privileged, because without them it is impossible to make
sense of intelligible discourse involving the term “racism.” It is plausible,
for example, that the term must have a meaning of sorts, since otherwise
an important domain of discourse—one that intersects moral, social and
political discourses—would not exist. It seems we are forced to posit some
successful usage of the term “racism” in order to explain the fact that the
term is used to make meaningful judgments. Looked at from the perspec-
tive of speech act theory, a meaningful expression is one that can be used
to say something. And we seem to succeed in performing various illocu-
tionary acts with “racism,” such as condemnation. It seems that our ability
to perform the acts of assertion, imperative, and so on, as well as our abil-
ity to understand and engage in racial discourse, presupposes a more or
less stable grammar. But once this is granted, the objector continues, it is
plausible to argue that the grammar of this term (and hence the discursive
practices it makes possible) is justifiable on pragmatic grounds. After all,
these speech acts have pragmatic value for us. Therefore, we ought to
conserve ordinary usage of the term “racism” as much as possible.
I agree with the objector up to a point. I agree that for all the confusion
and disagreement about what racism is, and what is and what is not racist,
some assertions and discourses which invoke the term “racism” are both
meaningful and worth preserving. For example, everyone agrees about
certain paradigms of racism (e.g., “Slavery is racist”). A similar example is
that everyone but the proud racist agrees that racism is wrong, and even
she understands that her belief that racism is good is considered wrong
and racist by most competent speakers. Examples like this suggest that
some of what we say about racism is intelligible. Finally, it seems plausible
that positing the intelligibility of some of our discourse about racism seems

and extreme revisionism. On one hand, it seems unlikely that everything about our existing
practices is perfectly fine just the way it is; on the other, it seems unlikely that everything
about these practices is fundamentally flawed and in need of revision. Presumably, we shall
find that some aspects of our practices are now correct while others need to be revised”
(349).
250  A. G. URQUIDEZ

necessary in order to explain the possibility of legitimate disagreement

about racism. For otherwise our disagreement about what is racist would
be reduced to conceptual confusion, to individuals talking past one
another. Hence the word “racism” cannot be meaningless; nor is it tenable
to hold, pace the suggestion of some scholars, that the term “racism” has
become a mere epithet.
The force of these arguments should be conceded, in my view. As a
Wittgensteinian I hold that disagreement about racism presupposes a sub-
stantial amount of agreement in definitions. Nevertheless, I do not agree
that this argument succeeds in establishing a presumption in favor of con-
serving ordinary usage of “racism” as much as possible. What this argument
shows, I think, is that we should preserve some of what is called “racism”—
what I have called basic grammatical propositions in Chap. 3—for other-
wise we might destabilize the pragmatic foundations of racial discourse.
For instance, we should grant and must start from certain foundational
claims about racism: “Racism is a racial phenomenon,” “Racism is always
morally objectionable,” “Racism is manifest in history,” “Race-­based slav-
ery is racist,” “White supremacy is racist,” and so on. Such “framework
propositions,” as we might call them, set limits on an adequate theory of
racism. Taken collectively, however, they seem not to fix a stable meaning
(and referent) of “racism.” At best, they determine a vague or indetermi-
nate concept.
To better see this, we can distinguish two senses in which usage of “rac-
ism” might be said to have a meaning, or two senses in which usage of the
term “racism” might be deemed useful. First, the grammar of “racism”
might be meaningful/useful in the sense that it enables (some) thoughts
to be expressed and potentially understood by others. Second, it might be
useful in the sense that it enables the social purposes of discourse to be
achieved. I think the grammar of “racism” is useful in the first sense, but I
think it reasonable to be suspicious of how useful it is in the second sense.
Two people might use the term “racist” in a way that expresses distinct
thoughts about racism, confirming the fact that the grammar of this term
is useful in the first sense. However, these intelligible thoughts might be
incompatible; further, our speakers might be unaware of this fact if confu-
sion ensues. And confusion might ensue if the concept is vague enough so
that it is difficult to understand which thought is expressed on a given
occasion of use. The result of this interaction might be the thwarting of
the social purpose in question.
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  251

Suppose that on a given occasion of use, an individual managed to

express a thought; further, imagine that one’s purpose was to persuade
one’s conversation partner that some racial ill was wrong (by calling it rac-
ist) and to explain why it was wrong (by virtue of invoking a certain defini-
tion of “racism”). The fact that one’s usage of “racist” is stable enough to
permit the expression of an intelligible thought does not by itself guarantee
that this particular thought will be the one that others grasp or are willing
to accept. Our practices of employing this term might not be stable enough
to achieve the intended goal in using it. Furthermore, if we suppose that
mutual understanding is achieved during a conversational exchange, the
conversation might be stymied if one or more participants to the conversa-
tion reject as ungrammatical or confused another participant’s employment
of “racism.” Conversation partners might reject each other’s claims about
racism on account of subscribing to different conceptions of racism. The
nature and extent to which meaningful discourse about racism is possible
and the extent to which ordinary usage prompts conceptual confusion on
this front is a significant factor in determining whether it is pragmatically
justifiable for the purposes of social practice and communicative success.
The point here is not simply that two individuals might not know how
the other person is using “racism” on a given occasion of use. The point is
also that the concept of racism is (or might be) too vague to resolve inter-
esting cases of disagreement, because ordinary usage of “racism” permits
incompatible uses. This may be because ordinary usage is constituted by
several incompatible standards of correctness. For instance, ordinary usage
may allow us to say both that X is racist (on one ordinary usage) and X is
not racist (on some other ordinary usage). Consider the example from the
previous chapter, Glasgow and Blum’s disagreement about a particular
case. Suppose that a high school teacher calls on a black Haitian student
to provide “the black perspective” on race relations to the class. Is the
action racist? If “racism” is ordinarily used by a sufficiently large number of
people to condemn everything that is racially disrespectful, these folk may
conclude that the teacher’s action is racist. And if the term is also used by
a sufficiently large number of (different) people to condemn only those
cases that involve serious racial disrespect, then these folk may conclude
that the teacher’s action is not racist. Hence ordinary usage may be too
unstable to resolve substantive disagreement about the high school teach-
er’s action. For the disagreement would be a function of ordinary usage,
which furnishes two incompatible norms. If it is plausible, as it I think it
252  A. G. URQUIDEZ

is, that Blum and Glasgow’s definitions of “racism” reflect different seg-
ments of our linguistic community, then their dispute reflects the internal
inconsistency of ordinary usage.  In that case, Glasgow appeals to the
established  norm “Racism is racial disrespect” (call this DA) and Blum
appeals to the established norm “Racism is serious racial disrespect” (call
this SDA).24 DA and SDA are incompatible in the sense that these norms
generate incompatible judgments, like “The high school teacher’s action
is racist” (given DA) and “The high school teacher’s action is not racist”
(given SDA). Given this type of  performative incompatibility, a proper
solution to this disagreement requires a normative decision: an endorse-
ment of one or the other of these competing norms. (Or, perhaps, an
endorsement of some other competing norm.) It seems plausible that
there may be other incompatible norms, akin to DA and SDA, and that
these too may be partly constitutive of ordinary usage (e.g., the dispute
between individualists and institutionalists about the correct definition of
“racism”). I take examples like these to show that it is plausible to wonder
whether the existing concept of racism is currently too unstable to provide
the final word in resolving substantive disagreement.
If ordinary usage is unstable in the way I have suggested, then the idea
that introducing revisions to ordinary usage might destabilize ordinary
usage is dubious. On the contrary, introducing revisions to ordinary usage
might be necessary to stabilize ordinary usage. If this is correct, then not
only do doxastic inertia (destabilization) arguments fail to establish the
presumption of conservatism, but thinking through them leads to a per-
suasive instability argument against conservatism and for revisionism.
Destabilization arguments are a type of pragmatic argument, because they
attempt to justify the presumption of conservatism by reference to the
utility of retaining everyday usage. The problem for such arguments is that
any such value is called into question by vast amounts of disagreement and
conceptual confusion about racism. This creates the room needed by revi-
sionists to turn such arguments on their head. The revisionist would here
appeal to the same set of pragmatic considerations that motivated
McCormick’s argument for the presumption of conservatism. For the
instability of the term “racism” threatens to undermine our system of dox-

24
 This is a plausible interpretation of their dispute, because Glasgow subscribes to the
moral condition—the desideratum that racism is always morally objectionable, while Blum
subscribes to the serious moral condition—the desideratum that racism is always seriously
morally objectionable. For further discussion, see Chaps. 1, 5, and 7.
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  253

astic beliefs, inasmuch as our concept of racism is intricately related to

moral concepts such as racial wrongness, moral wrongness, moral responsi-
bility, and so forth. Stated differently, the pragmatic need to stabilize the
otherwise unstable concept of racism puts pressure in the direction of
revising it.
This sums up my argument for an agnostic default position.
Conservatives have the burden of establishing the utility of ordinary usage
in the second sense described above; they must show that ordinary usage
is sufficiently stable enough to meet the needs of social discourse.
Prescriptive argumentation is necessary to show that ordinary usage is suf-
ficiently stable, in the face of widespread disagreement and confusion
about racism, to resolve substantive disagreement. Revisionists have the
burden of undermining the prospects of such a virtue; or, at least, they
have the burden of showing that there are equally pressing virtues on the
side of revision. One possible strategy here, as I have outlined, is to argue
that widespread disagreement and confusion is a fundamental source of
social difficulties so drastic that revisions to ordinary usage are desirable, if
not necessary.
The presumption of agnosticism is superior to the presumption of con-
servatism because it respects the contingency of ordinary use. We know
that the meanings of words are subject to change, to evolve. Further,
it is plausible that the normative status of the ordinary use of a term is
subject to change as sociocultural conditions change. This is particularly
so with concepts that are about sociohistorical phenomena, like racism.
Sociohistorical conditions mediate and shape our needs, including the
need to introduce a new term, or modify an old one. Hence it is plausible
to think that the correct answer to the question “How should ‘racism’
be used?” is likely to evolve with changes to social conditions: as new
modes of racial inequality emerge, as racial progress is made, and so forth.
Agnosticism is consistent with this evolutionary aspect of grammar. For
agnosticism does not judge that either revisionism or conservatism is the
correct approach. Instead, it judges that the correct approach depends
on the social circumstances, on the pressing grammatical or linguistic
needs of the day, and on the prevailing linguistic practices of society. The
principle of agnosticism is thus consistent with the pragmatic nature of
grammar. The antecedent commitment to preserving existing usage not
only begs the normative question against the revisionist; it implausibly
assumes that linguistic meanings are not subject to change, as though
they were transhistorical, or eternal, essences—which is a point that even
254  A. G. URQUIDEZ

some conservatives allegedly reject.25 For only on such an assumption,

it seems to me, does it make sense to eschew the relevance of practical
considerations a priori.
The heavy contestation of a term is largely a function of empirical consid-
erations that are unpredictable and not determinable a priori. Commonsense
thinking, as we know, may be harmful and oppressive, a source of misunder-
standing and confusion, politically biased, and so on. Yet, there is no a priori
way to detect these deficiencies independent of the facts and their examina-
tion. Empirical investigation is required to identify the pertinent facts and
organize them into a prescriptive argument for or against ordinary usage.
The normative status of ordinary usage is not something one can determine
by intuition; so it should not be treated as obvious, self-evident, or know-
able independent of investigation and argumentation. For example, I dis-
cuss below the conceptual inflation of the term “racism.” Overusage of this
term is Blum’s evidence for rejecting the normative status of ordinary usage.
His empirical argument reveals some of the relevant questions it is impossi-
ble to settle independent of empirical inquiry: Does ordinary usage of “rac-
ism” promote or stymie interracial dialogue? Is ordinary usage a major
source of misunderstanding, conceptual confusion, substantive disagree-
ment, and so on? Does ordinary usage prompt categorial drift, or “racism-
or-nothing” fallacious reasoning? The answers to these questions are
contingent upon various facts—some of which may not emerge unless they
are “dug up” by empirical inquiry. Polling data might be used to confirm
deficiencies and progress in racial discourse and might additionally help
scholars identify the source/s of disagreement, and measure, more or less
precisely, how divided individuals are on the issue of racism. Blum takes a
different route, looking primarily to news stories, discussions of contempo-
rary events, and examples of public disputes about what is and what is not
racist, he identifies a wide variety of incompatible uses and other practical
difficulties emerging from current usage of “racism.”26

25
 See Garcia’s (1997, 7–10). For a defense of the claim that racism is a contingent, socio-
cultural phenomenon, see Clevis Headley, “Philosophical Analysis and the Problem of
Defining Racism” (2006).
26
 For some representative examples of Blum’s evidence in support of the inflation prob-
lem, see Sect. 6.4.1, below. There are, of course, other ways to challenge the normative status
of ordinary use, including polling data suggesting that there is no one “ordinary use” of
“racism,” because whites and non-whites use the term differently. Another line of argument
I consider below (in Sect. 6.4.2) is that ordinary usage is biased in favor of individualistic
accounts of racism.
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  255

So the proper method is to begin by looking at  data about existing

usage of the term (which bears on its stability), as opposed to presuming
(a priori) that existing usage of the term is in good normative standing.
Perhaps some may object to the merits of Blum’s empirical methodology.
It might be argued, for instance, that his “loose” methodology is too
­scattered and unsystematic to draw reliable social scientific conclusions
about the normative status of ordinary usage. Supposing we grant this
objection, it nevertheless seems that Blum is on the right track in endeav-
oring to assess the normative status of ordinary usage on empirical grounds.
Implicit in his approach is the recognition that some sort of empirical
methodology is required to address practical objections and questions
about ordinary usage. The same is true for Shelby and other philosophers’
political arguments, which I discuss below. These philosophers claim that
ordinary usage may reflect the interests of certain social groups and that
this may give us reason to revise or endorse ordinary usage. This, too,
implies that the normative status of ordinary usage cannot be determined
a priori. For the interests of particular racial groups is a contingent mat-
ter. Agnosticism is, therefore, the more reasonable default position because
it respects the fact that the justifiability or reasonableness of ordinary usage
(commonsense thinking) is contingent upon experience. The contingent
nature of experience thus seems to confirm agnosticism as the most appro-
priate starting point when assessing the conservative and revisionist debate.

6.4   Two Arguments for Revisionism

I have now argued that philosophers should start from the presumption of
agnosticism and that, consequently, OUC is a substantive normative claim
that must be argued for. Very roughly, my argument was that ordinary
usage can be shown to be problematic and that this gives us a reason to set
aside OUC until we have properly established the normative status of
ordinary usage. Adopting OUC without such argumentation betrays a
conservative bias, that is, a bias that consists of the unwarranted privileging
of conservative theories of “racism.”
My argument up to now has taken for granted that ordinary usage of
“racism” is the source of several practical problems that undermine, or at
least seriously challenge, the normative status of ordinary usage. It is now
time to provide a more proper defense of this premise. Starting from an
agnostic default position, what normative arguments lend support to a revi-
sionist theory of “racism”? I endeavor to show that Blum and Shelby’s
256  A. G. URQUIDEZ

arguments for problematizing ordinary usage undermine the positive nor-

mative standing of ordinary usage of “racism.” Blum identifies several prag-
matics problems facing contemporary usage, based on overusage of the term
“­racism.” Shelby, and others, direct our attention to several interconnected
political problems ­facing contemporary usage, which support the claim that
“racism” should be defined in non-individualistic terms. Together, their
arguments construct the following obstacle to defining “racism”: How
ought we to use the word “racism” given its current overusage (which prompts
various pragmatics problems we would like to resolve) and given our evalua-
tive starting point which is rooted in non-negotiable political values (which
may be contested and incompatible with some values expressed in ordinary
usage)? Their arguments, I contend, tilt the balance in favor of a revisionist
definition of “racism.” My thesis, then, is that (a) the default assumption
that conserving existing usage should be preferred is unjustified, because
(b) there are reasons to hold that existing usage is problematic and should
be revised.

6.4.1  Conceptual Inflation Argument

Having articulated the general structure of my prescriptive argument, I
turn to Blum’s normative critique of ordinary usage. In “Racism: Its
Core Meaning,” Blum identifies a series of problems associated with
what he calls the “conceptual inflation of racism.” This term is not origi-
nal to Blum, as it was coined by Robert Miles. In “Conceptual Inflation,”
Miles defines this term as a process “whereby the concept has been rede-
fined to refer to a wider range of phenomena,” and develops an analysis
that details the diversity in application of the term “racism” inasmuch as
it has been used to denote various ideologies, intentional practices, and
unintended processes or consequences.27 For the most part, Miles’ criti-
cal discussion of conceptual inflation is limited to scholarly usage and
select moments of political usage. By contrast, Blum’s argument is much
more general in scope, for he discusses conceptual inflation as rooted in
everyday linguistic practice. This renders his argument and approach to
inflation the more relevant source of pragmatics problems with the
term “racism.”

 Robert Miles (1989, 42).

27
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  257

The problem of conceptual inflation is the fact that, currently, in ordinary

usage, the concept of racism covers too much phenomena in its extension,
that is, more than it reasonably ought to cover. What makes conceptual infla-
tion problematic, argues Blum, is its contributing to several practical prob-
lems: (i) a deficiency in the meaning of the term “racism” (which either
consists in the term’s vagueness or indeterminacy of meaning, or in its loss
of meaning on particular occasions of use); (ii) a deficiency in the moral
force connoted by the term “racism” (that is, weakening of its condemna-
tory force); (iii) the inhibition of (inter)racial dialogue and communication,
partly due to the fact that people (especially whites) are fearful of being
called “racist” as a result of uttering the wrong thing in racial contexts; (iv)
the problem of “categorial drift” (see below); and (v) the problem of “rac-
ism-or-nothing” false dichotomous reasoning (see below). Conceptual infla-
tion is the most fundamental problem here, as it explains problems (i)-(v) (as
well as problems (vi)-(viii), introduced below). I thus begin with this notion.
Blum defends his contention that ordinary usage of “racism” is concep-
tually inflated by specifying three sources of inflation and arguing that
each contributes to one or more of the aforementioned practical prob-
lems. The three sources28 are as follows:

1. Racial moral overload—the term “racism” currently picks out mor-

ally too diverse phenomena in the racial domain (for the term picks
out everything that goes wrong in the racial domain).
2. General moral overload—the term “racism” currently picks out mor-
ally too diverse phenomena in the moral domain (for the term picks
out every form of group discrimination, oppression, or denial
of dignity).
3. Categorial undifferentiation—the term “racism” currently picks out
a categorial plurality of entities and people often fail to recognize
that different categories of racist entity carry different moral valences.
(The fallacious reasoning that moves from the premise that one cat-
egory of entity is racist to the conclusion that some other—generally
more objectionable—category of entity must be racist is called “cat-
egorial drift.”29)

 Blum (2002, 31).

28

 Blum (2002, 13–14).

29
258  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Consider the first source of inflation—what Blum simply calls “moral

overload.” In the chapter’s opening paragraph, Blum writes:

Some feel that the word [“racist”] is thrown around so much that anything
involving “race” that someone does not like is liable to castigation as “racist.”
“Is television a racist institution?” asked an article concerning the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) criticism of
prime-time network shows for having no “minority” actors in lead roles.30 A
local newspaper called certain blacks “racist” for criticizing other blacks who
supported a white over a black candidate for mayor.31 A white girl in Virginia
said that it was “racist” for an African American teacher in her school to wear
African attire.32 The Milton, Wisconsin, school board voted to retire its
“Redmen” name and logo depicting a Native American wearing a headdress,
because they had been criticized as “racist.”33 Merely mentioning someone’s
race (or racial designation), using the word “Oriental” for Asians without
recognizing its origins and its capacity for insult, or socializing only with
members of one’s own racial group are called ‘racist.’34

It is easy to see how these sorts of examples contribute to problems (i)–

(v), above. Yet it is just as easy to see how the moral overload of the word
“racism” might contribute to further practical difficulties, difficulties
which Blum does not explicitly name. I will rely on Blum’s examples (from
the quoted passage) to illustrate these additional difficulties:

(vi) ambiguous usage/conceptual misunderstanding (e.g., it’s not clear

whether black support for a white mayoral candidate is thought
to be racist because whites are, for some reason, unable or unwill-
ing to represent the interests of blacks or whether it is because
blacks have some moral duty to stand in solidarity with fel-
low blacks);
(vii) objectionable usage/conceptual confusion (e.g., a teacher’s wearing
African American attire to school is surely not racist; however, it
might be mistakenly thought to be, if wearing African attire is

30
 Bernard Weinraub (1999, A1, A14).
31
 “Black and White in Baltimore,” Indianapolis Star-News, Aug. 23, 1999 (article ID no.
19999235133, on www.Indystar.com)
32
 David K. Shipler (1997, 92).
33
 Kathleen Ostrander, “Milton Board Decides to Retire Indian Logo, Name,” Milwaukee
Journal Sentential (online, July 20, 1999).
34
 Blum (2002, 1).
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  259

confusedly thought to be a token racial expression and if deliber-

ate and overt racial expression is confusedly thought to be racist);
( viii) contested usage/disagreement about what is and what is not racist
(e.g., the lack of minority actors in lead roles on prime-time tele-
vision is undeniably racially problematic, but whether it is racist
and why that is so—if it is racist—may be legitimately disputed on
ordinary usage; that is, the allegation of racism is not obvious to
all competent speakers, but controversial).

Turning to the second source of conceptual inflation, it will be helpful

to differentiate the problem of the “moral overload” of the word “racism”
from what I above called the “general moral overload” of this word. The
difference is that the scope of the latter is broader than the scope of the
former. That is to say, whereas moral overload is restricted to the racial
domain, general moral overload extends beyond the racial domain. As
Blum explains: “Conceptual inflation and moral overload arise from
another source as well—designating as ‘racism’ any prejudice, injustice,
inferiorizing, or bigotry against human groups defined, say, by gender,
disability, sexual orientation, or nationality.”35 As an example he cites
Avishai Margalit’s definition of “racism” which identifies racism with “the
denying of dignity to any human group….” Blum then offers the follow-
ing criticism:

This inflated use of “racism” does, certainly, pay indirect tribute to racial
oppression and denial of dignity as the central form of such mistreatment in
contemporary Western consciousness; and that centrality is reflected also in
coinages such as “sexism,” “ableism” (discrimination against the disabled),
“classism,” and “heterosexism.” This proliferation of other “isms” at least
avoids the confusion wrought by Margalit’s conflating all of them with “rac-
ism” itself and discrimination, exploitation, and denials of dignity based on
race and those based on gender, sexual orientation, disability, national mem-
bership, and the like. But Margalit’s subsuming all these moral ills under
“racism” cuts off such inquiry at the starting line, and, in so doing, contrib-
utes to a counterproductive inflation of the term “racism.”36

35
 Blum (2002, 3).
36
 Blum (2002, 3).
260  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Thus Margalit’s “counterproductive” inflation of “racism” is deemed

problematic because it conflates different kinds of group wrong, such as
racism and sexism. To this criticism we can add that Margalit contributes
to the problems of conceptual misunderstanding and confusion by obscur-
ing these discrete categories.
As regards the third and final source of conceptual inflation—what I
have termed “categorial undifferentiation”—Blum introduces it thus:

We have looked at two ways that “racism” and “racist” have been concep-
tually inflated and morally overloaded, diminishing their usefulness and
forces as concepts expressing moral reproach: the tendency to apply them
to every malfeasance in the racial area, and to use them as general con-
cepts for all forms of group discrimination, oppression, or denial of dig-
nity. We are now in a position to discuss a third such devaluation of these
words, which results from their undifferentiated use in regard to very
different entities: beliefs, acts, attitudes, statements, symbols, feelings,
motives, and persons. I call this confusion “categorial drift.” For instance,
a person commits one racist act and is called “a racist,” or makes a racist
statement and is assumed to be doing so from a racist motive. Here we
have drift from one category of racism to a second, generally more objec-
tionable one.37

We see here that one common type of categorial drift involves an inference
from “S did something racist” (or “S said something racist”) to “S is a
racist person.” Another common type of example involves an inference of
the form: “Institution X involves racist agent S, so X must be a racist insti-
tution.” Thus if an institution (such as a school) involves some “bad
apples” one might mistakenly infer that the entire institution is contami-
nated with racism. Blum’s guiding idea, however, is that different catego-
ries of racist entity should be judged according to different criteria of
racism—that is, criteria suitable to that particular category of entity, which
do not automatically travel across categories. Moreover, the moral valence
of one category of racist entity may not be the same as that of other cate-
gories of racist entity. As Blum explains:

Once one moves away from the general idea of “racism” as a kind of large
undifferentiated thing, an “impersonal force,” as Bob Blauner once referred
to it, it is obvious that not all forms and instances of racism are equally hei-
nous. An act of racist violence is worse than telling a racist joke. Believing in

 Blum (2002, 13–14).

37
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  261

the human inferiority of a racial group is not as morally evil as acting on that
belief in order to deprive the group of its rights. Harboring racist feelings
that one never expresses is not as morally bad as expressing them whenever
one has the chance.38

Blum’s argument presupposes a positive thesis about the nature of racism,

which we have yet to discuss. Like many philosophers of racism, Blum
maintains that racism is always wrong. However, he goes further in main-
taining that “‘Racism’ and ‘racist’ should be reserved for certain especially
serious moral failings and violations in the area of race.”39 Blum also uses
the term “severe” (as well as “serious”) to characterize the degree of moral
force (that ought to be) connoted by the term “racism.” Blum’s judgment
is clearly normative, as it is a recommendation for patching up ordinary
usage. As such, his normative proposal might be disputed. Yet it has the
virtue of being both intuitively plausible and partly supported by the fact
that it is reflected in historical usage of the term “racism.” Blum argues
that his normative proposal has important historical roots in the evolution
of the use of this term.40
Blum’s contention that racism is essentially a “severe” or “serious”
form of racial wrong might be thought to conflict with his claim that the
moral force of the term “racism” varies from one category of entity to the
next. For example, if harboring racist feelings is “not as morally bad as
expressing them” in action and behavior, does this then imply that some
forms of racism are not severe forms of racial wrong or that some are not
seriously morally objectionable—thereby contradicting his general posi-
tion that racism as such is always seriously objectionable? Blum offers the
following reply to this objection:

But if the term “racism” carries such different moral valences in its many
manifestations, what remains of the idea that it is always a term of strong
moral opprobrium, for the reasons mentioned earlier? The answer, I think,
is that the opprobrium operates within categories of racist manifestations.
Thus racist beliefs are particularly vile types of beliefs: racist symbols, par-
ticularly vile symbols, and so forth. But the comparative vileness does not
operate across categories. Racist belief is not necessarily more objectionable
morally than harmful nonracist behavior.41

38
 Blum (2002, 29).
39
 Blum (2002, 2).
40
 See Blum (2002, 3–8 and 27–28).
41
 Blum (2002, 29).
262  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Thus there is no contradiction in observing that some instances of racist

wrongdoing are less “seriously objectionable” than other instances of non-­
racist wrongdoing of a different kind. For the severity attributed to racist
entities is relative to, and operative within, particular categories of entity.
I now turn to a discussion of problem (v), above, which Blum calls the
problem of “racism-or-nothing” reasoning.42 Like the other difficulties,
problem (v) is a function of inflated usage of “racism,” but is more specifi-
cally a function of the moral overload of “racism” (as will become evident
soon). For it stems from the following presupposition:

The moral overload assumption: Everything  in the racial domain  that is

morally wrong is racist

The “racism-or-nothing” problem consists in a fallacious form of rea-

soning that takes one of two forms.

Form 1: Some racial wrong, X, which merits moral condemnation but not
serious moral condemnation, is recognized to be wrong and so is
wrongly condemned as racist (i.e., as a serious moral offense).
Form 2: Some racial wrong, X, which merits moral condemnation, is not
condemned at all, because it is rightly recognized not to be racist.

We can use two Blumsian examples to illustrate:

[N]ot all remarks, jokes, and symbols that have a racial significance are nec-
essarily racist. Jokes that depend on a stereotype of Italians as loving pizza or
whites as a bit uptight may offend; but they are not racist. They do not
portray their targets in a degraded or seriously deficient light. The character-
ization of something as racist must be done with care, partly to avoid emo-
tionally and morally overloading a situation that does not warrant it, partly
to assure that other ills and missteps in the racial arena garner their appropri-
ate claim on our consciences, and partly to protect the severe opprobrium
that currently attaches to the epithet “racist.”43

Let J stand for the joke or stereotype that “Italians love pizza” (alterna-
tively, “Whites are bit uptight”). Then the racism-or-nothing mentality
might lead to this fallacious inference:

 See, for example, Blum (2002, 2, 29, 31).

42

 Blum (2002, 20).

43
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  263

1. Everything in the racial domain that is morally wrong is racist, and

every instance of racism is seriously morally objectionable.
2. This racially offensive joke or stereotype J is a wrong within  the
racial domain.
3. Therefore, J is racist and seriously morally objectionable.

The argument is unsound. Premise 2 is true, but premise 1 is false, accord-

ing to Blum, because its first constituent proposition (the moral overload
assumption) is false. The agent who reasons thus fails to see that J,
although morally wrong, is not seriously objectionable. Hence the source
of the problem is the moral overload assumption. Consider now an exam-
ple of  fallacious reasoning, also predicated on the racism-or-nothing
mentality:

1. Everything in the racial domain that is morally wrong is racist, and

every instance of racism is seriously morally objectionable.
2. This racially offensive joke or stereotype J is not seriously morally
objectionable.
3. Therefore, J is not racist and is not a moral wrong in the racial domain.

Premise 2 is again true and premise 1 false, according to Blum. Here the
agent’s reasoning fails to appreciate that just because J is not racist doesn’t
mean that J is not morally objectionable. That is, the agent fails to see that
some wrongs in the racial domain are worth condemning even if they are
not racist. So, whether in forms 1 or 2 “racism-or-nothing” reasoning
involves a false dichotomy that overlooks a third possibility. The moral
overload assumption is misguided because it conflates moral wrongness
(in the racial domain) with racism. That is, it conflates racial wrong with
racism. The corrective to such reasoning is embracing the truism: Not
everything that is morally wrong in the racial domain is racist. Some racial
ills may be wrong and yet not racist.
We have now identified eight distinct pragmatics problems associated
with ordinary usage of the term “racism.” These practical difficulties are
internal to ordinary usage—that is, to the current content of the term—
inasmuch as they are prompted by everyday linguistic practice. We have seen
that these difficulties arise from three sources of conceptual inflation—
racial moral overload, general moral overload, and categorial undifferentia-
tion. I thus conclude that, currently, ordinary usage of “racism” is
normatively problematic. That is, Blum’s arguments give us reason to think
264  A. G. URQUIDEZ

that the way the term is currently used is not the way it ought to be used.
This, in turn, gives us good prima facie reason to think that we would do
well to revise the meaning of “racism.” Moreover, these problems, especially
problems (vi) and (viii)—the problems of ambiguity and contestation—give
us good reason to think that the current referent of “racism” is too unstable
to lend itself to monistic analysis (one that accommodates all and only those
things that are called “racist,” on ordinary usage). In particular, the moral
threshold for something’s counting as racist seems hotly contested. If these
problems do not undermine the moral purposes of racial discourse, they
make it extremely difficult to achieve them.
Normative analysis seems necessary, then, not merely to fix the referent
of “racism,” but to ensure that the process by which the referent is fixed is
morally justifiable. For instance, we do not merely want to settle on a defi-
nition of “racism” that resolves the problem of inflation. We can easily do
that by stipulating a simple, arbitrary, consistent definition. What we want,
however, is to solve the problem in a responsible manner. We need to
ensure that whatever definition we posit satisfies the various needs we have
for condemning things as racist. This will become more evident as we turn
to the political critique of ordinary use. The objection here is not that
ordinary use is too unstable to fix the referent of “racism,” but that
(some?) of it promotes a certain conception of racism that attends to the
wrong set of needs and promotes the wrong set of practical interests.

6.4.2  Political Morality Argument

In this section, I will mention some political worries and objections to
ordinary usage. That is, I will not provide details or empirical evidence in
support of them. For my aim is merely to illustrate how such political
arguments might be developed in an argument against the normative sta-
tus of ordinary usage.
In his paper “Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism,” Shelby agrees
with Blum that the terms “racist” and “racism” are overused; indeed, he
agrees that these terms no longer have a determinate meaning in everyday
life. Nevertheless he argues that, from a pragmatic point of view, philoso-
phers should favor an approach that assigns less weight to how the term
“racism” is used in everyday life.44 The problem of rehabilitating ordinary
usage (in an effort to facilitate racial comity) is a relatively insignificant

 Tommie Shelby, “Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism” (2014, 59).

44
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  265

practical concern compared to a much more pressing political matter.

Without rejecting Blum’s arguments, Shelby rejects the priority Blum
assigns to the aim of repairing interracial dialogue. He writes: “The con-
versation-stopper problem that Blum highlights should be taken seriously.
But solving or mitigating that problem does not require us to accept a
narrow-scope conception of racism.”45

[I]t would be just as reasonable, from a pragmatic point of view, to define

the scope of “racism” by focusing on those race-related ills that have the
greatest consequences for the liberty, material life prospects, and self-respect
of individuals. It is no doubt because of these urgent practical concerns that
many African Americans insist that racism be understood (primarily) as a
system of oppression rather than (strictly) in terms of individual prejudice.
For example, in their influential book Black Power, Stokely Carmichael and
Charles V. Hamilton (1967) famously urged that we shift our critical eye
away from identifying racist individuals and toward understanding the sub-
tle dynamics of institutional racism. They recognized that overt expressions
of personal bigotry were becoming less common but that Blacks and other
racial minorities in the United States were still oppressed. They wanted a
conception of racism that focused squarely on the unfair burdens that racial
minorities were being forced to carry, regarding individual prejudice, what-
ever its normative valence from the standpoint of personal morality, as much
less practically significant. Antiracist considerations such as these suggest
placing questions of social justice at the center of accounts of racism, where
the focus is on whether the major institutions of social life treat all individu-
als justly regardless of their race.46

Shelby is not alone in questioning ordinary usage. Consider, for instance,

Andrew Pierce’s distinct but  related objection to Glasgow’s ordinary
usage condition:

Worse yet, deferring to the ordinary usage of a morally and politically loaded
term like racism can actually discourage using the term in non-typical ways
that nonetheless might illuminate important features of social reality, like
the existence of unjust, systematic racial disadvantage. In fact, I think this is
precisely the problem with standard accounts of racism, which typically do
reflect the way the term is ordinarily used, a use that is deeply connected to
the individual, agent-based view, and therefore makes it difficult to r­ ecognize

45
 Shelby (2014, 62).
46
 Shelby (2014, 61–2).
266  A. G. URQUIDEZ

forms of racism that don’t readily correspond to individual moral failings. In

describing institutions that systematically disadvantage some racial groups as
“racist,” I am admittedly parting with some forms of ordinary usage, but
this is because those forms are an impediment to recognizing some of the
most harmful instances of racial disadvantage.47

Given that the logic of individual agency fails to map on to what Pierce
calls “institutional agency,” he concludes that we should move away from
an individualist conception of racism. Thus, if Shelby and Pierce are cor-
rect, deviating from ordinary usage, given a pragmatic or moral perspec-
tive, proves to be a virtue for moral theory, rather than a vice.
Clevis Headley similarly worries about the individualistic focus of much
contemporary usage of the term “racism”:

Most individuals in mainstream society can complacently claim to have no

hatred for or hold any ill-will toward blacks and, hence, say they are not rac-
ist. Now, all the while many, if not most, blacks still find themselves unable
to secure adequate housing, meaningful employment, good education, and
equal access to health care. We are confronted by the situation where most
members of society confess their commitment to formal universal principles
of justice and equality, yet there remains persistent racial subordination.48

Headley emphasizes the intentionality that underwrites much contempo-

rary usage. He thus follows a long line of scholars in arguing that ordinary
usage permits whites to espouse “their commitment to formal principles
of justice and equality” while opposing race-conscious policies that are
arguably necessary to bring about racial justice.49 Shelby explains how the
principle of race-neutrality or colorblindness contributes to racial injustice:

According to this principle [of colorblindness] a person’s race should never

be a consideration in determining how government institutions treat him or

47
 Pierce (2014, 35).
48
 Headley, “Philosophical Analysis and the Problem of Defining Racism: A Critique
(2006, 11).
49
 See, for example, George Lipsitz’s “The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized
Social Democracy and the ‘White’ Problem in American Studies” (1995).  For systematic
discussion of the various ways that appeals to the values of colorblindness and liberalism are
used to rationalize existing racial inequality, see Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without
Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States
(2006).
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  267

her, even if the proposed race-conscious policy is designed to promote some

otherwise worthy social goal, such as reducing occurrences of racial dis-
crimination, creating greater racial integration, or attenuating the legacy of
racial exclusion. Most Whites have a material stake in treating colorblindness
as an absolute moral principle, for in viewing it thusly redistributive mea-
sures that would be costly to them can be regarded not only as bad policy—
that is, as unwise, ineffective, or inefficient—but as unjust.50

It is not difficult to see how such considerations might be brought to

bear on the normative status of ordinary usage. If most whites use the term
“racism” in a way that limits racism to instances of individual wrongdo-
ing—to the detriment of uses that are more sociopolitically significant to
the interests of historical victims of racial prejudice and ­discrimination—
and if the term is ordinarily used to condemn race-conscious, corrective
policies (like affirmative action or reparations) as a matter of principle, then
it is arguably the case that ordinary usage of the term “racism” is morally
objectionable. Policies that might otherwise have a fighting chance at clos-
ing the gap on racial inequality are condemned as racist by whites who tout
a colorblind ideal to protect their white privilege. The white counterargu-
ment is that policies like affirmative action are wrong (or racist) because
they discriminate on the basis of race. For Shelby, the colorblind commit-
ment of many whites is not accidental, for its material basis is sociopoliti-
cal—it serves white interests. Whites as a group benefit from this social and
linguistic norm which has it that race talk—particularly race talk that seeks
to correct ongoing racial inequalities—is wrong. Shelby thus concludes:

I raise this issue to express general doubts about the common-sense morality
of race in the “postracial” era. In particular, I want to urge caution about
how we use the public discourse about race—an often self-serving, deeply
dishonest, and conflict-ridden discourse—in our philosophical analyses of
racism. Racial common sense, whether rooted in the sensibilities of domi-
nant groups or subordinate ones, should not determine the conclusions of
systematic theory, and generalizations about what “we” mean by “racism”
should be viewed with skepticism.51

Summing up the upshot of Blum, Shelby, Pierce, and Headley’s argu-

ments, we can extract two practical objections to existing usage of “racism.”

 Shelby (2014, 62).

50

 Shelby (2014, 62–3).

51
268  A. G. URQUIDEZ

The first is the set of problems stemming from overusage or conceptual infla-
tion—including the “conversation-stopper problem” Shelby mentions. The
second problem—and the more pressing one, from Shelby’s p ­ erspective—is
a problem of political morality. Ordinary usage of the term “racism” exac-
erbates oppressive racial disparities and inequalities by identifying racism
with individual wrongdoing and the standard of colorblindness. A philo-
sophical definition of the term “racism,” according to Shelby, ought to be a
moral-political tool for individuals concerned with racial justice. However,
a prevailing definition of “racism” currently reflects the material interests of
whites who use it in connection with issues of personal morality, making this
a favored tool of the opposition. By emphasizing personal racism, ordinary
usage distracts more than helps—for example, a focus on personal morality
feeds into debates about identity politics and political correctness, as Linda
Martin Alcoff has argued.52 Following Shelby and Headley, there is arguably
a case to be made that if one truly values social justice, then one ought to
question the normative status of ordinary usage.
In short: If ordinary usage of the term “racism” prompts significant
practical problems—for instance, if the “race talk” that is required to ade-
quately address the most pressing problems of race today is inhibited by
inflated and white-interest-serving usage—then the prescriptive question
“How should ‘racism’ be used?” cannot be properly answered by mere
reference to what is called “racism,” since ordinary usage (commonsense
thinking about racism) is part of the problem.

6.5   Conclusion
How do the above criticisms bear on the destabilization of “racism”? The
political objections to ordinary usage we’ve considered suggest that ordi-
nary usage is politically skewed toward white interests, that ordinary usage
promotes an objectionable political agenda. These arguments do not seek
to show that ordinary usage is unstable (though they arguably presuppose
that it is). Blum’s argument, by contrast, shows that the meaning of “rac-
ism” is so inflated that ordinary usage allows us to call virtually everything
that goes wrong in the racial domain racist. Hence, although both argu-
ments suggest that the presumption of conservatism is misguided, only
Blum’s argument speaks directly to the instability of ordinary usage.

52
 Alcoff’s Visible Identities (2006) provides a helpful survey of social scientific literature on
the role of racial discourse in identity politics disputes. She argues that what are in fact legiti-
mate racial concerns are castigated as “identity politics” rhetoric.
 6  RE-DEFINING “PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS”  269

Ultimately, both sets of arguments are complementary by virtue of provid-

ing distinct  normative considerations that support the decision to start
from the presumption of agnosticism.
Taken together, these arguments provide a prima facie case for the supe-
riority of revisionism over conservatism. Adopting revisionism as the correct
normative approach, however, does not imply that no aspects of ordinary
usage are worth preserving. Rather, it implies that we need an ideal other
than OUC to guide us. Moreover, we have seen that there are no good
independent arguments for OUC and that conservatives simply proceed on
the unwarranted assumption that conserving-ordinary-usage-­for-its-own-
sake is prima facie plausible or obvious. In the next chapter, I defend a sub-
stantive normative ideal  that I take to be consistent with the revisionist
approach. This is the ideal of defining “racism” from the perspective of the
historical victims of racial prejudice, discrimination, and the like.
The tentative or prima facie argument I have laid out for revisionism—
and thus for the rejection of OUC—can be summarily presented as follows:

1. Ordinary usage of “racism” prompts significant practical difficulties

(like conceptual inflation, conceptual misunderstanding, conceptual
confusion, disagreement about what is racist, and so on), though
such difficulties might be averted by revising ordinary usage.
2. If ordinary usage of “racism” prompts significant practical difficul-
ties that might be averted by revising ordinary usage, then this fact
counts as a mark against the normative status of ordinary usage and
so counts as a reason for revising ordinary usage (hence for
rejecting OUC).
3. Therefore, the fact that ordinary usage of “racism” prompts signifi-
cant practical difficulties counts as a mark against the normative sta-
tus of ordinary usage and so counts as a reason for revising ordinary
usage (hence for rejecting OUC).

Prima facie evidence for both premises was provided, though my case is
defeasible. Clearly, a more thorough accounting of the social and political
dynamics involved in the practice of ordinary usage might reveal addi-
tional considerations relevant to its normative status. Finally, I will leave it
to others to more thoroughly investigate the various normative critiques
of ordinary usage we have considered. What I have sought to provide is a
plausible prima face case against conservatism for purposes of u­ ndermining
270  A. G. URQUIDEZ

the conservative default position. Moreover, I hope to have shown that

something along the lines of premise 2 of the above argument should be
adopted as an adequacy condition for a prescriptive theory of “racism.”
That is, premise 2 can be viewed as a partial answer to the methodological
question “Given an agnostic default position, how should we decide
between conservatism and revisionism?”
The preceding argument underscores the importance of justifying sub-
stantive adequacy conditions, such as OUC.  I will attempt to defend a
desideratum consistent with revisionism in the next chapter.

Acknowledgments  This chapter is a modified version of “A Revisionist Theory of

‘Racism’: Rejecting the Presumption of Conservatism,” forthcoming in Journal of
Social Philosophy.

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 PART III

Toward a Prescriptive Theory

of Racism
 CHAPTER 7

Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive

Theory of Racism: Toward an
Oppression-Centered Account

7.1   Introduction
If the argument that’s unfolded in preceding chapters is sound, the philo-
sophical question “What is racism?” is best viewed as the expression of a
grammatical need, one that has an important practical dimension. The
concept of racism is hotly contested and different groups have different
interests for its use. Political contestation (perhaps in conjunction with
other factors) means that the ordinary concept  racism is constituted by
multiple representational norms, some of which are incompatible in the
sense that they generate incompatible judgments. For this reason, the phi-
losopher must pragmatically advocate for revisions that will introduce an
internally consistent set of norms. Negotiation of the grammar of racism,
at least in some contexts or occasions, seems a promising way forward, for
a definition that is not followed by the relevant community is at best a pos-
sible rule. Negotiation, in order to be successful, must be realized in prac-
tice.1 In this chapter I present my case for three adequacy criteria for a
prescriptive theory of racism.

1
 The metalinguistic negotiation I envision is not the result of a single conversation. Nor is
it one that will come out of a voting committee at a session of the American Philosophical
Association. It is naïve for any scholar to believe herself unique in possessing the magic sauce
that will transform her peers into proponents of her doctrine. Scholarly consensus will likely
be achieved, if at all, the old fashioned way—over a course of many years, with scholars argu-
ing back and forth, making some converts here and there, modifying one’s own views,

© The Author(s) 2020 275

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_7
276  A. G. URQUIDEZ

In the course of arguing for certain adequacy criteria, I provide a sketch

of a definition of “racism” that I take to satisfy my criteria. My reason for
including an account of racism in a chapter that aims to develop prescrip-
tive criteria for an account of racism is as follows: my criteria are generated
a priori, from the same source that inspires my account of racism. Said
differently, after much effort, I came to discover that I would not be able
to discuss my criteria for a theory of racism without simultaneously pre-
supposing a definition of “racism.” Thus it is reasonable to read this chap-
ter as a rationalization of my proposed definition, as a discussion of the
considerations that weighed with me in grappling with my puzzlement
about how best to define the term. My proposed definition is essentialist
in some sense of the term, but not in an ontological sense. It is not an
account of “what racism is,” if by that is meant a true description of reality.
For, as I’ve argued, the philosophical question “What is racism?” is equiva-
lent to the question “How should ‘racism’ be used for moral-­
representational purposes?” It is not a request for a description of racism,
but a rule for representing things as racist. To orient the discussion, I start
from the following non-negotiable value judgment (which I develop

et cetera. This is a communal rather than an individual effort. However, we must distinguish
negotiation among philosophers or scholars of racism and negotiation of “racism” in the
wider moral community. Making converts in the latter domain may seem even less realistic,
largely because political prejudices tend to be more prevalent and less constrained by rational
norms (not everyone argues in good faith, for example). What, then, is the value of negotia-
tion if it is unachievable? The criticism rests on a questionable assumption. It assumes that
wide-scope consensus within the entire moral community is necessary if the notion of negotia-
tion is to have a place in moral and political discourse. As I argue in Chap. 9, however, most
consequential decisions do not require unanimous agreement within the entire community.
Where unanimous agreement is required, it may only be required for a subset of the larger
community.   Moreover, it is usually not agreement about definitions that is essential, but
agreement about policy. A social critic brings her conceptions (and hence, her arguments for
these conceptions) to relevant political discussions. Clearly, agreement in definitions may be
important to achieving her political ends, but the way in which these conceptions inform her
arguments for substantive policy proposals may be more important to achieving her political
ends than convincing others to adopt her particular definition. Similarly for the academic. The
hope of a book like mine is that its ideas will make a contribution to the ongoing discussion
about “what racism is.” As scholars, despite our knowing that our ideas may never become
adopted by our peers, we continue to write and defend them. This is analogous to the struggle
for social justice. One struggles with the hope that with time, and with more articulate pro-
ponents of one’s views, and with…, one’s ideas will catch on. I take this to be related to what
Shelby calls the role of the “social critic”—that is, one who develops conceptions that directly
and indirectly inform public policy issues, strategic planning, and the like.
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  277

below): a theory of racism should provide a definition (along with other con-
ceptual resources) in service of an anti-racist agenda.
I propose three all-things-considered criteria for any satisfactory theory
of racism. I first state the desiderata in generic fashion, then elaborate and
qualify each in the sections that follow:

The moral condition: a moralist definition of “racism” should accommo-

date usage of the term (whether ordinary, scholarly, or novel) that satis-
fies a legitimate moral need for the corresponding linguistic convention.
Legitimacy is to be determined by establishing an analogue to paradig-
matic cases that are furnished by historical usage. (It should thus accom-
modate usage that corresponds to the needs of historical victims of
racial oppression; hence why I argue the political morality approach is
superior to the personal morality approach.)
The explanatory condition: as much as possible, a moralist definition should
strive to explain forms of racism in terms of more basic forms, for exam-
ple, by showing that the latter are the causes of the former (I argue that
individualistic forms of racism should be explained in terms of structur-
alist and institutionalist forms of racism.)
The resolution/ameliorative condition: as much as possible, a moralist defi-
nition of “racism” should resolve or mitigate practical problems (includ-
ing pragmatics and moral-political problems) prompted by ordinary
usage, and should avoid generating any practical problems of its own.
(I take this condition to be of secondary importance, relative to the
other criteria.)

I begin, in Sect. 7.2, by defending the moral condition. My account is,

from beginning to end, moralist in the sense described in that section. I
clarify what I mean by “moral” and “legitimate” in the expression “legiti-
mate moral need,” and reply to the objection that moralist accounts are
inherently biased. In Sect. 7.3, I elaborate and defend the explanatory
condition (though see my application of it in the next chapter for illustra-
tion). In Sect. 7.4, I turn to the resolution condition. Here I briefly
address the moral and pragmatics problems that are prompted by ordi-
nary usage.
Before moving on, I should note that my adequacy criteria are not
designed to govern social scientific work on racism, for they are criteria for
theories of moral representation. Perhaps, they probably ought not be
implemented in many social scientific projects, since much social scientific
278  A. G. URQUIDEZ

work has a descriptive rather than a moralist aim. To take this a step fur-
ther, it is not my position that the concept of racism is only a moral con-
cept; it is also social and political. As a complex phenomenon it should be
studied from multiple perspectives and employed for different purposes.

7.2   The Moral Condition

Below I argue that the concept of racism is and ought to be amenable to
revision. But this limit does not hold for every feature of the concept.
Some features should be permanent, held with unwavering commitment.
One of these non-negotiable features is that racism is bad (seriously mor-
ally objectionable). Another is that racism is a sociocultural concept (see
below; also, Chaps. 1 and 2). In this section, I defend the claim that racism
is unjustifiable and seriously objectionable. This is the heart of what I call
the moral condition, which states that prescriptive theory should define
the term “racism” by reference to a legitimate moral need. The questions
I address in this section are:  What counts as a legitimate moral need?
What  is the particular moral need  that determines legitimate usage? In
addition, I consider some interrelated worries raised by Tommie Shelby
and Charles Mills, which can roughly be characterized thus: moralist
accounts of “racism”  lack  warrant because they uncritically  start from
accepted moral values that bias the ensuing account.

7.2.1  A Necessary Value: Advance Nonwhite Interests

The heart of the moral condition is the term “legitimate moral need.”
Since this term is vague, a sharpening of the term is in order. I begin with
the expression “moral need.” Along the way, I introduce terminology that
I will use throughout the rest of this chapter.
As aforementioned, the relevant moral need that orients my philosophi-
cal investigation is the ideal of anti-racism. Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin puts
it this way:

Though they offer distinct analyses of racism, the political view and the
moral view are both closely connected to what we can call the pragmatic
aim: the aim of eliminating, or at least mitigating, racism. This aim is appar-
ently furthered by the political view’s commitment to focusing on institu-
tional and social structures, the elimination of which would effect widespread
and materially beneficial changes in the lives of those who suffer most from
racial oppression. As suggested above, this seems to be one major attraction
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  279

of the political view. But the pragmatic aim is related also to the moral view
in that it is justified by that view’s commitment to the necessary immorality
of racism. To claim that racism is immoral is to claim that there are reasons
to combat it.2

Mitchell-Yellin calls this feature pragmatic, but, clearly, it is also moralist,

for the notion that we should commit to ending racism presupposes that
racism is morally objectionable. Moralist theories wear their anti-racist
agenda on their sleeves. As I deploy this term, moralism is a feature predi-
cated of philosophical theories and approaches to racism that treat anti-­
racism as fundamental and uncompromisable to their analytical projects.
Mitchell-Yellin’s “aim of eliminating racism” goes beyond the require-
ment to account for racism’s moral badness. Taken to its logical conclu-
sion, his criterion implies that prescriptive  theory ought to  serve the
interests of victims of what has historically been called racism. I will use the
expression “racism’s historical victims” to signify the class of individuals
who have been relegated to a subordinate racial group (i.e., nonwhites).
Before going further with this discussion, I will pause to provide some
terminology for purposes of this chapter. Although we may distinguish
various kinds of moral badness, following Mitchell-Yellin (and Tommie
Shelby), we can group racist phenomena into two types of badness, two
levels at which the value of anti-racism applies: personal and political
morality. I begin, however, by positing a generic term to differentiate
racial ills in each domain.

• the term wrongness signifies something (e.g., lying) that is objection-

able on personalist grounds (e.g., lying is a vice); more specifically,
“wrongness” applies to anything for which an individual can be
morally criticized and/or held responsible, including sins of the
­
“heart” and “mind.”3
• the term injustice signifies a social arrangement or practice (e.g.,
a voter ID law) that is objectionable on political-moral grounds; here,
“injustice” applies to the conditions that produce/sustain unfair
advantage for some racial groups and unfair disadvantage for others.
It is objectionable in that there are reasons to combat or change it.4

2
 Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (2018, 57–8).
3
 Some personal morality approaches to racism: Appiah (1990), Schmid (1996), Garcia
(1996), Blum (2002).
4
 Some political morality  approaches to racism: Mills (1997),  Headley (2000), Pierce
(2014), Shelby (2016), O’Connor (2002), Haslanger (2004), and Curry (2017). Virtually
280  A. G. URQUIDEZ

In principle, racial wrongs and racial injustices may be objectionable with-

out being racist. Which racial wrongs/injustices are racist and why will
depend on the criteria for racism. (For example, my account of racism-as-­
racial-oppression implies that nonwhites cannot be racist toward whites in
most actual contexts and situations. For anti-white prejudice does not
usually function to oppress whites. Hence we can say that anti-white prej-
udice is racially wrong, but not racist.) When I speak of morality in a broad
sense—that is, to pick out racist phenomena as morally objectionable—I
use the term racial badness/vileness:

• The term racial badness/vileness is an umbrella term that covers every

significant racial ill that merits an ascription of racism (i.e., an ill that
is seriously morally objectionable).

This distinguishes racially bad/vile phenomena from what Lawrence

Blum calls “racial ills.”

• The term racial ill is a broader umbrella term than “badness”/

“vileness”; it picks out every morally problematic phenomenon that
occurs in the racial domain, including non-racist racial ills.

The above terminology (“wrongness,” “injustice,” “racial badness,”

“racial ill”) should be understood as stipulative. I invoke it merely for pur-
poses of clarity of exposition. (My contention below will be that all
instances of racial injustice are racist, and many racial wrongs [though not
necessarily all] are also racist.)
We can now specify the meaning of “moral need.” The moral need that
underlies prescriptive theory is the need to represent some racial ills as
worse than others, as viler than others. Specifically, there is a need for his-
torical victims of racism to combat the deleterious legacy of racialized
thinking, which is still alive and well, today. The way to do this is to single
out for special attention the set of racial ills that are characteristically harm-
ful to this group. This vileness we single out and convey via the weight of

all racial oppression accounts of racism are injustice approaches to racism, including non-
philosophical approaches. For non-philosophical accounts of racism-as-racial-oppression, see
hooks (2015), Carmichael and Hamilton (1967), Feagin (2006), and Sidanius and Pratto
(1999). Much work in the humanities and social sciences presupposes an oppression approach
to racism.
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  281

the terms “racism” and “racist,” thereby signifying the high moral severity
of these racial offenses. To mark this distinction, I will say that those racial
ills that “rise” to the level of racism—those that are, in some way or other,
demonstrably harmful to nonwhites—are seriously/severely objectionable.
My use of “moral need” in this context should be understood as a purely
terminological point. I do not wish to imply that “non-­serious” racial ills
are not serious in any ordinary sense of the term; rather, the sense in which
they are “not serious” is that they should not be called (condemned as)
racist  in moral representation. I call the criterion for determining the
moral seriousness of a racial ill severity constraint. Below I address the
questions: What makes some racial ills worse than others? What deter-
mines severity? My discussion will be couched in the context of some ini-
tial objections to moralist theories of racism.

7.2.1.1 T
 he Mills-Shelby Objection: Theory Should Not Explain
Racism’s Wrongness
A philosopher might grant that racism is always wrong and yet maintain
that a moral-philosophical theory of racism should not start from this pre-
sumption. At least initially, the idea seems to be, a philosophical definition
of “racism” ought to be neutral on the question of what accounts for rac-
ism’s normative valence. This intuition is further supported by the notion
that theory is, first and foremost, concerned with the metaphysical rather
than normative nature of racism. After all, the initial goal of theory is to
determine what precisely racism is. The semantic externalist thus argues
that only once the referent of “racism” is determined should the theorist
go on to raise questions about the normative status of racism. For it might
turn out that upon discovering what racism is, we might learn, to our
surprise, that racism is not always objectionable. Alternatively, we might
arrive at the conclusion that the objectionable status of racism is not a
matter of personal wrongdoing, but of the unjust structuring of society, or
something along those lines.
This position has been defended by Charles Mills and Tommie Shelby.
Here is Shelby’s argument:

Nowadays, as Garcia himself correctly points out, the term “racism” is so

haphazardly thrown about that it is no longer clear that we all mean, even
roughly, the same thing by it. Some even complain that the term is fast
becoming (or has long since become) a mere epithet, with strong emotive
force but little or no clear content. This doesn’t mean the concept is no
longer useful, but it does suggest that we need to clearly specify its referent
282  A. G. URQUIDEZ

before we can determine whether the relevant phenomenon is always mor-

ally problematic. This will require some philosophical reconstruction, which
may diverge, even radically, from ordinary usage. Until such a reconstructive
project is completed, though, we should remain agnostic about whether
every instance of “racism” is immoral, for our best reconstruction may show
that many of our pretheoretic moral convictions are unfounded or
inconsistent.5

Mills presents the same worry, though with different emphasis: “it is not
legitimate to eliminate, or at least handicap, competing analyses by pre-
senting as seemingly obvious what is in fact a theoretically heavily loaded
prerequisite. The necessary immorality of racism is something that has to be
argued for, not something that can be stipulated in advance.”6 “Moralist
approaches,” he says, stipulate (a priori) “that racism in its different variet-
ies is always wrong before we seek to do an analysis of racism,” and this
“aprioristic assumption may distort the investigative project.” Garcia is
cited as the characteristic example of this fallacy:

Rather than approaching things neutrally, we may find ourselves denying

that certain phenomena which prima facie seem racist, or have been taken by
many to be racist, are such, because they do not pass the (im)morality test.
Shelby argues, and I agree, that this is just what has happened in Garcia’s
account. By moralizing racism, by making it (always) a vice, a sin, he not
only ties himself to an account with implausible implications, but distorts his
own investigation, ending up tailoring the description of the phenomena to
fit his preferred definition.7

Shelby and Mills’ arguments are two sides of the same coin. The former
can be said to raise a concern about concept distortion (moralist theories
get things backwards: by stipulating the necessary wrongness of racism
prior to determining its referent, theorists risk distorting the concept. The
latter can be said to raise a concern about theory distortion (moralist crite-
ria are biased by virtue of excluding racist phenomena that fail to meet the
aprioristic standard). To avoid distortion in either case, theory must first
specify the referent of “racism,” by presenting a reconstruction of the
concept. Both Shelby and Mills think this is to be properly done by refer-

5
 Shelby (2002, 412).
6
 Mills (2003, 34).
7
 Ibid., 58.
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  283

ence to empirical work rather than by reference to ordinary usage or com-

monsense thinking. Both are, therefore, committed to semantic externalism
as the appropriate vehicle of metaphysical analysis.
My first reply to these objections is that the externalist semantics taken
for granted is questionable. I have considered and rejected semantic exter-
nalism in Chap. 4. The idea that we must first specify the referent of “rac-
ism” is confused, because there is no language-independent referent of
“racism.” Definitions of “racism” are not descriptions of racism, so they are
not descriptions of why racism is wrong. Definitions of “racism” are norms
of representation. Since these issues were extensively discussed in the first
four chapters of the book, I will not repeat my arguments here.
What about Shelby’s worry that the term “racism” is so haphazardly
thrown about that it is no longer clear that we all mean, even roughly, the
same thing by it? I conceded this point in previous chapters. The term
“racism” is overused, in part because of the concept’s intrinsically politi-
cized nature. The term naturally lends itself to use as a political weapon by
individuals who have incompatible material stakes in how the term gets
applied. This very point, however, is precisely the reason why grammatical
negotiation is called for: we must decide how the term “racism” ought to
be used, so as to give it a definite meaning, one that can be pragmatically
justified by reference to the moral need of racism’s historical victims. At
the very least, we must negotiate the meaning of the term in moral con-
texts where definitional  agreement is essential to achieving a desirable
social, pedagogical or political end. If this is correct, then the Mills-Shelby
objection does not undermine moralist accounts generally, nor mine
­specifically. Their argument, in my view, simply underscores the need for a
prescriptive account of racism (i.e., the need to make a decision).
For Mills, moralist accounts are individualistic (agent-centered)  theo-
ries which focus on personal virtue and vice, blame and praise, rightful and
wrongful action, and the like. This is consistent with Shelby’s account of
moralist definitions. A “moralistic definition of racism,” he says, is “a defi-
nition that treats every instance of racism as a culpable failure of some
individual or group to endorse or comply with a valid moral principle.”8
My use of the term “moralism” differs from theirs. As I use the term, any
account that appeals to racism’s intrinsic wrongness or badness is moralist;
that is, any account that advances criticisms on the presumption that “rac-
ism” is a term of criticism, reproach, or condemnation is moralist. My

8
 Shelby (2014, 65).
284  A. G. URQUIDEZ

reason for broadening the category of moralist approaches beyond indi-

vidualistic notions is that I think it incoherent (hence, impossible) to ana-
lyze the concept of racism for moral-political purposes on the assumption
that racism is not objectionable. The presumption that racism is objection-
able is necessary if we want a concept that retains its condemnatory-critical
function for the purpose of promoting anti-racist ends. At the same time,
in order to avoid biasing the account, we need to acknowledge that there
are multiple levels of vileness which are currently associated with “racism.”
Some or all of these may be legitimate, and so should not be precluded by
a moralist approach, without argumentation. Shelby claims that a theory
of racism need not be moralist, since it is sufficient that it have moral sig-
nificance.9 This claim makes sense as an objection to individualistic
accounts of racism that exclude the concerns of political morality. However,
the solution to this exclusion is not to remove the concept’s moral content,
even provisionally, as semantic externalism proposes, but to determine the
scope of racial ills we would like to condemn with this term. Said differ-
ently, Shelby’s requirement that a theory of racism must have moral import
presumes at the outset that racism is morally objectionable on some level
or other. Or is he seriously proposing that science might discover that rac-
ism is morally benign or, alternatively, morally good? Obviously, he
wouldn’t accept any theory of racism that suggested either of these. So, his
account is pretheoretically informed by moral intuition, and should not
pretend otherwise. Moral theory must start from a basic moral conviction
if it is to address the political contestedness of the term (e.g., the dispute
between individualists and institutionalists). And, as mentioned above, the
notion that we can somehow provisionally remove the moral content of
racism is predicated on a dubious externalist semantics for “racism.”
Shelby writes as if his interest in using the concept of racism for polit-
ical purposes is unimportant to this discussion. His political interest,
however, is an expression of his moral perspective. I agree with him that
“racism” should be primarily used as a critical social term. But this is a
substantive normative point, and the basis for this judgment should be
made explicit and defended on normative-pragmatic grounds (as I
attempt below). Shelby tacitly acknowledges his substantive moral

9
 He writes: “we could maintain that racism, whatever its form or mode of expression, is
prima facie a cause for moral concern (in accordance with postulate 2 of the wide-scope
conception) but that not everything properly regarded as racist represents a moral failing (in
accordance with postulate 4)” (ibid.).
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  285

­ osition in his discussion of an “alternative set of initial assumptions,”

p
all of which are substantive moral-­grammatical propositions. One of
them is that not every instance of racism is a grave moral failing, and
another is that instances of racism are prima facie cause for moral con-
cern. He then makes this important concession: “I won’t defend these
postulates by suggesting they are all self-evident. They clearly are not.
The strength of my case will depend on showing how the postulates
advance our understanding in comparison with a compelling alternative
set of initial assumptions.”10 He later adds:

Suppose, for purposes of moral criticism, that we wanted to put the phe-
nomenon of racism into some familiar category of recognized wrongs, such
as intolerance for legitimate differences. We could not do so properly if we
failed to grasp the nature of the phenomenon at issue, if, for example, we
were wrongly to assume that it is a response to cultural differences between
racially defined groups. Social scientific research will therefore be essential to
ensuring that our moral assessments are suitably informed by the relevant
facts. In addition, it is important to recognize the possibility that these facts,
as with all scientific facts, may diverge from or conflict with common sense,
prompting us to revise our pre-conceptions.11

I have defended (and will further defend below) the claim that grammar
should be informed by empirical facts about racial phenomena. But it is
illusory to think that philosophers are merely being guided by facts. For as
Shelby himself has pointed out, fixing the referent of “racism” is not
enough: we must ultimately start from an “initial” set of substantive moral
assumptions.  One of these non-negotiable assumptions is that rac-
ism is vile.

7.2.1.2 A
 rthur’s Objection: Racism Is Not a Moral Flaw,
but an Epistemic Flaw
Any account of racism that aims to explain why racism is wrong or unjust
is moralist, as I’ve defined the term. We have dealt with a set of method-
ological objections to moralist accounts. John Arthur, however, provides
a different line of objection. He argues that not all instances of racism are
deserving of moral condemnation. “But is it true,” he writes, “that racism
alone constitutes a moral defect? If so, what is the nature of the defect?” He

 Ibid., 61.
10

 Ibid., 63.
11
286  A. G. URQUIDEZ

invites us to consider the case of the reluctant racist, a case involving a

racially hateful person (perhaps, due to his upbringing), who despises and
“deeply regrets” his hostile attitudes.12 According to Arthur, the racist’s
hostile attitudes are not morally objectionable “unless there is something
that he has done that warrants condemnation. … The core of racism and
its normative force is therefore epistemic.” He concludes:

Although he is still a racist, it seems clear that it would be wrong to blame

such a person. He is like a person who is born with an inclination to violence
or a kleptomaniac who has a tendency to steal worthless junk. Indeed, there
is reason to feel some sympathy for the person. Such a reluctant racist, were
he to exist, has a heavier moral burden to bear than others who are more
fortunate.13

What are we to make of Arthur’s claim that we should not call the reluc-

tant racist  a morally depraved person, but should instead  lament his
impoverished cognitive state and extend our sympathies? Joshua Glasgow
rejects this argument on the ground that it fails to accord with ordinary
usage of “racism” (though he acknowledges that ordinary usage might be
problematic in its own right).14 Whether reluctant racism is possible on

12
 John Arthur (2007, 17).
13
 The position that racism involves an epistemic flaw rather than a moral one no longer
seems to be the dominant view in the literature, but it is not uncommon either. Dummett,
for instance, defines racism as a kind of irrational prejudice that manifests in hostile behavior
toward a racial group (2004, 28). According to Dummett, a negative generalizing belief
about an entire race of people is normally irrational because it will either be empirically inde-
fensible or will be based on ignorance. It can be rational, says Dummett, if it is based on a
kind of plausible ignorance. “A belief in the inferiority of a whole racial group in either
respect can be sustained with some show of rationality only if it is held that the group will
never produce anyone of the highest achievements: that, say, there will never be a great ora-
tor, writer, artist, musician, or scientist from that group—say, from Africa and the black
population of the New World, or, again, from the subcontinent. It would need a remarkable
ignorance to put forward such a proposition; but then, some people, though rational, are
remarkably ignorant” (2004, 29). Even if the prejudice is rational, however, the behavior
based on it will be irrational if it is “of the kind that usually characterizes racists. It would be
a poor reason for not wanting someone of a certain racial group to enter one’s house or buy
the house next door that one did not expect any great scientist or artist to stem from that
group. No great amount of either intelligence or artistic talent is needed for ordinary day-to-
day dealings between human beings. One could not justify withholding common courtesy,
just treatment, or compassion from someone by a plea that that person lacked high intelli-
gence and great talent, even if one was oneself a genius or prodigy” (29).
14
 Glasgow (2009, 80).
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  287

ordinary usage is not particularly relevant, in my view, for conforming to

ordinary usage is not an adequacy criterion for a theory of racism.
I reject Arthur’s claim  that racists who are indoctrinated into racist
antipathy, disdain, disregard, and the like should not be seen as responsi-
ble for their untameable cognitive attitudes. The idea that they should get
a free pass if they have tried their best, et cetera is objectionable. It is simi-
lar, though not completely analogous, to cases where an agent is unaware
that she harbors implicit racial biases and acts in harmful ways toward oth-
ers when these are triggered. We can imagine that she has no reason to
suspect that she harbors such biases. In both cases we are supposed to
conclude that racial wrongdoing is not worthy of serious moral reproach,
regrettable though that may be, because of the exculpatory condition of
control: an individual must have control over her attitudes in order to be
morally culpable for her conduct. In the case of implicit bias, there is an
additional argument that might be used: an individual cannot be morally
culpable for an attitude she is unaware she holds. I will explain the prob-
lem I have with applying the exculpatory and awareness conditions in the
context of implicit racial bias before turning to Arthur’s application of the
former in the case of the reluctant racist.
Tommy Curry, following a line of critical race theorists, draws attention
to empirical studies and social science work (e.g., social psychological
studies) that support the claim that “white implicit bias prevents whites
from acting against blatant acts of racist violence, recognizing Black
human rights during catastrophes, or simply acknowledging racism that
they themselves have witnessed.”15 A moment’s reflection on the ramifica-
tions of these conclusions reveals that the effects of implicit bias are far-­
reaching in that they impose unfair burdens on subordinate racial groups
(i.e., nonwhite races). I start with this point, because the conversation
about moral responsibility for implicit bias ought to be addressed within a
sociocultural framework. It is tempting to evaluate cases of implicit bias as
isolated events, as though broader social forces at play are morally insig-
nificant. However, when these social forces perpetuate a condition of
­vulnerability that is burdensome for nonwhites, these social forces surely
become morally significant. Implicit racial biases are widespread and con-
sist of invidious racial stereotypes that originated in the racism of the past.
What is more, these biases are learned at a very young age, which implies

15
 Curry (2010, 554). He cites as evidence for these claims Goff et al. (2008), Hanson and
Hanson (2006), and Kawakami (2009).
288  A. G. URQUIDEZ

that they  are products of racist culture  that continues to persist.

Consequently, failing to criticize the phenomenon of implicit racial bias on
the grounds that individuals are either unaware or incapable of controlling
them has a  complicitous effect with this racist culture; it is  functionally
equivalent to endorsing the underlying racism in our culture. For whether
whites are aware or able to control their racial biases does little to mitigate
the fact that an unjust burden is placed on the shoulders of the victim
group. The question should therefore be framed as a question of justice:
Who should bear the brunt of carrying the burdens of implicit racial bias?
Plausibly, the collective burden should be placed on whites rather than
nonwhites, since this psychological and intersubjective phenomenon is
most harmful to nonwhites, who suffer from stigmatization. Furthermore,
the existence of this phenomenon is one that was cultivated and sustained
over a long period of time. That is, it is a function of a racist past that has
worked to the detriment of nonwhites and the benefit of whites. The
political norm of fairness, of fairly distributing social burdens, overrides
the moral norm of holding individuals accountable for attitudes and con-
duct over which they have control and awareness. Given the value of racial
justice, whites should sometimes be held responsible for implicit biases of
which they are unaware and lack control. (How and in what ways they
should be held accountable is something that requires further discussion.)
To be sure, accountability would place a social burden on whites, but this
is a fair price to pay given the collective benefits and privileges whites have
accrued as a consequence of past racism and its continued presence in our
racist culture. In other words, shifting the burden onto whites brings a
modicum of justice to the political problem of which racial bias is one
component: the problem of creating a more racially just society. We have
reason, then, to condemn white implicit bias independent of whether the
agent is aware or capable of controlling her attitudes. In addition to hav-
ing a demeaning effect on the racial other, implicit racial bias contributes
to racial dehumanization, stigmatization, and injustice: it contributes to
the subordinate position of nonwhites. An important upshot of my argu-
ment is that intentional wrongdoing is not the only relevant factor in
developing a moralist evaluation of implicit racial bias.
A second problem with this argument is that, if racist attitudes are in
fact functions of longstanding racial oppression, we should expect that
virtually all people born into the society will be enmeshed in racist culture
and thus acquire implicit racist attitudes. In a society shaped by hundreds
of years of white supremacy, it would be astonishing if most denizens
were not tainted by racist attitudes. Most people then are without excuse
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  289

if and when such attitudes are activated. That is to say, individuals have a
moral responsibility to try to identify what racist attitudes they may or
may not have, and to do what can be done to mitigate those attitudes or
prevent them from being activated.16 We should call these attitudes racist
when nonwhites are the object of a negative association qua nonwhite-
ness, or when whites are the object of a positive association qua white-
ness. At this point, however, we arrive at a disanalogy with the case of the
reluctant racist. For the reluctant racist, we are imagining, has done
everything he could to mitigate his hostility.
If the reluctant  racist has tried his best to unlearn racism or at least
constrain it, is the racist off the hook? The preceding discussion of implicit
racial bias suggests that the answer here is, No. Arthur’s flawed assump-
tion is that  characterological considerations are the only way to address
the issue of personal accountability, the only just basis for condemning the
reluctant racist. Further, he seems to incorrectly assume that it is coherent
to talk about someone being racist without being morally responsible for
one’s racism.
The term “racism” is not just a term of individual criticism, but of social
criticism. In the case of the reluctant racist this means that we ought to
critically assess two things: the agent and the society that birthed him. We
ought therefore to consider whether the reluctant racist’s attitude is a
symptom of a racially oppressive society. Here we would be interested in
the  social causes and not merely the psychological or characterological
causes of his attitudes/conduct. The racist hostility that our reluctant rac-
ist has learned (let us imagine this is through no fault of his own) presup-
poses a racist culture as the background condition that makes this case a
real possibility (i.e., a possibility for the actual world). A racist culture is
not, of course, logically necessary to imagine such a person. But imagining
such a person within the context of a racist culture seems necessary for
generating intuitions that apply to the actual world. For without painting
this background, the reluctant racist would be inexplicably pathological:
he would be analogous to someone who harbored hostility for individuals
with pimples (or some other arbitrary physical feature). As social critics we
ought to ask: To what degree is unwitting racial hostility an intersubjective
phenomenon among whites? Is the reluctant racist’s attitude an expression
of a systemic or historically patterned effect? Addressing these questions is

16
 This argument is increasingly being made by empirically minded philosophers of race.
See, for example, Natalia Washington and Daniel Kelly in “Who’s Responsible for This?”
(2016); Madva’s “A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads
Social Policy” (2017).
290  A. G. URQUIDEZ

preliminary to addressing this moral issue from a perspective that privi-

leges the needs of (actual) victims of this form of racist agency. Arguably,
the reluctant racist’s attitude can be condemned on account of contribut-
ing to racial stigmatization and  racial oppression. I thus conclude that
questions concerning moral responsibility (for implicit bias and reluctant
racism) should not simply be assessed from the lens of personal morality,
but also from the lens of political morality. Giving reluctant racists a pass
seems unjust: it seems to legitimate the unfair burdens that are currently
being carried by racism’s historical victims.
The logic of political morality can be extended to assess the idea that we
should “pity” the reluctant racist. Assuming she is white, the idea is par-
ticularly  worrisome in the context of Arthur’s argument. If we are not
careful to separate the conceptual question about racism from the sympa-
thies we may have for a victim of pathological thinking, these feelings can
lead to the  magical transformation of a member of a privileged social
group, a beneficiary of racism, and an agent of oppression into a victim. In
deciding how best to define the term “racism” our sympathies ought to be
with the historical victims of racism, not with its historical perpetrators.
Exculpating the perpetrator in effect amounts to complicity with injustice.
The idea that we should limit the grammar of “racism” (racism’s necessary
vileness, in particular) so as to express sympathy toward reluctant racists
prioritizes the interests of whites at the expense of those who tend to be
most harmed by irrational attitudes such as racial animus. (In public life,
we should of course sympathize with whites or anyone else that is psychi-
cally ill, suffers from pathological tendencies, and so forth, but the context
of concern here is not interpersonal interactions. Rather, we are here con-
cerned with a conceptual matter. The question before us is this: Which set
of burdens should we be “sympathetic” to for purposes of defining the
term “racism”?) The failure to extend sympathy to those most commonly
targeted by racism—those who experience it as a condition rather than an
isolated event—adds insult to injury; it also perpetuates their second-class
status. I thus conclude that Arthur’s objection fails. I shall therefore pro-
ceed on the premise that racism is morally bad.
I have now argued that a theory of racism must explain racism’s moral
badness. Minimally, this consists in: specifying the type of badness at issue
(personal morality, political morality); the moral grounds of condemna-
tion; and criteria for determining which phenomena or categories of phe-
nomena can be(come) bad on these grounds. An explicit statement of
each element need not be necessary, of course, provided that answers to
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  291

these questions can be provided. Before we address these points, however,

a more basic question is in order. What makes racism morally bad?
Specifically, what gives it its special objectionable status, such that some
racial ills (those that are racist) are more seriously objectionable than others?
I will have more to say about this below. But two remarks are in order.
First, the ills in question are pervasive: they affect several aspects of a vic-
tim’s life. Second, historical victims—those who bear the brunt of pat-
terned forms of racial harm—suffer immensely (often with great intensity)
as a result of these ills. Many of these racial ills continue to be inflicted to
this day. Hence there is a need to meaningfully distinguish racism and
racial ill, and not just in any old way, but in a way that is conducive to the
representational needs of racism’s historical victims. Resolving this matter
is all the more urgent for theory, given that racism is politically contested,
often by non-historical victims of racism who have an interest in control-
ling the content of this norm. Since conceptual disagreement about what
counts as racist must be addressed via prescriptive intervention, moralists
must lay down the anti-racist value discussed in this section as a necessary
and uncompromisable desideratum.
Of the three theoretical burdens mentioned above, my account will
focus on the following two: (1) to specify a broad principle for deciding
what racial phenomena ought to be condemned as racist; and (2) to pro-
vide moral grounds for condemning said phenomena as racist.

7.2.2  Legitimate Need and Historical Usage: The Racial

Oppression Approach
Having explained what “moral need” means in the expression “legitimate
moral need,” I now turn to the meaning of “legitimate.” To sharpen this
term for theoretical purposes it is necessary to stipulate a criterion of legiti-
macy. Clearly, not just any limit on the concept racism which distinguishes
it from racial ill qualifies as legitimate, for not just any limit will address
the moral need described above. The proposal I defend is that the bounds of
“legitimacy” should be rooted in historical usage of “racism.” I am not the
first to identify historical usage as an adequate criterion for this purpose—
for example, Blum has made a similar proposal.17 His argument is the basis

17
 Blum writes: “The moral force of the term lies in both the violation of fundamental
moral norms and in their relation to the evils of historical systems of oppression within which
racist phenomena have been embedded” (2002, 32).
292  A. G. URQUIDEZ

for my own, but my argument is critical of certain aspects of the way he

develops it, and I ultimately arrive at a different definition than he does.
Expressions are introduced into language to fulfill specific needs. In the
case of “racism,” that need is representational: to represent as-worthy-of-­
condemnation. By “historical usage” I mean usage that is constitutive of
those practices of predication which have persevered over long tracks of
time, and which have historically functioned as standards for establishing
continuity between past and current usage as well as for extending the
term. Since the referent of “racism” has changed, not just over time, but
across contexts of use, it will be important to look to the underlying prag-
matic structures and not merely the content of any one particular definition.
An objection is likely to be raised at this point. The normative authority
of historical usage as a standard of legitimate moral use is not intrinsic to
it. So, why privilege historical usage? I submit that historical pres-
ence explains the longstanding practical need for the term. In other words,
the longstanding need for the linguistic convention is a correlate of his-
torical usage. For if historical linguistic practice did not meet this
­longstanding need, it seems likely that it would have long been forgotten
and fallen into disuse (having joined the dustbin of antiquated terms and
uses). Perhaps this point does not always hold; perhaps one must always be
attentive to, and potentially critical of, the underlying values presupposed
by an established practice. In the case of “racism,” however, the term was
coined in the twentieth century as a tool of the oppressed. The term has
continued to fulfill an important need for anti-racists, even if the term has
also been appropriated by historical beneficiaries of racism. 
The ongoing and consistent preservation of this term as a tool of moral
reproach is a strong indicator that it corresponds to a deep need for the
linguistic convention. This is particularly true if the term is so used by
victims of racism and their anti-racist allies. It seems plausible, then, to
hold that historical usage reflects underlying anti-racist values which are
still worth preserving. Hence the desideratum: other things equal, historical
usage should be privileged. One of the implications of my argument is that
the core of historical usage must be exhibited in much (though certainly
not all) contemporary linguistic practice. Hence it should be possible to
reconstruct this core by analyzing the pragmatic structure that grounds
historical usage.
What longstanding practical need does historical usage reflect? Blum
thinks it is the need to condemn racial ills that are seriously morally objec-
tionable. His argument is that attentiveness to the term’s evolution reveals
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  293

that its various extensions were always prompted by an important moral-­

critical need. This need, moreover, evolves in response to changes in social
conditions. Old forms of racial harm and injustice are replaced with new
forms. It ultimately transpired that, over time, rather than narrowing in
scope, the concept has broadened and branched out in various directions.
From its humble beginnings as a term restricted to insidious theories of
racial belief and ideology, it expanded to cover motives, intentions, prac-
tices, institutions, societies, and so forth. These extensions reflect the
growing need to condemn serious racial ills. But what is our criterion of
“seriousness”? What makes one racial ill more or less serious than another?
According to Blum, the severity connoted by “racism” is a function of the
oppressive effects of systems of racial domination:

[T]he moral wrong of race-based violations can not lie solely in their violat-
ing general moral norms, that is, violations that carry the same force for any
victim. Otherwise, showing contempt for someone based on her race would
have the same moral status as doing so because she has bad taste. What is it
about racially-based violations of these human norms that intensifies the
moral wrong involved.
The additional opprobrium is racism’s integral tie to the social and systemic
horrors of slavery, apartheid, Nazism, colonialism, segregation, imperialism,
and the shameful treatment of Native Americans in the United States—all
race-based systems of oppression. US law recognizes that racially based
wrongs are more serious than other similar wrongs by calling race a particu-
larly ‘invidious’ distinction. Because racial distinctions have been the source
of the most heinous forms of systemic mistreatment, American law requires
any policy that makes racial distinctions to pass the most stringent level of
scrutiny as to whether its likely benefits outweigh its presumed wrongs.18

Blum maintains that racism increases the negative valence of anteced-

ently objectionable phenomena. For instance, if lying is morally wrong,
then lying to someone because of her race is even worse. If murdering
someone is wrong, then murdering him because of his race is even worse.
If discrimination is bad, then racial discrimination is worse. And so on.
That which confers additional moral opprobrium upon racist phenom-
ena (in contrast to non-racist phenomena of the same kind) is racism’s

18
 Blum (ibid., 27). For Blum’s historical argument, see (ibid., 3–8). For a helpful historical
account of racism, one that defines “racism” as an ideology that is integral to systems of racial
oppression, see Frederickson (2002).
294  A. G. URQUIDEZ

historical link to racial oppression. According to Shelby’s understanding

of Blum, “the association of race with such great evils [as racial oppres-
sion] is enough to give the charge of racism extra condemnatory
power.”19 That is not the view I take here. I am not suggesting that a
mere association between ascription of racisms and great racial harm is
sufficient to explain why racism is always wrong. We must not confuse a
genetic thesis or description of how “racism” came to connote serious
harm with the criterial status that we confer to “racism.” Racism’s seri-
ous objectionable status stands in need of justification. The justification
I propose is this: racial ills that rise to the level of racism are worthy of
severe condemnation because they have historically contributed to racial
oppression. For instance, consider racist jokes, which some people would
say are not particularly harmful on normal occasions. Even if we grant
that offensive jokes are not particularly harmful to specific individuals
who hear them, racial jokes may play a role in sustaining racial oppres-
sion. Suppose that racial jokes are more likely to have a stigmatizing
effect than non-racial jokes, where the brunt of the joke is a racial minor-
ity. This may be explained in more than one way. Perhaps, the racial
minority is one that has been historically targeted for demeaning stereo-
types. If these stereotypes are widely believed within the society, the
practice of making racist jokes may reinforce the belief that these stereo-
types are true (even if joke-makers do not necessarily believe this). In this
case, a prima facie case can be made for condemning the joke as racist.
(Making racist jokes may also be objectionable on grounds of moral
viciousness, especially when it flows from the racist character of a per-
son.) This argument is strengthened by the premise that racist jokes
occur within a sociocultural context of racial oppression.
I  have suggested that racism is racial oppression, but  what exactly  is
racial oppression? I will not try to develop a definition of “oppression”
here. Instead, I will settle for an intuitive understanding of the notion, with
a few refinements based on a brief survey of the literature on oppression
theory. My aim is to highlight some characteristic features of oppression,
especially the types of harms it tends to produce. The first thing to empha-
size in this regard is that oppression transgresses multiple virtues and
undermines multiple essential human goods. Thus Iris Marion Young ana-
lyzes oppression as a structural concept, one that involves a power relation
between social groups, that is constituted by the “five faces” of oppression:

 Shelby (2014, 68).

19
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  295

exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and vio-

lence.20 Jason Chen has recently identified seven distinctive harms. He
takes these to be exhaustive: (1) political deprivation; (2) economic depri-
vation; (3) freedom deprivation; (4) social deprivation; (5) psychological
harm; (6) the deprived capability to self-develop; and (7) some combina-
tion of these. The “core harm” of oppression, according to Chen, is the
deprived capability to self-develop, where self-development is defined as
“the development of one’s capacities in accordance with one’s true
values.”21 He argues, along the way, that oppression is a species of domina-
tion and therefore entails domination.22
Clearly, the types of harms that oppression commits are far-reaching,
shaping significant aspects of one’s life. Ann Cudd’s Analyzing Oppression
argues that oppression “is an institutionally structured, unjust harm per-
petrated on groups by other groups through direct and indirect material
and psychological forces.” She claims that oppression is essentially a kind
of social injustice, “a harm through which groups of persons are system-
atically and unfairly or unjustly constrained, burdened, or reduced by any
of several forces.”23 Deprivation of freedom seems to be the primary
explanatory harm, on her account, though she holds that there is no one
harm of oppression. The phenomenon, moreover, cannot be properly
understood by reference to its consequent harms alone. To properly
analyze it, we must understand its causal mechanisms.24 One reason for
this is that understanding the causes of oppression helps to answer an
important and puzzling question about oppression: “How does oppression
endure over time in spite of human’s rough natural equality? …To answer
this question theorists have always had to show how the oppressed are
induced to participate in their own oppression rather than resist it.”25 She
describes the process in question as “cyclical”:

I shall argue that material forces, by which I mean physical and psychologi-
cal violence and economic domination, initiate a vicious cycle of harm that
subjugates the oppressed to one or more privileged groups. These forces
work in part by coercing the oppressed to act in ways that further their own

20
 Iris Marion Young, “The Five Faces of Oppression” (1990).
21
 Jason Chen (2017, 430).
22
 Ibid., 436.
23
 Cudd (2006, 23).
24
 Ibid., 25.
25
 Ibid., 21.
296  A. G. URQUIDEZ

oppression. Direct forces externally affect the choices of individuals, while

indirect forces shape the background social beliefs and desires with which
we perceive and behave toward others. The most important and insidious of
these indirect forces is an economic force that acts by means of the oppressed
persons’ own preferences and rational choices. Psychological forces, both
direct and indirect, reinforce and secure oppressive institutions.26

“Racism” is plausibly defined as oppression because of its near-universal

connection to the system of white supremacy. The systemic and all-­
encompassing nature of white supremacy accommodates all of the afore-
mentioned forms of harm. Moreover, white supremacy’s lasting power
thrusts onto the lap of theory Cudd’s question: What explains the persis-
tence of racial oppression? This parallels the sociologist’s question: What
explains the persistence of racial inequality? Regardless of whether people
hold explicit racist attitudes or anti-racist and liberal attitudes, racial
oppression seems to persist. This suggests that there are structural ele-
ments that stand above and beyond individual attitudes and ­conduct.
Arguably, racial oppression persists both because of the “material forces”
at play (“physical violence” and “economic domination”) and because of
“indirect forces” which includes widespread “background social beliefs
and desires.” Together, these forces function to create a condition of vul-
nerability for the victim.
Unlike Cudd, Peg O’Connor’s Oppression and Responsibility stresses the
invisibility of some forces of oppression. She helpfully cites a remark from
Wittgenstein that she uses to illuminate the collaborative nature of pro-
ducing and reproducing oppression: “What determines our judgment, our
concepts and reactions is not what one man is doing now, an individual
action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background
against which we see any action.”27 This collaborative effort is often unseen
and hence unknown because it is invisible:

This ‘hurly-burly’ is infused with power relations that are in no way simply
given. They are created, implemented, utilized, and deployed through our
practices. Sexual abuse, battering, racism, homophobia, marital rape, and
being closeted as queer are all practices that are part of this hurly-burly.
These practices and the beliefs about them are part of the background.28

26
 Ibid., 26; see also 79–80.
27
 This passage is from Wittgenstein’s Zettel (1967, sect. 567).
28
 O’Connor (2002, 4).
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  297

As an example she notes, as Curry does, that whites often cannot see rac-
ism and racist acts.29 They see acts, behaviors, practices, and institutions,
to be sure. They often even see the undesirable consequences of all this.
But they do not see these things as racism, as manifestations of racial
oppression. For that, one needs the requisite concept. Following
O’Connor, I contend that racial oppression provides the background
against which the legitimate use of terms like “racist action” and “racist
ideology” acquires a prescriptively justified sense. By positing that racism
is racial oppression I am laying down a form of representation that will
hopefully prove useful for its explanatory power. It is an attempt to see the
connections in things, to view racial oppression as the glue that binds oth-
erwise discrete forms and manifestations of vile and often insidious racial
phenomena together.  As illustrations, I would point to my analyses of
responsibility for implicit racial bias and reluctant racism.
The oppression approach to racism strikes me as promising, because the
all-encompassing nature of oppression seems to be precisely what is needed
to bring unity and clarity to the discrete phenomena that are justly called
“racist.” After all, oppressive systems are, functionally speaking, notorious
for generating multifarious ills, and white supremacy in particular has been
a source of the types of historical injustices mentioned above. There is a
need then to condemn racial oppression, and to conceive of this harm as
seriously morally objectionable. The above is not of course meant to be a
complete justification of my contention that racism ought to be viewed as
racial oppression. It is but  the prima facie justification of a preliminary
investigation. Moreover, a final caveat is in order. My proposal is that
­racism is the core or the most basic form of racism. Most of what is justly
called “racism,” however, is not intrinsically or characteristically oppres-
sive, but is oppressive in virtue of its role as a contributing cause (symp-
tom). Hence the norm “Racism is racial oppression” is but a helpful
shorthand for the following rule-­formulation: “Racial oppression is a spe-
cial kind of racial injustice as well as the core of racism, that by reference
to which ascriptions of racism are to be explained and justified.  Racial
oppression is the background condition that explains the various forms of
racial ills which merit an ascription of racism.” (I will say a bit more about
racial oppression as a kind of injustice in Chaps. 8 and 9.)

29
 Ibid., 5. Elsewhere in the book, she develops this point through an extended discussion
of the meaning of church burning as a practice (see chapters 3 and 4 of her Oppression and
Responsibility).
298  A. G. URQUIDEZ

7.3   The Explanatory Condition

My second desideratum for a moralist theory of “racism” is that it should
attempt to explain one form of racism in terms of more basic forms. I have
already noted that explanation does not exist in a vacuum, and is essen-
tially guided by our values. In deciding which forms of racism are most
basic, for instance, we presuppose a certain teleological orientation: there
is a particular moralist end in mind. I have argued that this end should
center  the moral-representational needs of racism’s historical victims.
However, there is a second kind of explanation that theory must provide:
sociocultural explanation.30 My aim in this section is to clarify this form of
explanation.

7.3.1  
Racism as Sociocultural Phenomenon
As discussed in Chaps. 1 and 3, I accept Clevis Headley’s notion that rac-
ism is a sociocultural phenomenon.31 Let us consider the way in which this
notion enters social scientific discourse. In social psychology and educa-
tion the term “sociocultural approach” is used to denote a certain meth-
odological orientation. This approach is highly critical of individualist
accounts of racism, and originated in response to individualism in these
fields. Scholars in the sociocultural  tradition argue that racism must be
viewed as a social-structural problem rather than an “atomistic” problem.
Sociocultural approaches view racism as a system of racial oppression, and
they take racial oppression to be a normal (and constitutive feature of
society. Racism is a system that is deeply embedded in society. Atomistic
(individualistic/personalist) approaches, by contrast, locate racism in the
hearts, minds, and conduct of individuals. Racism on this alternative is
thought to consist in mental states, such as  hostility or  prejudice, or in
behavior, such as discrimination. In my view, the sociocultural approach
provides a way of framing judgments about what is racist and what is not.

30
 As argued in Part I, Wittgensteinian philosophy subordinates the a posteriori to the a
priori, at least in this respect: grammar can be justified only on pragmatic grounds, by refer-
ence to the need for the convention. Hence sociocultural explanation should be subordinate
to moral explanation for purposes of a priori moral theorizing.
31
 For examples of non-philosophical scholarship that embodies what I am calling the
sociocultural approach, see Glen Adams et al. (2008a), Glen Adams et al. (2008b), Oyserman
and Swim (2001), and Swim and Stangor (1998), Crenshaw (1991), and Freeman (1978).
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  299

It is helpful in allowing one to view phenomena in terms of their role in

sustaining racial oppression.
Proponents of the sociocultural approach argue that it is superior
to methodological individualism. First, it has the virtue of defining “rac-
ism” from the victim’s perspective rather than the dominant group’s per-
spective. A second virtue is that racism is seen as deeply embedded, that is,
as highly integrated into public and political life. This, of course, compli-
cates our understanding of racism, but in so doing extends our apprecia-
tion of racism as a problem foundational to society. This is what makes
Mills’ notion of a society founded on a racial contract so powerful.  To
illustrate, consider the notion that particular manifestations of racism
should not be viewed as isolated or localized problems, but as manifesta-
tions of problems that are organic to society. In Chap. 1, I discussed the
hypothetical situation of a store manager racially profiling his customers,
on the premise that members of some races are more likely to shoplift than
others. Is the manager’s practice racist? Standard evaluations of the man-
ager’s practice are often discussed in localized fashion. The focus tends to
be on the practice’s public rationale or intended consequences, or else on
the agent’s intentions and motives. It is possible, however, to assess the
practice in relationship to other social phenomena, that is, in respect to its
role within society. If our evaluative scope is restricted to the practice’s
rationale or its consequences for the specific individuals targeted, or if the
scope is restricted to the agent’s motives or moral character, then one will
not take account of the burden that such a practice can impose on the
targeted group. This is objectionable, however, for imposing an unjust
burden on a group of people is a morally relevant consideration. Indeed,
it is all the more relevant when that group suffers from stigmatization due
to a legacy of past social injustice. If this logic is correct, then the moral
status of a particular case of racial profiling cannot be determined inde-
pendent of taking account of the empirical fact that past racism contin-
ues to have an impact on the present. This causal effect, in other words,
is morally significant since it reproduces group vulnerabilities. Nonetheless,
some will view this holistic approach to moral evaluation as a limitation
rather than a virtue for a theory of racism, because  it fails to jive with
commonsense thinking about issues of personal responsibility, which
do not always acknowledge such entities as group sins and responsibilities.
To this I reply that, in the previous chapter, I argued that the goal of
prescriptive theory is not to systematize commonsense thinking, but to
theorize how we ought to think about racism. Plausibly, the p ­ ragmatic
300  A. G. URQUIDEZ

warrant for the grammar of “racism” is that it is (and ought to be) a tool
for social justice. In this section I analyze a few grammatical propositions
that are congenial to a sociocultural approach to racism. I do so in an effort
to more sharply distinguish a priori and empirical analysis within the study
of racism, and to elucidate their relationship.
(1) Racism is a sociocultural phenomenon is a methodological norm of
representation within some social scientific circles. This norm licenses infer-
ences of the form: “X is racist, so X is (a part or is otherwise related to) a
sociocultural phenomenon.” The idea is that something should not be
called racism in the social sciences if it cannot be shown to be systematically
linked to a sociocultural phenomenon. Some view this broader sociocul-
tural phenomenon as a system that is properly called racial oppression.
Given this norm,  nothing should be called racism within the practice of
social-empirical explanation that does not bear the proper relation to a sys-
tem of domination (e.g., white supremacy). What I would like to suggest
is that this empirical limit on social scientific explanation is relevant to mor-
alist theories of racism. For instance, to say that racial hatred is racist, on
this approach, is to say that racial hatred is a part or an aspect of racial
oppression. That is, it plays a role in racial oppression. This role, in my view,
is morally significant in that understanding it is relevant to the practice of
social criticism. One may be interested to see how racial hatred functions in
the production of racial inequality, for instance. The idea is to broaden the
scope of moral resources for assessing the moral status of racial hatred.
Racial hatred may be more than a vice, it may also be a virulent political
force, and insofar as it is this fact is clearly morally significant; in particular,
racial hatred should be condemned for being a vehicle of racial inequality.
This analysis has implications for how we think about extensions of
“racist,” say, “racist person.” To think about racism socioculturally is to
theorize entities (like individuals) in their roles within the system of racial
oppression. Individuals may have more than one role to play in the subju-
gation of subordinate racial groups. An individual’s role in racism may be
that of an agent of racial oppression—say, an administrator of racist poli-
cies, “someone who is disposed to act on racist assumptions, even when
that person does not fully know that such assumptions shape his or her
conduct,” as in cases of implicit bias.32 A socioculturally informed approach
to political morality analyzes forms of agency in terms of the agent’s social
roles. Consider the question of whether white beneficiaries of racism are

 Shelby (2016, 24).

32
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  301

racist. Some philosophers are inclined to follow Cudd in arguing that ben-
eficiaries of racial oppression are only weakly morally responsible for their
complicity with a racist system. But consider the following scenario. Some
who oppose reparations have benefited from wealth inheritances that were
unjustly accumulated by their white ancestors, through acts of theft and
economic exploitation. A white beneficiary of past racism claims that she
herself has done nothing to bring about this unjust state of affairs. This
individual advances her interests on the basis of that injustice, yet fails to
see that her material inheritance is an unjust transaction. Her opposition
to any form of monetary rectification thus lacks moral standing. The inter-
est of social justice would be more concerned to create a more equitable
sharing of economic burdens; that is, it would prioritize correcting past
injustices over disadvantaging and inconveniencing those who presently
benefit from that injustice vis-à-vis their superior social position. The intu-
ition that it is wrong to punish whites for the sins of their fathers is pres-
ently valued more highly than the intuition that systematically locking out
entire groups of people from intergenerational wealth is wrong. This
moral disconnect and disregard merits the label “racism” because it is a
means of sustaining a permanent, economic undercaste. Now, a sociocul-
tural perspective would take account of the functional complicity that
standard discourses against reparations play in controlling the narrative
surrounding reparations. Do such discourses lack moral standing? Do they
quell the political efforts of those engaged in the morally just cause of
reparations by virtue of undermining a national political will that helps to
explain why a reparations program is rarely taken seriously? If so, then the
individuals propounding such discourses are arguably racist, that is, play a
racist role in perpetuating the unjust economic burden placed upon sub-
ordinate racial groups.
Commonsense thinking is thus challenged by taking account of the
empirical reality, which embodies the legacy of racial oppression. In com-
monsense thinking, the connection between racism and individuals is usu-
ally conceived in terms of personal morality. This relationship might be
expressed thus: (2) Racism is a matter of individual or personal wrongdo-
ing. How this would apply in the case of individualist phenomena is obvi-
ous. To call a belief racist would be to condemn it as an aspect of the
individual; hence, it would be to condemn the individual. Recent theorists
have sought to extend moral-individualist accounts of racism by theoriz-
ing institutional racism in agential terms. However, none have explicitly
sought to account for the phenomenon of racial oppression. Is racial
302  A. G. URQUIDEZ

oppression always racist, on these individualist theories? How might the

statement,  “Racial oppression is racist” be analyzed on an individualist
definition of “racism”? Presumably, racial oppression would be analyzed as
a function of personal wrongdoing. The analysis would specify criteria for
identifying and condemning racial oppressors (i.e., for holding them
accountable for their individual contribution to a system of oppression).
Blum and Garcia seem to be committed to something like this view. Blum,
for example, argues that calling a practice institutionally racist “implies
that the practice was, or is, driven by racist motives (despite that implica-
tion’s being disclaimed in the [standard] definition), and tars it with an
opprobrium that implies that it could never be morally acceptable.”33 If
every instance of racial oppression, on the personal/agential approach,
must be intrinsically linked to “racist motives,” as Blum claims, then it is
clear that racial oppression necessarily entails that racial bigots are actively
at work in keeping subordinate races in their place. This, in turn, suggests
that Blum’s agential approach is impotent to accommodate more subtle
forms of racial oppression, such as those considered above. That is, Blum’s
account has the unintuitive implication that certain forms of racial oppres-
sion are not racist. For instance, suppose we concede that the racial wealth
gap is an instance or contributing cause of racial oppression. How might
Blum’s individualist theory explain the wrongness of this case? He might
implausibly assert that all or most white beneficiaries of the racial wealth
gap have racist (unconscious) motives. Alternatively, he might assert that
there are no such motives and that, therefore, there is no racism here. The
former seems implausible, whereas the latter seems to entail the absurdity
that racial oppression is not necessarily racist. This counterexample sug-
gests that a broader sociocultural approach to racism is necessary to
account for cases of racial oppression (i.e., structuralist accounts of institu-
tional racism).
I have now contrasted two approaches to racism, the personal and
political approaches. The personal approach presupposes (2) and is cen-

33
 Blum (2002, 23). The definition under consideration is a standard account of institu-
tional racism: it is any “practice that is itself free of racial bias but in its implementation has a
disproportionately negative effect on subordinate racial groups” (22). The example under
consideration is the seniority system: “since previous employment discrimination has allowed
whites to accumulate much more seniority than blacks and Latinos, a system of greater job
protection and rewards for seniority has disproportionately negative impact on these racial
groups. With less seniority, black and Latino workers are those most vulnerable to layoffs due
to recession or downsizing” (22–23).
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  303

tered on issues of personal responsibility, viewed within a characterological

or some other individualist moral framework. The political approach, by
contrast, presupposes (1) and is centered on issues of justice and injustice.
This approach, as we have seen, is characterized by the sociocultural prem-
ise that racist phenomena necessarily  play a role in racial oppression.
The guiding norm here might be expressed thus: (3) Racism is a sociocul-
tural phenomenon that is the central object of cultural criticism (i.e., social
and political criticism). Shelby and Haslanger, among others, have recently
advocated for this approach.34 We should be careful, however, to avoid
caricatures of the political approach. One might hold, for example, that
the political approach reduces all moral ills to political ones. To take a
famous example: some scholars, who subscribe to the “prejudice plus
power” model of racism, argue that blacks cannot be racist against whites.
This is interpreted by some rather uncharitably: as suggesting that blacks
are never morally responsible for manifestations of racial bigotry or resent-
ment against whites. This is a “straw man” characterization of the posi-
tion, for the power plus prejudice model only makes a conceptual point
about racism. The claim is not that blacks lack moral responsibility in the
racial domain (in their interactions with whites), but that their failings in
this domain should not be condemned as racist. This is consistent with
availing ourselves of existing moral (including racial) vocabulary to con-
demn the wrongdoings of blacks against whites. Terms like “racial insen-
sitivity,” “racial prejudice,” and so on may be legitimately applied to
blacks. Another caricature is that the political approach is not in the busi-
ness of generating criteria for holding agents personally responsible, and
that it is consequently antithetical to the concept of personal responsibility.
This too is mistaken. If a political theorist concludes that racial profiling is
racially unjust, this may entail that agents who participate in racial profil-
ing should be punished and their behavior condemned. Hence both per-
sonal and political approaches advance theories that have implications for
interpersonal relations and their moral status. What is distinctive about the
political  approach is that holding individuals accountable for personal
wrongdoing is not its final aim. Rather, considerations of personal respon-
sibility inform and are informed by considerations of social justice. Political
morality accounts of racism ascribe moral responsibility to individuals
when individual wrongdoing is systemically integral to racial oppression.

 Shelby (2014, 63). Haslanger (2017, 2, 6).

34
304  A. G. URQUIDEZ

One of the ramifications of my defense of sociocultural analysis is that

empirical analysis is important to moralist theory. It is important for the
following reason: if we are to properly criticize racism qua sociocultural
phenomenon, it is necessary that we understand how social phenomena
work, including the role played by race neutral practices. Empirical analysis
may offer explanations and  causal accounts of sociocultural phenomena,
thereby helping us to understand the causes of racial oppression. In addi-
tion, empirical analysis can uncover new racial ills for moral theory to assess.
For it is the business of empirical theory to discover subtle, covert, and new
forms of racial ill when they emerge. Good examples of this include the
discovery of institutional racism and, more recently, implicit racial bias. In
short, as critics of the harmful roles of race in society, moral theory is in a
better position to advance its criticisms if it is informed by empirical theory.
This, of course, comes back to my position that moralist theory is justified
by reference to a moral-representational need, the need to combat racial
oppression.
Having defended the primacy of political morality over and against per-
sonal morality in the theory of racism, I can now codify the above in a defi-
nition of  “racial oppression”: Racial oppression is  the core of racism; it is
perhaps best conceived as the set of social conditions that bring about an unjust
condition of racial vulnerability. To sum up, I have argued that we should
not call something racist unless it plays a role in racial oppression. To come
full circle, this brings me to my initial formulation of the explanatory con-
dition in Sect. 7.1. There I stated that a moralist definition should strive to
explain one form of ­racism in terms of more basic forms, for example, by
showing that one is the cause of the other. My oppression-centered theory
of racism meets this desideratum by positing the norm: racial oppression is
the focal point from which all forms and manifestations of racism are to be
explained. One example of this is that individual forms of racism should be
explained in terms of racial oppression. This may well have revisionist
implications, as far as ordinary language is concerned. On the one hand, it
may mean that some personal racial wrongdoings are not racist if they do
not play the right kind of role in racial oppression. On the other hand, it
may mean that some things which are not normally called racist (say,
because they do not involve personal wrongdoing) ought to be called racist
because of their role in racial oppression.
A theory of “racism” ought to explain how various forms and manifes-
tations of racism are part of a wider sociocultural system, a web or nexus
of sociocultural interactions, directed at a common function (racial oppres-
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  305

sion). In the actual world, this function is best conceived in terms of

reproducing a system of white supremacy. To identify something as racist
is to implicate it as having a role in the nexus of white supremacy.
A final point. Theoretically, one could accept the explanatory condition
without identifying racial oppression (or white supremacy) as the ultimate
function. Nevertheless, I maintain that “racism” should be defined opera-
tionally, as a function or output (regardless of what one takes that function
to be). For apart from a functionalist definition, I do not see how any
essentialist account of racism can successfully accommodate the various
things that are properly called racist. Function-essentialism stands in con-
trast to category-essentialism. The categorial essentialist believes that it is
possible to define “racism” in terms of a specific category of entity, which
captures every instance and form of racism. A functionalist account also
posits a common form: but it is one that makes no reference to the char-
acteristic properties of objects. Instead, the form it imposes makes reference
to the characteristic function of a certain kind of objectionable racial phe-
nomenon. My function-essentialism is one I am prescribing. And my rec-
ommendation is partly based on the premise that a theory of racism ought
to accommodate much of the categorical plurality of racism, for most, if
not all, categories of entity are capable of playing a role in racial oppression.

7.3.2  Criteria and Vagueness
It might be objected that my account of racism-as-racial-oppression is
unhelpful because it is too vague for purposes of moral analysis and every-
day ascriptions of racism. Here it becomes important to talk about criteria
of application. We have some well-established criteria for the application
of “racism.” A criterion, in Wittgenstein’s sense, is a priori evidence that
immediately licenses the application of a term (see Chap. 2). The evidence
is a priori because it forges a conceptual connection. A “license” is here
conceived as an inference ticket; one need not cash one’s ticket, but one is
permitted to do so (for the a priori connection makes the inference intel-
ligible). The definition of “bachelor” licenses me to call an unmarried man
“a bachelor,” but I am not obliged to do so. Similarly, cases of racial slav-
ery license the judgment, “That is racist.” A general definition of “rac-
ism,” I admit, does not automatically generate specific criteria for other
uses of “racist” and “racism.” The methodological discussion of the previ-
ous section added an additional criterion: if something can be shown to play
a contributing role to racial oppression, then this should be condemned
306  A. G. URQUIDEZ

as ­racist. Perhaps it will be objected that this criterion is not as informative

as it ought to be. After all, it does not provide an algorithm for generating
criteria for most  categories  of entity. For instance, it does not generate
specific criteria for “racist belief,” “racist intention,” et cetera. All of this
suggests that “Racism is racial oppression” is too vague to be helpful in
determining criteria for the various things that are called racist.
Is this not a problem for my oppression approach to racism? Not neces-
sarily, for although it does not provide a mechanical procedure, it does
provide a set of tools that can be applied on a case-by-case basis. No
mechanical procedure is possible, on my approach, because the phenom-
enon of racism is sociocultural: its temporal and empirical nature renders
judgments of racism contingent upon the facts and circumstances. We
might say that a sociocultural approach to racism entails a contextualist
principle. The ways in which racial oppression may be sustained can change
over time. What is more, there are various kinds of “contributions” or
“causes” of racism, so clearly more needs to be said here. The a priori
starting point, however, is the primacy of the historical victim. And the
explanatory model it offers is that racist phenomena are to be explained in
terms of their role in sustaining a condition of racial vulnerability. We have
seen that this is a workable model, since we have witnessed its ability to
account for some cases. What is correct about this worry is that my pro-
posed norm of representation is vague, for I do not presume that we have
decided in advance of every possible situation what we are and are not
willing to call a contribution to racial oppression. Nevertheless, my crite-
rion is a start. And I chose to start at the broadest level possible: my norm
should be understood as the most general and overarching criterion of
racism, as I’ve argued. I should also note that the vagueness of the concept
of racism is not something we can escape, at least not if we want the con-
cept to be empirically dynamic.
Given the vagueness of my general criterion, it might be objected that
adopting it would allow us to condemn more than we would like. That is,
it overdetermines the concept of racism, overinflates it in ways that are
obviously objectionable. Garcia provides an instructive example:

Now, imagine that a program of large-scale deincarceration, undertaken for

antiracist reasons of the sort recently advanced by Angela Davis and Glenn
Loury (among many others), turned out to hurt Black people on the whole,
or most Black people, or the worst-off Black people, and to do so in ways that
could have been anticipated. Note that, like Glasgow’s first ‘Real Estate’
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  307

scenario,35 the program’s implementation depends on the occurrence of past

racism, which partially accounts for the disproportionally large number of
Black inmates. Does this combination of racially disparate impact with racially
tainted history suffice to make the decarceration program institutional anti-
Black racism? Intuitively, we think not. Indeed, just the opposite: it is an
antiracist initiative, even if an unsuccessful, even counterproductive, one.36

To fit his counterexample to my proposal, if decarceration contributes to

the racial oppression of racialized black and brown men, then it seems
that this “contribution to racial oppression” satisfies my criterion of rac-
ism, for the individuals that are harmed are historical victims of racism.
Consequently, the decarceration program seems racist. But, intuitively, it
seems that this type of effort is precisely what we should not call a racist
measure. On the contrary, this is what we should call an anti-racist mea-
sure. What are we to make of Garcia’s objection? One way out is to argue
that, if the decarceration program has harmful racial results that “could
have been anticipated,” then a case can be made that the program was
implemented prematurely, which is to say negligently. Suppose, however,
that no negligence and irresponsibility is involved in the articulation and
application of this program. What this example shows is that the concept
of racism-as-racial-­oppression needs an additional constraint to stave off
this type of worry. In my view, the issue before us is analogous to refining
a moral principle like “Murder is wrong” and “Lying is wrong,” both of
which admit of various exceptions.
One possible way to refine the notion at issue is to stipulate that: Sincere
and reasonably well-thought out strategies that aim at combating racial
oppression cannot be racist, even if they inadvertently contribute to racial
oppression. This might seem like cheating, but is not so. For it is we who
are in charge of our grammar, as it is a vehicle of our needs. Our grammar
is not responsible to any body of facts. The grammatical norm requires
pragmatic justification, however, since it breaks with our criterion of rac-
ism. An illuminating example developed by Leonard Harris will aid me in
developing the pragmatic case for just such an exception. He queries: Are
slave insurrections unjust? They occasionally occurred during the heyday of
chattel slavery. These revolts, he claims, were morally necessitated, despite
the fact that they were doomed to failure in almost all cases. If we were to
employ, say, David Goldberg’s criterion for “irrational” or “unreasonable”

 See Glasgow (2009, 72f).

35

 Garcia (2016, 225).

36
308  A. G. URQUIDEZ

beliefs and conduct, we would be forced to conclude that slave insurrec-

tions are almost always irrational and unreasonable.37 Yet, slave insurrec-
tions always have as their aim liberation from human bondage. Moreover,
Harris argues, they are meritorious because they are expressions of self-­
respect, tenacity, personal dignity (among other virtues), under conditions
of oppression. Garcia’s decarceration program and Harris’ slave insurrec-
tions are both likely to exacerbate racial inequality, that is, produce undesir-
able consequences: decarceration could lead to the worsening of blacks’
social condition just like  a failed revolt could lead to the deaths of an
enslaved community, including children and others who may not have par-
ticipated in it. These are unwitting and unintentional contributions to racial
oppression (though they could have been foreseen), but they are not racist.
Indeed, it is not even clear that they are morally wrong. It seems that what
is needed is elaboration of the notion “contribution to racial oppression,”
which ought not blame the victim for resisting oppression, for affirming
one’s humanity and dignity. Said differently, to blame the victim of oppres-
sion would be to undermine the point of the concept of racism. For the
point is to use it to advance the interests of the oppressed.
We might here appeal to some principle of justice. In his Dark Ghettos,
Shelby thinks deeply and carefully about the justification of violent conduct,
which he understands in relation to Rawlsian principles of justice and legiti-
mate forms of social defiance and disobedience.38 He defends violent forms
of defiance in particular circumstances. His basic idea is that Rawlsian reci-
procity is at the heart of justice. Thus the basic structure of society com-
mands respect and obedience to its laws and institutions, but only under
conditions of mutual reciprocity. The basic principle he derives from Ralws is
that every denizen of society has a reasonable expectation to build a dignified
life in the society. If one has the ability to survive only, say, on a “starvation
wage,” then this reasonable expectation is not met. When  one’s repeated
attempts to do right by the laws of society are unsuccessful and unrecipro-
cated, one is free to resist and defy the norms of the state. When it is an entire
group that is targeted, this is even more unjust, for it suggests that society
does not care about its obligations to a devalued minority class. Shelby thus
argues that when the basic structure is so inherently tilted against particular
groups, they are not bound by the norms of reciprocity and fairness. Their
basic right to a dignified life justifies overt acts of defiance, even violent defi-
ance, provided that its aim is liberation from oppression.

 Harris (2002). For Goldberg’s criterion, see (1999).

37

 Shelby (2016, part III).

38
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  309

If Shelby is correct that the injustice of racial oppression licenses acts of

civil disobedience and defiance, then Harris is correct that oppressed peo-
ples stand in need of their own ethic, a logic of insurrection. Harris’ insur-
rectionist ethic is partly a logic of self-preservation, but it is principally, in
its core, a logic of liberation and hope, by means of cultivating resources
such as self-respect and dignity to resist oppression. The logic of cultivating
virtues of self-respect under conditions of oppression explains why insur-
rectionist acts are capable of having moral worth. It may seem absurd to
hold that beating and murdering one’s master or his innocent children is a
meritorious act. One might believe that such acts are wrong, regardless of
the circumstances. To this I reply that prioritizing the value of personal
moral responsibility over the value of liberation from oppression amounts
to blaming the victim for a situation she did not desire or have any control
in creating. We must not forget that it is not just the innocent white child,
that is murdered during an insurrection, that is innocent, but the enslaved
man and woman, also. What is more, the situation is socially constructed
and depends entirely on the oppressive will of the oppressor class. The vic-
tim did not find herself there merely through misfortune or bad luck; she
was placed there, with the aim of subjecting her to a state of degradation
and dehumanization, for the sake of exploitation. Precepts of moral respon-
sibility surely apply first and foremost to agents who have the freedom and
ability to set things right. If this is correct, then racial oppression, at least in
paradigmatic cases, creates an oppressive condition that compels those in
bondage to say: “I simply have no choice, but to…” There is a moral “must”
expressed in this assertion. Perhaps this is more than a “must” of material
necessity and survival; perhaps it is also a “must” of moral compulsion.
Does moral theory have a duty to take the victim’s moral “must” seri-
ously? Following Harris, I believe that it absolutely does. He argues that
moral theory must start from the rationalization and justification of insur-
rectionist acts. Similarly, I argue that a theory of racism must start from
the rationalization and justification of the logics that oppressed peoples are
compelled to contemplate. Arguably, they have a moral duty to make sense
of their lived experience and develop reasoned articulations under condi-
tions of oppression. The oppressed individual’s lack of choice and feeling of
compulsion establishes a pragmatic ground that an anti-racist approach to
the definition of “racism” ought to take seriously. If the aim is to define
“racism” from the perspective of the victim, in the service of the victim’s
interests, then a decision to admit exceptions to the rule “Whatever con-
tributes to racial oppression is racist” might be reasonable given the logic
we are trying to systematize in theory. As Baker and Hacker point out (in
310  A. G. URQUIDEZ

a very different context), how we draw the ­essential/inessential distinction

“is often a context-dependent and purpose-relative matter.” “Our criteria
for sameness and difference of meaning are often indeterminate. If one has
to give a determinate answer to this kind of question in a given context, it
is a decision that is called for, not a discovery.”39

7.3.3  Racism as Open Texture and Unfolding Process

There is one more issue about vagueness that I would like to discuss. One
might have thought that if the aim of a book is to provide a definition of
a term, then it is a mark of the author’s failure that the definition provided
is vague and open-ended. In this section I explain why this objection is
misplaced. My contention is that in the case of racism, the desire to remove
complete vagueness is undesirable. On the contrary, some vagueness is a
desirable feature of any proposed definition of the term.
One virtue of using the term “racism” to refer to an empirical process
or condition has not gone unrecognized by scholars of racism. The empir-
ical world, we are inclined to say, far from determining a static and
unchanging essence, determines a modifiable and malleable world for us.
Empirical processes, including those contingent upon social practices, are
fuzzy, not always well-defined. Our concepts are often left vague or inde-
terminate, so arguments for limiting the concept one way rather than
another are called for. The open-endedness of empirical concepts is best
captured, I believe, by the concept of open texture.
Friedrich Waismann introduced this concept to describe empirical
terms. He thought that “most of our empirical concepts are not delim-
ited in all possible directions.”40 One example he gives is of the concept
gold. Suppose we discovered some piece of gold-looking substance that
satisfied all our criteria for gold but emitted some new radiation, unlike
any piece of gold known to have existed. Should we call it gold? We may
choose to, thereby updating our definition. Or we may choose against
doing so. In either case, the appropriate conclusion to draw, according
to Waismann, is this: a decision is called for precisely because our con-
cept has not been delimited in this particular respect. Experience can
throw new information at us, and when it does we encounter the possi-
bility of updating our definitions. What is true for gold, however, is true

 Baker and Hacker (2005, 156).

39

 Waismann, “Verifiability” (1945/1951).

40
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  311

for almost all empirical terms. For empirical patterns are not always uni-
form, but come in degrees, admit of variation and, in some cases, have
unforeseen consequences. Moreover, subtle and drastic shifts, in initial
conditions can generate a wide range of possible outcomes. The term
“open” thus signifies an indeterminate phenomenon, one constituted by
an essentially endless set of possibilities. Some of these possibilities may
be likelier than others. But these possibilities underline the openness of
our concepts.41
Peter Hacker thinks that Waismann’s position has an unwelcome
implication that undermines the notion of open-texture. The implica-
tion  is that it is impossible for a competent user of an open-texture
term to know every possible thing to which the term applies.42 He then
observes that this theory of empirical concepts is incompatible with
Wittgenstein’s account of criteria of understanding (see Chap. 2). For
understanding a word consists in knowing how to use it in the relevant
contexts, and for Wittgenstein this means that meaning, or a term’s
conditions of application, must be transparent to competent speakers.
No one is acquainted with every thing to which the term “dog” applies
(since no one has witnessed every dog there is), but every competent
speaker knows the conditions under which this term  applies. At the
limits of this knowledge, of course, lie borderline cases over which
there can be legitimate disagreement. However, from the
Wittgensteinian perspective, these cases, which reflect the indetermina-
cies of our concepts, are not cases for which we do not “know” whether
the concept applies or not. Rather, they are cases about which we have
not decided whether to apply the term or not. Have we decided that
“game” is to be applied to War Games? Logic Games? Degenerate cases
of chess? And have we decided how many rules of chess can be aban-
doned before the game in question is no longer properly called chess? It
seems clear that we have not decided such cases, for different people
will have different intuitions about them. Settling these disputes is a
matter of decision rather than of being true to the facts. It is a matter
of weighing pragmatic considerations and making a decision (and we

41
 For a helpful discussion of open texture concepts, in the social sciences, see Root (1993,
210f).
42
 Peter Hacker (1996, 164). Hacker takes “open texture” to mean “not vagueness but the
possibility of vagueness” (ibid.).
312  A. G. URQUIDEZ

normally do so relative to the task at hand, for generally speaking we

choose to leave the concept open).
For Wittgenstein, the idea that we do not now know some of the cases
to which the term applies is confused. However, there is a way to preserve
the spirit of open texture, on the Wittgensteinian approach. We can hold
that an open texture concept is one that is extensionally open in the sense
that we treat it as modifiable in light of new information. For many social
terms (among other referring expressions), we expect to uncover indeter-
minacies in applying them. We anticipate changes in our social environ-
ments and discourses which will generate questions about the utility of the
underlying concept. Sometimes these considerations  will raise the issue
of  whether to extend the concept. In such cases, it may be prudent to
describe the referent of the term as a temporal/sociocultural phenomenon.
Sociocultural concepts are distinguished from other “open” definitions in
that their openness to modification and refinement is based on politically
significant shifts in the empirical and social landscape. For it is ultimately a
politically significant phenomenon that the linguistic community aims to
track. The above criticisms of open-texture notwithstanding, I argue that
this concept (or at least this metaphor) is a useful one.43
It is common for scholars to describe racism as a temporal concept.44
Racism is said to change, evolve over time, to be chameleonic, to be an
enduring condition, and so forth. To provide just one example, George
Frederickson describes the concept of racism as a “scavenger concept,”
one that latches on to new forms of racial dynamism when it is opportune
to do so: “Racism is therefore ‘a scavenger ideology, which gains its power
from its ability to pick out and utilize ideas and values from other sets of
ideas and beliefs in specific socio-historical contexts.’ But there are also
‘strong continuities in the articulation of the images of the “other,” as well
as in the images which are evident in the ways in which racist movements
define the boundaries of “race” and “nation.”’”45 What I want to consider
is the following grammatical proposition: Racism is a temporally unfolding
process. I think this pattern of inference is warranted. What does it amount
to? What is its significance in the context of moral theory? Why not, for
example, settle for saying that the concept of racism (as opposed to racism

43
 Headley (2006, 2) has also suggested that the concept of racism can be fruitfully under-
stood as an open-texture concept.
44
 See, for example, Goldberg (1993); Headley (2000).
45
 Frederickson (2002, 8, 22).
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  313

itself) is embedded in a sociohistorical process? I argue that the picture of

racism as an evolving and unstable entity is attractive because it anticipates
and lends itself to adding new forms of racism. Is implicit bias racist, for
example? Are microaggressions racist? A decision is called for.
In the next chapter I discuss a “shift” from old racism (biological rac-
ism) to new (colorblind racism). What does this shift consist in? To call it
a shift is somewhat misleading. For it primarily consisted in adding new
criteria to our concept of racism, and only secondarily (if at all) in remov-
ing old criteria. There was no radically revisionist transformation of our
concept of racism. For example, a biological conception of race was taken
to be criterial for racism. The criterion can be expressed in a grammatical
proposition: “Racism is belief in the biological superiority of some races
and the biological inferiority of others.” We did not abandon this rule sim-
ply because we adopted new criteria, such as this one: “Racism is the belief
that some cultural expressions are inferior, based on race.” More gener-
ally, in expanding our concept of “racial ideology” to cover new forms of
discourse (such as Bonilla-Silva’s “abstract liberalism”), we did not aban-
don the aforementioned criterion for racist ideology. The belief that some
races are superior and others inferior remains a paradigmatic kind of racist
belief. After all, we do not say: “It used to be racist to believe that some
races are inferior and others superior, but now it’s okay.” And this reveals
something about the grammar of “racism.” The concept (for the most
part—when it is doing moral work for us) is expanded to cover new pos-
sibilities, but not to remove old ones. The extension of the concept in
any given instance introduces a new technique of applying “racist.” Thus
the new criterion for “racist belief” permits us to condemn forms of dis-
course that were not associated with racism before (for example, “cultural
racism”). The shift that occurred on the material level (in sociohistorical
conditions) led to a conceptual shift. But the conceptual shift was marked
by the expansion of the concept. New techniques were added, but existing
techniques remained.
It is in this sense that racism can be fruitfully thought of as an “unfold-
ing process.” From its humble beginnings, the terms “racism” and “rac-
ist” have greatly expanded their reach. We now talk about “institutional
racism,” “racist ideology,” “colorblind racism,” “structural racism,”
­“cultural racism,” “racist liberals,” and so forth. Shifts/expansions in our
concept of racism should be welcomed if they enhance our understanding
of phenomena on the ground. But we are not looking to add just any
concept-­ forming technique of application. We must keep the victim’s
314  A. G. URQUIDEZ

needs at the forefront of our thought. Interestingly, the justification for

adding new techniques appears to have been grounded in old ones. Hence
we speak of continuity and evolution from one form of racism to another,
and of racism going “underground” (by which we mean: becoming
covert), but not of old forms of racism becoming obsolete. Or rather,
when we say that they have become obsolete, we mean that they are no
longer widely practiced, not that they are no longer racist. Racism, then,
is an unfolding process. (“More and more reality is daily being brought to
light.”) To retain coherence in the notion of racism-as-a-process I propose
that we view it as unfolding in the sense that the concept permits of new
criterial additions, new forms of racism. These new forms are properly
understood as emerging from shifting conditions in the reproduction of
racial oppression.46
What is the significance of viewing racism as an unfolding process? A
whole range of phenomena resemble certain forms of racism in various
respects, but it is not clear whether we ought to call them racist. Is implicit
racial bias racist? Are microaggressions racist? Is white privilege racist? Are
all white people racist (as some philosophers have charged in recent
years)? Can nonwhites who lack “power” be racist against whites? Is the
discipline of philosophy racist (as Leonard Harris and Charles Mills argue)?47
Can academic disciplines be racist? Do we have predetermined criteria to
decide all these cases? The concept of racism is currently vague on at least
some of these issues. By viewing racism as an open texture—or as I prefer
to say, an unfolding process—we acknowledge that there is no predeter-
mined answer to the question of whether such and such should be called
racist, because the concept has not yet “unfolded,” as it were, on that
particular matter. It is we who must make the decision, not some putative
essence given by the ontological nature of racism. Further, adopting this
perspective encourages deliberation and discussion about our representa-
tional needs and whether in this or that case to extend the concept.
Much disagreement about racism, it seems, is not disagreement about
the concept per se, but about whether to extend the concept to such and

46
 The only time we should toss out an existing form of racism, the only time we should
revoke its criterial credentials, is when it is not pragmatically justifiable or when it conflicts
with other criteria of racism, and conflicts in a way that undermines the point of the concept
or prompts significant practical problems. And then we should say, “X has never been a legiti-
mate form of racism, it should have never been called ‘racism.’ X is not part of the unfolding
process of racism.”
47
 Harris (1995).
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  315

such cases. Not every question about whether such and such is racist is one
in search of a criterion of racism; some are in search of empirical informa-
tion to apply an existing criterion. For instance, do we need a new crite-
rion of racism to determine whether the movie industry is racist? Or do we
simply need to apply the criteria we have? Perhaps what we need is more
information about whether discrimination goes on, to what degree it goes
on, and so forth; or perhaps we need information to decide whether some
institutional norm of fairness is systematically violated in order to decide.
That is to say, we may simply need to apply the definitions of “unjust racial
discrimination” and “institutional racism” to settle the issue. Nevertheless,
there are cases where a conceptual determination is called for. Isn’t implicit
bias, for example, very similar to what is called racist belief? It is similar,
but is it sufficiently so? And in what respects? There are analogies and dis-
analogies for us to consider. Arguments are thus made on each side, and
in each case an appeal is made to a similarity or difference by comparison
to paradigmatic forms of racism.
To help resolve these matters, an overarching principle would be help-
ful. A widely accepted principle of racism would enable us to  generate
narrower  criteria of application. For example, the question my defini-
tion invites us to ask is this: Does implicit racial bias contribute to racial
oppression? If so, then a case can potentially be made for calling it racist.
Successful argumentation terminates in the recommendation of a new cri-
terion of racism, a new grammatical proposition and rule for the correct
use of “racism.” To be clear, my proposed definition is not a replacement
of existing criteria. As a unifying and overarching norm, it may entail revi-
sions to current usage, but its primary functions are to solidify existing
criteria under a common form, and to serve as a means of generating new
criteria. The rationale for imposing an overarching unity on the concept
of racism is that doing so will best satisfy the representational needs of
historical victims of racism.
We can now explain why a  vague  concept of racism is desirable. It is
desirable because systems of racial oppression are dynamic and capable of
responding to forms of resistance; that is, they have a tendency to change.
As forms of racial oppression are molded in novel ways, an open-textured
concept of racism allows us to condemn and criticize such ­transformations.
One such development, which was discussed in Chap. 1, is the phenome-
non of language-game contestation in the development of the term
“reverse racism.”  Given  harmful and objectionable attempts to include
new criteria for “racism” which decenter racism’s historical victims, theo-
316  A. G. URQUIDEZ

rists must be vigilant in challenging such attempts. Conceptual resources

are necessary to license the judgment: “The claim that affirmative action is
racist is itself racist.” There is a need to condemn assaults on race-­conscious
policies, ostensibly rooted in liberal principles, often made in bad faith.
What is the criterion for saying that affirmative action is not just ineffective
or counterproductive, but racist”? Where did this criterion come from,
and how did it become established as a widely accepted criterion in society?
Empirical analysis is called for. These changes in social conditions generate
a need to condemn new forms of discourse and practice. If we define “rac-
ism” as racial oppression—that is, if we settle for this vague criterion as our
overarching principle—then we are one step closer toward explaining why
the charge of reverse racism is not just false but racist. Racism, then, is not
just an unfolding process, but  one that is  necessarily directed by values,
which currently are under assault and must be safeguarded.

7.4   The Resolution Condition

One of the claims I defended in the previous chapter can be stated as fol-
lows: “If ordinary usage of the term ‘racism’ prompts significant practical
difficulties that might be averted by revising it, then this fact counts as a
mark against the prescriptive status of ordinary usage and so counts as a
reason for revising it.” This provides a sketch of an adequacy condition
that may be fleshed out thus:

Resolution condition: Other things equal, a philosophical theory of “rac-

ism” is preferable over rival alternatives to the degree  that  it resolves
practical problems prompted by ordinary usage  and generates fewer
such problems than its rivals.

Because I provided the basis for this condition in the previous chapter, my
discussion of it here will be brief. Two kinds of practical problems were
identified in Chap. 6: pragmatics problems and political problems. Blum’s
inflation problem and Shelby’s political morality problem were cited as
examples. From Blum we learn that the ordinary concept of racism is
inflated and that it ought to be deflated, as much as possible. Doing so
requires the elimination of some common usage of “racism.” Blum is cor-
rect that deflating the concept would be a virtue, but not for intrinsic
reasons. Its value would derive from the fact that deflation would go some
way towards ameliorating certain communicative problems. In particular,
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  317

a deflated concept would mitigate potential conceptual confusion and

avert misunderstanding. It could also have the potential to rehabilitate the
moral force of “racism,” since the inflatedness of the concept functions to
diminish its moral force. How does my proposal that racism is racial
oppression fair on these fronts?
On the pragmatics front, it might be argued that my oppression defini-
tion of ‘racism” falls victim to Blum’s inflation problem. For it is arguable
that most racial ills (particularly those committed by whites) contribute to
racial oppression in some way or other. How should we respond to this
objection? It seems unlikely that every racial ill contributes to racial oppres-
sion. However, if defining “racism” as racial oppression inflates the concept,
which it plausibly will to some extent, then that is because racial oppression
permeates almost every aspect of public and private life. The guiding a priori
value of my analysis is to stipulate criteria for defining “racism” that will ben-
efit historical victims of racism. Hence the setbacks of inflation must be
weighed against the setbacks of defining “racism” in a way that might oth-
erwise not powerfully address the representational stake that historical vic-
tims of racism have in this debate. I do not have the relevant empirical data,
nor have I considered the relevant arguments on this front, but my suspi-
cion is that the need to criticize the pervasiveness of racial oppression over-
rides the need to resolve the inflation problem that my proposed grammatical
norm is likely to perpetuate. Moreover, there is no reason to think that, if
my proposed norm of representation should be adopted as the prevailing
norm, it would exacerbate the existing level of inflation beyond what is cur-
rently  the case in the practice of using “racism.” My oppression theory
inflates the concept of racism by positing that virtually every category of
entity can be racist, for in principle any category of entity can play a causal
role in sustaining racial oppression (given the right social conditions). At the
same time, it imposes a uniformity that does not currently exist across lin-
guistic practice. This uniformity consists in the requirement that an ostensi-
bly racist phenomenon must be shown to be racist by reference to its role in
sustaining white supremacy. More importantly, because the simplicity of the
definition makes it clear and easy to grasp (though not always easy to deter-
mine in practice), conceptual confusion and misunderstanding will be miti-
gated on my definition, as it would on most generalizing definitions (e.g.,
Glasgow’s “Racism is racial disrespect”).
How does my proposed definition deal with the problem of political
contestation? On the one hand, if racism were widely viewed as racial
oppression, it would be naive to think that alternative and incompatible
uses would not also prevail. That is, no definition of “racism” can be
318  A. G. URQUIDEZ

reasonably expected to end all contestation about what is racist. For

that, we need a magic wand, not a philosophical analysis. Further, polit-
ical contestation would persist even if everyone agreed that racism is
racial oppression. One reason for this is that there remains the question
about what the primary causes of oppression are. Perhaps, some would
be inclined to view a phenomenon like implicit racial bias as racially
oppressive while others would not. Such issues are decidable by refer-
ence to empirical arguments of the sort I sketched in my example of
implicit racial bias. There may be empirical limitations on our ability to
adequately address this question; these limitations may be a function of
insufficient information about the relationship of implicit bias to racial
oppression.  In any case, my point is that these outstanding issues are
decidable.
Another aspect of the political problem is that much disagreement is
a function of political contestation. In my view, where political interests
are involved,  many who favor, say, an individualist definition of “rac-
ism,” will probably continue to do so if they have a large enough stake
in conceiving of racism thus. There may be no way of persuading people
by moral-pragmatic argumentation in such cases. But then it does not
follow that we must abandon the theory of racism. As an anti-racist
community, we are obligated to insist upon a definition of “racism” that
places the victim at the center. Perhaps that is the most we can hope to
accomplish.
Another way to deal with the political reality of endless contestation is
to embrace the role of “social critic,” ala Shelby. “Social critics seek to
inform, and possibly shape, public opinion with clear and careful thinking,
well-established facts, and moral insight.”

The principal role of the philosophical social critic, as here conceived, is to

shed light on the most fundamental conceptual and normative issues that
race-related questions raise. Indeed, I propose that we view the contempo-
rary debate over the meaning of “racism” as, at its heart, a disagreement
among philosophically-minded social critics. In this discursive domain, gen-
erating general agreement on the meaning of “racism” is not the aim. The
objective is to arrive at the most illuminating account of racism, even if that
account is gained at the cost of breaking with common sense or seeming to
deny the obvious.48

48
 Shelby (2014, 63).
 7  ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR A PRESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF RACISM  319

Presumably, the reason why “generating general agreement on the mean-

ing of ‘racism’” should not be the aim of theory is that it is a dim, imprac-
tical prospect, and that for political reasons. Shelby might be right (though
I would need to see more argument for this), but I would argue that one
of the roles of the social critic—one of the ways that she “sheds light” on
conceptual and normative issues—is by convincing others about what she
takes racism to be. Policy discussions, for instance, may turn on a defini-
tion, and it is the role of the advocate to argue for the superiority of one
definition over the  others. Hence the role of the social critic cannot be
completely detached from metalinguistic negotiation and consensus build-
ing. Finally, I would add that if “[t]he objective is to arrive at the most
illuminating account of racism, even if that account is gained at the cost of
breaking with common sense or seeming to deny the obvious,” then my
proposal that racism is racial oppression should be seriously considered.49
If my argument in the previous chapter was meant to motivate my con-
tention that it is prima facie plausible that a prescriptive definition of “rac-
ism” is superior to alternatives to the degree that it addresses all relevant
practical problems prompted by ordinary usage of “racism,” my argument
in this section hopefully shows that despite any potential setbacks for my
proposed definition, it is plausible to conceive of racism as racial oppression.

7.5   Conclusion
In this chapter, I defended criteria for a definition of “racism” and defended
an account of racism. I argued that we should start with the vague defini-
tion that racism is racial oppression. On my view, racial oppression is vile
for many reasons, but its racist vileness is best explained in terms of politi-
cal considerations. Additionally, racial oppression generates other forms of
wrongness and injustice. One implication of this view is that racist ascrip-
tions suggest that there are other elements at work—other racist phenom-
ena—that are part of the network of racial oppression.
Although one of my aims has been to provide a prima facie defense of
that definition, my overarching aim in this book has been to make the case
for a normative-pragmatic approach to defining racism. My proposed defi-
nition can thus be viewed as a foil for discussing various adequacy condi-
tions for prescriptive theory, in order to illustrate the virtues of a
normative-pragmatic approach (conventionalism). To further refine my

 Ibid.
49
320  A. G. URQUIDEZ

conception, I propose that racial oppression be analyzed in terms of three

distinct paradigms: racial viciousness, racial dehumanization, and racial
injustice. Phenomena that fit any of these paradigms are primary causes of
racial oppression. Hence these norms function as criteria of racism. These
may be viewed as centers of variation, or paradigms as I prefer to call them.
I do not have the space to argue for them here  (though see my brief
remarks in Chap. 9).
Whether a single definition is capable of resolving all the relevant prac-
tical problems we would like to resolve remains to be seen. I have given
some reason for thinking the complete resolution of practical problems
unlikely. However, I did attempt  to address some of them. In the next
chapter I provide an illustration of how my adequacy criteria can be
invoked to critically assess existing theories of racism. I apply my criteria to
Jorge Garcia’s influential volitional theory. I argue that although his the-
ory is admirable for its rigorous attempt to comprehensively accommodate
the categorial plurality of racism, it ultimately fails to accommodate the
full scope of what is (legitimately) called “racism,” because he ignores
the grammatical plurality of racism. Further, his theory fails to satisfy the
moral condition, because it does not always take into account the legiti-
mate moral needs we have for condemning phenomena as racist.
Another major aim of the next chapter is to show that it is plausible to
think that an oppression approach to racism can accommodate the catego-
rial and grammatical plurality of “racism,” and do so in a way that is rooted
in pragmatic rather than epistemic justification.

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 CHAPTER 8

Racial Oppression and Grammatical

Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia
on Racist Belief

8.1   Introduction
In the previous chapter I defended three adequacy conditions for a defini-
tion of “racism.” One of my desiderata holds that usage of this term ought
to be preserved if it is pragmatically justifiable by reference to the moral
aim of combatting racial  oppression  facing historically subjugated racial
groups. My aim in this chapter is to argue that much contemporary usage
is defensible on this condition. To this end, I explore some of the ways in
which racially objectionable beliefs contribute to racial oppression.
Racial oppression is an all-encompassing phenomenon. A consequence
of this is that racial oppression contaminates human life, well-being, and
social relations. It is thus unsurprising that racism is predicated of a wide
range of phenomena. Blum, for instance, speaks of the “categorial plural-
ity” of racism, while Glasgow speaks of racism’s various “locations.”1 The
notion of categorial pluralism posits that the terms “racism” and “racist”
apply to several categories of entity. Attitudes, persons, institutions, sym-
bols, language, and much else besides are called racist. Prescriptive theory
is not committed to accommodating the full categorial plurality of racism.
The fact that a category of entity can be racist on ordinary usage is not in
itself sufficient for preserving it. For prescriptive theory’s interest is not
ultimately in describing ordinary usage, but in prescribing correct usage.
The prescriptive theorist must critically differentiate uses that are worth

1
 See Blum (2002, 71); Glasgow (2009, 69).

© The Author(s) 2020 325

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_8
326  A. G. URQUIDEZ

preserving from those that are not. To this end, I argued in the previous
chapter for a  criterion of prescriptive adequacy: A category supplied by
ordinary usage is legitimate and ought therefore be preserved by prescrip-
tive theory if it contributes to racial oppression. A strong prima facie indi-
cator (though not a decisive consideration) is that the particular usage in
question aligns with historical usage.
The goal, then, is to critically accommodate the categorial plurality of
racism, as much as pragmatic argumentation necessitates. This task is not
as straightforward as one might think. For doing so requires the accom-
modation of what I call racism’s grammatical pluralism. Grammatical plu-
ralism posits that a single term (e.g., “racist belief” or “racist action”) may
have more than one semantically significant use (meaning), such that dif-
ferent uses entail different kinds of racism (e.g., different kinds of racist
belief or racist action, respectively). My focus in this chapter is on the
category of racist belief. My aim qua prescriptive theorist is to articulate a
definition of “racism” that accommodates the various attitudes falling
under the category of racist belief, where a racist belief is one that contrib-
utes to racial oppression. Racist beliefs of different kinds should be accom-
modated without obscuring the nature of their wrongness and their role
in sustaining racial oppression. For instance, if a belief is racist because it
stigmatizes the targeted group, thereby contributing to their low station
in life, theory should not reject this explanation or downplay its signifi-
cance for theory simply because it does not so easily fit the philosopher’s
preferred account of racism’s wrongness. Against my oppression theory of
racism, it might be objected that it entails an implausible moral monism (a
monistic account of moral badness that distorts other kinds2 of ill).
However, the objection is misguided, for my account is output-driven
(rather than input-driven). As such, it recognizes that an entity can be
wrong for categorial (internal) and functional (external) reasons. For
instance, if racial hatred is racist, then it must contribute to the wrong of
racial oppression, on my account. However, this fact should not lead us
to conclude that racial hatred is only because it contributes to racial
oppression. For the phenomenon might be wrong for intrinsic reasons
(as well). Prescriptive theory should respect rather than distort this fact.

2
 Note that by “kind” I do not mean a kind in standard philosophical jargon. My focus in
this chapter is on grammatical/conceptual kinds, as given by prescriptively correct usage, not
ontological (language-independent) kinds, such as those I reject in Chap. 4.
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  327

My functionalist approach is compatible with moral pluralism about racial

ills, for moral pluralism about racial ills is compatible with moral monism
about racism. My account leaves open the question of whether a racial ill
is wrong or objectionable for reasons having to do with the kind of thing
it is. With respect to racial hatred, for example, my analysis insists that, in
addition to being objectionable on, say, volitional grounds, this phenom-
enon is objectionable for being a cause of racial oppression. By the same
token, a racial ill that is not causally related to racial oppression should not
be called racist, even if it is still wrong and objectionable on other racial
grounds. For instance, calling white people “whitey” is racially offensive
and, perhaps, morally wrong; however, it does not seem to contribute to
the racial oppression of any racial group, hence it should not be con-
demned as racist. In this way, my account encourages the use of moral
vocabulary other than “racist.”
Prescriptive theory, as I’ve discussed it, is in the business of investigat-
ing the pragmatic grounds for calling and not calling something racist. My
account is potentially revisionist in that it assesses ordinary usage by refer-
ence to a standard, outside of ordinary usage. In this way, it is not slavishly
committed to preserving ordinary usage for its own sake.  Consider the
desire to accommodate the categorial plurality of racist belief. This aim is
not generated by the requirement that ordinary usage be accommodated
as much as possible. Rather, it is generated by the possibility that much of
what is called racism may be a cause of oppression. Claims to the effect
that some instance of ordinary usage is worth preserving must be backed
by pragmatic argumentation. The justificatory requirement of pragmatic
argumentation is the burden of demonstrating a moral-­critical need.
Philosophers engaged in descriptive analysis  do not see themselves as
being in the business of offering pragmatic arguments in defense of ordi-
nary usage. For their “descriptive” task, as they see it, is to describe com-
monsense thinking about racism by laying down a definition that captures
such widespread thinking. Descriptive analysts, like Glasgow, are  thus
motivated by a desire to accommodate all of racism’s locations. That is,
descriptive analysis often aims at comprehensive theoretical explanation.
This is not so in the case of the pragmatic approach I have defended. As was
argued in the preceding chapter, the desire to accommodate the existing
grammar of “racism” is limited to the full range of predications that cor-
respond to the legitimate moral need for the concept. The aim, in other
words, should be to specify those uses of “racism” that describe seriously
328  A. G. URQUIDEZ

objectionable racial phenomena (i.e., causes of racial oppression). Below, I

argue that the category racist belief divides into four species or kinds of rac-
ist belief, each of which is pragmatically justifiable. I do not claim that this
is a comprehensive rendering of everything worth preserving with respect
to our use of the term “racist belief.” There may well be others. What justi-
fies each kind is the unique moral-representational need to which it corre-
sponds. These distinctive needs can be brought out by grammatical analysis.
Each distinctive usage and corresponding moral need is related to the oth-
ers. The common thread running through each representational practice is
a harmful social function: each kind of belief reflects and helps to sustain a
condition of racial vulnerability, a condition of  oppression. At the same
time, these four kinds are wrong for different reasons, even if they are all
wrong, in part, for contributing to racial oppression. The pragmatic legiti-
macy of each usage suggests that any theory of racism that fails to accom-
modate one or more of them is normatively incomplete and/or inadequate.
The foil for my argument is Jorge Garcia’s volitional approach.3
My analyses of the grammatical plurality of racism aim to expose a meth-
odological deficiency in his argument. Garcia’s project fails to accommo-
date three of the four uses of “racist belief” I discuss, despite his claim to
the contrary. This is problematic for his approach inasmuch as he claims
that his metaphysical analysis of racism captures the core of ordinary usage
of the terms “racism” and “racist.” His account’s inability to accommo-
date the grammatical plurality of “racist belief” means that it fails to com-
prehensively accommodate the category of racist belief. This in turn means
that his account is prescriptively inadequate, hence pragmatically
unjustified.
My critique also underscores a potential danger with conflating norma-
tive analysis with metaphysical analysis. More than simply failing to accom-
modate pragmatically justifiable uses of “racist belief,” Garcia’s approach
eschews them as false or misguided. This is partly due to his interest, espe-
cially in subsequent work, in providing an ontological theory of racism
itself. (It is partly also a function of his desire to provide a univocal/essen-
tialist account of racism.) In previous chapters, I’ve documented that
Garcia rejects the proposition that a theory of racism should be guided by
a pragmatic desideratum; that is, he thinks it a mistake to use pragmatic

3
 For other critiques of Garcia, see Shelby (2002); Mills (2003); Blum (2004); Headley
(2006); and Faucher and Machery (2009). For a defense  of Garcia against Faucher and
Machery’s critique, see Garcia (2011); Valls (2009).
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  329

considerations to evaluate the legitimacy of a theory of racism. This is not

to say that he thinks his account is pragmatically useless. Rather, his posi-
tion seems to be that pragmatic warrant is not an adequate criterion for
assessing whether the theory is true (on this point Garcia and Shelby seem
to agree). I have argued, in previous chapters, that this is a mistake, and
will not attempt to show this here.
The ability of Garcia’s account to explain much ordinary usage in terms
of a single unifying core blinds him to the fact that there are moral-­
representational needs that escape this core. His argument, one might say,
fails to take Wittgenstein’s advice to heart: “Don’t say: ‘They must have
something common, or they would not be called “games”’—but look and
see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them,
you won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities,
and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look!”4 As
Wittgenstein draws attention to different kinds of game, I want to draw
attention to different kinds of racist belief. My Wittgensteinian method
considers the use of “racist belief” across contexts of use and highlights
substantive differences. My most basic criticism is that Garcia does not
“look and see” whether everything that is called “racist belief” is necessar-
ily connected to racial disregard. He thus overlooks certain uses of the term.
I employ a modified version of Wittgenstein’s “grammatical method”
in analyzing “racist belief.” The most important modification is that I do
not employ it as a purely descriptive method, although clarifying existing
usage for the sake of dissolving conceptual confusion is a crucial compo-
nent of my Wittgenstein-inspired approach. My aim in employing it goes
beyond description (even if it mostly consists in describing), for in addi-
tion to clarifying the concept of racist belief, I aim to justify a portion of
the grammatical plurality of “racist belief” on pragmatic grounds. Again, I
do not aim at comprehensive description, for I do not claim to uncover
every possible and legitimate use of this term.
Finally, my appropriation of Wittgenstein’s grammatical method should
not be taken to mean that I endorse the stronger descriptive claim that the
prevailing concept of racism has no essence or that it is a family resem-
blance concept, as some scholars suggest.5 For one thing, my project is
neither descriptive nor metaphysical. When most philosophers claim that a
concept has a certain kind of unity (e.g., necessary and sufficient concept,
family resemblance concept, cluster concept), they are almost always

4
 Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, 2009, §66).
5
 See Tamas Pataki (2004, 10, 20) and Clevis Headley (2000, 245).
330  A. G. URQUIDEZ

­ aking a factual claim. They may be claiming that their account captures

m
the core  of commonsense thinking; alternatively, they may be claiming
that their account captures the nature of a thing in itself. In either or both
of these contexts, the theses of essentialism and (alternatively) of anti-
essentialism ought to be the result of descriptive analysis rather than stipu-
lated in advance.6 Nothing in this chapter, at least not by itself, undermines
either possibility. For my goal is not to preserve commonsense thinking
about racism per se, and I believe that metaphysical accounts of racism are
confused. That being said, from a perspective, I believe that racism should
be conceived as a focal concept with an essence, centered on the notion of
racial oppression. As such, the present chapter does not refrain from mak-
ing recommendations and evaluative judgments about how the term “rac-
ist belief” ought to be used. These judgments cannot be justified by
reference to Wittgenstein’s grammatical method, as he conceived it, for
my arguments do not leave ordinary uses of “racist belief” where they are.
A racial belief might be called racism, for example, if it is harmful, but this,
on my view, is not by itself an adequate reason to call it racist. The pre-
scriptive judgments I recommend below are intended to conform to my
desiderata for prescriptive grammatical analysis (especially the explanatory
and moral conditions). I take for granted that the philosophical question
“What is racism?” is best analyzed as the prescriptive question “How
should the term ‘racism’ be used?”

8.2   Garcia’s Theory: Two Senses of “Racism”

In his seminal paper “The Heart of Racism,” Garcia develops a theory
of racism that can be read as a descriptive project. His goal seems to be
to unpack and systematize commonsense thinking, rather than to cap-
ture the essence of racism itself. He states that his aim is to describe the
ordinary use of “racism” without significantly revising it. He argues that
his theory “better reflects contemporary usage of the term, especially its

6
 Approaches like those of Joshua Glasgow (2009) proceed on the supposition that racism
has an essence, in an effort to identify what that essence is. Since it is possible that the analysis
will fail, his essentialism is methodological. However, he takes his methodological essential-
ism to be a desideratum (2009, 77). Hence his approach is biased against pluralistic and
non-essentialist approaches, for it deems such approaches less plausible or desirable a priori
and without argument.
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  331

primary employment as both descriptive and evaluative.”7 In his

“Current Conceptions of Racism,” he specifies several adequacy condi-
tions for a theory of racism. I argue that he fails to meet the following
two: “[I]t should count in favor of an understanding of racism if it does,
and count against it if it does not: [1] clarify why racism is always
immoral (without trivializing the moral judgment by making it a matter
of definition); … [2] conform to our everyday discourse about racism,
insofar as this [sic] free from confusion.”8

8.2.1  Garcia’s Core Essentialism

I distinguish two kinds of essentialism, core and property essentialism.
Property essentialists, like Joshua Glasgow and Paul C. Taylor, believe that
a set of properties cuts across all instances (and categories) of racism. The
basic idea is that everything that is properly called “racism” is racist in
virtue of sharing a set of properties.9 Garcia rejects this approach to
essentialism:

[Robert] Miles challenges those who insist on talking only of ‘racisms’ in the
plural to ‘specify what the many different racisms have in common’ (Miles,
1989: p. 65). This may go too far. Some philosophers have offered respected
accounts of common terms that seem not to require that every time A is an
F and B is an F, then A and B must have some feature in common (other
than that of being-an-F, if that’s a feature). Nominalism and Wittgenstein’s
‘family resemblance’ view are two examples. However, if we are not dealing
with two unrelated concepts the English terms for which merely happen to
have the same spelling and pronunciation (like the ‘bank’ of a river and the
‘bank’ that offers loans), then we should be able to explain how the one
notion develops out of the other.10

By contrast, Garcia’s core essentialist approach seeks to (a) identify the

core form of racism (that underlies commonsense thinking) and (b)
explain alternative kinds of racism in terms of this core. According to
Garcia, the core of racism is the volitional core of the agent, what he calls
“the heart” of the individual (will, intention, desire, motivation, etc.). For

7
 Garcia (1996, 6).
8
 Garcia (1997, 6).
9
 See Glasgow (2009) and Taylor (2004, 32–38).
10
 Garcia (1996, 10).
332  A. G. URQUIDEZ

purposes of defining “racism,” Garcia divides the volitional core into

two types:

My proposal is that we conceive of racism as fundamentally a vicious kind of

racially based disregard for the welfare of certain people. In its central and
most vicious form, it is a hatred, ill-will, directed against a person or persons
on account of their assigned race. In a derivative form, one is a racist when
one either does not care at all or does not care enough (i.e., as much as
morality requires) or does not care in the right ways about people assigned
to a certain racial group, where this disregard is based on racial classification.
Racism, then, is something that essentially involves not our beliefs and their
rationality or irrationality, but our wants, intentions, likes, and dislikes and
their distance from the moral virtues.11

In this passage, Garcia identifies two types of disregard: hatred or ill-­

will, on the one hand, and not caring enough or in the right ways, on the
other. Charles Mills has argued that there are significant differences in the
two cases.12 However, for the purposes of this chapter I set aside his objec-
tion that Garcia conflates these notions. I will use the term “racial disre-
gard” to refer to one or the other of these types (the one that best fits the
context at hand).

8.2.2  Infection and Characteristic Racism

Garcia introduces, and masterfully deploys, a form of focal explanation
that he calls an infection model of theoretical explanation. Here is how
defines it:

Infection models of wrongdoing—according to which an action is wrong

because of the moral disvalue of what goes into it rather than the nonmoral
value of what comes out of it—seem the best approach within virtue-based
ethics. In such ethical systems, actions are immoral insofar as they are greedy,
arrogant, uncaring, lustful, contemptuous, or otherwise corrupted in their
motivational sources. Finally, desires, wishes, and intentions are racist when
they either are, or in certain ways reflect, attitudes that withhold from peo-
ple, on the basis of their being assigned to a particular race, levels or forms
of good-will, caring, and well-wishing that moral virtue demands. At its
core, then, racism consists in vicious attitudes toward people based on their

11
 Garcia (1996, 6–7).
12
 Mills (2003, 36).
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  333

assigned race. From there it extends to corrupt the people, individual

actions, institutional behavior, and systemic operations it infects” (11).

Garcia’s infection model, which is at the heart of his theory, entails an

important distinction between primary and secondary forms of racism.
Racial disregard is the primary form and focal point from which extensions
(i.e., distinct kinds of racism) arise. I will sometimes refer to these exten-
sions as secondary forms of racism. At other times I will refer to them as
infections, for secondary forms are analogous to an infectious disease.
Imagine a cancer that is initially isolated in a certain region of the body,
but soon spreads to infect the rest of the body. Garcian essentialism under-
stands racial disregard as akin to an infectious disease that originates in the
will of a person. It can spread internally, within the individual (to one’s
beliefs, actions, etc.). It can also spread externally, outside the individual
(to institutions, laws, symbols, etc.). However, unlike cancer, racism
always arises in the same central location: volition.13
It might be helpful to illustrate how Garcia’s infection model accommo-
dates cases of racism that are not instances of racial disregard. Take a swas-
tika. Garcia can maintain that it is not racist in and of itself—in virtue of its
physical or internal properties—but in virtue of infection. Volitional con-
siderations explain the infection: the swastika’s racist symbolism is linked
to a history of racial disregard. For whites have used this symbol to express
their hatred and alleged superiority. In other words, the object (better:
what it symbolizes) is condemnable insofar as its meaning is connected to
individual intent. Evidently, talk pertaining to the viciousness of the object
(or what it symbolizes) is metaphorical: a way of expressing condemnation
and ascribing moral responsibility to individuals. Contingent facts about
the object—say, its effect on victims (generating fear and leading people to
avoid certain spaces) or facts about the practice (that it is placed in a public
space)—do not explain why it is racist. It is the infection that explains this:
it symbolizes racial hatred in virtue of belonging to a practice that involves
ill-will, hatred, and the like.
The notion that racism spreads from the heart of the individual to swas-
tikas and other racist symbols generalizes to all secondary forms of racism.
Garcia, for example, relies on an infection model to explain cases of racist

13
 The point of the analogy is logical rather than psychological. It is not a claim about what
causes people to believe what they do. Garcia is not committed to the view that racial disre-
gard is the only mechanism that drives individuals to form racist beliefs.
334  A. G. URQUIDEZ

action and belief: “Actions and beliefs are racist in virtue of their coming
from racism in the desires, wishes, and intentions of individuals, not in
virtue of their leading to these or other undesirable effects.”14
Racial disregard (and arguably the racist person) is racist in virtue of its
nature and is therefore the primary form. Racism’s secondary forms consist
of all instances of racism that are racist in virtue of infection. The volitional
core, which constitutes the primary form, entails a plurality of secondary
forms, for there are many kinds of things that are racist besides the will:
beliefs, actions, symbols, institutions, et cetera.15 Garcia’s infection model
thus seems to accommodate much of the categorial plurality of racism.
Unfortunately, it does not accommodate everything that is called “racism,”
as I argue below. Garcia seems to recognize this limitation since he supple-
ments his infection model with the thesis of characteristic racism (or perhaps
more aptly termed, the thesis of what is characteristically called “racism”).
He writes: “Racism is not, on this view, primarily a cognitive matter,
and so it is not in its essence a matter of how or when one makes one’s
judgments. Of course, we can still properly call prejudiced-based beliefs
racist in that they characteristically either are rooted in prior racial disre-
gard, which they rationalize, or they foster such disregard.”16 The idea
here seems to be that prejudiced-based beliefs are properly called “racist”
even though they are not necessarily racist. For they are “characteristically”
infected by racial disregard. “Characteristically” appears to be synonymous
with “generally,” “usually,” or “typically.” One way to think about the
distinction is in terms of belief-types and their tokens. A belief-type might
be properly called “racist” even though some of its tokens are not racist.
Another way to think about his proposal is that the set of things that are
properly called “racist” divides into two groups: what is called “racist” in
virtue of being racist and what is called “racist” in virtue of being charac-
teristically racist.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. Sections 8.3 and
8.4 assess Garcia’s infection model of racism. In Sect. 8.3, I consider
paternalistic racism and its connection to racist belief. I argue that one
form of paternalism, the kind articulated by Charles Mills, is both rooted
in ordinary language and bears no connection to racial disregard. Section
8.4 considers beliefs that are racist in virtue of their ideological function

14
 Garcia (1996, 11).
15
 Plurality is also evident within the volitional core. See Garcia (2011).
16
 Garcia (1996, 12–13).
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  335

(independent of intent). I argue that ordinary language should be extended

to cover scholarly uses of “racist belief,” such as the ideological use, which
satisfy an important moral need. That is, it is prima facie warranted on
pragmatic grounds. Section 8.5 considers beliefs that are wrong in virtue
of their content alone. I argue that Garcia’s thesis of characteristic racism
(TCR) provides a misguided explanation of the necessary wrongness of
intrinsically wrong beliefs.

8.3   Paternalism and the Primary Sense

I begin my evaluation by considering the central component of Garcia’s
theory, his infection model. He claims that racism is essentially a matter of
volition and that all secondary forms are explicable in volitional terms.
Hence, one way to undermine Garcia’s infection model is to show that the
volitional core fails to explain a kind of racist belief.

8.3.1  Two Pictures of Paternalism

Garcia maintains that belief becomes infected with racism when it is held
“for racist reasons.” He provides two individually sufficient conditions for
infection:

(1) A belief is racist (in his primary sense) “when it is duly connected
to racial disregard,” i.e., meets one of the following conditions:
(i) “it is held in order to rationalize that [racial] disaffection”; or
(ii) “when contempt inclines one to attribute undesirable features
to people assigned to a racial group.”17

I argue for the existence of other uses of “racist belief” which Garcia’s
theory fails to accommodate. I present three counterexamples in Sects. 8.3,
8.4, and 8.5, respectively. The first of these is based on a criticism by Mills.18
Mills’s objection to Garcia’s infection model is that racial disregard is
unnecessary for racism. Scholars have long maintained as an empirical
matter that many whites were paternalists—that is, seemingly good-­
intentioned individuals whose paternalistic treatment of blacks was based

17
 Garcia (1996, 13). Garcia holds that beliefs that do not satisfy either sufficient condition
can still be classified as racist, not in virtue of infection, but in virtue of being characteristi-
cally racist. This claim is assessed in Sect. 8.5.
18
 Mills (2003, 51–57).
336  A. G. URQUIDEZ

on racial inferiorization.19 To inferiorize an individual (or group) is to

believe that one (or it) is inferior on account of race, and to harbor atti-
tudes and paternalistic behavior consonant with that belief. Garcia, how-
ever, argues that he can offer an alternative account of this phenomenon
consistent with his infection model:

What is essential is that [racial antipathy] consists in either opposition to the

well-being of people classified as members of the targeted racial group or in
a racially based callousness to the needs and interests of such people. This,
I think, gives us what we need in order to see part of what makes our patri-
cians racists…. They stand against the advancement of Black people…. They
are averse to it as such, not merely doing things that have the side effect of
setting back the interests of Black people. Rather, they mean to retard those
interests, to keep Black people “in their place” relative to White people.
They mean to adopt this stance of active, conscious, and deliberate hostility
to Black welfare either simply to benefit themselves at the expense of Black
people or out of the contemptuous belief that, because they are Black, they
merit no better. In any event, these aristocrats and their behavior can prop-
erly be classified as racist.20

I call this conception Garcian paternalism, a corollary of which is that

benevolent racists are not really benevolent.21 As a matter of fact, Garcia’s
view implies that it is logically impossible for paternalists to act from
benevolent motives, since “they [really] mean to retard” black interests. If
he is correct, the proposition that some paternalists have good intentions
toward those they inferiorize is false or incoherent.
Surely it is plausible that some paternalists pretended to be benevolent
while acting from ulterior racist motives. That is, they surely “mean[t] to
retard those interests, to keep Black people ‘in their place’ relative to
White people.” A paradigmatic picture of keeping blacks in their place is
one of intentional force, domination, and oppression: for example, the

19
 Mills, for instance, quotes several passages from Litwack’s Trouble in Mind (1998, 186,
202, 204, 211, and 245).
20
 Garcia (1996, 17), quoted in Mills (2003, 52).
21
 My reading of Garcia might be contested. I interpret Garcia as holding that paternalists
merely pretend to have benevolent motives while actually having malevolent intentions. An
alternative reading is that paternalists think they have benevolent intentions while actually
having malevolent intentions. Being racist while pretending not to be racist is different from
being racist while thinking one is not racist. The former implies malevolent intent while the
latter does not; the latter implies false belief while the former does not.
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  337

desire to impose brute force, the intention to dominate, and so on.

Examples such as these suggest that Garcia is right that ordinary usage is
equipped with the resources to condemn paternalistic beliefs on voli-
tional grounds.
Mills, by contrast, thinks that the inferiorization of blacks has not always
been connected with racial hatred, ill-will, and the like. He thinks that
good intentions are compatible with inferiorization:

A white person has feelings of good-will toward Native Americans (whom

he wants to see successfully assimilate), to black slaves in the United States
(whom he wants to take care of, since they are incapable of taking care of
themselves), to blacks, browns, and yellows in the colonial world (whom he
wants to civilize). His feelings of benevolence seem quite real, but in each
case they are predicated on his belief in the inferiority to whites, whether
biological and/or cultural, of the nonwhite racial groups. So these ­inferiors—
Tonto, Faithful Ol’ Uncle Remus, Gunga Din—need to be helped, and he
gets real pleasure out of doing what he can to help them. Now in the litera-
ture on racism, this is seen as an important sub-variety; racism comes in
more than one form, and there are other kinds besides the malevolent kind.
Yet most theorists would insist that this still counts as racism, since what is
crucial for them, unlike Garcia, is the doxastic dimension: the paternalist’s
belief in the racial inferiority of these nonwhites.22

Mills defends this view by distinguishing objective and subjective racism.23

A paternalist’s inferiorizing beliefs are objectively wrong when they lead to
racially harmful consequences for the inferiorized individual. They are sub-
jectively good when the paternalist’s intentions and motives aim to further
the well-being of the inferiorized individual. For, “in general, if I have a
certain (mistaken) picture of your needs, capabilities, and limitations,
which I sincerely believe, and I act on the basis of this picture to further
your well-being, then it cannot justifiably be claimed, when you suffer by
my actions, that I desired to harm you.”24
Given that morality, for Mills, covers the objective and subjective
alike—morally good and bad intentions, and good and bad outcomes—a
paternalist may pass the subjective test while failing the objective test. He
fails the objective test if he harms and degrades blacks in his treatment of

22
 Mills (2003, 51).
23
 Mills (2003, 53).
24
 Mills (2003, 52).
338  A. G. URQUIDEZ

them, despite his benevolent intentions. It follows that Garcia’s volitional

approach wrongly restricts morality to the subjective domain. The argu-
ment can be helpfully articulated as an objection to definition (1) above.
Everyone agrees that the paternalist’s inferiorizing beliefs are racist. But
Mills’s argument suggests that they are not racist in virtue of what Garcia
calls “racist reasons,” that is, the paternalist’s beliefs are not rationaliza-
tions of his disaffection toward Rs, and race-based contempt is not what
inclines him to attribute undesirable features to Rs. So definition (1) does
not explain this instance of racist belief.
What makes a paternalistic belief racist if not the paternalist’s intention?
One might think that inferiorizing beliefs are racist in virtue of their con-
tent—a claim I consider later in the chapter. However, we have seen that, on
Mills’s account, they are racist in virtue of their effects, that is, objective
outcomes. Inferiorizing beliefs determine a racist form of life that keeps those
ineferiorized in a state of perpetual subordination. Hence it is not merely the
belief’s content that is relevant, but more importantly its ensuing effects. To
this we might add that intention has an important role to play to the extent
that intentions motivate action. I call this analysis Millsian paternalism.
Mills’s analysis implies the following explanation of “racist belief ”:

(2) S’s belief about race R is paternalistically racist if the belief depicts
Rs as inferiors, and if this belief leads S to form benevolent inten-
tions toward Rs, which results in harmful and objectionable con-
duct toward them (most notably, a condition of racial oppression).

8.3.2  Garcia’s Revisionist Proposal

We have now seen that Garcia and Mills differ in their accounts of pater-
nalism. For Garcia, the paternalist is malevolent rather than benevolent,
and deliberately deceptive. For Mills, the paternalist is honest and truly
benevolent, but cognitively misguided. Their disagreement is in part
about the proper use of expressions like “keep blacks in their place.” I now
argue that Mills has the upper hand in this dispute. To demonstrate the
inadequacy of Garcia’s account, Mills does not need to show that Garcian
paternalism is impossible. He only needs to show that racial disregard is
inessential to some racist beliefs. By contrast, Garcia claims to have the
univocally correct analysis of “racist belief.” He therefore needs to under-
mine Millsian paternalism as a legitimate kind of racism.
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  339

One way to illustrate the burden on Garcia’s shoulders is to consider

two types of meaningful statement:

I. This black man must be kept in his place, because he is my property;

because I am white and he is black; because I can and will dominate
this inferior; et cetera.
II. This black man must be kept in his place, because otherwise he
might hurt himself or get himself into trouble; because he cannot
fully control his violent dispositions; because he needs assistance;
et cetera.

Garcian paternalism offers a plausible analysis of type (I) statements, but

not of type (II) statements. However, Garcia might argue that although
type (II) cases are possible, they do not involve racism.
This reply to Mills renders Garcia’s position consistent with the follow-
ing theses. First, only those cases of paternalism that fall under type (I)
satisfy the proper definition of “paternalistic racism.” Second, some cases
that seem to fall under type (II) are properly categorized as falling under
type (I) instead. This accounts for the intuition that some (perhaps most)
white paternalists are deceivers: they appear to be benevolently motivated
and present themselves as such, but in fact they are not so. Third, to the
extent that type (II) cases exist, these are not legitimate instances of racist
belief. Millsian paternalism may well correspond to an actual ­phenomenon,
but this phenomenon should not be described as racist. To describe it thus
is to misuse the term “racist.”
Unfortunately, Garcia presents no argument against type (II) cases, and
I can see no reason to think that if type (I) cases obtain (so that Garcia’s
analysis of “keep blacks in their place” is correct), then type (II) cases can-
not obtain (so that Mills’s analysis is incorrect). Hence, both types of case
seem possible; ordinary language is broad enough to encompass both. If I
am right about this, Garcia’s essentialist analysis of “racist belief” is inad-
equate—not because it fails to get the phenomenon right, but because it
fails to get the whole phenomenon right. That is, it excludes a kind of racist
belief. It seems plausible because it captures a large segment of ordinary
usage, but it retains its plausibility by presenting a one-sided diet of exam-
ples, namely the use of “keeping blacks in their place” to express ill will,
contempt, and the like. If, however, we focus on Millsian examples, we see
that Millsian paternalism is also at home in ordinary language. Given that
Mills’s and Garcia’s pictures of ­racist belief correspond to different uses of
340  A. G. URQUIDEZ

expressions like “keep blacks in their place,” Garcia’s analysis, which

excludes type (II) cases from the category of racism, should be understood
as an attempt to revise ordinary usage. For a theory that rejects certain
segments of ordinary usage is revisionist. We thus see that on the most
charitable interpretation, Garcia’s position amounts to the recommenda-
tion that we not describe type (II) cases as “racist.”
It follows that Garcia is misguided in thinking that his theory of rac-
ism describes ordinary usage without significantly revising it. Millsian
paternalism aptly describes type (II) cases, but Garcia claims that
Millsian paternalism is misdescribed as racist. His misdescription charge
amounts to the judgment that Mills does not use the term as he ought
to (i.e., a prescription). Implicit in this objection is the recommenda-
tion that we revise ordinary usage to remove type (II) cases from the
category of racism. So, Garcia unwittingly misrepresents the goal of his
analytical project, for he misdescribes it as capturing the core of ordi-
nary usage. What is more, given that his prescription excludes an impor-
tant source of racial oppression, it strikes me as a rather significant
revision to ordinary usage.
The upshot is that the dispute over whether type (II) cases ought to be
considered racist cannot be settled by appeals to ordinary usage. That said,
one might try redeeming Garcia’s theory by dropping the descriptive pre-
tense and recasting the theory as a substantive revisionist proposal. Indeed,
one of Garcia’s adequacy conditions seems to make room for such a move,
for he maintains that a theory might revise ordinary use along plausible
lines of development.25 Going down this road requires some sort of pre-
scriptive argument for revising ordinary use, for we have seen that both
uses of “keep blacks in their place” seem worth preserving.
It seems to me that there is good reason to retain both. Garcian and
Millsian uses of “racist belief” correspond to a common moral need, one
that is justifiable by reference to the moral condition. The argument can
be summed up as follows. The definition of “racist belief” that follows
from each philosopher’s analysis of paternalism is partly constitutive of a
distinct moral language-game. Garcian paternalism is primarily wrong,
according to Garcia, because it offends against the virtues, because racial
hatred (and the like) is morally vicious. Millsian paternalism is primarily
wrong (it would seem) because it denigrates and disrespects agents, who
are treated as inferiors. We thus have two ways to account for the wrong-

25
 Garcia (1996, 6).
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  341

ness of each kind of racist belief. However, my argument would be that

each of these language-­games is worth condemning as racist because each
instance of belief contributes to racial oppression. Garcian paternalism is
morally objectionable on “subjective” grounds, yet this particular form of
subjective wrong has been the source of enslavement, forced labor and
servitude, and unearned benefits for whites. Consequently, both Garcian
and Millsian paternalism are objectionable on “objective” grounds of per-
petuating conditions of unjust privilege for whites and unjust subordina-
tion for blacks. Benevolent forms of paternalism have inflicted harm on so
grand a scale that historians credit this phenomenon a key explanation of
the persistence of racial subjugation. Millsian paternalism helps to explain
how racial subordination can persist in a society where many individuals
do not have racist hearts. Therefore, the Millsian use of “racist belief” does
not merely belong to ordinary usage, it also ought to be preserved.
To sum up, Mills rightly argues that Garcia’s theory does not provide a
necessary condition of racism because, as far as ordinary language is con-
cerned, non-intentional forms of racist paternalism are possible. The
Garcian reply that racial disregard corresponds to a plausible picture of
paternalism is correct, but inadequate as a reply to Mills. At issue is not
whether racial disregard can account for a certain kind of racist belief, but
whether Mills’s analysis offers an account of a distinct type of racist belief.
Type (II) cases are meaningful condemned as racist, and there seems to be
good pragmatic reason to continue doing so.
Since Mills’s paternalistic use of “racist belief” appears to be free from
conceptual confusion and satisfies Garcia’s desideratum [2], it offers a
legitimate counterexample to his infection model—which attempts to
treat racial disregard as the most acceptable account of racist belief.

8.4   Ideology and the Primary Sense

In this section I discuss a third use of “racist belief” that I call the ideo-
logical use. The ideological use is arguably not at home in ordinary usage
if “ordinary usage” signifies the normal or most common usage across an
entire linguistic community. For, as I explain below, the popular Marxian-
inspired use of “racial ideology” is a technical, refined employment. This
limitation notwithstanding, I argue that we should retain this expert use
because it meets the moral condition I laid out in the previous chapter.
Stated more simply, a theory of racism ought to accommodate scholarly
342  A. G. URQUIDEZ

usage of “racist belief” when it is justifiable on moral-pragmatic grounds.

If a scholarly definition satisfies the need for moral representation, then
we ought to adopt it, even if it is currently unordinary, for this simply
means that our language should be expanded. I will argue that the ideo-
logical use of “racist belief” is justifiable on pragmatic grounds. I will
further show that ideologically racist beliefs are not racist in virtue of
Garcian racial disregard, but in virtue of their social function. Therefore,
the ideological use constitutes the second counterexample to Garcia’s
infection model.

8.4.1  Ideology’s Role in the Racial Structure

Tommie Shelby gives expression to a standard account of “ideology”:
“Put briefly and somewhat crudely, ‘ideologies’ are widely accepted illu-
sory systems of belief that function to establish or reinforce structures of
social oppression.”26 This definition is in keeping with the presupposition
that racism is a sociocultural phenomenon, not simply because of its refer-
ence to oppression but because it acknowledges the relevance of empirical
considerations. Present day racial oppression and the historical legacy that
generated it is presupposed as the background condition that makes the
social role which ideology occupies possible. This is not, of course, a new
idea. Racism has historically been conceived as an ideology. Originally, rac-
ism was defined in racialist or scientific terms, as the ideology that there
are discrete biological races. At the heart of this racialist ideology is the
conviction that certain racial groups are biologically inferior to others, this
being a natural product of human evolution by natural selection, on the
more sophisticated defenses of biological racism. The social function of
this ideology was the rationalization of the oppression and mistreatment
of enslaved Africans and indigenous peoples. Like all social products, ide-
ologies are susceptible to change as social conditions change. Ideologies
are in a constant state of flux, evolving in accordance with changes to the
sociohistorical context.27 The argument is thus made that new ideologies

26
 Shelby (2002, 415). When this chapter was first published (in 2017), I had not yet read
Shelby’s Dark Ghettos or his other essays on racial ideology. His definition of “racism” in
these other pieces is more elaborate and illuminating: “racism is an ideology: a widely held set
of associated beliefs and implicit judgments that misrepresent significant social realities and
that function, through this distortion, to bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations”
(2016, 22).
27
 Frederickson (1999, 2002). Omi and Winant (1994).
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  343

gradually replace older ones when the latter are no longer efficacious, for
example, because they are no longer widely regarded as morally or scien-
tifically defensible.
The contemporary ideology which many sociologists think has come to
replace biological racism, particularly in the United States, is sometimes
called “the new racism” or “colorblind racism.” We should distinguish col-
orblind racism qua ideology and qua praxis; the two, however, work hand
in hand. Theorists maintain that after the collapse of Jim Crow segregation
it was no longer socially acceptable to openly discriminate against people of
color. White beneficiaries of the old racism, however, wanted to retain their
privileged status. Among other things, they wanted to retain unjustly accu-
mulated wealth that was created for their benefit by de jure and de facto
forms of white supremacy. Therefore, racism’s institutional expression
changed forms and became covert. Specifically, it was now expressed in
colorblind regulations, policies, and laws that disproportionately harm
non-whites, though theoretically they apply to everyone. Michelle
Alexander provides a vivid illustration of differential racial treatment, based
on a colorblind policy: “Among other harsh penalties, the legislation [Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986] included mandatory minimum ­sentences for the
distribution of cocaine, including far more severe punishment for distribu-
tion of crack—associated with blacks—than powder cocaine, associated
with whites.”28 Many would describe this colorblind practice as institution-
ally racist in virtue of its racially-targeted harmful effects.29 Crucially, this
social function does not depend on individual intention. Thus the new
racism has been described as “racism without racists.”30
The term “colorblind racism” thusly used refers to institutionally racist
practices. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva identifies another important use of the
term. In Racism Without Racists, he uses the term “colorblind racism” to
describe the set of discursive practices and racial(ized) categories (“crimi-
nal,” “gangster,” “welfare queens,” “deadbeat dads,” etc.) that are com-
monly invoked to rationalize deleterious colorblind practices. For instance,
the discourse of liberalism, what Bonilla-Silva terms “abstract liberalism,”
is regularly used to rationalize institutional racism. A pertinent example is
the assertion that race-conscious policies, like reparations and affirmative
action, are racist because they discriminate on the basis of race. This argu-

 Alexander (2010, 53).

28

 The term “institutional racism” was coined by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967).
29

30
 See Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists (2006). For an illuminating account of the
New Racism at work in the U.S. criminal justice system, see Alexander (2010).
344  A. G. URQUIDEZ

ment appeals to the liberal value of “equality,” but the notion is under-
stood abstractly. Treating people equally is said to mean “treating people
the same,” and the effect of so treating people is that policies and practices
are implemented without regard to salient racial differences. Thus by imple-
menting a notion of equality—abstracted from the material fact that non-
whites have never been made whole and therefore do not have the resources
and opportunities necessary to succeed on an “equal” playing field—rele-
vant racial differences are erased  from collective memory and are disre-
garded as irrelevant factors at best or racially divisive at worst. The term
“racism” is thus deployed to attack policies designed to correct for the
racial injustices of the past. Bonilla-Silva refers to this form of discourse as
a “discursive frame” of colorblindness and argues that there are others.31
Hence colorblind racism—qua ideology—is distinct from the colorblind
practices it rationalizes. Together, they work to uphold racial oppression.
To capture this relationship, Bonilla-Silva introduces the notion of a
“racial structure”:

I have argued that racism should be conceived in materialist rather than

idealist fashion. That is, that racism is above anything, about practices and
behaviors that produce a racial structure—a network of social relations at
social, political, economic, and ideological levels that shapes the life chances
of the various races. This structure is responsible for the production and
reproduction of systemic racial advantages for some (the dominant racial
group) and disadvantages for others (the subordinated races). Thus, racism
as a form of social organization places subjects in common social locations.
As subjects face similar experiences, they develop a consciousness, a sense of
“us” versus “them.”32

The notion of racism-as-racial-ideology was thus introduced to help

explain an important source or cause of institutional racism. It constitutes
a force of racial oppression.

8.4.2  
Ideology, Social Function, and Intuition
As sociologists conceive it, racial ideology is a causal mechanism of insti-
tutional racism. The way in which this mechanism works is relevant to
the theory of racism. A belief is ideologically racist in virtue of its social

 Bonilla-Silva (2006, Chap. 2).

31

 Bonilla-Silva (2015, 1360).

32
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  345

function. I will unpack this idea further, below. But I begin by underlin-
ing an important ramification of this definition: ideological racism can-
not be determined a priori or solely in virtue of the content of belief.
Consider the proposition “Mexicans are rapists.” In the next section I
suggest that a proposition of this sort is justly criticized as objectionable
in virtue of its content alone. Yet, if the belief is ideologically racist, its
content is insufficient to determine its status as racist. For experience is
needed to inform us of the social role of the belief. If a society largely
believes that Mexicans are ­rapists, intuitively we would expect this belief
to play a role in rationalizing the deliberate mistreatment of those identi-
fied as Mexicans (which will, of course, include many non-Mexicans); we
would expect it to rationalize the desire to oppress them. This is pre-
cisely the role of this belief within contemporary US society. Imagine
now that “Whites are rapists” were widely adopted within society. What
is the likely role of this belief in contemporary US society? It is not far-
fetched to believe that it would rationalize an educational campaign to
study this pathological tendency among whites. Perhaps it would also
rationalize a well-funded health campaign to treat the “sick victims” of
this pathology (especially if “whites” were construed broadly to include
white women). Experience, then, conditions our predictions and intu-
itions about what “would follow” (or “what would be likely to follow”)
if such and such were the case. Independent of experience and the infer-
ences that experience enables us to make, there is no way of knowing the
social role of belief.
The sociohistorical character of ideological racism suggests that we
should not rely on our intuitions in assessing the moral status of the social
role of belief. A belief might seem harmless, complimentary, flattering, or
morally benign judging by its content alone, and yet, it may be morally
harmful and objectionable when judged by its social role. Take, for
instance, the belief that blacks are naturally athletic and strong.33 Like

33
 For another example of a seemingly “benign” attitude, which can nevertheless  be
extremely harmful, consider Schmid’s argument for the claim that most people have a natural
disposition to socialize with members of their own racial group. Smith calls this “ordinary
racism” because he says it is extremely common and not particularly serious. “Here, clearly,
the ‘preference for one’s own kind’ in terms of one’s own ethnic or racial group may be an
essentially beneficent and relatively benign attitude. It exhibits racial preference, to be sure,
and it may contribute to discrimination and injustice (even of the kind which we prohibit in
public life), but it is not the kind of racism that we should have foremost in mind when we
346  A. G. URQUIDEZ

racial stereotypes generally, this belief is false; nevertheless, its proposi-

tional content is arguably morally benign. One would not assume, inde-
pendent of experience, that this belief is commonly used to rationalize
racial oppression. However, imagine a society in which most people
believe—indeed, it is “common knowledge”—that blacks are naturally
predisposed to violence and criminality, prone to harm whites, easily
aroused, impulsive, and lacking in self-control. In a society such as this,
the belief that blacks are naturally strong may be racially harmful, particu-
larly if it is commonly invoked in connection with these other stereotypes.
We know, for example, that black males in the U.S. have been and con-
tinue to be assaulted by police officers that view them as larger, older and
stronger than they are. This implicit bias is connected with the history of
antiblack racism in this country and the stereotypes of black males as men-
acing threats to society. Even within societies that do not draw these con-
nections, their potential to do so is alarming. The more time passes the
more social conditions are likely to change; hence the likelier it will be that
at some point the belief will be employed to rationalize sentiments, judg-
ments, policies, and practices that are harmful toward blacks. Since intu-
ition often belies social reality, we would do best to minimize our tendency
to draw conclusions about the benign or harmful role of a belief a priori,
that is, by generating an intuition about its content. Hence philosophical
intuitions have a limited role to play in the analysis of ideological rac-
ism. Indeed, intuitions that are unattuned to sociocultural facts are likely
to mislead and distort the phenomenon in question.
The emphasis on social function should not be taken to mean that the
content of belief and the reasons why it is believed are entirely irrelevant
to its ideological function. For the content of a belief B obviously makes a
contribution to the social role of B. Consider the content of the belief that
Sam is stronger than most people. This belief is potentially useful for any
number of purposes. Strength is associated with fear, so people who

say, ‘He’s a racist’” (1996, 33). Although he calls the belief a “kind of racism,” it is clear that
he wishes to contrast it with what he elsewhere terms “true racism,” that is, racism that is
seriously morally objectionable. Schmid’s argument dismisses and minimizes the moral sig-
nificance of beliefs that are harmful in virtue of their social function, as Headley argues
(2000). To this extent, his argument potentially has an ideologically racist function, for it
provides a rationalization of racially oppressive practices. (By calling his belief racist in the
ideological sense, I am suggesting that it plays an objectionable social role, not that Schmid
himself is “a racist person” in his own motivational sense of the term.)
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  347

believe this proposition might be disposed to respect Sam out of fear. But
their fear might lead them to rationalize a policy of control, extermination
or exploitation. Strength is also associated with desirability and attractive-
ness. So the belief that Sam is strong might dispose people to want to date
or socialize with Sam. Can the belief that Sam is strong justify thinking
just any old thing about Sam? It is difficult to see how this stereotype
could justify branding him as a schemer or as a lover of politics. Hence
although a belief’s social role is contingent upon social circumstances, its
content sets limits on what this role can be.
Let us consider a few more features of racial ideologies. Racial ideolo-
gies, as Shelby and Bonilla-Silva define them, are Marxian ideologies. As
such, they are more than mere ways of mapping and making sense of the
world. In particular, they have two characteristic features that make them
especially ­dangerous: they are false and widespread. False beliefs may gen-
erate conduct, even a general orientation, that’s misguided and distorted.
When false beliefs are consequential in relation to society and social
groups, they are likely to inspire socially harmful conduct. The widespread
nature of false beliefs creates a veil of ignorance that conceals the ripple
effects of discrete actions, which conform to deleterious pattern of con-
duct; hence, they are likely to reproduce existing forms of ­oppression
without the individual agent’s knowing any better.
Another aspect of ideology is that they generate social meaning and
significance. This means that the content of an ideology must be distin-
guished from the content of the individual  beliefs  that comprise it. An
ideology can provide social meaning which is greater than the sum of its
parts, that is, which no constitutive belief, taken by itself, is able to pro-
vide. As Bonilla-Silva explains, beliefs about race are commonly expressed
in social type terms (i.e., terms saturated with social meaning), like “black
man,” “welfare queen,” “immigrant,” “Mexican,” or “racial minority.”
Terms such as these cannot be understood in isolation from the broader
web of beliefs (associations) that gives them their significance. These terms
enter forms of description that are widely recognized and understood in
specific ways (e.g., “They hired a Mexican” in some contexts conveys
“They made a diversity hire”). Their social meaning is not reducible to
their analytic meaning. Nor is it reducible to the sentence-meaning, or
even to the normal use of term/sentence. To apprehend their social mean-
ing, one must understand them in the context of society’s  racial “story
348  A. G. URQUIDEZ

lines,” that is, “socially shared tales that are fable-like and incorporate a
common scheme and wording”—the “of course” of racial narratives.

What makes these story lines “ideological” is that storytellers and their audi-
ences share a representational world that makes these stories seem factual.
Hence, by telling and retelling these story lines, members of a social group
(in this case, the dominant race) strengthen their collective understanding
about how and why the world is the way it is; indeed these stories tell and
retell a moral story agreed upon by participants. These racial narratives,
therefore, do more than assist dominant (and subordinate) groups to make
sense of the world in particular ways; they also justify and defend (or chal-
lenge, in the case of oppositional stories) current racial arrangements.34

The need to feel justified in oppressing others is psychologically crucial

to sustaining an oppressive regime. Sustaining a sense of moral upright-
ness is much easier when one belongs to a community that provides reas-
surance that everything is as it ought to be. In the case of oppressive
societies, this means that a common mythology must be established and
constantly reinforced. Hence the importance of ideology.  The unique
claim of the ideology theorist is that analyzing the propositional contents
and individual practices and attitudes of individuals is not enough to
understand the rich cultural meaning and social significance of an ideol-
ogy, for example, the way it becomes constitutive of the identity of the
oppressor group that defines itself in contradistinction to the oppressed
group. Analyzing the propositional contents of individual units of belief
will not fully explain why the community adopts a fundamentally irrational
and unwarranted position. An important part of the story must go beyond
reason, into the depths of cultural meaning, notions of self-worth, mate-
rial stakes and group interests, and so forth. Hence ideology theory
encourages the ethnographical study of  racial story lines, in connection
with recurring patterns  and  social structures. All of this is required  if
theory is to understand the social dimension of individual belief.

8.4.3  Ideology and the Ideological Role of Virtue

We have defined racially ideological beliefs as those that harm a subordinate
racial group and that justify/rationalize group oppression. Another charac-
teristic feature of ideological beliefs is that they have a way of perpetuating/

 Bonilla-Silva (2006, 76).

34
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  349

sustaining the oppression they produce and rationalize. The way in which
they do this is by concealing the oppression in question, by hiding it from
plain view. They achieve this by means of naturalizing or normalizing
oppression. Indeed, it is important to the proper functioning of many ide-
ologies that their wrongfulness and unfairness be unknown to most mem-
bers of society. Consider Thomas Schmid’s example of a store manager
who believes that young blacks are more likely to shoplift from his store than
whites or Asians. Let us assume that the manager sincerely believes this on
the basis of statistical data. Schmid finds the practice objectionable on
grounds of violating the principle that all people should be treated the
same. Yet, he rejects the claim that the practice is racist, for he argues that
in order to be racist it must be motivated by racial animus or the desire to
oppress, which, per hypothesis, is not the case.35 Since the only thing that
matters for Schmid is the desire or intention of the manager, his moral
assessment overlooks whether the manager’s belief contributes to the
unjust stigmatization of young black males. The manager might be unaware
of the deleterious consequences of his belief, yet his belief may contribute
this injustice just the same. The belief’s ideological function no more
depends on the manager’s knowing this than it depends on Schmid’s know-
ing this. For individuals can be ignorant (or have false beliefs) about what
forms of oppression exist in the society and what their causes are.
In some cases, the deleterious consequences of belief might depend on
widespread public ignorance about its social role. Suppose that the man-
ager has the second-order attitude that his first-order attitude (his belief
that blacks are predisposed to shoplifting) is justified on empirical grounds.
The manager’s second-order belief that profiling blacks in his store is justi-
fied helps to explain why institutional racism in places like his store still
exists. For if he knew that his first-order belief about blacks contributed to
a harmful social function, he might have given it up. Or at least he might
have done so, if he valued social justice and subjected his first-order belief
to critical scrutiny (for he might have concluded from such an interroga-
tion that the belief is false or unjustified); alternatively, he might have
concluded that despite his sincere belief that his first-order belief is true it
is wrong to act on it because it  contributes to a condition that unfairly
brands young blacks as criminal. After all, he may not want to contribute
to the oppression of blacks. In this way, the actual social harm that his
belief produces might partly depend on his not knowing its actual social

 Schmid (1996, 37).

35
350  A. G. URQUIDEZ

role, just as it might depend on his sincere belief that his first-order belief
is racially benign since it is an “statistical fact.”
Ideological racism might also depend on the believer not having racial dis-
regard in her heart. We have already seen, in the case of the paternalist, the
kind of harm that can be done by well-intentioned people that harbor false
beliefs about racialized groups. Christian colonists and missionaries who
think about their indigenous subjects as inferior savages can enforce oppres-
sive assimilationist regimes if they think of themselves as virtuous persons.
As Mills argues in his critique of Garcia, an important step in thinking of
oneself as a virtuous person is that one believes that one’s views about the
outgroup are well founded. If a person is thought to be mentally inferior,
then treating her as a mentally inferior (sub)human is the right thing to do.
To intend to so treat one is to harbor good rather than bad intentions
toward her. Contrary to what Garcia maintains, the intention to limit an
individual’s autonomy is not inherently misguided from an intentional per-
spective, for this limitation can be conceptualized in more than one way.
Limiting the autonomy of a child, for example, is a means of protecting her,
not of abusing her. (Such paternalism is called “good parenting.”) And
this, of course, is similar to how many slave holders thought about their
slaves. If this is correct, then the objectionable status of ideologically racist
belief might in some cases presuppose the believer’s benevolent intentions
and lack of desire to oppress the targeted group. Garcia’s infection model
cannot condemn such cases as racist, because volitional considerations do
not enter the explanation in the right way. On the contrary, the way in
which they enter the analysis problematizes personal morality by implicat-
ing it as a contributing source of oppression. We could put the point this
way: ideological racism exposes the vile role of personal virtue within oppres-
sive cultures. I  thus conclude that the possibility of ideologically racist
belief need not be connected to Garcian racial disregard. Moreover, virtu-
ous volitional states are sometimes racist in virtue of their role in sustaining
oppression. To the question “How is it possible for well-intentioned per-
sons to oppress others?” part of the answer may be that ideology has an
insidious way of coopting moral virtue to vicious effect. For, if my analysis
is correct, benovelence is sometimes required for racist beliefs to perform
their  ideological function. The possibility of ideologically racist belief
entails the inadequacy of Garcia’s infection model, which cannot account
for, and is sometimes at odds with, this particular kind of racist belief.
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  351

8.4.4  Ideology and Political Morality

One limitation of Garcia’s account is that although it explains part of what
is wrong with some instances of institutional racism, it misses those aspects
that crucially depend on the social role of belief, that depend on what I
have termed “ideological racism.” It is important to distinguish, as Shelby
does, moral evaluation within two different contexts: personal morality
and political morality.36 Roughly, one way to think about these approaches
is that they differ in regard to the order of moral explanation. Personal
accounts of racism acknowledge the existence of structural and institu-
tional forms of racism. Political accounts recognize the existence of agen-
tial forms of racism. Where they differ is on the question of which forms
should be primary in explaining racism’s negative valence. Political
accounts stress the institutional and structural as being of first importance,
whereas personal accounts stress the agential as being of first impor-
tance.  Following Shelby, I believe that the concept of racism should be
analyzed, essentially, as a tool of political morality.
To condemn belief on political grounds is to assess according to stan-
dards of social justice rather than  standards of personal responsibility.
Political morality is not, first and foremost, an attempt to assess an indi-
vidual’s intentions, motivation, and character; it is an attempt to assess the
fairness of social practices, organizational roles, and the like. The premise
is that rule-governed practices are worthy of critique, independent of
issues of personal accountability. Personal morality makes a different
assumption. For example,  when we judge that someone is a racist, we
do not always need to consider the social context in which she acts. We
often  look to her subjective states and conduct—her intentions and
actions, for example—and determine on this basis alone that she is a racist.
This practice is well-suited to the task of assigning blame and responsibil-
ity based on a person’s character and the kind of person she is. However,
assessing the heart of the individual (her flaws and vices) does not always
disclose her role in sustaining unjust social arrangements. This is the point
of condemning paternalistic racists and ideological racists. For these indi-
viduals acquire their harmful social roles in virtue of their beliefs (and, in
some cases, also their good volitional states). What is in the heart of indi-
viduals is surely one source of injustice, but so is her cognitive apparatus.
Where the goal is to criticize social practices that create an unjust society,
the goal of calling someone racist should be to identify and condemn her

 Shelby (2014).
36
352  A. G. URQUIDEZ

role within racial injustice. Hence it is essential that we not treat individu-
als in isolation from their social surroundings. We must consider them as
agents situated within a broader social nexus, as playing a certain kind of
role in it.
Garcia’s analysis of racism misses the moral significance that we assign
to social practices, because he assumes that, for purposes of condemning
racism, social practices can only be (morally) assessed from the vantage
point of what is in the heart. To borrow Headley’s term, Garcia unjustly
restricts the moral domain to the actions of “isolated individuals.”37 Hence
the moral status of the manager’s racial profiling practice is thought to be
fully analyzed by reference to the volitional core of the agent, without
regard to whether it contributes to the stigmatization of a racial group. The
implication is that the social environment wherein the agent acts is of no
moral consequence. The political issue of how to structure society so as
not to impose further burdens on racially disadvantaged groups is pre-
sumed to be beyond the scope of moral theory. This arbitrary limit is a
convenience which serves white interests well, but is detrimental to the
representational needs of racism’s historical victims. Political morality, by
contrast, asserts that the current organization of society, which distributes
burdens and privileges unevenly, and the question of how best to reorga-
nize society so as to correct these injustices is the heart of the theory
of racism.
We have said that the theory of racism has a political interest in grap-
pling with norms of corrective justice. How best to grapple with injustice,
however, depends on what its causes are. This renders Bonilla-Silva’s soci-
ological questions pertinent to political morality:

How is it possible to have this tremendous degree of racial inequality in a

country where most whites claim that race is no longer relevant? More
important, how do whites explain the apparent contradiction between their
professed color blindness and the United States’ color-coded inequality? In
this book I attempt to answer both of these questions. I contend that whites
have developed powerful explanations—which have ultimately become jus-
tifications—for contemporary racial inequality that exculpate them from any
responsibility for the status of people of color. These explanations emanate
from a new racial ideology that I label color-blind racism.38

The sociologist may be interested in social explanation rather than politi-

cal morality, but it is clear that sociological accounts which uncover the

 Headley (2000, 238–39).

37

 Bonilla-Silva (2006, 2).

38
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  353

distribution of differential burdens and benefits are relevant to prescriptive

moral theory. The explanatory criterion laid down in the previous chap-
ter (in connection with the presupposition that racism is a sociocultural
concept) calls for accommodating forms of racial harm that contribute
to racial oppression; hence we are required to take seriously the argu-
ments of sociologists when these arguments identify a legitimate moral
need. Bonilla-Silva’s account of “racist belief ” corresponds to a need to
condemn—and not merely  explain and understand—racial inequality.
­
Since racial ideology is a major cause of racial inequality (oppression),
it ought to be condemned as racist. This is relevant to my assessment of
Garcia because his account fails to meet the explanatory condition, as
it fails to take seriously discussions of racial ideology. However, it also
illustrates my claim that prescriptive theory must take empirical analysis
seriously.
I close this section by considering an objection. Garcia might reply that
the goal of his analysis was not to accommodate sociological (or expert)
usage of “racist belief,” but to accommodate ordinary usage of the term.
On the assumption that the former is not part of the latter, my reply is that
ordinary use should be expanded to accommodate it. After all, the term
“racism” was initially introduced by experts and the same goes for “insti-
tutional racism,” among other extensions of the term. Over time, these
terms were incorporated into the broader culture. It was incorporated
because of its utility in moral representation. So, it seems that the histori-
cal lesson here is criterial. Our criterion for determining the proper defini-
tion of a term should not be grounded in answers to questions like: “Who
introduced the term, an expert or a non-expert?” and “Did the term arise
organically in the culture or by sheer stipulation?” In the previous chapter,
I argued that we should adopt a moral criterion in assessing the pragmatic
value of prospective definitions of racist phenomena: What needs does this
term purport to meet and does it succeed in meeting them? Plausibly, the
ideological use passes this test.
Further, one of Garcia’s adequacy conditions gives license to extensions
of “racism” along pragmatic lines. He claims that a theory of racism should
“either stand continuous with past uses of the term ‘racism’, or involve a
change of the term’s meaning that represents a plausible transformation
along reasonable lines of development.”39 I would argue that the ideologi-
cal use of “racist belief” bears sufficient resemblance to the paradigm of

 Garcia (1997, 6).

39
354  A. G. URQUIDEZ

institutional racism, thereby passing Garcia’s test. To begin with, ideologi-

cally racist belief retains the condemnatory function of the terms “racism”
and “racist.” Second, it retains the characteristic connection to racial
oppression. For not only does racial ideology resemble what is called insti-
tutional racism in terms of its effects, it is causally linked to it. Some forms
of institutional racism are racist (in part) because of the racial harm they
produce. The ideological use simply extends this thought: some beliefs
perpetuate institutional racism in virtue of entering into discursive frames
that function to justify and rationalize institutional racism. These beliefs
are unjust because they perpetuate the institutional harm that they ratio-
nalize. Consequently, moral and pragmatic warrant exists for extending
the term “racist belief”: there is a moral need to combat these discursive
practices, which sustain white supremacy.
To conclude, ideological accounts of racism start from the premise that
belief content and the reasons why beliefs are held (doxastic and volitional
attitudes) are not the only things that are relevant to moral assessment. A
belief with morally benign content can be connected to benevolent
motives and yet be ideologically racist. The possibility of ideologically rac-
ist beliefs, having no connection to racial disregard, undermines Garcia’s
volitional account of “racist belief.” We can therefore lay down a third
definition of “racism,” and counterexample to Garcia’s theory:

(3) A belief is racist when it is objectionable on account of its harmful

and unjust social function; specifically, when it contributes to racial
oppression, as exhibited in  patterns of discrimination, exclusion
and disproportional harm for members of historically disadvan-
taged racial groups, independent of the content of belief and the
reasons why it is held.

In light of my argument in the previous section it is clear that racist

beliefs (2) and (3) are closely connected. Paternalistic racism is predicated
on a particular type of racial ideology, one that inferiorizes the racial
other. Hence it can bring about an unjust social function if the ideology
is sufficiently widespread and the relevant societal conditions are in place.
However, there are two major differences between (2) and (3). First, a
paradigm of ideologically racist belief involves non-inferiorizing attitudes,
such as colorblind attitudes. Second, a paradigm of paternalistically racist
belief is that it involves an intention to harm or dominate in the case of
Garcian paternalism, whereas no such intention is found in the case of
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  355

colorblind racism. In any case, what I have argued is that, in both (2) and
(3), racist belief is causally linked to racial oppression.

8.5   The Secondary Sense as Wrong Explanation

I have argued that Garcia’s infection model cannot accommodate defini-
tions (2) and (3) of “racist belief.” However, it might be replied that I did
not discuss (2) and (3) in relation to Garcia’s thesis of characteristic racism
which introduces a secondary sense. I will first illustrate the significance of
the thesis by showcasing its ability to reply to a recent objection from
Lawrence Blum. I will then argue that the Garcian reply offers the wrong
explanation inasmuch as it fails to capture the necessary wrongness
of racism.

8.5.1  Blum’s Objection and Characteristic Racism

On Garcia’s infection model, only racial disregard can be racist in itself. All
other racist phenomena must be racist in virtue of infection, that is, in
virtue of some connection to racial disregard. It follows that no belief can
be racist in virtue of its function, effects, or content alone. Blum rejects
this corollary as obviously false. He offers the following counterexample:

But what about the proposition P itself? Isn’t the proposition ‘blacks are
subhuman’ a morally repulsive proposition, independent of what leads any-
one to believe it? That is, isn’t there something about the content of propo-
sitions itself that can make them racially objectionable—that they declare a
racial group to be humanly deficient, or inferior in some fundamental way,
or … that they portray a racial group as worthy of hate?40

Blum’s objection focuses on propositions, but an analogous objection

applies to beliefs. For instance, the belief that blacks are subhuman is called
“racist” in virtue of its content alone. Blum’s intuition is thus captured in
the following definition:

(4) A belief is racist when its racial content denigrates or degrades the
dignity, personhood or humanity of a racial group, irrespective of
why it is believed or what its effects are.

 Blum (2004, 72).

40
356  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Garcia seems to have anticipated this line of objection. For his Thesis of
Characteristic Racism (TCR) seems apt to address it. Why do beliefs like
“Mexicans are rapists” intuitively strike us as racist? Garcia might answer
that given the content of such beliefs and independent of experience it is
plausible to suspect racism. For we can readily imagine the kind of person
who would believe this sort of thing (the bigot). Moreover, apart from
intuition, we know from experience that beliefs of this kind are usually
racist. The belief that Mexicans are rapists is a xenophobic and white
supremacist trope that is characteristically accompanied by racial antipathy,
which it is used to rationalize. The belief, moreover, is used by political
opportunists to fear-monger, scapegoat, and, ultimately, justify harmful
policies. Currently, Donald Trump has used this racist stereotype to crimi-
nalize Latinos, deport undocumented Latino immigrants, and separate
Latino children from their families.
If “Mexicans are rapists” is likely to engender racial disregard, then it is
rightly called “racist” in virtue of this characteristic connection. If this is
correct, Garcia can reply that beliefs with objectionable content are racist
in his secondary sense of “racism,” even if they are not racist in virtue of
their content alone. Since his thesis successfully accommodates the lin-
guistic practice of calling said beliefs “racist,” Blum-like counterexamples
are unsuccessful.
Garcia could use the same strategy to reply to my objection that his
infection model excludes Millsian paternalism (i.e., cases that conform to
definition (2)). The argument would be that instances of Millsian pater-
nalism are properly called “racist” even though they are not in fact racist
in every instance. Beliefs about the innate inferiority of certain groups are
characteristically racist, that is, standardly involve racial disregard. The aim
of the present section is to undercut this line of defense. I will argue that,
among other things, TCR does not properly capture the relevant linguistic
practice because it offers the wrong kind of explanation.

8.5.2  The Wrong Explanation

To develop my argument, I will focus on the following belief, which I take
to be racist:

B = Blacks are intellectually inferior to whites

 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  357

Since Garcia holds that racism is always wrong (see his desideratum [1]),
his account of racist belief must explain why B is wrong in every instance.
He cannot settle for the claim that B is racist 90% or 99% of the time. If
there is even one token of B that is not wrong on Garcia’s account, then his
theory has failed in that instance. If he replies that TCR allows us to call
it racist in every instance, then his argument should be rejected.
Accommodating B on TCR is beside the point. The explanation that we are
justified in calling something racist because it is normally racist is the wrong
explanation. What we need is an explanation that shows us why this some-
thing is actually racist.
My criticism can be illustrated with an imaginary conversation between
Garcia and Joel:

Garcia: A belief is racist when it is held for racist reasons; that is, when it
bears some connection to racial disregard. For example, a racist might
affirm that B in order to rationalize her racial hatred.
Joel: What if someone believes that B on empirical grounds, so that the
belief has no connection to racial disregard? In that case, is it racist?
Garcia: In the case you describe B would not be racist; however, that
would be an unusually rare case. And in any case, it is proper to describe
B—this type of belief—as racist, for it is the kind of belief that is nor-
mally used in connection to racial disregard. Calling it “racist” might
communicate the rightful suspicion that the believer of B has unethical
motives or a corrupt moral character. Or calling it thus might commu-
nicate the potential it has to foster racial disregard; that is, it might cau-
tion people against believing it.

TCR analyzes “B is racist” as an empirical description or association

rather than as an expression of moral condemnation. Rather than explain-
ing why B is morally wrong, we are given an empirical judgment—an
association of a type of belief with moral badness. We are told that beliefs
like B have a general connection to racial disregard, as opposed to a neces-
sary connection. In particular, Garcia’s analysis implies that some tokens
of B are not infected with racism, for example, those that are sincerely held
on empirical grounds and have no connection to Garcian racial disregard.
For Garcia, something counts as morally objectionable in his primary
sense if and only if it is identical to racial disregard or is infected by racial
disregard; and since no belief is identical to racial disregard, Garcia’s
358  A. G. URQUIDEZ

infection model implies that beliefs must be infected with racial disregard
to be racist. Hence non-infected tokens of B are not racist. If Garcia should
here appeal to TCR to make up the difference, this does him no good. For
TCR merely conflates an explanation of why something is wrong with an
explanation of why it is usually wrong. Said differently, we do not merely
want to know why beliefs usually are racist or why they are properly called
“racist.” We want to know why they are racist. It follows that TCR does
not provide a proper explanation of the badness of some Bs. TCR accom-
modates the linguistic practice of calling beliefs of a certain type racist,
while failing to accommodate an important part of what we mean by “rac-
ist belief.” Consequently, TCR provides the wrong kind of explanation for
calling B racist.
An analogy may help. If I say that murder is properly called “unjust”
because it usually causes needless pain and suffering or because it usually
is motivated by malice, I imply that an act of murder is not necessarily
wrong. That is, I imply that the wrongness of murder is contingent upon
a certain relation. However, if part of what we want from an account of
murder is an account of why it is wrong, then contingent explanations are
inadequate. Similarly, part of what we want from an account of B’s racist
character is an account of its badness. TCR permits calling tokens of B
racist, but for the wrong reason: not because they are truly objectionable,
but because they are tokens of a type that is usually objectionable. The
source of my difficulty is Garcia’s volitional limit on the proper use
of “racism.”
I have argued that TCR provides an improper kind of moral explana-
tion. It analyzes “B is always racist” as “B is always properly called ‘racist’
(for it usually is racist).” That said, that TCR offers the wrong kind of
moral explanation does not mean that its explanation has no legitimate
moral function. Let us imagine Joel—who has just been schooled on the
proper use of “racist belief”—conveying this newfound information to his
friend, Gabriel:

Joel: It is not always racist to believe that blacks are intellectually inferior
to whites. The belief is not racist if racial disregard is completely absent.
However, the belief is a moral “red flag” and is to be avoided; for it is a
common way of rationalizing racial disregard and is likely to foster racial
disregard. As such, it is rightly called “racist” in the secondary sense that
it usually is connected to racial disregard. Thus, we ought to be suspi-
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  359

cious of the motives of anyone who claims to believe B on strict empiri-

cal grounds.

When Gabriel learns that somebody believes that B, he will not yet know
whether this token is truly racist, for true cases of racism have some connec-
tion to racial disregard and Gabriel does not yet know why the individual
believes that B. Gabriel is in need of further information to justify an attri-
bution of blame. However, in the interim, Gabriel can have legitimate
moral concern. The worry might consist in moral suspicion (that someone
who believes that B might be racist) or moral caution (akin to a signpost of
potential risk, “Danger up ahead”). So TCR has an important moral func-
tion: it calls attention to the potential pitfalls of believings of certain types.
These virtues notwithstanding, Gabriel’s moral concern is not that
(some token of) B is morally objectionable, but that it might be so or that
it has the potential to be(come) so. TCR replaces the expression of con-
demnation and the attribution of badness with the expressions of moral
suspicion and moral caution. However, it seems that the former rather
than the latter captures the point of calling B “racist” as the expression is
ordinarily used. Further, by Garcia’s own account of what a proper expla-
nation of racism consists in, he owes us an explanation of B’s necessary
wrongness.

8.5.3  
Moral Grounds for Condemning Intrinsically
Wrongful Beliefs
I close by considering some likely objections to my argument, and by
applying my own account of racism to the problem of intrinsically wrong
belief. Garcia might reply that I have missed the point of TCR. For I have
criticized TCR for offering an improper explanation of racism’s necessary
wrongness as if the point was to provide such an account. Perhaps, how-
ever, the point of TCR is to offer an account of how non-infected beliefs
can be(come) morally problematic. This is a type of criticism, after all, he
might argue. As we have seen, Garcia’s secondary sense provides grounds
for moral suspicion and moral caution. Since TCR serves an important
critical function, albeit one that does not explain racism’s necessary wrong-
ness, does my analysis miss its target?
If I have misinterpreted the goal of TCR, this by itself does not get
Garcia off the hook. For the question remains: How can Garcia account
for B’s necessary wrongness, if not by reference to TCR? The starting
360  A. G. URQUIDEZ

point of my argument was Blum’s objection to Garcia’s infection model.

Blum worries that, on Garcia’s theory, intrinsically wrong beliefs are
impossible. For instance, we cannot assert that believing that blacks are
subhuman is always racist and mean by “racist” that it is wrong of the
individual to believe this. It was precisely for this reason that we turned to
TCR as a way of offering an analysis of this type of belief. If we now con-
cede that TCR is incapable of explaining the necessary wrongness of said
beliefs, then we have not yet answered Blum’s objection.
In reply, Garcia might argue that Blum and I are mistaken in claiming
that beliefs like B are intrinsically wrong. However, such an objection
poses a problem for Garcia’s own account, for the claim that B is intrinsi-
cally racist is grounded in ordinary usage. Garcia thus owes us an account
of why ordinary usage fails. I do not think he can adequately undermine
the pragmatic underpinnings of this piece of ordinary usage, for it accords
with the moral condition, as I now argue; that is, there is good pragmatic
reason to preserve it.
There is a need to condemn B outright and unconditionally because it
falsely depicts blacks as inferiors and so dehumanizes them and because
dehumanization is functionally designed to oppress. In the next chapter, I
briefly touch on David Livingstone’s Smith’s account of dehumanization.
He holds that the primary psychological function of dehumanization is to
remove one’s inhibitions against committing atrocious acts of violence,
including the extermination of one’s target. If he is right about the psy-
chology of dehumanization, then there is a perfectly reasonable sense in
which racial dehumanization can be described as “intrinsically racist.” The
term “intrinsically” is not herein used in the logical sense that denotes rac-
ist “in all possible worlds.” Rather, the relevant sense is this: B is always
racist in the actual world. For dehumanizing attitudes are closely linked to
dehumanizing actions and atrocities; hence, objects of dehumanization
are vulnerable to these corresponding atrocities. If these atrocities are
never carried out, objects of dehumanization are nevertheless entrapped;
for they cannot escape living under their shadow, under the perpetual
threat of their activation. Targets are thus forced to live in a condition
analogous to a Hobbesian “state of war,” that is, they must live under the
horizon of imminent danger. Since being forced to carry such a burden is
unfair, beliefs like B are, for all practical purposes, “intrinsically” racist (in
the non-logical sense described above) in virtue of their psychological-
social role, and this simply means such beliefs are oppressive in the actual
world. Moreover, this conclusion is compatible with racially dehumaniz-
ing beliefs being wrong in virtue of their content alone. By contrast,
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  361

Garcia’s analysis requires that we wait and see whether B has a corrupting
moral function in the individual before we can condemn it as racist. His
analysis demands that we ignore the corrupting moral function of B within
society; for instance, the way in which it stigmatizes blacks. Given the
dehumanizing nature of B, which is a crucial first step in the direction of
racial oppression, there is good prima facie reason for retaining the ordi-
nary use of “B is racist.”
How is it possible, on my output-based approach, to accommodate
that which is intrinsically wrong, when intrinsic wrongness is a function of
inputs, not of outputs? I might not have a decent answer to this question
were it not for Shelby’s distinction between wide- and narrow-scope con-
ceptions of racism’s badness. Narrow-scope conceptions define “racism”
narrowly and draw moral distinctions across a wide range of racial ills (rac-
ism being only one type of racial ill). Wide-scope conceptions define “rac-
ism” widely and draw moral distinctions within the category of racism. In
this way, wide-scope conceptions allow that different categories of racist
entity can have different moral valences. This is a useful tool for output-
based approaches, like mine. For the wide-scope approach, to which I
subscribe, allows me to say that some racist beliefs are always wrong in
virtue of their content and others are wrong only under certain condi-
tions. Consider the principle of equal opportunity which is partly constitu-
tive of abstract liberalism. The theorist who objects to colorblind ideology
as racist does not assert that this principle is intrinsically bad; rather, he
asserts that its badness is contingent upon certain social conditions—that
is, the principle is contingently racist. Here it becomes important to dis-
tinguish an explanation of what makes X’s social role racist (and bad), on
the one hand, and what makes X’s nature bad (if indeed it is bad), on the
other hand. The explanation of why X is racist and bad will be similar
across categories and contexts. (What makes them racist is a causal con-
nection to white supremacy in the actual world.) However, the explana-
tion of what makes X’s nature bad will differ from one category of entity
to another. Whereas some categories of entity may be intrinsically bad,
others will not be. Hence, X may be necessarily bad in virtue of its nature,
and contingently racist in virtue of its social role.
Is it not a problem for my view that beliefs like “Mexicans are rapists”
are contingently racist? My account seems to fly in the face of Blum’s argu-
ment that we intuitively deem “Mexicans are rapists” and similar such
beliefs necessarily objectionable. This Blumsian intuition can be defended
by reference to the following thought experiment. Suppose we have com-
plete knowledge of the circumstances under which an agent S believes that
362  A. G. URQUIDEZ

Mexicans are rapists. Suppose we know that S’s belief bears no connection
to Garcian racial disregard and is unlikely to foster it in the future. Suppose
further we are certain that the belief will not contribute to a deleterious
social role that victimizes Mexicans. Intuitively we want to say that S’s
belief is racist. But we cannot say this on my output-based theory of rac-
ism. How should we think about this counterexample? I might first reply
that my revisionist theory is not committed to accommodating ordinary
usage. However, this reply is inadequate, for I have argued, against Garcia,
that there is good reason to preserve the belief that it is racist to believe
Mexicans are rapists. A more adequate reply is that, on my theory, the
belief that Mexicans are rapists may be objectionable in virtue of its con-
tent alone, even if it is not racist in virtue of its content alone. Alas, then,
I concede that, on my theory, “Mexicans are rapists” is contingently racist.
However, contingency isn’t a problem for my view because I conceive of
racism as a sociocultural phenomenon. If dehumanizing racial stereotypes
should magically cease to produce racial oppression, this would entail fun-
damental changes in the nature of the empirical phenomenon my analysis
aims to condemn, that is to say, changes in the way racial oppression oper-
ates in society. In the imaginary universe of the objector’s thought experi-
ment, dehumanization operates in a radically different manner from how
it actually operates. For if most of society can sincerely believe that a sub-
group of society is a band of rapists, without this belief’s influencing the
majority group’s conduct and other attitudes, without contributing to the
stigmatization of the minority group, then indeed it is plausible that dehu-
manization does not deserve the opprobrium we attribute to it in the
actual world. For the psychological and causal nexus which conditions our
behavior and creates the need for many of our moral concepts find no
foothold in this possible world. What this thought experiment really shows
is that the grammar of racism which I am proposing is pointless within this
fictional universe. Yet, I maintain that my grammatical analysis of
“Mexicans are rapists” captures an important moral need in the actual
world—a world with our psychological makeup, and all the rest.

8.6   Conclusion
We have identified several interconnected problems with Garcia’s theory.
First, his infection model is sometimes exclusionary, that is, it excludes
ordinary usage of “racism.” It excludes the Millsian paternalistic use, the
ideological use, and the use that condemns beliefs that are racist in virtue
 8  RACIAL OPPRESSION AND GRAMMATICAL PLURALISM  363

of content alone. Second, his account is revisionist. Adopting Garcia’s defi-

nition as correct would result in revising ordinary usage. Third, Garcia’s
theory is in need of pragmatic justification, for the uses he recommends
for exclusion correspond to moral needs that would remain unsatisfied
were we to adopt his revisionist proposals. Perhaps Garcia thinks these
consequences a good thing, if, as it appears, he favors an individualistic
picture of racism that undermines many charges of racism from the politi-
cal left. But his position still requires defending. Simply appealing to ordi-
nary usage will not do, for terms like “paternalistic racism” and “B is
racist” have uses that Garcia’s theory overlooks. His theory sometimes
avoids the aforementioned objections only to err in the direction of
improper explanation. B is not just potentially dangerous, but morally
objectionable. On TCR beliefs that strike us as intrinsically wrong can be
called “racist,” but such an assertion does not express moral condemna-
tion. Consequently, the TCR analysis of “racist belief” does not allow us
to mean what we ordinarily mean by this term. For all of the above ­reasons,
I recommend rejecting Garcia’s theory of racism, as he presents it, namely,
as a comprehensive descriptive and prescriptive account of racism.41
My critical arguments against Garcia have proceeded by means of clari-
fications of ordinary usage in conjunction with appeals to pragmatic justi-
fication. I have presented reminders of grammatical differences in the use
of “racist belief” in an effort to underscore the grammatical plurality of
this category. Wittgensteinian grammar consists of the set of rules govern-
ing the correct use of words, and his descriptive method involves the use
of these reminders to dissolve conceptual confusion. Freedom from con-
ceptual confusion is the negative aim of Wittgenstein’s method, but I
hope that the positive upshot of this negative task is deeper understanding
of the grammar of “racism.”42 Going beyond this purely descriptive task,

41
 In  most of his papers Garcia presents his account of racism as a metaphysical theory.
Indeed, “The Heart of Racism” is the only paper in which he explicitly frames his argument
for a volitional theory of racism as an argument about ordinary usage. My contention that
his theory is “revisionist” is directed at his claim about ordinary usage.
42
 My heartfelt thanks to Mark LeBar and three anonymous referees for their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. These comments greatly improved the quality and
structure of the chapter. I am grateful to Phillips Exeter Academy for awarding me a
Dissertation Year Fellowship, as it was during my residence at the Academy that the nascent
idea for this chapter was born. I gratefully acknowledge funding from the Phillips Exeter
Academy Professional Development Stipend, the William L.  McBride Travel Grant
(Department of Philosophy, Purdue University), and the Summer Institute in American
Philosophy Graduate Student Travel Grant. These generous funds made it possible for me to
364  A. G. URQUIDEZ

I have sought to provide pragmatic arguments in defense of uses of “racist

belief” that Garcia would have us exclude. My arguments have sought to
vindicate these uses of the term by appealing to the moral need to condemn
the causes of racial oppression. Unlike Garcia, I attempted to retain the
intrinsic wrongness of beliefs like B by turning to empirical analysis. In
doing so, I hope to have to shown conventionalism’s methodological
capacity to find a place for both a priori and empirical analysis in the the-
ory of raicsm. I hope also to have shown conventionalism’s explanatory
power in explaining the grammatical plurality of “racist belief,” including
its ability to outline a novel theory of intrinsically racist belief. On my
output-model, racism is a sociocultural phenomenon, the wrongness of
which is contingent, contextual and political rather than intrinsic, atomis-
tic, and personal.

Acknowledgments  This chapter is a modified and expanded version of “Jorge

Garcia and the Ordinary Use of ‘Racist Belief’” in Social Theory and Practice,
vol. 43, no. 2 (April 2017): 223–248.

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and Reparations,” 29–62.
Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. 1994. Racial Formation in the United States:
From the 1960s to the 1990s. New York: Routledge.
Pataki, Tamas. 2004. Introduction. In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and
Tamas Pataki. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Schmid, W. Thomas. 1996. The Definition of Racism. Journal of Applied Philosophy
13: 31–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00147.x.
Shelby, Tommie. 2002. Is Racism in the ‘Heart’? Journal of Social Philosophy 33:
411–420. https://doi.org/10.1111/0047-2786.00150.
———. 2014. Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism. Du Bois Review 11
(1): 57–74.
———. 2016. Injustice. In Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform.
Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Taylor, Paul C. 2004. Race: A Philosophical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Valls, Andrew. 2009. Racism: A Defense of Garcia. Philosophy of the Social Sciences
39 (3): 475–480.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. 4th ed., ed. and trans.
Peter M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Originally
published in 1953.
 CHAPTER 9

Coda

9.1   Going Forward from Here: On the Feasibility

of Negotiation

We have seen that contentiousness surrounding the discourse of racism is

the source of the philosophical question, What is racism? This is the prob-
lem of definition. In this book, I have developed a framework for settling
this question and have defended a resolution to this problem, which takes
the form of a recommendation.
In Part I, I proposed that a definition of “racism” is the expression of a
rule governing the proper use of this term. Competing definitions of “rac-
ism” are thus competing rules of representation. The meta-theoretical
framework that emerges from this argument is an analysis that takes the
question “What is racism?” to be a prescriptive question. This prescriptive
question is roughly equivalent to “How should the word ‘racism’
be used?”1

1
 This is akin to what Sally Haslanger calls “ameliorative analysis,” an approach she applies
to the theory of race. However, she seems to take a non-ameliorative analytical approach to
the theory of racism in her “Oppressions: Racial and Other” (2004). For although she pro-
vides a revisionist account of racism, her account aims at capturing the core of commonsense
and historical usage. Luc Faucher seems to think otherwise. He writes that her account is
“explicitly revisionary,” unlike Blum’s “disjunctive account,” which “tries to ground his
analysis in both history and current folk use” (2018, 419). This is misguided on two fronts.
First, Haslanger’s account is indeed revisionary, but so is Blum’s account. (As we have seen,

© The Author(s) 2020 367

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_9
368  A. G. URQUIDEZ

In Part II, I argued that conceptual disagreement about racism is best

understood as disagreement about competing answers to the prescriptive
question. From there I went on, in Parts II and III, to develop a normative-­
pragmatic framework for settling the prescriptive question. I argued
(among other things) that whites and nonwhites have competing material
stakes in deciding the prescriptive question. Philosophical theory must,
therefore, start from a non-negotiable value. I laid down the following a
priori norm: the definition of “racism” should serve the interests of rac-
ism’s historical victims. Consistent with this value, I argued for adopting a
norm of representation according to which racism is racial oppression.
A question that has up to now remained in the background of my argu-
ment is a practical one: Of what use is a definition? What can be done with
it? Many things, as it turns out. Definitions form concepts. So, in addition
to the various things we do with definitions (e.g., teach the meaning of a
word and correct misunderstanding), a definition of “racism” can serve
the purposes of the social critic. It can inform thinking as one deliberates
about policy, advises like-minded colleagues and community organizers,
educates politicians and leaders in positions of power, offers public com-
mentary on contemporary events, and so on. Of course, the role of the
social critic is not necessarily that of one who participates in these activities
herself (though she may well do so). Shelby correctly distinguishes the
role of the social critic from that of the public intellectual. A social critic,
he says, need not be a public intellectual. I agree. The primary way that the
social critic “informs” others is through the medium of scholarly work.
The philosopher herself need not be a public figure for her ideas to enter
policy deliberation, public and personal debates, counsel, education, and
social commentary, among other things. The social critic’s role is defined
by the practice of developing conceptual resources, instrumental to antira-
cist projects.

Blum explicitly argues that the point of his definition—his claim that racism is best defined as
racial antipathy or racial inferiorization—is to rehabilitate ordinary usage. His strategy is thus
to deflate the concept of racism by eliminating some of what is called racism. For further
discussion, see Urquidez (2018); Shelby (2014, 61). Second, Haslanger’s account is rooted
in history and folk usage of “oppression,” like Blum’s: “I believe that racial oppression is
counted as a form of racism both in popular discourse and in some academic contexts. So an
inquiry into what racism is and how we should combat it reasonably includes attention to
racial oppression. …What is racial oppression? …Presumably, in order to understand racial
oppression, we should consider oppression in general, as well as historically specific instances
where racial injustice is at issue” (2004, 97–98).
 9 CODA  369

Is the problem of definition only a problem for scholarly discussions

about the nature of racism? Can it be a problem for other linguistic com-
munities? The problem of definition, I believe, applies both to scholarly
and non-scholarly communities. For it is not just academic scholarship
that relies on a shared conception or understanding of racism. One antira-
cist project which is valued by the social critic is the practice of converting
others to her political agenda. One way to convert people to a political
agenda is to argue that it is necessary for mitigating or ending racism.
Hence one of the aims of social criticism is to shape and change people’s
minds about the nature of racism. For instance, the problem of definition
arises within the philosophy classroom. One of the aims of the social critic
(though not her only aim if she is the instructor) is to intellectually engage
students with the aim of converting them to her way of thinking. This is
to be done, of course, by conforming to the norms of intellectual rigor
and critical evaluation, and without compromising other pedagogical val-
ues (including respecting students’ freedom to dissent and to express dis-
agreement). Hence the problem of definition applies to communities
outside the scholarly community. Indeed, this problem emerges in all dis-
cursive contexts where competing understandings of racism prevail and
where agreement about the definition of “racism” is instrumental for
achieving some antiracist end.
I have argued that (a) the problem of defining “racism” has no final
solution, since the grammar of racism is arbitrary and the issue is essen-
tially a matter of negotiation. Consequently, (b) in some instances, the
problem of definition will not be resolvable by a single individual or
scholar, since this problem has an ineliminable collectivist dimension in
some contexts. Suppose, then, that one agrees with me that metalinguistic
negotiations are rational endeavors and that achieving scholarly consensus
about the meaning of “racism” is both possible and rational, as I have
argued. In that case, one might nonetheless question the feasibility of
achieving consensus. Let us call this the practical feasibility challenge. The
challenge can be stated thus: Is achieving consensus about the definition
of “racism” practically feasible in scholarly and other contexts? The honest
answer is that it sometimes is and sometimes is not feasible. I will qualify
this answer in three ways.
First, that consensus is sometimes unfeasible does not undermine the
role of the social critic. We have seen that there are other political roles for a
definition of “racism” to play. For example, the social critic’s ideas can inform
antiracist praxis vis-à-vis informing policy deliberation, ­ argumentation,
370  A. G. URQUIDEZ

advising/counsel, pedagogy, strategic planning, and social commentary.

Second, where consensus is necessary—that is, where metalinguistic nego-
tiation is a condition of achieving some antiracist end—it is important to
recall that consensus is sometimes feasible. The feasibility of achieving
consensus partly depends on external factors, such as the size of the com-
munity and the open-mindedness of its members. Consider the following
context: a one-on-one conversation with a friend or family member about
the need for reparations for Native Americans. Let us imagine that the
conversation quickly evolves into disagreement about the justice of repa-
rations, one that turns on a conceptual disagreement about racism.
Assuming that one’s conversation partner is open-minded and is arguing
in good faith, the possibility of conversion may be feasible. This is not to
say that conversion is easily achievable. Feasibility may strengthen with
time. It may turn out that ongoing conversation about reparations is
instrumental to the process of persuasion. This brings me to my third
point. Even where consensus is necessary for achieving a political end, the
process of making the case for a definition of “racism”—the process of
clarifying and defending a definition on more than one occasion—may
have instrumental value in achieving one’s political aims. A conversation
need not result in immediate conversion to be valuable. It may make a
more modest contribution, that is, it may “plant a seed,” as it were, that
may go on to bear fruit at some later point. Plausibly, this may be one
important way that prevailing attitudes and “national conversations”
about socially contentious issues and policies evolve.
The above description provides a gloss on the practical significance of
my Wittgenstein-inspired, normative-pragmatic framework for the theory
of racism. My focus on the question “What is racism?” unfortunately
means that I have had limited space to develop my oppression theory of
racism. Thus I was unable to articulate a comprehensive account of rac-
ism’s grammar, and unable to defend it against objections. What follows is
an expansion of my account with an eye toward future work.

9.2   Three Paradigms of Racial Oppression

My aim in this section is to provide a brief illustration of the utility of defining
“racism” as racial oppression. In The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the
Dilemmas of Black Manhood, Tommy Curry lays down this definition:
“Racism is a complex nexus of cognitive architecture used to invent, reimag-
ine, and evolve the presumed political, social economic, sexual, and psycho-
logical superiority of the white races in society, while materializing the
 9 CODA  371

imagined inferiority and hastening the death of inferior races.”2 This defini-
tion has cognitive and behavioral components. A cognitive definition is one
that defines “racism” in terms of belief or cognition. A behavioral definition
defines “racism” in terms of behavior or action. Curry’s definition also seems
to have a functionalist component. A functionalist definition is one that
defines “racism” in terms of its output or results. The functionalist nature of
his definition is evident from two considerations. First, Curry does not say
that racism is a kind of belief or behavior, but a “complex nexus” that involves
these components. Hence he seems to treat cognition and behavior as means
to racism. Second, he speaks of the “use” of cognitive architecture for “evolv-
ing” a social reality.
What, then, is the core of racism, on his account? The core seems to be
the social functions of “materializing” racial inferiority and “hastening”
the death of inferior races. In other words, the cognitive architecture and
the behavior that make use of this architecture are significant because of
their social role in sustaining white supremacy (for they are used “to invent,
reimagine, and evolve” material superiority for some and material inferior-
ity for others). Racism, for Curry, is a process of racial construction,
deconstruction, and reconstruction, which aims at subjugation and domi-
nation. The fundamental proposition of his book is that US black males
are constructed as death-ridden subjects. However, I will limit my discus-
sion to Curry’s definition rather than his argument about black males.
Curry’s definition adds some much-needed flesh to the account I gave
of racism in Chap. 7. First, it provides the mechanisms through which
racial oppression is sustained (political, social, economic, sexual, and psy-
chological forces). Second, it explicitly names the system of racial oppres-
sion: white supremacy. One might object that this latter qualifier is
problematic since it limits the scope of racism to white racism. However, I
take his account to be a historical one. That is, it is not meant to be an
account of every possible form of racism, but only of actual forms of rac-
ism. The account does not apply in every possible world, for it aims to
account for racism in the here and now. To build on Curry’s account, I
offer an analysis of what makes racism objectionable. I argue that it is prin-
cipally objectionable on political grounds and secondarily on moral grounds.
Before building on the above account, I will pause to note that Curry’s
account is far from complete. For instance, it lacks specificity in articulat-
ing criteria for differentiating racist and nonracist phenomena. How do we
determine, for example, whether some racial harm is racially oppressive,

2
 Curry (2017, 4).
372  A. G. URQUIDEZ

that is, contributes to the materializing of nonwhite inferiority? Curry’s

definition suggests that cognitive architecture in conjunction with certain
conduct must play an essential role. But what if the cognitive architecture
at work is not an antiblack stereotype? Should we call it racist? Moreover,
belief, practice, action and policy are not the only kinds of things that can
be racist. The election of a black man as US president may causally con-
tribute to white supremacy in the way that President Barack Obama’s elec-
tion and reelection did. The white backlash that his presidency effected
may have contributed to the election of a white supremacist sympathizer
(Donald Trump), which may have contributed to a growing regressive
white supremacist class. Are we then to call the election of President
Obama racist? It would seem that not just any causal contribution to white
supremacy should be called racist. Surely, the contributing cause must be
more than an empirically detectable pattern of racial harm and injustice; it
must be a pattern that is directed at nonwhites. But how do we determine
whether an empirically detectable pattern of racial harm is “directed” at
nonwhites? This problem does not simply apply to Curry’s account. It
applies to my own account, as well. In fact, it is a problem for functionalist
(output-driven) accounts of racism, in general. This is a problem I hope to
return to in future work.
What makes racism wrong? My proposal is that racial oppression is
wrong, because it violates a principle of social justice, but racial oppression
is often wrong for other reasons as well. Tommie Shelby helpfully articu-
lates the Rawlsian approach to social justice. The “basic structure” of any
society, he says, necessarily has

effects on the freedom and life prospects of individuals [which] are immense
and wide-ranging, and these effects have an impact on the quality of indi-
viduals’ lives from birth until death. Because each of us must make a life for
ourselves under the dominion of the basic structure of some society or
other, we each have a legitimate claim that these institutions treat us fairly.3

Every denizen has a “legitimate claim” to access fair opportunities and

resources to survive and thrive under the basic structure of her society. If,
for example, a professional degree is necessary for denizens to access good
health care and a home to raise one’s family, then every denizen should
have access to the educational resources requisite to achieving a profes-

3
 Shelby (2016, 21).
 9 CODA  373

sional degree. Similarly, this individual should have access to similar job
and housing opportunities as other members of the society. Otherwise the
society which deprives some of these resources is unjust. People are enti-
tled to this because they are forced to make a life under the dominion of
the basic structure of their society.
Among the opportunities and resources every denizen is entitled to are
basic human rights: the right to life, to freedom from violence, and so on.
A society is obligated to protect these rights. When the basic structure
treats certain individuals or groups unfairly, their life prospects are limited
by a condition of vulnerability. Structural injustices often have wide-rang-
ing effects on a person’s life, and one has no choice but to try and make a
life under their dominion. Shelby argues that blacks are often consigned to
ghettos which frustrate these rights and resources. Curry argues that black
men are the primary targets of violent acts (including sexual violence),
although blacks as a race suffer violence and other modes of stigmatiza-
tion, degradation, and social disadvantage.
Thus far I have argued that racial oppression is most fundamentally
wrong because it violates a principle of justice—that people are entitled to
fair treatment under the basic structure of society. Injustice, then, is the
first and most central paradigm of racism. An oppressive system that is
founded on a rigged set of rules—rules that produce stratification, differ-
ential opportunities, health disparities, differential incarceration rates, and
so on—is morally unjust because every individual has a right to make a life
for herself under the dominion of the basic structure of the society she is
born into. Nevertheless, if racial oppression is unjust, this is not the only
ground on which this phenomenon is morally objectionable. Racial
oppression is wrong for other reasons, as well. A system of racial oppres-
sion, of subjugation and domination, cannot function without mecha-
nisms in place to sustain it. Racial oppression thus infects other social
phenomena with racism.
Racial oppression is sustained by several causes. For my purposes, I will
group them into two families. The first family I will call racial viciousness.
The second family I will call racial dehumanization. Both categories are
deliberately moralized (value-laden), for my aim is to use them to shed
light on what makes racism bad. I begin with the former. Racial viciousness
is first and foremost a harm that occurs at the characterological level, so it
is a wrong of personal morality (unlike racial injustice which belongs to
political morality). Garcia’s account of racial viciousness, or what he calls
“volitional racism,” captures most of what falls under this category. Recall
374  A. G. URQUIDEZ

that, for him, racism is hatred (ill will) and disdainful disaffection directed
at an individual, based on her assigned race. We have seen that Garcia’s
infection model helpfully explains how the volitional core of the agent
causes racism outside the agent’s volitional core and outside the agent. For
instance, we saw, in Chap. 8, that Garcia’s account can accommodate
much of the categorial plurality of racism. This point was illustrated with
the example of racist belief. Similarly, Garcian volitional racism is the
source of what Joshua Glasgow calls “institutionalized attitudinal racism.”
That is, the racist attitudes of an agent can infect the design and operation
of an institution.
However, unlike Garcia, I do not believe that racial viciousness must
originate in the volitional core of the agent. As Shelby and Mills have
argued, it is not at all clear that racial viciousness, within the will of the
agent, can exist without reference to the beliefs of the agent.4 Belief and
will interact in ways that, plausibly at least, make infection a co-constitu-
tive relation. Let us, then, briefly mention some of the moral deficiencies
that characterize racial ideologies. Here I draw from Shelby’s brief discus-
sion. According to Shelby, “we often criticize persons who are careless or
credulous when it comes to forming their beliefs. And we also criticize
those who are dogmatic. Such dispositions can be viewed as character
flaws, and the beliefs formed because of these flaws accordingly could be
regarded as morally tainted.”5 Similarly, sometimes “ideological justifica-
tions, race-­based or not, are offered in bad faith,” which “constitutes a
wrong in addition to the dominance itself,” since “racists promulgate
these absurd things to cover their tracks or soothe their souls but don’t, at
least on reflection, honestly believe them.”6 Finally, ideologies run into a
“moral inconsistency” problem, for “believing that Blacks are subhuman
yet producing offspring with them or celebrating liberty and equality
while holding slaves” is a kind of hypocrisy.7 Character flaws, like dogma-
tism and credulity, are moral wrongs, but their wrongness does not neces-
sarily depend on the (racial) content of these attitudes. They are arguably
wrong because of the harm they produce.
Why should racial viciousness, whether as a characterological flaw or an
epistemic flaw, be construed as racist, on my account? What is the role of
racial viciousness in producing or reproducing racial oppression? Both

4
 Mills (2003, 37–39, 47–48); Shelby (2002, 414).
5
 Shelby (2014, 64).
6
 Shelby (2014, 69).
7
 Shelby (2014, 70).
 9 CODA  375

types of viciousness can be accommodated by my oppression theory of rac-

ism. Garcia rightly argues that racist beliefs are often rationalized by racial
hatred or racial disaffection, and that racist actions and practices, including
those that are partly constitutive of institutional conduct, are often moti-
vated by racial hatred, race-based lack of concern, and so forth. Similarly,
bad faith, credulity, and moral hypocrisy/inconsistency are often functions
of racial disregard, in Garcia’s sense. What makes characterological flaws of
this sort racist is that (i) they corrupt agents (e.g., conscious and uncon-
scious racial bigotry). Further, (ii) corrupted agents are disposed to partici-
pate in racially harmful conduct (e.g., paternalistic practices), thereby
causing stigmatization which is a kind of dignitary and expressive harm.8
Stated differently, (i) and (ii) are racist because they are characteristic causes
of racial oppression. It is important to note here that (i) and (ii) may con-
tribute to racial oppression, even if they are not connected to Garcian racial
disregard.
Shelby is right that some characterological failings need not be explained
in terms of the volitional core of the agent. For instance, credulity—or the
readiness to believe things, including insidious racial stereotypes—need
not be motivated by Garcian racial disregard in order to be morally objec-
tionable. Racist beliefs “make faulty claims to knowledge; they mislead
and distort; they create and spread myths; they misinform and conceal.”9
The epistemic dimension of racist belief is politically significant, indepen-
dent of volitional concern. Epistemic deficiencies, which may distort one’s
outlook and bring about harmful conduct, are morally significant insofar
as they are sources of invidious racial mythologies. A false belief may func-
tion as a shield against sound criticism. And under the right circumstances,
it may contribute to unjust paternalistic oppression and stigmatization,
even if the belief is unmotivated by racial animus. Consequently, false
beliefs about race and racial matters are cause for moral concern and merit
moral condemnation, even if the basis of such concern is a justice claim.
To sum up, what makes racial viciousness racist is that it lends itself to
characterological flaws, habituated conduct, and institutionalized attitudi-
nal practices that are racially oppressive. Characterological flaws are objec-
tionable on personal morality grounds. However, racial viciousness, in
both its characterological and epistemic modes, should be classified as rac-

8
 See, for example, Headley (2000, 230f).
9
 Shelby (2014, 68).
376  A. G. URQUIDEZ

ism because viciousness is a characteristic cause of racial oppression. Racial

viciousness thus constitutes the second paradigm of racism.
The third fundamental harm of racial oppression is racial dehumaniza-
tion. By dehumanization I mean those (conscious and unconscious) beliefs
regarding the innate or cultural inferiority of some races and the innate or
cultural superiority of others. David Livingstone Smith discusses an
extreme form of dehumanization, namely, the belief that a certain race is
subhuman or less than human. Consistent with Curry’s account of Man-­
Notness, he claims that the primary psychological function of dehuman-
izing attitudes is to solve a cognitive problem:

Dehumanization is a response to conflicting motives. It occurs in situations

where we want to harm a group of people, but are restrained by inhibitions
against harming them. Dehumanization is a way of subverting those inhibi-
tions. For a population to be dehumanized they must be perceived as a race
(a natural human kind) with a unique racial essence. The racial essence is
then equated with a subhuman essence, leading to the belief that they are
subhuman animals. The function of dehumanization is to override inhibi-
tions against committing acts of violence.10

Clearly, then, racial dehumanization is a paradigmatic cause of racial

oppression—one that can foster multiple forms of violence, depending on
the goals of the dehumanizing agent.
However, as I use the term “dehumanization,” the practice need not
involve the belief that a racial group is subhuman, though it may. Weaker
forms of dehumanization involve the belief that a racial group is culturally
inferior in some respect or other. What is required for dehumanization,
then, is what Blum characterizes as “inherentism.” This is the belief that a
certain group just is the way it is; that its being this way is inherent to the
group. The claim of inherency holds “that certain traits of mind, charac-
ter, and temperament are inescapably part of a racial group’s ‘nature’ and
hence define its racial fate.”11 Inherentism may come in biological or cul-
tural forms and may come in unqualified or qualified forms. Unqualified
inherentism attributes certain traits and dispositions to all members of
the group; qualified inherentism attributes it to most. Biological inher-
entism attributes innate properties to biological endowment (e.g., genet-
ics); cultural inherentism attributes them to culture. If dehumanization in
Smith’s sense is essential to the rationalization of violence, genocide, and

 Smith (2011, 264).

10

 Blum (2002, 133).

11
 9 CODA  377

other overt forms of subjugation and domination, then dehumanization

in the form of inherentism is essential to rationalizations of milder (and
more common) forms of racial discrimination, lack of concern, and disaf-
fection for the racial other. Inherentism dehumanizes when it attributes
non-human traits to a human group, when it denies positive human traits
to a human group, or when it exaggerates the traits of a human group in
a way that is deleterious to that group.
Racial dehumanization, in both its weaker and stronger forms, is objec-
tionable on grounds of disrespect, viciousness and injustice. Here I will
focus on dehumanization’s characteristic connection to injustice. Shelby
provides a helpful summary of the flaws of racial dehumanization, con-
ceived as a kind of ideology. First, racial ideologies are dehumanizing when
“they deny that members of the relevant subordinate group are equal
members of the moral community entitled to just treatment.”12 For this
kind of dehumanization not only commits a kind of expressive harm
against those targeted, but also stigmatizes the entire group. Second, dehu-
manizing racial ideologies imply “permanent subordinate status,” for unlike,
say, religious ideologies, racial subjugation denies the possibility of con-
verting to a different race. Third, “They contribute to the production and
reproduction of unjust social arrangements by concealing the fact that these
arrangements are unjust.”13 For Shelby, this last deficiency constitutes the
central wrong of Marxian forms of ideology, in general. “Most importantly,
they legitimate group domination through their misrepresentations.”14 I
thus submit that racial dehumanization is a criterion of racial oppression,
and hence, a criterion of racism. It constitutes a third paradigm of racism.
I have now identified three paradigms of racial oppression: racial injus-
tice, racial viciousness, and racial dehumanization. These paradigms con-
stitute three distinct but interrelated families of racial ill, each of which is
morally objectionable in its own right and by its own standards.
Dehumanization, viciousness, and injustice need not be based on race to
be objectionable. However, when they are, they are properly condemned
as racist. Moreover, all three paradigms of racism are arguably necessary
for producing a racialized state (white supremacist society)—what Mills
describes as “globalized white supremacy.” In this way, they become inte-
grated into the patterned fabric known as the basic structure of society,
rendering it fundamentally unjust.

12
 Shelby (2014, 69).
13
 Shelby (2014, 70).
14
 Shelby (2014, 68).
378  A. G. URQUIDEZ

These three paradigms provide an important point of departure for the

theory of racism, for they provide a crude response to my question: By
what criteria do we determine that Curry’s “cognitive architecture” and
social forces are racist? I submit that they are or become racist when they
can be linked to one of my three paradigms of racial oppression.15 In other
words, I am proposing that my oppression approach to the theory of rac-
ism can accommodate historical accounts of racism, such as Curry’s analy-
sis. It can do so by directing our attention toward the social and explanatory
role of racially objectionable phenomena in producing and sustaining a
white supremacist regime. Each paradigm is seriously morally objection-
able, and intrinsically so. Racial injustice (by definition) transgresses a cri-
terion of justice, while racial viciousness (by definition) transgresses
principles of personal moral virtue. Racial dehumanization, at the personal
level, seems to transgress some principle of respect or moral virtue. At the
social level, racial dehumanization transgresses a principle of justice (this
occurs when dehumanizing attitudes contribute to racial stigmatization,
systemic forms of violence, structural discrimination, and the like).
The intrinsic wrongness of each paradigm means that we do not need
to call them racist to condemn them. What makes them racist is that they
bear a characteristic connection to systems of racial oppression.

9.3   Going Forward from Here: Implications

and Future Research

I would like to conclude by laying out some of the theoretical and practi-
cal implications of my theory of racism. First, it provides an account of
racism’s objectionable moral status, in terms of political and personal
morality. Many philosophers, including Garcia, Schmid, Blum, Glasgow,
and Headley, hold that racism is either always morally objectionable or
seriously morally objectionable. Others, like Shelby, Mills and Arthur
claim that racism is not always morally objectionable; for them, racism is
always objectionable in some sense, but not necessarily a moral sense. I
have argued that political morality is a kind of moral position. The term
should not be restricted to personal morality accounts of racism. Political

15
 This, of course, does not fully resolve the need to fine-tune the criteria for racism. For
there remain legitimate questions about criteria I do not address in this book: Are there
borderline cases of racial dehumanization, racial viciousness, and racial injustice? If so, how
do we decide these cases? What about apparent counterexamples and objections to my
argument?
 9 CODA  379

morality accounts are correct to locate racism’s negative moral valence in

injustice. The fundamental wrong of racism is that it is oppressive: it cre-
ates a condition of vulnerability to death, stigma, insult, lack of oppor-
tunity, lack of access, health disparities, and the like. It structures society
in ways that privilege historically dominant white races and ways that
disadvantage historically subjugated nonwhite races, which is fundamen-
tally unfair.
A second theoretical implication of my theory is that it resolves Blum’s
“categorial plurality” problem, which Glasgow describes as the “location
problem.” This is the problem of specifying the primary category of entity
wherein racism is located or originates. I have defended an output-driven
account of racism. An output-model, such as mine, identifies racism with
a certain effect or output rather than a specific categorial location. If rac-
ism is racial oppression, then the various things that are called “racism”
can all be contributing causes to oppression. Racism is best viewed as a
function rather than a category of entity. Racism is not a thing, but a con-
dition brought about by an unjust social structure, which is racially orga-
nized. In this way, my account also solves the problem of grammatical
plurality. For most if not all the things that are called “racist belief,” for
example, can be explained this way. Perhaps my account does not
­accommodate the full grammatical plurality of “racism,” but arguably it
captures everything that ought to be captured.
A third theoretical implication of my approach is that theorists of rac-
ism are encouraged to analyze putative cases of racism (e.g., borderline
cases) from a sociocultural perspective. I provided the example of implicit
racial bias. The assessment of this phenomenon should not be restricted to
the narrow set of issues that are prominent within discussions of personal
responsibility, such as the psychology and agency of those who harbor
implicit biases. It should also be assessed in terms of its social role. Hence
my theory encourages a broader set of questions, including these: Does
implicit racial bias impose extra burdens on historically subjugated racial
groups? If so, how can the exculpation of moral responsibility for implicit
bias be justified? I suspect that it cannot, at least not in a way that escapes
the charge of racism.
Fourth, my account encourages theorists to consider new social phe-
nomena, not ordinarily considered racist, in search of “latent” or “hid-
den” causes of racial oppression. These, in turn, are to be investigated
vis-à-vis their relationship to my three paradigms of racism. This implies
that philosophers should make use of empirical analysis in deciding
380  A. G. URQUIDEZ

whether to extend the concept. My analysis thus appropriates a priori and

a posteriori modes of analysis. A priori analysis furnishes the non-­negotiable
standard of defining “racism” from the perspective of the historical victim,
with an eye toward condemning and repairing the victim’s ongoing state
of oppression. Staying true to this standard requires that empirical consid-
erations be taken seriously in determining the ways in which victims are
oppressed. As forms of oppression change, so too might the nature of rac-
ism change. Racism, in this sense, is an unfolding process.
In addition to resolving some important methodological issues, my
account is helpful in resolving controversial cases. For example, it implies
that, normally, nonwhites cannot be racist against whites. This is a revi-
sionist conclusion, which deviates from ordinary usage. Why can’t non-
whites be racist against whites? I think it is justified by reference to the
need of historical victims of racism: the term “racism” should be used to
condemn racial oppression. The collective body of individuals known as
“whites” either do not belong to historically subjugated racial groups or
else these groups have been assimilated to whiteness. One exception to
this rule is antisemitic racism. Although Jews have overcome many forms
of oppression, they evidently continue to be oppressed in some respects.
This becomes patent whenever an important strand of white supremacist
ideology rears its ugly head, as it is currently doing. Suppose that a black
person mistakenly thinks herself white and subscribes to white supremacist
ideology. She harbors anti-Jewish sentiment, rooted in her belief that the
Semitic races are inferior to the Aryan race. Does this delusional black
person harbor anti-Jewish racism? If so, then isn’t it possible for blacks to
be racist against whites? I am inclined to say that the black person is (ought
to be judged) racist against Jews. However, this is consistent with my
claim that, normally, nonwhites cannot be racist against whites.
There are other implications I could discuss, but these will have to wait
for another moment. In future work, I hope to do several things. First, I
hope to apply my normative-pragmatic theory of racism to controversial
cases, with an eye toward generating criteria of application. The aim would
be to analyze and appraise the rich grammar exhibited by our racial vocab-
ulary. If my oppression theory of racism is to be worthy of being called
“the (prescriptively) correct definition of ‘racism,’” it needs to generate
criteria of application for such terms as “racist person,” “racist discrimina-
tion,” “institutional racism,” “intentional racism,” and “ideological rac-
ism.” Careful assessment of the grounds for each criterion must be
accompanied by prescriptive argumentation. Second, I have said very little
 9 CODA  381

about the relevant notion of race that informs my conception of racism.

So, I need to delve more deeply into the historical record, to discuss the
relationship of race to racism. Third, I hope to provide a sustained empiri-
cal account of racism-as-racial-oppression. Finally, I hope to further refine
my a priori adequacy condition, which holds that racism should be defined
from the perspective of the victim, especially in respect to the meaning of
“contributing cause of racial oppression.”
In this book I have sought to criticize and correct much of what strikes
me as problematic in the theory of racism. However, at the end of the day
it is obvious that this book has not gone far enough in providing a sus-
tained analysis of racism. Part III of this book barely scratches the surface
as far as a theory of racism is concerned. The other two parts articulated a
framework for theorizing racism. Hopefully, I have succeeded in demon-
strating that there is much conceptual confusion in the theory of racism,
and that a substantial amount of this confusion is methodological and
rooted in linguistic misunderstanding. “For our forms of expression,
which send us in pursuit of chimeras, prevent us in all sorts of ways from
seeing that nothing extraordinary [I want to say: nothing metaphysical] is
involved.”16 “One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on
the pivot of our real need.”17 This partly explains why the important part
of this book is the part I didn’t write: the dustbins of confusion needed to
be cleared first, so that inquiry into racism could be turned around on the
pivot of our real need.

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 Index1

A pragmatic aim (Mitchell-­

Adequacy conditions for descriptive
theories of racism
moral condition (see Moral condition)
ordinary usage condition (OUC)
(descriptive); Garcia’s,
238–239; Glasgow’s, 239,
265–266; normative neutrality
constraint (NNC), 237;
preservationist aim, 238, 239;
reformist aim, 238–239;
Shelby’s critique of the, 42, 49
Adequacy conditions for prescriptive
theories of racism, 275–320
antiracist value as non-negotiable
(see Antiracist value)
explanatory condition, 277,
298–316 (see also Sociocultural
approach)
moral condition (see Moral condition)
ordinary usage condition (OUC)
(conservative); normative status
of ordinary usage, 281
Yellin), 278–279
resolution condition, 277, 316–319
Agent-based theories of racism, see
Personal racism
Agnostic default position, 253, 255
Agreement in definition/explanation/
practice/form of life
about definitions of “racism”;
internal contestation doesn’t
undermine intelligibility of
“racism,” 69; shared
understanding is internally
contested, vague, 70
communal/intersubjective, 104
as a condition for rational
resolution, 222, 224, 227–228
disagreement with the
Pirahã, 179–182
human attitudes and, 173
importance of–for achieving political
ends, 276, 283, 370
Alcoff, Linda Martin, 268, 268n52

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 395

A. G. Urquidez, (Re-)Defining Racism, African American Philosophy and
the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9
396  INDEX
Alexander, Michelle, 343,
343n28, 343n30
Ameliorative analysis
conceptual engineering, 32
conceptual ethics, 229–230
See also Conceptual change;
Prescriptive analysis,
approaches to
Amesbury, Richard, 104n16, 117n26
Analytic/synthetic distinction,
113, 116, 168
Anthropological nature (of grammar),
see Culture/anthropology
Antiracist value, 265
ethic/agenda/commitment, 18–24
and historical victims of
racism, 19–24
starting point for prescriptive
theory; serve the interests of
racism’s historical victims, 279
See also under Non-negotiable values
Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 5, 5n3,
51n19, 238, 238n6, 279n3
Approaches to the theory of racism
conventionalism (see
Conventionalism qua
framework for
prescriptive theory)
descriptive analysis, including
descriptive grammatical analysis
(see Descriptive analysis)
empirical analysis (see Empirical
analysis of racism)
Goldberg’s purely conceptual/
stipulative (see Stipluative
definition)
metaphysical approaches;
conceptual analysis
(see under Approaches to
descriptive theories of racism);
externalism (see Semantic
externalism); See also
Metaphysical analysis
moralist approaches to racism;
ameliorative analysis (see
Ameliorative analysis);
conservatism (see
Conservatism); revisionism (see
Revisionism); See also Moralism
A priori analysis, 18–19, 129–137
a priori-based intuitions about
definition; a priori as “what
precedes experience,” 114; depth,
116–117; epistemic justification
(see Epistemic justification);
immovability/unwavering
attitude/commitment, 108–109;
inference rule, 115–117; logical
priority of grammar (meaning
precedes truth), 112–120;
material validity, 114–115, 117,
118; necessary truth, 108;
necessity in a system and of a
system, 111, 112; pattern of
inference, 117–118; universal in
application, 112; universal
truth, 107–112
constitutive rules, 26, 106,
222–224, 226
as descriptive grammatical analysis/
pure description (see under
Descriptive analysis)
primacy of–over empirical
analysis, 18–19
Arbitrariness of grammar, 101–107,
120–129, 182–187
grammar not responsible to reality,
122 (see also under Epistemic
justification)
and pointless/unimportance of
grammar; the U.S. Constitution
as arbitrary, 103
Arbitrary
decision to lay down a rule, 212–213
definition (see Arbitrariness of
grammar)

Atomistic
approach; inability to accommodate
racial oppression, 328; See also
Isolated individual
racism as an–problem, 298
Autonomy of grammar, see
Arbitrariness of grammar
B 344n31, 344n32, 347, 348n34,
“Bachelors are unmarried”
is rule, not a description, 74, 94–97,
99, 102, 107, 110, 113, 116,
134, 147, 233
See also A priori analysis
Badness, see under Moralism
Baker, Gordon P., 19, 58, 58n25,
58n27, 59n30, 60, 60n32,
60n33, 62, 63n34, 65, 68–69,
75n47, 84, 94n2, 99n9, 100n11,
100n12, 101, 101n14, 117n26,
121, 121n32, 127n36, 163n8,
163n9, 182–183, 183n24,
184n26, 185–186, 186n27, 188,
188n29, 189n30, 189n31, 190,
193, 194, 194n33,
309–310, 310n39
Barker, Chris, 206, 206n5, 207
Basic/non-basic grammatical
propositions
basic propositions as foundational
core of moral grammar, 105
basic propositions as framework
propositions, 250
internal v. external grammatical
criticisms, 105; internal
criticisms of non-basic
propositions, 133–135
Bell, Derrick, 228n35
Benevolent racism, see Racism,
examples of, paternalistic racism
Blum–Glasgow
disagreement, 216–220
 INDEX  397
Blum, Lawrence, 6n4, 24, 35, 50,
50n17, 215–220, 224–227, 235,
240, 242, 244, 246, 247, 251, 252,
252n24, 254–265, 267, 268,
279n3, 280, 291–294, 302,
302n33, 316, 317, 325, 325n1,
328n3, 355–356, 360, 361,
367–368n1, 376, 376n11, 378, 379
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, 313, 343, 344,
352, 352n38, 353
Boxill, Bernard, 6–7, 7n5
Brandom, Robert, 57n24, 73n45,
75–77, 114, 117n26,
121n31, 151n55
Burden of proof
in establishing stability/instability of
ordinary usage (see Agnostic
default position; Conservatism)
in establishing the nature of
definition (see under
Conventionalism qua view of
definition)
Burgess, Alexis, 229, 229n37–39, 230
C
Carmichael, Stokely, 265,
280n4, 343n29
Carroll, Lewis, 115, 115n2
Categorial drift/undifferentiation, see
under Practical problems
generated by ordinary usage
Categorial plurality, see under Pluralism
Ceteris paribus rules/laws, 118, 119
Colorblindness
ideology; a liberalism, 313, 343,
361; new racism vs. old racism,
141, 313
praxis/practice, 343
principle, 266–267
See also Institutionalist critiques of
individualism; Racial ideology
398  INDEX
Competent speakers, 10, 13, 59, 60,
66, 67, 70, 75, 77, 81, 82, 84,
85, 102, 123–125, 130, 167,
249, 259, 311
Conant, James, 58n25, 58n26
Concept-formation
extensions of grammar of
“racism” as, 127
“Water is H2O” as, 61, 99, 158,
169, 170, 175, 177–180, 187,
188, 190, 194
See also Language learning/language
acquisition
Concept/ion
accidental and essential features
of, 13–15
necessity and contingency of,
11–13, 97, 141
of racism; chameleonic, 312;
competing, 4–7; as constituted
by incompatible norms,
19, 31, 169, 251–252; as
contested, 8, 10, 14, 17,
69–71, 105, 106, 119, 169,
199, 221–226, 234, 237,
246, 246n21, 259, 264, 275
(see also Essentially contested
concept); a moral concept,
20n14, 141, 225, 253, 278,
362; narrow-and wide-scope,
265, 361; and natural/
non-natural entities, 148–149,
152; open-texture, 311, 312,
312n43, 315; politicized,
8, 10, 16, 283; scavenging,
312; as self-­creation, eternal,
147; as social-explanatory
concept, 20n14; as a
sociocultural concept (see
Sociocultural approach);
vague/open-­ended,
70, 310
Concept-term, 82n63, 219, 246
Conceptual analysis, see under
Approaches to the theory of racism
Conceptual change
as evidence of semantic externalism,
34, 52, 54, 157–158, 159n2,
163, 168, 169, 195, 283, 284
internalist account of, 34, 162,
169–187, 229
sparked off by scientific discoveries,
27, 169–174, 179, 181, 182,
184, 187, 195, 200
See also Ameliorative analysis;
Concept-formation
Conceptual confusion, see under
Wittgenstein’s conception of
philosophy
Conceptual disagreement, see under
Disagreement
Conceptual engineering, see under
Ameliorative analysis
Conceptual ethics, see under
Ameliorative analysis
Conceptual imperialism, 180
Conceptual inflation of “racism” and
“racist,” 217–219, 235, 254,
254n26, 256–264, 268,
306–307, 316, 317
practical difficulties generated by (see
under Practical problems
generated by ordinary usage)
Conceptual investigation into racism,
2, 3, 10, 17, 48, 53, 160, 162,
215, 379
importance of, 203
Conditions of sense, 63, 99n10, 114,
116, 117, 117n26, 120, 146, 153
Connective analysis, 47–51, 82,
82n63, 136n42
Conservatism, 238–242, 244–245,
269, 270
presumption of, 35, 234, 235, 237,
249, 252, 253, 268
principle of (Vargas/McCormick), 245

Conservative
bias (conservatism), 255
objection to Wittgnestein’s
philosophy (see under
Wittgenstein’s conception of
philosophy)
Contestedness of racism (see
Disagreement about racism; see also
Essentially contested, racism as)
Context
context for metalinguistic
negotiation (Plunkett and
Sundell); contextually supplied
standard, 207, 208; contextual
parameters, 209; See also
Metalinguistic negotiation
context in understanding grammar
and meaning (Medina);
contextualist view of meaning,
75n48, 306; practice-based
contextualism, 73n45, 74
context-sensitivity, 68, 208n8
Context of use, see under
Language-games
Contingency
contingency as mark of
culture, 95–100
contingency of convention; can be
changed, revised, challenged,
106–107; depend on decision
and practice, not facts, 97; mere
convention, 96, 108
contingency of definition of
“racism,” 106, 141
Janus-faced character of racism
(necessity/contingency
divide), 9–18
See also Facts
Contributing cause of racial oppression
Harris’ insurrectionist defense (see
Insurrectionist ethics)
what counts as a cause, 327
 INDEX  399
Conventionalism qua framework for
prescriptive theory
critique of Wittgenstein’s
conception of
philosophy, 129–132
goal of prescriptive theory;
prescriptive endorsements of
grammar, 137
as naturalistically plausible and
superior to
descriptivism, 146–151
normative-pragmatic pluralism,
24–32; prescriptive grammatical
analysis, 29–32
as superior to objective
realism and social
constructivism, 142–146
Conventionalism qua view of
definition
burden of proof in debate over the
nature of definition, 146–147
disagreement is about, 200–202;
what the norm is (descriptive
disagreement), 201; what the
norm ought to be (prescriptive
disagreement), 201
explanations of racism, 131
meaning as use, 162
metaphysical predicates recast as
facets of convention, 94–129
object of definition; is an entity or
kind (descriptivism), 201; is a
norm (conventionalism), 201
object of disagreement, 200–202; a
convention (normative
disagreement), 201; a matter of
fact (factual disagreement), 201
rules of representation, 25–26, 367
standards of correctness, 25–26,
109, 147, 251
See also Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
language
400  INDEX
Conventional meaning of “racism,” see
under Skeptical worry (What is
racism?)
Conversational values, 214
Corlett, J. Angelo, 4, 4n2, 50,
50n18, 242
Correct/correctness, 60, 162–163
definition, 78 (see also Definitions,
truth of)
no practice-independent
standard of, 224
use; descriptive grammatical
correctness, 132; grammatical
correctness, 61–65; as ground
of intervention not just fails to
conform to a standard, 80;
Paul Boghossian on “correct
use,” 78; prescriptive
correctness, 28, 136
Criteria of understanding, see
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
language, sense and intelligibility,
understanding meaning
Cudd, Ann, 295, 295n23,
296, 301
Culture/anthropology,
94–151, 169–187
cultural/anthropological nature of
grammar, 138, 139
custom, 66, 69
non-scientific culture, 170–171,
173, 178, 184
sociohistorical character of
necessity/a priori, 91
temporal nature of grammatical
propositions, 99
undermining grammar is
undermining a cultural way of
living (conquest), 185
Curry, Tommy J., 29, 29n19, 228n35,
279n4, 287, 287n15, 297,
370–373, 376, 378
D
DA/SDA distinction, see under
Disrespect, racial
Decision/choice
based on aesthetic or personal
preferences (Glock), 80
collective/communal (human)
decision; collective decision-­
making, 210; may be
forced, 227
decision exhibited in practice, 182
decision-making process is
pragmatic not epistemic, 27
to extend/modify grammar, 128
individual decision, 73n45
to resolve a dispute by
stipulation, 212–216
resolving disagreement about
borderline cases by
decision, 311
See also Metalinguistic negotiation
Default assumptions, see under
Presumption
Definitions
contingency of, 106, 141
as conventions (see Conventionalism
qua view of definition)
as descriptions (see under
Descriptivism)
of racism; as expressions of norms,
134, 152, 179; as rules of
moral representation, 25, 26,
43; See also Explanation,
of racism
a tool, 106
truth of; descriptive grammatical
truth, 137; rhetorical function
of “it is true that…,” 99–100,
100n12, 122, 131, 132, 134,
137; true in all possible worlds,
97n8, 108, 113, 119, 360; See
also Grammatical analysis

Dehumanization
as injustice, 377
and intrinsically wrong/racist
belief, 360–362
as paradigm of racism (see under
Paradigms of racism)
psychology of, 360
See also Stigmatization
Descriptive
grammatical truth, 137
proposition; definition of, 55;
descriptions of reality, 55
Descriptive analysis
captures commonsense
thinking, 219
Glasgow’s, 236, 237, 239n9
Wittgenstein’s; descriptive
grammatical analysis (pure
description), 132, 136; See also
Wittgenstein’s conception of
philosophy
Descriptivism
definitions as descriptions, 73, 124
and facts (see Facts)
simultaneity thesis, 189, 190
in the theory of racism, 145
Wittgenstein and, 73, 73n45, 74
See also Conventionalism qua view
of definition
Desiderata for a theory of racism, see
Adequacy conditions for
descriptive theories of racism;
Adequacy conditions for
prescriptive theories of racism
Destabilization arguments, see
Instability arguments
Disagreement
conceptual, 3, 19, 23, 127, 199,
200, 202, 207, 216, 219, 222,
225, 230, 237, 238, 291,
368, 370
factual, 201, 208, 211, 215
 INDEX  401
legitimate/illegitimate, 203; object
of–vanishes, 203
normative, 54, 201–202;
descriptive, 201; prescriptive/
non-descriptive,
200–202, 205–209
about racism; Blum-Glasgow’s
disagreement (see Blum-­
Glasgow disagreement); as
essentially contested (see
Essentially contested concept);
as heavily/hotly contested, 8,
14, 69, 234, 237, 246, 264,
275; and intelligibility of
“racism” (see under Agreement
in ­definition/explanation/
practice/form of life); is
rational/resolvable, 221; may
go on indefinitely, 222; as
metalinguistic negotiation, 34,
205–213, 216, 220, 222,
275n1, 319, 369, 370
See also Metalinguistic negotiation
Discovery of real essence/real
definition, see under Real
definition; see also Real essence
Disrespect, racial
DA and SDA distinction, 252
dehumanization as, 377
theory of racism, 6, 18, 70, 217,
225–227, 251, 252, 317
Domain of racism, see Racism,
domain of racism (that limits
candidates for racism), trivial
definition of
Domination/subjugation relation, see
Oppression, racial, domination/
subjugation relation
Doris, John M., 248n23
Doxastic inertia, 245–249, 252
Dummett, Michael, 5, 5n3, 57n24,
238, 286n13
402  INDEX
E function-essentialism v. category-­
Empirical analysis of racism, 9, 18, 19,
107, 137–151, 300, 304, 316,
353, 364, 379–380
empirical intuitions about the nature
of definition; contingent,
arbitrary, evolving,
sociohistorical, 111
Haslanger on, 138
Headley on, 138, 140,
141, 146–150
Valls’ objection to, 139–141
when–is justified, 140
Empirical discoveries
generate rival intensions, 169–175
as pragmatic reasons (see Pragmatic
reasons)
provide new information, 171
See also Facts; Justification
Epistemic justification
and arbitrariness of grammar,
121–125; grammars are
created/constructed, not
proved, 125; lexica are
standards of descriptive
grammatical correctness,
63, 67, 83
objections to–of prescriptive
grammar; fails to establish
normative superiority, 124;
grammar is unjustifiable by
facts, 121; is circular, 129n37
science as–for grammar (see Science)
skeptical worry epistemic gap; of
descriptive grammatical
propositions, 123, 124
Epistemic/pragmatic justification, see
under Justification
Essence, see under Real definition
Essentialism
core essentialism v. property
essentialism, 331–332
essentialism, 305
Essentially contested concept
Kekes’ conditions for, 221,
221n27, 223n31
as practical problems (see also
Problems-to-cope-with)
racism as, 220, 222, 246n21
Everett, Daniel, 176, 176n19–21,
177, 177n22
Expert intuitions, see under Intuition
Explanation
of grammatical proposition, 61–65
of meaning, 59, 61–75, 77, 81, 82,
147, 163, 181, 213n16; comes
to an end, ends in consensual
action, 65; dictionary/lexical,
63, 64; diversity of, 85; as
public and immanent, 65
of racism, 69–71
Extensions of grammar, see
Concept-formation
Externalism, see Semantic externalism;
see also Conceptual change
F
Facts
empirical facts/considerations; and
concept-formation, 183;
constrain grammar by making
norms useful, 183; contingency
of, 111; hardened into rules,
188–189n29; as pragmatic
reasons (see Pragmatic reasons);
See also Empirical analysis
of racism
grammar is conditioned
by, 126–128
matters of fact, 95, 114, 122, 200
science; non-epistemic significance
of, 180; and the Pirahã (see also

Pirahã); scientific–don’t make
definitions true, 178–179
sociocultural facts, 346; about a
human community, 184
very general–of nature (regularities),
68, 75n48, 183
Faucher, Luc, 28, 139, 139n46,
328n3, 367n1
Final solution, see Rationality
Fodor, Jerry A., 77n53
Following a rule/rule-following,
57n24, 66, 67, 75n48, 213n15
Form of life, 120, 124, 127, 135, 137,
180, 182, 184, 224, 338
See also Agreement in definition/
explanation/practice/form of life
Forms of representation, 10n19, 183,
227, 297
Forster, Michael, 82n63
Foundation
epistemic–for definitional norms
(see Epistemic justification)
of moral grammar (see under Basic/
non-basic grammatical
propositions)
naturalness as–for a technique, 126;
makes linguistic norms useful,
practicable, practical,
impractical, 186–187
pragmatic–of racial discourse, 250
science as epistemic–for grammar
(see Science)
for teaching language, 67
for a theory of racism, 19
training as–of explanation and
rule-following, 66
Framework propositions, see under
Basic/non-basic grammatical
propositions
Frederickson, George M., 293n18,
312, 312n45, 342n27
Functionalist, see Output-v. input-­
models of racism
 INDEX  403
G
Gallie, Walter B., 221n28
Garcia, Jorge Ll. A., 4, 4n1,
33, 35–36, 42, 50–53,
139, 139n46, 150, 164,
202, 203, 203n2, 203n3,
205, 211, 214–216, 219,
238, 238n7, 239, 241–245,
247, 254n25, 258, 279n3,
281, 282, 302, 306–308,
320, 325–364, 373–375, 378
Glasgow, Joshua, 35, 50–52, 131,
163, 215–220, 224–226,
236–239, 242, 244, 251, 252,
252n24, 265–266, 286, 286n14,
306, 307n35, 325, 325n1, 327,
330n6, 331, 331n9, 374,
378, 379
Glock, Hans-Johann, 56n23, 57n24,
76–84, 92–93n1, 94n2, 117,
117n26, 129n37, 134, 134n41,
150, 151, 151n55, 170n16, 171,
171n17, 181, 181n23, 182,
186–187, 187n28,
208n9, 213n15
Goldberg, David T., 214–215,
215n17, 307–308,
308n37, 312n44
Grammar
as arbitrary (see Arbitrariness of
grammar)
criticisms of (see under Basic/
non-basic grammatical
propositions)
as heavily/hotly contested (see under
Disagreement, about racism)
knowledge of, 65–69, 114,
123, 130
not responsible to reality, 27
qua discipline v.–qua objection of
grammatical investigations, 131
of “racism” is internally contested/
inconsistent, 70, 247
404  INDEX
Grammar (cont.)
See also Arbitrariness of grammar;
Conventionalism qua view of
definition; Grammatical
explanation; Language-games;
Language learning/language
acquisition; Rules;
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
language
Grammatical analysis, 136–137
goal of; descriptive grammatical
analysis (see Wittgenstein’s
conception of philosophy);
prescriptive grammatical analysis,
129, 136, 137, 150, 330
two kinds of grammatical truth;
descriptive grammatical truth,
137; prescriptive grammatical
truth, 137
See also A priori analysis;
Conventionalism qua
framework for prescriptive
theory; Conventionalism qua
view of definition
Grammatical explanation, 61–65
explanation of meaning, 59, 61–75,
77, 81, 82, 85, 147, 163, 181,
213n16; as a grammatical
reminder, 131–132, 136
grammatical proposition; basic/
framework (see Basic/non-basic
grammatical propositions); as
justifiers, not justified, 121n31;
prescriptive, 27, 29–32, 129,
132, 135–137, 150, 195, 330;
as reasons, 120–121
and justification; I will reach
bedrock (reasons will soon give
out), 121; made true by
convention, 126, 128
understanding a; background of
prior understanding, 67–68;
and learning/teaching/
training, 65–66
See also Grammar; Grammatical
analysis
Grammatical knowledge, see Language
learning/language acquisition
Grammatical propositions, see under
Grammatical explanation
Grammatical rules, see Grammatical
explanation
Grammatical truth, 98, 110, 137
v. empirical truth, 121
See also Grammatical
explanation; Truth
H
Hacker, Peter M. S., 58, 58n25,
58n27, 59n29, 59n30, 60,
60n32, 60n33, 62, 63n34, 65,
68–69, 75n47, 84, 94n2, 94n3,
96n6, 99n9, 100n11, 100n12,
101, 101n14, 101n15, 107n17,
110n19, 117n26, 121, 121n32,
122, 123n34, 126, 126n35,
127n36, 131, 131n38, 133n39,
151n55, 163n8, 163n9,
182–183, 183n24, 184n26,
185–186, 186n27, 188–190,
193, 194, 194n33, 309–311
Hamilton, Charles, 265,
280n4, 343n29
Hanfling, Oswald, 166–167, 167n15,
171–174, 179
Hare, Richard M., 205
Harris, Leonard, 29, 29n21, 33,
33n27, 51, 52, 142–146, 148,
152, 153, 203, 211, 229,
229n36, 246n21, 307–309,
314, 314n47
Haslanger, Sally, 22n17, 32, 32n26,
45, 45n4–7, 46, 46n9, 46n10,

49–50, 50n16, 52, 131, 138,
138n43, 157, 157n1, 159–162,
201, 236, 236n2, 242, 242n16,
279n4, 303, 303n34, 367–368n1
Headley, Clevis, 6–7, 7n5, 18n13, 33,
33n27, 51, 52, 53n22, 138,
138n44, 140, 141, 146–150,
152, 153, 266–268, 279n4, 298,
312n43, 312n44, 328n3, 329n5,
346n33, 352, 352n37,
375n8, 378
Heavy/hot contestation, see under
Disagreement, about racism
Historical victims of racism, see under
Antiracist value
I 50n13, 51n19, 78, 139n46,
Ideological racism, see under Racial
ideology
Immanent
grammar of social terms is, 106
justifications of grammar;
explanations of meaning as, 65;
reasons (internal to
language), 103
pragmatic reasons provide–
justifications (see under
Pragmatic reasons)
racism as an–reality, 163
Immovability, see under Necessity
Implicit/unconscious racial bias, see
types/categories of, under Racism
Inclusive/exclusive function of
rules, 109–110
Individualism/individualist, 246, 252,
266, 284, 298, 299,
301–303, 318
See also Atomistic, approach;
Institutionalist critiques of
individualism; Personal
morality; Personal racism
 INDEX  405
Inequality/injustice, see racial
Injustice, under Paradigms
of racism
Infection model, 332–335
primary sense, 333, 334
secondary sense, 333–334
Inference rule, see under A priori
analysis
Inference-ticket, see under A priori
analysis
Inflated usage, see under Conceptual
inflation of “racism” and “racist”
Input-v. output-models of racism, see
Output-v. input-models of racism
Instability arguments, 252
Institutionalist critiques of
individualism, 27, 35–36, 42,
145–146, 256,
264–268, 325–364
See also Atomistic, approach;
Colorblindness; Racial
ideology; Sociocultural
approach; White-interests-­
serving usage
Insurrectionist ethics, 309
See also Contributing cause of racial
oppression
Intention/intentional
action, 66, 151
decision to create/modify/revise a
rule, 213, 213n15
racism, 380
Internal complexity, 222, 222n29,
223, 223n30, 223n32
See also Rationality
Internalism, see Conceptual change;
internalist semantics, under
Semantic externalism
Internal relation, 60, 82
Intrinsically racist/wrong belief,
36, 335, 359–364
406  INDEX
Intuition, 51, 91, 111, 119, 148–149,
160–162, 199, 217, 241–243,
248n23, 249, 254, 281, 284,
289, 301, 311, 339, 344–348,
355–356, 361
and descriptive/conceptual
analysis, 45
as evidence of correct definition
(e.g., Garcia), 34, 143, 170,
180, 209, 210, 216, 252, 380
expert, 160
folk/ordinary, 45
unreliability of, 243
Isolated individual, 21, 352
See also Personal Morality
J Kim, Hanseung, 159n2
Janus-faced character of racism, see
under Contingency
Johnston, Paul, 133–135
Jones, Richard, 18n13
Jones, Robert P., 244n19
Justice/injustice, 3, 10, 15, 19–23,
25, 27, 29, 33, 71, 138, 246,
265–268, 279, 280, 288, 290,
293, 295, 297, 299–301, 303,
308, 309, 319, 320, 344, 349,
351, 352, 370, 375, 377–379
Shelby’s definition of injustice, 279
See also Moral condition
Justification, 4, 20, 29, 62, 65, 67, 68,
71, 92, 97, 102, 103, 106, 107,
113, 114, 120–129, 137, 139,
142, 144, 163, 172, 174, 183,
185, 186, 195, 211, 213n15,
215–219, 233, 237, 240, 247,
249, 251, 252, 255, 264, 270,
283, 286n13, 294, 297, 298n30,
304, 307–309, 314, 320, 325,
327–330, 337, 340, 342,
347–349, 352, 354, 356, 357,
359, 363, 374, 379, 380
concepts may be conditioned by
facts, guided by our
values, 127–128
definitions are tools (means), 127
epistemic (see under Epistemic
justification)
facts about human harm/misery
establish moral norms, 126,
127, 144n51
immanent–of grammar (see under
Immanent)
pragmatic (see under Pragmatic
justification)
K
Kekes, John, 216, 220–228
Knowledge, 16, 20, 42, 46n9,
58, 59, 65–69, 84, 114, 123,
124, 130, 141, 150, 151n55,
159–161, 171, 173, 177, 179,
346, 375
externalist semantics of, 60–61 (see
also Grammatical knowledge)
feminist and Foucauldian
critiques of, 174
gatekeepers of, 174
of racism itself (see under Skeptical
worry (What is racism?))
of word “racism,” 42
Kolman, Vojtěch, 76n50, 77n56
Kripke, Saul, 34, 57n24, 158, 162,
164–170, 174, 181, 190–194
L
Language
as family resemblance concept,
11, 31n25, 59, 92n1, 94n2,
329, 331
is interwoven with; our language-­
games, 106; our lives, 127, 212

meaning; criteria of understanding
(see Understanding meaning);
demarcating semantic rules,
81–85; dictionary entries give
semantic information, 64;
meaning does not have an
existence, does not exist
anywhere, 81
multiplicity of things we do with
language: commands, pray,
requests, etc., 62
See also Concept-formation;
Language-games; Language
learning/language acquisition
Language-games, 14–16, 27, 29, 42,
62, 72, 98, 101, 120, 124, 188,
191–193, 315, 340, 341
of blame, 101
context of use; clarifying
language-­game by
clarifying, 193
making a move in the, 12, 56, 93
problem of–contestation, 15–16
of social criticism, 101
of “What Measures” and “What is
Measured” (see under Standard
Meter Bar)
See also Language
Language-independence thesis
meaning exists independent of
language; logical priority of
metaphysical question, 52–53
ontological presupposition, 52
Language learning/language
acquisition, 41
and concept-formation, 183
how–is acquired, 65–69; teacher,
67; training, 66–68
knowledge of grammar; as ability
(mastery of a technique), 65,
66, 69; is exhibited in action
(my following a rule), 66; is
 INDEX  407
knowledge-how rather than
knowledge-that, 65, 123;
and understanding, 65–69
normative significance of
teaching, 68
presuppositions of, 67
Legitimate/illegitimate
disagreement, see under
Disagreement
Levine, Michael, 160, 163–164,
164n11, 195
Linguistic rules/norms, see
under Rules
Location problem, see Categorial
plurality
Locke, Alaine, 18n13
Logic of disagreement, see
Problems-to-cope-with
Ludlow, Peter, 230, 230n41
M
Machery, Edouard, 139,
139n46, 328n3
Margalit, Avishai, 259, 260
Mastery of technique, see under
knowledge of grammar, under
Language learning/language
acquisition
Material validity, see under A priori
analysis
McCormick, Kelly, 245, 245n20, 252
Meaning, 10, 14, 34, 46, 56–86, 92,
93, 96, 98, 100–102, 106, 114,
116–118, 123, 125–127, 130,
134, 146, 147, 150, 152,
157–195, 200, 201, 204, 205,
209, 210, 215, 280, 310, 311,
326, 333, 339, 341, 347, 348,
353, 368, 381
as the object or kind picked out,
164, 168, 169, 171, 175
408  INDEX
Meaning (cont.)
of “racism,” 3, 15, 16, 32, 33, 42,
43, 49, 53–54, 71, 160, 195,
211, 217, 219, 225, 230, 238,
246, 247, 249, 250, 257, 264,
268, 283, 319, 369
as the use of a word (see under
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
language)
Medina, José, 67, 67n40, 67n41,
73–75, 117n26
Metalinguistic negotiation, 34,
205–216, 219, 319, 369, 370
contested rationality, 222
contextualized standards in, 210
conversational values, 214
limits of negotiation, 275n1,
369, 370
negotiating the meaning of “racism”
(see Negotiating (the meaning
of) “racism”)
objections to; and loss of objectivity,
210, 212; natures can’t be
negotiated, 208
objective agreement in, 210
parameter settings, 209–212
pragmatic advocacy on behalf of
stipulative definition, 209–212
problem-solving logic of, 214
as rational deliberation process,
214, 220
what makes–rational, 211–214
Metaphysical analysis, 9n7, 21n15, 27,
28, 31, 45–55, 73, 85, 131, 139,
152, 157, 158, 161, 203–204,
236, 242, 243, 283, 328
externalist approach (see Semantic
externalism)
Harris’ objective realist approach,
142–145; objection to
Headley’s naturalism, 150;
objective realism, 145; objective
standards, 144; social
constructivism, 145; on stable/
enduring definition, 142–144
Headley’s institutionalist/
naturalistic approach, 33n27
non-empirical approach, 107, 108,
112–114, 116, 117, 119, 122
(Expert intuitions; see also A
priori analysis)
presuppositions of; auxiliary
propositions, 53; descriptivist
view of definition, 200;
ontological
presupposition, 52–55
the skeptical worry (see Skeptical
worry (What is racism?))
See also Contingency; Descriptivism;
Language-independence thesis;
Philosophical question, the, the
form of words “What is
racism?,” Racism, itself
(racism-as-it-is-in-itself)
Miles, Robert, 247, 256, 256n27, 331
Mills, Charles W., 21–22, 22n16, 24,
24n18, 35, 132, 143, 143n50,
150, 239–240, 240n11, 240n13,
278, 279n4, 281–285, 299, 314,
328n3, 332, 332n12, 334, 335,
335n16, 336n19, 336n20,
337–341, 350, 374, 374n4,
377, 378
Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin, 229,
229n20, 242, 243,
278–279, 279n2
Modus vivendi, see Problem of
definition/of defining “racism,”
Problem-to-cope-with;
Problem-to-resolve
Monism, see Moral monism v. moral
pluralism; see also pluralism
Moral condition, 252n24, 277–297,
320, 330, 340, 341, 360

historical usage criterion of
legitimate usage, 291–293
legitimate use/usage, 291–297
objections to “racism is wrong”;
Arthur’s objection, 285–291;
Blum’s defense, 355–356; the
Shelby-Mills objection, 281–285
personal blame v. social
criticism, 20–21
“racism is wrong,” 70, 94, 99,
103–106, 108, 111, 112, 114,
117–120, 129n37, 131, 132,
136, 150, 249; Blum’s,
355–356; Garcia’s version,
355–362; Glasgow’s version,
225; Urquidez’s version and
defense of, 283, 285
severity constraint on the, 281, 293
Moralism
badness/vileness, 280
injustice, 279
pragmatic aim (see Adequacy
conditions for prescriptive
theories)
racial ill, 279, 280
“racism is wrong” (see Moral
condition)
wrongness, 279
See also Moral condition
Morality
is subjective/intersubjective, 104
personal, 20, 21, 50, 265, 268, 277,
279n3, 290, 301, 304, 350,
351, 373, 375, 378
political, 21, 50, 264–268, 277,
279, 284, 290, 300, 303, 304,
316, 351–355, 373, 378
subjective and objective
(Mills), 337
Moral monism v. moral pluralism
categorial pluralism, 28–29
grammatical pluralism, 326–327
racism’s plural forms, 24
 INDEX  409
See also narrow-and wide-scope,
under Concept/ion; Pluralism
Moral-philosophical analysis, 43, 216
See also Approaches to the theory
of racism
Mounce, Howard O., 120, 120n29
N
Narrow-scope conception of racism,
see narrow-and wide-scope, under
Concept/ion
Naturalness, see Foundation
Necessity, see under A priori analysis
Need, 291–297
“the deep need for the convention”
(Wittgenstein), 117,
119–120, 215
the–for a definition of “racism”
(for defining “racism,” for a
stipulative definition; to lay
down a definition), 26, 56, 94,
212–216, 354
moral–confers a common interest,
126, 127, 215, 216, 224, 225,
227, 278, 280, 281, 283, 291,
320, 327, 328, 335, 340, 353,
354, 362–364
“pivot of our real need”
(Wittgenstein), 381
Negotiating (the meaning of)
“racism,” 211
Non-empirical analysis, see A priori
analysis
Non-natural entities, see under
Concept/ion
Non-negotiable (political) values,
276, 368
antiracist value/ethic as, 19, 22
in the interests of racism’s historical
victims, 22, 23
“racism is wrong” as non-negotiable
(see under Moral condition)
410  INDEX
Normative/normativity, 24–32,
75–85, 129–132, 187–194,
200–202, 236–238
grammatical analysis, 129, 131, 132
as human creation (cultural
product), 98, 108, 149
power/force of, 80, 81, 177
v. prescriptive distinction (see under
normative, under
Disagreement)
proposition, 80, 131, 132,
187–190, 192, 194
as sui generis component of natural
world, 151
a temporality, 24
Normativism, 56n23
Brandomian normativism, 77
Glock, Boghossian, 77–78
Wittgenstein’s normativism, 75–85
See also sense and intelligibility,
under Wittgenstein’s
philosophy of language
Norm-existence statements, see under
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
language
O Ordinary usage
Objective/objectively
agreement, 210
correct, 143, 204, 210
fact, 53, 147
good, 337
meanings, 168, 182, 195
moral criteria, 144
realism (approach), 18n13, 108,
142, 145
reality of racism, 18n13, 108
standard, 210
Omi, Michael, 244n19, 342n27
Ontological presupposition, see
Language-independent thesis;
Metaphysical analysis
Open
negotiation is–to change/
updating, 310
negotiation is–to several correct
answers, 222
racism as–texture concept
(see under Vagueness); as
open-ended (see under
Vagueness)
racism as–to rational contestation, 222
Oppression
as an injustice (the political wrong it
commits), 295
as a condition of vulnerability, 19,
23, 296, 304, 328, 379
racial; defining “cause of racial
oppression” (see Contributing
cause of racial oppression);
domination/subjugation relation,
23, 371, 373, 377; paradigms of
racism (see under Paradigms of
racism); racism as, 22–23, 25,
28–29, 35–36, 122, 125, 132,
233, 259, 277, 278, 280, 280n4,
288, 290–309, 314–320,
325–364, 368, 368n1, 370–381
See also Stigmatization
condition (see under Adequacy
conditions for descriptive
theories of racism; Adequacy
conditions for prescriptive
theories of racism)
of “racism” and “racist”; correct/
incorrect use of (see Correct/
correctness, use); historical
function of, 21; incompatible
uses of, 246, 251, 254, 317; as
inflated (overinflated, overused)
(see Conceptual inflation of
“racism” and “racist”);
linguistic intuition about, 52,
161, 241–242; moral functions

of–(personal blame, social
criticism), 19–21; ordinary vs.
expert intuitions about, 160;
serves white interests (see
White-interests-serving usage);
See also “Racism,” referent of
reflects commonsense thinking, 8,
10, 19, 35, 52, 200, 217, 219,
245, 247, 254, 255, 268, 283,
299, 301, 327, 329–331
See also Conservatism; Revisionism/
revisionist
Output-v. input-models of racism
functionalist; account of rules, 62;
definitions of “racism,” 28, 29,
305, 371, 372; theory of
“racism” (output-driven
account) (see under Output-v.
input-models of racism,
output-driven/output-model/
output-based)
function-essence, 305
output-driven/output-model/
output-based, 28, 326, 361,
362, 364, 372, 379; output as
effect/input as cause, 22
See also Moral functions of “racism”
and “racist,” under
Ordinary usage
Overusage (overinclusive usage) of
“racism” and “racist,” see
Inflated usage
P (see also racial viciousness, under
Paradigms of racism
racial dehumanization, 23, 29, 288,
309, 320, 360–362,
373, 376–378
racial injustice, 15, 23, 29, 71,
266–267, 280, 297, 320, 344,
352, 368n1, 373, 377,
378, 378n15
 INDEX  411
racial viciousness, 23, 29, 294, 320,
333, 373–378
See also racial, under Oppression
Pataki, Tamas, 329n5
Paternalism, see examples of racism:
paternalistic racism, under Racism
Patterned experience, see under
Regularities
Pattern of inference, see under A priori
analysis
Peregrin, Jaroslav, 76, 76n50, 76n51,
77, 77n53–55, 114–116,
118, 118n28
Personal morality, 20, 21, 50, 268,
277, 290, 301, 304, 350, 351,
373, 375, 378
individualist conception that serves
white interests, 266
individualist v. institutionalist,
252, 284
isolated individual (see Atomistic,
approach)
See also Personal racism
Personal racism
characterological flaws, 20, 289,
303, 373–375
individualistic forms; behavioral
racism, 4, 5, 49, 51, 105, 246,
371; cognitive racism, 5, 287,
334, 370–372, 378; volitional
racism, 4, 35–36, 50, 242n18,
243, 244, 320, 327, 328,
331–335, 337, 338, 350–352,
354, 358, 363n41, 373–375
Paradigms of racism)
personal blame/moral
responsibility for, 20
racist person; pathological racism,
22, 289, 290, 345; proud
racist, 70, 135, 249; reluctant
racist, 286, 287, 289–290
See also Personal morality; Racism
412  INDEX
Phillips, Dewi Z., 58n26, 120, 120n29
Philosophical question, the
the form of words “What is
racism?”; the child’s question,
43, 64; philosophical question
as function of confusion, 30;
the second-order question, 41,
55; See also Skeptical worry
(What is racism?)
problem of definition; the problem
of defining “racism,” 31, 33,
41–86, 157, 213, 220, 227,
228, 230, 241, 369; problem
to cope with (see
Problem-to-cope-with)
three interpretations of, 41–47;
descriptive (see Descriptive
analysis); metaphysical
(see Metaphysical analysis);
prescriptive (see Prescriptive
analysis, approaches to)
See also Language-­independence thesis
Picture
pictures of necessity (immovability,
etc.), 108
picture/s of racism, 363; as an
evolving, unstable entity, 313;
competing, 23
two pictures of
paternalism, 335–338
Wittgenstein’s (conventionalist)–of
language and meaning, 33,
152; picture of definition,
73, 92, 202
Pierce, Andrew, 240n13, 243n19,
265–266, 266n47, 267, 279n4
Pirahã, 175–182, 184
Are they mistaken/confused?, 178
(see also Sociocultural facts,
under Facts)
cultural immediacy of experience
principle, 177
empiricist epistemology, 176
See also Agreement in definition/
explanation/practice/form of
life; Culture/anthropology
Plunkett, David, 46n8, 205–210, 214,
229, 229n37–39, 230, 230n40
Pluralism, 24–32, 35–36, 203, 257,
305, 320, 325–364, 374, 379
categorial (see under Moral monism
v. moral pluralism)
grammatical (see under Moral
monism v. moral pluralism)
moral (see Moral monism v. moral
pluralism)
normative-pragmatic
(see Conventionalism qua
framework for prescriptive
theory; Moralism)
ontological, 24
Political morality, 21, 50, 264–268,
277, 279, 284, 290, 300, 303,
304, 316, 351–355, 373, 378
and moral badness/injustice,
279, 290
and normative status of ordinary
usage, 264, 267
and social criticism, 21
superiority of–to personal
morality, 277
See also Personal morality; Social
criticism
Practical problems generated by
ordinary usage
political problems (see
Colorblindness; Political
morality; White-interests-­
serving usage)
pragmatics problems (incomplete
list), 256–264; ambiguous
usage, 258; categorial drift,
254, 257, 260; contested
usage, 259; disagreement, 259;

general overload, 257, 259,
263; inhibition of interracial
dialogue, 257; moral overload,
257–259, 263; See also
Conceptual inflation
Practice
as a complex system of rules, 223
language as a, 62, 64, 67, 68, 106,
125, 223
language-game as a, 15, 16, 29,
56, 62, 98
Pragmatic aim, see under Adequacy
conditions for prescriptive
theories of racism
Pragmatic justification, 106–107,
125–129, 142, 174, 185–187,
216, 218, 307, 363
and empirical facts/considerations
in establishing grammar,
126, 127
of the grammar of “racism,” 128
and naturalness, 126; naturalness as
foundation for a technique (see
under Foundation)
and prescriptive grammar; deep
need for the convention, 117,
119–120, 215, 292; of moral
grammar, 127; shared need for
the convention, 220, 225
sociocultural considerations (see
under Facts)
See also Language learning/language
acquisition; Pragmatic reasons
Pragmatic reasons, 169–175
defense of–over metaphysical reasons
in the theory of racism, 236
justify against a background (form
of life), 98, 120, 124, 135,
137, 177, 180, 182, 184,
224, 238
as non-epistemic reasons,
126, 180, 186
 INDEX  413
and our moral need, 127
as prescriptive justifications (for how
things should be), 69, 127, 137
provide immanent justifications of
grammar, 107
types of, 80, 103, 126–127,
172, 228
Prescribe/prescription, 26, 132, 136,
140, 145, 147, 151n55, 201,
217, 229, 239, 240, 340
Prescriptive analysis, approaches to
conservatism (see under Conservatism)
prescriptive grammar/grammatical
analysis, 27, 29–32, 129, 132,
135–137, 150, 195, 330
presumption of agnosticism (see
Agnostic default position)
principle of conservatism (see under
Conservatism)
revisionism (see under Revisionism)
See also Adequacy conditions for
prescriptive theories of racism;
Ameliorative analysis
Prescriptive correctness, see under
Correct/correctness, use
Prescriptive grammar/grammatical
analysis, see Prescriptive analysis,
approaches to
Presumption
of agnosticism (see Agnostic default
position)
of conservatism (see Prescriptive
analysis, approaches to)
Problem of definition/of defining
“racism,” see Philosophical
question, the
Problem-solving, see under Rationality
Problems-to-cope-with, 227–229
Solution to a–is always a modus
vivendi, 227
See also Practical problems generated
by ordinary usage
414  INDEX
Problem-to-resolve, 2, 18–19, 26, 35,
69, 125, 127, 136, 145, 204,
212–214, 218, 227, 233, 234,
237, 238, 240, 251, 253, 264,
277, 317, 320, 379
Proposition
descriptive (see Descriptive
proposition)
grammatical (see under Grammatical
explanation)
normative (see under Normative/
normativity)
Pure description, see Descriptive
analysis
Putnam, Hilary, 9, 9n8, 34, 151n55,
158, 159n2, 162–175, 178, 179,
181, 195
R Racial viciousness
Race
definition of, 13–14
race-conscious policies, 266–267;
affirmative action, 3, 15, 267,
316, 343; reparation, 3, 20,
267, 301, 343, 370
race-neutrality, 266–267 (see also
Colorblindness)
racialized individuals, 21
Racial dehumanization, see under
Dehumanization
Racial discrimination, see under Racism
Racial hatred/disregard, see under
Personal racism; Racism
Racial ideology, 341–355
Bonilla-Silva’s definition of, 344
ideological racism; abstract
liberalism, 313, 343; social
meaning and racial story
lines, 344–348
Shelby’s definition of, 342, 342n26
See also Colorblindness
Racial ill, 251, 269, 284, 293,
361, 377
definition of, 280
and racism, distinction,
279–281, 291, 294, 317, 327;
Glasgow’s conflation of
distinction, 217
see under Moralism
Racial injustice, 3, 10, 15, 19–23,
25, 29, 71, 128, 138, 228,
246, 259, 266–267, 280,
280n4, 288, 290, 293, 295,
297, 299, 301, 303, 309, 320,
344, 345n33, 349, 351, 352,
368n1, 372, 373, 377, 378,
378n15, 379
as a paradigm of racism (see under
Paradigms of Racism)
Racial prejudice, see under Racism
as a paradigm of racism (see under
Paradigms of Racism; see also
Personal racism)
see also under Paradigms of racism;
see also Personal Racism
Racism
examples of; Blum’s teacher
example, 3, 216–218; criminal
justice system, 3; immigration
policy; lynching, 70n42;
paternalistic racism, 335–341,
354, 363; profiling, 3, 4, 6,
299, 349, 352; racist joke and
speech, 249, 260, 262, 263,
294; segregation/apartheid,
70, 343; slavery, 70, 105,
111–112, 246, 249, 250, 305
from the eyes of the victim (see
under Antiracist value)
itself (racism-as-it-is-in-itself), 26,
42, 44, 49, 52–54, 85, 122,
145, 150, 202, 204, 216, 236,

237, 241, 243, 248, 259,
312–313, 328, 330; no such
thing as, 25, 28, 54, 62, 66,
97, 132, 151, 189, 191, 193;
as superfluous posit, 149
as racial oppression (see under
Oppression)
and sexism, 148–150, 260
as a sociocultural phenomenon (see
Sociocultural approach)
theories of, 4–7; disrespect/dignity,
6, 7, 18, 70, 217, 218,
225–227, 236, 246, 251, 252,
259, 308, 309, 317, 355, 377;
ideological, 5, 6, 49, 334–335,
341, 342, 345, 346, 348–351,
353, 354, 380 (see also Racial
ideology); individualistic (see
Personal racism); institutional
(see Institutionalist critiques of
individualism); stigmatization,
5, 6, 288, 290, 294, 299, 326,
349, 352, 361, 372, 373, 375,
377, 378 (see also
Stigmatization)
types/categories of; dehumanization
(see Dehumanization);
discrimination, 15, 70, 70n42,
104, 105, 244n19, 259, 267,
269, 293, 298, 315, 345n33,
354, 377; disregard, 56, 122,
287, 301, 329, 332–335, 338,
341, 342, 344, 350, 354–359,
362, 375; expressive/dignitary
harm, 6, 375, 377; hatred/
antipathy, 28, 70–71, 122, 150,
217, 287, 300, 326, 327, 332,
333, 336, 337, 340, 356, 357,
368n1, 374, 375; implicit/
unconscious racial bias, 3, 4, 35,
37, 104, 119, 141, 142, 146,
287–290, 297, 300, 304,
313–315, 318, 346, 379;
 INDEX  415
inequality, 1, 20n14, 21, 22,
70n42, 140, 244n19, 253,
266n49, 267, 268, 296, 300,
308, 352, 353; inferiorization,
217, 259, 336–338, 354,
368n1; institutional racism, 2, 6,
15, 21, 22, 70, 70n42, 104,
227, 244, 244n19, 265, 301,
302, 302n33, 304, 315, 343,
343n29, 344, 349, 351, 353,
354, 374, 380; prejudice,
144n52, 221, 259, 265, 267,
298, 303; racist belief, 35–36,
261, 306, 313, 315, 325–364,
374, 375, 379; “reverse racism,”
15–16, 141, 315, 316 (see also
problem of language-­game
contestation, under Language-
game); white supremacy, 3, 6,
22, 23, 70n42, 140, 244, 250,
288, 296, 297, 300, 305, 317,
343, 354, 361, 371, 372, 377
wrongness/badness/vileness of (see
under Moralism)
See also Concept/ion
“Racism is wrong,” see under Moral
Condition
Racism-or-nothing fallacious
reasoning, see categorial drift,
under Practical problems
generated by ordinary usage
“Racism,” the term
definition of (see Definitions,
of racism)
domain of racism (that limits
candidates for racism); trivial
definition of, 211, 225
expert use/usage of, 341, 353
meaning of, 3, 15, 16, 32, 33, 42,
43, 49, 53–54, 71, 160, 195,
211, 217, 219, 225, 230, 238,
246, 247, 249, 250, 257, 264,
268, 283, 319, 369
416  INDEX
“Racism,” the term (cont.)
moral function of, 20, 361
as name of an entity in a
definition, 144
negotiating (see Negotiating “racism”)
ordinary use/usage of, 16, 19, 28,
35, 36, 42, 45n5, 49, 51, 52,
70, 124, 130, 131, 135, 147,
160, 161, 167, 214, 217–219,
234–241, 243–244, 248–257,
259, 261, 263–269, 277, 283,
286–287, 316, 319, 325–330,
337, 339–341, 353, 360–363,
368n1, 380
referent of, 7, 11, 49, 53, 61, 132,
160, 168, 179, 205, 241, 246,
247, 250, 264, 281–283, 285,
292, 312; object of racist
ascription, 2, 7
why “racism” is needed; satisfies
moral needs of injustice,
unfairness, wrongdoing,
128, 278–281
See also Ordinary usage
Rational disagreement/resolution,
see disagreement and rationality,
under Rationality
Rationality, 102, 286n13, 332
contested, 221–226
disagreement and rationality;
agreement in definition as
condition of rational resolution,
220, 221n27, 222, 224,
226–228, 234; rationality
with/without final solutions,
34, 199–230; See also
Disagreement
Dummett on, 286n13
John Kekes’ problem-solving
account of, 221
Real definition, 161
discovery of, 169–175
real essence; single, stable,
unchanging, 202–203
of water, 164, 165, 170
Real essence, see under Real definition
Reference
meaning as the referent of a word
(see Meaning, as the object or
kind picked out)
referent of “racism” (see “Racism,”
the term; Stabilizing the
referent of “racism”)
Reference fixing, see under Semantic
externalism
Regularities, 66, 125,
151n55, 213n15
in nature, 68
patterned experience (forms and
effects of harm), 153
in practice/forms of life, 68
Representationalism, 77, 81
Representation/representational
forms of, 110n19, 183, 227, 297;
ideal, 227
moral, 14n11, 22, 25, 26, 43, 71,
101, 127, 128, 141, 146, 204,
234, 235, 276, 277, 281, 298,
304, 328, 329, 342, 353
norms/rules of, 25, 73, 98, 103,
186–187, 283, 367
racist, 26, 128, 227–228, 284n9
representational
possibilities, 110n19
representational practices, 26, 33,
34, 99, 106, 118, 125, 126,
132, 134, 137, 142, 204, 211,
214, 216, 224, 328
Revisionism/revisionist, 200, 235,
237–242, 248, 249n23, 252,
253, 255–270
costs of revising ordinary usage, 239
Glasgow’s tacit, 218
paradigmatic (Vargas), 240

recommendations; Garcia’s
implicit, 340
theorists (see Blum, Lawrence;
Shelby, Tommie; Urquidez,
Alberto)
theory sympathizers (see Mills,
Charles W.; Pierce, Andrew)
See also Moralism; Ordinary usage
Rule formulations, see under rules; see
also Grammatical rules
Rules
agreement about rules; antecedent
agreement in definitions (see
Agreement in definition/
explanation/practice/form of
life); negotiating
agreement, 216–220
constitutive, 26, 106, 223, 224, 226
functions of rules; defining action,
62; inclusive/exclusive
function, 109; other functions,
110; teaching, 66
lay/stipulate a, 26, 27, 56, 63, 74,
78, 94, 99, 100, 134, 213
linguistic rules, 109, 117, 119, 189,
208n9; syntactical rules, 63, 77
of representation, 25
rule-formulation, 57n23, 63,
92–94, 100n12, 101, 213n16,
297; internally related to a rule,
62; lay down, 66;
representational practice, 99
rules governing communication
(inferentialism), 75, 76, 78, 82
rules necessary for sense and
understanding (see under
Grammar; Grammatical rule)
unjustifiability of, 121 (see also
Epistemic justification)
what are rules, 25–26
See also Grammatical rules
Russell, Bertrand, 115n23, 194
 INDEX  417
S
Schmid, W. Thomas, 148n54,
345n33, 349
Science, see under Culture/
anthropology; Facts; Pirahã
Sellars, Wilfrid, 114, 116, 117n26
Semantic externalism
externalist semantics for natural
kinds; “Gold is yellow” example
(Kripke), 166; “Water is H20”
example (Putnam), 169, 170,
175, 178, 188, 190, 194
externalist semantics for social kinds;
Glasgow’s on externalist
approach, 163; racism, 34, 54,
60–61, 160n5, 164, 168, 195,
200, 283, 284 (see also
Conceptual change); Shelby’s
externalist approach, 51, 52,
160–162, 281, 283, 284
intension/extension distinction, 162
internalist semantics; Putnam and
Kripke’s arguments against,
164–168; rival
intensions, 169–175
internal nature, 54, 159, 161, 164,
167–169, 177; hidden nature,
60, 167, 169
kinds; natural, 122, 159, 164; social,
54, 122, 159, 160, 163, 164;
See also Semantic externalism;
Semantic/s
logical priority of metaphysical
question over practical moral
questions, 112–120
paradigms, 160, 169
reference fixing; and ordinary use,
167; solution to skeptical
objection to metaphysical
analysis, 168
Twin Earth/Twin Earthian, 159n2,
164, 165, 173, 175
418  INDEX
Semantic/s
correctness/incorrectness, 25, 26,
41, 56, 61–63, 73, 78, 79, 86,
109, 118, 124, 147, 161, 163,
168, 186, 187, 203, 206, 209,
212, 216, 220, 222, 224, 251,
268; licenses intervention, 309
evaluation of rules; correctness, 25,
26, 61–63, 109, 118, 124,
163, 186
externalism and internalism (see
Normativism; Semantic
externalism)
inferential role, 77
and non-semantic mistakes (factual,
social, semantic), 78, 79
relationship of–to ontology, 243
rules; employed by competent
speakers, 59, 60, 67, 70, 75,
82, 84, 85, 124, 167, 249,
259, 311; given by explanations
of meaning, 57n23, 62, 63n34,
64–69, 74, 75, 77, 84, 85, 102,
125, 126, 147, 158, 178, 183,
200, 205
Sentence
descriptive v. normative uses
of, 188–190
minimal unit for making a move in a
language-game, 56, 93
use of v. form of, 94
Serious/severe moral wrongness. see
Severity constraint, under Moral
condition
Shelby, Tommie, 5, 14n10, 33, 35,
41, 42, 47–52, 55, 131, 150,
160, 240, 244, 247, 255, 256,
264–268, 276n1, 278, 279,
281–285, 294, 303, 308, 309,
316, 318, 319, 329, 342,
342n26, 347, 351, 361, 368,
368n1, 372–375, 377
Simultaneity thesis, see under
Descriptivism
Skeptical worry (What is racism?), 42,
49, 123, 124, 168, 243. See also
Language-independence thesis;
Philosophical question, the
knowledge of “racism” v. knowledge
of racism, 42
the linguistic novice’s
question, 41, 64
ordinary usage might be
mistaken, 51
the philosopher’s question, 27, 43
true meaning v. conventional
meaning of “racism,” 42, 49,
160, 168
“What is racism?,” 2, 11, 27, 30–32,
41–55, 64, 71, 72, 79, 85, 139,
145, 146, 157–159, 195, 200,
204, 233, 237, 241, 275, 276,
330, 367, 370; question about
reality v. question about
language, 72, 159
Smith, David Livingstone, 360, 376
Social criticism
moralist aim of (see Moralism)
the philosopher as a social critic,
50n13, 318
Sociocultural approach, 298n31, 298,
300, 302, 306
analysis of racism as; racial
oppression (see Racial, under
Oppression); sociocultural
concept, 16–18; sociocultural
phenomenon, 18, 27, 91, 138,
140, 141, 148n54, 254n25,
298–305, 312, 342, 362, 364;
unfolding process/open-­
texture, 305–310
Headley’s conceptual limit on theory
of racism, 6, 18n13, 33, 51, 52,
140, 141, 146–150, 378

social-explanatory concept, 20n14
victim’s perspective (see Historical
victims of racism, under
Antiracist value)
See also Atomistic, approach; isolated
individual, under Personal
morality
Sociocultural facts, see under Facts
Stabilizing the referent of
“racism,” 253
Standard
dictionary/lexical, 63, 64, 85
tacit endorsement of a, 99, 218
Standard Meter Bar, 187–194
Kripke’s objection to Wittgenstein’s
argument; extraordinary
property of, 190, 193; the has
no length, 190, 191
the role of the bar, 192; measure
that measures itself, 190–194
“What is measured” language-­
game, 191
“What measures” language-game,
191, 193
Starting point for a theory of racism,
see Adequacy conditions for
descriptive theory; Adequacy
conditions for prescriptive theory;
Nonnegotiable value;
Presumption
Stigmatization
dehumanization and, 362
as injustice, 299
Stipulative definition, 212–216
features of, 212–215
“mere difference in word use” (see
under Legitimate/illegitimate
disagreement)
stipulate/lay down a rule, 26, 56,
63, 74, 94, 100
Strawson, Peter F., 82, 82n63,
92, 136n42
 INDEX  419
Successful/meaningful usage, 249
Sundell, Tim, 205–210, 214, 230
T
Taylor, Paul, 238, 331
Technique
of application, 66, 69, 93, 199, 213,
213n16, 313, 380
of measurement, 126
Temporality, see under Culture/
anthropology
A temporality/timelessness of
grammar, see under Normativity
Theoretical problems for a theory of
racism, 10–11
U
Understanding meaning, see under
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
language
Unfolding process, see sociocultural
analysis of racism as unfolding
process, under Sociocultural
approach
Universal truth, see under Truth
Urquidez, Alberto
aim of book (methodological
intervention), 79
future research, 378–381
Use
bad faith s of “racism” and “racist,”
8, 15, 374, 375
competing s of “reverse racism,”
15–16, 141, 315, 316 (see also
Language-game contestation,
problem of–contestation)
meaning as (see Meaning)
of “racism” and “racist,” 2, 10, 16,
25, 28, 29, 31, 70, 240, 260,
313, 325
420  INDEX
Use (cont.)
of a racist epithet or expression, 6
white-interests-serving of “racism”
and “racist,” 268
of a word or expression, 14
W 99, 124, 132
Waismann, Friedrich, 100, 310, 311
“What is racism?,” see Philosophical
Question, the
White-interest-serving usage, 235, 268
White supremacy. see under Racism
Wide-scope conception of racism, see
narrow and wide-scope
conceptions of racism, under
Concept/ion
Winant, Howard, 244n19, 342n27
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 8, 55, 92, 158,
201, 237n5, 296, 329
Wittgenstein’s conception of
philosophy
descriptive endorsements of
grammar, 245 (see also
prescriptive endorsements,
under Conventionalism qua
framework for
prescriptive theory)
noncognitive aim of philosophy;
aims to foster understanding
(not knowledge), 58;
conservative objection to, 104;
philosophy leaves everything
where it is, 31, 136
philosophy as therapy; clears up
misunderstanding, 32;
conceptual confusion, 25, 30,
31n25, 33, 123, 130, 133,
136, 152, 221, 228, 250–252,
254, 258, 269, 317, 329, 341,
363, 381; philosophical
problems as deep disquietudes,
30; therapy in the theory of
racism, 27, 33, 370
role of the philosopher, provide;
normative description (remains
a description), 55, 58,
129–132, 136, 163, 201;
norm-existence statements, 55,
See also A priori analysis; Descriptive
analysis
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language,
8, 25, 32, 56, 57, 73, 75, 81
essence expressed in grammar, 64
family resemblances, 92n1, 329, 331
language as practice; making a move
in a language-game, 56, 93;
normative practices, 62, 67, 71,
73n45; speaker endorsement of
a rule, 132; speaker
entitlements, 59; speaking/
saying something, 78,
79, 93, 188
learning a language (see under
Language learning)
as philosophically plausible, 73,
195, 200
sense and intelligibility; criteria of
understanding, 58, 59, 311;
explanation of meaning, 61–75,
77, 81, 82, 85, 86; meaning as
use, 127, 162; normativism,
56n23, 75–85, 151, 151n55;
understanding meaning,
59n29, 60, 84; What is X?
questions, 7, 157;
Wittgensteinian semantics, 34,
35, 158, 160, 169, 188
See also Agreement in definition;
Concept-formation;
Conventionalism; Culture/
anthropology; Decision/choice;
Definitions; Descriptive; Form

of life; Foundation;
Grammatical explanation;
Language-games; Learning
language; Normative/
normativity; Pragmatic
justification; Rules; Rules, of
representation; Standard Meter
Bar; Truth; Wittgenstein’s
conception of philosophy
 INDEX  421
Wrong explanation (for racism’s
intrinsic wrongness), see
Intrinsically racist/wrong belief
Wrongness/Wrongdoing, see under
Moralism; Racism
Y
Young, Iris M., 294, 295n20