Case 8:11-cv-00094-DKC Document 1 Filed 01/12/11 Page 1 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division

STATE OF MARYLAND *

and *

THE INSURANCE COMPANY *

OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
*
Plaintiffs
V. Civil Action No.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *

SERVE ON: *
United States Attorney General
Department of Justice *
lot
and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530 *

and: *

Rod J. Rosenstein *
United States Attorney
for the District of Maryland *
36 S. Charles Street, 4th Floor
Baltimore, Maryland 21201 *

Defendant *

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, the State of Maryland and The Insurance Company of the State of

Pennsylvania, plaintiffs herein, and for their complaint against defendant, the United States of

America, state the following upon information and belief:

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Jurisdiction and Venue

This action arises against the United States of America under the Federal Tort

Claims Act ("FTCA"), codified in Title 28 of the United States Code at sections 2671-2680 (28

U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680).

2. This Court is vested with jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1346(b).

3. Venue in the District of Maryland is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b)

because the State of Maryland resides, and many of the acts or omissions complained of

occurred, in the judicial district.

4. The United States of America will be served through the United States Attorney

General and the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland pursuant to Rule 4(i) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

5. Prior to initiation of this action, the State of Maryland and The Insurance

Company of the State of Pennsylvania filed a timely administrative claim with the United States

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), on or about September

22, 2010, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).

6. On or about December 2, 2010, by registered mail, the FAA responded to the

Plaintiffs’ administrative claim, denied responsibility for the loss at issue, and informed the State

of Maryland and The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania of their right to file suit.

7. The State of Maryland and The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania have

elected to file suit in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2675.

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Factual Allegations

8. Plaintiff State of Maryland was the owner of a 1989 Aerospatiale SA365N- 1

Dauphin helicopter, registration N92MD, now destroyed (the "Aircraft")

9. Plaintiff The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania insured the Aircraft

against physical injury.

10. At all times relevant hereto, the Aircraft was one of a fleet of aircraft operated by

the State of Maryland through the Maryland State Police Aviation Command ("MSPAC"), which

operated a public use helicopter service on behalf of the citizens of Maryland to conduct, among

other things, medical evacuation flights.

11. The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), which operates the ATC system

and employs air traffic controllers who provide services within this system, is an agency of the

United States of America.

12. The primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision between aircraft

operating in the system and to organize and expedite the flow of traffic, and to provide support

for National Security and Homeland Defense. In addition to its primary function, however, the

ATC system has the capability to provide (with certain limitations) additional services. The

ability to provide additional services is limited by many factors, such as the volume of traffic,

frequency congestion, quality of radar, controller workload, higher priority duties, and the pure

physical inability to scan and detect those situations that fall in this category. It is recognized

that these services cannot be provided in cases in which the provision of services is precluded by

the above factors. Consistent with the aforementioned conditions, controllers are required to

provide additional service procedures to the extent permitted by higher priority duties and other

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circumstances. The provision of additional services is not optional on the part of the controller,

but rather is required when the work situation permits.

13. On September 27, 2008, the State dispatched the Aircraft, call sign "Trooper 2,"

from its base at Andrews Air Force Base ("ADW") to the scene of a motor vehicle accident in

the area of Waldorf, Maryland, for a medical evacuation flight.

14. Arriving near the motor vehicle scene, the Aircraft picked up two motor vehicle

accident victims and a volunteer paramedic and subsequently departed for Prince George’s

Hospital ("PGH") in Cheverly, Maryland. There were five individuals onboard Trooper 2 at the

time: two motor vehicle accident victims, the pilot, a paramedic, and a volunteer paramedic.

15. En route to PGH, the pilot of the Aircraft was in communication with the Ronald

Reagan Washington National Airport Tower ("Washington Tower"). The pilot advised the

Washington Tower that, due to deteriorating weather, the Aircraft was not able to land at PGH:

"[W]e just ran into some heavy stuff - I don’t think we’re gonna be able to make it all the way to

the hospital.... I’d like to continue on about three more miles and see what happens, and if I

don’t get a hole I’ll have to go IFR back to Andrews."

16. Anyone familiar with the aviation lexicon would have understood this transmission

to mean that Trooper 2 was encountering weather that would prevent a descent in visual

meteorological conditions and that, if the pilot did not find an opening in the. clouds, he would need

to fly under instrument flight rules through instrument meteorological conditions to ADW.

17. The Washington Tower controller advised Trooper 2’s pilot that he could choose

an altitude at his discretion and to advise of his intentions.

18. Subsequently, Trooper 2’s pilot confirmed that the weather required flight under

instrument flight rules through instrument meteorological conditions: "[I]t’s just solid up here,"

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the pilot advised; "I’d like to climb to 2,000 feet and go over to radar and shoot an approach

back into Andrews." The FAA air traffic controller "approved as requested" and directed

Trooper 2 to "contact approach."

19. The Washington Tower controller never inquired whether the pilot was qualified

to fly under instrument flight rules and failed to coordinate with the Potomac Terminal Radar

Approach Control ("Potomac TRACON") about transitioning the Aircraft to its airspace control.

20. Coordinating Trooper 2’s request would have saved Trooper 2’s pilot from having

to explain his circumstances and request to the Potomac TRACON controller and would have

increased the likelihood that the Potomac TRACON would have provided appropriate and timely

services to Trooper 2. The failure to do so increased the pilot’s workload, making an already

stressful situation more stressful.

21. At 11:48 pm, Trooper 2’s pilot made contact with the Potomac TRACON, which

the Potomac TRACON controller acknowledged. Trooper 2’s pilot then replied, "We tried to

make a medevac up at PG hospital, we’re about seven miles northwest of Andrews, like to climb

to 2,000 feet and shoot an approach into runway one left at Andrews."

22. The Potomac TRACON controller should have understood this broadcast to mean

that Trooper 2 was carrying one or more patients and needed to fly an instrument approach to,

and land, at Andrews. The controller, however, did not respond.

23. Despite having heard Trooper 2’s initial call, the Potomac TRACON controller

walked away from his position to address a low priority duty, assuming that Trooper 2 would be

a routine call, and he did not hear all of Trooper 2’s transmission.

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24. Trooper 2’s pilot waited for a minute and broadcast once again. The Potomac

TRACON controller responded this time but solely with the "Trooper 2" call sign. He failed to
respond to, or even acknowledge, Trooper 2’s request.

25. Trooper 2’s pilot stated that he was waiting for a reply and that he was heading

two hundred degrees and climbing to two thousand feet.

26. The Potomac TRACON controller was slow to respond and, completely disregarding

the pilot’s request for an approach to ADW, issued instructions to contact Washington Tower.

27. The pilot, appropriately frustrated at this point, responded, "No, sir. I want to

shoot the approach at Andrews."

28. The Potomac TRACON controller transmitted, "Tell you what go direct to the

you - you want to shoot the ILS to 19, what runway?"

29. At this point, Trooper 2’s pilot asked, "Are they using 19? Uh, runway one nine right?"

30. Thus, despite what was a very light workload for the Potomac TRACON

controller and a heavy workload under stressful conditions for the pilot, the Potomac TRACON

controller was slow to respond, made the pilot repeat his requests, and offered no assistance.

31. Upon information and belief, one reason the Potomac TRACON controller was so

unresponsive and unhelpful is that he and another controller assigned to work the particular shift

had agreed that each would work only half the shift while the other would take an extended

break. But even that does not fully explain the poor service that the Potomac TRACON

controller provided.

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32. The Potomac TRACON controller then gave Trooper 2 an instrument flight

clearance to Andrews and provided radar vectors to the final approach course for the ILS runway

19R approach.

33. He was required to, and was about to, assign a discrete transponder code to Trooper 2

but then chose not to do so. This prevented the controllers from receiving minimum safe altitude

warnings ("MSAW Alerts") when Trooper 2 subsequently flew too low to the ground.

34. Trooper 2’s pilot explained to the Potomac TRACON controller that he had

patients on board and was "trying to get them down."

35. The Potomac TRACON controller issued to Trooper 2 what he called the "latest"

Andrews weather (seven miles visibility, an 1,800 foot cloud ceiling, and a two degree Celsius

temperature/dewpoint spread), but the weather information was almost five hours old at the time it

was issued and suggested weather far better than the weather actually was at the time or that then

current report would have suggested. At the time the Potomac TRACON controller issued the

"latest" weather, the current weather report indicated that the temperature/dewpoint spread was zero.

36. Dewpoint is the temperature to which air must be cooled in order to be saturated

with water vapor present in the air. Weather reports for pilots include the dewpoint as well as

the temperature. When the two are compared, the difference reveals to the pilot how close the

air is to being 100% saturated. This difference is called the temperature-dew point spread.

37. Had Trooper 2’s pilot been told that the temperature had reached the dewpoint, as

he should have been, he would have known that Andrews likely was enshrouded in fog.

38. The Potomac TRACON controller asked the pilot whether he wanted a "short

approach." Normally, controllers are required to provide radar vectors so that the aircraft

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intercept the final approach course three miles or more from the final approach fix. The standard

three miles provides adequate time and distance for an aircraft to intercept and establish itself on

the approach course. Approaches can be made with less distance, but doing so makes the

process more challenging and gives the pilot less time to take care of other duties.

39. Trooper 2’s pilot opted for the short approach (perhaps because he had patients on

board and was anxious to get them on the ground), and the Potomac TRACON controller

vectored accordingly.

40. The Potomac TRACON controller, however, was not permitted to offer a short

approach and, in so doing, made the approach more challenging for the pilot and gave him less

time to take care of his other cockpit duties.

41. The Potomac TRACON controller’s handling of Trooper 2 as the aircraft

approached the final approach course also was deficient. He was late in issuing a turn to intercept

the final approach course, resulting in an overshoot that was corrected by the pilot rather than the

controller. The controller issued a heading of 170 degrees, which would have allowed Trooper 2

to intercept the final approach course at an angle of about 20 degrees, except that the instruction

was issued too late. Trooper 2 crossed the localizer and had to turn to intercept the final

approach course from the east side, requiring a heading of about 210 degrees. The pilot

corrected the poor intercept on his own, with no comment or assistance from the controller, but

was likely distracted from other duties as a result.

42. Once Trooper 2 intercepted the final approach course, the Potomac TRACON

controller instructed Trooper 2 to contact the Andrews Control Tower. Despite knowing that

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Trooper 2 was carrying two patients, the Potomac TRACON controller did nothing to coordinate

with the Andrews Tower before switching Trooper 2 over to its frequency.

43. The ILS, or instrument landing system, approach consists of the following components:

a. The localizer, which provides course guidance by transmitting a beam

between three and six degrees wide (adjusted to provide for a 700’ width at

the runway threshold);

b. The glideslope, which transmits an angular beam of 1.40 from top to bottom

and provides glidepath guidance; and

c. Marker beacons or, in the case of the ILS Runway 19R to Andrews, distance

measuring equipment (DME) fixes and marker beacons which provide range

information.

44. The localizer is a ground-based transmitter that provides course guidance for the

pilot. The localizer antenna is situated at the departure end (the far end) of the primary runway

that it serves. Not infrequently, a given runway is served by an ILS approach to each end. In

some cases, these ILS approaches have the same frequency, in which case the ILS systems at

each end of the runway are not operated simultaneously. This was the case with the ILS serving

Runway 19R at Andrews. The tower controller would select which ILS system is active with a

control panel in the tower.

45. The localizer provides lateral guidance to allow an aircraft to navigate to and

arrive at the approach end of the runway aligned with the runway. The glideslope provides

vertical guidance.

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46. The instrument approach that Trooper 2 was cleared to execute is the ILS Runway

19R approach. A copy of the chart for this approach appears in Figure One, below.
CAMP SPRINGS, MARYLAND
APCII CR3 R’y Id9 9300
ILS or LOC R\A/Y 19R
bC -MXK
111.5 190" AL-561 (USAFI ANDREWS APE/NAP (KADW)
Elev

V When AL5 mop, mnc’ease CAT ABCDE RVR to 40 and yin to 4 mile, A SF-S MISSED APPROACH: Climb to 900,
WhenALS loop license CAT AR RVR to 50 and v ’o I mile, CAT CD RVR - - thee climbing let Irn to 2230
to 80 andvis to 1.’ iii en, CAT E eN to 11i miles,, -j direct R,ATTA and io d.
* * Circling nct autiorized V/of R’ey iL-i PR
A71 OTOMAC APP CON ANDREWS TOWER GND Cot-I CINC DEl.
113.1 251.05 119.3 335.5 1 118.4 349.0 121.8 275.8 127.55 285.475 ASR
WI’en AbS mop, Increase CAT AR RYR to 50
cod vie to 1 mile, CAT CD us 10 ilL miles, CAT
egD 4 V BALTIMORE

Eve to llrriles.
(I F’ t A Mm Rolling
alt 25DO
DCAR-D57
O 25 Do
Max holding
/
/
40W f 0 It 4030
Mci,c holding
\
1149 \
L_J 23OKIAS
\
/3
PUFFE Misnel approach requires AT
0-CA R-078
I 40W
RADAR monitoring.
I ,-.-
I -o A jJ I
803 ANDREWS
- A 438
\ 113.1ADW...l
/
Z

\\ N OPR

CO
I‘J R-098
\ WASHNGICN RATTA
- /
\’i it.o DCA AOW 0
-. /
ChOti 47
A
.,,__/ ADW
2
474 / L
o
/
LI1 co
0
N LOCALIZEI1 - n .s CD
0 I-MXK
EMERG SAFE ALT 100 NM 6300 - . - \ _- w
r FROM "ADW" VORTAC Ln
- -’ NOTTNGI-IAM
ELEY 280 I 266
i90 5.iNM’A
from FAT 306 161
bL
S269, A
GDC DA 0-057 200 2500 RAITA
0 010
ADW DCAR C78 A " h-098

483 1 /f
40W ED
BARLS ACW
00 VORTAC VCbl angle and
ito (i-t not
-0" -. I , concidont with
20001 I /
lhelSglide
slope orgle aid
435 I cc" I

CArEoRi A B 0 F
381 S ILS 19R * 473/18 200 (200- 4) 473/24 200 1200-2)
fi 0 680/50
TOZI Rwy 1L-9R 1L I IU S-LOC 19R - ’ 680/24 407 (400-1-3) 680/40 407 (400-i1) (4C0-il
HIRLalI Rsvp 7201 740 1 7-40 1‰
OC es to MAP (.6 NM CIRCLING 111- ,,’ 1 840-2 560 16Cc-S)

150 I 1:3715-ASR 198 1780/24 213/ (2UQ’fl 1780/50 30/ 131J31l

MeSon 13041 ;: 507 (600 114(1
CAMP SPRINGS, MARYLAND 38" L9N-76 57W ANDREWS ATE/MAE (KADV’)
009 08269
ILS or LOC RWY 19R
Figure 1. The Insirtitnent Approach Chart for u.S Runway 191Z at Andrews.

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47. The "plan view" (or overhead view) section of the approach chart (see Figure

Two) shows that the final approach course is 190 degrees, which aligns with Runway 19R

(runways are assigned numbers based on their magnetic headings with the last digit omitted; thus

if the runway’s magnetic heading is 191 degrees, it is called Runway 19).

+ Wion ALS mop. incroao CAT AS RVR to 50

cod vis o 1 ml o CAT CO in to 1i milas , CAT
__Vt BALTIMORE

0o to 1T$n,ilos, t\ \
/ t A
Mm holding

I/
oil 2500
ESUDE
Ma,, haIair
DCA R - 057
.11 4000
1149
/ D
ADW
-jIT , max holding
230 KIA
A
I e
P-56S

P-56A
Z3~ PIJFFF
OCA 5-078
M med opp-ooci. roqoiro ArC
8ADAR monitoring,
ADW
-

38A ED ANDREW S
I
685

\ A 438

\Or, All
S
"7 I WASHINGTON RATTA
11.0 DCA?
Ck c 47 I /: ADW
D P,
/ DOI
LOCALIZER 11 1.5
EMERG SAFE ALT 100 NM 6300
FROM ADW VORTAC -

-- 140T7INGHAM
I 268
190 1 NM
mm FAF X6 16
86,
Figure 2. Chart Plait View.

48. The "profile view" section of the approach chart (see Figure Three) shows that an

aircraft on the localizer and closer than 10 DME (nautical miles) to the Andrews VORTAC may

descend to an altitude of 2,000 feet or above. The lightning bolt pointing from "2000" to the Maltese

cross indicates that the glideslope intercept altitude is 2,000 feet MSL. The aircraft is to stay at or

above 2,000 feet until it intercepts the glideslope, at which point descent along the glideslope (while

following the localizer) is permitted. The "GS 3.00 " indicates that the glideslope centerline is at a

three degree upward angle from the transmitter. "TCH 58" means that an aircraft on the glideslope

centerline will cross the runway threshold 58 feet above the touchdown zone elevation.

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[DUDE DCA r-O57 PUFE I 2500 I RA1TA

I
E I
Hi ED
ADW tCA -07 -O98

<DND

2500 BARLE ADW

CS3cO0’s4 VORIAC VGSI inIeciid
TCH no
j #’ ’flc, cbir.L.4 ;+r

2000 th e 1L5 glice

sop3 angle nd
I Cl-I,
I H8
Figure 3. The Profile View.

49. The minima section of the chart (see Figure Four) shows various minima

applicable to the approach. Trooper 2 fell into approach category "A." The top minima line

indicates that, with both localizer and glideslope functioning (i.e., a "full" ILS approach), the

approach could be continued to a "decision altitude" of 473 feet MSL. The "18" following the

slash indicates that the visibility must be at or better than 1,800 feet at the runway. The "200"

indicates that the MSL altitude of 473 feet equates to 200 feet above the touchdown zone

elevation. The numbers in parentheses are for military operations.

CAEGOV I C 0 C
TI 381 -IL5 198 473118 200 (200-‰) 473/24 ___ 230

fiI R 680/50
TD!L Rwy 1 L-1 R
HIRL all Rwy
11 510C 19R** 680/24
__________
407 (430-h)
(43 680/40 407 (400-( 407 (400.1) I
- 720-1 I 740-1 740-1Y2 I
Kiol
LOC RAF F0 MAP 4.6 \IM
60 90 120 I 150 180
CIRClI lJC
440(500-1) I 46D 500-1) 460(5(43-1 hIl
4l3- 560 (600.3)

5-A5R 19R 507 (5)0-X) (500-1)

70J60
lAn:S 4:36 3:04 2:18 1:50 1:32 780/24 780/50 507
1507 (500-1)4)
Figure 4. The Minima Section and Time-Distance Table.

50. This means that, as the aircraft reaches 473 feet, the pilot must make a decision

whether to continue the approach and make a landing or execute the missed approach procedure.

Those are the only two choices, and the decision to continue the approach requires the pilot to have

the runway or certain elements of the runway environment (such as its lights) in sight and be in a

position from which a normal landing can be made using normal procedures and maneuvers.

51. The second minima line is for approaches where the glide slope (whether the

airborne or ground-based equipment) is not functioning properly. The "minimum descent

altitude" is 680 feet MSL. The "24" following the slash indicates that the visibility must be at or

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better than 2,400 feet at the runway. The "407" indicates that the MSL altitude of 680 feet

equates to 407 feet above the touchdown zone elevation. The numbers in parentheses are for

military operations. In this situation, the approach becomes a "non-precision approach," and

different information from the profile view becomes relevant. The reason for the different names

of the minima for the full ILS or localizer-only approaches is the recognition that, if the aircraft

is descending along the glideslope, it will (due to reaction time and inertia) descend below the

decision altitude even if the decision to execute the missed approach is made at that point. With

a localizer-only approach, the minimum is in fact a minimum altitude. With a non-precision

approach, the missed approach is initiated at a missed approach point, which is determined either

by timing from the "final approach fix" or in the case of this approach by the BARLE fix, which

can be determined using distance measuring equipment or estimated using time, speed, and

distance calculations. A time table is presented on the approach chart, and pilots using the table

must approximate their groundspeed and, if necessary, interpolate between values.

52. The final approach fix is marked by the Maltese cross and is identified by 6.1

DME from the Andrews VORTAC. BARLE is identified by 1.5 DME from Andrews

VORTAC. That the missed approach point is at BARLE is indicated by the approach course line

changing from solid to dashed at that point.

53. After the Potomac TRACON controller advised Trooper 2 to contract Andrews

Tower, the pilot advised Andrews Tower that Trooper 2 is "with you ah for on the localizer for

runway one nine right."

54. The Tower Controller cleared Trooper 2 for the option. Cleared for the option is

an ATC authorization for an aircraft to make a touch-and-go, low approach, missed approach,

stop and go, or full stop landing at the discretion of the pilot. The Tower Controller did not

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know that Trooper 2 was carrying patients or planned a full stop landing because the Potomac

TRACON controller failed to coordinate with her to provide this information.

55. After being cleared for the option to land at ADW, and just before midnight on

September 27, 2008, Trooper 2’s pilot advised the Tower Controller that he was not "picking up

the glideslope."

56. The Tower Controller replied, "it’s showing green on the panel but you’re the

only aircraft we’ve had in a long time so I don’t really know if it’s working or not."

57. Almost immediately thereafter, and at approximately three (3) minutes before

midnight, Trooper 2’s pilot requested an Airport Surveillance Radar ("ASR") approach. A

request for an ASR approach is a request from an aircraft to air traffic controllers to provide

guidance to the runway using ground-based radar.

58. The Tower Controller responded that she was not "current" on ASR approaches

and could not give one. Thereafter, she neither inquired as to the pilot’s intentions nor did she

render, or attempt to render, any other assistance to Trooper 2.

59. Shortly after the Tower Controller declined to give Trooper 2 the ASR approach,

Trooper 2 entered a steep descent that continued until the aircraft crashed in Walker Mill Regional

Park in District Heights, Maryland, approximately three-and-a-half miles short of the runway.

60. Despite not being current on ASR approaches, the ADW Tower was equipped

with a Tower Radar Display that displayed Trooper 2’s position, groundspeed, and altitude. The

Tower Controller was required to use the Tower Radar Display.

61. Controllers are required to issue a safety alert to an aircraft if they are aware the

aircraft is in a position/altitude which, in their judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain,

obstructions, or other aircraft. The issuance of a safety alert is considered a first priority duty

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once the controller observes and recognizes a situation of unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain,

obstacles, or other aircraft. Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations

of the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in determining whether it is

reasonable for the controller to observe and recognize such situations.

62. The Tower Controller did not have any higher priority duties. There was no

frequency congestion, and her workload was limited to one aircraft. Her inability to see outside

the tower cab, an aircraft that had reported trouble receiving the glideslope, and a denied

requested for an ASR approach justified rapt attention to the radar display.

63. The Tower Controller never advised Trooper 2 that he was descending too

rapidly, was unusually low, that she "lost him on radar," or that she could not see him because

the control tower was shrouded in fog.

64. The Tower Controller had the last clear chance to prevent this accident, but she

did not or even attempt to do so. Indeed, the evidence suggests that despite the fact that

Trooper 2 was the only aircraft she was in communication with at the time she was not paying

attention to Trooper 2.

65. Trooper 2 was destroyed in the crash and four of its five occupants were killed

and the fifth severely injured.

66. Plaintiff The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania insured the

helicopter operated as Trooper 2 against physical injury. As a result of its destruction, The

Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania paid plaintiff State of Maryland the insured

value of the helicopter, $4,114,000 less a $100,000 deductible.

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NEGLIGENCE

67. Plaintiffs incorporate herein each of the allegations contained in paragraphs one

through 66.

68. The FAA, through its employees, has a duty to assign air traffic controllers to

work shifts so that competent personnel are available to perform the services offered by the

facilities that they staff or, if they will not do so, to issue appropriate notices to pilots.

69. FAA employees, including each of the air traffic controllers whose involvement

with Trooper 2 has been alleged, have a duty to act with reasonable care in performing their

official duties.

70. The FAA, acting through its employees within the course of their employment,

and individual FAA employees, including each of the air traffic controllers whose involvement

with Trooper 2 has been alleged, each acting within the course of employment with the FAA,

breached legal duties owed to the State, including, but not limited to the following particulars:

a. Failing to staff the Andrews Tower on the shift during which the accident took
place with a controller competent to issue ASR approaches or, alternatively,
issuing notices to airmen that ASRs were not available at specified times;

b. Permitting lightly staffed sectors of air traffic control facilities to be even

more lightly staffed by condoning a practice of air traffic controllers working
only half of their assigned shift and remaining on break for the other half,

c. providing outdated weather information;

d. failing to issue a discrete transponder code (thereby precluding minimum safe

altitude warnings);

e. providing poor service due to distraction of each of the controllers by

unimportant or lower priority matters (costing Trooper 2 valuable time and
opportunity, distracting the pilot, and unnecessarily increasing his workload in
poor weather conditions);

f. failing to coordinate with subsequent controllers;

g. improperly radar vectoring;

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 Case 8:11-cv-00094-DKC Document 1 Filed 01/12/11 Page 17 of 17

h. failing to provide assistance;

i. failing to issue safety alerts;

failing to closely monitor Trooper 2;

k. failing to advise loss of radar contact; and

1. failing to advise of rapidly deteriorating weather.

71. The foregoing breaches of duty, individually and collectively, were a substantial

cause of the crash and the loss of Trooper 2.

72. The State of Maryland and The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania

were damaged thereby in the amount of $4,114,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant judgment in their favor

against the United States of America and award them damages in the sum of $4,114,000.00 plus

costs.

Dated: January 10, 2011 Respectfully submitted,

STATE OF MARYLAND and
THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE
PENNSYLVANIA
By Counsel

SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP

BL( U2
Jonhan M. Stern (Trial Bar No. W 933)
jstern@schnader.com
Gordon S. Woodward (Trial Bar No. 14210)
gwoodwardschnader. corn
Mollie L. Finnan (Bar No. 17199)
mfinnan@schnader.com
750 Ninth Street, NW, Suite 550
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 419-4202
Facsimile: (202) 419-4252

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