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Thermopylae: A Suicide Mission

The battle of Thermopylae is famous for the Spartans’ memorable last stand in a situation when
they were vastly outnumbered against superior Persian forces and their three-day resistance in
which they managed to dent the Persian forces sufficiently to help the Greeks eventually
overcome their invasion. As I will go on to discuss, the sources for the information we have been
provided is not 100% reliable and there is a large element of myth making involved regarding
‘Leonidas and his 300 men.’ This still however raises questions as to what the Spartans really
were like and how much truth there is in the accounts given to us.

This essay will also examine the social, psychological and military factors that lie behind the
Spartans' extraordinary heroics at Thermopylae and in all battles, and attempt to explain the
particular circumstances of the battle itself that only left 300 Spartans to oppose the Persian
forces at such a crucial strategic encounter.

An example of this is an incident noted by Herodotus when Xerxes had sent a spy to ascertain
the Greek army’s strength and although he could not see the full force of the Greek force, he
managed to get a glimpse of the Spartans. He returned to Xerxes in shock reporting that they
were stripped for exercise whilst others were combing their hair. He was bewildered as the
Spartans seemed to be preparing themselves for death.i

How are we to understand such a mentality? There are three key factors that led to the events at
the battle of Thermopylae:

Firstly the famous agoge, which instilled such toughness and patriotic pride in their men, is
critical to such a mentality. This must of course be a very important factor, as we shall see but,
first we must uncover the different view on this unique schooling system in antiquity. Secondly,
what happened after the years of the agoge, during the army training itself that must have made
the real difference between the Spartans and the other non-professional armies? Finally I will try
to uncover the reality that lies between the inspirational myths of the battle of Thermopylae

When researching the topic of Sparta, it becomes apparent that the Spartans were a very secretive
group of peopleii. They did not leave a written account of their existence during this classical
period. This means that the evidence collected about them is mainly from foreigners. The
historians however are not always impartial so some of my findings may in fact be biased against
the Spartans. Therefore one must be cautious about what one reads about Sparta. To emphasise
their secrecy, they had a periodic expulsion of any foreigners that had managed to infiltrate the
Spartan territoryiii. One of key historians is Herodotus who is a very different historian from the
modern historians. One key difference is his lack of understanding of military techniques, which
may prove to be problematic when analysing the actual battle of Thermopylae and trying to
ascertain reasons for the Spartan army’s actions. Although he aimed to provide an impartial view
of events and to obtain his knowledge through inquiry and investigation, he often appeared more
favourable to the Athenians as he was a great fan of democracy. For past deeds he spoke to
eyewitnesses, who may not have been reliable, may have forgotten and also could have been
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biased towards one side or the other. Also the message they were trying to convey to him could
have been mixed up in translation.

Many modern scholars have criticised Herodotus saying that he often over romanticised events
and conversations as he was consciously emulating the Homeric style of writing. He was
recording events worthy of remembrance, however the heroes were people he would have
known, not classical heroes of long ago. It is also questionable how he knew about certain
events, like conversations held by Xerxes, and he is criticised for his over-dramatisation of these
small episodes. It is also questionable how he knew so much about such conversations. He was
writing at least two decades after the end of the battle of Thermopylae so many of the intricate
details will have been forgotten by the witnesses that he spoke to. The war ended in 479BC and
he was born in 484BC, which means that he was only 5 years old when the war ended!

The actual upbringing system was called the agoge. When a baby was born a decision would be
made by the elders and if he was rejected he would be left to die; some might consider such a
child lucky, as the others who were kept alive would be taken away from their mother after six
years and would be enrolled in a group of boys of similar age and they would all be under the
leadership of an older boy. As with much about the Spartans the organisation of this system is
not completely clear, however it is not important. What is known is that the boys would spend
the next fourteen years of their lives in that group as they progressed through the increasingly
brutal schedules. They were in fact taught music and dancing as both had military uses. With
regards to reading and writing, they were also taught, but as Plutarch remarks, ‘only because they
were unavoidable.’

Xenophon and Aristotle provide contrasting accounts of the Spartan upbringing. Xenophon was
exiled by Athens for fighting under King Agesilaus II of Sparta against Athens. He was also
given property in Scillus by the Spartans. Therefore he obviously was biased towards the
Spartans; however his account of the Spartan upbringing seems more believable than the hostile
account provided by Aristotle.

Yet even Aristotle who is never short of critical words of the Spartan system of education iv
admits that ‘one might praise’ the Spartans for the great care they took in having that system run
communally by the statev. The Spartans went so far as to exclude those who evaded this hard and
strenuous process imposed by the state, by the rules of Lycurgus, from the privileges of Spartan
citizenshipvi. Such was their drive to ensure a uniform development in their youths. Aristotle and
Xenophon are in agreement over this fact and also in describing the Spartan education with
words rooting from the Greek pon-, which implies suffering. Aristotle also states that the
Spartans used this form of education to give them manly courage and made them brutish vii. He
goes on to blame this for their eventual downfall, and states that other states matched the
Spartans’ ability in the military arena and excelled in other areas, unlike the Spartans who lacked
educational ideals. The narrowness by which he describes the Spartans is most probably an
exaggeration and he also goes on in a different work to contradict himself and offer a completely
different reason for the Spartan demise. However this could simply be the tendency to inflate a
single factor when describing it. It is also interesting to note that even when Aristotle was
blaming the Spartans for narrowness and bestiality, he seems to have accepted the above
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propagandaviii that the Spartans may have wanted to propagate, that their brute strength and
toughness brought them to power.

As a ‘friend’ of Sparta, Xenophon is clearly partially biased towards Sparta, but his explanation
of the Spartan educational system is more plausible as he states that the system produced not
only courage but also useful qualities such as instilling obedience and willingness to defer to the
moral opinions of othersix. However a lack of art and literature from this classical period of
Spartan history would indicate that these more ‘free-spirited’ activities were not taught and no
real emphasis was placed on such things. Rather it was vital that the Spartans were brought up
appropriately so that they were able to serve their state and die for her.

The famous Spartan myth about the boy hiding the fox from the soldiers indicates the warrior-
like discipline of all the Spartan youth. This shows the self-control that the children were
expected to learn, and could also indicate the deceptive nature of Spartans in general. However,
looking at it from a more basic point of view, this could be perceived as a stupid act by the boy
for two reasons. Not only has he stolen a fox and not managed to conceal it properly, but he has
also allowed a fox to chew at his stomach. This could have caused him irreparable damage and
could have even been fatal.

Such myths of bravery and possible stupidly have fuelled accused of “folly”x, “arrogant
stupidity”xi, disastrous ineptitudexii and “characteristic selfishness and lack of foresight”xiii in
contemporary writings. To encourage the view that the Spartans were not very intelligent,
Thucydides said of Brasidas an eminent soldier and politician that he was “an able speaker – for
a Spartan”xiv.

Due to their immense strength when it came to warfare, the image of stupidity or lack of superior
intellect could have been one would have been a beneficial one for them to propagatexv. They
may have deliberately encouraged the idea that Spartan warriors were simply mindless obedient
soldiers, devoting themselves solely to the state. According to Thucydides, on one occasion the
Spartan authorities, after having heard a long speech by a Samian embassy, replied that they had
forgotten the first part of it and did not understand the rest of it xvi. This could have been to give
the impression of stupidity or could also have been a ploy to annoy the Samians because they
took the side of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War against the Spartans. This of course
depends on when this incident took place, which is not clearly stated by Thucydides, (once again
proving the evident problems with writing about Sparta, as their history is so vague).

Because they were a secretive society much of their internal affairs was not known, but this
event being one where they interacted with another group people, it was the ideal opportunity for
them to give an impression of themselves to the other Greek states that they wanted, and it could
simply have been that the Spartans were just not very well educated, or that there was not much
importance placed on education, but there may well be more than meets the eye about this
reputation for stupidity.

Why would they want to give out this impression of their stupidity? Imagine being an opponent
of the Spartans. It would be demoralizing to think that you were about to face an army that was
renowned for its brute force and military discipline and obedience. Many non-Spartan societies
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knew that they were not willing to sacrifice comfort of peaceful economic activity to match the
military power of the Spartans. If they thought that the Spartans were superior because of their
pure power, military strategy may have seemed easier to overcome and to counterxvii. This is
because formulating strategies may have been easier than increasing the intensity of their armies’
training; hence they would believe it near on impossible to better the Spartans in warfare. The
Spartans could have been keen to restrict their opponents’ knowledge of their strategic
capabilities and hence were not only a secretive society but also chose to outwardly appear dim-
witted.

So, not only did the Spartans succeed due to extra-ordinary toughness but also a great element of
cunning, deception and secrecy also emerge as fundamental to Spartan educational aims.
However such stories of the boy and the fox don’t help to explain the group cohesion and
discipline of the army itself. After the agoge, one must take into account the military training
received by the Spartans and how much of a difference it made to them.

Unfortunately we only have concrete evidence of the army’s organization from the end of the 5 th
Century BC, in Xenophon, and have to assume that there may have been a similar arrangement
in the decades before, on the same grounds of tradition and success. From at least 403BC xviiitill
the time of Leuktraxix, the infantry of the Spartan army was split up into morai of which there
were apparently six, all according to Xenophon. Each mora was commanded by an officer called
a ‘polemarch’xx, in one of his books he also mentions subordinate officers called pentekosteres
but this is not mentioned in the Hellenika. Xenophon goes on to explain that each mora was split
up into two lochoi. In one passage, he refers to them as ‘the twelve lochoi’xxi which would
support the belief that there were 2 lochoi in each mora and hence 6 morai in total.

A more important question is how many enomotiai there were in each mora. This unlocks the
key to the size of the whole Spartan army. By ascertaining the number of enomotiai simple
calculations will tell us the size of each mora and the army as a whole. Again according to
Xenophon, there were 40 men in each enomotia consisting of 5 men from each of the 8 age
rangesxxii. As shown below…
*FRONT LINE*

O O O O O  men of ages 21-25

O O O O O  men of ages 26-30

O O O O O  men of ages 31-35

O O O O O  men of ages 36-40

O O O O O  men of ages 41-45

O O O O O  men of ages 46-50

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Although Xenophon does not even hint as to how many enomotiai there were in each mora he
did tell us in the Constitutions that each mora had sixteen enomotarchoixxiii, implying 16
enomotiai. The above formation was said to be adaptable into a system with 3 files, 12 ranks
deep. This begs the question of what happens to the ‘left-over’ four men. In the second system
there are 36 men in the enomotia. Could this be a flaw in the numbers suggested by Xenophon?
In this proposed arrangement the youngest men would be entrusted with the front line and surely
an experienced army such as the Spartans’ would not have their newest recruits at the forefront.
It would seem logical to post more experienced men at the front to lead by example and they
would also provide vital protection at the battle of Thermopylae from the arrows that were
launched by the Persians. This is problematic for contemporary scholars as it is difficult to
decide whether to trust the classical historians such as Xenophon and Herodotus. To avoid the
arrows of the Persians, the Spartans were well drilled in manoeuvres allowing them to provide a
moving target and also remain as a unit, which made them hard to break down.

As was portrayed in the Hollywood movie 300, there is a conception that the Spartans were
brutish and emotionless soldiers, but this idea along with the thought that their strength was in
forgetting their individual fears, and needs and acting as a unit may be slightly exaggerated.
There is no doubt that their success in warfare was due to their strategic ability to manoeuvre as
one and in this regard they were far greater than their non-Spartan rivals. By this time the
Spartans had already been using their divisions in the army. In a particular battle the lochai
began to overlap as the right wings of the armies tended to drift to the right. This is because the
Spartans held their weapon in their right hand and their shields in their left hands. Each hoplite
was responsible for the life of the man on his left. The men all moved to their shield-less side to
get closer to the soldier on the right xxiv who was protecting him, giving in to their individual fear.
Thucydides suggests that this was a tendency even of the Spartans and the generals and officers
had no control over this occurrence.
The generals, whether kings or others, were never given any formal training in tactics or strategy
in Sparta. They would analyse past battles and learn what not to attempt in battle. They certainly
did not achieve their high position due to ability or military knowledge. Instead they were born
into their positions. For this reason the hoplites did not expect much of their leaders just simply
that they did not make fools out of themselves. It would however have definitely been a boost to
morale to see their king on the battlefield with them. At the battle of Thermopylae the fall of the
king stirred the soldiers even more and prompted them to fight with more tenacity and there was
an even more ferocious display of valourxxv.
So much for the traditions of military training; what of the battle of Thermopylae day itself? To
what extent does the myth match reality here? It is interesting to note that the Spartans were a
religious group and it may be surprising to hear of the number of documented occasions when
religion has inhibited their actions altogether; for example at various times during the
Peloponnesian Warxxvi. At other times the Spartan generals were deterred from carrying out
actions even in the face of the enemy due to bad omens. According to Herodotus, upon receiving
the following oracular prophecyxxvii:

‘O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon!

Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Perseus,
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Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country

Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.’

it was clear to the Spartans that they had to sacrifice a leader to save the whole of Sparta. This
oracle could also quite plausibly have been concocted after the battle to justify the sacrifice of
Leonidas. It could have been that Thermopylae seemed like the perfect instance to ‘sacrifice’ a
king that was aging and could have been considered almost useless to save Sparta. Leonidas was
over the age of sixty and hence not required to fight in the wars. Therefore he would have been
considered of no use. It could have been the case that he was considered ‘dead’ in some regards
as they were a military state and he was past his peak military years. For this reason the decision
could have been made to send him with a small force to face what would be their definite
demise. If they this were to come, being the religious people that they were, they would have
averted the more serious danger of the fall of Sparta. However the one question that instantly
springs to mind is whether Leonidas and his men knew that they were acting as a sacrifice for the
state. They could have been oblivious to this fact and could have simply been under the
impression that they were simply going ahead, awaiting further assistance from their fellow
Spartans. Also the men were chosen by drawing lots because there was a taboo against fighting
during the Karneia. All the men that drew lots were senior members of the Spartan army and all
had children of their own. This may have been because they were considered the fading
generation that were less able in war than the youths. If the 300 that went with Leonidas were
aware of their fate, could that be the reason that they maintained their daily rituals xxviii even after
seeing the army of Xerxes and not seeming to have any fear? Or it could have been that
experienced men were required to hold the pass at Thermopylae and the younger soldiers would
not have been as effective as those more experienced?

There were also circumstances near the time of the battle that may have led to the Spartans
standing their ground. Firstly, the Spartans had never seen the Persian army of Xerxes that was
said to be over 1,000,000 men strong. They had heard of their high numbers but had never first
hand witnessed the monstrous sight. It is reported by Herodotus that for this reason when
Leonidas initially saw the Persian army, he sent messages for help out of sheer panic and
confusion. This is because any help that could be summoned would be too late and would not be
able to spare Leonidas and his 300 men from the massacre which they were about to fall victim
to.

Along with the 300 Spartan hoplites, there were 1000 helots who were their subject population
which they were left with after their conquests of Lakonia and Messenia. Herodotus reports that
in one war in the year 479, the Spartiates fought with 5,000 of their own citizen hoplites, 5,000
of the perioikoi (free men who were not Spartan citizens but lived within Sparta) xxix. It goes on to
say that for every Spartan there were 7 helotsxxx. The problem that faced the Spartans regarding
the helots is that they were not foreigners but were captured Greeks who had lost their freedom.
Aristotle said that, ‘they continually lie in wait, as it were, to take advantage of the Spartans’
misfortunes.’xxxi Their presence, posed a huge problem for the Spartans. They were constantly
under threat of an uprising and so were weary when it was necessary for them to send their
warriors abroad to conquer new land. This would give the helots a window to attack the Spartans
whilst they were vulnerable. The helots were constantly looking for a chink in the Spartan
amour; any sign of weakness of any slip on which they could capitalize. Therefore there was the
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risk that if the Spartans had retreated the helots would see that they were weak and scared of
another army, and then they could then try and attack the Spartans in their moment of
vulnerability. Therefore the 300 Spartans were prepared to sacrifice their lives to save the image
of Spartans for future generations.

The Spartans could have had the foresight to pre-empt the fact that after their heroic last stand
they would go down in history and legend as ‘Leonidas and his 300 men’
i
Her Pen T pg 516
ii
Thuc. II 39 1.
iii
Thuc. II 39 1
iv
Arist. Pol 1337a
v
Arist. Pol 1337a
vi
Xen. Const. Sparta. III 3 cf. X 7
vii
Arist. Pol 1338b
viii
Cf Thuc I 84 4
ix
Xen. Const. Sparta. II 2
x
W.G. Forrest, A history of Sparta, 105, 139, cf. 100.
xi
Ibid. 138.
xii
A. H. M. Jones, Sparta, 59
xiii
H. Michell, Sparta, 39f., cf. 335
xiv
Thuc. IV 84 2
xv
Hdt. III 46 1f
xvi
Thuc. I 86 1
xvii
Cf. Thuc. I 121 4
xviii
Xen 2.4.31
xix
Xen 6.4.17
xx
Xen 4.4.7
xxi
Xen 7.4.20
xxii
Xen 2.4.32, 4.5.14
xxiii
LP 4.11
xxiv
Thuc 5.71.1
xxv
Herod. 7.225.1
xxvi
Thuc 3.89.1
xxvii
Her, G. Rawlingosn translation
xxviii
Her 7.209
xxix
Hdt. IX 28
xxx
Hdt. IX 10f, 28f
xxxi
Arist. Pol. 1269a