G.R. No.
157399 November 17, 2005 document which changes its meaning, and with the use of the said falsified commercial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted), ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO, JAIME OCHOA,
all of the National Power Corporation, and RAUL GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas,
Alias George Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo (At large), Accused. JAIME
OCHOA, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC)
intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus,1 Jaime Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted
before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of
Commercial Documents defined and penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in an amended Information, 2 docketed as Criminal
Case No. 19558, which alleges –
That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy,
Jr., a public accountable officer, being the Treasurer of National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR), Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both public officers being the Manager of
the Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader
Analyst, respectively, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas,
alias George Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo, a private individual being a foreign
exchange trader, said public officers taking advantage of their official positions, with grave
abuse of authority and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with their private co-accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s
application for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in
the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
(P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez
SA-111-121204-4, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew that the Payment
Instructions (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the account
number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine
documents, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and receiving the total amount of
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75),
Philippine Currency from the National Power Corporation, which they thereafter malverse,
embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the
damage and prejudice of the National Power Corporation in the aforementioned sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge, while
Gutierrez has remained at large.
On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated –
1. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at the NPC;
2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information was (sic)
the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED);
3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at the time
mentioned in the information;
4. That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public funds;
5. That accused Ochoa’s position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require him to take
custody or control of public funds;
6. That the application forms for cashier’s check or Manager’s check are not accountable
forms of the NAPOCOR.3
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru falsification of Commercial
Document and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
equal to the amount malversed which is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND
TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy,
Jr. Accused Ochoa shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Costs against
the accused.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is hereby
ACQUITTED of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial
Document. However, because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY LIABLE for
the damages suffered by the NPC in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS
AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jaime
Ochoa. The Hold Departure Order against the accused embodied in this Court’s
Resolution dated April 18, 2002 is recalled.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias
George Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo with last known address at 1348 A. Mabini
Street, Ermita, Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred in –
1. convicting him based on the allegations in the information;
2. admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements;
3. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI Report.6
The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the Sandiganbayan, are not disputed
by the parties:
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation ("NPC") became embroiled in a
controversy involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which were
originally on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch ("PNB") but were
subsequently used to purchase two (2) managers’/cashier’s checks (the first check was in
the amount of P70,000,000.00 while the second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to
comply with its loan obligations to the Asian Development Bank ("ADB"). As NPC’s debt in
favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous procedure
of buying US dollars from a local bank (in this case, United Coconut Planters Bank or
UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which local bank was supposed to remit the US dollars to an
off-shore bank. This off-shore bank (in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then
supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this case, the
Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the account of the
ADB. The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks (embodied in three [3] "Payment
Instructions") included a "value date" (which was July 13, 1990), the mere arrival of which
would trigger the above-mentioned procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of the
NPC obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted
Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise, per
routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted on said
value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however, despite the fact
that the PNB had already issued two (2) manager’s/cashier’s checks ("Manager’s check"
for brevity) for such purpose, did not make the agreed remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so
Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan,
Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB,
T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais.
Both explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.7
The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the two PNB
Manager’s checks by falsifying a commercial document called an "Application for
Cashier’s Check" (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a private
individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did
not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC
instructing PNB to prepare a Manager’s check to be charged to NPC’s savings account did
not contain any account number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded
in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez @
Raul Nicolas @ George Añonuevo @ Mara Añonuevo, who is still at large.
In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed any of the
acts alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the ACC; that he deposited
the checks subsequently issued or that he received the proceeds thereof; or that he
conspired with any of his co-accused. He claims that his conviction was based on the
alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview
with appellant by the NPC personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the
Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was
not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed
the affidavit.
To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential
elements:
a.] The offender is a public officer;
b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable;
and
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or
property.8
Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the information
without violating his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the
accusation against him. He points out that the information alleges willful and intentional
commission of the acts complained of while the judgment found him guilty of inexcusable
negligence amounting to malice.
Appellant’s contention lacks merit. Malversation may be committed either through a
positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through negligence
by allowing another to commit such misappropriation.9 To sustain a charge of
malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence10 and while the
prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the
offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence
because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed
through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform
penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful malversation, conviction for
malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves
that mode of commission of the offense.11 Explicitly stated –
Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would
still be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.
The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.12
The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the crime by
means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor
of first impression. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al.,13 we ruled that an accused
charged with willful or intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification
through negligence, thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in
Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, … but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a
quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former
can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense,
upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that
obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the
evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the
falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not
act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure
himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other
words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to
be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance
between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal.
....
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly,
having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at
the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.
In People v. Consigna, et al.,14 we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also applies to the
felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful malversation, in an
information containing allegations similar to the present case, can be validly convicted of
the same offense of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the
latter mode of perpetrating the offense.
Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his
sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was
taken and the NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn
statement was taken without the benefit of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right
under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that –
Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
The "investigation" under the above-quoted provision refers to a "custodial"
investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody 15 and the
investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or
admissions from the suspect.16 More specifically –
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities
after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.17
Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular person as a suspect.18 Such a situation contemplated has been more
precisely described thus where –
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange
and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods
and means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may
pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence....19
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by
accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the
picture.20 Thus we held in one case21 that admissions made during the course of an
administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within the purview of
Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to
admissions or confessions made to a private individual, 22 or to a verbal admission made to
a radio announcer who was not part of the investigation,23 or even to a mayor approached
as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity.24
Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen is not
covered by the provision although in so ruling, we warned trial courts to take extreme
caution in further admitting similar confessions because we recognized the distinct
possibility that the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television.25
Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime,26 nor to a
person undergoing an audit examination because an audit examiner is not a law
enforcement officer.27
Thus, the flaw in appellant’s argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis-à-
vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during
the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team28 and before he was taken into
custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the
time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was confined at
the time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not
to police authorities.29 Appellant can hardly claim that, under the prevailing circumstances
at the time, whatever degree of compulsion may have existed went beyond the borders of
the unobjectionable where impermissible levels of duress would force him into making
false and incriminating declarations against his interest. While he may have been
persuaded into doing so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way as to bring
his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional provision.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the
sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence
of the constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The interview where the sworn
statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPC’s administrative
investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct
and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together
with the latter.
Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran30 in insisting that the constitutional safeguard
should have been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet arrested or under detention
at the time. He also invites our attention to the pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas31 that "the right to counsel is available if a person is in custody, even if he is not a
suspect; or even if not yet in custody but he is a suspect."
The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the constitutional protection
covers not only confessions but admissions as well, we qualified the ruling with the
statement that what is being eschewed is the evil of "extorting" a confession from the
mouth of the person being interrogated. As defined, "extortion" is an act or practice of
taking or obtaining anything from a person by illegal use of fear, whether by force, threats
or any undue exercise of power. 32 In the context of obtaining an admission, "extorting"
means "compelling or coercing a confession or information by any means serving to
overcome his power of resistance, or making the confession or admission involuntary." 33 In
this case, we find nothing on record to support appellant’s claim that his statements were
extorted from him.
Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986 deliberations on what was
later to become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead to the conclusion that the
rights are available when the person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is
a suspect even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty, Fr.
Bernas34 qualified this statement by saying that "[J]urisprudence under the 1987
Constitution, however, has consistently held, following Escobedo, the stricter view, that
the rights begin to be available only when the person is already in custody."35
Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were admissible in
evidence, the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. He contends
that although his statement was supposedly gathered from the transcript of stenographic
notes of the conversation between him and Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the
person who actually prepared the sworn statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn
statement is hearsay.
The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as witness Atty.
Lamberto P. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show him the prepared
statement and to verify from him the truth of its contents.36 Atty. Melencio testified that he
asked appellant to go over the document before affixing his signature thereto.37 He also
inquired whether or not appellant was coerced or intimidated by anybody when the
statement was taken.38 Appellant denied that he was coerced or intimidated,39 affirmed the
contents of the document as a true reflection of his statements, 40 and signed the same.41 It
need not be overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized document which
has in its favor the presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be contradicted only by clear
and convincing evidence. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of regularity, the
evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its execution, as
well as the statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.42
In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant insists that at the time he
signed the document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore not physically and
mentally fit to assess the significance of his signature. This pretext however collides with
the testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita Sadava, who stated that appellant was
confined for three days and, who, when queried whether "ischemic heart disease" had any
emotional or psychological effect, gave the inconclusive reply that it "may or may not."
Moreover, as aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and
repulsed as he was by the alleged falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who is
supposedly astute in business matters as he then occupied the position of Foreign Trader
Analyst of the NPC, nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another affidavit retracting
the same after his recovery from illness. Verily, evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself – such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.43
Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the transcript of
stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extra-judicially. The record,
however, shows that the prosecution presented the team leader of the NBI investigators
who conducted the investigation, although his testimony was dispensed with as the parties
stipulated on the existence and due execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without
admitting the truth of its contents. If at all, the admission of the report’s existence is an
acknowledgment that it is neither spurious nor counterfeit.
All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by appellant to prop up
his cause, his appeal must fall.
WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED in
all respects.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had
been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He
consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So
the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner
insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So
they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his
face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body
could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His
will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and
he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as
directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no it
did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical
injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall over do himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under
his charge, by the imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information
from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum
period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition
to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused.
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the case of People
vs. Cabrera,   has consistently and strongly condemned the practice of maltreating
1
prisoners to extort confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of human
rights. But the practice persists. Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather
than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused
Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-
2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a
widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo,
Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body
by a blunt instrument.   More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban
2
picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion)
living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however,
September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station.
Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a
team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores.   NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary
3
interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions.   But the
4
following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed
a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling
Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime.   As a result, he was charged
5
with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban, province of
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose
true Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and three of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and by means of force, intimidation and
violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of said
Natividad Fernando, cash money of an undetermined amount, belonging to said Natividad
Fernando, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount;
that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of enabling them
(accused) to take, steal and carry away the said cash money in pursuance of their
conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the success of their criminal act, with intent to
kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a
dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting
multiple injuries on the head and extremities, which directly caused her death, and the
total amount of the loss is P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the
presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court,
finding the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence,
the present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early morning of
August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight
of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the accused and two others in her
(victim's) own residence at Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused Francisco Galit
and his wife having an argument in connection with the robbery and killing of the victim,
Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977, accused Galit and two others,
namely, Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at Marikina,
Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was
further agreed among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at the back yard by
climbing over the fence; that once inside the premises, they will search every room,
especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of looking for cash money
and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two companions, Juling Dulay and Pabling, as
per their previous agreement, met at the place where they formerly saw each other in
Mariquina, Rizal; that the three conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon
passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they stopped and they waited at the side of the
road until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three repaired to
the premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that they entered the said premises
through the back wall of the house; that while entering the premises of said house, Juling
Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to
destroy the back portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first entered
the house through the hole that they made, followed by the accused Galit and next to him
was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23, 1977 when the three were able
to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the three could not find anything valuable
inside the first room that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of the
victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the victim, the three accused
decided to kill first the victim, Natividad Fernando, before searching the room for
valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim,
who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim; that
after the victim was killed, the three accused began searching the room for valuables; that
they helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the victim, where
they found some money; that when the three accused left the room of the victim, they
brought with them some papers and pictures which they threw outside; that after killing
and robbing the victim, the three accused went out of the premises of the house, using the
same way by which they gained entrance, which was through the back portion of the wall;
that the three accused walked towards the river bank where they divided the loot that they
got from the room of the victim; that their respective shares amount to P70.00 for each of
them; and that after receiving their shares of the loot, the three accused left and went
home.
When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that of accused
Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and his wife quarreling about the intention of
accused Galit to leave their residence immediately; that he further stated that he
overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other two companions robbed and killed
Natividad Fernando.
As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than seven stab
wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of death was due to
shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C'
and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime.
He claimed that he was in his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in
Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession
extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and without
the benefit of counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution
does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts
attributed to the accused are not supported by competent evidence. The principal
prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were
living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of
his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the
morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were
quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving the house because he
and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in
Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but the latter
was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing about two handfuls
(dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning of what the
accused had done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and reported to the
police chief about what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to
their house and arrested the accused.  6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile,   laid down the correct procedure
7 does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he
for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial
investigation, and which We reiterate:
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution
and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under
investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands
Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know
that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after
he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement
was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted
by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state
witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it
a close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are
inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the
taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into
giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in
toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he
may deem proper to take against the investigating officers.
16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE,
and another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged.
Let him be released from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With
costs de oficio.
17. SO ORDERED.

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin
ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng
naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring
ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol
at kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang
mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.
G.R. No. L-61016 April 26, 1983
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO R.
MORALES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO
KINTANAR, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO C.
MONCUPA, JR. ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO
KINTANAR, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Augusto Sanchez, Jejomar Binay and Antonio Quintos for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
1. The petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED.
2. Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while they were
riding together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, Quezon City, by elements
of Task Force Makabansa of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Since their arrest,
they have been under detention. Petitioner Morales filed his petition for habeas
corpus with this Court on July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19,
1982. On July 20, 1982 petitioners, together with several others, were charged with
rebellion (Art. 134, Revised Penal Code) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial of the
case has yet to be terminated. The continued detention of petitioners to answer for
the offense charged is therefore legal.
3. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their
constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to
remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. They also
air the charge that they were subjected to maltreatment and torture; that they did
not have the opportunity to present their defense before the inquest fiscal and
therefore asked this Court to order the reinvestigation of the charges against them.
Acting on such plea, this Court in a resolution en banc dated July 22, 1982 ordered
the City Fiscal of Quezon City to conduct such reinvestigation and at the same time
appointed him "to act as commissioner of this Court and receive evidence of the
charges made by petitioners before this Court of alleged torture and violation of
their constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel." On September 28, 1982,
the City Fiscal submitted his report on the reinvestigation affirming the existence of
a prima facie case for rebellion against petitioners and several others. And on
February 8, 1983 he submitted to this Court the transcript of the notes taken at the
reception of the evidence on the charges of petitioners.
4. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would have no
rights to speak of. However, the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.   We have a
1
Constitution framed by a constitutional convention and duly ratified by the people. We
subscribe to the rule of law. We believe in human rights and we protect and defend them.
Petitioners are entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And
this Court stands as the guarantor of those rights.
5. Our Constitution provides:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 
2
6. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange
and un familiar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods
and means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may
pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the
Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means-by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of
the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall
be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by
any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or
in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
8. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his counsel at
any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and privately, in the jail or any
other place of custody. 3
Arrest.
9. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to
answer for the commission of an offense. 4
10. An arrest may be made with or without a warrant.
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.  5
11. Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of arrest and
limits them to a "judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." It
also lays down in unmistakable terms the procedure required before a search warrant or
warrant of arrest may issue.
12. A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued by the
President of the Philippines.   Its issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of
6
the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest issued
by a judge issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in
the same manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge.
13. An arrest may also be made without a warrant.
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant — When lawful.— A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 7
14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no
justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary
detention  or unlawful arrest   or for some other offense.
8 9
15. The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The Memorandum to the
President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, wherein he reported the arrest of petitioners, the subversive
documents seized from them and the results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a
recommendation for the issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was
approved by the President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were
arrested without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners were already
under surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion. From the results of the said
surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and the documents seized from them at the time
of their arrest, it would appear that they had committed or were actually committing the
offense of rebellion. Their arrest without a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly
justified.
Procedure after Arrest.
16. After a person is arrested either without a warrant or by virtue of a warrant of arrest
issued by a judge or by virtue of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, the proper
complaint or information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the time
prescribed by law, to wit:
FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED
(PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1404)
WHEREAS, the periods within which arrested persons shall be delivered to the judicial
authorities as provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are on
occasions inadequate to enable the government to file within the said periods the criminal
information against persons arrested for certain crimes against national security and public
order.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, and in the interest of
national security as well as public safety and order, do hereby decree and order as part of
the law of the land the following amendment to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:
SECTION 1. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons. -The penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain
any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: six hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light
penalties, or their equivalent; nine hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent; Provided, however, That the President
may, in the interest of national security and public order, authorize by Executive Order
longer periods, which in no case shall exceed 30 days, or for as long as the conspiracy to
commit the crime against national security and public order continues or is being
implemented, for the delivery of persons arrested for crimes or offenses against public
order as defined in Title III, Book 11 of this Code, namely: Articles 134, 136, 138, 139,
141, 142, 143, 144, 146 and 147, and for acts in violation of Republic Act No. 1700 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 885, taking into consideration the gravity of the
offense or offenses, the number of persons arrested, the threat to national security or to
public safety and order, and/or the occurrence of a public calamity or other emergency
situation preventing the early investigation of the cases and the filing of the corresponding
information before the civil courts.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel, and to be visited by his immediate relatives.
SEC. 2. All acts, executive order, proclamations, Presidential Decrees, General Orders,
Letters of Instruction, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 3. Transitory provision.-Pending the preparation and promulgation by the President
of the Executive Order referred to in Section 1 hereof, the detention of persons arrested
for any of the abovementioned offenses against public order shall continue to be governed
by the provisions of General Orders No. 2, dated September 22, 1972 as amended by
General Order Nos. 60 and 62, dated September 24, 1977 and October 22, 1977,
respectively.
SEC 4. This decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila this 9th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-eight."
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute a
violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be
entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting
process issued by a competent court. 10
Power of the Courts.
18. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of liberty. It is
the most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has been illegally detained.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, but not the writ itself.
19. The Bill of Rights provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
20. In Lansang vs.Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,473,We said:
In our resolution of October 5, 1972, We stated that 'a majority of the court 'had
'tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and
889A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the
requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine
Constitution ...' Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in
the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in
order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
21. We reiterate this doctrine.
22. Furthermore, We hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional
mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and
aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to
the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can
the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied.
23. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and
the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter
of the Constitution and does violence to the basic precepts of human rights and a
democratic society.
The Right to Bail.
24. Next to life a man loves his freedom. Some men love their freedom even more than
their life.
25. In all criminal prosecutions the accused is presumed innocent. Because of this
presumption and inasmuch as every man has a natural desire to be free, our Constitution
laid down the right to bail in these words:
SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not
be required. 11
26. Although martial law was terminated on January 17, 1981, by virtue of Proclamation
No. 2045 of the President of the Philippines, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus continues to be suspended in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all
other places with respect to certain offenses, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby revoke
Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines) and
Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of Martial Law) and proclaim the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines; Provided, that the call to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in the
two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue; and in all other
places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to
persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for
the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on
the occasion therefore, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. ... (Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045).
27. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect to persons at present detained
as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith," the natural consequence is that the right to
bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold
otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense
for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail
even after the charges are filed in court.
28. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct attacks on the life of the State.
29. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the
State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in
preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against it
and commit acts that endanger the State's very existence. For this measure of self-
defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to
these offenses.
30. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where
the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted
without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the
detainee regains his right to freedom.
The Charges of Torture.
31. When petitioners charged in their petitions that they had been tortured and maltreated,
the Court decided to appoint the City Fiscal of Quezon City to hear the charges and to
receive the evidence. Not because We are an investigating body. Nor are We a trier of
facts. But because petitioners' charges are material and relevant to the petitions before
Us.
32. As mentioned earlier, the Court Commissioner submitted the transcript of the
proceedings held before him. We will not pass upon the merits of the torture charges.
However, they should be filed before the body which has jurisdiction over them as
provided for in Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-A and 1850.
33. The present form of our government, to all intents and purposes, merged the executive
and legislative branches into one. Members of parliament are at the same time cabinet
ministers. Under the system of checks and balances ordained by the Constitution, the
judiciary serves as the check and balance to the merged executive and legislative
branches. The judiciary is therefore called upon to express its thoughts on areas outside
the traditional and narrow confines of decision making, with the end in view that together
we may explore the free market of Ideas and arrive at what is best for our country and our
people.
34. Our people cry out for a better life. They want more food in their stomachs, roofs over
their heads, health services for themselves and their families, education for their children,
and other necessities that make life worth living. They cannot be denied. They want it and
they want it now. Timely indeed are the thrusts of the KKK and the BLISS programs.
35. However, we cannot lead them to a truly better life, unless we achieve complete peace
in our land; and we cannot have complete peace unless we improve the administration of
justice.
36. It was a wise man who once said: "Tell me how a country's poor receive their justice
and I will tell you how stable its government is." 
12
37. Whenever we speak of the administration of justice we refer to four principal areas: the
preservation of peace and order which is the primary task of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Integrated Police, both under the Ministry of Defense; the
investigation and prosecution of offenses and the administration of our penal system which
are under the Ministry of Justice; the application and interpretation of laws and the trial and
adjudication of cases which fall under the jurisdiction of the courts; and appearance as
counsel for the government particularly in appealed criminal cases and as counsel for the
Commission on Elections, Securities and Exchange Commission, and others, which is the
responsibility of the Office of the Solicitor General. In everyone of these areas much can
be done to achieve our ultimate goal-that in this fair land of ours, no man, no matter how
humble, no matter how poor shall thirst for justice.
38. Our machinery of justice should be geared towards helping and protecting the poor
among us. Not knowing their rights, not having the means to pay for the services of a
lawyer, possessing no influence whatsoever, they are invariably the victims of injustice.
The affluent can take care of themselves. They are better aware of their rights, they have
influence, and they can engage the services of the best counsel. But the poor can only
pray to God and hope to find relief in the system of justice established by their
government.
39. We must open all avenues for complaints and keep them open so that the grievance
procedure may be made more readily available to the masses of our people. Only by
knowing their needs can we give them what they rightfully deserve.
40. It is undeniable that throughout the length and breadth of our land, lawlessness and
disorder have increased and continue to increase to undesirable proportions. It is wishful
thinking to believe otherwise. An efforts must be exerted now to reverse the trend. We
cannot afford any delay. And we should begin by bringing to the bar of justice the culprits
in particular who burned and destroyed public property, and attacked, kidnapped and killed
public functionaries. For the questions may validly be asked: If the government cannot
protect public property, how can it protect private property? If the government cannot
guarantee the safety and lives of its officials, how can it guarantee the safety and lives of
private individuals?
41. The investigation and prosecution of cases should be further improved so that only
meritorious cases shall reach the courts, thus contributing to the unclogging of court
dockets. Many criminal cases initiated by complainants are just harassment suits and
should never have been filed in court. In the process, it is required that all fiscals be
appointed in a permanent capacity. Their security of tenure is the foundation stone of their
independence. Our penal system should be further updated to make more effective the
rehabilitation of criminals. Let us do away with instances of first offenders who serve
sentence in order to be reformed but who come out instead as hardened criminals.
42. And with the judicial revamp just effected under B.P. 129, the trial and decision making
process has been modified and vastly improved to achieve better results. But it must be
remembered that courts which are not filled are as good as no courts at all. Therefore,
more appointments to the existing vacancies should be made.
43. One lesson our people have learned-painfully but well-is that politics and a good
administration of justice-like oil and water-do not mix; that when politics infiltrates the
administration of justice, injustice is often the outcome. In some jurisdictions of the United
States, there are sheriffs (peace officers) and district attorneys (prosecutors) who are
elected by the voters and who run for office as the candidates of a political party. In the
Philippines such a system would never work because in our culture we have values
peculiarly our own-value like "utang na loob", "compadre", "pakikisama", "tayu-tayo",
"bigayan", "bata ko", "amo ko", and the "god- father mentality". Values like these have
derailed and may derail the administration of justice. Political followers commit abuses in
the belief that come what may their political bosses would shield them from punishment.
Can you imagine how criminal cases would be investigated and prosecuted if fiscals
(prosecutors) were chosen by election? How would our laws be enforced if policemen and
members of the Armed Forces were elected by the people? And yet the heads of the
Ministries of Justice and Defense and the Office of the Solicitor General are all active
politicians.
44. The burdens of office fall heavily on their shoulders. Perhaps it is time we relieve them
of the additional burdens that being politicians entail. Our Constitution foresaw the need
for heads of ministries who are not active politicians in providing that ". . . . At least a
majority of the Members of the Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the
Regional Representations of the Batasang Pambansa. . . ."  13
45. The campaign against venality in office-malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfesance
should be pursued with renewed vigor. For graft and corruption are like termites gnawing
away the foundation of government. The harm done is sometimes not realized; or even if
realized, under- estimated. In the process let us remember to stress preventive measures
to save public property from loss.
46. The communist threat remains a nagging problem of government. Whether Marxist,
Maoist, Leninist, aided by the New People's Army, rebels, radicals, and lawless elements,
they all have but one aim-one single purpose-one defined objective: to bring down by
violence the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to forcibly seize political
power in order that they may replace our existing political, social, economic, and legal
order with an entirely new one based on communism.
47. Once before, in the early fifties, communists threatened the established order. They
were driven back by the Armed Forces, mainly because of the support of our people. We
must keep, strengthen and solidify the sympathy, faith, loyalty, and trust in the government
of our brothers in the rural areas. Guns and bullets alone will not do it. We can accomplish
this only by giving them better government. It is a condition sine qua non to achieve
success in the fight against subversion.
48. By and large, the Armed Forces are composed of good and disciplined men. However,
there are those who are not worthy of the uniforms they wear. Not a few have enriched
themselves by abusing the powers of their position. Some are involved in extortion,
smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. There are others who maintain gambling, drug
rings, and prostitution dens. And still others have committed robbery, rape, murder, and
other offenses. The campaign to rid the organization of such misfits should be carried out
with missionary zeal. For indeed victims of abuse are often alienated from the government.
49. The Filipinos are a God-loving and a God-fearing people. We believe in peace and
freedom. We believe in the family and its strong ties. We can never willingly accept
communism and what it stands for.
50. While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with all the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our
Constitution and our laws.
51. When the judgment of history is written, as leaders of our people, we shall be asked to
account not only for what we did, not only for what we did not do, but also for what visions
we have today of our tomorrow.
52. What will be our answer?
53. WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the petitions should be, as they are hereby,
DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.
54. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145566             March 9, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DINDO "BEBOT" MOJELLO, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu,
Branch 61, finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty
of death.1
Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in
an Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows:2
That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio
Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design
and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12)
years of age and with mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and by reason
and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance
of his criminal design, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack,
assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the
different parts of her body which caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty." Trial followed.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty.
From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December 15, 1996, at or
around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group which included
Roger Capacito and his wife and the spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the
Capacito residence located at Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu. 3
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way home, he saw
his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a nephew of Roger Capacito,
walking together some thirty meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota. Since he
4 
was used to seeing them together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange
about this. He proceeded to his house. 5
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family was informed that
the body of Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately
proceeded to the site and saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio
was devastated by what he saw. A remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to
protect his niece. He even attempted to take his own life several days after the incident. 6
Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for
Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he
was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio
during his custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains
Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was
executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who later on voluntarily
signed it. Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of
7 
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan. On December 21, 1996, an
8 
autopsy was conducted on the victim's cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal
Branch of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII. 9
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal lacerations positively
indicate that the victim was raped. He observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and
10 
contusions on her neck show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia. He indicated
11 
the cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and
physical injuries to the head and the trunk.
12
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant is admissible in evidence; and whether appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
We now resolve.
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the alleged
extrajudicial confession which he executed on December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant
avers that the confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily
entered into. He argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his
13  most despicable criminal suspects a measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the
constitutional rights before the confession was taken from him. Hence, his confession,
14  suspect, and the underlying mission of custodial investigation – to elicit a confession.
and admissions made therein, should be deemed inadmissible in evidence, under the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine.
We are not convinced.
At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial investigation
enshrined in Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what jurisprudence has termed
as "Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark decision of the United States Supreme
Court, Miranda v. Arizona. It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the
15 
ultimate refuge of individuals against the coercive power of the State.
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the
right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of
law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his
counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will
be provided before any questioning if he so desires.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was based on the
leading case of People v. Galit and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, rulings subsequently
16  17 
incorporated into the present Constitution. The Miranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter
took on a modified form where the right to counsel was specifically qualified to
mean competent and independent counsel preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver
of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements compared to its American
counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the presence of counsel.
Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to
provide for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v.
Arizona. The purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process
shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art.
III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with
the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the
extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of
his Miranda rights under the Constitution. The court a quo observed that the confession
18 
itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. As further
19 
proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a
Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist
appellant. Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his
20 
counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted
and appellant's statement taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty.
Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and not to
do so if he was not sure of his answer. Atty. Giduquio represented appellant during the
21 
initial stages of the trial of the present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the
contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence
and independence in representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover,
appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during
the custodial proceedings.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of
a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay,
obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason
or another, is not available to protect his interest.
22
We ruled in People v. Continente that while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the
23 
person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the
preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's appointment during the course
of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement
before the swearing officer.24
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In People v. Dumalahay, this Court
25 
held:
The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they were properly apprised of their
right to remain silent and right to counsel, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee.
At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused proceeded to the office of Atty.
Rexel Pacuribot, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All of
the three accused, still accompanied by Atty. Ubay-ubay, subscribed and swore to their
respective written confessions. Before administering the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot reminded
the three accused of their constitutional rights under the Miranda doctrine and verified that
their statements were voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot also translated the contents of
each confession in the Visayan dialect, to ensure that each accused understood the same
before signing it.
No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify falsely against the accused.
Their participation in these cases merely involved the performance of their legal duties as
officers of the court. Accused-appellant Dumalahay's allegation to the contrary, being self-
serving, cannot prevail over the testimonies of these impartial and disinterested witnesses.
More importantly, the confessions are replete with details which could possibly be supplied
only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot
be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied. These factors
are clear indicia that the confessions were voluntarily given.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have
been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of
maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant
evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is
admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be
voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential
facts contained in such confession.
The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each of the accused gave the same
detailed narration of the manner by which Layagon and Escalante were killed. This clearly
shows that their confessions could not have been contrived. Surely, the three accused
could not have given such identical accounts of their participation and culpability in the
crime were it not the truth.
Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's
apprehension by the police authorities violated the Miranda doctrine on two grounds: (1)
no counsel was present; and (2) improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made
in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the December 23, 1996 custodial
investigation which elicited the appellant's confession should nevertheless be upheld for
having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1. Even though improper interrogation methods
were used at the outset, there is still a possibility of obtaining a legally valid confession
later on by properly interrogating the subject under different conditions and circumstances
than those which prevailed originally. 26
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently
entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under
Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2
Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior to conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his
constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect, notably Cebuano, a language known to the
appellant, viz:
27
PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY) : Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos sa usa ka inbestigasyon diin
ikaw gituhon nga adunay kalabutan sa kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong
paglugos kaniya. Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw adunay katungod sa
pagpakahilom ning maong inbesigasyon karon kanimo ug aduna usab ikaw ug katungod
nga katabangan ug usa ka abogado nga motabang karon kanimo ning maong
inbestigasyon. Imo ba nasabtan kining tanan? (DINDO MOJELLO, you are hereby
reminded that you are under investigation in which you were suspected about the death
and raping of LENLEN RAYCO. Under the Constitution you have the right to remain silent
about this investigation on you now and you have also the right to have counsel of your
own choice to assist you in this investigation now. Have you understood everything?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Human ikaw sayri sa imong katungod ubos sa atong
Batakang Balaod sa pagpakahilom, gusto ba nimo nga ipadayon nato kining
inbestigasyon karon kanimo? (After you have been apprised of your rights under our
Constitution to remain silent, do you want to proceed this investigation on you now?)
TUBAG (QUESTION) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Gusto ba usab nimo ug abogado nga makatabang kanimo
ning maong inbestigasyon? (Do you want counsel to assist you in this said investigation?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
APPEARANCE : Atty. Isaias Giduquio is appearing as counsel of the affiant.
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Ako usab ikaw pahinumdoman nga unsa man ang imo isulti
karon dinhi magamit pabor o batok kanimo sa Hukmanan, nasabtan ba nimo kining tanan
mo nga mga katungod nga walay naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal kanimo o nagsaad ba
ug ganti sa kaulihan? (You are also hereby reminded that all your statements now will be
used as evidence against or in your favor in any court of justice. Have you understood all
your rights with nobody coercing or forcing you, or mauling or promising a reward in the
end?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo (Yes.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Andam ka nga mohatag ug libre ug boluntaryo nga
pamahayag? (Are you now ready to give your free and voluntary statement?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
xxx   xxx   xxx
(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)
x x x       x x x       x x x.
The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such
confession. Appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial
28 
confession of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca,
Municipal Judge of Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan
and Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of
the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He subsequently acknowledged
that when appellant subscribed to his statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and
his Clerk of Court were present as well as other people. 29
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of
the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence. The lower court was
correct in giving credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing
him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the
person who threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that
he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan
dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
In People v. Pia, we held that "where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion
30 
or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to officers who
administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged maltreatment; where there appears no marks of violence on their
bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions." The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file
charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the
chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. To hold31 
otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere allegation of threat,
torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without any proof whatsoever. People v.
Enanoria further declared that another indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details
in the confession which could have been known only to the declarant. 32
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress,
compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than
his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly
executed. Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption.
33  34
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will
was overborne at the time he confessed. In cases where the Miranda warnings have been
35 
given, the test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the
probative weight of the confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains
unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to ensure
that a suspect has been properly apprised of his Miranda rights, including the right to
counsel. It is in the paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective
administration of criminal justice relies on the faithful adherence to the Miranda doctrine.
Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police authorities is central to the criminal
justice system; Miranda rights must in every case be respected, without exception.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under
Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that
the admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the
poisonous tree" since the tree itself is not poisonous.
Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty despite the glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In
his Brief, he argues that the evidence against him is insufficient to warrant his conviction of
rape with homicide.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled with the corpus
delicti as established by the Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco,
leads us to no other conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco
on December 15, 1996. It passes the test of moral certainty and must therefore be
sustained.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the victim.
Neither is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on the
occasion of the rape a homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical
evidence further precludes us from connecting the slaying of the victim to her sexual
assault, given the quantum of proof required by law for conviction. No estimated time of
death was given, which is essential in making a connection with the appellant's story that
he went home after a night of drinking. The time when he and the victim were headed
towards the seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996 until the time
when the victim's lifeless body was found at or about 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1996 had
a time variance of between six to seven hours. Although the circumstances may point to
the appellant as the most likely perpetrator of the homicide, the same do not constitute an
unbroken chain of events which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion that appellant
was guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are gaps in the reconstruction of facts
and inferences surrounding the death of Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to boxing the
victim when she shouted, then hurriedly ran away. The cause of death of Lenlen was
cardio-respiratory attack due to asphyxiation and physical injuries; she was strangled to
death and left on the seashore as manifested by the frothing in her lungs. No physical,
scientific or DNA evidence was presented to pinpoint appellant as the person who killed
the victim. Fingerprints, if available, would have determined who committed the homicide.
Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of rape with homicide considering the insufficiency of
evidence which thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the said special
complex crime.
Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory rape, the victim
Lenlen Rayco being then eleven years old. The sexual assault was necessarily included in
the special complex crime charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.
The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded upon the finding of the fact of rape. Moral damages
36 
in the amount of P50,000.00 may likewise be given to the heirs of the victim without need
of proof in accordance with current jurisprudence. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bogo,
Cebu, Branch 61 in Criminal Case No. B-00224 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Dindo Mojello is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory
rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim, Lenlen Rayco, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135562 November 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENITO BRAVO, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of a child was found in a vacant lot along the
road leading to Patul, Rosario Santiago City.   Her body was found between two concrete
1
fences half naked, shirtless and skirt pulled up, her panty stuffed in her mouth.   The body
2
was identified to be that of a nine year old girl named Juanita Antolin, a resident of
Rosario, Santiago City and known in her neighborhood as Len-len. Her body was found
about 700 meters from her house putrid and in rigor mortis.   The scalp on the left side of
3
her head was detached exposing a fracture on the left temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal
examination showed fresh laceration at 2:30 o'clock and old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00
o'clock and easily accepts two fingers. The cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage.  4
On May 25, 1994 an Information for rape with homicide   was filed against herein accused-
5
appellant which states:
That on or about the 12th day of January 1994, in the municipality of Santiago, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design and by means of
violence and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with one Juanita Antolin y Jandoc, a
nine year old girl, against her will and consent; that on the occasion and by reason of the
said rape, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
assault, attack and hit with a blunt instrument the said Juanita Antolin y Jandoc, inflicting
upon her, a fracture on the skull, which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On September 26, 1994 the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. 6
Evelyn San Mateo an eight year old second grader from Rosario, Santiago City neighbor
and cousin of the victim testified that she was with the deceased the night before she
disappeared. She stated that while they stood on the roadside watching "Home Along Da
Riles" from an open window of a neighbor's house the appellant approached them and
asked Len-Len to come with him to a birthday party and then he will buy her Coke and
balut. Len-Len asked her to go with them but she did not want to because she was
watching television. Len-Len went alone with the accused. The following morning Len-
Len's mother told Evelyn and her mother that Len-Len was missing. In court, Evelyn
positively identified the appellant as the person last seen with Len-len before she was
found dead.  7
The owner of the house where Len-len and Evelyn watched television, Gracia Monahan,
corroborated Evelyn's testimony that on the evening of January 12, 1994 she saw the
appellant talking to Len-len while the two girls were watching television from her open
window and that when she looked again towards the end of the program to the direction
where the girls were situated, only Evelyn was left watching television. Monahan testified
that she is familiar with the appellant and the two children because they are neighbors.  8
The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police Department, Alexander Mico,
testified that on January 15, 1994 his office received a report that a dead body was found
in a vacant lot. The body was later identified as Juanita Antolin. Mico stated that he
interviewed San Mateo who pointed to the appellant as the man last seen with the
deceased. Mico found the appellant at his place of work at the Spring Garden Resort at
Sinsayon, Santiago City. Upon seeing Bravo, Mico informed him that he is a suspect in the
killing of a girl in Rosario, Santiago City and asked him to come with him for questioning.
The appellant agreed. Mico further narrated in court that at the police station the appellant
admitted he was with the girl and he carried her on his shoulder but he was so drunk that
night that he does not remember what he did to her.   On cross-examination Mico admitted
9
that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel
and of his right against self-incrimination before the appellant made the said admission
because according to Mico he was only informally interviewing the accused when he made
the admission and that custodial interrogation proper was conducted by the assigned
investigator. 
10
The appellant Benito Bravo testified in court that on his way home after work at around five
o'clock in the afternoon of January 12, 1994 he was invited to go on a drinking spree at
Purok 1, Rosario, Santiago City where he and four other men consumed five round bottles
of gin until 7:30 that evening. He then headed for home. Appellant admitted in court that
he passed by the house of Gracia Monahan but stated that he did not see the two girls
watching television along the road. At home, he found his mother very sick and so he
decided to stay home all night. He woke up the following morning at around 4:30 a.m. and
prepared to go to work. On January 15, 1994 a policeman came to his place of work and
apprehended him without a warrant of arrest and at the police station he was forced to
admit commission of the crime of rape with homicide of Juanita Antolin. The appellant
denied the accusation and stated that the deceased was his godchild and that he has
known Fely Handoc, the mother of the child, for three years prior to this proceedings. 
11
Juanito Bravo, the brother of the appellant testified that the appellant stayed home on the
night of January 12, 1994 to take care of their sick mother who died a few days
thereafter. 12
Ernesto Pastor, the foreman at the Spring Garden Resort where the appellant was
employed, testified that he has known the appellant for a long time and that he knows him
to be hardworking and of good moral character. Pastor corroborated the appellant's
testimony that police investigator Mico came to the Spring Garden Resort and arrested
Bravo without a warrant. 13
The testimony of the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the autopsy was dispensed
with by the prosecution as the handwritten Autopsy Report made by the Municipal Health
Officer of Santiago, Isabela, marked as Exhibit B, was admitted by both parties.   The14
Report reads:
AUTOPSY REPORT
ABEL MEMORIAL HOMES
PUROK 2, ROSARIO,
SANTIAGO, ISABELA
JANUARY 15, 1994
2:30 P.M.
JUANITA ANTOLIN
PUROK 1, BARANGAY ROSARIO
AGE: 9
FATHER: ANTONIO
MOTHER: OFELIA JANDOC
Was investigated under the mango tree where the crime was committed and left side of
the face is covered by sand (done by anay) with rigor mortis and with putrification, easy
pulling of the skin and plenty of small worms coming out from the ears, nose, eyes and
mouth (without panty), the whole body is edematous.
After complete washing, coming out of small worms on both eyes and ears and mouth,
scalp on the left side was detached and skull exposed.
— Fracture of the skull with left temporal
— Edematous
— Abdomen, extremities has no pertinent findings except easy pulling of skin and all are
edematous
Vaginal examination — shows fresh laceration at 2:30 o'clock, old lacerations at 5:00 and
7:00 o'clock — could easily accept two fingers.
Cause of death — cerebral hemorrhage (fracture of skull temporal region, left). 
15
On August 25, 1998 the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the
crime charged as follows:
Wherefore, finding the accused BENITO BRAVO "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE punishable under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, the court sentences him the penalty of DEATH
and ordering him to pay the heirs of Juanita Antolin y Jandoc the amount of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as indemnity and three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.  16
and held that abuse of confidence and treachery attended the commission of the crime.
This case is before us on automatic review in view of the penalty imposed by the trial
court.
Both counsels for the accused-appellant and the appellee plead for the acquittal of the
accused. Both the accused-appellant and the appellee invoke the constitutionally guarded
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused and the latter's right to remain silent and
to counsel. The testimony of the policeman that the accused admitted he was with the
victim on the evening of January 12, 1994 but the latter was too drunk to remember what
happened should have been held inadmissible by the trial court in view of the policeman's
own admission in court that although he informed the accused that he is a suspect in the
rape and killing of one Juanita Antolin he did not inform the accused of his constitutional
rights before he asked him of his participation in the crime under investigation. Both the
appellant and the appellee are in agreement that the trial court grievously erred in finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the sole circumstantial evidence
that the victim was last seen by her cousin in the company of the accused whereas the
Rules of Court clearly requires the presence of at least two proven circumstances the
combination of which creates an unbroken link between the commission of the crime
charged and the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The single circumstance
proven by the prosecution that the victim was last seen conversing with the accused two
days before she was found dead cannot serve as basis for any conclusion leading to the
guilt of the accused of the crime charged. The evidence for the prosecution falls short of
the quantum of evidence required by the Rules to establish guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In sum, both the appellant and the appellee profess that the
presumption of innocence of the accused was not successfully overturned by the
prosecution.
We resolve to acquit Benito Bravo.
Sec. 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded
a person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the correlative duty of the
State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. It states:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(1) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(3) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well
as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the time
a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of
a crime although not yet in custody.   The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that
17
police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and
psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It
was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and
intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to
admit although untrue.   Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively
18
communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully
understood. Any measure short of this requirement is considered a denial of such
right.   Courts are not allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and custodial
19
investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any information or admission
given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time
without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as
inadmissible.   It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to
20
a confidant of the accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule.  21
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written extra-judicial
confession; the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during an "informal
talk" at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and killing of
Juanita Antolin. The arresting policeman testified that the appellant admitted that he was
with the victim on the evening of January 12, 1994, the probable time of the commission of
the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too drunk to remember
what subsequently happened. The arresting policeman admitted that he did not inform the
appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. We note that the
alleged admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the company of the
victim at the time the crime was probably committed.
The exclusionary rule applies.
The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and any statement
allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior
notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's
apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the admission was made during
an "informal talk" prior to custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The appellant was
not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the alleged admission was made
the appellant was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and
killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission was
coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such presumption is the
absence of a written extra-judicial confession to that effect and the appellant's denial in
court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as
inadmissible.
We also agree with both the appellant and the appellee that the trial court erred in
rendering judgment convicting the appellant based on a single circumstance. Only one
circumstantial evidence was proven i.e., that the victim went with the accused to buy soda
and balut on the evening of January 12, 1994. Section 4 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the case of People vs. Adorfina   this court held that:
22
. . . a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person, that is, the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete
sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. The
two witnesses for the prosecution testified to a single circumstance, namely, that the victim
was seen in the company of the appellant on the night of January 12, 1994. This
circumstance alone cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction. There is no other
proven circumstance linking the appellant to the crime as the perpetrator thereof to the
exclusion of any other possible culprit e.g. that the appellant was at or near the scene of
the crime at the time it was probably committed or any other evidence to establish the
appellant's participation in the commission thereof. The prosecution's theory that the
appellant is guilty of the crime charged because he was seen with the victim a few days
before she was found dead is not tenable. The approximate time the crime was committed
was not established at all because the physician who made the autopsy report was
discharged as a witness when both parties admitted the report. The two day interval
between the evening of January 12th when the victim was seen with the appellant and the
day when her dead body was found on January 15th presents a wide range of possibilities
as to the perpetrator of the crime. The Rules and jurisprudence demand no less than an
unbroken chain of proven facts pointing to the appellant as the guilty person to the
exclusion of all others. This the evidence for the prosecution failed to do. Both counsels for
the appellant and the appellee are correct in their submission that the single circumstance
that the victim was seen with the appellant two days before she was found dead is clearly
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
The rape and killing of nine year old Juanita Antolin is supported by concrete evidence
undisputed by both parties. The unpardonable assault on the child is tragic and the trial
court may have been swayed by the tide of human indignation. We must however uphold
the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused when the evidence at
hand falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. The appellant Benito Bravo is
acquitted of the crime charged herein. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered
to immediately release him from custody unless he is detained for another legal cause.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130189 June 25, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO R. MULETA, accused-appellant.
 
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An extra-judicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights is
inadmissible in evidence. During custodial investigation, suspects have the rights, among
others, (1) to remain silent, (2) to have an independent and competent counsel, (3) to be
provided with such counsel, if unable to secure one, (4) to be assisted by one in case of
waiver, which should be in writing, of the foregoing; and (5) to be informed of all such
rights and of the fact that anything he says can and will be used against him. Where the
remaining pieces of evidence are insufficient to determine guilt with moral certainty, the
appellant is entitled to an acquittal. A conviction must rest on the strength of the
admissible evidence of the prosecution, not on the weakness or insufficiency of the
defense.
The Case
Domingo R. Muleta appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. 3264-M-93, finding him guilty of the complex crime of
rape with homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated October 1, 1993 and signed by Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel Y.
Velasco, charged appellant as follows:
That on April 30, 1993, between the hours of 12:05 past midnight to 2:00 in the morning, at
a house in Malolos, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge
of a woman in the person of Charito M. Delgado without her consent, by using force and
intimidation and while the latter was unconscious; and thereafter accused Domingo Muleta
y Rocero by reason or on occasion of the said rape incident, taking advantage of his
superior strength, stab[bed] Charito M. Delgado in the neck and at the back causing the
instantaneous death of the latter. 1
Upon arraignment on December 10, 1993, the appellant  pleaded not guilty to the charge.
2 3
After trial, the lower court rendered its assailed August 15, 1997 Judgment,  the dispositive
4
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused Domingo R. Muleta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of [r]ape with [h]omicide and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Charito Delgado
death indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages of P44,000.00, exemplary damages of
P20,000.00 and moral damages of P20,000.00.
No pronouncement as to costs. 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as viewed by the prosecution, are summarized in the Appellee's Brief  thus:
7
On April 15, 1993, nineteen-year-old Charito Delgado, a native of Oriental Mindoro, went
to Manila to find work. Once in Manila, Charito proceeded to 1347 Banaba Street,
Moriones, Tondo, Manila, where her uncle, Ruben Delgado lived. There, she stayed with
her sister Marissa. Shortly thereafter, Charito landed a job as a saleslady at the Ali Mall, in
Cubao, Quezon City.
In the afternoon of April 29, 1993, Charito left Tondo, Manila and moved to Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, bringing with her some of her sister's baggage. She, however, returned to
Tondo, Manila to pick up their remaining baggage. It was the last time she was seen alive
by her relatives.
On April 30, 1993, Charito's lifeless body was found naked in Mojon, Malolos, Bulacan,
tied to a post with the use of a pair of pants and both her hands were tied with a bra.
Charito's body bore five (5) stab wounds, three (3) in the left side of her neck and two (2)
at her back.
The initial investigation on Charito's death was conducted by the police in Malolos,
Bulacan but the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, later took over and the
case was assigned to NBI Agent Ely Tolentino on May 19, 1993.
Based on Tolentino's investigation, appellant is Charito's uncle, [appellant] being the
brother of Charito's mother, Milagros Delgado; that on April 29 and 30, 1993, appellant
was working at the Loadstar Shipping Lines located at Pier 16, North Harbor, Tondo,
Manila; that on April 29, 1993, appellant left his work at 9:30 in the evening; that appellant
reported for work on April 30, 1993 at 8:00 in the evening; that according to appellant's
wife, he left for work on April 29, 1993 but returned only in the morning of April 30, 1993.
On September 19, 1993, Tolentino went to appellant's house in Oriental Mindoro and
requested appellant to go with him to the NBI, Manila for investigation. Appellant readily
obliged. Danilo Delgado, Charito's paternal uncle, accompanied Tolentino and appellant to
Manila.
During his custodial investigation on September 19, 1993, appellant was assisted by
counsel, Atty. Deborah [D]aquis  , with address at Room 401, D & D Building, Pedro Gil
8
and San Marcelino Street, Manila. There, he admitted having raped and later killed Charito
Delgado.
Another prosecution witness, Danilo Delgado, testified that during the wake of Charito
Delgado on May 13, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, appellant became hysterical,
crying, shaking his head and muttering: "Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa,
nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay na".
Delgado saw appellant drink a bottle of "chlorux", after which he fell to the ground.
Appellant was brought to the Fatima Hospital.  (citations omitted)
9
Version of the Defense
The appellant, on the other hand, submits the following as the facts of the case:
. . . [T]he defense presented the accused himself [Domingo Muleta] who testified that he
was not the one who committed the crime [he was] being charged [with]; that he was just
unscrupulously picked up by the NBI and forced to admit the crime in question; that on
April 30, 1993, he was in their rented house at Camias St., Magsaysay, Tondo, Manila;
that on that day, he left the house at 5:30 in the afternoon and went to the house where
Charito Delgado was then residing; that he learned from his sister Milagros Delgado that
the latter's daughter Charito transferred to another house and she was then missing; that
he reported the matter to the police authorities; first, to the PNP Headquarters in Tondo;
second, to the PNP Headquarters at U.N. Avenue; and third, to the PNP Headquarters
situated at Caloocan; that on May 8, 1993, he found the body of Charito Delgado already
lying in state at Valenzuela, Metro, Manila; that he learned from his sister Milagros that her
body was found somewhere in Malolos; that he was working in the Load Star shipping as
a welder on a contractual basis; that from April to May, 1993, he was applying to another
company because Load Star Shipping closed shop; that on September 19, 1993, he was
picked up by the NBI at Banos Gloria, Oriental Mindoro; that he was brought at Taft
Avenue; that he was tortured; that aside from boxing and kicking him, [they] brought [him]
to a secluded place; that he was blindfolded; that he was told to lie down on his back, his
feet were tied and water was poured on his nose; that he was forced to sign a document
which he was not able to read, that he was forced to sign the document because he
[could] no longer bear the torture; that he did not have a lawyer at that time; that the NBI
agent's name is Ely Tolentino who testified earlier in this case; that he knows that the
reason why he was accused of raping his niece is that he gave an information about a
woman he saw in the room of his brother-in-law Rolando Delgado.
. . . [T]hat the last time he [accused] visited his niece in her residence in Moriones was
April 26, 1993; that Marissa was present when he visited Charito Delgado; that he used to
work at Lawang Bato, Bagbaguin, Valenzuela, Bulacan; that he did not work in Malolos;
that when he saw the cadaver of Charito, he was so sad about her condition, that he
[could] no longer recall what he did because of his anger.
. . . Emelinda Muleta testified that her husband, the accused-appellant, never left the
house in Tondo, Manila in the evening of April 29, 1993.  10
 Ruling of the Trial Court
Despite the absence of an eyewitness, the trial court held that the circumstantial evidence
in this case was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant. In so holding, it referred to
the following as sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict:
First, the accused is familiar with the place VOP Compound, Bo. Mojon, Malolos, Bulacan,
where the crime was committed and where the body of the victim was found;
Second, the accused left his place of work at around 9:30 in the evening of April 29, 1993;
Third, the accused did not go home in the evening of April 29, 1993 but went home only in
the morning of April 30, 1993;
Fourth, that during the wake of Charito, the accused went wild and hysterical and uttered
these words: "Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti
pang mamatay na.";
Fifth, the accused admitted in his sworn statement, that he uttered these words;
Sixth, the accused admitted that he drank chlorox and was brought to the Fatima Hospital
for treatment; and
Seventh, the sworn statement executed by the accused contains details of the manner in
which the crime was committed which only he could have known.  11
In upholding the validity of the extrajudicial confession, the lower court further ruled:
The contention of the accused that his extra-judicial confession [was] inadmissible
because it was obtained through force and without the assistance of counsel is untenable.
Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is
proved. In th[is] case, the presumption has not been overcome. The narration contained in
the sworn statement bespeaks spontan[ei]ty and truth. Not only is the [confession of the
accused] replete with details only he could have supplied, but the circumstances
surrounding its execution belie his claim. Indubitably established is the fact that accused
was assisted by Atty. Deborah Daquis who even signed the statement; that before
accused made his extrajudicial confession he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Daquis to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, while accused
recited a litany of alleged acts of maltreatment, no medical certificate had been shown to
prove that he did suffer inhuman treatment. Nor was there any proof that he even initiated
the filing of an administrative or criminal complaint against his alleged tormentors. Neither
did accused present any eyewitness to the alleged torture. In short, his allegation,
obviously self-serving, hardly deserves consideration. Noteworthy too, is the fact that he
did not repudiate said confession at the earliest opportunity and did so only during trial,
thus indicating that his repudiation [was] only a last-ditch effort to avoid the consequences
of the crime.
The court upholds the admissibility of accused's extrajudicial confession which, by itself, is
sufficient basis for his conviction.
The rule is, a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
Finally, accused's defense of denial and alibi cannot negate his culpability because these
are not supported by any credible evidence other than his bare assertion. Additionally,
there was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses that might have led them to give fabricated testimony against the
accused.   (citations omitted)
12
Assignment of Error
Appellant presents this lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE PROSECUTION AND IN THE PROCESS DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.  13
A reading of the Appellant's Brief, however, yields the following issues to be resolved: (1)
the validity and admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the appellant, (2) the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and (3) alibi as a defense.
This Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious. The extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible, and
the remaining circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sorely insufficient to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 First Issue:
Validity of Extrajudicial Confession
The appellant claims that "it is not true that [he] had executed an extra-judicial
confession"  . As correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, however, the appellant
14
actually admits to the execution of the said confession, albeit without the assistance of
counsel. But unlike the solicitor general, we are not ready to declare that such
"ambivalence only indicates the unreliability of [appellant's] claim."   Indeed, confessions
15
extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.
To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A
confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of
any of the following rights of persons under custodial investigation: to remain silent, to
have independent and competent counsel preferably of their own choice, to be provided
with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted by such counsel during the
investigation, to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights, and to
be informed of all these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used
against them in court. In People v. Santos,   we held:
16
A confession is not admissible unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was
obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III thereof,
provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is subsequently
tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely — without coercion, intimidation,
inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal
experience of mankind.
A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order
because no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to be the
perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.   Otherwise, it is
17
disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the exclusionary rule.   (citations
18
omitted)
Flagrantly violated in the present case were the appellant's right to be informed of his
rights under custodial investigation, his right to counsel, as well as his right to have said
counsel present during the waiver of his rights under custodial investigation.
The Right to Be Apprised
of Constitutional Rights
The right to be informed of one's constitutional rights during custodial investigation refers
to an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected
individual, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights. Understanding
would mean that the information transmitted was effectively received and comprehended.
Hence, the Constitution does not merely require the investigating officers to "inform" the
person under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be "informed." 19
The prosecution's purported compliance with this requisite appears in the following portion
of the extrajudicial confession:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO NA IBINIGAY KAY NBI
AGENT ELY T. TOLENTINO DITO SA TANGGAPAN NG NBI, ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME
DIVISION NGAYONG IKA-19 NG SETYEMBRE, 1993 SA HARAP NG ILANG SAKSI.
x x x           x x x          x x x
01. TANONG: Bago kita tanungin hinggil sa pagkamatay ni CHARITO DELGADO y
MULETA ay nais ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na itinatadhana ng ating
saligang batas, at ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
01. Ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at huwag sumagot sa mga katanungan sa iyo sa
imbestigasyong ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
02. Ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng abogado na sarili mong pili, pero kung wala
kang ikakaya ay bibigyan ka namin ng abogado para matulungan ka sa imbestigasyong
ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ang karapatan mong ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
03. Ang lahat ng bagay na sasabihin mo sa imbestigasyong ito ay maaaring gamitin laban
sa iyo sa alinmang hukuman[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
Matapos na malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan ikaw ay nakahanda pa ring magbigay
ng pahayag?
SAGOT: Nakahanda po akong sabihin lahat ng totoo.
02. Ikaw ba ay may abogado na matatawagan ngayon na sarili mong pili?
S: Wala po.
03. T: Nais mo bang bigyan ka namin ng abogado?
S: Opo.
04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty. Deborah Z. Daquiz isang abogada na pribado
na handang asistihan at tulungan ka sa imbestigasyong ito. Gusto mo bang tawagin natin
siya bago natin ituloy ang pagbibigay mong pahayag?
S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz was called first and the statement taking was
temporarily stopped until after her arrival).
05. T: Ngayong naririto na si Atty. DEBORAH DAQUIZ, ikaw ba ay nais pa ring magbigay
ng salaysay nabukal sa iyong kalooban?
S: Opo.
06. T: Atty. Daquiz: Gusto mo bang talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo
ng ating Konstitusyon?
S: Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO
DELGADO na pamangkin ko. (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
xxx xxx xxx
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of September, 1993 at the Office
of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division, NBI Building, Taft Avenue, Manila and hereby
certify that I have personally examined the herein Affiant and found him to have fully read
and understood the contents of his statement containing three (3) pages and that he
executed the same out of his own volition.
(Sgd.) Atty. ARTEMIO M. SACAGUING
Chief AOCD
(By Authority of Rep. Act 157)
xxx xxx xxx   (emphasis ours)
20
The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the strict requirements
mandated by the Constitution.   Such "terse and perfunctory statements"   implied a
21 22
superficial reading of the rights of the accused, without the slightest consideration of
whether he understood what was read to him. This Court will not subscribe to such
manner of "informing" the accused of his constitutional rights. We have stated this
then,   and we reiterate it now:
23
[The] stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which
assumed the nature of "legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type
it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in
their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
(emphasis supplied)
The Right to Counsel
The prosecution contends that this constitutional requirement was satisfied because
appellant executed the confession with the assistance and in the presence of Atty.
Deborah Daquiz.   The participation of the counsel was described in the confession in this
24
manner:
x x x           x x x          x x x
04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty. Deborah Z. Daquiz, isang abogada na pribado
na handang asistihan at tulungan ka sa imbestigasyong ito. Gusto mo bang tawagin natin
siya bago natin ituloy ang pagbibigay mo ng pahayag?
S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz was called first and the statement taking was
temporarily stopped until after her arrival).
x x x           x x x          x x x
However, the testimony of Tolentino, the investigating NBI agent, clearly contradicts the
claim of the prosecution. The agent testified:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Did you inform her [Atty. Deborah Daquiz] . . . thr[ough] the
phone . . . why you were soliciting her assistance?
A Yes [,] sir. We told her that we have a subject to confess what he [did, I will you kindly
assist him in this investigation[?]
Q What was the response of Atty. Daquis?
A She [asked] me [if it] could . . . be made the following day.
Q What was you[r] answer?
A It is up to you, I said.
Q If the request of Atty. Daquis was the following day[,] meaning September 20, are you
saying that the statement of Muleta was given the following day[,] on September 20?
A September 19, I started taking the statement I think I just finished the question the
following day I continued. [sic]
xxx xxx xxx   [Emphasis ours]
25
Atty. Quintana amplified this point on cross-examination:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q In the direct examination, you claimed that the accused Domingo Muleta gave his
statement and made a confession?
A Yes, madam.
Q You also claimed that you started taking the statement of Domingo Muleta, the accused,
without the presence of counsel?
A No, madam. I took his statement in the presence of Atty. Daquis.
Q In the direct examination on May 27, 1994, page 81, last paragraph and I quote: "A.
September 19, I started taking the statement. I think I just finished the question the
following day I continued." Now, do you want to change now your answer that you took the
accused" [sic] statement with the presence of counsel?
A No, madam. Although I started to take his statement on the night of September 19, I
continued it when Atty. Daquiz arrived . . . the following morning wherein the accused
conferred with the accused, madam. [sic].
Q But, [is it] not true that on the night of September 19, 1993 you started taking the
statement of the accused without the presence of Atty. Daquiz and only continued the
same on the early morning of September 20, 1993 when Atty. Daquiz arrived?
A Yes, madam.
Q Don't you know that as a police officer NBI a[t] that, that before a suspected person can
give his statement, a counsel must be present at all times?
A Yes, madam.
xxx xxx xxx   (emphasis ours)
26
Despite Agent Tolentino's claim that the confession of the accused started to be taken on
September 19, 1993 and continued the next day, the sworn statement itself clearly
showed that what began on the 19th of September ended on the same day. According to
the jurat, the extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to on September 19,
1993. The importance of the jurat must be stressed.   In People v. Relucio,   we
27 28
observed:
At this point, it must be noted that Exhibit 2-A, the statement which Padrones claimed
above to have been admittedly taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 but, supposedly signed
by him later and not on the same day before Judge Vicencio as he had previously stated,
bears the following heading:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES y ESPEJO SA PAGTATANONG NI
P/CPL J. S. VILORIA DITO SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG KABANATUAN NGAYONG
IKA-19 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA IKA 5:15 NG HAPON . . . .
and ends with the following jurat:
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 20 ng Oktubre 1972, dito sa
Lunsod ng Kabanatuan.
With the dates October 19 and 20 thus appearing in this statements, how could there be
any proximity to the truth in the assertion of Padrones that his statement was first taken by
Viloria on October 5, 1972 and that it was signed by him before Fiscal del Rosario on
October 9, 1972 and that it was the very statement he had been referring to earlier as
having been signed by him before Judge Vicencio? (emphasis in the original)
We note that the heading of the sworn statement refers to the same date: September 19,
1993. It is thus daylight clear that the purported sworn statement of the appellant was
prepared prior to the arrival of his NBI-procured counsel.   In other words, the sworn
29
statement was executed and completed on September 19, 1993, while Atty. Daquiz
arrived only the following day, September 20, 1993. Thus, when the appellant executed
and completed his purported extrajudicial confession on September 19, 1993, he was not
assisted by counsel.
As observed by this Court in People v. Lucero,   "[w]e have constitutionalized the right to
30
counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render
them inadmissible." This Court has consistently held, without equivocation, that no
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is done in the presence of
counsel.   The failure of the prosecution   to present Atty. Daquiz to testify on the validity
31 32
of the confession substantiates the conclusion that the sworn statement is constitutionally
suspect and invalid. In relation to this, we stress that the right to counsel refers to
competent and independent lawyers preferably chosen by the accused persons
themselves.   This Court, as well as the court a quo, did not have the opportunity to
33
determine the competence and the independence of the NBI-procured lawyer because,
despite the denial of the accused that he was assisted by counsel, the prosecution failed
to present Atty. Daquiz. 34
Based on the prosecution's own evidence, the accused was already singled out as the
perpetrator of the crime. The supposed "invitation" by NBI Agent Ely Tolentino was in
reality a custodial investigation targeting the accused for the purpose of procuring a
confession. Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial investigation the
practice of issuing "invitations" to persons being investigated in connection with an offense
they are suspected to have committed.   Under the present factual milieu, Domingo Muleta
35
should have been accorded the right to counsel (and all the constitutional rights of the
accused), from the time that he was brought to the NBI office in Manila.
No Valid Waiver
The illegality of the alleged confession is further demonstrated by the fact that appellant
exercised no satisfactory waiver of his rights. As stated in our earlier discussions, since he
was not assisted by a lawyer when the waiver was made, there was no valid waiver to
speak of. 36
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the appellant was assisted by counsel when
he waived his lights, the waiver itself was lamentably insufficient. After Atty. Daquiz was
allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this question: "Gusto mo bang talikdan
ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon?"   To this appellant
37
replied: "Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay
CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin ko."  38
To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly required.
Such waiver failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and
the implications of his waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a
language that clearly manifested his desire to do so.   The part of the sworn statement in
39
which the accused "waived" his rights referred to them as "mga karapatan na ibinigay sa
iyo ng ating Konstitusyon" and "iyon" — words that were utterly vague and insufficient to
satisfy the Constitutional requirements.   As presented, the prosecution would have us
40
refer to the first part of the sworn statement for guidance, as if it were a footnote saying
"Please see first part." Such stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of
rights cherished and enshrined in our basic law.
Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised only one question: whether appellant would like to waive his
rights. This was odd, because she had been called to assist appellant in making his
confession, not his waiver. Atty. Daquiz made no effort to determine whether the accused
was treated well, or the understood his rights. Such perfunctory, even cavalier, attempt
falls short of constitutional requirements.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence for the Prosecution
Having ruled the alleged confession as unconstitutional and inadmissible, we now
determine whether the other pieces of evidence — all circumstantial in nature — would be
sufficient to overturn yet another constitutional right: to be presumed innocent unless
otherwise proven.
The rule is that ". . . in the absence of direct-proof, conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. 
41
Here, the solicitor general, as well as the trial court, posits that the conviction of the
appellant was sufficiently warranted by the aggregate of the following circumstantial
evidence:
1. The appellant was familiar with the place where the crime was perpetrated.
2. The appellant left work around 9:30 on the evening of April 29, 1993 and did not return
home until the morning of April 30, 1993.
3. The appellant, during the victim's wake, became hysterical and allegedly uttered:
"Patawarin mo ako Charo, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti pang mamatay
na," after which drank "chlorox."
We do not agree. At the outset, we stress that a careful review of the records of this case
reveals that these pieces of circumstantial evidence were controverted by the defense
and, even more important, they were not sufficiently established. 
42
Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination,   the appellant consistently
43
denied that he worked in the place where the victim's body was found. Also, the
prosecution failed to prove that he was at work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 and
that he went home on April 30, 1993.   All it could present was the testimony of NBI Agent
44
Ely Tolentino, who merely testified on what appellant's co-workers related to him: that
appellant left work earlier.   This is clearly hearsay. The affidavits of these co-workers do
45
not help the prosecution's case, since they themselves were not presented during the trial.
An affidavit is hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and subjected to cross-
examination.   Besides, the appellant's wife, Emelinda Muleta, stated categorically that her
46
husband was with her at home on April 29 and 30, 1993.   The appellant himself
47
steadfastly affirmed this during his cross-examination. 
48
The appellant's rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his testimony,
due to his perceived failure to take care of his niece.   This was corroborated by the
49
testimony of Danilo Delgado.   Moreover, the defense claims that the words he said during
50
the wake were ambiguous. "Patawarin mo ako Charito" could have meant that the
appellant was blaming himself for being unable to protect the victim. "Ikaw kasi lumaban
pa" could have connoted frustration with what he imagined could have saved the life of his
niece. "Nakakahiya ako, mabuting mamatay na" also shows the appellant's for blaming
himself inutile, indicating his desire to take his own worthless life. If these words merit
anything, it is this: it places the appellant under suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is
not synonymous with guilt. 51
Most importantly, even if we were to assume that all the foregoing were proven, they are
still not enough to establish an unbroken chain leading inexorably to the guilt of the
appellant. That the appellant could have been familiar with the place where the body was
found did not legally prove anything. That he left work at 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 did
not necessarily mean he was at the scene of the crime. So many other possible
conclusions could be made regarding this circumstance. As for his statements during the
wake, they are ambiguous.
We have said that "[i]n the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be
established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of
moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot
sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the state's evidence does not constitute an
unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an
acquittal."   Thus, in People v. Bato,   the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented
52 53
there — those showing that the accused brothers invited the victim (and his son) for a
drink, suddenly tied his hands and took him away; after which his body was recovered
from the river the next day — were ruled to be inadequate to sustain a conviction based on
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  54
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented acquires significance only when taken
together with the appellant's confession.
The pattern of the tapestry,   which the prosecution would want us to see, is bound by only
55
circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof
against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could
be laid the responsibility for the offense charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the
burden, then it is not only the accused's right to be freed; it is, even more, the court's
constitutional duty to acquit him."

a single thread — the confession of the appellant. Due to constitutional infirmity, that one
strand has been cut, and thus the pattern disintegrates. The tapestry becomes an
unreadable puzzle.
Third Issue:
Alibi as a Defense
True, we have always considered alibi inherently weak,   because it can be either easily
56
fabricated or difficult to disprove.   However, we have consistently held that the
57
prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case, not on the
weakness of the defense:
True, alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the prosecution's evidence in this case. .
. . Indeed, it is when the evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much
more obligated to rely on the strength of ifs own case and not on the weakness of the
defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.   (emphasis
58
supplied)
One final note. In acquitting appellant, the Court is not saying that he did not commit the
offense charged. We are only saying that the prosecution failed to present credible and
admissible evidence of appellant's guilt. The strongest evidence of the prosecution is the
extrajudicial confession of appellant. But the Constitution is clear — a confession obtained
in violation of the rights of an accused cannot be used as evidence. Without Muleta's
confession, the other pieces of circumstantial evidence lose their significance. Had the
National Bureau of Investigation followed the law in extracting appellant's admission of
guilt, perhaps — just perhaps — the result of this case would have been different. The
Court is saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the law which they have sworn
to defend and uphold. A mockery of the law — which was manifestly perpetrated in this
case — must not be allowed to sully the country's quest for peace and order.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is hereby
REVERSED and VACATED. Appellant Domingo R. Muleta is hereby ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to
cause the release of appellant forthwith, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another
cause; and to inform the Court of his release, or the reasons for his continued
confinement, within ten days from notice. No costs.
1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
Presumption of Innocence

"Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the
constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness
or even the absence of his defense, for any conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution's case and not on the weakness of the defense."   Here, without the
59

confession of the appellant, the presumption of innocence prevails.

This principle is well-articulated in People v. Mejia.   "In our jurisdiction accusation is not
60

synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit[ed] only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course,
requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and
documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every
 committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon
Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic
Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta.

The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and
alleged the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the ordinary
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price. 1

Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiaño were arrested. However, before Quiaño could be
arraigned, he escaped on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine
Constabulary/PNP Regional Command I at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet.  The 2

cases, which were consolidated and jointly tried, proceeded only against the appellant.

After the appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 4 September 1987, trial on the
merits was held on various dates from 11 May 1988 until 10 January 1990.

On 30 May 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision  in the consolidated cases
3

acquitting the appellant in Criminal Case No. 4649-R (frustrated murder) and Criminal
Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R (attempted murder) for insufficiency of evidence but
convicting him in the two murder cases, Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with
treachery as the qualifying circumstance.  It also ruled that the aggravating circumstances
4

of evident premeditation and price had been duly established. It then sentenced the
appellant as follows:
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
Upon these premises, the accused Jaime Agustin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of
murder, the prosecution having proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In each of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, criminal cases aforesaid, he should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of Death, there
vs. being two aggravating circumstances. However, since the death penalty is not imposable
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAÑO, MANUEL "JUN" at this time, the accused is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. He is further ordered to
ABENOJA, JR., and FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused. JAIME "JIMMY" indemnify the heirs of the victims; Anna Theresa Francisco the sum of sixty Three
AGUSTIN, accused-appellant. Thousand Pesos (P63,000.00) as actual damages (Exhibits "F," "I" and "G"); and Dr.
Napoleon Bayquen, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). With costs against
the accused, Jaime Agustin.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: SO ORDERED. 5

In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), The version of the prosecution is based on the testimonies of (1) Isidoro Magpantay, a
Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. member of the Baguio City Police Force, who identified the initial report (Exhibit "A"); (2)
4647-R and 4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with Christie Napeñas, a stenographic reporter in the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City,
attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly who took down the stenographic notes of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia's investigations of
accused Wilfredo Quiaño (Exhibit "D") on 30 January 1987 and of the appellant on 10
February 1987, and who identified her stenographic notes containing the statement of the
appellant (Exhibit "B") and the transcript of said stenographic notes (Exhibit "C"); (3)
Dominic Bayquen, the victim in Criminal Case No. 4650-R, who testified on how they were
shot; (5) Eulogio Francisco, the father of Anna Theresa Francisco, who identified her
death certificate (Exhibit "I") and testified on the list of expenses (Exhibit "G"); (6) Rogelio
Mumar, a supervising ballistics expert, who declared that the fourteen shell recovered from
the scene of the crime were not fired from any of the three armalite rifles submitted to him;
(7) Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, who testified that he was the lawyer who assisted the
appellant and accused Wilfredo Quiaño while they were being investigated by City Fiscal
Balajadia; and (8) Lilian San Luis Bayquen, wife of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and mother of
Dominic Bayquen, who testified on what she did after Dominic informed her by telephone
about the shooting incident.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts. At past 7:30 p.m. of 6
September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son,
Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny
Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence
at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving the car. While they were
cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the
right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the
Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The
Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car
which then sped away.
All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dr.
Bayquen's head was blown off. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the
Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened. Later,
she and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital.  Danny Ancheta went
6
home and was then brought to the Notre Dame Hospital for treatment.  Anna Theresa
7
Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor.  The police later arrived at the crime scene
8
and conducted an investigation. they recovered some empty shells of an armalite rifle. 9
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiaño, an alleged former military agent
or "asset" who had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during
the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he
was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He
implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow military agent and the "bagman"
who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who provided the
armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by
Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, a representative of the Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Ms. Christie Napeñas, a stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
investigation.   Thereafter, she transcribed the notes and the transcription became the
10
sworn statement of Wilfredo Quiaño which he signed, with the assistance of Atty.
Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia.  11
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime
Agustin, was picked up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel and brought to
Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of that date, he was taken to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo
Balajadia where he was investigated in connection with the crime. Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom
assisted the appellant during the investigation. Ms. Christie Napeñas took down
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. The stenographic notes
consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which was signed afterwards by the appellant
and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeñas subsequently transcribed these notes which the
prosecution marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant narrated therein his knowledge of the
shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a
confrontation two days later, he identified Quiaño as "Sony," the triggerman.
The defense presented the appellant and his wife, Elizabeth Agustin. The appellant, who
is a farmer and whose highest educational attainment was grad four, impugned the validity
of his extrajudicial statement. he alleged that in the morning of 10 February 1987, he went
to Carmen, Pangasinan, to buy some fertilizer and upon his return he was met by two
armed men who took him to their car where two other companions, armed with armalites,
were waiting. They then brought him out of Pangasinan. He later learned that they were on
their way to Baguio City.
Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun, and he answered that he did not.
Along Kennon Road, he was made to stoop down at the back seat whenever they would
reach a toll booth, and then brought out three times near the ravines and made to kneel at
gunpoint in order to force him to admit his involvement in the shooting, which he finally did
out of fear. Then he was brought to the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City.
While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with him and
their presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being
threatened. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom, to assist him, he, nevertheless, asked for his uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver
Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and
Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Then later, at Camp Dangwa to
where he was taken, he told his wife to get in touch and talk with Atty. Tabin. Finally, he
asserted that he was promised by his captors that he would be discharged as a state
witness if he cooperates, but the plan did not push through because his co-accused,
Quiaño, escaped.  12
Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband's story that he went to Carmen in the morning
of 10 February 1987 to buy some fertilizer and that he failed to return. Her efforts to locate
him proved futile until days later when she finally learned that he was detained at Camp
Dangwa.  13
The trial court admitted the appellant's extrajudicial statement and gave scant
consideration to his claim of force, intimidation, and other irregularities because of the
following reasons: (a) the presence of material improbabilities in his tale of when and how
he was allegedly taken at gunpoint from his hometown in Pangasinan; (b) it was
improbable that he was made to kneel thrice at gunpoint along Kennon Road considering
the vehicles which were passing along that road; (c) it was unbelievable that when he was
in the Fiscal's Office he asked for his uncle, Atty. Tabin if he could not go home for a
period of one month; (d) no less than the city Fiscal of Baguio City interrogated him and
yet he did not tell the fiscal that he was being forced to give a statement; (e) the fiscal
even provided him with a lawyer who conferred with him and apprised him of his rights; (f)
he signed each and every page of the stenographic notes of his statement and this was
witnessed by no less than the City Fiscal of Baguio and the lawyer who assisted him; and
(g) he disclosed in his statement that he voluntarily gave it because of his ill feeling against
his co-accused who did not give him any money.
The trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct
participant in the crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial
confession" shows that "he was in on the plan," and even "expected to be paid, to be
rewarded monetarily"; and that he "decided to give a statement only when he was not
given the money." Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court was established by the prosecution's evidence, it found his conviction for
murder inevitable.
The appellant filed a notice of appeal. In this brief, he imputes upon the trial court the
commission of this lone error:
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONSIDERING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIM.  14
The appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation of his rights
under Section 11, Article III of the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted
him, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the
city Fiscal. Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur
Galace, and conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he understood only
Ilocano. Moreover, when Atty. Cajucom briefly conferred with him and when the city Fiscal
interrogated him, his military escorts were present.
He stresses that the lawyer "who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should
be of the latter's choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigator or other
parties,"   and that where there are serious doubts on the voluntariness of the extrajudicial
15
confession, the doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.   He then concludes that
16
his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible and his conviction cannot stand, there being no
other evidence linking him to the crimes charged.
In its brief,   the appellee, reiterating the reasons of the trial court in upholding the validity
17
of the confession, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision.
After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a
painstaking evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit.
Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial confession — of the appellant,
which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime
charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's right
under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.
Before we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of
the trial court and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed
extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission.
We take this opportunity to once more distinguish one from the other. Sections 26 and 33,
rule 30 of the Rules of
Court   clearly show such a distinction.
18
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.   Wharton   defines a confession as
19 20
follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his
guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts,
to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is something less than a confession, and
is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are
satisfied that nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely
admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Nevertheless,
when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers
to both confession and admission. Thus:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
These first and second paragraphs are taken from Section 20, Article IV (Bill of Rights) of
the 1973 Constitution which read:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have
broadened the aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means not
just any counsel, but a "competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice"; (2) the right to remain silent and to counsel can only be waived in writing and in
the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility expressly includes admissions,
not just confessions.
In Morales vs. Enrile,   this Court, applying Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
21
laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial investigation and ruled that the
waiver of the right to counsel would not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory of
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We reiterated the above ruling in People vs. Galit,   People vs. Lumayok,   People vs.
22 23
Albofera,   People vs. Marquez,   People vs. Penillos,   and People vs. Basay,   among
24 25 26 27
other cases.
The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."   It is not enough for the investigator to
28
merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution; the former must
also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under
investigation may or may not do, and in language the subject fairly understands. The right
to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to
explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject
understanding what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained,
the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education,
intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing the
investigation.
In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such any statement. If you will not give a
right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he statement, you will not be forced to do so,
can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he do you understand this right?
decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and,
therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, ANSWER — I understand, sir.
must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.  29

02. Q — If you will give a statement, you have the

The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and right to be assisted by a lawyer of your own
intelligent.   Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was
30
choice, if you cannot afford to secure the
made without the assistance off counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the services of a lawyer the government will
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 31
provide a lawyer for you, do you understand
this right?
The extrajudicial admission of the appellant,   contained in twenty-two pages of yellow
32

pad, does, indeed, appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. what we find A — I understand, sir.
in these yellow pads are stenographic notes. these were transcribed by the stenographer
who took down the stenographic notes, but for reasons not explained in the records, the 03. Q — Now, do you want to be assisted by a
transcript of the notes (Exhibit "C"), which consists of twelve pages,   was not signed by
33
lawyer?
the appellant since it does not indicate any jurat. On the other hand, the same
stenographic reporter, who took down the stenographic notes when accused Wilfredo
A — Yes, sir.
Quiaño was being investigated by City Fiscal Balajadia, transcribed the notes, and the
transcription   was subscribed and sworn to by the accused before City Fiscal Balajadia
34

and also signed by Atty. Cajucom, who represented the accused in the investigation. 04. Q — I am now informing you that a lawyer in the
person of Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom is now
present in this investigation room, do you
Since we cannot even reads or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we
wish to avail of his assistance in connection
cannot expect the appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to
with this investigation?
read or decipher its contents. We have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its
accuracy. A perusal of the transcript convinces us that the appellant was not given a fair
deal and was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. A — I want, sir.
Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The transcript (Exhibit "C")
shows the following preliminary questions of the City Fiscal and the answers of the 05. Q — I am also informing you that whatever you
appellant: say in this investigation can be used as
evidence in your favor and it can also be
01. QUESTION — Mr. Jaime Agustin, I am informing you that used as evidence against you in any criminal
you are under investigation in connection or civil case, do you understand that?
with the death of Dr. Nap Bayquen of which
you are one of the principal suspects. I am A — Yes, sir, I understand.
informing you of your constitutional rights
before you give any statement. First, you 06. Q — After informing you of your constitutional
have the right to remain silent meaning, you rights, are you now willing to give a
may give a statement or you may not give statement?
A — Yes, sir, I agree.
Investigator — Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, the witness or
respondent Jaime Agustin has chosen you to
give him assistance in this investigation, are
you willing to assist him?
Answer — I am willing, fiscal, to assist the witness.
Investigator — Have you appraised [sic] him of his
constitutional rights?
Answer — Yes, fiscal.
Investigator — Do you know after examining him whether
or not he is giving a free and voluntary
statement of his own volition without any
intimidation or force exerted on him?
A — As stated by him, fiscal, he is willing to give
a free and voluntary statement in relation to
what really happened.
It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have
a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind
any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could
not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not
categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and
that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact,
waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of
such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to
prove its existence.
Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily and intelligently
"accepted" by the appellant as his counsel to assist him in the investigation. Atty.
Cajucom's presence in the Office of the City fiscal at the time the appellant was brought
there for investigation is unclear to us. At least two possibilities may explain it: it was a
mere coincidence in the sense that he happened to be attending to some professional
matter, or he was earlier called by the City Fiscal for the purpose of giving free legal aid to
the appellant. These possibilities are not remote but whether it was one or the other, it is
clear to us that Atty. Cajucom was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in the
above-quoted portion of Exhibit "C," the city fiscal immediately suggested the availability of
Atty. Cajucom without first distinctly asking the appellant if he had a counsel of his own
choice and if he had one, whether he could hire such counsel; and if he could not, whether
he would simply exercise his right to remain silent and to counsel. In short, after the
appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive
language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him.
While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be investigated has the final
choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him by the investigator and ask
for another one,   the circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation of the
35
appellant left him no freedom to intelligently and freely do so. For as earlier stated, he was
not even asked if he had a lawyer of his own choice and whether he could afford to hire
such lawyer; on the other hand, the city Fiscal clearly suggested the availability of Atty.
Cajucom. then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and Sgt. Roberto
Rambac, military officers of RUC I, who brought him to the City Fiscal's Office for
investigation in the afternoon of the day when he was unlawfully arrested in Sto. Tomas,
Pangasinan. Along Kennon road, on the way to Baguio City, he was coerced and
threatened with death if he would not admit knowing "Jun" and "Sonny" and hi participation
in the crime. This testimony was unrebutted by the prosecution. The presence of the
military officers and the continuing fear that if he did not cooperate, something would
happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated his free will.
Why it was the City Fiscal who had to conduct the custodial investigation is beyond us.
Nothing in the records shows that at that time the criminal cases against the culprits had
already been filed with the City Fiscal's Office for preliminary investigation and had,
therefore, ceased to be a police matter. If they had been so filed, then the City Fiscal
should have followed the usual course of procedure in preliminary investigations. It
appears, however, from the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 46648-R that
it was Assistant City Fiscal Octavio M. Banta who conducted the preliminary investigation
and who prepared, signed, and certified the informations. city Fiscal Balajadia merely
approved them and administered the jurat in the certification. the conclusion then is
inevitable that he did not conduct the preliminary investigation.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant voluntarily agreed to be
assisted by Atty. Cajucom, we doubt it very much if he was an independent counsel. While
we wish to give him the benefit of the doubt because he is an officer of the court upon
whose shoulders lies the responsibility to see to it that protection be accorded the
appellant and that no injustice be committed to him,   and, moreover, he generally has in
36
his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties,   there are special
37
circumstances in these cases which convince us that he was unable to assist the appellant
in a satisfactory manner. For one, he admitted on cross-examination that at that time, and
even until the time he took the witness stand, he was an associate of the private
prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, in these and the companion cases. Thus:
Q Mr. Witness, at the time you assisted the accused you belonged to the office of Atty.
Galace, you were an associate at the time when you assisted the accused?
A I was represented [sic] then as IBP Legal Aid.
Q The question is not answered, we are only requesting him if he was an associate of
Atty. Galace up to the present?
A Yes.  38
Then we have misgivings on whether Atty. Cajucom was in fact understood by the
appellant when the former informed the appellant of his constitutional rights in English and
Tagalog considering that the appellant, a fourth grader and a farmer, could only
understand Ilocano. Thus:
ATTY. TABIN:
So in other words when you appraised [sic] him of his constitutional rights using English
Language and Tagalog Dialect you did not have any Ilocano dialect Interpreter. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
As far as I can remember, I explained it in Tagalog and English. 39
And when asked whether he was sure if the appellant understood him, Atty. Cajucom
merely answered:
A At least I put everything as far as I could give to him to appraise [sic] him of his
constitutional rights. 
40
Then too, even if he were fully understood by the appellant, we are not satisfied that his
explanations were adequate. On direct examination, he gave the following answers:
Q — Did you explain the constitutional rights of the accused to
caution him of the consequences of his statement?
A — I explained to him that he has the right to remain silent, to
confront in person the witnesses against him and that he has
the right to choose a counsel to assist him in the hearing of
the case which was being investigated then.
Q — And what was his reply regarding the consequences of this
statement?
A — He told me that he is willing to give a truthful statement and
in order to shed light. 41
It appears to us that Atty. Cajucom did not actually impress upon the appellant that he was
one of the accused; rather, Atty. Cajucom made the appellant believe that he was only a
witness. Thus:
Q [by the prosecutor]
— But, nevertheless, you gave the precautionary measure
entitled to any witness?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Why do you say that it was given voluntarily?
A — Before presenting him to the investigation we were given
time to talk personally without any other people and that
was the time that I explained to him all his rights and
consequences pertaining to him as witness to this case.  42
On cross-examination, Atty. Cajucom also declared:
ATTY. TABIN:
That is why I am requesting him how he explained in that language, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
I told him that this is a grave case which he would be giving some narrations as a
witness and his involvement would mean the most grievous offense and if found guilty will
bring him for some years in jail and I told him that I could help him if he will be presenting
the truth and narrate is the truth. This is in combination, English and Tagalog, and most of
the time, I made it in Tagalog. 
43
Moreover, considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious
doubts about his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional
rights since Atty. Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog.
Finally, Atty. Cajucom knew, as admitted by him on cross-examination, that the appellant
was picked up on 10 February 1987 by military men in Pangasinan without a warrant for
his arrest.   Since the crimes with which the appellant was charged were allegedly
44
committed on 6 September 1986 or more than five months earlier, no arrest without a
warrant could have been legally and validly effected. a warrantless arrest should comply
with the conditions prescribed in Section 5, rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Said section
provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Needless to say, the conduct of Atty. Cajucom under the circumstances only strengthen
our belief that the appellant had all the cards stacked against him.
Thus, we do not hesitate to declare the appellant's extrajudicial statement inadmissible in
evidence because it was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the
Constitution. since it is the only evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was
convicted, he must then be acquitted.
His acquittal must not write finis to these murder cases. These crimes must be solved and
the triggerman and the mastermind apprehended. We see in these cases the failure of the
Government to exert the necessary efforts to bring the guilty parties to the bar of justice.
Until now, the accused, who were implicated by the triggerman as having ordered for a
price the murder of Dr. Bayquen, remain at large and the records do not show any diligent
effort to effect their arrest. The triggerman escaped while in the custody of the PC/INP at
Camp Dangwa. The City Prosecutor's Office of Baguio City should then use all the
resources at its command, in coordination with the law-enforcement agencies of the
Government, such as the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National
Police, to immediately arrest the other accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal
Case No. 4648-R, and ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN. His immediate
release from confinement is hereby ORDERED unless for some other lawful cause his
continued detention is warranted.
Costs de oficio.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal SO ORDERED.
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

None of these exceptional circumstances were present at the time the appellant was
arrested on 10 February 1987. The prosecution did not even insinuate that the crimes
were committed in the presence of the arresting officers (for otherwise they could have
arrested the appellant on 6 September 1986 yet) or that the appellant was a prisoner who
had escaped from his place of detention; or that the crimes had just been committed for
they were in fact committed more than five months earlier. Atty. Cajucom knew or ought to
have known that the arrest was unlawful. If he were then truly moved by his duty to fully
assist the appellant, he should have forthwith taken the appropriate measures for the
immediate release of the appellant instead of allowing the City Fiscal to investigate him.
 with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
the accessory penalties prescribed by law.

The dispositive of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding Jovito Tujon and Ernesto Parola
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, described and
penalized under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. There being
no modifying circumstance attending the commission of the crime, the said accused are
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law, to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Rolando Abellana the amounts
of P18,000.00 representing indemnification for death and P180.00 representing the money
stolen, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the proportionate
cost.

IT IS ORDERED. (Rollo., p. 9)

The aforesaid judgment as to accused Ernesto Parola has not yet been promulgated by
the court a quo since the said accused escaped after arraignment and has not been re-
arrested to date. Accused Cesar Paredes, on the other hand, remains at large and does
not appear to have been arraigned before the trial court.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On November 3, 1977, the dead body of Rolando Abellana, a taxi driver, was found at
Doña Faustina Village, Quezon City, with stab wounds. Dr. Rolando Madrid, Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI, conducted an autopsy on the corpse and found that the cause of death
G.R. No. 66034 November 13, 1992
is hemorrhage, acute, profuse, secondary to multiple stab wounds on the chest and neck.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
On November 23, 1977, accused Jovito Tujon and Ernesto Parola were arrested by the
vs.
police and turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division, Quezon City Police
JOVITO TUJON y TAPEL, ERNESTO PAROLA y CORTINA, AND CESAR PAREDES
Department, where they allegedly confessed to the commission of the crime.
@ Cesar (at large), accused JOVITO TUJON y TAPEL, accused-appellant.
On December 1, 1977, an information was filed by Assistant Fiscal Jesus T. Baldonado
BIDIN, J.:
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Quezon City, charging
the accused of robbery with homicide having been committed as follows:
This is an appeal interposed by the accused-appellant Jovito Tujon from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Quezon City, Branch XVII, in
Criminal Case No. Q-8808 finding him and Ernesto Parola guilty of the crime of Robbery
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1977 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, with intent of gain, by the use of violence and intimidation, conspiring
with, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with co-accused,
ANTONIO MENA Y BALDESIMO, a minor who is also charged with the same offense in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one ROLANDO ABELLANA Y FABROA, a taxi driver of EH
taxi in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned, said
accused pursuant to their conspiracy boarded the taxicab and thereafter, the above-
named accused, armed with a (sic) knives and pointed their knives to the said victim, who
struggled and in the course of struggle was stabbed at the chest and neck, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his untimely death; that after the said attack upon said Rolando Abellano y Fabroa, said
accused, did then and there take, rob and carry away his day's earning in the amount of
P180.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
Rolando Abellana y Fabroa and in such amount as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 2)
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant and Ernesto Parola entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter trial on the merits ensued.
There is no eyewitness for the prosecution. To establish the case against the accused, the
prosecution relied mainly on the extra-judicial confessions of the former taken down by
Det. Armando Estrada.
The extra-judicial confession of Ernesto Parola y Cortina (Exhibit "A" Original Records)
reads:
MALAYA AT KUSANG LOOB NA SALAYSAY NI ERNESTO PAROLA Y CORTINA NA
KINUHA NI DET. ARMANDO B. ESTRADA DITO SA CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
DIVISION, STATION 1, NPD, MPF NGAYON ALAS 10:15 NG UMAGA, 23 NG
NOVEMBER, 1977 SA HARAP NG MGA SAKSI . . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
01 Tanong: Bago kita siyasatin ay gusto kong malaman mo ang inyong mga karapatan at
gusto kong malaman mo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat sa salang pagpatay ng tao na may
kasamang pagnanakaw. Gusto kong maunawaan mo na ang inyong mga karapatan ay
ang mga sumusunod:
1. Na ikaw ay may karapatan manatiling tahimik sa pagsisiyasat na ito.
2. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng inyong sariling abogado para tulungan ka sa
pagsisiyasat na ito.
3. Na ikaw ay may karapatang pagkalooban ng abogado kung ikaw ay walang ikakayang
kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado.
4. Na ang lahat ng sasabihin mo rito ay maaring gamitin laban o panig sa yo sa alin mang
hukuman sa Pilipinas. Naunawaan mo ba ang iyong mga karapatan at handa ka pa rin
bang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay na hindi ka tinakot, sinaktan
o pinangakuan ng ano mang pabuya?
SAGOT: Opo. (SGD) ERNESTO PAROL Y CORTINA
02 T: Ikaw ba ay marunong bumasa at umintindi ng wikang tagalog?
S: Opo.
03 T: Ano ang pinakamataas na naabot mo sa iyong pagaaral?
S: Grade six lang po.
04 T: Ano ang inyong pangalan at iba pang bagay na may kinalaman sa iyoong pagkatao?
S: ERNESTO PAROLA Y CORTINA, 18 na taong gulang, binata, pahinante sa PIER 8,
tubo sa Macrohon, Southern Leyte at naninirahan sa No. 3377 Mithi St., Tondo, Manila.
05 T: Ano ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
S: Dahil sa hinuli po kami ng mga pulis na hindi ko kilala na sila raw taga YOUTH AID
BUREAU at kami po ay ibinigay dito sa Criminal Investigation Division, Station 1, NPD,
MPF dahil sa salang pagpapatay at pagholdup.
06 T: Kailan ba kayo nahuli ng mga pulis?
S: Noon pong mga alas 3:00 ng hapon, Linggo, 20 ng November, 1977 doon po sa Mithi
St., Tondo, Manila.
07 T: Ipinapakita ko sa iyo ang isang litrato, ano ang masasabi mo sa taong ito at
natandaan mo ba ang taong ito? (Affiant being shown the picture of one ROLANDO
ABELLANA Y FABROA, 27 years old, married, EH TAXI driver, native of Davao Del Sur
and residing at No. 188 Sauyo Road, Novaliches, Quezon city who was killed after having
been held up and the body of which (sic) was dumped at Tandang Sora, Quezon City.
11 T: Hindi mo ba alam kung saan nila dinala yong taxi?
S: Hindi ko po alam, sir.
12 T: Magkano naman ang nakuha niyong pera doon sa driver na pinatay niyo?

S: Opo. Nakilala ko po yan. Yan po ang taong hinoldup namin at aming pinatay at S: Ang sabi po ni CESAR PAREDES at saka si JUNIOR ay P180.00.
pagkatapos po ay itinapon namin doon sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City subalit hindi ko po
matiyak and exaktong lugar.
13 T: Magkano naman ang ibinigay sa yo bilang parte mo doon sa perang naholdup niyo?
08 T: Kailan at saan ninyo hinoldup itong taong ito?
S: Binigyan po kami ng P20.00. Ang sabi po ni CESAR at saka ni JUNIOR ay tama na raw
ang parte naming P20.00.
S: Hindi ko po matandaan kung kailan subalit natatandaan ko po na sa unang linggo ng
November, 1977 doon po sa Moriones, Tondo, Manila subalit dinala namin siya sa
14 T: Sino-sino ba ang mga kasama mo sa pagholdup dito sa taxi driver na ito?
Balintawak, Quezon City doon po sa may highway na hindi ko masyadong matiyak ang
lugar at doon namin siya sinaksak at kinunan ng pera at nang siya ay patay na ay isinakay
namin uli sa taxi at dinala namin sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City at doon namin itinapon. S: Sina CESAR PAREDES na nakatira sa Mithi St., Tondo, Manila, si JUNIOR na taga
Mithi din, si JOVITO TUJON na taga Mithi St., Moriones, Tondo, Manila at saka si
ANTONIO MENA na taga Mithi St. din at saka ako.
09 T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang pagkatao ng taong yan sa sinasabi mong pinatay
ninyo at itinapon sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City?
15 T: Ano ang partisipasyon mo sa pagpatay doon sa taxi driver (ROLANDO
ABELLANA)?
S: Siya po ay driver ng TAXI na hindi ko natatandaan ang pangalan na ang kulay po ng
taxi ay kulay pula na may guhit na dilaw sa katawan.
S: Ako po ang humawak sa kamay niya at pagkatapos po ay sinaksak ko rin siya
10 T: Maari bang isalaysay mo sa akin kung papano ninyo hinoldup ang taong yan?
16 T: Ano naman ang partisipasyon noong mga kasama mo?
S: Noon pong mga alas 10:00 ng gabi, linggo, 20 November, 1977 pinara po namin ang
taxing minamaneho nitong taong ito (affiant referring to the picture of ROLANDO S: Si CESAR PAREDES ang humawak sa ulo at pagkatapos ay sinaksak niya, si JUNIOR
ABELLANA) at kami ay sumakay at pagkatapos ay dinala namin sa Balintawak, Quezon ay sumaksak din, si JOVITO TUJON ay sumaksak din, at si ANTONIO MENA ay
City. Pagdating po namin doon ay pinahinto po namin ang taxi at pagkatapos ay kinuha sumaksak din.
namin ang kanyang pera at pagkatapos ay nakatakbo. Nang tumakbo siya ay hinabul
namin at nang inabutan namin ay sinaksak namin. Nang siya ay patay na ay isinakay 17 T: Ano ang ginamit mo sa pagsaksak doon sa taxi driver?
namin uli sa taxi at pagkatapos ay tinapon namin doon sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City.
Pakatapos naming itapon ay dinala namin ang taxi at ang nagmaneho ng taxi ay si S: Isang kutsilyong stainless at ang aking mga kasama ay balisong at ice pick ang
CESAR PAREDES na nakatira sa Mithi St., Tondo, Manila. Pagkatapos po ay ipinagbili po kanilang ginamit.
nila ang metro ng taxi. Hindi ko po alam kung magkano nila ibinenta at kung saan nila
ibinenta sapagkat hindi na po ako kasama noon, pero binigyan po ako ng P20.00. Ako po 18 T: Nasaan ngayon ang kutsilyong pinangsaksak mo?
noon ay nagpaiwan na dito sa may Blumentrit, (palengke) at sila ay dala pa rin nila ang
taxi. S: Naki JUNIOR po at ang lahat ng kutsilyong ginamit namin ay sa kanya.
19 T: Nasaan naman ang mga kasama mong binanggit mo?
S: Ang dalawa na sina JOVITA TUJON at si ANTONIO MENA ay kasama kong nahuli
subalit sila CESAR at si JUNIOR ay nakatakas at sila ngayon ay nagtatago.
20 T: Maari bang ilarawan mo yong taxi driver na pinatay niyo matapos niyong kunin ang
kanyang kita at itinapon niyo sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City?
S: Siya po ay mahabang buhok, katamtamang lang ang katawan, mga 27 na taong
gulang, may kaunting biguti, kayumanggi ang kulay.
21 T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ilan nang tao ang pinapatay niyo dahil sa holdup?
S: Isa lang ang napatay na kasama po ako.
22 T: Alin yong napatay niyo na kasama ka?
S: Yong pong itinapon namin sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City.
23 T: Bakit niyo pinatay ang taong ito?
S: Sapagkat sinabi po ni CESAR at saka ni JUNIOR na patayin daw namin kaya po namin
pinatay.
24 T: Ilang beses ka nakasama sa panghoholdup?
S: Apat na beses na po ako nakasama sa kanila. Dalawang jeep at saka dalawang taxi.
Nakalimutan ko na po ang pangalan nang mga taxi.
25 T: Sabihin mo kung saan at kung kailan niyo hinoldup ang binanggit mo?
S: Yon pong dalawang jeep ay doon sa Novaliches, Quezon City at yong isang taxi ay sa
Balintawak, Quezon City at yong isa ay sa Novaliches, Quezon City.
26 T: Ilan bang grupo ang sinasamahan mo?
S: Ang sinasamahan ko lang ay ang grupo ni CESAR at saka ni JUNIOR.
27 T: Maliban sa pagholdup ng taxi ay umakyat din ba kayo ng bahay para magnakaw?
S: Opo. Umaakyat din po kami ng bahay para magnakaw.
28 T: Ilang beses na kayo umakyat sa bahay?
S: Dalawang beses po yong nasamahan ko sa kanila na umakyat kami ng bahay.
29 T: Natatandaan mo ba kung saan bahay yong inakyat ninyo?
S: Hindi ko po alam sabihin ang lugar subalit alam ko po kung pupuntahan ko.
30 T: Ano-ano ang mga bagay na nakuha niyo nang kayo'y umakyat sa bahay?
S: Ang nakuha po namin ay PHONO, RADIO, SAPATOS, DAMIT, CALDERO, KALAN NA
BUMBA.
31 T: Saan ninyo ibinebenta ang mga ninakaw niyo?
S: Ibinebenta namin doon din sa Mithi St., Moriones, Tondo, Manila.
32 T: Magkano ninyo ibinenta yong PHONO at saka yong RADIO?
S: Yon pong PHONO ay P150.00 at yong radio ay P125.00.
33 T: Yong bang grupo ninyo nina CESAR, JUNIOR, JOVITO, at si ANTONIO ay mayroon
bang baril?
S: Si CESAR po ay may baril na .22 caliber. Si JUNIOR ay Parolee.
34 T: Yong mga metro ng taxi na kinuha ninyo, saan ninyo ibinibenta?
S: Hindi ko po alam kung saan nila ibinibenta. Ang nakakaalam ay si CESAR, si JUNIOR
at si JOVITO.
35 T: Wala na akong itatanong sayo, mayroon ka bang nais bawasin o idagdag sa
salaysay mong ito?
S: Wala na po. 2. May karapatang kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado para tulungan ka sa pagsisiyasat na
ito.
36 T: Lalagdaan mo ba ang salaysay mong ito bilang patunay na ang mga sinabi mo rito
ay pawang katotohanan? 3. May karapatang pagkalooban ng abogado kung ikaw ay walang ikakayang kumuha ng
iyong sariling abogado.
S: Opo.
4. Ang lahat ng sasabihin mo rito ay maaaring gamitin laban o panig sa yo sa alin mang
37 T: Ang paglagda mong ito ay hindi kita tinakot, sinaktan at pinangakuan ng ano mang hukuman sa Pilipinas.
pabuya o kaluwagan sa buhay?
Gusto ko ring malaman mong ikaw ay sinisiyasat sa kasong pagpatay ng tao na may
S: Opo. kasamang pagnananakaw. Ikaw ba ay handa pa ring magbigay ng isang malaya at
kusang loob na salaysay na hindi ka tinakot, sinaktan o pinangakuan ng ano mang pabuya
(SGD) ERNESTO PAROLA Y CORTINA o kaluwagan sa katawan?
Nagsalaysay
Sagot: Opo. (SGD) JOVITO TUJON Y TAPEL
Statement taken by:
Det. ARMANDO B. ESTRADA 02 T: Ikaw ba ay marunong bumasa at umintindi ng wikang tagalog?
Investigator, H & A Sec.
S: Opo.
MGA SAKSI SA PAGLAGDA:
03 T: Ano ang pinakamataas na inabot mo sa iyong pag-aaral?
1. (SGD) 2. (SGD)
Det. Enrico Larga Augusto Perlada S: Grade six lang po.

On the other hand, the extra-judicial confession of appellant Jovito Tujon y Tapel, likewise
taken by Det. Armando B. Estrada on November 23, 1977 (Exhibit "B", Original Records),
reads:
MALAYA AT KUSANG LOOB NA SALAYSAY NI JOVITO TUJON Y TAPEL NA KINUHA
NI DET. ARMANDO B. ESTRADA DITO SA CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION,
STATION 1, NPD, MPF NGAYONG ALAS 1:45 NG HAPON, 23 NG NOVEMBER, 1977
SA HARAP NG MGA SAKSI . . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
01. Tanong: Bago kita tanongin ay gusto kong malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan sa
ilalim ng ating bagong saligang batas na ikaw ay:
1. May karapatang manatiling tahimik sa pagsisiyasat na ito.
04 T: Ano ang iyong pangalan at iba pang bagay na may kinalaman sa iyong pagkatao?
S: JOVITO TUJON Y TAPEL, 22 na taong gulang, binata, trabahador, tubo sa Ogbong
Biga, Catanduanes at naninirahan sa No. ____ Mithi St., Moriones, Tondo, Manila.
05 T: Ano ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
S: Dahil po sa pagpatay doon po sa taxi driver na hindi ko po nakikilala.
06 T: Nalalaman mo ba kung anong taxi ang minamaneho noong taong pinatay niyo?
S: Hindi ko na natandaan yong pangalan ng taxi subalit ang natatandaan ko po ay kulay
blue at mayroon pang ibang kulay na hindi ko po natandaan.
07 T: Kailan at saan niyo pinatay ang driver ng taxi na yan?
S: Hindi ko po natandaan ang petsa pero unang linggo ng November, 1977 doon po sa
pagpuntang Sta. Maria, Bulacan at nang patay na ay dinala po namin doon po sa may
Tandang Sora, Novaliches, Quezon City.
08 T: Papano niyo pinatay ang taxi driver na ito?
S: Sinaksak po namin.
09 T: Anong uri ng patalim ang ginamit niyo sa pagsaksak sa kanya?
S: Kutsilyo po na pangkusina na stainless na may ganito kahaba po. (Affiant
demonstrating a length of about 8-½ inch) Yong mga kasama ko po ay talagang dagger at
yong iba naman po ice pick.
10 T: Ilang beses mo sinaksak ang taong ito?
S: Dalawa po.
11 T: Mayroon ka bang nalalamang dahilan kung bakit niyo sinaksak ang taong ito?
S: Hinoldup po namin pagkatapos po ay pinatay po namin.
12 T: Magkano namang pera ang nakuha ninyo sa kanya?
S: P180.00 na perang cash ang nakuha namin sa kanya.
13 T: Maari bang isalaysay mo sa akin kung papano ninyo hinoldup at pinatay yung tao na
taxi driver?
S: Noon pong mga alas 9:00 ng gabi, hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa subalit
natatandaan ko po na unang linggo ng November, 1977 kami po ay sumakay sa taxi na
hindi ko po matandaan ang pangalan at pagkatapos po ay dinala po namin siya sa Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. Pagdating po namin doon ay tinutukan po namin ng kutsilyo at tinutukan
namin ni CESAR ng baril at pagkatapos ay ibinalik namin doon sa may tulay doon din sa
Sta. Maria, Bulacan at pagkatapos po ay pinahinto po namin doon sa may tulay at
pagkatapos po ay kinuha namin ang kanyang pera. Pagkatapos po niyang iyabot yong
pera ay parang natakot yong driver at biglang tumakbo at pagkatapos po ay hinabul
namin. Ngayon po ay inabutan ng aking mga kasama at pagkatapos po ay ibinalik po
namin doon sa may taxi at pagkatapos po ay nagtaas ng kamay yong driver at pagkatapos
po ay sinaksak na ni CESAR. Pagkatapos po ay sinaksak ni NESTOR (Real name is
ERNESTO PAROLA). Pagkatapos po ay itinulak po ni CESAR sa akin at sinabing
saksakin mo rin kaya ko po sinaksak din. Pagkatapos po ay naghihingalo na po yong
driver ay isinakay po namin siya sa taxi niya at pagkatapos po ay dinala namin doon sa
may Tandang Sora, Novaliches, Quezon City at doon namin itinapon. Ang lugar na pinag
tapunan po namin ay canal. Pagkatapos po noon ay sumakay na naman po kami doon sa
kanyang taxi at kami po ay nagtuloy sa may MORIONES, Tondo, Manila. Kami po ni
ANTONIO MENA at si ERNESTO PAROLA ay nagpaiwan na po doon sa Moriones,
Tondo, Manila. Kami pong tatlo ay umuwi na subalit sina CESAR at si JUNIOR ay dinala
nila yong taxi at hindi ko po alam kung saan nila dinala yong taxi.
14 T: Magkano naman ang parte mo doon sa perang hinoldup ninyo doon sa taxi driver?
S: P30.00 po ang ibinigay sa akin ni CESAR.
15 T: Maari bang ilarawan mo sa akin ang itsura noon taong taxi driver na hinoldup ninyo?
S: Ang edad po noong driver ay mga 27 o 28 na taong gulang, mga 5'1" and taas, payat
po, kayumanggi po may biguti, hindi po masyadong mahaba ang buhok, medyo maliit ang
mukha na mabuto at kung makikita ko ang litrato po niya ay makikilala ko po.
16 T: Ipinapakita ko sayo ngayon ang isang litrato, natatandaan mo ba kung naririto yong
taxi driver na hinoldup ninyo?
S: Ito po yong taong hinoldup po namin at aming pinatay doon po sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
(Affiant pointing to the picture of the one ROLANDO ABELLANA Y FABROA, an EH TAXI
driver who was discovered lifeless along Charles Conrad St. near Alan Beam St., Doña
Faustina Subdivision, Bo. Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City as he was shown by this
investigator).
17 T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang suot noong driver na pinatay niyo doon sa Sta.
Maria, Bulacan?
S: Hindi ko na po natandaan ang kulay ng kanyang pantalon subalit natandaan ko po na
ang kanyang polo shirt ay kulay abo (gray).
18 T: Isa-isahin mo nga kung sino-sino yong mga kasama mo doon sa holdup at pagpatay
doon sa taxi driver na yon?
S: Si CESAR PAREDES, si JUNIOR, ERNESTO PAROLA (NESTOR-alias), at si
ANTONIO MENA na lahat ay taga Mithi St., Moriones, Tondo, Manila (Squatter's Area).
19 T: Ano-ano ang mga armas na dala ninyo noon nang hinoldup ninyo itong taxi driver na
ito?
S: Ang may baril po ay si CESAR (.45 caliber), si JUNIOR ay may .22 caliber revolver, at
lahat na kami ay puro kutsilyo na. Pero maliban doon sa baril ni CESAR at ni JUNIOR ay
mayroon pa po silang panaksak.
20 T: Nasaan ngayon yong mga panaksak na ginamit niyo sa pagpatay doon sa taxi
driver?
S: Dala po ni JUNIOR at saka si CESAR pati yong baril po ay nasa kanila.
21 T: Ilang beses ka na pumatay ng tao?
S: Dalawa na po na kasama po ako.
22 T: iwanagin mo nga kung saang lugar at kung kailan?
S: Ang una po ay October, 1977, hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa pero pinatay po
namin doon sa Novaliches, Quezon City at iniwan lang po namin doon. Yong pangalawa
po ay yong taxi driver po na hinoldup po namin ay pinatay namin sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
23 T: Sigurado ka bang patay din yong unang sinaksak niyong iniwan ninyo sa
Novaliches, Quezon City?
S: Hindi po namin alam kung namatay yon o hindi.
24 T: Maari bang ilarawan mo sa akin kung ano ang isura ni CESAR at saka si JUNIOR?
S: Siya po ay mga 19 na taong gulang, mga 5'3" ang taas, malaki ang katawan, maputi,
hindi masyadong mahaba ang buhok, medyo bilog ang mukha at matangos ang ilong,
medyo guapo, ang buhok ay may hati sa kanan, medyo kuba kung lumakad, mayroong
kaunting biguti at ang hinlalaki ng kaliwang paa ay parang pataas. Si CESAR ay may
tatlong SPUTNIK sa kanang likod. Si JUNIOR naman ay mga 25 taong gulang, mga 5'1"
ang taas, medyo maliit ang katawan, maputi, maiksi po ang buhok dahil sa siya ay
nagpakalbo, may pagkaguapo na medyo matangos ang kanyang ilong, may manipis na
biguti, may tattoo sa tiyan.
25 T: Maliban sa pangholdup, kayo ba ay umaakyat din ng bahay?
S: Opo. Umaakyat din po kami ng bahay doon po sa Novaliches, Quezon City.
26 T: Ilang beses na kayo umakyat ng bahay?
S: Sa Novaliches ay dalawang beses na po umakyat ng bahay at diyan lang po kami
umakyat ng bahay.
27 T: Ano-anong mga bagay ang mga nakuha ninyo nang kayo umakyat ng bahay?
S: Isang RADIO PHONO, pantalon, damit, kalan na di bumba, gitara. Ito ay isang bahay
lang sa Novaliches, Quezon City. Doon sa isang bahay ay mayroon po kaming kinuhang
pantalon, damit, television (dalawa) kaserola, alak, Shellane na kalan, caldero, wala na
po.
28 T: Ilang lahat ang bahay na inakyat ninyo?
S: Lima pong bahay. Hindi ko po alam ang address subalit alam po naming puntahan.
29 T: Saan ninyo ibinibenta ang mga ninanakaw ninyo?
S: Doon po sa Mithi St., Moriones, St., Tondo, Manila. Yong television ay ibenenta namin
sa Pasay City sa Tia ni Cesar. Naibenta po namin ng P400.00.
30 T: Magkano ang parte mo rito sa lahat ng nanakaw ninyong ito?
S: P400:00 ang parte ko po.
31 T: Ang mga metro ng taxi na ninanakaw niyo, saan niyo ibinibenta?
S: Sa Moriones po namin ibinibenta yong iba at yong iba naman ay sa Marikina. Ang
kasama po naming nagbenta ay si JUNIOR.
32 T: Ilang metro na ang naibenta niyo? SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 30 DAY OF NOV. 1977 HERE IN
QUEZON CITY, PHILIPPINES.
S: Mga walong (8) metro na po. Tatlo (3) ang naibenta sa Marikina at lima naman sa
Moriones. (SGD) ADMINISTERING OFFICER

33 T: Ilang taxi at ilang jeep ang inyong naholup? In addition, the prosecution presented the following witness, whose testimonies are as
follows:
S: Dalawang jeep at tatlong taxi ang tinutukan namin.
Det. Armando B. Estrada, a police detective of the Northern Police District, Criminal
34 T: Saang lugar ninyo ninakaw ang mga taxi meter na ito? Investigation Division, Station I, Quezon City, identified the extra-judicial confessions and
testified that he was the officer who received custody of the accused from the members of
S: Sa PIER 12 ay dalawa, sa Pier 10, tatlo, sa Moriones tatlo po. the Youth Aid Bureau for investigation on November 23, 1977 (TSN, June 21, 1978, p. 1-
2), and declared that before he took the extra-judicial confessions of the accused-
appellants, he advised them of their constitutional rights to remain silent, to secure the
35 T: Saan natin makukuha itong si CESAR at saka si JUNIOR?
services of a counsel to assist them and if they can not afford to secure the services of
counsel, they will be provided with one, and that everything they will say may be used for
S: Si JUNIOR ay maaring sa PIER 8 si CESAR ay hindi ko po alam. or against them in any court of the Philippines (TSN, June 21, 1978, pp. 2-3). Immediately
thereafter, he asked them if after knowing their rights, they were still willing to give their
36 T: Pansamantala ay wala na akong itanong sayo, mayroon ka bang nais bawasin o statements freely and voluntarily. Both accused-appellants answered in the affirmative
idagdag sa salaysay mong ito? (TSN, June 21, 1978, pp. 3-4). Appellants allegedly further declared that they will give their
statements even without the assistance of counsel, considering that what they will state
S: Wala na po. therein would only be the truth. Accordingly, he took the statements of the accused without
a lawyer, and both signed their confessions in his presence (TSN, June 21, 1978, pp. 4-7).
37 T: Lalagdaan mo ba ang salaysay mong ito bilang patunay na ang mga sinabi mo rito
ay pawang katotohanan na hindi ka tinakot, sinaktan o pinangakuan ng ano mang pabuya Dr. Romulo Madrid, resident physician of the Polymedic, Mandaluyong, testified that on
o kaluwagan sa katawan? November 3, 1977, he was the one who conducted an autopsy on the corpse of one
Roland Abellana at Funeraria Popular, one of the official morgues of the National Bureau
S: Opo. of Investigation and issued Necropsy Report No. N-77-1779 (Exhibit "D", Rollo). His
findings revealed that the victim died of hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds on
(SGD) JOVITO TUJON Y TAPEL the chest and neck and that the probable weapon used in inflicting said stab wounds on
the victim was a sharp-pointed bladed instrument (TSN, November 7, 1979, pp. 2-4).
STATEMENT TAKEN BY:
DET. ARMANDO B. ESTRADA Fiscal Jesus T. Baldonado, of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, was presented as a rebuttal
witness of the prosecution. He testified that on November 23, 1977, the accused Jovito
NILAGDAAN SA HARAP NG MGA SAKSI: Tujon and Ernesto Parola accompanied by policemen were brought to his office for
investigation; that before he proceeded with the said investigation, he apprised first the
accused of their constitutional rights, which was his standard operating procedure; that he
1. (SGD) 2. (SGD) asked both accused if the statements they executed before the police were freely given,
Det. Enrico Larga Cpl. Augusto Perlata which was answered in the affirmative by the accused; that he left them affix anew their
respective signatures on the said statements in his presence. He further stated that during
the said investigation, both accused did not in any way complain that they had been
maltreated by the policemen nor did he notice any sign of injury on their persons. He
declared that it was likewise his standard operating procedure that should he notice any
sign of injury on the persons of the accused, he would readily refer them to the City Health
Office for medical treatment (TSN, February 26, 1982, pp. 1-5).
After the presentation of the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, the
prosecution rested its case.
During the pendency of this case, accused Ernesto Parola escaped from the Quezon City
Jail; consequently the defense presented only accused Jovito Tujon as its lone witness,
who vehemently denied the accusation against him.
Jovito Tujon testified that he arrived in Manila only on November 2, 1977 and that he came
from the province of Catanduanes. He came to Manila to look for a job and while in
Manila, he stayed with his uncle named Alberto Ubal in Tondo, Manila. He was in his
uncle's house on November 3, 1977, helping him do some odd jobs. Two weeks after his
arrival, he was arrested for unknown reasons. He also testified that he did not know his
other co-accused, namely: Ernesto Parola, Cesar Paredes and Antonio Mena. He came to
know the other accused Ernesto Parola only at the police precinct when they were
arrested.
Accused-appellant Tujon further testified that while he was at the police precinct, he was
made to face the wall and was kicked from behind for which reason he fell on the floor in a
sitting position. He was then brought to a room where he was given fist blows. Then he
was asked to lie on a bench with his hands tied behind him. A rag was placed inside his
mouth and water was poured in his nose while his stomach was being boxed, causing him
to vomit. He further testified that the policemen asked him to admit his participation in the
crime and if not, they would box him again. The policemen asked him to sign a paper the
contents of which he did not know. He did not have a chance to read the said piece of
paper considering that all parts of his body were painful as a result of the said mauling.
Neither did he have a chance to receive medical attention (TSN, February 24, 1982, pp. 1-
2)
He further declared that he did not know that accused Ernesto Parola implicated him in the
alleged robbery holdup of a certain Rolando Abellana. He had nothing to do with the
offense charged against him and that he could not remember having been investigated by
Det. Armando Estrada regarding this case (TSN, February 24, 1982, pp. 2-3).
The trial court gave more with to the evidence of the prosecution consisting mainly of the
extra-judicial confessions of the accused, and, as earlier stated, found both accused
Ernesto Parola and Jovito Tujon, guilty as charged.
Hence, this appeal.
On March 18, 1987, accused-appellant Jovito Tujon filed an urgent motion to withdraw
appeal (Rollo, p. 110) but counsel for appellant in his comment on the motion, prayed that
the said urgent motion to withdraw appeal filed by Tujon be disregarded, as it was merely
a by-product of misjudgment. The motion to withdraw appeal was then denied by this
Court.
Among others, counsel for appellant contends that the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting the two accused of the crime charged by relying heavily on their respective
extra-judicial confessions, which are clearly not admissible in evidence in the instant case.
The Solicitor General agrees with counsel for appellant that the evidence presented is not
sufficient to sustain conviction. He correctly observed that it was not even shown by the
evidence how appellant came to be suspected of the robbery and killing and subsequently
arrested. The evidence against the accused consists solely of their extra-judicial
confessions. There is no eyewitness and not even a single circumstantial evidence
pointing to the accused as the perpetrators of the crime (Rollo, pp. 89-90). Compared with
the evidence of the prosecution, the claim of Tujon that he has just arrived in Manila to
look for a job when he was arrested by the police for unknown reason, is more persuasive.
Furthermore, it was observed that the extra-judicial confessions are not even consistent
with each other nor credible. In the extra-judicial confessions of Ernesto Parola y Cortina,
the victim was killed in Quezon City and his body was dumped at Tandang Sora, Quezon
City while in the extra-judicial confession of Jovito Tujon y Tapel, the victim was killed in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Similarly, in the former, it was stated that the killing occurred on
November 20, 1977, while in the latter, the killing was supposed to have taken place in the
first week of November, 1977. Notably, the body was found on November 3, 1977. Still
further, Parola stated that the color of the taxi is red while according to Tujon, the color is
blue (Rollo, pp. 90-96). It is, therefore, evident that the veracity of aforesaid confessions is
not acceptable.
But more importantly, while it is clear from the records that the accused were informed of
two (2) constitutional, rights, namely: (1) the right to remain silent and (2) the-right to be
assisted by counsel of their own choice, it is not clear that they were actually offered the
services of a lawyer and they refused. In any event, it is undisputed that the waiver of the
accused of their right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel.
This Court has ruled that the right of a person under custodial interrogation to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to counsel, implies a correlative obligation on the part of
the police investigator to explain and contemplate an effective communication that results
in an understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it
cannot truly be said that the accused has been "informed" of his right (People v. Newman,
163 SCRA 496, [1988]). When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be
informed to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle (People v. Flores, 165 SCRA 71 [1981]). It is the duty of the police
officer to explain their practical effects (People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 [1986]). Thus,
it would not suffice for a police officer just to report to the person under investigation the
provision of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Art. III, Section 12, 1987
Constitution; People v. Flores, supra,).
As pointed out by this Court in People vs. Nicandro, supra:
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police
officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article
IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the
latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms . . . In other words, the
right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication
that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right,
as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the
right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will
necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal
circumstances of person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid
explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.
In the case at bar, and in the testimony of the police officer, it is undeniable that no serious
effort was shown to have been exerted by the investigators to explain the consequences
of the investigation. On the investigator is reposed the duty to explain the effects of the
constitutional rights practical terms (People v. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100 [1986]).
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to counsel to be valid,
must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Extra-judicial confessions taken without
the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence (People v. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123
[1987]). Hence, while the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be done
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and made in the presence of the accused's lawyer.
If the records do not show that the accused was assisted by counsel in making his waiver,
this defect nullifies and renders inadmissible in evidence his confession (People v.
Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623, [1988]. In the case of People v. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760 (1988),
this Court, citing the procedure laid down in the case of People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465
[1985]), ruled that the suspect must be informed that he has a right to the assistance of
counsel and assured that he will be provided with one for free. While he may choose to
waive the right, such waiver must be a knowing and intelligence one and in any case must
be made only with the assistance of counsel. Any waiver made without observance of
these requirements is null and void. Thus:
At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. (Morales, Jr. v. Ponce
Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]).
Indeed, the ban against uncounseled confessions is even more pronounced under Sec.
12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this . . . shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him. (See also People v. Nicolas, 204 SCRA 191 [1991]).
It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in the absence of counsel de
parte or de oficio and the waiver of counsel, if made at all, was not made with the
assistance of counsel as required. Under the circumstances, there is no question that
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt has not been established. As ruled by this Court,
when the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the
scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the constitutional
presumption of innocence the accused enjoys as a counterfoil to the awesome authority of
the State that is prosecuting him. Undoubtedly, if a life is taken, justice demands that the
wrong be redressed, but the same justice that calls for retribution cannot convict the
prisoner at bar whose guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The element of
doubt, if reasonable as in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the
prosecution would draw from its evidence (People v. Pecardal, 145 SCRA 647-648
[1986]).
As aforesaid, no promulgation of judgment was rendered with respect to Ernesto Parola
who managed to escape from jail shortly after arraignment.Considering, however, that the
crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and the disposition herein
arrived at is favorable to accused Ernesto Parola, he shall benefit from the judgment of
this Court which is acquittal despite the fact that he jumped bail. In this regard, apropos is
the pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Fernandez (186 SCRA 834 [1990]), viz.:
While, in effect, committed an act of defiance of the law by escaping, we are not without
other prior incidents where such undesirable conduct, which should not be condoned, has
sometimes been ascribed to a sense of desperation of those who believe they are guiltless
but fear that they cannot prove their innocence. While we castigate and reprove his
jumping bail and remaining at large up to now, we have to concede, however, that our
disquisition in this case is applicable and favorable to him, hence, he is affected by and
shall benefit from the acquittal that we hand down in this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and both accused
are hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132154               June 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PACITO ORDOÑO Y NEGRANZA alias ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA Y
NOSUELO alias POLING, accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
COURTS are confronted, repeatedly, with the difficult task of scrutinizing the sufficiency of
extrajudicial confessions as basis for convicting the accused. The drive to apprehend the
culprits at any cost, particularly in crimes characterized by brutality and savagery, not too
infrequently tempts law enforcement agencies to take unwarranted shortcuts and
disregard constitutional and legal constraints that are intended to ensure that only the
guilty are punished. In the delicate process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
courts play a crucial role in assuring that the evidence gathered by government agents
scrupulously meets the exacting constitutional standards which if not met impose a strict
exclusionary rule, i.e., "any confession or admission obtained in violation of Art. II, Sec. 12
(1), shall be inadmissible in evidence."
This case is on automatic review of the 11 December 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 34, Balaoan, La Union, in Crim. Case No. 2415 finding both accused Pacito
Ordoño y Negranza alias Asing and Apolonio Medina y Nosuelo alias Poling guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide and imposing upon each of them two (2) separate
death penalties.
The records show that on 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young girl was found
among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was
later identified as Shirley Victore, fifteen (15) years old, a resident of Barangay Guesset,
Poblacion, Santol, La Union, who three (3) days before was reported missing. Post-
mortem examination conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI,
revealed that the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the
crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon invited the two (2) suspects and brought
them to the police station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence then directly
linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina returned to the
police station one after another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the
crime. Acting on their admission, the police immediately conducted an investigation and
put their confessions in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the
services of a lawyer to assist the two (2) accused in the course of the investigation
because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of
the Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where
nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own dialect
of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of
their choice. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and
did not require the services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the Parish
Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La
Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the
two (2) suspects who admitted their participation in the crime.
1âwphi1.nêt
The first to confess was Apolonio Medina who in addition to the Parish Priest, the Mayor,
the Chief of Police and the other police officers was also accompanied by his wife and
mother. Apolonio Medina narrated that in the morning of 2 August 1994 while he was
walking towards the house of Pacito Ordoño in Sitio Buacao, Poblacion, Santol, La Union,
he noticed a young woman walking towards the school at the Poblacion. Upon reaching
Sitio Buacao, he saw Pacito Ordoño standing along the road. When the woman reached
him he suddenly grabbed her, held her tightly and covered her mouth with his right hand.
As Medina neared them, Ordoño turned to him and said, "Come and help me, I am feeling
uneasy."
Although Medina claimed he was surprised at the request, he nonetheless went to
Ordoño, helped him hold the legs of the young woman including her bag and umbrella and
together they carried her to the hushes where they laid her down. Medina held her legs as
requested while Ordoño continued to cover her mouth with his hand and boxing her many
times on the head. When she was already weak and weary Ordoño knelt near her, raised
her skirt and lowered her panty down to her knees. Medina continued to remove her panty
as Ordoño removed his short pants, then his briefs. Ordoño then raped her, boxed her
head continuously, with Medina continuously pinning her legs down and boxing those legs
every time she struggled.
After Ordoño had satiated himself Medina took his turn in raping the same victim with
Ordoño holding her legs. After they were through, Medina left to watch out for intruders
while Ordoño tied a vine around the girl's neck, hanged her on a tree that ended her life.
Then, they went back to the road and parted ways.
After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into tears. He then affixed
his signature on his statement and so did his wife, followed by all the other witnesses who
listened to his confession.
Pacito Ordoño narrated his story in the afternoon. According to him, in the morning of 2
August 1994 he was on his way to Sitio Guesset, Barangay Manggaan, Santol, La Union,
when he saw a girl followed by Apolonio Medina. When the girl was near him he
immediately grabbed her and covered her mouth. Medina drew near, held her two legs,
bag and umbrella and together they carried her into the thicket. After laying her down
Ordoño boxed her breasts and face while Medina boxed her legs. When she became
weak Ordoño raised her skirt and lowered her panty while Medina completely removed it.
Ordoño then removed his pants and walker briefs, went on top of Shirley and as Medina
spread her legs Ordoño immediately inserted his penis into her vagina. After ejaculating
Ordoño turned to Medina for him to take his turn in raping the girl. Ordoño was now
holding her legs. At the end of his narration Ordoño affixed his thumbmark on his
statement in lieu of his signature as he did not know how to write.
Thereafter, Apolonio Medina and Pacito Ordoño were detained at the Santol police station.
News about the apprehension and detention of the culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley
Victore soon spread that Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio station DZNL,
visited and interviewed them. In the interview which was duly tape-recorded both accused
admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events
surrounding their commission thereof. According to Medina, his remorse in having
committed the crime was so great but his repentance came too late.  He and Ordoño
1 
hoped that the parents of Shirley Victore would forgive them.  Upon conclusion of the
2 
interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played the taped
interview on the air. The same interview was played again on the air the following morning
and was heard by thousands of listeners.
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the office of the PAO
lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and counseling. In a closed-door session,
PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of the accused of his constitutional rights and,
even though their confessions were already written in their dialect, explained to them each
of the questions and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to
ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their
second signature/thumbmark thereon.
After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and informed him of
their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their
respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised the two (2) accused of their
constitutional rights, explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally,
accompanied them to Judge Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan, La Union, who
further apprised the two (2) accused of their constitutional rights and asked them if they
had been coerced into signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their
statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not
been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the
accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina to affix their signatures/thumbmarks on their
respective confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed
their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few members of the MTC staff
who witnessed the signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not guilty.
In his defense, Pacito Ordoño testified that on 5 August 1994, while he was cooking at
home, the police arrived and invited him to the headquarters for questioning. The police
asked him his whereabouts on 2 August 1994 and he answered that he worked in the farm
of Barangay Captain Valentin Oriente. According to Ordoño, the questioning took one (1)
hour with the police boxing him several times on his stomach and on his side. They even
inserted the barrel of a gun into his mouth in an effort to draw out answer from him. This
being fruitless, he was placed in jail and released only the following morning, 6 August
1994. Three (3) days later, or on 9 August 1994, the police once again invited him to the
headquarters where he was told that he was responsible for the rape and death of Shirley
Victore.
Accused Pacito Ordoño insisted on his innocence and maintained that he was working
with a certain barangay captain; nonetheless, he was detained. Later that night the police
took him out from jail and brought him to the room of investigator SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga
where he was hit with the butt of an armalite and forced to admit to the rape and slay of
Shirley Victore. On 10, August 1994 SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga took a typewriter and asked
questions from him for one (1) hour without a lawyer assisting him nor a priest witnessing
the investigation. A barrel of a gun was placed inside his mouth forcing him to admit the
commission of the crime and to affix his thumbmark on the document. He was also
brought to the office of the PAO lawyer twice but did not affix his thumbmark on any
document because he could not understand its contents. A radio announcer visited him
inside his cell for an interview but he declined to answer his questions. He only answered
the radio announcer during his fourth visit when SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga threatened to hit
him if he did not admit to the commission of the crime. As to Apolonio Medina, he heard
from the police that he was also detained but maintained that he (Ordoño) did not know
Apolonio.
For his part, Apolonio Medina testified that on 5 August 1994 while he was pasturing his
carabaos at Barangay Guesset, in Santol, La Union, the police came and invited him for
questioning. They asked him where he was on 2 August 1994 and he replied that he was
carrying bananas for his aunt Resurreccion. The interrogation lasted for about an hour with
neither a lawyer assisting him nor a relative being present, after which he was placed in
jail. Later, he was brought out and taken to a hut near the headquarters where he was
boxed, kicked and hit with a nightstick. He lost consciousness and recovered only after he
was brought back to his cell. That same night he was returned to the hut outside the police
headquarters where he was again boxed. On 8 August 1994, with his legs tied to the
ceiling beam, he was hanged upside down. His breast was hit with the butt of a gun which
was fired near his ear. A barrel of a gun was inserted into his mouth. He was threatened
that he would be salvaged if he did not admit to killing the victim. He was forced to sign a
statement but could not recall its date of execution. He was brought to the office of the
PAO lawyer twice but he did not sign the document. The investigator warned him that if he
did not sign he would be buried in the pit which he himself dug. On his third visit to the
office of the PAO lawyer he signed the document. He could not remember having gone to
the office of the MTC Judge of Balaoan, La Union.  He was interviewed by a radio
1avvphi1
announcer and was instructed by the investigator to narrate those that were in his
statement. He admitted he knew Pacito Ordoño. He showed his bruises to his mother
when the latter visited him in jail, prompting the latter to request medical treatment for her
son but the request was denied.
On 11 December 1997 the trial court adjudged accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio
Medina guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy, and imposed
upon each of them two (2) death penalties on the basis of their extrajudicial confessions.
The accused are now before us assailing their conviction on the ground that constitutional
infirmities attended the execution of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of
counsel to assist them during custodial investigation thereby making their confessions
inadmissible in evidence.
Under the Constitution  and the rules laid down pursuant to law  and jurisprudence,  a
3  4  5 
confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements:
(a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the
confession must be in writing.  Among all these requirements none is accorded the
6 
greatest respect than an accused's right to counsel to adequately protect him in his
ignorance and shield him from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial
investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of
the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense. Hence, if there is
7 
no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited from the
accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is premised on the
presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through,
menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical
and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 
8
In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoño and Medina
voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and the investigating officer started
asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right
of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing the
accused of their rights the police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none
could be furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La
Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union,
where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police should have already
desisted from continuing with the interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent
of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the police, they requested
the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the
relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary
execution by the accused of their statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not
cure in any way the absence of a lawyer during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused's parents,
older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be
present, RA 7438 does not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute
for counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that before the
above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the
accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be executed. RA 7438 does not
therefore unconditionally and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel but
underscores its importance by requiring that a substitution of counsel with the above-
mentioned persons be made with caution and with the essential safeguards.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal
Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the
municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two
(2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be
effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel.  Consequently, any
9 
admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not remedy
this omission either. Although there was a showing that the PAO lawyer made a thorough
explanation of the rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions
of their admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and
valuable advice given by counsel still came several days too late. It could have no
palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation
when the extrajudicial statements were being taken.  10
The second affixation of the signatures/thumbmarks of the accused on their confessions a
few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with
the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make
their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial investigation
without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and later signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.  If the lawyer's role is
11 
diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an
indication therein that there was compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused,
the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. The standards
utilized by police authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the accused in the instant
case therefore fell short of the standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.
It should further be recalled that the accused were not effectively informed of their
constitutional rights when they were arrested, so that when they allegedly admitted
authorship of the crime after questioning, their admissions were obtained in violation of
their constitutional rights against self-incrimination under Sec. 20, Art. IV, of the Bill of
Rights.
As testified to, the police informed the accused of their rights to remain silent and to
counsel in a dialect understood by them, but despite the accused's apparent showing of
comprehension, it is doubtful if they were able to grasp the significance of the information
being conveyed. Pertinent portions of the extrajudicial confessions of Pacito Ordoño and
Apolonio Medina, translated into English, read —
PRELIMINARY —
Mr. Pacito Ordoño, I am informing you that you are being investigated of an offense but
before we continue, I tell you that you have the right to remain silent under the new
Constitution of the Philippines.
And you are also herein reminded that all statements you give may be used for or against
you in any Philippine court as evidence and it is herein likewise reminded that you have
the right to secure the services of a lawyer of your own choice to represent you in this
investigation, do you understand all these?
A: Yes, sir because all that I will state will only be the truth.
Q: Do you want that we will continue with this investigation after having been appraised of
all your rights?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And, do you want that we continue with the investigation even without a lawyer of your
own choice to represent you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you now prepared to give your voluntary statement consisting only the truth,
without any lies whatsoever?
A: Yes, sir . . . .
PRELIMINARY —
Mr. Apolonio Medina, I inform you that you are being investigated of an offense but before
we proceed with this investigation, I am informing you that you have the right to remain
silent to all questions asked of you, according to the new Philippine Constitution.
And you are likewise reminded that all statements you give may be used for or against you
in any Philippine court and you have a right to have a lawyer of your own choice to
represent you in this investigation, do you understand this?
ANSWER — Yes, sir.
Q: After having known all your rights; do you want that we continue with the investigation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you want that we continue with this investigation even without a lawyer to represent
you?
A: Yes, sir because all that I will state are the truth.
Q: Are you now prepared to give your voluntary statement consisting only the truth,
nothing but the truth?
A: Yes, sir.
The advice proffered by the investigating officer to Ordoño starkly resembles that given to
Medina, thus leading us to conclude that the advice was given perfunctorily and belonged
to the stereotyped class — a long question by the investigator informing the appellant of
his right followed by a monosyllabic answer — which this Court has condemned for being
unsatisfactory.  The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is
12 
rendered meaningless if the lawyer gives an advice in a cursory manner as opposed to a
meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If advice is given
casually and tritely as to be useless, understanding on the part of the accused is sacrificed
and the unconstrained giving up of a right becomes impaired.
To be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the transmission
of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle." It is not enough for the interrogator to merely enumerate
to the person under investigation his rights as provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the
Constitution; the interrogator must also explain the effect of such provision in practical
terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the
subject fairly understands. 
1
With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered inadmissible in evidence, we are
left with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite as evidence. The
taped interview was offered to form part of the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to
whom the admissions were made and to prove through electronic device the voluntary
admissions by the two (2) accused that hey raped and killed Shirley Victore. The defense
objected to its acceptance on the ground that its integrity had not been preserved as the
tape could easily have been spliced and tampered with.  However, as Roland Almoite
14 
testified, it was the original copy of the taped interview; it was not altered; the voices
therein were the voices of the two (2) accused; and, the defense never submitted evidence
to prove otherwise. Under the circumstances, we are inclined, as was the lower court, to
admit the authenticity of the taped interview.
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that
the interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police officers
and was done willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police
authority ordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be
expected that police officers were around since the interview was held in the police station,
there was no showing that they were within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where a tree by tying a vine around her neck, 2 was proved by the finding of a depressed mark
the interview was being conducted. At most, the participation of the police authorities was involving the anterior and lateral portions of the neck. 
24

only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.

The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-
slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.  By analogy, statements made by
15 
herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview
was not in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in
answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not talk to
him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their uncounselled
confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights.
Sec. 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of
the two (2) accused to the radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art.
III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth. 
16
As to the assertion of the accused that they were tortured and subjected to inhuman
treatment, we find such allegations baseless. The accused were given several
opportunities to decry the maltreatment they allegedly suffered in the hands of the police
but at no time did they complain about it. First, they could have told the radio announcer
outright of the abuses they were subjected to before signing their confessions. Second,
when they were brought before the PAO lawyer they likewise did not make any such
claims but instead chose to ponder over the lawyer's advice and deferred the signing of
their confessions. Lastly, they had the chance to tell the MTC judge about the fatal defect
of their confessions, if there was any, when the latter asked them whether they voluntarily
signed the same and whether coercion was used in extracting their confessions; however,
they answered in the negative. The accused cannot therefore on a later date make
assertions that they were maltreated when at no time — during their detention and when
they were in the presence of persons who could have helped them — did they make such
complaints.
The doctor who physically examined them further disproved their assertions when she
testified thus —

FISCAL TECAN:
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual.  It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
17 
Q: Now, you said that you talked with the prisoners, Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina,
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that what did you actually tell them?
certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that
may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect.  18 
A: I said, "What do you feel on your body?" and I also said, "What part of your body are
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to (sic) painful?"
protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department
of government and its agencies.
Q: What did they answer?
The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are
A: They did not answer me, sir.
further bolstered and substantiated by the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as
reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings. The narration of the accused
Apolonio Medina that Asing boxed the victim, who was struggling as she was being Q: More or less, how many questions did you ask?
raped,  was proved by the Autopsy Report stating that the victim suffered contusions on
19 

the leg, right, lateral aspect, middle third, etc.;  that accused Pacito Ordoño boxed the
20  A: Only that, sir.
face of the victim to make her weak  was proved by the testimony of the NBI Medico-
21 

Legal Officer that there was blackening on the face of the victim due to hematoma caused Q: After you have observed the prisoners, did you notice any injury?
by violence or boxing on her face;  and, that accused Pacito Ordoño hanged the victim on
22 
A: None, sir . . . .
Q: . . . . You noticed any injury on their bodies?
A: None, sir, that is why I looked to see what was really painful.  25
Considering that the doctor was a witness for the defense, it was surprising that she never
mentioned about any maltreatment. She saw not a single scratch on the bodies of the
accused. She even inquired into their physical well-being but they did not tell her of any
pain or injury. They could have easily asked the doctor for immediate treatment if indeed
they were physically harmed, but they did not. This puts their claim of maltreatment into
serious doubt. With this, the testimony of the mother of the accused Apolonio Medina
alleging that the police refused treatment for her son despite his critical condition becomes
a fabrication, a mere figment of the imagination. As found by the lower court, her tale of
buying an antibiotic for her son, all on her own, without the prescription of a doctor, is hard
to believe since she is already an elderly woman, seventy-three (73) years of age,
unschooled and illiterate. 26
To further exculpate themselves, the accused invoked alibi. Ordoño testified that at the
time of the incident he was at work in the place of Barangay Captain Valentin Oriente,  27 
while Medina claimed that he went to carry bananas for a certain aunt Resurreccion.  28 
However, such allegations deserve no credit as alibi becomes worthless when it is
established mainly by the accused themselves.  The defense of alibi is always considered
29 
with suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable, but also because it can easily be fabricated.  30
Quite interestingly, Bgy. Capt. Valentin Oriente was presented as a witness for the
prosecution, not for the defense, while "aunt Resurreccion" was not presented at all. Bgy.
Capt Oriente testified that Pacito Ordoño did not work with him on 2 August 1994; on the
contrary, he saw him on the bridge at Sitio Guesset.  31
Other than their lame assertions that they were with the above-mentioned persons, the
accused failed to substantiate their defense and to give details on what transpired that
fateful day, especially since they were in the same town where the crime happened. For
alibi to prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt about the physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity
at the time of the incident.  Since the accused failed to convince the Court otherwise, their
32 
defense must fall.
The lack of prior design or plan to rape and kill the victim prior to the commission of the
crime does not negate conspiracy. For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of
the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent. It is sufficient that at the time of
the commission of the offense the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. From the foregoing, it is evident that the accused helped each other in carrying
out their bestial acts. The taped interview as played in open court clearly revealed thus —
(STATEMENT OF ACCUSED APOLONIO MEDINA) —
INTERPRETER:
When I was walking there already about to be near him, he was already holding the
woman and said, come and help me because I was (sic) not feeling well. Well, I was
shocked of what I saw, sir. But later on, as usual I regained my composure and so I finally
went to help him, sir.
FISCAL TECAN: We will continue, Your Honor.
INTERPRETER:
And then we laid her down among the bushes then Asing boxed her because she was
struggling, Your Honor. And Asing did what he wanted, sir. And then he asked me to take
my turn and then I went outside to look and see if there are (sic) people and then Asing
went to get a vine, sir. And when I arrived at their place, he was already tieing (sic). After
that, we left for home, sir. 
3
x x x           x x x          x x x
(STATEMENT OF ACCUSED PACITO ORDOÑO)
Q: But Apolonio Medina was already there as your companion?
A: He was there already, sir. He was the one who held her legs, sir.
Q: Who was the first one to rape or use her?
A: Me, sir. and after that, Apolonio Medina, sir.
Q: And after you were through, what did you do, was she still conscious?
A: She was practically unconscious, sir. each of them to four (4) death penalties. This Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
with the modification that the accused should instead suffer four (4) penalties of reclusion
Q: What did you do then? perpetua by reason of the constitutional proscription on the imposition of the death
penalty. The four (4) death penalties for each of the appellants were explained to be
A: We tied her neck and hanged her on a tree, sir. 34 ordained by the fact that conspiracy had been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The modifying circumstance of conspiracy being present, each of the accused shall be In 1996, in People v. Laray  this Court convicted two (2) of the accused charged therein
40 

liable for the other's acts as well. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that with multiple rape and sentenced each of them to suffer two (2) counts of reclusion
"when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall perpetua because of the existence of conspiracy.
be death"
Accordingly, herein accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina should be held liable for
In 1971, in People v. Jose  this Court convicted the four (4) accused with forcible
35  the special complex crime of rape with homicide on two (2) counts as defined and
abduction with rape, and three (3) counts of rape, and imposed upon each of the accused penalized in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.
four (4) death penalties in view of the existence of conspiracy.
We have held that the indemnification of the victim shall be in the amount of P100,000.00
In 1981, in People v. Yutila  this Court affirmed the judgment of the court a quo declaring
36  if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under
each of the three (3) accused guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws.  In addition, this
41 

and sentenced each of them to suffer a single penalty of death. However, Justice Barredo Court has likewise ruled that in crimes of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
in his separate opinion interposed that in accordance with the doctrine laid down in the damages must be awarded to the victim without need of proof nor even pleading the basis
Jayme Jose case, three (3) death penalties should have been imposed on each of the thereof. 
42

accused.
Four (4) Justices of the Court however continue to maintain the unconstitutionality of RA
In People v. Vizcarra  where the four (4) accused were charged with rape with homicide,
37  7659 insofar as it prescribed the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of
the Court held that only one of them should be held liable for the crime of rape with the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be
homicide and all the rest for simple rape. But since four (4) successive offenses were lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
charged and proved, each of the accused was imposed four (4) death sentences for four
(4) separate and distinct crimes of rape. The existence of conspiracy among them, the WHEREFORE, the 11 December 1997 Judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court-
overwhelming evidence as to the nature and the number of crimes committed, as well as Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union, as AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the two (2)
the attendance of the aggravating circumstances, fully justified the imposition of four (4) accused PACITO ORDOÑO y NEGRANZA alias ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA y
death penalties. NOSUELO alias POLING are held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide on two (2) counts and are sentenced each to two (2) DEATH
In 1988, in People v. Diño  where the three (3) accused took turns in ravishing the victim
38  PENALTIES. Each of the accused is further ordered to indemnity the heirs of Shirley
and thereafter killed her, the Court declared each of them guilty of three (3) crimes of rape Victore in the amount of P200,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 for moral
with homicide and sentenced each of them to three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua. damages for both counts of rape. Cost against both accused.
The penalty in fact should have been death but with its proscription in the 1987
Constitution the penalty imposed was reduced to reclusion perpetua. In consonance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659 amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
In 1991, in People v. Flores  registered nurse was successively raped by four (4) men
39  Office of the President for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.1âwphi1.nêt

and then killed. The trial court convicted each of them with the special complex crime of
multiple rape with homicide on four (4) counts and as a consequence thereof sentenced SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169431             April 3, 2007
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 149891-92]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JERRY RAPEZA y FRANCISCO, Appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In the complex but exquisite scheme laid down by the Constitution, the Bill of Rights
occupies a position of primacy, way above the articles on governmental power. 1 Once
again, the Court extends fresh vitality to the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, which, beginning with the 1987 Constitution, has been accorded equal but
segregate weight as the traditional right against self-incrimination, to tip the scales of
justice in favor of the presumption of innocence and the lot of an unlettered confessant.

This treats of the appeal from the Decision2 dated 1 July 2005 of the Court of Appeals
affirming the Consolidated Judgment3 dated 24 July 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City in Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 where
Jerry Rapeza (appellant) was found guilty of two (2) counts of murder and sentenced to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, plus a total of ₱100,000.00 as indemnity
for the heirs of the two (2) victims.

In two (2) separate Informations, appellant, together with Mike Regino, was charged with
the murder of the Spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas,4 with the following
accusatory allegations:

Criminal Case No. 13064

That on or about the 21st day of October, [sic] 1995, more or less 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon at Cawa-Cawa District, Municipality of Culion, Province of Palawan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and while armed with bladed
weapons, did then and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with their bladed weapons, to wit: knives, PRI[S]CILLA LIBAS, hitting her in the
different vital parts of her body and inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds which causes
(sic) hypovolemic shock which were (sic) the direct and immediate cause of her
instantaneous death.5
Criminal Case No. 13202
That on or about the 21st day of October, [sic] 1995, more or less 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon at Cawa-Cawa District, Municipality of Culion, Province of Palawan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and while armed with bladed
weapons, did then and there wilfully, [sic] unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with their bladed weapons, to wit: knives, CESAR GANZON, hitting him in the
different vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds which causes
hypovolemic shock which were the direct and immediate cause of his instantaneous
death.6
As Mike Regino was at large, only appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
Forthwith, joint trial ensued which resulted in the judgment of guilt against appellant as co-
principal for two (2) counts of murder, with conspiracy and evident premeditation attending
the commission of the felonies. Both cases were thereafter elevated to this Court on
automatic review, but later referred to the Court of Appeals per People v. Mateo.7 The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of guilt.8
The prosecution had sought to establish the facts and events recited below.
In the afternoon of 21 October 1995, an unidentified woman went to the Culion Municipal
Station and reported a killing that had taken place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Barangay
Osmeña, Culion, Palawan.9 The officer-in-charge, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas, sent to the
victims’ house which was the scene of the crime an investigating team led by SPO2
Crisanto Cuizon, Jr. and PO2 Isidro Macatangay. There they saw two bloodied bodies,
that of a woman lying on the floor of the sala and that of a man inside the bedroom. The
investigating team wrapped the bodies in blankets and loaded them in a banca to be
brought to the morgue.10 The victims were later identified as Priscilla Libas and Cesar
Ganzon.
The Autopsy Reports11 show that the common cause of death of both victims was
hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding secondary to multiple stab wounds and
that both bodies were in the early stages of decomposition. The medico-legal officer
testified that Ganzon sustained six (6) wounds on different parts of his body while Libas
bore sixteen (16) wounds.12 All the wounds of the victims were fatal and possibly caused
by a sharp instrument.
Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant had wanted to confess
to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to look for appellant. 13 He found appellant fishing in
Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to
make a confession in the presence of a lawyer.14 Appellant was then brought to the police
station after which SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad Arnel Alcantara to provide appellant
with a lawyer. The following day, appellant was brought to the house of Atty. Roberto
Reyes, the only available lawyer in the municipality. 15 The typewriter at the police station
was out of order at that time and Atty. Reyes could not go to the police station as he was
suffering from rheumatism.16 At the house of Atty. Reyes, in the presence of Vice-Mayor
Emiliano Marasigan of Culion, two (2) officials of the Sangguniang Barangay, SPO2
Cuizon and an interpreter, SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the custodial investigation of
appellant who was assisted by Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that he was
being investigated for the death of Libas and Ganzon.
Per the Sinumpaang Salaysay17 that appellant executed, he was informed of his
constitutional rights in the following manner:
xxxx
Tanong: Bago kita kunan ng isang salaysay, ikaw ay mayroong karapatan sa ating
Saligang Batas na sumusunod:
a) Na, ikaw ay maaaring hindi sumagot sa tanong na sa iyong akala ay makaka-apekto sa
iyong pagkatao;
b) Na, ikaw ay may karapatang pumili ng isang manananggol o abogado na iyong sariling
pili;
c) Na, kung ikaw ay walang kakayahan kumuha ng isang ab[u]gado ang Pulisya ang
siyang magbibigay sa iyo.
d) Na, ang lahat na iyong sasabihin ay maaaring gawing ebidensya pabor o laban sa iyo.
Sagot: Opo, sir.
Tanong: Nakahanda ka na bang ipag-patuloy ang pagsisiyasat na ito, na ang ating
gagamiting salita ay salitang Tagalog, na siyang ginagamit nating [sic]?
Sagot: Opo, sir.
x x x18
Thereupon, when asked about the subsequent events, appellant made the following
narration:
xxx
Tanong: Maari mo bang isalaysay ang pang-yayari [sic]?
Sagot: Opo, [n]oong Sabado ng umaga alas 8:00[,] petsa 21 ng Oktobre, 1995, kami ni
Mike ay nagkaroon ng pag-iinuman sa kanilang bahay sa Cawa-Cawa at sinabi sa akin
[sic] puntahan naming iyong matanda, dahil may galit daw si Mike sa dalawang matanda
[Pris]cilla Libas at Cesar Ganzon) na nakatira din sa Cawa-Cawa at ang layo ay humigit-
kumulang isang daang metro sa aming pinag-iinuman at kami ay nakaubos ng labing
dalawang bote ng beer, mula umaga hanggang alas kuatro ng hapon at habang kami ay
nag-iinom aming pinag-uusapan [sic] ang pagpatay sa dalawang matanda. Noong
sinasabi sa akin ni Mike, ako umayaw ngunit ako ay pinilit at sinabihan ko rin siya (Mike)
at pinag-tatapon [sic] pa niya ang bote ng beer at may sinabi pa si Mike "hindi ka pala
marunong tumulong sa akin, pamangkin mo pa naman ako." At ang sagot ko sa kanya, ay
maghintay ka, mamayang hapon natin[g] puntahan. At noong humigit-kumulang [sa alas]
[sic] kuatro ng hapon, amin ng pinuntahan ang bahay ng mag-asawa, at pagdating namin
sa bahay na dala naming [sic] ang patalim, tuloy-tuloy na kaming umakyat, at hinawakan
ni Mike ang babae (Presing) at nilaslas na ang leeg at sinaksak ng sinaksak niya sa iba’t
ibang parte ng katawan at ako ay umakyat din sa bahay at nakita kong nakataob ang
lalaki (Cesar)[,] aking hinawakan [sic] ko sa kanyang balikat, at siya ay nakaalam [sic] na
mayroong tao sa kanyang likuran, akin nang sinaksak sa kaliwang tagiliran [sic] ng
kanyang katawan, at hindi ko na alam ang sumunod na pang-yayari [sic] dahil ako[’]y
tuliro. At kami ay umalis at tumalon sa likod ng kusina, nang alam na naming [sic] na patay
[na] iyong dalawang matanda.
x x x x19
An interpreter was provided appellant as he was not well versed in Tagalog being a native
of Samar. As he is illiterate, appellant affixed only his thumbmark on the statement above
his printed name. Bonifacio Abad, the interpreter, and Atty. Reyes, as the assisting
counsel, also signed the statement. Atty. Reyes signed again as the notary public who
notarized the statement.
Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was filed against appellant, and Regino was
likewise arrested. Judge Jacinto Manalo of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Culion
conducted a preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause only as against appellant,
Regino was ordered released.20 The Provincial Prosecutor, however, reversed the finding
of the MTC by including Regino in the Informations, but by then the latter had already left
Culion.21
Testifying in his defense, appellant presented a different story during the trial. The defense
presented no other witness.
Appellant testified that he did not know the victims and that he had nothing to do with their
deaths. He was a native of Samar and he did not know how to read or write as he never
attended school.22 He arrived in Culion as a fisherman for the Parabal Fishing Boat.23 As
his contract had already expired, he stayed in Culion to look for work. He lived with Regino
as the latter was his only friend in Cawa-Cawa.24 Regino’s house was about 40 meters
away from the victims’ house.
Several days after appellant’s arrival, the killings took place. Appellant, along with Regino
and another man named Benny Macabili, was asked by a police officer to help load the
bodies of the victims in a banca. Shortly thereafter, appellant was arrested and brought to
the municipal hall where he was mauled by PO2 Macatangay and placed in a small
cell.25 Regino, too, was arrested with him. While under detention, appellant told the police
that it was Regino who was responsible for the killing of the victims but the police did not
believe appellant. But appellant later testified that he implicated Regino only in retaliation
upon learning that the latter pointed to him as the perpetrator. 26 Appellant was then asked
by SPO2 Gapas to sign a document so that he will be released. When appellant replied
that he did not know how to sign his name, SPO2 Gapas took appellant’s thumb, dipped it
in ink and marked it on the document. 27 Appellant claimed he did not resist because he
was afraid of being mauled again.
Appellant further denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting Abad, the alleged
interpreter. He never left the jail from the time he was arrested except to attend the
hearing before the MTC.28 When appellant was brought to the MTC, nobody talked to him
during the hearing nor did counsel assist him.29 He was thereafter brought by a police
officer to a hut in a mountain where he was told to go a little bit farther. He refused for fear
of being shot. The police officer then got angry and punched him in the stomach.30
On the basis of appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the RTC found him guilty of both
crimes. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.
Appellant submits for our resolution two issues, namely: (1) whether his guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant mainly contends that the extrajudicial confession upon which the trial court
placed heavy emphasis to find him guilty suffers from constitutional infirmity as it was
extracted in violation of the due process guidelines. Specifically, he claims that he affixed
his thumbmark through violence and intimidation. He stresses that he was not informed of
his rights during the time of his detention when he was already considered a suspect as
the police had already received information of his alleged involvement in the crimes.
Neither did a competent and independent counsel assist him from the time he was
detained until trial began. Assuming Atty. Reyes was indeed designated as counsel to
assist appellant for purposes of the custodial investigation, said lawyer, however, was not
appellant’s personal choice.
Appellant likewise maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay states that his rights
were read to him, there was no showing that his rights were explained to him in a way that
an uneducated person like him could understand. On the assumption that the confession
is admissible, appellant asserts that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
was not amply proven as the trial court merely relied on his alleged confession without
presenting any other proof that the determination to commit the crime was the result of
meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the constitutional guidelines on
custodial investigation were observed. Hence, appellant’s Sinumpaang Salaysay is
admissible. Even if appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his
alleged detention, that would not be relevant, the government counsel argues, since
custodial investigation began only when the investigators started to elicit information from
him which took place at the time he was brought to the house of Atty. Reyes. Moreover,
appellant did not interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel. As to the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the Solicitor General submits that the
same was sufficiently proven when accused proceeded to the victims’ house together with
Regino, armed with bladed weapons, in order to consummate their criminal design. He
further argues that appellant’s defense of denial and his lame excuse of being illiterate
must be rejected in the face of a valid voluntary extrajudicial confession.
The fundamental issue in this case is whether appellant’s extrajudicial confession is
admissible in evidence to warrant the verdict of guilt.
There is no direct evidence of appellant’s guilt except for the alleged confession and the
corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the
witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be
discarded.
A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily shown to have been obtained
within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. 31 Sec. 12, Art. III thereof states in part,
to wit:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxxx
Republic Act No. 7438,32 approved on 15 May 1992, has reinforced the constitutional
mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation. The pertinent
provisions read:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of
Public Officers.—
a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform
the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer private with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be
provided by with a competent and independent counsel.
xxxx
f. As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation
of law.
If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it must further be
tested for voluntariness, that is, if it was given freely by the confessant without any form of
coercion or inducement,33 since, to repeat, Sec. 12(2), Art. III of the Constitution explicitly
provides:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible,
must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the
confession must be in writing.34
If all the foregoing requisites are met, the confession constitutes evidence of a high order
because it is presumed that no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately
confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. 35 Otherwise, it is disregarded
in accordance with the cold objectivity of the exclusionary rule. 36 The latter situation
obtains in the instant case for several reasons.
Appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights in custodial investigation.
A person under custodial investigation essentially has the right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and the
Constitution requires that he be informed of such rights. The raison d' etre for this
requirement was amply explained in People v. Ayson37 where this Court held, to wit:
xxxx
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a
person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement
of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers
are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights."
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." The situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court.
x x x After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins[,] a confrontation
arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or
police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as
many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in
strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to
him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or
what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware
of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence
of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20
of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
x x x x38
We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by A To ask [a] question about the crime committed in the Island of Cawa-Cawa.
SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 o’clock in the morning
of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial xxx
statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been informed of
his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of Q That was the only reason why you invited him, being a transient in that place you made
the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the him a suspect?
investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house
of Atty. Reyes.39 In People v. Dueñas, Jr.,40 we ruled, to wit:
A In the first place[,] Your Honor, he was not a suspect but 2 days after the commission of
the crime a certain person came to me and said that Jerry Rapeza requested that he will
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to give his confession but in front of a lawyer, so he said: "Puntahan nating [sic] ang isang
be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person taong nagngangalang Jerry Rapeza."
as a suspect. According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellant’s arrest, the latter already
insinuated to him that he would confess his participation in the killing. As he testified on
xxx
cross-examination:
Q And based on your experienced [sic], would it not be quite strange that a person who
Q On December 18, 1996, when you arrested him what did he actually told [sic] you?
committed a crime would voluntarily give confession because ordinarily a criminals [sic]
will find a way to escape?
A Before we put him in jail at the Baler Police Station he told us that he has [sic] to reveal
something about the death of Elvira Jacob.
A Yes, sir. [B]ut at that time the person who assisted me strongly believed that Jerry
Rapeza would confess so I did not make any "tanong-tanong" in order to solve that crime
Q So you already know [sic] that on December 18, 1996 that whatever Catalino Duenas so I proceeded to that place and talked to the suspect.
will reveal to you will give you lead in solving the investigation in connection with the death
of Elvira Jacob, isn’t it?
Q So you already considered Jerry Rapeza as a suspect?
A Yes, sir.
A When that person informed me that Jerry Rapeza would like to confess.
Q So, you still waited until December 23, 1996 for that revelation, isn’t it?
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]42
A Yes, sir. That’s all, your honor.41
Already being held as a suspect as early as 21 October 1995, accused should have been
informed of his constitutional rights. SPO2 Gapas admitted that appellant was not so
In the case at bar, SPO2 Gapas testified: informed, thus:

Q By the way, when you conducted the investigation in the house of Atty. Reyes in Culion, Q What was he doing?
why was Jerry Rapeza there?
A He was fishing, sir.
A I invited Jerry Rapeza and upon my invitation he voluntarily came to me.
Q And you told him that you’re going to arrest him?
Q In the first place, why did you invite him?
A He did not refuse to go with me, sir.
 xxxx A Yes, sir.

Q From the Island you brought him to the station? Q You did not consider that as part of the investigation?

A Yes, sir. A Yes sir, my purpose at that time was to certain (sic) the suspect of the said crime.

Q And there you arrived at the station at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning? xxxx

A Yes, sir. Q Please answer my question[,] Mr. Witness, on October 22, 1995, did you inform him of
his constitutional rights?
Q And then you started to conduct the investigation as Investigator of the Police Station?
A No sir, I did not.
A Yes, sir.
x x x x(Emphasis ours.)44
xxxx
Even supposing that the custodial investigation started only on 23 October 1995, a review
Q And what was the[,] result of your investigation? of the records reveals that the taking of appellant’s confession was flawed nonetheless.

A According to him he would confess and he would give his confession in the presence of It is stated in the alleged confession that prior to questioning SPO2 Gapas had informed
a lawyer so I talked to Kgd. Arnel Alcantara. appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be
used in evidence for or against him, that he has a right to counsel of his own choice, and
x x x x43 that if he cannot afford the services of one, the police shall provide one for him. 45 However,
there is no showing that appellant had actually understood his rights. He was not even
informed that he may waive such rights only in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Q On October 22, 1995[,] when you brought him to the Police Station, did you start the
investigation at that time?
In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful
communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a
A Not yet sir, I only talked to him.
routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof.46 Since comprehension is the
objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education,
Q When did you start the investigation? intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing
investigation.47
A I started the investigation when Jerry Rapeza was in front of his lawyer.
In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate
Q When was that? and was not well versed in Tagalog.48 This fact should engender a higher degree of
scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to
A October 23, 1995[,] noon time, sir. him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession.

Q From the Island you just talked to him? The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to
buttress its claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him.
However, the presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently
established. Although the confession bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether
he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the alleged confession.
For one thing, SPO2 Cuizon did not mention Abad as one of the persons present during
the interrogation. He testified:
Q Who were present during that investigation?
A Vice Mayor Marasigan and the two other SB members.
Q Can you identify who are these two SB members?
A SB Mabiran and SB Alcantara.
Q Who else?
A No more, sir.
Q So, there were two SB members, Vice Mayor Atty. Reyes, Gapas and you?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x49
For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have been in
the best position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to Waray for
appellant to understand what was going on. This significant circumstance lends credence
to appellant’s claim that he had never met Abad.
According to the appellate court, appellant admitted in his Brief that the confession was
made in the presence of an interpreter. The passage in appellant’s Brief on which the
admission imputed to him was based reads, thus:
The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant is
admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in the
presence of an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person under
investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The
interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a
language understood by accused-appellant. 50
Clearly, the imputation is erroneous. Throughout his Brief, appellant disputes the
allegation that he ever met the interpreter much less made the confession with the latter’s
assistance. The evident import of the passage is that on the assumption that there was an
interpreter present still there was no indication that the rights of a person under
investigation were effectively imparted to appellant, as the interpreter could not translate
that which was not even said in the course of the proceeding.
Moreover, SPO2 Gapas testified on direct examination:
Q As a way of refreshing your mind[,] Mr. Witness, can you take a look at this statement
[referring to appellant’s Sinumpaang Salaysay] those appearing on page 1 of the same up
to the word "Opo sir," kindly take a look at this, do you remember that you were the one
who profounded (sic) this (sic) questions?
A Yes, sir, I was the one who profounded [sic] that [sic] questions.
Q And you are very definite that the answer is in [the] affirmative, in your question and
answer?
A I am not very sure, sir.
Q You are not very sure because he has a lawyer?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x51
SPO2 Gapas could not say for certain if appellant had indeed understood his rights
precisely because he did not explain them to appellant. In any event, SPO2 Gapas would
be incompetent to testify thereon because appellant’s alleged confession was made
through an interpreter as he did not understand Tagalog. SPO2 Gapas’ testimony as
regards the contents of appellant’s confession would in fact be hearsay. In U.S. v. Chu
Chio,52 this Court rendered inadmissible the extrajudicial confession of the accused therein
because it was not made immediately to the officer who testified, but through an
interpreter. Thus, the officer as witness on the stand did not swear of his own knowledge
as to what the accused had said. Similarly in this case, SPO2 Gapas’s testimony as to
what was translated to appellant and the latter’s responses thereto were not of his
personal knowledge. Therefore, without the testimony of Abad, it cannot be said with
certainty that appellant was informed of his rights and that he understood them.
Not having been properly informed of his rights prior to questioning and not having waived
them either, the alleged confession of appellant is inadmissible.
Confession was not made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel of
appellant’s choice.
Appellant denies that he was ever assisted by a lawyer from the moment he was arrested
until before he was arraigned. On the other hand, the prosecution admits that appellant
was provided with counsel only when he was questioned at the house of Atty. Reyes to
which appellant was allegedly taken from the police station.
SPO2 Gapas testified that he "talked" to appellant when they got to the police station at 11
o’clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 and the result of their "talk" was that appellant
would give his confession in the presence of a lawyer. Appellant was then held in the
police station overnight before he was allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes.
The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that
the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. 53 Appellant did not
make any such waiver.
Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to his
competence and independence as appellant’s counsel for purposes of the custodial
investigation. The meaning of "competent counsel" and the standards therefor were
explained in People v. Deniega54 as follows:
The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one
furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is important that he should be competent and
independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would be merely be giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this
Court stressed that an accused’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel "contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s
relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition." Lawyers
engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship
between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the
beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in
a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to
remain silent or terminate the interview.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)55
The standards of "competent counsel" were not met in this case given the deficiencies of
the evidence for the prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes signed the confession as
appellant’s counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no evidence on how
he assisted appellant. The confession itself and the testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and
SPO2 Cuizon bear no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant his
constitutional rights. Atty. Reyes was not even presented in court to testify thereon
whether on direct examination or on rebuttal. It appears that his participation in the
proceeding was confined to the notarization of appellant’s confession. Such participation is
not the kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to appellant in legal
contemplation.
Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant’s counsel of choice but was picked out by the
police officers allegedly through the barangay officials. Appellant’s failure to interpose any
objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as consent under the
prevailing circumstances. As discussed earlier, appellant was not properly informed of his
rights, including the right to a counsel preferably of his own choice. SPO2 Gapas testified
thus:
xxxx
Q Now Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the accused[,] when he allegedly gave his
voluntary confession[,] he [sic] did not read the document when he made his thumbmark?
A He did not because according to him he is illiterate.
Q Illiterate because he only placed his thumbmark and you have all the freedom to
manipulate him and in fact he doesn’t know that he is entitled to have a lawyer of his own
choice?
A He doesn’t know.
x x x x56
Strikingly, while it was made to appear in the alleged confession that appellant was
informed of his right to a counsel of his own choice and that if he cannot afford the
services of one, the police shall provide him with one, it was overlooked that it was not
similarly made to appear in the same statement that appellant was advised that he had the
option to reject the counsel provided for him by the police authorities.57
Set against the clear provisions of the Constitution and the elucidations thereof in
jurisprudence, the foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities preclude the
admissibility of appellant’s alleged confession.
Confession is not voluntary.
It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.58 The trial court found that appellant’s
bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to
hold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility.
First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the
investigators themselves.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its
face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details—which could only be supplied by the accused–
reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary.59 The trial court
applied this rule but without basis. On closer examination of the evidence, the key details
in the alleged confession were provided not by appellant but by the police officers
themselves.
The prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the killings. This is disturbing, to say
the least.
The trial court found that the killings were reported to the police at four o’clock in the
afternoon of 21 October 1995. That when the investigating team arrived at the scene of
the crime, the bodies of the victims were already rank and decomposing, 60 and that two
days after the crimes were committed, SPO2 Gapas had set out to look for appellant
following information from a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant would like to confess to
the crimes.
Indeed, SPO2 Gapas testified that he received a report of the killings on 21 October 1995
and sent a team to investigate the incident. On direct examination, he declared that two
days after the commission of the crime, he received information that appellant would give
his confession in front of a lawyer.61 However, on cross-examination, he stated that it was
on the following day or on 22 October 1995 when he found appellant and invited him to the
police station and that appellant’s custodial investigation had taken place on 23 October
1995.
Likewise, SPO2 Cuizon’s testimony is far from enlightening. He testified, thus:
xxxx
Q Now, on October 24, 1995, where were you?
A I was in Culion Police Station.
Q While you were there in the Police Station, what happened?
A A woman reported to us regarding this incident.62
xxxx
Q When was the investigation conducted?
A October 24, 1995.
Q On the same day that you discover [sic] the cadavers?
A The investigation was conducted on October 25, 1995.
x x x x63
The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility of Q When you opened the house[,] you are [sic] with Macatangay?
the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession.
A Yes, sir[.] I was with POII Macatangay but he was a little bit far from the victim and I was
While the prosecution insists through the recitals of the Informations and the testimony of the one who opened the door and went upstairs.
its witnesses that the killings took place on 21 October 1995, the totality of its evidence
shows otherwise, i.e. the killings took place earlier. When the bodies were discovered on Q What did you find out inside the house?
21 October 1995, they were already decomposing, a factor that indicates that the victims
had been dead long before then. How then could appellant have killed the victims at 4 A I have seen a woman lying down with her hands "nakadipa" on the ground and blooded
o’clock in the afternoon of 21 October 1995 as expressly stated in the confession, when (sic).
that was the same date and time when the bodies were discovered? Had appellant
voluntarily confessed and had he really been the killer, he would have given the correct
xxxx
date and time when he committed the horrid acts. The only sensible way to sort out the
puzzle is to conclude that the police officers themselves supplied 21 October 1995 and
four o’clock in the afternoon as the date and time of the killings in appellant’s statement, a Q Where else did you go when you were already inside the house?
barefaced lie on which the prosecution based its allegations in the Informations and which
SPO2 Gapas repeated on the witness stand. A I went to the other bedroom.

Moreover, the police officers went to the house of the victims on 21 October 1995 where Q And what did you find out?
they found the bodies. The autopsy on the victims’s bodies was done the following day or
on 22 October 1995 while appellant’s statement was allegedly taken on 23 October 1995. A An old man with his face facing downward.
By then, the investigators knew how and where the victims were killed, circumstances that
could have enabled them to fill up the details of the crime in the extrajudicial confession.64 Q The woman already dead was in the sala?

Curiously, the autopsy report on Ganzon’s body shows that he sustained six (6) stab A Yes, sir.
wounds, four (4) on the right side of his body and two (2) on the left side. Yet, it is stated in
appellant’s extrajudicial confession that he stabbed Ganzon on his left side. Quite oddly, x x x x65
SPO2 Cuizon testified that Ganzon was wounded on the left arm only. His full account on
this aspect runs, thus: Q Do you know in what bedroom (sic) of her body she was wounded?

Q Where did you go? A The neck was slashed and both arms and both foot (sic) were wounded.

A I immediately proceeded to the house of the victim. Q How about the man?

Q What did you find out when you went to the house of the victim? A Left arm, sir.

A I have seen blood on the ground floor of the house. Q Where else?

xxxx A No more, sir.

x x x x66 (Emphasis ours.)
The prosecution’s evidence likewise fails to establish when the custodial investigation had
taken place and for how long appellant had been in detention. Strangely, the confession is
undated and it cannot be ascertained from it when appellant made the confession or
affixed his thumbmark thereon. What emerges only is the bare fact that it was notarized by
Atty. Reyes on 23 October 1995. One can only speculate as to the reason behind what
seems to be a lack of forthrightness on the part of the police officers.
These unexplained inconsistencies cast doubt on the integrity and voluntariness of
appellant’s alleged confession.
Second, again appellant was not assisted by counsel.
To reiterate, the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is
to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make
self-incriminating statements.67 And in the event the accused desires to give a confession,
it is the duty of his counsel to ensure that the accused understands the legal import of his
act and that it is a product of his own free choice.
It bears repeating that appellant was held in the police station overnight before he was
allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes. He was not informed of his rights and there is
no evidence that he was assisted by counsel. Thus, the possibility of appellant having
been subjected to trickery and intimidation at the hands of the police authorities, as he
claims, cannot be entirely discounted.
Confession was not sufficiently corroborated.
Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed
unless they are corroborated.68 There must be such corroboration so that when considered
in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.69
As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who
testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made70 or by
any other evidence.71
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt
as to the credibility of appellant’s statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies
of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation.
However, they were not presented in court.
Abad’s testimony was likewise crucial in proving that appellant had understood every part
of his alleged confession. Confessions made in a language or dialect not known to the
confessant must also be corroborated by independent evidence. 72 As appellant is
unschooled and was not familiar with the Tagalog dialect, his confession which was in
Tagalog necessarily had to be read and translated to Waray allegedly by Abad. This Court
has held that "such a multiple process of reading and translating the questions and
translating and typing the answers and reading and translating again the said answers is
naturally pregnant with possibilities of human, if unintentional, inadequacies and
incompleteness which render the said confession unsafe as basis of conviction for a
capital offense, unless sufficiently corroborated." 73 A confession may be admissible if it is
shown to have been read and translated to the accused by the person taking down the
statement and that the accused fully understood every part of it. 74 To repeat, we cannot
accept SPO2 Gapas’ testimony as regards the contents of appellant’s alleged confession
for being hearsay evidence thereon. Since appellant allegedly made the confession to
SPO2 Gapas through Abad, Abad’s testimony is thus indispensable in order to make the
confession admissible.
1a\^/phi1.net
Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which must
be resolved in favor of appellant 75 and the confession should be disregarded as
evidence.76 Verily, we are left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers against
whose abuse of authority the Constitution protects the appellant. As their respective
testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we find the same
insufficient bases to hold appellant’s extrajudicial confession admissible against him.
The only other prosecution evidence under consideration are the autopsy reports with
which the alleged confession supposedly dovetails, as the trial court concluded. However,
a perusal of the alleged confession would reveal that does not fit the details in the autopsy
report. As discussed earlier, Ganzon was found to have sustained six (6) stab wounds on
different parts of his body while appellant allegedly admitted stabbing him on his left side
only. The confession does not even state how many times appellant stabbed the old man.
SPO2 Cuizon testified that he saw only one stab wound on Ganzon’s body and it was on
the latter’s left arm. Thus, it is not with the autopsy reports that the alleged confession
dovetails but rather with what the police authorities would like us to believe as the truth.
Nevertheless, since the confession is inadmissible, it becomes irrelevant whether it
dovetails with the autopsy reports. The corroboration that medico-legal findings lend to an
extrajudicial confession becomes relevant only when the latter is considered admissible.
In People v. De la Cruz,77 we held, to wit:
It is significant that, with the exception of appellant’s putative extrajudicial confession, no
other evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the People. The proposition that
the medical findings jibe with the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly committed
the crimes falls into the fatal error of figuratively putting the horse before the cart.
Precisely, the validity and admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial confession are in
question and the contents thereof are denied and of serious dubiety, hence the same
cannot be used as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which has
still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando.78
No motive could be ascribed to appellant.
For the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is
essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator. 79 In view of
the inadmissibility of the confession, there is no other evidence that directly points to
appellant as the culprit. However, the prosecution failed to show any motive on appellant’s
part to commit the felonies. Appellant consistently denied having known the victims.
Although the confession states that Regino allegedly sought appellant’s help in killing the
victims as Regino was his nephew, the fact of their relationship was denied by appellant
and was never established by the prosecution. In People v. Aguilar, 80 we held that "the
absence of apparent motive to commit the offense charged would, upon principles of logic,
create a presumption of the innocence of the accused, since, in terms of logic, an action
without a motive would be an effect without a cause."81
In conclusion, the overriding consideration in criminal cases is not whether appellant is
completely innocent, but rather whether the quantum of evidence necessary to prove his
guilt was sufficiently met. With the exclusion of appellant’s alleged confession, we are left
with no other recourse but to acquit him of the offenses charged for the constitutional right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overcome only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In fact, unless the prosecution discharges the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in
his behalf.82
WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan, Puerto
Princesa City in Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 and the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jerry Rapeza y
Francisco is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence leading to reasonable
doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of
appellant from confinement, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to
report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, appellant’s conduct after the killings was not that of a guilty person. He never
attempted to flee even if he knew that the police authorities were already investigating the
incident as he was summoned to help load the bodies in a banca. Being a transient in the
place, he could have easily disappeared and left the island but he remained there to
continue looking for work.

Taken together, these circumstances generate serious doubts that must be resolved in
appellant’s favor, congruently with the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In view of the inadmissibility of appellant’s confession, which is the sole evidence of the
prosecution against him, the resolution of the issue of whether the qualifying circumstance
of evident premeditation had attended the commission of the crimes has become
academic. Indeed, there exists no other prosecution evidence on which appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt may be based.
G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999 Complainant

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Assisted by

vs.
RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant. (SGD) ROSITA BERMAS

  Mother 
1

VITUG, J.:
In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been
adduced, it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental
nights.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque,
Branch 274, Metro Manila, to the crime of rape under a criminal complaint, which read:
COMPLAINT
The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla
Bermas, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of
which the lower court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino,
rendered its decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the accused guilty
of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by way of
automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as An Act To Impose Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal
Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes, which took effect
on 31 December 1993).

That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account, rather
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed briefly, of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.
accused, while armed with a knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own
complainant against her will.
father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their
1âwphi1.nêt

house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8, Parañaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN,
CONTRARY TO LAW Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed the victim's shorts and panty,
placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital
Parañaque, Metro Manila movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened the
victim with death if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)
August 8, 1994
On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which yielded the
(SGD) MANUEL P. following findings:

BERMAS
The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the
body of the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible and its
office wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average sized,
2
adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any hymenal laceration. 
The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the
charge, and that of his married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who
attributed the accusation made by her younger sister to a mere
resentment by the latter. The trial court gave a summary of the
testimony given by the accused and his daughter Luzviminda; viz:
The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on her
daughter, the complainant. He told the Court that he could not do such a thing because he
loves so much his daughter and his other children. In fact, he said that he even performed
the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the time of his separation from
his wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the crime of rape, the
complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous
scoldings that she has received from him on account of her frequent coming home late at
night. The accused stressed that he knew of no other reason as to why his daughter, the
complainant, would ever charge him of the crime of rape except probably in retaliation for
being admonished by him whenever she comes home late in the night.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs.
4
SO ORDERED. 
In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-
Villanueva (in collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force),
detailed several errors allegedly committed by the court a quo; thus:
I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.
A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE AND
VIGILANT COUNSEL.
1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing the accused's
counsel de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;
a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal arrest;

The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that the b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid filing of the
complainant was raped by the accused. She said that the complainant did not come home information;
in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a liar. She told the Court that the concoction
by the complainant of the rape story is probably due to the resentment by the latter of the c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;
frequent scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused. She further added that
she was told by the previous household employer of the complainant that the latter is a
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number;
liar. She went on to testify further that she does not believe that the accused, who is her
3
father, raped the complainant, who is her younger sister. 
e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;

The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.
prosecution against the accused as having been duly established and
so ruled out the defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the 3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio.
part of private complainant that allegedly had motivated the filing of
a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;
the complaint against her father. The court adjudged:
b. His work was shoddy;
4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio
5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and prejudicial to the
accused.
B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN
IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.
C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND
FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.
D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.
E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT "SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION" THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
5
DOUBT. 
The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the
appeal enough to warrant a remand of the case for new trial.
It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of age,
assisted by her mother Rosita Bermas, executed a sworn statement before SPO1
Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Parañaque Police Station, stating, in sum, that she had been
raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own father in 1991 and 1993, as well as
on 03 August 1994, particularly the subject matter of the complaint, hereinbefore quoted,
duly signed and filed conformably with Section 7, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court. The
Second Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect that the accused had
waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused was brought
before the trial court without counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C
Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be the counsel de officio. Accused forthwith
pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The prosecution placed
complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. She testified on direct examination
with hardly any participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-
examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her duty as counsel de officio.
ATTY. VILLARIN:
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my pañero besides me,
would accede to my request that I be relieved as counsel de officio because I could not
also give justice to the accused because as a lady lawyer, if my pañero here and if this
Honorable Court will accede to my request.
COURT:
It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is your sworn duty,
Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are you retracting?
ATTY. VILLARIN.
6
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court. 
Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was
appointed the new counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez was
ultimately allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should be
quite evident, however, that he barely had time, to prepare therefor.
On this score, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva in the
instant appeal would later point out:
To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez to be
appointed as defense counsel de officio. And so the trial court appointed him.
Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross examination,
presumably to prepare. But a ten minute preparation to cross examine the complainant
upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on the accused who stands to be meted
the death penalty if found guilty, is far too inadequate. He could not possibly have
familiarized himself with the records and surrounding circumstances of the case, read the
complaint, the statement of the complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of the police,
transcripts and other relevant documents and confer with the accused and his witnesses, It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In view of the fact
all in ten minutes. 
4 that the defense counsel is not interested anymore in defending the accused because last
time he moved for the continuance of the hearing of this case and since this time he did
not appear, he is unduly delaying the proceedings of this case and considering the
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer accused here is under detention, I think it would be better if the Court appoints another
had testified. lawyer. He should file his withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.

The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994, it was later
reset to 09 January 1995. When the case was called on 09 January 1995, the following
transpired:
COURT.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear in this Court
to defend his client-accused, the Court is hereby constrained to appoint another
counsel de officio to handle the defense of the accused. For this purpose, Atty. Nicanor
Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla
8
Bermas. 

Where is the counsel for the accused? The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995
COURT.
upon the request of Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame
himself asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but later, albeit
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the defense to reluctantly, retracted, thus:
present its evidence.
COURT:
PROSECUTOR GARCIA.
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
COURT:
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I be allowed to
Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that the accused is give her my responsibility as counsel de officio considering that the lawyer from the PAO.
under detention . . . it seems he cannot comply with his obligation.
COURT:
COURT:
What about?
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
ATTY. LONZAME.
ACCUSED R. BERMAS.
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will allow us to be
Wala po. relieved from our responsibility as appointed counsel de officio of the accused.

COURT: COURT.
You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de officio? As an
officer of the Court you don't want to handle the defense of the accused in this case?
ATTY. LONZAME.
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my responsibility as
counsel de officio.
COURT.
So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
ATTY. LONZAME.
9
Yes, Your Honor. 
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the
witness stand. He denied the accusation against him. The next
witness to be presented was his married daughter who corroborated
her father's claim of innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who himself, for
one reason or another, had ceased to appear for and in behalf of accused-appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not properly
and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that
it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor laws. Indeed, even prior to
the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused has already been
recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in
10
all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings,   and
that if he is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign one to
defend him. 11 The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in
declaring, in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that —
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973
Constitution, essentially, has remained unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a
worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the provision from which prevailing
jurisprudence on the availability of the right to counsel as early as the stage of custodial
interrogation can be deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states —
Sec 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which
declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be
present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment
to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal
12
proceedings should never be taken lightly.   Chief Justice Moran in People
vs. Holgado, 13 explained:
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity
to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no
skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel,
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor
14
or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. 
In William vs. Kaiser; 15 the United States Supreme Court, through the
late Justice Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused "needs the
aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the
law's complexity or of his own ignorance or bewilderment." An
accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for,
unless so represented, there is great danger that any defense
presented in his behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. 16 The right to
counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's
basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than lust the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or
the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means
that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active
involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the
case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and
17
truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.  liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect,
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to
counsel; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of
one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if
he so desires or that one can be provided to him at his request. 18 Section
7, Rule 116, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of the
offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de
oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience
and ability may adequately defend the accused. But in localities where such members of
the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and
of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
A counsel de oficio is expected  A mere pro-
to do his
19
utmost. 
forma appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect
the interests of the accused merits disapprobation. 20 The exacting
demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when
one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not as a burden but
as an opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No
lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for the
most compelling and cogent reasons. 21
Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058,
promulgated on 29 March 1999, this Court has said:
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the
manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them
displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client.
xxx xxx xxx
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively
much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly
performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused
Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court
must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and faithfully to
the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility, otherwise, commission of
any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.

The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a
quo for new trial.

WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the
complaint, aforequoted, under which he was arraigned Atty. Ricardo A Fernandez, Jr. of
the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.

Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Parañaque, Roberto Gomez
and Nicanor Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen much too short of their
responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the Bar and are warned that any
similar infraction shall be dealt with most severely.
1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109149 December 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN, accused-appellant.
 
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during
trial, the judgment should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new
trial. A person who misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for indirect
contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the
offended party the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape   of a girl less than
1 AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
nine (9) years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis,
San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution
presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the
medico-legal officer who examined the victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant denied
committing the rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and
her playmate, from quarreling.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision   finding appellant guilty as
2
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory
penalty. The accused is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the complainant and
another amount for costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of failure to pay the civil
liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 6127, as
amended, and he has agreed in writing to abide by the same rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with the full duration of his preventive
imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal.   In his brief,   appellant made the following
3 4
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING
THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES
OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON MATERIAL POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS
OWN TO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first resolve
the issue of proper representation by a member of the bar raised by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C.
Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the
direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however,
appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who
discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further
verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact.   Appellant therefore
5
argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal
of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the
fact that appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was
afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records
reveal that said person "presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a
seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful
manner." However, the right of the accused to be heard by himself and his counsel, in our
view, goes much deeper than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of our
adversarial system of justice. Where the interplay of basic rights of the individual may
collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need a professional learned in the law as
well as ethically committed to defend the accused by all means fair and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to
resolve a similar issue in the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals.   In Delgado, petitioner
6
and two others were convicted by the trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public and/or official documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her
remaining co-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed petitioner's
conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of judgment, petitioner discovered that
her lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence, she filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court. The Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded the
case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining that —
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the
bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is
represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf
will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.  7
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused was
represented by three successive counsels from the Public Attorney's Office, the Court has
ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that accused was given mere
perfunctory representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not properly and
effectively accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en banc case of People v. Bermas,
G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished
three (3) PAO lawyers for failing to genuinely protect the interests of the accused and for
having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as members
of the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where the accused was not even duly represented by
a certified member of the Philippine Bar, no matter how zealous his representation might
have been.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken
lightly.   Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
8 Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their appropriate action.
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.   The 9
right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the
State.   Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
10
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.  11
The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12 and
14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of
Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the accused
at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from
the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law to the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly
states who are entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly
provides for the requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Jurisprudence has
also held that "the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in
its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public
trust."   Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the practice of law that
12
in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,   a Bar candidate who has already successfully hurdled the Bar
13
examinations but has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys, and who was
caught in the unauthorized practice of law was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3
(e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of
law is liable for indirect contempt of court for assuming to be an attorney and acting as
such without authority.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED
to the trial court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C.
Ompong in connection with this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation
regarding this matter and to report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90)
days from notice of this, order. Let all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139333            July 18, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
CRISPIN VELARDE y BANDOJO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent and independent counsel qualified
to assist a person under custodial investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken
from the accused with His Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this
confession, the remaining evidence, which is circumstantial, fails the test of moral
certainty. Hence, acquittal is inevitable.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision1 dated February 12, 1999, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 11), finding Crispin
Velarde y Bandojo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide in Criminal Case
No. 773-M-97. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused CRISPIN B. VELARDE GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of Death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as
actual damages."2
The Information3 against appellant dated June 13, 1997, reads as follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of May, 1997, in the [M]unicipality of Guiguinto, [P]rovince of
Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Brenda Candelaria, a
minor who is eight (8) years of age, against her will and consent.
"That on the occasion and by reason of said rape, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strangle
said Brenda Candelaria in the neck which directly caused her death."4
When arraigned on July 1, 1997, appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio,5 pleaded not
guilty.6 In due course, he was tried and found guilty.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the evidence for the prosecution as
follows:7
"On May 11, 1997 at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Brenda Candelaria, an eight
year old child, together with her friend Melanie Sangalang, seven years of age, was on
board a pedicab driven by appellant. Upon reaching the house of Melanie, said appellant
told Melanie to alight on the pretext that her mother might look for her. Melanie obeyed
leaving Brenda inside the pedicab with appellant continuing his driving.
"In the afternoon of the same day, appellant and Brenda were seen together by Flora
Bonganay in front of the latter's store located near the church in Tikay riding the same
pedicab.
"Later on, Angelita Robles while waiting for a ride saw appellant already alone emerging
from a place near Doña Pilar Homes Subdivision. Angelita noticed something strange in
appellant's actuation as he was uneasy, haggard looking with his hair disheveled.
"The following day, May 12, 1997, the naked lifeless body of Brenda Candelaria was found
in a grassy vacant lot along the Cagayan Valley Highway in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan
near the Doña Pilar Homes Subdivision. Recovered beside her body were a rubber
slipper, blood stained white sando, a blue and white striped t-shirt and a shoe string.
"Dr. Dominic Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the NBI assigned at Region III, conducted a
post mortem examination on the body of the victim. His findings revealed that Brenda
Candelaria was raped and strangled to death. According to the doctor, the victim died of
asphyxia by manual strangulation.
"On the other hand, based on the leads furnished by witnesses, appellant was tagged as A         Yes, sir.
suspect and was brought to the Malolos Bulacan Police Station for investigation.
Q         If you did not rape Brenda, if you did not kill Brenda and Brenda is your first cousin,
"During his investigation, appellant, after being informed of his constitutional rights in the your mother and the mother of Brenda are sisters, why were you accused of rape and
presence of Atty. Danilo Domingo whom he agreed to act as his counsel, voluntarily killing Brenda?
admitted having raped and killed the victim Brenda Candelaria. Accordingly, his
extrajudicial confession was reduced to writing which was signed by him. Atty. Villacorta:

"It was on the bases of the foregoing occurrences that the corresponding Information for Objection, Your Honor, the question calls for an opinion.
rape with homicide was filed against appellant with the Regional Trial Court." (Citations
omitted) Court:

Version of the Defense Never mind, it is a matter of defense.

On the other hand, appellant presents his version of the incident as follows:8 Witness:

"Accused Crispin Velarde DENIED having raped and killed Brenda Candelaria. Thus, A         I was only suspected (n[a]pagbintangan), sir.

CONT. OF DIRECT-EXAM. Atty. De Leon:

OF CRISPIN VELARDE BY: Q         According to some witnesses who testified for the prosecution, they have seen you
and Brenda riding in a tricycle?
Atty. de Leon:
Atty. Villacorta:
Q         Mr. Velarde, do we understand from you that you did not rape Brenda?
No, no, not tricycle, Your Honor, pedicab:
A         No, sir.
Court:
Q         You did not kill Brenda?
After the incident?
A         No, sir.
Atty. De Leon:
Q         Brenda is your first cousin?
No, no, several days before the incident. Not exactly the day of the incident. I modify the
A         Yes, sir. question by adding several days before the alleged incident.

Q         Your mother and the mother of Brenda are sisters, is it not? Witness:
A         No, sir, that is not true. Q         Never?

Atty. De Leon: A         No, Your Honor.

Q         And, there was a witness who testified here that she has seen you riding on a jeep Court:
perspiring . . . .
Cross next time?
Court:
Atty. Villacorta:
Give the specific place.
Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. De Leon:
"Accused declared on June 19, 1998 that he has been detained since May 12, 1997 or
Q         The witness has seen the accused about to ride the jeep perspiring as if you have more than one (1) year already because he was told that he was the one who committed a
committed a crime is it true? crime against his cousin Brenda Candelaria. According to him, on the night of May 11,
1997 he was arrested while selling balot in Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, by four (4) Barangay
A         I do not know anything about it, sir. Officials. When said Barangay Officials asked him where he brought the child Brenda
Candelaria, he told them he 'don't know' [sic]. He did not insist answering them 'because I
Q         But according to that witness, you were carrying a basket, is it true? don't know what they were asking about the child'. He just went with them because if he
will not go with them 'di nila lulubayan and pamilya ko'. He was brought to the Barangay
Hall of Barangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. He was kicked and mauled by the father and
A         No, sir.
brothers of Brenda. The father of Brenda is his uncle and was the one who hurted [sic]
him. He was boxed several times, hitting him in all parts of his body. While he was being
Atty. De Leon: boxed, he told them to stop because he did not know about the incident. Inside the
Barangay Hall he was 'nilusob'), was stabbed by the eldest son (Ruel Candelaria) hitting
That's all, Your Honor please. him in his right leg. The person who stabbed him even said: 'Tabla tabla na lang kami'
meaning 'manos na lang kami sa nangyari'. He did not answer because he did not know
Atty. Villacorta: anything about the incident. Besides, he was already 'bugbog sarado', meaning his body
was aching and it was painful. His hands were even tied at his back with a handkerchief by
May we be allowed to conduct the cross considering . . . a former neighbor. After hurting him inside the Barangay Hall he was made to sign by one
of the Barangay Officials. He signed without reading what he signed because he cannot
Court: read very well. After signing, the members of the Barangay including the Barangay
Captain, brought him to the Municipal Building on the midnight of May 12, 1997. Upon
(to witness) reaching the Municipal Building he was brought to the Provincial Hospital where his
wounds were treated and [s]urtured [sic]. He was not however given medicine. After one
(1) hour he was returned to the Municipal Building by the Barangay Officials. He was
Q         Have there been an occasion when Brenda took a ride in your tricycle you were placed inside the jail where he was mauled by around eight (8) inmates. They were asking
driving? him where the child was, but he told them he did not know. They were insisting that he
admit or to confess but he answered he did not know anything. According to him 'marami
A         None, Your Honor. pong pahirap na ginawa sa akin. Mayruon pong koriente, mayruon pong saksak sa puwit'.
He could not talk because he was already 'hirap na hirap na'. Such hurting acts were done The trial court erred in not relying on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented
several days, six (6) times a day. His body was even pounded by a piece of wood hitting by the accused in support of his defense.
him in his back because he was on a sitting position. He could not speak because of the
'sobrang kirot ng katawan ko.' "THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

"He further declared that in the morning of May 11, 1997, he was in the basket ball court The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the accused himself was the culprit
watching the game. He came from their house because it was the birthday of his mother. behind the rape-slay of the victim Brenda Candelaria, which finding and declaration were
They heard mass in Tikay. He is a Catholic, a Corsilista. based on surmi[s]es and conjectures.

"The accused was candid enough to admit that the signature appearing in Exh. M is his "FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
signature; that Atty. Domingo is known to him because he was then the Mayor of Malolos;
that he hired or engaged the services of Atty. Domingo; that he was also candid enough to The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the extrajudicial confession of the
testify that 'wala akong alam diyan.' His educational attainment was up to Grade four (4) accused of May 14, 1997 (Exh. H) is admissible in evidence.
only. He claims that he does not know the police investigator who typed the 'Sinumpaang
Salaysay' marked Exh. M." (Citations omitted)
"FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that there was nothing irregular or
objectionable in Atty. Domingo's representation who is a lawyer of good standing and
The RTC found the existence of enough circumstantial evidence pointing to appellant as being the local chief executive of Malolos, Bulacan, to serve as counsel for the accused.
the culprit in the crime. It also found his written extrajudicial confession admissible in
evidence. As a consequence, it convicted him of rape with homicide and imposed upon
"SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
him the supreme penalty of death.
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the confession of the accused is
Hence, this automatic review.9
considered valid and binding upon said accused.
Assignment of Errors
"SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo for the following alleged errors:10
The trial court erred in not giving due credence to the defense of the accused of denial
which defense prevails over and above the alleged circumstantial evidence presented by
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR the prosecution.

The trial court erred in relying merely on the weight and sufficiency of the circumstantial "EIGHT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
evidence adduced by the prosecution and the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession
of the accused contained in his Sworn Statement made before the police authorities of
The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
Malolos, Bulacan.
homicide and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages.
"SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused of the crime charged, with costs-de- Q:         Up to the present?
oficio.
A;         Yes, sir.
"TENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
x x x           x x x           x x x
The trial court erred in not ordering the release of the accused from confinement and
detention." Q:         What time on May 14, 1997 did you meet that Crispin Velarde?

The issues in this case can be compressed into two: (1) whether the extrajudicial A:         In the afternoon, sir. I cannot remember the exact time.
confession of appellant is admissible in evidence, and (2) whether the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves his guilt beyond reasonable Q:         Where did you meet him?
doubt.
A:         At the Malolos Police Station, sir.
The Court's Ruling
Q:         Can you tell the Honorable Court the reason why Crispin Velarde was in the
The appeal is meritorious. Malolos Police Station?

First Issue: A:         He is the suspect in a Rape with Homicide case, sir.

Extrajudicial Confession
x x x           x x x           x x x
Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos arrested
appellant while he was selling balut on the night of May 11, 1997.11 He was subsequently
Q:         What transpired during your meeting with Crispin Velarde at Malolos Police
brought to the Malolos Police Station, where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly
Station?
mauled.12 On May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the Malolos police to the incumbent
mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Danilo Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to
him.13 Upon the advice of the mayor, Velarde's written extrajudicial confession was taken. A:         We made investigations in his person, sir.
During the investigation, appellant was assisted by the mayor as counsel. 14 Armed police
officers were also present during the investigation.15 Q:         When you were conducting … who was conducting the investigation or the
questioning?
Appellant was investigated by a PNP member of the Malolos Police Station, SPO4
Edilberto Almazar, who testified as follows: A:         I, sir.

"Q:         Mr. Witness, you said that you are a police officer of Malolos Police Station? Q:         And who were the persons present while you were interrogating or conducting
investigation on Crispin Velarde?
A:         Yes, sir.
A:         Atty. Danilo Domingo, sir.
Q:         Since when have you been connected with that station?
Q:         Will you please tell the Honorable Court why Mayor Danilo Domingo was present
A:         Since February 9, 1982, sir. during the investigation of Crispin Velarde?
 x x x           x x x           x x x x x x           x x x           x x x

A:         He was the one assisting Crispin Velarde, sir.16 Q:         Before the statement was taken, where did Crispin Velarde come from?

Yet on cross, appellant stated: Co[ur]t:

Q:         Was Atty. Danilo Domingo the counsel or the lawyer of the accused when you If you know[?]
took his statement?
A:         He was inside the jail, sir.
Court:
Q:         Municipality of what?
Base on your perception?
A:         Malolos, sir.
A:         No, sir.
Q:         This jail, how far was it from the investigation room?
Court:
A:         Very near, sir. Just downstair because the police station is located in the basement
What do you mean by 'No' and the jail was located upstairs.

A:         He is not the lawyer of Crispin Velarde, Your Honor. x x x           x x x           x x x

Court: Q:         But no relatives of Crispin Velarde were present during the investigation?

That's how you can see it at that time? A:         I do not remember, sir.

A:         Yes, Your Honor. x x x           x x x           x x x

Atty. Villacorta: Atty. De Leon:

Q:         If he is not the counsel, what was he doing there? I am asking now, who were present?

A:         He learned about the incident that's why he talked to the accused, sir. A:         Atty. Danilo Domingo and myself, sir.

Q:         Did you see Mayor Domingo talking to the accused at the time this statement was Q:         How about other policemen?
being taken by you?
A:         And the other police officers, sir.
A:         Yes, because the three of us were there, sir.
Q:         Beside you, Atty. Domingo and the accused, there were policemen present?
A:         Yes, sir. interest."20 Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place where the investigation
was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant.
Q:         How many?
In People v. Taliman,21 we ruled that a mayor cannot be considered
A:         I cannot remember how many and who were they, sir. the independent lawyer referred to by the Constitution.

Q:         During the investigation, the policemen were armed with weapons? "Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their
custodial investigation.
A:         Yes, sir."17
"In People vs. Culala, we held that the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant
Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confession taken during the investigation is was inadmissible as he was 'assisted' by the incumbent municipal attorney. In People vs.
inadmissible in evidence. We agree. Bandula, we held that a municipal attorney could not be an independent counsel as
required by the Constitution. We reasoned that as legal officer of the municipality, he
provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the
Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides:
delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It
is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the
"Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the accused without running into conflict of interests.
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
x x x           x x x           x x x
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel."
"If in the aforecited cases, we disregarded the extra-judicial statements of the accused,
how much more must we do so now, given that it was the mayor himself, and not just the
The dead body of Brenda Candelaria was found in the Municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan.
provincial attorney, that assisted accused-appellants?"22
But appellant, a resident of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos was brought to and
detained in the Malolos Police Station, where he was investigated by the Malolos police.
Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not just the
mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused. 23 The competent and independent lawyer
Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as
so engaged should be present "at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising
an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised
caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once
"operational supervision and control"18 over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers
in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to
included the utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the
remain silent or terminate the interview. The desired role of counsel in the process of
prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to
custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory
justice.19
advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing
questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired."24
As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to
appellant, who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay
During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent
case. Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of
counsel envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect
"operational supervision and control" over the police. "What the Constitution requires in
the rights of appellant. The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the
Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who
consequences of an extrajudicial confession.
will effectively undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of
It is significant to point out that, during the cross-examination and perhaps in total
confusion, the investigator even went so far as to state that Atty. Domingo had not acted
as appellant's lawyer. If this were so, then appellant had absolutely no counsel when his
extra-judicial confession was taken.
In whatever way we may look at the situation, it is clear that, in palpable violation of the
Constitution, appellant was not assisted by a competent and independent counsel during
the custodial investigation and the taking of his extra-judicial confession. Hence, the Court
is duty-bound to disregard it.
"This Court x x x will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of
government. The admonition given by this Court to government officers, particularly those
involved in law enforcement and the administration of justice, in the case of People v.
Cuizon, where NBI agents mishandled a drug bust operation and in so doing violated the
constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures, is
again called for and thus reiterated in the case at bench, to wit:
"x x x. In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights.
Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and
seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of
the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in
the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our
system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and
security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within
the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means.25
Second Issue:
Circumstantial Evidence
Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences have been derived are proven, and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such that it produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one another, and the only
rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be that the accused is guilty. They
must create a solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically believable, that point to the
accused -- to the exclusion of others -- as the perpetrator of the crime; and that sufficiently
overcome thereby the presumption of innocence in his or her favor.26
In this case, the prosecution presented the following pieces of evidence to prove that
appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.
First, appellant was with Brenda on the morning of May 11, 1997.27 They were also
together on McArthur Highway between three and four o'clock in the afternoon on the
same day, aboard a pedicab coming from Industrial City and going south towards Manila.28
Second, around five thirty in the afternoon on May 11, 1997, appellant was seen alone
emerging from Jaycee Auto Repair Shop, just beside Doña Pilar Homes.29 He looked
haggard and had disheveled hair.30
Third, Brenda's naked, lifeless body was found at six o'clock in the morning on May 12,
1997, on a vacant lot in Doña Pilar Homes.31
The above set of circumstantial evidence is too general. It is also consistent with the
hypothesis that appellant is innocent. He cannot be faulted for being seen with Brenda on
a pedicab, since the records show that the two of them are first cousins who live in the
same house.32 He cannot be faulted, either, for emerging near Doña Pilar Homes,33 since
the records show that he lives in Barangay Tikay,34 at the back of which is Doña Pilar
Homes.35 As Prosecution Witness Robles testified, she also lived in Barangay Tikay, yet
she waited for a jeepney in front of Doña Pilar Homes. Evidently, it is natural for residents
of Barangay Tikay to emerge in Doña Pilar Homes and wait for a ride from there. Appellant
cannot be convicted based on the circumstantial evidence which, though proven, remains
ambiguous.
The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is too full of holes. The
approximate time of death of Brenda has not been established, other than that she died
less than 24 hours before the autopsy. Such evidence shows that she could have been
killed on the night of May 11, 1997 or on the early morning of May 12, 1997. By that time
appellant was already in custody and, hence, could not have been the perpetrator. The
records further allude to a tee shirt found at the crime scene. Yet, the prosecution failed to
present it and have it identified. Had the police officers and the prosecution exerted more
effort in identifying its owner, a more direct link between the crime and the perpetrator
could have been established, and reasonable doubts on his identity could have been
eased.
In case of doubt, the scales must be tipped in favor of the accused. Circumstantial
evidence as a basis for criminal conviction should be weighed and accepted with great
caution. Jurisprudence teaches that it is preferable for the guilty to remain unpunished
than for the innocent to suffer unjustly 36 -- in this case, to be sentenced to die by lethal
injection.

Without the extrajudicial confession, the circumstantial evidence becomes utterly

insufficient to pass the test of moral certainty.

Although the defense of appellant -- mere denial -- is weak, this fact alone cannot justify
his conviction. The burden is on the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, not on him to prove his innocence. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that
the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the
strength of the prosecution.37 The Court cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and
overlook the prosecution's failure to discharge the onus probandi.38

Although the prosecution adequately proved the crime of rape with homicide in this case, it
failed to establish the identity of the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, we
cannot sustain appellant's conviction. The assault on the child is unpardonable, but this
Court must uphold the primacy of the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused, when the evidence at hand miserably falls short of the quantum required to
support conviction.39

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 773-M-97 SET ASIDE. Appellant Crispin Velarde y Bandojo
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. He is ordered released immediately from custody
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

The director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement this Decision

forthwith and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof of the date
appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123147               October 13, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH MANENG y ORTESA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch
1 
172, Metro Manila, convicting accused Joseph Maneng y Ortesa of robbery with homicide
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties and to indemnify
the heirs of deceased Nenita Santiago y Merculesio and Hermosa Gelito y Salvino the
sum of ₱50,000.00 each, without subsidiary imprisonment.
On March 23, 1993, State Prosecutor Bernard S. Razon filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, an information charging accused Joseph Maneng together
with John Doe and Peter Doe, with robbery with double homicide, committed as follows:
"That on or about March 16, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping
one another, with intent to gain and with use of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away with them cash
money amounting to P45,000.00 and an undetermined amount of assorted jewelries, all
belonging to one ALFREDO CELITO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in an
undetermined amount; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take and carry away the said articles, the above-named accused, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, stab HERMOSA CELITO and NENITA MERCOLESIO, thereby inflicting upon
the said victims serious physical injuries which directly caused their death.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
On May 12, 1993, at the arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Trial ensued accordingly.
The facts may be related as follows:
From 7:00 a.m. till 5:20 p.m. of March 16, 1993, Alfredo Gelito, the owner of the house at
No. 16 Esperanza St., Don Pedro Village, Marulas, Valenzuela, was tending his store
some 300 meters away from the house. At around 4:30 p.m., two (2) policemen arrived at
his store to buy a bicycle.
At about 5:15 p.m., Alfredo's son, Alfredo III, arrived at the store to inform him that a
robbery and homicide took place at their house. Alfredo, together with the two (2)
policemen, rushed to his house and found it to be in total disarray with the two dead
bodies of his housekeepers Hermosa Gelito and Nenita Santiago. Alfredo made a
thorough search of the house and found the following items to be missing:
1. one radio worth ₱3,500.00;
2. a camera worth ₱3,500.00;
3. jewelry box containing jewelries worth ₱45,000.00;
4. some tools; and
5. money belonging to deceased Hermosa Gelito amounting to ₱5,000.00. 4
On March 18, 1993, the police received information that the accused was one of those
who perpetrated the robbery and killing in the Gelito residence and that he was about to
take a ferryboat to Mindoro. When the policemen failed to find the accused on the
ferryboat at the port of Batangas City that was scheduled to leave at 6:00 p.m., they
waited at the gate of the port. Shortly, accused arrived, carrying a lady's bag. The police
officers approached him and asked his identity and destination. Accused said that he was
going to Barrio Masalay, Oriental Mindoro. He denied involvement in the robbery-killing but
when the officers searched his body and bag, they found a necklace with a heart-shaped
pendant wrapped in a cigarette pack.
The accused was thereafter invited to the Valenzuela Police Station where he executed a
sworn statement dated March 19, 1993 admitting his participation in the crime. Before
5 
taking down his statement, SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and Atty. Hortensio G. Domingo, Jr. of
3 
the Public Attorney's Office and counsel de oficio of the accused, apprised the accused of
his constitutional rights. The accused signed his statement in the presence of SPO1
Alabastro and of Atty. Domingo, Jr.6
For his part, accused put up an alibi and claimed that he was coerced into admitting
participation in the crime. He testified that he was at his place of work at 583 Malanday,
7 
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, doing his job as welder from 7:00 a.m. till 5:00 p.m. After work,
he arrived at his house at 172 Daang Bakal, Meycauayan, Bulacan at around 5:30 p.m.,
rested, ate dinner, watched television, and then slept.
At around 5:30 p.m. of March 18, 1993, accused went to the port of Batangas City to take
a ship bound for Mindoro in order to visit his wife and sick child. When he alighted from the
bus, three (3) policemen approached and frisked him. The policemen handcuffed him and
then brought him to the Valenzuela Police Station. He was forced to admit the robbery and
killing when the policemen boxed, kicked and hit him with a piece of wood and an
armalite.
8
The trial court disregarded accused's defense of alibi and involuntary confession and
found him guilty on the basis of his extrajudicial confession.
Thus, on August 31, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accused of
robbery with homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Accordingly, therefore, the Court finds accused Joseph Maneng GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua together with all the accessory penalties and to
indemnify the heirs of deceased Nenita Santiago and Hermosa Celito the sum of
₱50,000.00 each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency under present and
current jurisprudence.
The Court likewise orders the immediate commitment of the accused Joseph Maneng to
the National Penitentiary of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, after the promulgation of this
judgment-decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED." 9 It also appears that accused-appellant has been duly assisted by counsel, in the person of
Hence, this appeal. 10
In this appeal, accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in relying on his
confession that was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and in disregarding
his alibi.
The Court sustains the conviction of accused-appellant.
We are convinced that the confession of accused-appellant is admissible in evidence, as it
was satisfactorily shown that it was (1) voluntary, and (2) made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel. 11
In his sworn statement taken on March 19, 1993, where he confessed his participation in
12 
the crime, accused recounted in detail how he and his two (2) companions, Charlie Ropon,
Jr. and Marcial Maneng, perpetrated the robbery-killing, that at around 1:30 p.m. of March
16, 1993, as they were entering the Gelito residence they met one of the deceased
housekeepers whom Charlie Ropon, Jr. punched. The three carried the unconscious
housekeeper to a second floor room of the house where Charlie Ropon, Jr. raped her first,
followed by accused-appellant. The other deceased was also raped by Marcial Maneng.
After satisfying their lust, Charlie Ropon, Jr. knifed one of the housekeepers to death while
the other housekeeper also met the same death in the hands of Marcial Maneng. After the
twin killings, Charlie began ransacking the house. Thereafter, the three left and boarded a
jeep that brought them to accused's boarding house at San Diego St., Malanday,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Accused revealed that they planned the crime on March 7,
1993.
Accused repudiated his confession on the ground that it was extracted through force and
intimidation. However, the confession contained details that only the accused-appellant, as
perpetrator, could have known. Details disclosed in the confession that could have been
known only to the declarant indicate the voluntariness in executing the same. Thus, 13 
contrary to accused-appellant's protestations, no torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means appear to have been used against him to force him to
confess.14
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive
evidence showing that declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such
confession will be sustained.15
Atty. Hortencio G. Domingo, Jr., during the taking of his sworn statement/confession. Atty.
Domingo testified that:
"COURT:
Q. Did you ask the accused if he was willing to have you as his counsel?
A. Yes, sir, he just looked at me and asked does he have a choice?
Q. Did he ask for counsel of his choice? Q. And you never left?

A. He did not ask for counsel of his choice, your Honor. A. No, sir."
16

Q. But he agreed to have you as his counsel during that investigation? The right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own
counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is (1) engaged by
A. He asked if I will assist him, I said yes. anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation or (2) appointed by the court
upon petition of the said person or by someone on his behalf. 17

FISCAL:
Besides, accused-appellant did not object when Atty. Domingo, Jr. represented him during
Q. So he allowed you eventually to assist him during the taking of the statement? the investigation.

A. I presumed that he agreed, sir. Consequently, the defense of accussed-appellant of alibi must fail. Alibi is a weak defense
against extrajudicial confessions made by the accused. 18

Q. So what happened after that?

The taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or using force upon things constitutes robbery
COURT:
and the complex crime of robbery with homicide arises when, by reason of or on the
occasion of a robbery by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, someone is
Q. Did you advise him of his constitutional rights? killed.
19

A. Yes, your Honor, I told him that he has the right to remain silent, he has the right to be All the essential elements of robbery with homicide are present in this case.  Personal
assisted by counsel and…
1âwphi1

property belonging to the Gelito household consisting of a radio, television, camera, tools,
jewelry and cash were carted away by accused-appellant and his companions. And during
COURT: the heist, two (2) housekeepers were mercilessly raped and knifed to death.

Q. Did you cause to have that constitutional provision at the top of his statement? The fact that the housekeepers were killed first before the robbery does not detract from
accused-appellant's culpability for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The
A. I think, your Honor, that particular requirement was placed by the investigator before the homicide may precede the robbery or may occur after the robbery, as what is essential is
formal investigation was taken down. that there is a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing. 20

FISCAL: This Court agrees with the trial court that despite the presence of an additional killing as
an aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, since
Q. During that time that Police Officer Alabastro was typing down the questions that he the crime was committed prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659, which 21 

was propounding to the accused and answers that the accused was giving, were you reimposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes. 22

present?
In addition to the ₱50,000.00 death indemnity awarded to the heirs of each of the victims,
A. Yes, sir. the presence of one aggravating circumstance, which is the second killing, justifies the
award of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 23
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that we award the respective heirs of deceased
Hermosa Gelito y Salvino and Nenita Santiago y Merculesio an additional amount of
P10,000.00 each as exemplary damages, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Valenzuela, Branch 172, Metro Manila dated August 31, 1994, convicting accused
Joseph Maneng y Ortesa of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Nenita Santiago y Merculesio and Hermosa Gelito y Salvino in the
amount of P50,000.00 each, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152900,             February 11, 2005
IRENEO UY, Petitioner,
vs.
CARPIO MORALES and GARCIA, JJ. PHELA TRADING COMPANY, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner comes to us by way of petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of a
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56933.
1 
On May 10, 1994, respondent Phela Trading Company (Phela) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, Branch 35, against petitioner Uy a civil suit for a sum of
2 
money, damages (based on fraud) and attorney’s fees, to collect the sum of ₱716,490 he
3 
owed for fertilizer bought on credit and paid for with checks that were dishonored due to
the account being closed. 4
In spite of several requests for extension, petitioner never submitted a responsive
pleading. He did, however, execute a special power of attorney in favor of his son,
5 
Jonathan Uy, which empowered him to do the following: 6
1. To represent and appear for [him] and in behalf [sic] in Civil Case No. 5380 entitled:
PHELA TRADING, CO., VS. IRENEO UY, at any and all stages of the proceedings
including pre-trial conference, with specific authority to enter into any compromise
agreement or amicable settlement;
2. To sign papers or documents necessary for the above premises;
3. To do such other acts and things as maybe necessary in the premises.
Subsequently, on June 14, 1994, the parties submitted a compromise agreement under
which Jonathan Uy bound himself as a surety and solidary obligor for his father for the
amount of ₱796,679.52, including interest. Jonathan put up as collateral security his own
real property in Sultan Kudarat. On June 27, 1994, the court approved the compromise
7 
agreement and rendered judgment in accordance with its terms. 8
Later, claiming breach by petitioner and his son of the compromise agreement, Phela filed,
on August 29, 1994, a motion for issuance of a writ of execution which was granted by the
trial court on September 2, 1994. Pursuant to this, a levy was entered on September 13,
1994 as Entry No. 101428 in TCT No. T-26274 issued to Jonathan Uy covering Lot 592-B-
2-B. At the auction sale on January 27, 1995, respondent Phela was the only bidder for
₱972,281.06. It was consequently awarded the lot and issued a sheriff’s certificate of sale
dated May 18, 1995. 9
On October 23, 1995, Phela filed its omnibus motion for consolidation, cancellation of the
present title and writ of possession, alleging that no redemption had been seasonably
exercised. Petitioner opposed it as did AAB Trading which alleged that it had purchased
the lot in good faith on August 4, 1994, for which it was issued TCT No. 29447 on
November 4, 1994. Petitioner averred that Jonathan Uy was not a party to the case and
had exceeded the scope of his authority in entering into the compromise agreement, to
which he had allegedly agreed only because of respondent’s misrepresentations that he
would merely serve as a guarantor for his father’s obligation.
10
On February 3, 1997, the court promulgated a resolution ordering the purchaser in bad
faith, AAB Trading, to surrender the owner’s copy of the title of the contested lot (now TCT
No. 29447) to the Register of Deeds of Sultan Kudarat for cancellation in favor of then-
plaintiff, the respondent, and also ordering AAB Trading to surrender possession of the
said lot to respondent. The court also directed the Register of Deeds to cancel the said
title in favor of respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said resolution.
11
Petitioner now claims that: (1) the compromise agreement was invalid, considering that it
was entered into by Jonathan Uy merely as an agent of petitioner without his ratification;
(2) the notice of levy of execution upon his son’s property was improper; (3) that the trial
court’s resolution allowing respondent to consolidate its title over Jonathan Uy’s lot was
incorrect, and (4) the subject lot cannot be levied upon by respondent considering that Uy,
a non-party to the case, had already sold the land to AAB Trading.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Second Division of this Court ordered respondent to
comment, which it did through counsel on August 23, 2002. Later that year, on November
11, 2002, the case was transferred to the Third Division. We then required petitioner to
reply to the comment. The reply was filed on March 17, 2003. Subsequently, AAB Trading
(which was not a party to this case) submitted a comment to the petition, a memorandum,
a reply and a comment to respondent’s memorandum, all of which we merely noted, in
light of AAB’s dubious personality to claim relief.
We ordered the parties to submit their memoranda in a resolution dated April 4, 2004.
While respondent submitted its memorandum as early as June 23, 2004, the petitioner, in
the last nine months has submitted ten motions for extension of time to file memorandum,
but has yet to actually file one. We received his 10th motion for extension on January 11,
2005. In what we felt was the interest of justice, we have granted petitioner roughly 250
days of extensions within which to submit his memorandum. Petitioner has blatantly
abused our leniency and deserves no further accommodation. We now proceed to rule on
the petition, with or without petitioner’s memorandum.
The principal issues are: (1) whether or not Jonathan Uy was authorized to enter into the
compromise agreement with respondent and to bind himself solidarily with petitioner, and
(2) whether or not Jonathan Uy’s land which he sold to AAB Trading could be made to
answer for petitioner’s obligation, inasmuch as Jonathan was not a party to the case.
Corollary to the first issue is petitioner’s contention that, by entering into the compromise
agreement, his son was in fact making a confession of judgment without assistance of
counsel, and consequently his actions were null and void for being in violation of Article III
of the Constitution.
The Court of Appeals disposed of both main contentions in its discussion:
It is notable that registered owner Jonathan Uy who voluntarily joined as party defendant
and personally bound himself, did not oppose the said Omnibus Motion of Phela nor
question its grant by the court a quo. It was Ireneo Uy who did, but failed to show that
Jonathan Uy signed the instrument with vitiated consent and to overcome the
presumptions that support the validity of his participation. On the other hand, the Waiver of
Jonathan Uy and the Special Power of Attorney in his favor speaks clearly and eloquently
of the unvitiated consent of Jonathan Uy and of his authority to act for his father Ireneo
Uy. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our
Rules. (Manzano vs. Perez, G.R. No. 112485, Aug. 9, 2001). It must be remembered that
the general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof of an essential
fact must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon. (United Airlines vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124110, April 20, 2001). This Ireneo Uy failed to do.
We will not go as far as to characterize the sale to AAB Trading as part of a scheme to
elide the effects of the auction sale. But it does stand out that Entry No. 101428 made on
September 13, 1994 well precedes the registration on November 4, 1994 of the supposed
Deed of Absolute Sale to it dated August 4, 1994. Perforce, AAB Trading is charged of the
knowledge of the levy and must reap the consequences of buying a property with a
recorded burden or lien.
As a matter of doctrine, we do not disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. 12 
There are exceptions to this rule but not one of them is present here. As the CA has aptly
stated, the party making a material allegation bears the burden of proving it. While the
13 
record is replete with documents showing that Jonathan Uy willingly entered into the
compromise agreement, it is altogether bereft of even a scintilla of evidence that fraud
attended that transaction.
Nonetheless, and to show the petition’s lack of merit, we will likewise discuss petitioner’s
claim that Jonathan Uy entered into the compromise agreement in violation of his right to
counsel under Article III of the 1987 Constitution. A quotation from People v. Enrile upon
14 
which petitioner bases his theory should prove instructive:
Judge Willelmo C. Forton erred when he gave credence to the sworn statement of
Abugatal, considering that it was made without compliance with the requisites of a
custodial investigation, including the assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly
inadmissible. (underscoring ours)
Likewise, an excerpt from the Constitution itself will also shed some light on petitioner’s
15 
contention:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel. xxx (underscoring ours)
The compromise agreement which Jonathan Uy entered into with respondent was a purely
private transaction which provided a resolution to a purely private controversy. In the light
of the nature of the agreement and the case it settled, the constitutional right to counsel
finds no application here. Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, also known as
the Bill of Rights, pertains to the rights of persons accused of committing a crime. In
particular, the right to counsel is present when one is under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense. It does not apply to a person who is entering into a private or
16 
civil contract or agreement. The defense of "uncounselled confession" cannot be used to
invalidate such an agreement, even by analogy. We cannot countenance such a skewed
interpretation of the Bill of Rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Likewise, petitioner’s motions for extension of time to file memorandum dated November
8, November 23, and December 8, 2004, being the 8th, 9th and 10th such motions,
respectively, are hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133188             July 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, appellee,
vs.
ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial
confession. This appeal particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain
who is a lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section
12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging appellant
with Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996, about 2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed
with a bladed instrument (tres cantos), with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy, by stabbing
her with said bladed instrument, hitting her on the vital parts of her body, thereby inflicting
upon her physical injuries causing:
"CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK & HEMORRHAGE SEC. TO STAB
WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK (POSTERIOR ASPECT)"
as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, and trial thereafter ensued.
2 
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from
appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
As presented by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin @
Hapon, together with Rico and Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo, were
drinking "Red Horse" beer in Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the group at
around 1:00 in the morning,
saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to
Lorega proper. A few minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as the
latter heard Jaquelyn Tatoy, her goddaughter, asking for help. Isogan got two flashlights
3 
and they proceeded upstairs to Jaquelyn’s house. The first to go up was a certain Moises,
followed by the brothers Rico and Romy Magdasal, while Noel and Cardo remained
downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge and the "walling" of the main door were damaged,
as if it were kicked open, and only the light in the kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a
black shoe on the stairs and another in the sala, which he claims belong to appellant.
When they went into the kitchen, they saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up on the
floor, with her head inside a plastic container. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where
she expired. A neighbor later found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico
also identified to be appellant’s. A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres
4 
cantos for safekeeping which were later turned over to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide
Section, Ramos Police Station. The person who turned over the objects to Policeman
Tariao was not identified.5
At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius Yosores
and Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of the
information given by Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres cantos found in the scene of
the crime belonged to appellant. Together with Rico, they went to the house of Wilson
Magdasal where appellant was temporarily staying, and found him sleeping. Appellant was
wearing a bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the
killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato
Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the shirt he was wearing and he told them
that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. It was Edgar Magdasal who found his shirt, wet
and bloodstained, among the soiled clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his tanods to take
appellant to the police station.
6
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by SPO2
Mario Monilar of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being
apprised of his constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to
confess and asked for Atty. Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar
called Atty. Parawan but the latter told him that he will be available in the afternoon. When
Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon, he conferred with appellant for around
fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told him that appellant was
ready to give his statement. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession, which was taken down
7 
completely in the Cebuano dialect, reads:
8 
Pasiuna: Mr. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, pahibaloon ko ikaw nga ubos sa atong batakang
balaod (Constitution) aduna kay katungod nga pahibaloon sa imong mga katungod, sama
sa imong katungod sa pagpakahilum, ingon man duna kay katungod sa
pagdamgop/pagpilig sa abogado o manlalaban aron motabang kanimo niining maong
imbestighasyon nga may kalabutan sa kamatayon ni Jaqueline Tatoy niadtong mga alas
2:30 sa kaadlawon kapin kongkulang niadtong petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembra 1996,
didto sa Brgy Lorega proper, Siyudad sa Sugbo. Kong ugaling dili ka maka-abot pagbayad
o pagpangitago abogado aron motabang kanimo karon, ako isip negrepresenttar sa
Estado mohatag akong abogado kanimo. Nasabtan ba kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ka ang akong katungod?
Pangutana: Pahabloon ko usab ikaw nga sumala usab sa atong Batakang Balaod, anfg
tanan nga imong isulti karon dinhi, mahimong magamit ebedensya pabor o batok kanimo
sa bisan asaing husgado sa atong nasud. Nasabtan be usab kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ko usab kanang taan.
Pangutana: Tinuod ba gayod nga nasabtan pag-ayo nimo anf mao nimong mga katungod
ug anadam ka ba nga moperma karon dinhi timailhan sa imong tina-aw nga nga
pagsabut? ingon man andam ka ba sa pagsulti sa matuod walay lain kon kili ang matuod
lamang gayud?
Tubag: O
Tubag: Oo, andam ako nga mpemar Sir ug ania karon dinhi ai Atty Parawan ang among
Brgy Captain nga maoy akong giisip nga abogado nga akong pinili nga maoy motabang
kanako karon. Aron sa pagmatuod, ako kining pirmahan ning ika petsa 16 sa bulan sa
Disyembre 1996.
...
Pangutana: Sunlion ko, andama bas a pagsulti sa matuod Elizar Tomaquin kon dili ang
matuod lamang gayud? Ingon man andam ka ba nga modawat sa resulta o linugdangan
niini?
Tubag: Oo, andam gyud ako.
Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan nga circumstacia o rmay
kalambigitan sa imong pagkatawo, sa imong grado, imong trabaho, imong pinuy-anan ug
uban pa?
Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o apelyedo sa akong mama
sanglit dili man kasado and akong mama ug papa. Ang apelyedo sa akong papa, Cabagui
ug and akon angga Hapon. Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo ug kasamtangan nga
nagpuyo sa Brgy Lorega proper duol sa kapilaya San Roque apan ako lumad nga taga
Bo. Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu diin didto ano nakatungha sa grade six.
Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, diin ka man?
Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang kauba ko sa pag-inom si
Rico Magdasal didito sa Brgy Lorega Proper ug taodtaod niadto nilakaw ako libot sa sitio
Itom Tuta ug dayon nakong saka sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy sa Brgy Lorega nianang
pagka mga alas 2:20 sa maong petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa akong tuyo
sa pagkawat sa ilang colored nga TV.
Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga colored?
Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored TV.
Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa ilang TV, diin ka man
punta deretso.
Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang ilang TV.
Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo anf maong TV?
Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si Jaqueline Tatoy nga
naghidga sa ilang may terrace ug nidagan siya padulong sa kusina nila ug diha-diha
akong siyang ginsunod, gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi sa akong tres kantps
nga hinagiban (Gidtudo ni Eliza rang Tres Kantos nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas nga
Jaqueline Tatoy).
Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?
Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko makahinumdom kon diin to siya
maigo. Basta manadaghan to nako siya dunggaba ginamit ko ang akong Tres kantos.
Pangutana: Gawas nga imo to siyang gidunggab, wala ba nimo pahimudsi and iyang
pagkapbabye o wala ka bay plano sa pag rape kaniya niadtong higayona?
Tubag: Wala gyud to nako siya pahimudsi og wala gyud koy tuyo sa pag rape niya. Ang
ako ra gyud nga tuyo mao ra gyud and pagkawat sa ilang TV apan kay nisiyagit man
siyang nakaila man kayo siya nako, nahadlok kong mahibaw-an sa ako untang pagkawat
sa ilang TV, hinungdan nga ako siyang gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan.
Pangutana: Nganog nakahibawo or nakaila ka man nga si Jaqueline Tatoy tong naisiyagit
ug imong gidunggab?
Tubag: Duna ma hayag nga suga sa elektresidad sa ilang may kusina.
Pangutana: Kaila ba nimong daan si Jaqueline Tatoy?
Tubag: Oo, Sir ka saw ala pa ang among hitabo permi man kong nagtan-awan sa ilang
TV.
Pangutana: Human nim dunggaba si Jaqueline Tatoy unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat?
Tubag: Dihang sa akong pagtoo nga patay na siya, ako naidagan agi sa pultahan nga
akong gisikaran dayon kanaog subay sa hagdan didto nabiyaan nako ang akong sapatos.
Pangutana: Diin ka man paduiong dagan?
Tubag: Didto ako padulong sa akong gipuya-an sa ilang Wilson Magdasal sa maong Brgy.
Pangutana: Unya unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat og nahibaw-an?
Tubag: Niadtong hapon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, didtoy mga Brgy
Tanods sa balay ni Wilson Magdasal diin ila akong gipangutaan tali sa maong hitabo og
igo lan ako nitudlo sa akong white Slave shirt nga akong gihumulan ug tubig sa planggana
sa tumong nga makuha ang mansa sa dugo nga pinisik sa akong paggdunggab patay ni
Jaqueline Tatoy.
Pangutana: Ngano ug unsa may diay kalabutan niadtong maong slaveless white shirt
nimo?
Tubag: Mao na ang akong gisul-ob dihang akog kawaton unta ang TV nila ni Jaqueline ug
sa iyang pagsiyagit ako siyang gidunggab-dunggab patay. (Elizar Yomaquin postivo nga
nitudlo ug niangkon sa maong whitel sleve less shirt)
Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha didto so hagdan sa balay
nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy human siya nakit-i nga patay, unsa may imong ikasulti niini?
Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang hagdan human sa
hitabo ug gain sa akong pagdagan akong napatiran kadtong ilang container.
Pangutana: Sa pagkakaron, wala na akoy ipangutana kanimo. Ikay aduna ka pa bay
ikasul ti o bakwion ba hinoon sa mao nimong gipamahayag nga naglangkob sa duha ka
pahina lakip niining maong pahina?
Tubag: Wala na akoy ikadugang pagsulti ni bakwion ba hinnon. Nao kana ang tanan.
Pangutana: Andam ka ba pagperme niini sa pagmatuod nga wlay tawo nga nagpugos,
naghulga, nagsaad ug gnate o nag hadlok ba hinoon kon dili sa imong kaugalingon nga
kabubut-on lamang.
Tubag: Oo, andam ako pageram. Aron matuoron kining tanan kini akong permaahn ning
petsa 16 sa Diusyembre 1996, Siyudad Sugbo, Pilipinas. 9
On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico
Magdasal and three other persons. His version of the incident is that it was Rico who
committed the crime and not him. Appellant testified that Rico asked his help in stealing
the television set from the Tatoy’s residence. When Jacquelyn saw them, she ran towards
the kitchen but she did not reach it as Rico had stabbed her on the back with the tres
cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who owns the tres cantos, as well as the pair of
shoes, left inside Tatoy’s house. Afraid of what happened, appellant went home to Wilson
Magdasal’s house and slept there. He was awakened the next morning
by barangay tanod Julius Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also boxed and poked a gun
at him. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the presence
of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the latter’s house.
He was made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a family while he is single.
Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely
asked him to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to
assist and help him with his expenses. 11
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for brevity) rendered its
decision on October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, accused Elizar Tomaquin is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPERTUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to
indemnify the heirs of Jaquelyn Tatoy in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The
accused is, however, credited in full during the whole period of his detention provided he
will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED. 12
Hence, this appeal.
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BASED ON HIS UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION;
2. THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) GAVE FULL CREDENCE
AND FULL FAITH ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; 13
Appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano
dialect. Rule 132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their
attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.
The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language
other than the official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit
10
should be translated by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be
agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation sent to this court. In this
14 
case, there is no official translation of appellant’s extrajudicial confession in the Filipino or
English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the rule, then appellant’s extrajudicial
confession should not have been admitted by the trial court as evidence for the
prosecution.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the
parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or
knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written, such extrajudicial
15 
confession was appropriately considered by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the extrajudicial
confession executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato Parawan, is
admissible in evidence against him. There is no need at this point to secure an official
translation of the confession to English.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is not an
empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to
him by a diligent and capable lawyer. 16
As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of
Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. Under the 1991 Local Government Code,
a barangay captain performs the following duties and functions:
(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall
exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code
and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
punong barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;
...
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or
municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and
functions; . . .
17
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and
ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.
In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be
deemed as such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this
Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed
a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent
counsel of appellant.
In People vs. Culala, the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot be an
18 
independent counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal
assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order, and it was
seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused
without running into conflict of interests. Thus, the Court held that he is no better than a
fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.19
This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman, and People vs. Velarde, where we further ruled
20  21  Q What transpired during that conversation with the accused.
that a municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as required by the
Constitution.
Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a
peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of
providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime
in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent counsel of
appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution
requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will
effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.
22
Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant
counsel. An "effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant
answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. As held in People vs. Velarde:
23
. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of
the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation,
and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
24
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the
person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his
extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to
be presumed innocent. 25
The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant cannot be fittingly described as
effective and vigilant. As testified by Atty. Parawan, hereinbelow quoted verbatim, this was
what transpired when he went to the Ramos police station to assist appellant during the
investigation:
Q What happened when you arrived at the Ramos Police Station at around 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of December 16, 1996?
A I go (sic) to the room where Policeman Monilar and the accused and had a conversation
with the accused.
A I asked him. Are you going to get me as your lawyer?
Q And may we know what did he answer?
A Yes, Cap. Okay Cap.
Q When you said "Cap" what did he mean by that word "Cap."
A Being a Barangay Captain.
Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of choice. What did you do next if
any?
A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the implication of your
admission, you will be imprisoned.
Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his confession that could be
… because of that confession. What was his reaction?
A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: "Because of this confession you will be
imprisoned."
Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would execute that affidavit of
confession he would surely be imprisoned?
A No I even continue that "why did he do that?"
Q And what did he answer?
A He answered to me that he was drunk at that time.
Q And so what transpired next?
A So I told him are you willing now to give your confession, then policeman Monilar went
inside the room and we had that investigation.
Q Now how was the investigation of the accused done?
A It was made in a question and answer form.
Q And in what language were the questions framed?
A In the vernacular, vesaya.
Q What did you do during the question and answer form of investigation?
A I just observed them.
Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession was over?
A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my Barangay.
...
Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an Attorney did you
immediately inquire what had happened before you arrived like; Did you start the
investigation? did you inquire from that from Mr. Monilar?
A He was already preparing this top portion here.
INTERPRETER:
Q Witness pointing to the upper portion of the certification up to the signature to that
portion above the names typewritten thereon.
...
Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top most portion to that
portion immediately right before the typewritten name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty. Fortunato
Parawan you were not around. Correct?
A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with Monilar. 26
Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the morning of
December 16, 1996. When appellant intimated that he was willing to confess and
requested the presence of Atty. Parawan, SPO2 Monilar called up Atty. Parawan and
informed him of appellant’s decision. Atty. Parawan arrived at the Ramos Police Station
only at 2:00 in the afternoon. By the time Atty. Parawan arrived, the investigation had
27 
already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked and elicited information from
appellant. Worse, Atty. Parawan merely "observed" during the entire investigation and
failed to advise or explain to appellant the questions being propounded by SPO2 Monilar.
He did not even bother to ask appellant if the extrajudicial confession he was about to
execute was being voluntarily given.
Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his
own testimony that he already suspected appellant as having committed the crime when
the latter was brought to his house by the barangay tanods, viz.:
Q Being an attorney naturally your first question to your arresting tanods was where was
he arrested and how was he arrested and what is the reason why he was arrested.
Correct?
A Yes.
...
Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the Barangay Tanods could
explain to you the circumstances of his arrest you already started to ask questions like;
Why did you have blood in your pants. Where is your t-shirt you wore. Where did you get
that information since you were not in the house of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?
A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds. So when I saw
blood stains with all probability it might come from the victim. It was conclusion something
like when I saw that t-shirt stained with blood.
Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the conclusion of mine (sic) that
Elizar Tomaquin one of your constituents in the Barangay was already on your conclusion
in mine (sic) the killer of Jacquilyn Tatoy before your tanods turned it over to the police for
investigation. Is that what you are telling Atty. Parawan?
A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring him to the Homicide.
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded
appellant’s rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the
suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he would want
appellant to admit having committed it.
It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawan’s qualification as a
competent and independent counsel because he was his choice.
As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, "(A)ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right … to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be
present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of
the individual undergoing questioning, but the word "preferably" does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. 29 
What is imperative is that the counsel should be competent and independent. That
appellant chose Atty. Parawan does not estop appellant from complaining about the
latter’s failure to safeguard his rights.
It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was the barangay captain of
Brgy. Lorega where appellant resides, and apparently, appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to
protect his rights. The latter, however, fell short in tending to the trust reposed on him.
Appellant did not finish Grade 1 and does not know how to read and write. As between
30 
him and Atty.
Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellant’s predicament,
Atty. Parawan should have known better and exercised his sound judgment before
conceding to appellant’s choice. But it did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as
appellant’s counsel and instead, he even let appellant go through the investigation and
execute the extrajudicial confession knowing fully well that he was biased as regards
appellant’s innocence. Quoted verbatim, Atty. Parawan testified thus:
Q Atty. Parawan comparing yourself to the accused who is a graduate of Batchelor (sic) of
Law compared to your constituent who is jobless, illiterate [and] of low intelligence. The
question is this: It did not occur to your mine (sic) to inhibit yourself despite the request by
telling the accused as barangay Captain there could be a conflict of interest and bias that I
would not be in (sic) effective counsel or assistance to you. Did it not occur toy our mine
28
(sic) or not?
A It did not occur to my nime (sic).
...
Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you assist a suspect in the
police station and the circumstances he was arrested the best assistance a lawyer could
give is would be to tell the accused to remain silent. Would you agree?
...
A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time. 31
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of
an independent and competent counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an
uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People vs.
Deniega, stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions
32 
meet the exacting standards of the Constitution:
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the
sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the
sole basis for convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality
and ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these
agencies to take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to
bring about a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are punished. Our courts, in the
process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in
bringing about this assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered
by law enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the
Constitution. If the standards are not met, the Constitution provides the
corresponding remedy by providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny
confession or admission obtained in violation of (Article III, Section 12(1) . . . hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence."
Without appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case now teeters
precariously on circumstantial evidence, namely:
(1) Rico Magdasal’s testimony that:
(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of December 16, 1996;
(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyn’s residence belongs to
appellant; and
(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and white sando shirt on the night of the
crime, which blood-stained shirt was found among the soiled clothes in Wilson Magdasal’s
house;
(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza’s testimony that the blood stains on
appellant’s sando shirt and the tres cantos was of human origin. 33
These circumstances, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate positively and
convincingly that it was appellant who killed Jaquelyn.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be
sufficient to convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a
34 
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.
35
The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person.
For one, appellant’s act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning does not
establish appellant’s whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. There is nothing in
the testimony of Rico Magdasal and the other prosecution witnesses that will show if
appellant indeed went to Jaquelyn’s house after he left the group. No one saw him enter or
leave her residence. If at all, what was proved is that appellant was found by the barangay
tanods sleeping at home in the afternoon of the same day.
Added to that is the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody of these
valuable pieces of evidence.
Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes and tres
cantos were given to a certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later turned over to a
Policeman Tariao of the Ramos Police Station. Zabate, however, did not identify the
person who turned over the objects to the police. There was no showing who turned over
36 
those articles to the police and Rey was not presented to identify if these were the same
pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyn’s house and turned over to the police.
Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness stand so as to confirm if those articles
were the same evidence turned over to him and later presented in court. Ordinarily, it
would not be indispensable for the prosecution to allege and prove every single fact of the
case. But in this case, the pieces of evidence are crucial to the prosecution’s case. Also,
the fact that a civilian obtained and received the evidence, the possibility that the integrity
of these articles could have been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court even noted
that during his direct examination, SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the pair of
shoes presented in court was the same ones that were turned over to the police. It turned
out that the marking he made on the shoes were washed off because at one time, the
shoes fell in the canal located in front of the police station and they had to clean and wash
the shoes! Such sloppy handling renders the chain of custody of those pieces of evidence
37 
dubious, and damaging to the prosecution’s case.
And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that it was found
in the scene of the crime merely proved that he was in the residence of Jaquelyn at some
point in time. But it does not prove when particularly he was there, his authorship of the
crime or his motive for being
there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial,
not being an element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in this case, the
evidence of the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial. 38
The prosecution’s evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellant’s guilt is mainly
the testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however, is uncorroborated. The rule is
that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such testimony
positively establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover,39 
the doctrine of long standing that the testimony of a lone witness, if credible and positive,
is sufficient to convict an accused applies only to eyewitnesses. Thus, an
uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the
evidence itself is in serious doubt. Rico’s lone testimony is not sufficient to establish
40 
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In addition, appellant vehemently denied Rico’s allegations. According to appellant, it was
Rico who actually owns the pair of shoes and tres cantos; that it was he who bid appellant
to go to the Tatoys’ residence and lift their TV set; and that it was Rico who stabbed
Jaquelyn. Considering appellant’s denial and his different version of the incident, it
became incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut appellant's allegations with further
evidence to corroborate the statement of Rico. It must be noted that there were other
persons present during their drinking spree, namely, Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a
certain Cardo. These persons could have been presented as witnesses to back up Rico’s
claim but the prosecution did not do so. Rico testified that appellant owned the tres
cantos found by the stairs; but Rico also stated he only "heard" that the tres cantos was
found by the stairs. Who found the tres cantos that was supposed to have been used to
41 
stab Jaquelyn? The neighbor who allegedly found it by the stairs was not presented in
court to identify if the tres cantos presented by the prosecution was the alleged weapon in
the stabbing of Jaquelyn. Such failure of the prosecution to corroborate the material points
of Rico’s testimony weakened their case.
The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the white sando shirt that
appellant was allegedly wearing at the time of stabbing Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal
later found bloodstained among the soiled clothes.
First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he was wearing,
he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. According to barangay
tanod Armando Zabate, it was Edgar Magdasal who found the shirt, "somewhat wet and
bloody," among the soiled clothes. Edgar Magdasal, however, was not presented to testify
42 
as to where he found the shirt, the state the shirt was in when he found it, and how he
knew that it was the shirt worn by appellant.
Second, Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza testified that the bloodstains on
appellant’s sando shirt, as well as the tres cantos, were human blood. Mendoza, however,
43 
did not conduct further tests to ascertain the type of blood found on these pieces of
evidence nor did he match it with the victim’s blood type, hence, it does not connect the
44 
bloodstains to the herein victim. In People vs. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that
the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant and found positive of type O blood has
no probative value since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not taken for
purposes of comparison. 45
The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres cantos.
Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven.
Proof of the guilt of the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity. Although appellant’s
defense is weak, conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution's evidence
and not from the weakness of the defense. In this case, the prosecution’s evidence is not
strong enough to justify a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acquittal, therefore, is
46 
inevitable.
WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of
appellant unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the
date of his release, or the ground for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from
notice of herein decision.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109993 January 21, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS BARASINA y LAYNEZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
It was around 6:40 in the evening of July 17, 1988 when Fiscal Lino Mayo of Olongapo
City succumbed to a single bullet on his side of his face fired from an unlicensed .45
caliber firearm while he was walking at the VIP parking lot of the Victory Liner Compound
at Caloocan City. According to the People, it was herein accused-appellant who was
accountable therefor, resulting in his being charged with the separate misdeeds of illegal
possession of a firearm and murder in this manner:
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ELIAS BARASINA y LAYNEZA for
violation of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of July, 1988 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously in violation of
the above-mentioned Presidential Decree, have in his possession, custody and control
one (1) .45 caliber pistol-type firearm, marked Colt bearing SN-008645 with four (4) rds of
live ammos. one (1) cartridge case and one (1) magazine, without first securing the
necessary license/permit to possess the same. And while in possession thereof, said
accused used said firearm in committing the crime of MURDER.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accused ELIAS BARASINA y LAYNEZA, JOHN
DOE AND PETER DOE, true names, real identities and present whereabouts of the last
two mentioned accused, still unknown of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of July, 1988 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery
and evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot with a .45 cal, firearm on the head one FISCAL
LINO MAYO y MANIAGO, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which
injuries caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 25-26, Rollo)
When haled to respond to the inculpations, accused-appellant was indifferent in entering
any plea, thus the plea of not guilty to the two criminal charges was entered by the court of
origin in his behalf (p. 140, Record).
The generative facts of the case at bar, as culled from the exhaustive decision of the trial
judge, the Honorable Rene Victoriano, are supported by the record and are accordingly
adopted, thusly:
At about 6:40 in the evening of July 17, 1988, Rufino Alvarez was on his way to the
comfort room located inside the waiting shed for the passengers at the Victory Liner
Terminal Compound, Kalookan City. He was aware of the two men walking ahead of him
who were almost abreast of each other. A gunshot was heard. Instinctively, Rufino looked
ahead of him where the sound of the gunshot came from. He saw the man immediately in
front of him holding a .45 cl. handgun. He also saw at the same time the other man just
beside the gun man falling down the ground. The gun man continued walking at the same
time holding his gun with two hands trying to cock it. After walking a few meters, the gun
man tucked the gun in his right waist and began running away. At this time, Rufino saw
Barangay Councilman Prudencio Motos and about four other men chasing the gun man.
After this, Rufino approached and viewed the victim who was sprawled on the ground. At
this time there were already many people around trying to view the victim.
At about the same time on said evening of July 17, 1988, Felipe Hamtig who was a
security guard was at his assigned post at the V.I.P. Parking Space at the Victory Liner
Compound. He saw a stout man carrying an attache case pass by his post beside the
entrance to the V.I.P. parking area. There was another man following the aforementioned
stout man. When the stout was about five meters away, Felipe Hamtig saw the second
man shoot the stout man who was just ahead of him on the left cheek with a .45 cal. hand
gun. The gun man then cocked his gun and ran towards Rizal Avenue Extension. Felipe
Hamtig tried to chase the assailant but he saw several people already chasing him
(assailant). Among the person chasing the assailant was Councilman Prudencio Motos.
Because of this, Felipe Hamtig no longer ran after the assailant but he went back to see
the victim who was sprawled on the ground. He later came to know the victim as Olongapo
City Fiscal Lino Mayo.
At about the same time and date, Ruel Ganiola, a porter, was at the Sunshine Restaurant
waiting for cargoes coming from Olongapo. This is located about 20 meters from the
Victory Liner Terminal Compound. While standing, he heard a gunshot coming from the
V.I.P. parking area. He looked at the area where the sound came from. He saw a person
slumped on the ground. He saw another person running away from the man slumped on
the ground who was holding a gun and was even cocking it. Councilman Motos ordered
them to chase the gun man. Motos was in front of the Sunshine Restaurant at the time. He
followed the order of Motos and ran after the gun man. Michael Estapia, a porter, also ran
after the gun man. The chasers shouted at a policeman several meters ahead and pointed
at the fleeing gun holder. The policeman was able to catch the gun wielder at the stairway
of LRT Station at Monumento, Kalookan City. Pat. Francia took the gun of the accused (a .
45 cal. gun) from his right waist.
At about the same time and date, Barangay Councilman Prudencio Motos was standing at
the front of the Sunshine Restaurant. He heard a gunshot coming from the V.I.P. parking
area. He looked at the place where the gunshot came from and saw a man fall down on
the ground. He saw at the same time another man moving away from the fallen man and
cocking a gun at the same time. The gun man then tucked the gun in his waistline and ran
towards the direction of Rizal Avenue Extension. He shouted at his companions to run
after the gun man. Prudencio Motos and his companions ran after the gun man and when
the gun man was about to reach the LRT Station, they shouted at the policeman
conducting traffic in the area and pointed at the running man. The policeman, Pfc.
Napoleon Francia, shouted at the gun man who stopped and raised his hands. Pfc.
Napoleon Francia then confiscated a .45 cal. pistol from the gun man. Afterwards, Pfc.
Francia Councilman Motos and others brought the gun man to the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters aboard a passenger jeep.
Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, an NBI Medico-Legal Officer, conduct(ed) an autopsy on the body
of the victim, Fiscal Lino Mayo on July 17, 1988. A request for autopsy was made by Sgt.
Norberto Surara of the Kalookan City Police Force (Exhibit G). The autopsy was
conducted at the International Funeral Homes located at Rizal Avenue, Manila. The body
of the victim was identified by Omar Mayo, a relative of the victim (Exhibit H). The time and
date of death was placed at 6:45 p.m. on July 17, 1988.
After conducting an external examination, Dr. Muñoz found out that the victim suffered one
gunshot wound. The point of entrance of the bullet was on the left jaw and the point of exit
was at the back of the right ear.
After conducting an internal examination, Dr. Muñoz found out that there was a fracture of
the mandible and first cervical vertebra. There was also a fracture of the right mastoid
bone. The cause of death was gunshot wound on the head. It was possible that the
assailant was lightly at the back of the victim taking into consideration that the head is a
very movable part (tsn, June 6, 1989, p. 12). The muzzle of the gun used was more than
24 inches from the victim (tsn, June 6, 1989, p. 18).
Dr. Muñoz produce a diagram he prepared showing the injuries sustained by the victim
(Exhibit I). He identified the written report he made on his examination. (Exhibit J).
Aida Magsipoc, a supervising Forensic Chemist of the NBI testified in this case concerning
the paraffin examination conducted on the accused on July 18, 1988.
She received the letter request to conduct the examination at about 10:00 a.m. on July 18,
1988. Before taking the paraffin cast on the hands of the accused, she required the
accused to first wash his hands under running water. His hands were then air-dried. The
paraffin wax was melted and was applied on the dorsal aspects of the left and right hands
of the accused. She dropped the melted paraffin on the dorsal portion of both hands of the
accused. While she personally conducted the pre-casting on the hands of the accused, it
was Edwin Purificando, her subordinate, who actually conducted the actual examination.
Edwin Purificando, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted
a paraffin examination of the accused, Elias Barasina. He received a letter request dated
July 17, 1988 to this effect from the Kalookan City Police Force, which was signed by Lt.
Norberto Surara (Exhibit K). The accused was accompanied by the NBI Forensic
Laboratory by Kalookan City policemen where the accused was subjected to the paraffin
casting. The casting was made on the dorsal portion of the right hand and left hand of the
accused in order to test the presence of gun powder residue on the hands of the accused.
The casting was placed by Aida Magsipoc, an NBI Forensic Chemist Supervisor, in the
morning of July 18, 1988. Edwin Purificando was the one who placed the chemical
reaction agent, however, at about 10:00 p.m. of the said date. The chemical reaction agent
was then allowed to react on the paraffin cast.
As a result of the foregoing, process, the left and right hands of the accused were both
found to be positive for gun powder nitrates. Edwin then, prepared a diagram of the left
and right hands of the accused showing the exact spots where the presence of the nitrates
was found. The diagram was marked as Exhibit "L". A written report was then made on the
paraffin examination (Exhibit "M").
Because of the foregoing, it was possible that the accused fired gun before the paraffin
examination was conducted (TSN, June 6, 1989, p. 40). Gun powder residue stay in the
hands of a person for not more than 3 days. A photograph of the accused taken at the NBI
Forensic Laboratory just before the paraffin examination was identified (Exhibit "N").
Brandeis Flores is a ballistician of the National Bureau of Investigation. On July 17, 1988,
his office received a written request from Sgt. Norberto Surara of the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters for the ballistic examination of one cal. .45 gun with Serial No. 008645 with
magazine loaded with four rounds of live ammunitions and one empty shell marked "DDR"
(Exhibit "W"). Pat. Loreto Samson of the Kalookan City Police Force personally carried the
foregoing specimen to the NBI together with the letter request.
Brandeis Flores first conducted the actual test firing of the submitted .45 cal. handgun in
order to obtain empty shells for comparison with the evidence shell. After obtaining the test
shells, Brandeis compared them with the evidence shell under the microscope. He found
out that the evidence shell contains similar characteristics markings with the three test
shell was previously marked as Exhibit[s] "V-1". The three test shells were taped together
and were marked as Exhibit "X". His finding was that the evidence bullet (Exhibit "V-1")
was fired from the submitted .45 cal. gun marked as Exhibit "U". A written report of the
ballistic examination was prepared and marked as Exhibit "Y".
Pfc. Arsenio Nacis of the Kalookan City Police Force conducted the investigation of this
case. At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 17, 1988, Cpl. Napoleon Francia,
Barangay Councilman Motos, and a Barangay Tanod appeared in the office of Cpl. Nacis
at the Station Investigation Division. Cpl. Francia then turned over to Investigator Nacis the
accused and a .45 cal. handgun with four bullets and an empty shell. After having been
informed that the accused was a suspect in the death of a person at the Victory Liner
Compound, Pfc. Nacis, Cpl. Daniel del Rosario, Pfc. Elmario Adelante, Sgt. Serrano, and
the inquest Fiscal proceeded immediately to the scene of the crime. They found the body
of the victim right at the entrance of the Victory Liner Terminal. Investigator Nacis noticed
blood still oozing from the victim's ear. He prepared a sketch of the scene of the crime and
tried to get his evidence (Exhibit "F"). The victim was found lying face down and was
positively identified by the Inquest Fiscal Bonifacio Sison as Olongapo City Fiscal Lino
Mayo, his former classmate. He then invited the following witnesses to his office, namely:
Councilman Prudencio Motos, Rufino Alcaraz, Felipe Hamtig, Ruel Ganiola, Michael
Estapia and Pat. Napoleon Francia. Cpl. Daniel del Rosario took the statements of Rufino
Alcaraz (Exhibits "A" to "A-1")
and the joint sworn statements of Rule Ganiola and Michael Estapia (Exhibit "D").
Pfc. Nacis took down the sworn statement of Felipe Hamtig
(Exhibit "C"). He also executed his own sworn statement (Exhibit "R"). He prepared a
referral slip for the Kalookan City Fiscal (Exhibit "S").
Cpl. Daniel del Rosario investigated the accused but before doing so, he informed the
latter of his Constitutional rights. The accused then stated his desire to have a lawyer. As
instructed by Lt. Norberto Surara, one private practitioner named Atty. Abelardo Torres
was fetched from the latter's office. Atty. Torres arrived at the Station Investigation
Divisions of the Kalookan City Police Station at 3:00 p.m. on July 18, 1988. Atty. Torres
conferred with the accused for about 30 minutes. The accused indicated his desire to give
a statement in the presence of Atty. Torres. Before actually taking down the statement of
the accused, Cpl. del Rosario prepared a written appraisal of the Constitutional rights of
the accused in a document entitled "PAALALA" (Exhibit "P"). It was signed both by the
accused and Atty. Torres. Cpl. del Rosario then proceeded to take a written statement of
the accused. His counsel was present in the investigation room. The sworn statement of
the accused was identified (Exhibits "Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"). Cpl. del Rosario identified the
signatures of the accused in each page of said statement (Exhibits "Q-3", "Q-4" an "Q-5").
He also identified the signature of the statement (Exhibit "Q-6").
Lt. Norberto Surara, the Chief of the Homicide Section of the Kalookan City Police Force
confirmed that he assigned Pfc. del Rosario to take the sworn statement of the accused.
He also confirmed that he directed that Atty. Abelardo Torres be fetched to act as counsel
of the accused during the investigation. He introduced Atty. Torres to the accused and
after this, the accused accepted the services of Atty. Torres (TSN, July 3, 1989, p. 12). He
execute[d] a sworn statement on his participation in the execution of the sworn statement
of the accused (Exhibit "Z"). The accused, when brought to Inquest Fiscal Nepthali
Aliposa, refused to sign the statement. Thus, the statement was not sworn to (TSN, July 3,
1989, p. 20).
Atty. Abelardo Torres admitted being fetched in the afternoon of July 18, 1988 to assist the
accused (TSN, July 10, 1989, p. 4). He admitted having conferred with the accused on
said date before the statement of the latter was taken down. He was present when the
accused gave a written statement but left at the beginning to take his merienda. He
returned to the investigation room a few minutes later (TSN, July 20, 1989, pp. 21-22). He
was present when the accused signed his written statement.
Teresa Mayo, the widow of Fiscal Lino Mayo, testified on the civil aspect of this case.
Fiscal Mayo was the City Fiscal of Olongapo City at the time of his death and was
receiving a monthly salary of P12,000.00 then and a monthly allowance of P2,000.00. The
body of the late Fiscal was buried at Infanta, Pangasinan, after having lain in state at
Olongapo City for two days and at Infanta for 2 days. She paid P20,000.00 for the burial of
the victim (Exhibit "AA"). She spent P1,600.00 for the religious funeral services (Exhibit
"BB"). She also spent P40,000.00 for constructing the burial site of the victim (Exhibit
"CC"; Exhibit "DD"; Exhibit "DD-1"). She spent for food and groceries during the wake in
the total amount of P50,000.00.
The place where the victim, Fiscal Lino Mayo, was shot inside the V.I.P. parking area
inside the Victory Liner Compound located at Kalookan City. The V.I.P. Parking area is
located at the ground floor of the Administrative Office of said bus company (see Exhibit
"B" and
Exhibit "F").
Rufino Alcaraz described the area where Fiscal Mayo, the victim was shot as well lighted
(TSN, May 9, 1989, p. 7). The lighting facilities inside the Bus Terminal of the Victory Liner
consisted of fluorescent lamps installed at the ceiling. A distance of four to five meters
separate one fluorescent lamp from another (TSN, May 9, 1989, p. 4). This was
corroborated by Felipe Hamtig (TSN, May 9, 1989, p. 5). This was likewise corroborated
by Ruel Ganiola who stated that the lighting facilities included the V.I.P. Parking Area
(TSN, May 22, 1989, p. 9).
Prosecuting witness Rufino Alcaraz was residing at Stall No. 1 at the Victory Liner
Compound on the day of the incident. He was only about five (5) meters from the assailant
when he heard a gunshot (TSN, May 3, 1989, pp. 5; 26). He saw the faces of both men
although they were in front of him because their faces were a little oblique (TSN, May 9,
1989, p. 28). The gunman was carrying a .45 cal. pistol (TSN, May 9, 1989, p. 38).
Witness Alcaraz first identified the gunman when he executed a different statement before
the police on the evening of July 17, 1988 right after the shooting. The gunman turned out
to be Elias Barasina, the accused (TSN, May 9, 1989, p. 37).
Prosecution witness Felipe Hamtig was employed as a security guard of the Lions Security
Agency with assignment at the Victory Liner Compound (V.I.P. Parking Area) at the time of
the incident. He was seated at his post at the V.I.P. Parking Area when he saw the
accused shoot the victim at the left cheek with a .45 cal. pistol (TSN, May 10, 1989, pp. 8-
9). He was only five (5) meters away from the victim then (TSN, May 10, 1989, p. 6). He
identified the gunman on the evening of July 17, 1988 when he was investigated by the
Kalookan City Policemen (Exhibit "C-1"). The gunman was Elias Barasina whom the
witness again identified during the trial (TSN, May 10, 1989, pp. 6-7).
Prosecution witness Ruel Ganiola was a resident of Stall No. 3 inside the Victory Liner
Compound at the time of the incident. He was then working as a porter at the Victory Liner
Compound. He was standing at the Sunshine Restaurant which is about 20 meters from
the V.I.P. Parking Area inside the Victory Liner compound when he heard a gunshot (TSN,
May 22, 1989, p. 10).
He saw the gunman running towards Rizal Avenue Extension from the V.I.P. Parking area.
In doing so, the gunman passed by the place where Ganiola and another porter, Michael
Estapia were standing in front of the Sunshine Restaurant (TSN, 5/22/89, pp. 36-37).
Because he recognized the gunman, he identified the latter inside the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters on July 17, 1988 (TSN, May 22, 1989, p. 18). The gunman was the
accused, Elias Barasina.
Prosecution witness Prudencio Motos was a Barangay Councilman compound the area
around the Victory Liner Compound and owned a carinderia inside the compound of the
Victory Liner Compound at the time of the incident. The gunman was three meters away
when he passed in front of witness Motos outside the Sunshine Restaurant. Witness
Motos saw the face of the gunman (TSN, May 23, 1989, p. 24). He was with Pfc.
Napoleon Francia and others when the accused was brought to the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters (TSN, May 23, 1989, p. 3). He identified the gunman at the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters on July 18, 1988 (TSN, May 23, 1989, p. 16).
The gun which was confiscated from the accused by Pfc. Napoleon Francia on July 17,
1988 is a cal. .45 pistol marked "Colt" with Serial
No. 008645 with four (4) live bullets and one (1) empty shell. It was marked as Exhibit "U"
during the trial. The four live bullets which were taped together and the markings exhibit
was placed on the tape. The spent shell was marked as Exhibit "V-1".
Barangay Councilman identified the gun in Court. He was able to recognize it because of
the extended barrel and because of its serial number. He first saw the gun when the
gunman passed by him. He was one meter away when Pfc. Francia confiscated the gun
from the gunman. (TSN, June 27, 1989, p. 3). He saw Pfc. Francia recover the spent bullet
from the gun while Pfc. Francia, Motos and others were inside the jeep with the gunman
on their way to the police headquarters (TSN, June 27, 1989, p. 6).
Witness Rufino Alcaraz testified that the accused used a .45 cal. pistol (TSN, May 9, 1989,
pp. 8; 39-40).
Witness Felipe Hamtig stated that the accused used a .45 cal. pistol in shooting the victim
(TSN, May 10, 1989, pp. 8-9).
Witness Ruel Ganiola stated that when the gunman passed by him the gunman was
holding a .45 cal. pistol handgun (TSN, May 22, 1989,
p. 52).
Witness Pfc. Arsenio Nacis identified the gun which was turned over to him by Pfc. Francia
and Councilman Motos and which was previously marked as Exhibit "U". This was
previously marked as Exhibit "U". This was previously confiscated from the accused.
(TSN, June 27, 1989, p. 12). He recognized the gun (Exhibit "U") because of its serial no.
and because of its extended muzzle which is called a "Pin gun" (TSN, June 27, 1989, pp.
12-13).
The accused, Elias Barasina is not a licensed firearm holder of any kind. This was certified
to by the Chief of the Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearms and
Explosives Unit located at Camp Crame, Quezon City in a certification dated June 13,
1989 (Exhibit "T"). The Certification was brought to the courtroom by Lt. Agrifino Javier of
the aforesaid office. Lt. Javier identified the Certificate marked Exhibit "T".
In the course of the trial, the accused, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash on the
ground of double jeopardy. It was alleged that the accused was in jeopardy of being
convicted of two offenses — Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms based on an
alleged act which is defined and penalized as only one offense under Paragraph 2 of
Section 1 of P.D. 1866 which states:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.
This Motion was opposed by the Prosecution.
In an Order, dated August 17, 1989, this Court denied the Motion to Quash and cited the
case of Tangan vs. People, 155 SCRA 435; 436 in support of its Order. Its ruling follows:
There is no double jeopardy in the filing of the two aforesaid criminal cases against the
accused because the first jeopardy has not yet attached. It is well settled that the mere
filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offenses does not yet afford the
accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice
for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double
jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or
that the same has been terminated without his express consent. It is the conviction or
jeopardy of being convicted or the acquittal of the accused or termination of the case that
bars further prosecution of the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. (Tangan vs. People, 155
SCRA 435, 436).
Another issue cropped up during the Joint Trial. The cross examination of prosecution
witness Felipe Hamtig was not completed because he did not return despite the issuance
of subpoena and a warrant for his arrest. Hamtig testified on direct examination on May
10, 1989. A partial cross-examination was conducted. Because of the failure of Hamtig to
return for the completion of the cross-examination, accused through counsel moved to
strike out the records the entire testimony of Felipe Hamtig. The principal basis of the
Motion is the right of the accused to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against as
mentioned under
Sec. 14, Article III of the Constitution of the Philippines; as stated under paragraph F of
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and as listed in paragraph 6 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This was opposed by the Public Prosecutor in his
Memorandum of August 4, 1989.
This Court denied on August 8, 1989 the Motion to Strike Out the Testimony of Felipe
Hamtig. This was based on the following:
1. The partial cross examination of the witness was fairly through considering that the
same could be found from page 22 to page 37 of the Transcript of Stenographic notes
taken on May 10, 1989;
2. The Court was bale to make its observations on the reliability of its witness and to
determine if his testimony in chief was adversely affected by the partial cross examination;
3. The failure to complete the cross-examination was not the fault of the Prosecution. The
defense moved for a postponement of the cross-examination on May 10, 1989 but this
was opposed by the Prosecution. As a compromise, the Defense was directed to cross
examine the witness up to 11:00 A.M. on said date. Had the postponement not been
made, the cross-examination should have been completed on May 10, 1989;
4. Defense counsel failed to enter into the records how the absent witness, Felipe Hamtig
would have testified if he were available for further cross-examination; and
5. The right of cross-examination is not absolute and the Court may at its discretion, limit
the same and consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice (People vs.
Gorospe, 129 SCRA 242, 243).
The version of the accused follows:
Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on July 17, 1988, he was walking with his brother
Juanito, along Rizal Avenue Extension near the LRT Station, Caloocan City. They were on
the right side of the Rizal Avenue Extension because they were taking the light railway on
their way to Pasay. The accused noticed persons chasing each other at his back. Then
somebody bumped him and he stumbled on the sidewalk. Something fell down from said
person when he stumbled. This man stood up immediately and ran away. The accused
picked up the thing which fell from the stranger. He saw that it was a gun. He ran after the
man to return the gun and he even fired a warning shot. However, he lost his track of the
man who ran inside the LRT Station. As he was holding the gun, policemen who were
running after the said man accosted the accused and took the gun from him. He was then
brought to the Caloocan City Police Headquarters. He submitted his sworn statement to
the Fiscal who conducted a re-investigation of this case (see Exhibit "3", "3-A", "3-B", "3-
C"). The testimony of the accused was partly corroborated by Rodolfo Laurente, a balot
vendor. (pp. 2-12, Decision;
p. 27, Rollo in CA-G.R. No. 10892).
xxx xxx xxx
One of the principal defenses set up by the accused was that he was mauled, maltreated
and forced to sign two documents by the Caloocan policemen while he was inside a small
cell inside the Caloocan City Police Headquarters. He identified those two documents as
Exhibit "P", the "Paalala", dated July 18, 1988, and his statement dated July 18, 1988
(Exhibits "Q", "Q-1", "Q-2"). He further claimed that he never read any of those documents
and that he was not assisted by any lawyer during their execution. He claimed further that
he did not know Atty. Abelardo Torres. He signed an Affidavit of retraction dated July 22,
1988 (Exhibit "2", "2-a", "2-b"). (pp. 2-13, RTC Decision; pp. 27 et seq., Rollo in CA-G.R.
No. 10892).
Accused-appellant was found guilty by the court of origin on February 28, 1990, the
decretal portion of the discourse reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Elias Barasina y
Layneza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of:
1. Violation of Par. 1 of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm); and
2. Murder.
This Court hereby sentences said accused Elias Barasina as a result of his conviction
under P.D. 1866 to suffer imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17) Years, FOUR (4) Months
and ONE (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum to TWENTY (20) Years
of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs after taking into consideration
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
This Court also sentences said accused as a result of his conviction of Murder, to suffer
imprisonment of TEN (10) Years and ONE (1) Day of Prision Mayor as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) Years, EIGHT (8) Months and ONE (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal, as
maximum, there being no aggravating circumstances and after taking into consideration
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and to pay the costs.
The accused is hereby directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Fiscal Lino Mayo, the
amount of P61,000.00 representing the funeral and burial expenses of the victim and the
amount of P500,000.00 representing the moral damages suffered by his widow and the
loss of income as a result of the victim's death at the age of 50 years.
The subject of .45 cal. pistol and the subject of 4 rds. of live ammos., one cartridge case
and one magazine are forfeited in favor of the government and the Deputy Sheriff of this
Court is hereby directed to turn over the custody of the same to the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Unit, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for their disposition.
The accused shall be credited to the full record of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to
Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, provided the conditions enumerated therein have
between complied with.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 5, RTC Decision; p. 27, Rollo in CA-G.R. No. 10892).
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals (de Pano, Elbiñas, Gutierrez [P], JJ.), acting
on the appeal interposed by accused-appellant, rendered a decision jacking up the
penalties imposed on accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua for each of the two crimes
committed, thusly:
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED. In Criminal Case No. C-
30992 for illegal possession of firearm, the accused-appellant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. In Criminal Case No. 30995 for murder, he is likewise sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. With respect to this civil liabilities, in addition to the awards made by the trial
court, the accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the victim's widow the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
(p. 11, RTC Decision; p. 122, Rollo).
The records do not show that the case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure although the
records of the case were forwarded to us by the Court of Appeals on May 11, 1993 (p.
1, Rollo in G.R. No. 109993) after the assailed decision was promulgated on December
29, 1992. Seemingly, accused-appellant was served a copy of the decision of the
appellate court from which no entry of judgment was made because of the proscription
under Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In any event, the
appeal was later accepted by us (p. 2, Rollo in G.R. No. 109993) and accused-appellant
was thereupon required to file his brief following which the Solicitor General filed a brief for
the People.
Accused-appellant submits that two errors supposedly committed below ought to be
rectified at this stage, in that the Court of Appeals erred in:
I exclusion of other lawyers. Verily, and as tersely put by the trial court:
. . . affirming the ruling of the trial court admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession
of the herein accused-appellant.
II
. . . affirming the judgment of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt despite insufficient evidence adduced by the prosecution. (p. 10, Rollo in
G.R. No. 109993)
To buttress the first point, accused-appellant makes reference to the manner the
extrajudicial confession and waiver were extracted from him in the absence of a lawyer of
his own choice. He maintains that he procured the services of Atty. Romeo Mendoza in
the course of the custodial investigation but it was turned out that it was Atty. Abelardo
Torres who assisted during the interrogation upon the directive of P.Lt. Surara (p. 12, Brief
for Appellant; p. 21, rollo). Accused-appellant concludes that the extrajudicial statement
can not thus be utilized against him for want of competent, independent counsel of his own
choice.
Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the rights of a person
undergoing investigation reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of a counsel.
The phrase "competent and independent" and "preferably of his own choice" were explicit
details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1986
Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period,
the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and
therefore beholden to the military
(I Record of the Constitutional Commission 731-734; 1 Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 1987 First ed., p. 347). Yet, the apprehension of the human
rights advocates then along this line hardly inspires belief in the case at bar inasmuch as
there was no indication below that accused-appellant did in fact choose Atty. Romeo
Mendoza to assist him while in the process of offering the inculpatory statements, to the
. . . As previously stated, the execution of these two documents were testified to by Cpl.
Daniel del Rosario who prepared Exhibits "P" and "Q". Exhibit "P" is actually a waiver
signed by the accused by the investigator Cpl. del Rosario and by Atty. Abelardo Torres.
Exhibit "Q" is actually a confession signed by the accused and by Atty. Abelardo Torres,
the assisting counsel of the accused. Both Cpl. del Rosario and Atty. Torres described
how the documents were prepared. Atty. Torres related how he was called and how he
actually assisted the accused in the preparation of the two documents. Lt. Norberto Surara
testified as to why he called Atty. Torres to assist the accused then. He identified his own
sworn statement marked as Exhibit "Z" to show his participation in the execution of the two
documents.
(p. 13, RTC Decision, p. 27, Rollo in CA-G.R. No. 10892).
which observations were correctly sustained by the Court of Appeals, through Justice
Angelina S. Gutierrez of the Ninth Division in this wise:
The claim of herein appellant that he was assisted by counsel, not of his own choice, is
belied by records. During the custodial investigation, he failed to indicate in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney of his own
preference before speaking or giving any statement. Indeed, there is no showing that he
manifested any resistance when he was assisted by Atty. Torres. We are thus inclined to
agree with the Solicitor General that the hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as counsel by the
appellant after the custodial investigation is an afterthought.
(p. 8, CA Decision; p. 119, Rollo in CA-G.R. No. 10892)
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12[1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling
his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be
solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the
framers of the charter.
Assailed as well is the testimony of Felipe Hamtig, the security guard at the V.I.P. parking
lot at the Victory Liner Compound, which accused-appellant claims should be expunged
from the record considering that said witness was not thoroughly cross-examined (p. 12,
Brief for Appellant; p. 22, Rollo). But what is proscribed by statutory norm (Section 1[f],
Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure) and jurisprudential precept is the absence of
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness (U.S. vs. Javier, 37 Phil. 449 [1918];
2 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1988 ed., p. 296) and certainly does not cover
the situation where the witness had been extensively examined on material points and
thereafter failed to appear (People vs. Gorospe, 129 SCRA 233 [1984]);
2 Regalado, Vide at p. 534) more so, when, in this case, the failure to complete the cross
examination was not brought about by the prosecution (p. 12, RTC Decision; p.
27, Rollo in CA-G.R. 10892).
On the merits of the case, there is no need to re-emphasize accused-appellant's culpability
derived from the positive open court declarations of the People's witnesses since the
details indicating accused-appellant's participation have been sufficiently demonstrated to
such a degree as to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. In the light of
the mass of positive evidence adduced by the prosecution below when juxtaposed with
accused-appellant's naked assertion of denial, coupled with the strange and bizarre (Nutty
would probably be the pedestrian term) behavior of accused-appellant in allegedly picking
up a gun dropped by the imaginary gunman, attempting to return it to said gunman, and
when the killer would not stop, firing a round to call his attention, we have no recourse but
to agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, on account of the
elementary axiom in adjective law that affirmative, and, categorical testimony is stronger
than negative testimony (People vs. Angeles, 218 SCRA 352 [1993]). Verily, the efficacy
of accused-appellant's own version that he merely picked up the gun which supposedly fell
from a stranger who bumped appellant, presumably for the purpose of returning the
firearm to its rightful owner (p. 7, Brief for Appellant; p. 16, Rollo) had been adequately
diminished by Prudencio Motos who sat on the witness stand to particularly say that
nobody bumped accused-appellant near the LRT station at Kalookan City (tsn, August 31,
1989, pp. 2-4; p. 24, Brief for Appellee; p. 67, Rollo).
With respect to the penalty, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua, for the illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. C-30992,
and another reclusion perpetua for murder in Criminal Case No. 30995, inasmuch as this
action dovetails with the earlier doctrine laid down by the Court in People vs. Tac-an (182
SCRA 601 [1990]) and reiterated in People vs. Morato, (G.R. Nos. 95358-59, July 5,
1993).
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Court of Appeals, the conviction of accused-
appellant in Criminal Cases No. 30992 and 30995 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications: (a) the penalty for each offense shall be reclusion perpetua and (b) the civil
indemnity to be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of the victim is increased to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97936 May 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand up
for themselves. Thus, it protected those under custodial investigation with the all-important
right to counsel. We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the
scales of justice. For denial of his right to counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and
John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The Information against
them reads:
That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another , did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, in the manner as follows:
on the date and in the place aforementioned, the said accused, one armed with handgun,
pursuant to their conspiracy blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a
Mercedez Benz crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of) Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa,
this City, and did then and there, by means of violence and intimidation against persons,
take, rob and carry away his cash money amounting to P6,600.00; one gold necklace with
cross pendant, 7 karat, worth P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth P155,000.00;
one (1) 3 karat gold ring worth P80,000.00; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style, worth
P27,000.00; one (1) solid gold bracelet worth 363,600.00, Philippine Currency, belonging
to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party in the total amount aforementioned; that on the occasion of the robbery and pursuant
to their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and taking advantage
the(ir) superior strength, with the use of handgun, shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA,
a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which resulted to the insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such
amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law. 1
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The others
remained at large.
Trial proceeded only as against the three.
The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private complainant DR. DEMETRIO
Z. MADRID spent the night at his boarding house, located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street,
Bago-Bantay, Quezon City. He wanted to return that night to his residence at Project 6,
Quezon City. However, his driver, Lorenzo Bernales, advised him not to leave that night
for Bernales overheard that the group of Balbino and Bienvenido Echavez would rob him
on his way home. He heeded the advice.
It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again asked his driver to bring him
to his main residence in Project 6, Quezon City. While traversing Road 14, a gray-reddish
car overtook the Mercedes Benz he was riding and blocked their way. Three (3) men
swiftly alighted from the car blocking them and barged into his Benz. The first grabbed the
driver's seat and pushed his driver to the other side of the seat. The second occupied the
right side of his driver. The third sat beside Dr. Madrid at the back sent and punched him.
Simultaneously, the man at the right side of his driver pulled out his gun and announced a
hold-up.2
The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch, studded
with diamonds, worth P155,000.00, a three (3) carat diamond ring worth P80,000.00,
another two (2) carat domino-style ring, surrounded with diamonds worth P27,000.00, a
necklace worth P27,000.00, a bracelet worth P50,000.00, and his wallet containing
P6,600.00. 3
After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the malefactors stopped his car
and alighted. The worst came. The man at the right side of his driver shot the latter at the
chest before fleeing. Dr. Madrid and his driver were rushed by concerned citizens to the
Veterans Memorial Hospital. Two hours later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of
the gunshot wound he sustained.  Dr. Madrid survived.  He reported the incident to the
4 5
Quezon City police. When no action was taken on his case, he filed his complaint with the
Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS).6
Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the Special Operations Group
headed by Capt. Raul Boac, after a surveillance of the suspects, interrogated Bienvenido
Echavez in Camp Crame. Two days later, they apprehended Balbino Echavez and
Alejandro Lucero. They turned them over to the Investigation Department of the CIS. 7
Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared
that even before the investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the
crime and that he was the one who shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid. 8 identified one of the men to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS Special Operations Group.
In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no
lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer.  In 9 reveal the identity of the complainant. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS agent brought
due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m.
He identified himself as the lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about
the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was.
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He
explained to Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any
statement to the investigators, and that even if he has already given a statement, he may
refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta
gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. When the
investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake
of his friend, Capt. Emilio Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need,
he could be reached at his residence.
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's
house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was presented to Atty.
Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS agents , Atty.
Peralta examined Exhibit "C" and explained to Lucero its Legal implications. He asked
Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily. Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty.
Peralta then signed Exhibit "C". 10
The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7, 1988, he was at his house
in Caloocan City. He woke up at 6:30 a.m., stayed at his house the whole day repairing
the upholstery of a customer's chair. He was then with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and
his wife Mylen Lucero. He worked until 5 p.m. that day.
Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2) months after the
commission of the crime. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men
accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and
blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was He was blindfolded the whole night
and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers. Later, he
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He
was not informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they
him to a clinic inside Camp Crame. The doctor saw the contusions on his body. He
advised that he be treated. The CIS agent refused and they left the clinic.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this
case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was
made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "C")   under duress. He
11
denied engaging the services of Atty. Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was
not present during his actual custodial interrogation. 
12
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The
trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero. The dispositive portion of the
Decision   reads:
13
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO ECHAVEZ y
VALIDA are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence; and
2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide. Alejandro
Lucero is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of the deceased
victim Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by his family; and b) to pay
Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid the sum of P363,600.00 representing the cash money, and money
value of the jewelries and wristwatch he lost due to the robbery at bar.
SO ORDERED. 14
Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of error:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCES (SIC)
OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT, NOT CREDIBLE,
UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
ALLEGED CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT
CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS CASE.
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION (MADE IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION) WHICH WAS OBTAINED
THRU FORCE, VIOLENCE AND WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS
OWN CHOICE OR ENGAGED BY ANY PERSON ON HIS BEHALF OR APPOINTED BY
THE LOWER COURT AND THEREFORE SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.
4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY THE PROSECUTION.
5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF HIS
DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE; AND INSPITE OF THE LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
6. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
NOT ACQUITTING HIM LIKE HIS CO-ACCUSED AND ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS
[THE ECHAVEZ BROTHERS] OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
We find the appeal meritorious.
The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the
complainant, and (b) his extra-judicial confession admitting his participation in the crime.
We find that the evidence proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.
Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who
identified appellant, is seriously open to doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record that
appellant had to participate at the police line-up four (4) times before he was finally
identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no reason for the ambivalence. The robbery took place in
broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no mask. They drove them around for three
(3) hours. Considering these circumstances, there is no reason for Dr. Madrid's failure to
immediately identify appellant.
We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. Madrid during the trial. Initially,
Dr. Madrid claimed that he could identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold-
up.   At another point, Dr. Madrid said he could identify two of the malefactors.   In his
15 16
affidavit, Dr. Madrid presented he could identify all three.   Appellant's conviction cannot
17
be made to rest on this nebulous identification by Dr. Madrid.
Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial confession.
The 1987 Constitution   requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a
18
crime should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel
because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them
inadmissible.   We take pride in constitutionalizing this right to counsel even while other
19
countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We have sustained
the inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without any apology.
The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Indeed,
it did not impose a rigorous respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was
"substantial" compliance with the requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the
intent of the Constitution. The records show that Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel
of choice of appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second night of appellant's
detention. More exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with
appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from
appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him.   Worse, Atty.
20
Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started.
He said he had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude did not speak well of the
importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the
commission of a very serious offense. It was during his absence that appellant gave an
uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled confession for the next day,
appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of
these agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if
he signed it voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of
the confession. Atty. Peralta was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to
counsel was not infringed. We disagree.

We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any
kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at bench
clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta.
In People v. De Guzman,   we held that in custodial investigation, the right to counsel
21

attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the accused. In
this case, at the crucial point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left
appellant to attend the wake of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave his
uncounselled extra-judicial a confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was
unprotected from mischief cannot convict.

Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak
defense. Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Given the uncertainty of
appellant's identification and the inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession, there is no
thread of evidence to criminally inculpate appellant.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City , Branch CIII, convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of
robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83466 October 13, 1999 One (1) bag amounting to 20.00

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant, —————

vs.
ELIZALDE CULALA y BOGNOT, plaintiff-appellee. TOTAL P1,020.00

PURISIMA, J.: belonging to one Eduardo C. Simoy, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
total amount of P1,020.00, and that during the commission of this crime and on the
This is an appeal   from the Decision   dated February 1, 1987, of the Regional Trial Court
1 2
occasion thereof, the said accused, with intent to kill the said Eduardo C. Simoy, did then
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, convicting appellant Elizalde Culala y Bognot of and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bladed
the crime of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 4916-V-82; and sentencing him instrument he was then provided said Eduardo C. Simoy, hitting the latter on the different
to suffer the penalty of parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical which directly caused his death.
death,   as follows:
3

Contrary to law. 6

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the accused Elizalde Culala is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide punishable under art. 249 par. 1, With the accused pleading not guilty upon arraignment,   trial ensued.
6

and considering the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of death; and to pay by way of indemnification the heirs of the victim
the sum of P30,000.00, to indemnify the victims the sum of P500.00 for the uncovered
Ohm Meter and P100.00 cash taken from the victim and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.  4
The version of the prosecution as testified on by its lone eyewitness Juliana Celon-Simoy,
mother of the victim, runs as follows:
At about 9:50 p.m. of March 14, 1982, Juliana Simoy went out to fetch her twenty-three
(23) year old son, Eduardo C. Simoy, a radio and television technician.   Proceeding to R.
7

Delfin St., she saw, at a distance of fifteen (15) meters, in front of Interworld Steel Factory,
Filed, on May 10, 1982 by Provincial Fiscal Pascual C. Kliatchko, the Information indicting two men whom she did not recognize as the area was quite dark.   One man was picking
8

the accused-appellant, alleges: the left pocket of the other, at the same time pointing a knife at the back of the latter.   The
9

aggressor then grabbed the bag hanging on the left shoulder of the other man and
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1982, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro thereafter, stabbed him at the back.   Out of fear, Juliana Simoy sought cover at the gate
10

Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused of Skylark Plastic Corp., located on the road side.   After accomplishing his evil deed, the
11

Elizalde Culala y Bognot, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to gain, by means of violence, force and intimidation, take rob and carry away with him the
following, to wit:
culprit ran at the direction where Juliana was hiding. Nearing the gate of Skylark which
was then illuminated, he slowed down and walked, giving Juliana an opportunity to see his
face before, and as, he passed right in front of the said gate (at a distance of one (1)
meter),   with the aid of the light emanating from an electric post. Thereafter, accused-
12

Cash money amounting to P100.00 appellant fled towards the Batimana Compound.  13

Ohm meter tester amounting to 400.00 As the workers of Interworld Steel started to come out and gather around the lifeless body
in front of the factory, Juliana took a look at the victim. It was only then that she learned
Tools and spare parts amounting to 500.00 that the victim was her son, Eduardo Simoy. The bag belonging to Eduardo was later
recovered at Batimana Compound. Missing from the same, was the Ohm meter of the
victim worth P400.00 and cash of
P100.00.  14
On March 16, 1982, Juliana Simoy positively identified Elizalde Culala in a police line-up
as the person who robbed and killed her son, on the night of March 14, 1982.  15
The prosecution introduced in evidence the extra-judicial confession of the accused-
appellant admitting the commission of the crime, alleged to have been obtained in the
presence and with the assistance of Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who testified that he apprised the accused of his constitutional
rights. 
16
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, placed reliance on the defense of denial and alibi.
He theorized that he could not have committed the crime because at the alleged time of its
perpetration (around 9:00 p.m. of March 14, 1982) he was having a good time at a certain
Bell's Pub house in Monumento, where he stayed until the early morning of March 15,
1982.   He pointed out that the extra-judicial confession executed by him suffer from
17
constitutional infirmities and consequently, inadmissible as evidence because it was
extracted under duress, force and intimidation and was only countersigned later by the
Municipal
Attorney.  18
After trial, the court a quo came out with a judgment of conviction. Therefrom, appellant
took this appeal, theorizing that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT JULIANA COLON SIMOY,
MOTHER OF THE VICTIM, EDUARDO C. SIMOY, POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE
ACCUSED ELIZALDE CULALA y BOGNOT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED ELIZALDE CULALA y
BOGNOT GUILTY OF THE ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE AND SENTENCING HIM TO
THE PENALTY OF DEATH.  19
Well-settled to the point of being elementary is the doctrine that questions of fact are best
resolved by the trial court. The factual findings of the trial court are to be upheld on appeal
unless it is clearly shown that facts of substance had been overlooked or circumstances of
significance have been disregarded.   In the case under consideration, the trial court gave
20
credence to the testimony of eye-witness Juliana Simoy, who categorically identified the
accused-appellant at the police station as the person who robbed and killed her son. She
narrated, in part:
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. SORIANO:
Q You said you went to the police station the following day and upon arriving there, you
inquired from the police if there was already person arrested in connection with the
stabbing incident, is that correct?
A I did not inquire, sir. What I did at the following day, I went to the Municipal Building
because I heard from the people talking within our vicinity that the person who did the
stabbing was already apprehended and when I went there, the policemen asked me,
"Mrs., can you recognize the person who stabbed your son?" and I told them that if I would
see him again, I would be able to recognize him, and then the police tole (sic) me, "will you
please look at these persons and point to us that man." When I looked at the men around
there, I saw a man sitting with his head bowed. I asked the policeman to ask that man to
show his face to me and the policeman told the man: "Hoy, tumingin ka sa kanya" and
when he look (sic) at me, I told the police after I was sure that he was really the man
whom I saw and told the police he is the one.
Q So it is clear that you saw him in that place at the instigation of the police?
FISCAL:
That is misleading; how can it be instigation when she voluntarily went to the police station
because she had heard already from the people talking that the accused was already
arrested.
ATTY. SORIANO:
And what I am after is, what I am referring to is that she could have not pointed to that
person had she (he) not been pointed to her by the police.
COURT:
That is misleading. The police just asked her to look without any specific person being ATTY. SORIANO:
pointed to and it was the witness on her own to ask the police wo (sic) ask the man who
was stooping, his face, to let his face be shown to the witness. Therefore, it is not x x x           x x x          x x x
instigation by the police. It was upon the request of the witness.
Q And you saw him only on his profile of his face, is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx 21

FISCAL:
Juliana Simoy's credibility is not diminished by her admission that she saw the appellant
for the first time during the commission of the crime. On the contrary, it appears that she I think the question is a little bit vague.
indeed had a clear view of the accused-appellant as he approached the gate where she
was hiding. Pertinent portions of the unwavering testimony of the prosecution witness,
COURT:
state:
What do you mean?
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. SORIANO:
ATTY. SORIANO:
Q. What part of the face did you see?
Q When you saw that person who was according to you carrying the bag in the left hand
and in the right hand he was holding a knife, you were behind and he was in front, is that
right? A. The whole face, sir.

A I was here and he was there. (Witness pointing to 2 distances which the way they look Q. You said that he was walking along the road; he stopped, he did not run anymore when
at them they were opposite each other.) he reached your place but still walking in the direction of Batimana Compound?

COURT: FISCAL:

Q. Let us clarify. When for the first time did you see the accused walking? While you were Objection.
hiding, was it at the time when he did not pass yet the point when he was exactly in front
of you? COURT:

A. He has not yet passed me while he was walking I was looking at him. Sustained.

Q. You mean to say that the first time you saw him walking on that road he was somehow ATTY. SORIANO:
facing you or you could see his face, is that correct?
He was walking already.
A. Yes, sir, as a matter of fact he even looked at my direction.
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx  22

Reform the question.

ATTY. SORIANO:
Q. According to you this person, the stabber stopped running but continued walking and
passed by you, at the time you said you were looking. So the person who was running was
facing in the direction of the road, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir, but my position was I was facing him.
Q. And if you are facing him then you saw the right side of his face, is that correct?
A. I saw his face entirely because he was walking towards my position where I was
standing.
xxx xxx xxx  23
But even without the accused-appellant's extra-judicial confession, the judgment of
conviction under scrutiny is affirmable as the testimonial and documentary evidence on
record have established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent the inadmissible extrajudicial confession of accused appellant, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, primarily anchored on the narration by accused-appellant as to
how he attacked the deceased, cannot be considered. Anyway, with or without treachery
aggravating the crime, the imposable penalty would still be reclusion perpetua, considering
that the crime happened on March 14, 1982. Section 19 (1) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that "(a)ny death penalty for already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua."
While Republic Act No. 7659, which reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous
crimes including robbery with homicide, was thereafter passed and took effect on

December 31, 1993, such law, being penal in nature, cannot have retrospective effect.  29

So also, it bears stressing that a violent incident such as the one complained of may even
Following prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity should be increased to Fifty
serve as a catalyst to the witness' memory. The face of Elizalde Culala must have been, in
Thousand (P50,000) Pesos.   However, the indemnity for the unrecovered Ohm meter
30

the very nature of things, forcefully impinged upon and etched into the memory of Juliana
should only be P400.00, the value thereof alleged and proven.
Simoy by the atrocity perpetrated before her eyes.  24

All things studiedly considered, and viewed in proper perspective, the mind of the court
With respect to the alibi theorized upon by accused-appellant, the Court believes, and so
can rest easy on a finding of accused-appellant's guilt.
rules, that the same cannot hold against the positive identification by Juliana Simoy of the
1âwphi1.nêt

appellant as the culprit. Basic is the rule that alibi which is easy to concoct, cannot prevail
over the positive identification by the witnesses who were not shown to have been ill- WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment in Criminal Case No. 4916-v-82 is AFFIRMED with
motivated to testify against the accused-appellant.   Thus, in the absence of proof of
25 MODIFICATION, as above ratiocinated, and the accused-appellant, Elizalde Culala y
improper motive on the part of Juliana Simoy to implicate accused-appellant in the Bognot, is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
commission of the malefaction sued upon, there is no cause or ground for not giving due and is hereby sentenced therefor to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
weight and probative value to her testimony.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Eduardo C. Simoy in the amount of Fifty Thousand
On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant, it is worthy to (P50,000.00) Pesos as indemnity ex delicto, P400.00 for the unrecovered Ohm Meter and
note that during the custodial investigation he was assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, P100.00 for the cash taken from the deceased. Costs against accused-appellant.
Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. In People vs. Bandula,   it was held that a
26

Municipal Attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution.   As 27 SO ORDERED.
a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor
and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including
the maintenance of peace and order. It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can
effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests.
He is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigations.   Consequently, for being violative of Constitution, the
28

extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is inadmissible.

G.R. No. 159659             October 12, 2006
RUBEN S. SIA and JOSEPHINE SIA, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and TERESITA LEE, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners urge this
Court to nullify and set aside the April 25, 2003 Decision,1 and the July 29, 2003
Resolution,2 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 68057.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City, Branch 27 with three counts3 of violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective
Decree.
On October 15, 2001, the petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash alleging that (1)
the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) the City Prosecutors'
Office of Naga City has no authority to file the informations.
On October 18, 2001, the trial court denied the motion holding that it had jurisdiction over
the case. It also scheduled an arraignment on October 29, 2001. On October 23, 2001, the
petitioners filed a Motion to Resolve the Other Ground Raised in the Motion to Quash, i.e.,
whether the city prosecutor had the authority to file the informations. On October 24, 2001,
the trial court denied the motion stating that the city prosecutor was authorized to file the
informations. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Arraignment
was then reset to November 21, 2001. Petitioners' Motion for Postponement of their
arraignment was also denied. On November 21, 2001, the trial court appointed a counsel
de oficio for petitioner Ruben S. Sia and proceeded with the arraignment.
Before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with Application
for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 4 The petitioners
claimed that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged and the city
prosecutor had no authority to file the informations; that only the enforcement officers
under Executive Order No. 715 are authorized to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to
subdivisions. Moreover, they asserted that petitioner Ruben S. Sia was denied his right to
counsel when the trial court forced him to enter a plea with only a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the assailed orders AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court for the following reasons: (1)
the informations stated that petitioners violated Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 by failing to
register with the Register of Deeds of Naga City, the Contracts to Sell they executed in
favor of respondent Teresita Lee over several subdivision lots she purchased; (2) the acts
complained of were within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; and (3) the penalty
provided by law for the violation, i.e., imprisonment of not more than ten years, is within
the trial court's jurisdiction. Similarly, the appellate court sustained the city prosecutor's
authority to file the informations conformably with Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.7 Finally, it ruled that the trial court did not transgress petitioner Ruben S. Sia's right
to counsel since the preference in the choice of counsel expressed in Section 12, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution8 does not necessarily mean that such choice by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent lawyers
from handling the defense.
Hence, this petition. The petitioners enumerate the grounds of their appeal, as follows:
[a] x x x the alleged act or omission complained of and charged in the questioned
Informations [do not] constitute a violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 otherwise known
as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree[.]
[b] x x x the City Prosecutors have [no] power or authority to institute and prosecute the
present case for alleged violation of the provisions of P.D. 957 even without a prior
determination thereof by the Enforcement Officers of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)[.]
[c] x x x the herein petitioner Ruben Sia was deprived of his [c]onstitutional right to due
process and to counsel considering that he was assisted only by a counsel de
oficio during his arraignment despite his insistence to be assisted by their newly hired
counsel de parte[.]9
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) Did the charges in the informations constitute violations
of P.D. No. 957? (2) Does the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City have authority to file
the informations? and (3) Was petitioner Ruben S. Sia deprived of his right to counsel
when only a counsel de oficio assisted him during his arraignment?
After considering the submission of the parties, we find the present petition without merit.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that P.D. No. 957 is applicable only to residential
subdivision and condominium projects and not to commercial subdivision projects as in
this case, and that the property involved had been classified commercial and industrial in
City Ordinance No. 93-04110 and Resolution No. 93-26111 of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Naga City. Furthermore, petitioners add, the documents required to be
registered with the Register of Deeds under Section 17 of P.D. No. 957, refer to lands that
have been converted into a subdivision project for residential purposes.
Respondent Lee maintains that petitioners' Development Permit (DP No. 92-0415) showed
that the project was classified as socialized housing while the Zoning Administrator's
Certification dated May 14, 1992, indicated that the project was situated in a residential
zone in accordance with the Zoning Ordinance of Naga City. Thus, petitioners' subdivision
is residential. She also asserts that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 957, the registration of
the subdivision plan by the owner of a parcel of land who caused its conversion into a
subdivision is different from the subsequent registration of the contracts to sell, deeds of
sale and other similar instruments required by the same provision. Hence, according to
respondent, the petitioners are required to register the Contracts to Sell in her favor.
Pertinent here is Section 2 of P.D. No. 957, that defines a subdivision project as "a tract or
a parcel of land registered under Act No. 496 which is partitioned primarily for residential
purposes into individual lots with or without improvements thereon, and offered to the
public for sale, in cash or in installment terms. It shall include all residential, commercial,
industrial and recreational areas, as well as open spaces and other community and public
areas in the project."
Observe that the provision does not confine the meaning of "subdivision project" to parcels
of land classified as residential, contrary to what petitioners restrictively propose. A
subdivision project also includes parcels of land classified as commercial. Indeed, the
crucial requirement is that the subdivision project is partitioned primarily for residential
purposes, even if it is situated in a commercial district.
In this case, the subdivision project was intended primarily for residential purposes. No
less than petitioners' Development Permit showed that the project was for socialized
housing. Although the location of the subdivision was classified as a commercial district,
the subdivision project continued to be for residential purposes and was not removed from
the ambit of P.D. No. 957.
We have examined Sections 4 and 17 of P.D. No. 957, and found petitioners'
interpretation thereof, flawed. We quote these sections for clarity:
SEC. 4. Registration of Projects. - The registered owner of a parcel of land who wishes to
convert the same into a subdivision project shall submit his subdivision plan to the
Authority which shall act upon and approve the same, upon a finding that the plan
complies with the Subdivision Standards and Regulations enforceable at the time the plan
is submitted. The same procedure shall be followed in the case of a plan for a
condominium project except that, in addition, said Authority shall act upon and approve the
plan with respect to the building or buildings included in the condominium project in
accordance with the National Building Code (R.A. No. 6541).
The subdivision plan, as so approved, shall then be submitted to the Director of Lands for
approval in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 44 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended by R.A. No. 440): Provided, that in case of
complex subdivision plans, court approval shall no longer be required. The condominium
plan as likewise so approved, shall be submitted to the Register of Deeds of the province
or city in which the property lies and the same shall be acted upon subject to the
conditions and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 4 of the
Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726).
xxxx
SEC. 17. Registration. - All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar instruments
relative to the sale or conveyance of the subdivision lots and condominium units, whether
or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall be registered by the seller in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is situated.
Whenever a subdivision plan duly approved in accordance with Section 4 hereof, together
with the corresponding owner's duplicate certificate of title, is presented to the Register of
Deeds for registration, the Register of Deeds shall register the same in accordance with
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided, however, that if there
is a street, passageway or required open space delineated on a complex subdivision plan
hereafter approved and as defined in this Decree, the Register of Deeds shall annotate on
the new certificate of title covering the street, passageway or open space, a memorandum
to the effect that except by way of donation in favor of a city or municipality, no portion of
any street, passageway, or open space so delineated on the plan shall be closed or
otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without the requisite approval as provided
under Section 22 of this Decree.
Simply stated, P.D. No. 957 provides that when a registered owner of a parcel of land
wishes to convert the same into a subdivision project, he must register the subdivision
plan with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) (Section 4). Should he
decide to sell the lots therein, he must also register the subdivision project with the HLURB
and the subdivision plan with the Register of Deeds (Section 17, paragraph 2). Thereafter,
a registration certificate is issued to the subdivision owner and he may then apply for a
License to Sell the lots in the subdivision project. Whenever a lot is subsequently sold, the
subdivision owner is required to register the contract to sell, deed of sale and/or other
similar instrument with the Register of Deeds (Section 17, paragraph 1).
From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners are required to register the Contracts to Sell
in favor of respondent Lee, and their failure to do so is a violation of Section 17 of P.D. No.
957.
On the second issue, does the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City have authority to file
the informations?
Section 3 of E.O. No. 71 provides that:
SEC. 3. – Without prejudice to the Board's overall monitoring, enforcement and visitorial
powers, local chief executives shall designate appropriate local officials who meet or
possess the qualifications, standards and criteria set by the HLURB as enforcement
officers who shall have full power to monitor, investigate and enforce compliance
with these provisions of national laws and standards whose implementation have
been devolved to the local government in accordance with this Order.
Relative to the remaining provisions of the said laws, said officials shall, upon request of
local chief executive concerned, be authorized by the Board to initiate preliminary
monitoring and investigative activities, and issue initial notices to enforce compliance with
the Board's mandates, orders and decisions. In all such cases, the enforcement officer
shall endorse the records of the case, together with his actions thereon to the Board for its
final disposition and further enforcement actions.
In the exercise of his responsibilities under this Order, the said enforcement officer shall
be under the functional supervision of HLURB, which shall promulgate standard operating
procedures, policy guidelines and instructions for the guidance of said officials and call
their attention to effect such remedial measures as may be necessary. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, the enforcement officers of local government units shall only have full power to
monitor, investigate and enforce compliance with the provisions of national laws and
standards whose implementation have been devolved to the local government in
accordance with E.O. No. 71. Section 1 outlines which functions have been devolved:
(a) Approval of preliminary as well as final subdivision schemes and development plans of
all subdivisions, residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes of the public and
private sectors, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957 as amended and its
implementing standards, rules and regulations concerning approval of subdivision plans;
(b) Approval of preliminary and final subdivision schemes and development plans of all
economic and socialized housing projects as well as individual or group building and
occupancy permits covered by BP 220 and its implementing standards, rules and
regulations;
(c) Evaluation and resolution of opposition against the issuance of development permits
for any of the said projects, in accordance with the said laws and the Rules of Procedure
promulgated by HLURB incident thereto;
(d) Monitoring the nature and progress of land development of projects it has approved, as
well as housing construction in the case of house and lot packages, to ensure their
faithfulness to the approved plans and specifications thereof, and, imposition of
appropriate measures to enforce compliance therewith.
In the exercise of such responsibilities, the city or municipality concerned shall be guided
by the work program approved by the Board upon evaluation of the developers' financial,
technical and administrative capabilities;
Moreover, the city or municipality concerned may call on the Board for assistance in the
imposition of administrative sanctions and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the
institution of the criminal proceedings against violators;
(e) Assessment and collection of fees incident to the foregoing. In our view, petitioners' dilatory tactics should no longer be allowed to trump the progress
of the judicial process.
Noteworthy, the prosecution for the violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not included
in the foregoing functions. Hence, it follows logically that it remained with the City WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Prosecutors' Office of Naga City. Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 68057 dated April 25, 2003 and July 29, 2003, respectively,
are AFFIRMED.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It cannot be made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his No pronouncement as to costs.
Answer or Motion to Dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant. 12 The informations rest the cause of action on the SO ORDERED.
petitioners' failure to register the Contracts to Sell in accordance with Section 17 of P.D.
No. 957. The penalty imposable is a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos and/or
imprisonment of not more than ten years.13 Once again, clearly, the offense charged is well
within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

On the third issue, was Ruben S. Sia denied his right to counsel when the trial court forced
him to enter a plea with only a counsel de oficio?

We agree with herein respondent Lee when she said that petitioners were given ample
time by the trial court to get a counsel of their choice, but did not. Through the course of
the proceedings, the petitioners filed several motions. In its Orders dated November 21,
2001,14 the trial court noted that although the informations were filed on August 7, 2000,
the petitioners have not yet been arraigned as of that day. The delay could no longer be
countenanced.

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution assuring an accused of counsel of his
choice pertains specifically to a person under investigation. Even if we were to extend the
choice of a counsel to an accused in a criminal prosecution, the matter of the accused
getting a lawyer of his preference cannot be so absolute and arbitrary as would make the
choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.15 In Amion v.
Chiongson this Court stated:

Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another,
is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter.16
G.R. No. 114385 January 29, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EFREN JEREZ, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
Appellant Efren Jerez, along with Joselito Quijan, Zaldy Victa and Efren Bola (at large),
were charged with the crime of robbery with double homicide in Criminal Case No. 6755
before the Regional Trial Court   of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38, under an
1 was the last time, however, that the two were seen alive. When the latter failed to return
information   dated October 15, which reads as follows:
2 the following day, a search, led by Julian, was conducted. In the course of their inquiry, it
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 23, 1990 within the Basit Compound
at barangay Sta. Rosa, municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
(accused) armed with revolvers and bladed weapons conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of violence take from REYNALDO OCHOA
and JOSELITO BALBASTRO the following personal properties, to wit: cash money
amounting to P45,000.00, two (2) gold plated Seiko 5 wristwatch(es), one (1) golden
Horseshoe type ring and one (1) gold plated Ray-ban with the total value of P52,000.00,
Philippine Currency, belonging to said Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro; that on the
occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling the said accused to take, steal
and carry away the aforesaid articles, the herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior number and
strength, assault, attack and stab said Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro, thereby
inflicting upon them multiple mortal wounds on the different parts of their bodies, and as a
result thereof, the said Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro died instantly, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
A concise narration of the factual circumstances that led to appellant's conviction follows:
On May 23, 1990, while waiting for passengers near Josie's Restaurant in the Municipality
of Labo, Camarines Norte, tricycle driver Gil Villafranca was approached by a person, later
identified as appellant, informing him that he was looking for a carabao
buyer.   Subsequently, Villafranca accompanied the latter to the house of one Reynaldo
3
Ochoa. When apprised of purpose of the visit, Julian, the son of Reynaldo, sought his
father near Kathleen Pawnshop and advised him about the four carabaos allegedly for
sale at Barangay Teddy, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. 4
Appellant, together with Reynaldo and another carabao buyer, Joselito Balbastro, boarded
a motorcycle and proceeded to Barangay Teddy to check the condition of the carabaos. It
was learned that the motorcycle owned by Reynaldo was in the custody of the barangay
captain of Teddy, Jose Panganiban who told them that it was recovered from the Basit
Compound. Forthwith, they proceeded to the said compound and found Reynaldo and
Joselito lifeless, having sustained several mortally-inflicted stab wounds in different parts
of their bodies. The victims were divested of their watches, rayban glasses, and a sum of
money amounting to P37,000.00.
Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines Norte Integrated National Police testified
that upon appellant's arrest, the latter was apprised of his constitutional rights. On June
25, 1990, in the presence of Atty. August Schneider, an investigation conducted by the
police ensued and statements therein were reduced to writing, signed and sworn to before
Jose Panganiban Municipal Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or not
appellant understood the consequences of his confession. 5
Appellant, on the other hand, proferred alibi as his defense and that the extra-judicial
confession was allegedly obtained through the use of physical violence, coercion and
intimidation.
He contended that on the day the incident in question occurred, he was with his common
law wife, Mercedes Sarical, at the house of a certain Felix Rellolosa from 9:00 o'clock a.m.
to 4:00 o'clock p.m. drinking liquor with some friends.  He further tried to buttress his alibi
6
by declaring that no one saw with as a participant in the slaying nor was any property of
the victims recovered from him.
In a decision dated April 19, 1993, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding accused EFREN JEREZ guilty beyond
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to be admissible, it "must satisfy all
four fundamental requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession
must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the
confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing."  Appellant argued
8

reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with double homicide, he is hereby sentenced to that the first and second requirements were not complied with. The records of the case,
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify and/or reimburse the heirs of the however, reveal otherwise.
following:
It must be borne in mind that when appellant executed the extrajudicial confession, it was
To the Heirs of Reynaldo Ochoa done in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If
indeed his confession were obtained as a result of coercion and intimidation by policemen
1. P 50,000.00 damage for death at the police station, he could have informed the Mayor of the maltreatment he suffered.
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity Having failed to convince the authorities, the extra-judicial confession voluntarily made by
(estimated income x life span) Jerez is admissible in evidence. "The presumption, therefore, of spontaneity and
3. 25,000.00 articles/money lost voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise." 9

(P20,000.00, watch, others)

4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an independent
————— counsel of his own choice. The records show that at the time the extrajudicial confession
P225,000.00 was executed, appellant disclosed to the police officers that his counsel of choice was
Atty. Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be available as he is due to depart for
To the Heirs of Joselito Balbastro Manila on the same day. Subsequently, Major Rosales suggested that Atty. Schneider,
supposedly the only lawyer available in Jose Panganiban, appear as the counsel of
appellant during investigation and the latter answered in the affirmative, as shown from the
1. P 50,000.00 damage for death
excerpts of his extrajudicial confession, thus:
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity
(estimated income x life span)
3. 27,000.00 articles/money lost PASUBALI: — Ginoong Jerez, ikaw ay kukunan namin ng malayang salaysay tungkol sa
(P17,000.00, watch, Ray-Ban) isang usapin na aming sinisiyasat. Subalit, bago ang lahat, nais naming malaman mo na
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses ikaw ay may mga karapatan susog sa ating Saligang Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
—————
P227,000.00 Una: Ikaw ay may karapatang tumangging magbigay ng salaysay o kaya ay magbigay ng
salaysay, sapagkat ang anumang sasabihin mo sa pagtatanong na ito ay maaaring
But for insufficiency of evidence, Joselito Quijan and Zaldy Victa are hereby acquitted. gamitin laban sa iyo sa harap ng hukuman. Nauunawaan mo ito?

SO ORDERED.  7 Sagot: Opo.

Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the extra-judicial
statement, stating that at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an ineffectual
counsel who could not safeguard his constitutional rights and interests.
We affirm appellant's conviction.
Ikalawa: Ikaw ay may karapatang ding kumuha ng isang manananggol na sarili mong pili
upang siyang maging gabay mo sa pagtatanong na ito. Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo
Nais mo bang maging gabay mong manananggol ang ating kaharap na manananggol na
si Atty. Augusto B. Schneider?
Sagot: Opo.
Pangatlo: Nais din naming malaman mo at ng lahat na ikaw ay hindi namin
pinangangakuan, sinasaktan o tinatakot upang magbigay ng iyong sariling salaysay,
kundi, ito ay pawang katotohanang kusang loob mong sasabihin at isasalaysay.
Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo.
Tanong: Kung nauunawaan mong lahat itong mga pasubaling ito, ikaw ba ay nakahanda
ng magbigay ng iyong sariling malayang salaysay?
Sagot: Opo. 10
While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation
cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is available as in the
case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused has the final choice
as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided
by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any
objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the
accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer.   Thus, "once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the
11
constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be
voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary
and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.  12
Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was made under
duress, there is, however, no evidence on record to support the same. In People
v. Villanueva, this Court declared that "voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from
its language such that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details, which
could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence
which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have
been applied, it may be considered voluntary."   A scrutiny of the sworn statement
13
discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the commission of the offense
charged which the accused himself could only have known.
The Court, therefore, finds that appellant's constitutional right to counsel was not
breached when he agreed to be represented by Atty. Schneider.
Appellant likewise argued that the trial court should have admitted his defense of
alibi "considering that he was not properly identified and physical evidence like
properties, money, fingerprints were not discovered by the arresting officers."  14
This contention is simply unavailing in the case at bar. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that "for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission."   Appellant testified that on the day in
15
question, he was engaged in a drinking spree with his friends at the house of Felix
Rellolosa at Talobatib, Labo, Camarines Norte and he went home at 4:00 o'clock
p.m. staying thereat for the rest of the night. Unfortunately, this version of the
appellant was contradicted by prosecution witnesses, Julian Ochoa and Gil
Villafranca, who positively identified him in court as the person scouting for
carabao buyers in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte at around 9:00 o'clock
a.m. on May 23, 1990. Needless to say, where an accused's alibi is established only
by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the
strictest scrutiny. They are necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the
testimonies of the more credible witnesses for the prosecution.  16
The Court is, therefore, convinced that appellant's culpability of the offense charged
was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The computation, however, of the damages awarded by the trial court for loss of
earning capacity fixing the same at P100,000.00 for each victim is erroneous.
"The formula consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining life
expectancy is (2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death])."   Thus, the award
17
for loss of earning capacity for each victim shall be as follows:
Joselito Balbastro
P36,000.00 — gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)
Multiply: 30 — life expectancy (2/3 x 45 [80 - 35 {age at time of death}])
P1,080,000.00 — total loss of earning capacity

Reynaldo Ochoa

P36,000.00 — gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)

Multiply: 21 — life expectancy (2/3 x 31 [80 - 49 {age at time of death}])
P756,000.00 — total loss of earning capacity

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of
the trial court finding accused-appellant EFREN JEREZ guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant shall indemnify Joselito Balbastro and Reynaldo Ochoa in the amount of
P1,080,000.00 and P756,000.00, respectively, for losses of their respective earning
capacity. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145176             March 30, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large), ARMANDO DATUIN JR. y GRANADOS
(at large), ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO,
LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, accused,
ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES
y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent
representation. The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the
signing of an extra-judicial confession.
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No. 92-112322. Appellants Ulysses
Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y
Salisi, as well as their co-accused -- Santiago Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin Jr.
y Granados -- were convicted therein of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y
Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito De Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz
and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, are hereby convicted of the crime of qualified theft of
P194,190.00 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs. Moreover, all the accused are
ordered to pay the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
actual damages in the sum of P194,190.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
date of the filing of this action, November 9, 1992, until fully paid."2
In an Information dated November 9, 1992, 3 appellants and their co-accused were charged
as follows:
"That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away punctured
currency notes due for shredding in the total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the
Central Bank of the Philippines as represented by Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum of P194,190.00 Philippine currency;
"That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses
Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano and Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said
offense with grave abuse of confidence they being at the time employed as Currency
Reviewers, Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the offended party and as
such they had free access to the property stolen."4
Garcia was arrested on November 4, 1992; and his co-accused, on November 9, 1992.
Appellants, however, obtained two Release Orders from RTC Vice Executive Judge
Corona Ibay-Somera on November 9 and 10, 1992, upon their filing of a cash bond to
secure their appearance whenever required by the trial court.5
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective
counsels, pleaded not guilty.6 On September 30, 1998, the trial court declared that Datuin
Jr. and Peralta were at large, because they had failed to appear in court despite notice.7
After trial in due course, they were all found guilty and convicted of qualified theft in the
appealed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the facts
as follows:
"About 10:00 o’clock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central Bank of
the Philippines (CBP) [now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)] went to the Theft and
Robbery Section of Western Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for
Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito
de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
"Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC,
punctured currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of
Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department during
its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The
punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later
submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the
investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured
notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were
no longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen
from the BSP by the above-named accused.
"On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in
front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while he was waiting for a passenger
bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation.
"On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave
three separate statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He
also identified the other named accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated the
participation of each and everyone of them.
"On the basis of Garcia’s sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for
questioning at the police station and were subsequently charged with qualified theft
together with Garcia."8 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner:
"Accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the armored car of the Central Bank from
1978 to 1994.
"On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., a man who had identified
himself as a police officer arrested accused-appellant Garcia while waiting for a passenger
bus in front of the Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City. He was arrested without any
warrant for his arrest. The police officer who had arrested accused-appellant Garcia
dragged the latter across the street and forced him to ride x x x a car.
"While inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed behind his back, and
he was made to bend with his chest touching his knees. Somebody from behind hit him
and he heard some of the occupants of the car say that he would be salvaged if he would
not tell the truth. When the occupants of the car mentioned perforated notes, he told them
that he does not know anything about those notes.
"After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and x x x up and down x x x the
stairs. While being dragged out of the car, he felt somebody frisk his pocket.
"At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his co-accused and he told
them that he does not know his co-accused x x x. Whenever he would deny knowing his
co-accused, somebody would box him on his chest. Somebody poured water on accused-
appellant Garcia’s nose while lying on the bench. He was able to spit out the water that
had been poured on his nose [at first], but somebody covered his mouth. As a result, he
could not breath[e].
"When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear the torture anymore, he
decided to cooperate with the police, and they stopped the water pouring and allowed him
to sit down.
"Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard somebody utter, ‘may
nakikinig.‘ Suddenly his two ears were hit with open palm[s] x x x. As he was being
brought down, he felt somebody return his personal belongings to his pocket. Accused-
appellant Garcia’s personal belongings consisted of [his] driver’s license, important papers
and coin purse.
"He was forced to ride x x x the car still with blindfold. His blindfold and handcuffs were
removed when he was at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western
Police District, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
"SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latter’s name, age and
address. The arrival of Mr. Pedro Labita of the Cash Department, Central Bank of the
Philippines, interrupted the interview, and Mr. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get
accused-appellant Garcia’s wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel
supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcia’s wallet
and the former insisted that they recovered the said perforated notes from accused-
appellant’s wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down the statement of Mr. Labita.
"It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers
appearing in accused-appellant Garcia’s alleged three sworn statements dated November
4, 1992, November 5, 1992 and x x x November 6, 1992.
"At or about 6:00 p.m. on November 5, 1992, accused-appellant Garcia was brought to the delivered to someone waiting outside the premises of the building. The trial court held that
cell of the Theft and Robbery Section of the WPD. At or about 8:00 p.m., he was brought the coordinated acts of all the accused unerringly led to the conclusion that they had
to the office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw where his co-accused were also inside. He did not conspired to pilfer the perforated currency notes belonging to the BSP.
identify his co-accused, but he merely placed his hands on the shoulders of each of his co-
accused, upon being requested, and Mr. Labita took x x x pictures while he was doing the The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer was
said act. "an eleventh hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused." The trial court
found his allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence.
"Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorney’s Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcia’s
Office on November 4, 1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4 wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused.
Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accused-appellant Garcia and told him that Atty.
Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not agree to have Hence, this appeal.10
Atty. Sanchez to be his lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and
accused-appellant Garcia had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since then. He was not Issues
present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly signed x x x the alleged three (3) sworn statements.
In his Brief, Garcia raises the following issues:
"During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court
that he did not assist accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-
"1
appellant Garcia, and that he signed x x x the three (3) sworn statements only as a
witness thereto.
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three Sworn Statements of
Accused-appellant Garcia and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes
"Accused-appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to SPO4
Coronel’s warning that if he would not do so, he would again be tortured by water cure.
"2
"SPO[4] Coronel caused the arrest without any warrant of accused appellants De Leon,
Loyola, [Flores] on the basis of the complaint of Mr. Pedro Labita, and which arrest was The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified theft."11
effected on November 5, 1992, by SPO1 Alfredo Silva and SPO1 Redelico.
In their joint Brief, De Leon, Loyola and Flores interpose this additional assignment of
"SPO4 Coronel, in his letter dated November 6, 1992, forwarded the case to the Duty errors:
Inquest Prosecutor assigned at the WPDC Headquarters."9 (Citations omitted)
"1
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three sworn statements of
The trial court found that all the accused used to work for the BSP. Garcia was a driver Accused Ulysses Garcia (Exhibits ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’) and the alleged three pieces of P100
assigned to the Security and Transport Department; while Peralta, Datuin Jr., De Leon, perforated notes (Exhibits ‘N’ to ‘N-2’) over the objections of the accused-appellants.
Flores and Loyola were laborers assigned to the Currency Retirement Division. Their main
task was to haul perforated currency notes from the currency retirement vault to the "2
basement of the BSP building for shredding.
The trial court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of Accused-appellants De Leon,
On several occasions, during the period 1990-1992, they handed to Garcia perforated Loyola and Flores;
currency notes placed in a coin sack that he, in turn, loaded in an armored escort van and
"3
The trial court erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the
demurrer to evidence;
"4
The trial court erred when it failed to consider the evidence adduced by the accused-
appellants, consisting of exhibits ‘1’, ‘2’ to ‘2-B’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ and the testimony of their
witness, State Auditor Esmeralda Elli;
"5
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of qualified theft."12
Simplified, the issues are as follows: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants,
including the admissibility of Garcia’s confessions and of the three perforated P100
currency notes; and (2) the propriety of the denial of their demurrer to evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions given
by Garcia and the three perforated P100 currency notes confiscated from him upon his
arrest. Appellants, however, contend that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible.
Extrajudicial Confessions
Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without
the assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides thus:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited."
On the other hand, the OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the
Public Attorney’s Office, duly assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions 13 that Garcia was not
assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed
after the word "SAKSI." Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he
had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former
had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness.14
The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the
ground that Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the
Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel. The lower court’s action is manifest
error.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The
basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and
executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that
the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and
consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first
question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession.
Hence, the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing
of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights
of the accused.15 The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel.16
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not
enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary
relevance.17 The Constitution states that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in
violation of [the aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x." Hence, the
trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia
and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The question of whether he was tortured
becomes moot.
Perforated Currency Notes
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits "N" to "N-2")
allegedly confiscated from Garcia after his arrest were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and,
hence, inadmissible in evidence.
The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the
illegality of their arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends that the exclusion
from the evidence of the three punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of the
trial court.
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a
passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At
the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to
commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable
ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the circumstances justifying an
arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before
entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however,
that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an
incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the
search.
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures 18 of whatever nature.
Without a judicial warrant, these are allowed only under the following exceptional
circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk
situations, and (6) consented search.19
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly
illegal.20 Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.21 In the present case, the perforated
P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant
subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence.
Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general’s argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores
and Loyola waived the illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising objections
thereto, they entered a plea of guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and
searched, not the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an arrest can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. Objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves
of it.22
Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for
retirement. It failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to
appellants as the authors of the crime.
The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people who had
similar access to the shredding machine area and the currency retirement
vault.23 Appellants were pinpointed by Labita because of an anonymous phone call
informing his superior of the people allegedly behind the theft; and of the unexplained
increase in their spending, which was incompatible with their income. Labita, however, did
not submit sufficient evidence to support his allegation.
Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining
evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
Second Issue:
Demurrer to Evidence
Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the demurrer to
evidence filed by Appellants Loyola, De Leon and Flores. Not one of the documents
offered by the prosecution and admitted in evidence by the RTC established the alleged
qualified theft of perforated notes, and not one of the pieces of evidence showed
appellants’ participation in the commission of the crime.
On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judge’s determination of the
sufficiency or the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to establish a
prima facie case against the accused. Unless there is a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss may not be
disturbed.24
As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not become
apparent until after Atty. Francisco had testified in court. Even if the confiscated perforated
notes from the person of the former were held to be inadmissible, the confessions would
still have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt of appellants. On that basis, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying their demurrer to evidence.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants are
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED, unless they are being
detained for any other lawful cause. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby
directed to submit his report on the release of the appellant or the reason for his continued
detention within five (5) days from notice of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide Jr., CJ.,(Chairman) Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ concur.
The assailed Decision is a thin five-page conviction of the six accused. The first three
pages summarize the testimonies of the witnesses for both sides while the last two pages
contained the finding and ruling of the trial court. In one paragraph, the trial court refused
to believe Garcia’s recantation because 1) he repudiated them only five years after he
executed them; 2) there was no evidence substantiating Garcia’s allegation that he was
tortured, not even an administrative complaint against his alleged torturers; and 3) at the
time of his arrest, the police recovered from his wallet three pieces of P100 perforated
bills. Then the trial court made short shrift of the denials of Garcia’s co-appellants, and
held that the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. shored up the evidence against them all.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

However, this conclusion of the trial court is contradicted by the Solicitor General who
quotes parts from the confessions to show that Garcia was assisted by counsel. The
statement dated November 4, 199225 contains the following exchange:

"05. T: Meron ka bang abogado na nais na gamitin sa pagsisiyasat na ito upang siyang
tumulong sa iyo?

S: Wala pa ho sa ngayon pero si Attorney na lang pansamantala (Referring to Atty.

Francisco Sanchez III)."

It was also made to appear in the November 6, 1992 statement that Garcia was assisted
by Atty. Francisco:26

"03. T: Meron ka bang abogado na napipisil upang siyang tumulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat
na ito?

S: Sa ngayon po ay maski na si Atty. Sanchez na lang pansamantala."

G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997 abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the
unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The
vs. yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant. side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and
draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved,
he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the
face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it
towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2

PER CURIAM:
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of
discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled
rape with homicide committed as follows:
toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
injuries" sustained as follows:
accused, with lewd design, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y
Reyes against her will and without her consent; and the above-named accused in order to 1. Abrasions:
suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, 1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to left.
attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her 2. Abrasions/contusions:
death.
2.1 temple, right.
Contrary to Law. 1

2.2 cheek, right.

The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion
Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second- 2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two
bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
cash.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width, from
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house.
right MCL to left AAL.
He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken.
Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative.
She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the 2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma: concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim
pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. 4

3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.

Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right. wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and
learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right. also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the
police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with
some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were
4. Lacerated wounds:
found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to appellant. 5

4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.

4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad
traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought
him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the
concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant
relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne
and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid
the two bags of Marianne.  Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and
6

6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police. Appellant
went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a
canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to Marianne.
Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other suspects holding the
bags.7

7.1 minimal blood present.

Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The
following day, February 25, a physical examination was conducted on the suspects by the
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed vaginal Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
wall. Patawaran.  Appellant was found to sustain:
8

8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed negative for HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions
spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera). (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in
size Lt. 9

CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to

Traumatic Injuries, Face. 3

Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad
of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the
place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and
proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him
and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of
the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I
will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first
asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the
proceedings photographed and videotaped.   In the presence of the mayor, the police,
10
representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his
guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where
he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely
implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them.   He also said that the devil
11
entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost
everyday.   After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor
12
to help
him.   His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. 
13
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and
27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again
interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime.  15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the
afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in Barangay Tangos
attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00
P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00
P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect
some debts while he and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his father
cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there
until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police.  16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the
rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They
coerced him to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. When he refused, they pushed
his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant
confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of
his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the
back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life,
appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him
to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay
the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses
and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby is found
guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the Information (Rape
with Homicide) and penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec.
11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of Marianne Guevarra the amount
of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial and
incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. After automatic review of this
case and the decision becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED.  18
14
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act
No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT
OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS,
REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED
DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED
BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE
EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED.  19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three
policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to
whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on photographs
and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the
crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor
and the news reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the
assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the house
of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked
Romano Calma who were his other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito
Andan who cannot be found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?

(4) . . . A: Yes, sir.

Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the Q: And then, what else did you do?
right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice; and (3) to be informed of such A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned that his
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and
counsel.   Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is
20
investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was the culprit. 26

inadmissible in evidence against him.   The exclusionary rule is premised on the

21

presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is
menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical
admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was
and psychological, is forcefully apparent.   The incommunicado character of custodial
22

investigated and interrogated.   His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So

27

interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really

too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member
transpired.  23

of the investigating team testified:

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked as
investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no
Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these bags?
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person
as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.   As intended by the 1971
24
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal of the
Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which toilet.
will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such
other police agencies in our government."  25 Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags were located?

When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry
about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before
the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo
S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know where the
two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the place
where the bags were located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really showed
where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir.  28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They
are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.  29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad
visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk.
They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He
pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already many people from
the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able to talk to me
alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of Police,
mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will
tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was telling this to me, I
told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to hear what he was
going to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir.
This was even covered by a television camera.  30
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you something and
then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of Police and you stated
that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang
pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the second
one was before the media people, sir.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making further
admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he was going to say, sir.  31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession
before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police   and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
32
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter.   In fact, the mayor
33
did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor.
It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to
him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.   Thus,
34
it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given
in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the
crime.   What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
35
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent
him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.   Hence, we hold that appellant's
36
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions
were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in
evidence.  37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7,
interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and
showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence
of his wife, child and other relatives.   Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on
38
Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place where the A: Yes, sir.
body of Marianne was found, where did you start your interview, in what particular place?
Q: Who accompanied you?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police station of
Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and some of
asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from the relatives of the accused.
him that the victim was his cousin.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for raping
and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was voluntary or Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?
that there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on his person because
I knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting it
A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at that
voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was under the influence of drugs but
time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.
he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag,
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle beside
Bulacan, what transpired?
him at the time that you asked the question?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was committed
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall
by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where I tried to
anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime scene
accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how he carried out
or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside
the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.
the office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening
nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able to talk
to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the one who raped Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the scene of the crime
where the reenactment and everything that transpired during the killing of Marianne A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Guevarra.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag up to
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the accused the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.  39

A: Yes, sir.
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings
x x x           x x x          x x x for three successive days.   His testimony is as follows:
40

Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag PNP, you Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
also went to the scene of the crime?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so that we
can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief of
police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other persons. I
asked the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after the suspect
admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I reiterated the question to the suspect.
Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital
offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you really
admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative
answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures of
the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of Inday
Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect answered the same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you
affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa
ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo ba itong
kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa
pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped his
mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic
magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost everyday
before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and the
public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was really down
physically and I think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear that fell
on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx  41
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26,
1994.   He also testified that:
42
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the permission
that you asked from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the chief
investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was suspended, it was
the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There were
people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people from the
radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the wife
but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions that I asked
from the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we know what
question did you ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a tricycle.
He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim was
because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx  43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue
influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when
they interviewed appellant.   They were not acting under the direction and control of the
44
police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force
appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime.   In fact,
45
they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days
not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to
them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and
other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver was
news reporters. merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before you did you
re-autopsy?
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with A: Yes, sir.
the relation between a private individual and another individual.   It governs the
46

relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have been
addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect.   Governmental power is not
47
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim which
unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds could produce
aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its blood because there is no more circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I
agencies.  48
presumed that when the doctor examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor,
vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is impossible that
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical evidence the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those instruments because the victim
against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, was already dead and usually in a dead person we do not produce any bleeding.
conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in
the hymen.   Allegedly,
49
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted blood at 6
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her menstruation.  50
and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been inflicted or
could have been sustained while the victim was alive?
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic
L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings A: Yes, sir.
affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations,
thus:
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated wounds, now
will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the edges of the
Hymen — contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood?
positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 
51

A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6 o'clock. I
found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges of the
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been caused by lacerated wounds, sir.
an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive, indicating the
possibility of penetration.   His testimony is as follows:
52

Q: What could have caused those lacerations?

Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that small
position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the lacerations, I
A: It is possible, sir.  53

found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.

We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial evidence
negate the commission of rape   nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of
54
justify the conviction of appellant.
the hymen.   What is essential is that there be penetration of the female organ no matter
55

how slight.   Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations
56
found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused
by any injury in the first autopsy.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot
even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the commission of the crime.
Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away from Concepcion Subdivision and can be
traversed in less than half an hour. 
66

Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are supported
by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the witnesses
and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near
appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in their
house; 58
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos,
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan
y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide under
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and
P71,000.00 as actual damages.

(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a meter In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
the back of appellant's house; 
59 forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been dragged over SO ORDERED.
a flat rough surface.   This supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and
60

dragged to where her body was found;

(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his
house;

(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive for
the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the victim.   Marianne 's exact
61

blood type was not determined but her parents had type "A" and type "AB."   The victim's
62

pants had bloodstains which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood type;  63

(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain;  64

(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and were
later found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan;  65
G.R. No. 133026      February 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry
Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once
shared.1âwphi1.nêt
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an
emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without
warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend
Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to
stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker.
Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from
out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for
safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where
he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help
of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could
receive medical attention. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz,
cause of death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary
to a stab wound which penetrated the heart."1
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against
Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their
arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26
December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its
reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the
Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was
immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of
the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio
Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan
and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused
Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken
showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the
gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan,
where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them
money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a
few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for Antipolo.
Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was
shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through the
testimony of Clara Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis Aquino standing
outside the Soundlab Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by him, when Galgarin
suddenly approached them and without any prior warning stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to
run away, but Edward, a spurned lover who harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis,
shot Dennis. She recognized Edward and Gerry because the street was sufficiently
lighted.2
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door neighbor of
Dennis, who testified that a little past six o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Gerry
Galgarin together with a companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She instructed
them to proceed to the Soundlab Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. But a
few minutes later she heard a Instinctively, she instructed her two (2) young daughters to
duck for cover while she anxiously waited for her seven (7)-year old daughter Josephine
who was out of the house for an errand for her. Soon enough she heard Josephine
knocking at their door. She was crying because she said her Kuya Dennis had been shot
and stabbed.3
Josephine confirmed her mother's testimony and even said that she had seen Gerry
Galgarin stab her Kuya Dennis and she could remember Gerry very well because of the
mole below his nose.4
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying
of Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his
common-law wife Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born. He stayed with her until the
16th of October when she was discharged from the Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.5
Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported the alibi of
accused-appellant. However, she admitted that when she registered the child's birth on 13
December 1993 or more than two (2) years after the delivery, she informed the civil
registrar that the child's father was "unknown."6 His story was also confirmed by Dolores
Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his co-workers at the Kainan sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant,
who testified that accused-appellant was fetched by a neighbor from the restaurant in the
early afternoon of 14 October with the news that his wife was having labor pains.7
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed
that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the
videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.8
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the
police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a
finding that his confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have
dissipated any semblance of hostility towards him. The court gave credence to the
arresting officers' assertion that it was even accused-appellant who pleaded with them that
he be allowed to air his appeal on national television for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to
support his allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October
1991. Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified by
treachery9 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, he was ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Dennis Aquino P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as
actual damages. The case against his nephew and co-accused Edward Endino remained
in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement as soon as he could be arrested.10
In his Appellant's Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his alibi and
admitting his videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime on 16
October 1991 as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth on the 14th of
that month, is not persuasive. Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony of Cornelio Tejero
Jr.,11 Philippine Airlines Load Controller of the Puerto Princesa City, that the name of
"Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on their passenger manifest for the 16 October 1991
Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could not be relied upon inasmuch as he himself admitted
that they could not be sure of their passengers' real identities. The testimonies of accused-
appellant's co-workers that he was in Antipolo on 14 October 1991 did not fortify his
defense either since these witnesses did not categorically state that they saw him in
Antipolo in the evening of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as
the one who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine
Leong's identification of accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and
spontaneous manner. Her confidence as to the attacker's identity was clearly shown by
her vivid recollection of him having a mole below his nose, which is correct. Moreover, it is
inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to implicate accused-appellant, a complete stranger
to them, if there was no truth to their assertion. As for Clara, her naming of accused-
appellant as her boyfriend's assailant was not done out of spite, but was impelled by her
desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellant's guilt, probably with intense incriminating effect,
were his immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt at jailbreak12 revealing a guilty
conscience, hence, his persistent effort to evade the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped confession, we
find such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-
appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen.
Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police
officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.
Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor
from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the
trial court stated in its Decision13 -
Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed
Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that
the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept
the truth of his statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium
for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases,14 it is
prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial
confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an
offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the
accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. 1âwphi1.nêt
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused
with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the
line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw,
particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in
determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological
atmosphere.

A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always
remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection
of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It
requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted
ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.

With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next
presents itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as murder
qualified by treachery. Doubtless, the crime committed is one of murder considering that
the victim was stabbed while he was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend
waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the accused's criminal design. The suddenness of
the assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the slightest provocation from him who had
no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.15

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant GERRY

GALGARIN alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the
amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to
compensate the decedent's heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional and
mental anguish. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38859 July 30, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO VIZCARRA, LEOBINO SALAMATIN, JOSE DELOS REYES and LIBERATO
FERNANDO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Adolfo S. Azcuna, David Calvario and Armando Abad, Jr. for accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Review of the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, imposing the
death sentence upon Danilo Vizcarra, Leobino Salamatin, Jose delos Reyes and Liberato
Fernando for the crime of rape with homicide, the decretal portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused
DANILO VIZCARRA, LEOBINO SALAMATIN, JOSE DELOS REYES and LIBERATO
FERNANDO of the crime charged in the information beyond reasonable doubt and, in
accordance with the provision of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Acts Nos. 2632 and 4111, the Court is constrained to impose to each of them the
supreme penalty of death by electrocution as their penal sentence and to indemnify, jointly
and severally, the heirs of the late Erlinda Manzano in the amount of P12,000 and to pay
the costs. ...
The victim Erlinda Manzano was at the time of the incident a fourteen-year old maiden,
employed as a waitress at the Lily's Restaurant in Novaliches, Quezon City. When she
failed to come home in the night of June 25, 1969, her parents set out to look for her at her
place of work and the houses nearby. Having failed to find her, they reported her
disappearance to the Quezon City Police Department. Two days later, the lifeless and
almost naked body of Erlinda 1 was found in a grassy spot of a vacant lot behind an ice plant
at Dumalay Street, Novaliches, Quezon City. The deceased was lying on her back with a piece
of clothing material tied around her neck.
Dr. Ernesto Baylon, medico-legal officer of the Quezon City Police Department, who first
examined the body of the victim, testified that the protrusion of the deceased's tongue was
the result of excessive pressure exerted upon her neck and that the probable cause of
death was strangulation. 2
Dr. Ernesto Gimenez, medicolegal officer of the NBI, to whom the victim's body was
referred for autopsy, attributed the cause of death to "asphyxia by ligature strangulation."
He testified that the ligature used was a "piece of cloth or what appears as a portion of a
'sando' shirt"; that the ligature was still tied around the victim's neck when he performed
the autopsy; that his findings on the genitals "are compatible with sexual intercourse with
men and that the intercourse was done in a forceful manner or not with the cooperation of
the victim"; that the left breast of the victim was bitten, as evidenced by the presence of
deep teeth marks; and that the abrasion on the forearm, posterior lateral aspect, was
produced by fingernails. 3
Dr. Ernesto Brion, assistant director of the NBI medicolegal division, confirmed said
findings. Dr. Brion added that "the laceration at the 7:00 o'clock position of the victim's
genitals was the result of sexual intercourse committed before death or within five to ten
minutes immediately after death." 4
Elements of the Quezon City Police and the PC Criminal Investigation Service (CIS)
launched a massive manhunt for the malefactors. Acting on confidential reports received
by said law officers, they took into custody Leobino Salamatin, Jose delos Reyes, Liberato
Fernando, Patricio Verdote, Rogelio Vizmanos and Rodolfo Bagtasos; and in the course of
their investigation, these suspects gave written statements to CIS agents Fernando
Perucho, Arthur Sison, Modesto Garcia and Francisco Novero, wherein they admitted
having taken turns in raping the victim. They pointed to appellant Danilo Vizcarra, then at
large, as the one who strangled Erlinda to death. Their respective statements were signed
and sworn to by each of them before Assistant Fiscal Arsenio Santos of Quezon City.
On August 2, 1969, a verified complaint jointly signed by the victim's father, Patricio R.
Manzano, and Assistant Fiscal Miguel F. Halili, Jr. was filed in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Quezon City) charging Danilo Vizcarra, Rogelio Vizmanos, Leobino Salamatin,
Jose delos Reyes, Liberato Fernando, Patricio Verdote and Rodolfo Bagtasos with the
crime of rape with homicide. The complaint alleged that the accused conspired and
confederated together and mutually helped one another in having carnal knowledge one
after the other of Erlinda Manzano against her will, as well as in killing her, and that in the
commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances concurred:
(1) nighttime purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense; Appellants disclaimed having participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and
invoked the defense of alibi, which the trial court summarized as follows: 5
(2) advantage was taken of superior strength and means were employed to weaken the
defense; and According to accused Danilo Vizcarra, he drove a certain Mr. Sergio Peña to the doctor at
about nine o'clock in the evening of June 25, 1969 and from the house of the doctor at San
(3) the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately aggravated by causing Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, they proceeded to Manila to buy medicine and they
other wrong not necessary for its commission. stayed there up to twelve midnight; Jose delos Reyes claimed that from five o'clock in the
afternoon to twelve midnight of said date, he was with his friend-driver, "Manny", who was
Rodolfo Bagtasos was discharged and utilized as state witness. At the commencement of plying the Blumentritt-Novaliches route; Liberato Fernando alleged that he was watching
the trial, Danilo Vizcarra was still at large; but after he was arrested, the prosecution TV from eight o'clock in the evening of said date in Sta. Cruz, Novaliches, Quezon City
presented its evidence anew against him. after which he went home after eating in the place of Salamatin; while the accused
Leobino Salamatin claimed that at about four o'clock in the afternoon of same date, he
was with Leonardo Recuenco in buying palanca forms and clothing materials in Manila
After due trial, the lower court acquitted Patricio Verdote and Rogelio Vizmanos, but found
after which they returned to Novaliches at about seven o'clock in the evening and stayed
Danilo Vizcarra, Leobino Salamatin, Jose delos Reyes and Liberato Fernando guilty
in the place of Rosita del Rosario for about three hours, before finally going home.
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and, as aforestated, imposed on each of
them the supreme penalty of death.
The trial court correctly rejected the appellants' alibi, and it explained why:
Hence, this mandatory review.
... the defense of alibi interposed by the aforenamed accused cannot serve to overcome
the clear, explicit and positive Identification made of the said accused by state witness
At the trial, state witness Rodolfo Bagtasos substantially testified that at about 9:00 in the
Rodolfo Bagtasos (U.S. vs. Hudieres, 27 Phil. 45; Peo. vs. Tatlonghari, L-22094, March
evening of June 25, 1969, he, Patricio Verdote, Leobino Salamatin, Rogelio Vizmanos and
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 726; Peo. vs. Tapitan, L-21492, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 959). It is
Liberato Fernando went to a vacant lot located behind an ice plant at Dumalay Street,
well settled that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused
Novaliches, Quezon City, where they awaited the arrival of Danilo Vizcarra and Jose delos
(Peo. vs. Dela Cruz, 76 Phil. 601; People vs. Bondoc, 47 O.G. 4128; Peo. vs. Zapata, L-
Reyes, who, in accordance with their prior agreement, were to bring Erlinda to that
11074, Feb. 1960) for the reason that "oral evidence of alibi is so easily manufactured and
appointed place; that when Vizcarra and Delos Reyes arrived with the girl, they brought
usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence" (Peo. vs. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718;
her to an unlighted, grassy place and pushed her to the ground; that Vizcarra removed her
People vs. De Asis, 61 Phil. 384; People vs. Estacio, L- 11430, Jan. 30, 1960). Moreover,
panty and then took off his clothes; that whereupon he ravished the girl while the witness
it has been sufficiently established by the evidence that at the time and date in question,
Bagtasos and Liberato Fernando pinned down her legs, and Patricio Verdote and Rogelio
the accused Danilo Vizcarra, Leobino Salamatin, Jose Delos Reyes and Liberato
Vizmanos, her arms; that after Vizcarra had satisfied his lust, Jose delos Reyes took his
Fernando were residing in or within the vicinity of Sta. Cruz, Novaliches, Quezon City
turn, followed by witness Bagtasos; that while Bagtasos was on top of her, he noticed that
where the crime was committed and that on the particular time and date charged in the
one of the victim's nipples was bleeding, leading him to surmise that Jose delos Reyes
information, the said accused were not so far a distance as to preclude the possibility of
had bitten it; that after he was through, Patricio Verdote, Leobino Salamatin, Rogelio
the said accused's presence at the locus criminis (People vs. Manabat, 100 Phil. 603)
Vizmanos and Liberato Fernando took turns in that order in ravishing the victim, as the
especially considering the available means of travel (Peo. vs. Aparato, 80 Phil. 199) open
others alternated in holding her arms, legs and hair and in covering her mouth to prevent
to them or particularly to accused Jose delos Reyes, who was supposed to be on board a
her from shouting; and that afterwards Danilo Vizcarra tied around the girl's neck a string
passenger vehicle plying the Blumentritt-Novaliches route, and accused Danilo Vizcarra,
that looked like a plastic rope, which he pulled backward (binigti) so that the tongue of the
who claimed that he was then driving a Lambreta motorcycle.
girl protruded out; and that upon seeing this, he (witness Bagtasos) and his companions
ran away, leaving Vizcarra at the scene of the crime.
Moreover, it has been held that to establish an alibi, a defendant must not only show that
he was present at some other place about the time of the alleged crime, but also that it
was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed, either
before or after the time he was at such other place (U.S. vs. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587; Peo. vs.
De Guzman L-13340, April 30, 1960).
Appellants Salamatin, Delos Reyes and Fernando further assail the admissibility of their
respective extrajudicial statements 6 on the ground that they were extracted by the CIS
agents through force and intimidation. The circumstances revealed by the records fail to
support appellants' posture.
As heretofore pointed out, appellants admitted in their respective statements that they took
turns in ravishing Erlinda. Their responses to the questions of the investigators were so
candid and informative as to indicate the lack of any extraneous pressure on their mind. In
Exhibit D, Liberato Fernando stated the order in which he and his co-appellants took turns
in debauching the victim:
27. T — Sino sa inyo ang unang gumahasa kay Erlinda Manzano?
S — Una po si Danilo Vizcarra.
28. T — Sino ang pangalawang gumahasa kay Erlinda Manzano?
S — Si Jose delos Reyes po and natatandaan kong pangalawa nguni't hindi ko po
sigurado.
29. T— Ikaw pang-ilan ka sa mga kasamahan mong gumahasa kay Erlinda Manzano?
S — Pang-apat po.
30. T — Sino ang sinundan mong gumahasa kay Erlinda Manzano?
A— Ang natatandaan ko po ay si Rodolfo Bagtasos.
Appellant Delos Reyes, in Exhibit G, related his participation as follows:
16. T — Noong mga sandaling iyon, ano ang hitsura ni Erlinda kung iyong natatandaan?
S — Nakapanty na lamang si Erlinda at nakapangitaas na damit na lamang.
17. T — Ano pagkatapos ang iyong ginawa?
S — Naghubad ho ako ng pantalon at salawal at si Erlinda ay aking ginamit.
18. T — Noong kasalukuyang ginagamit mo si Erlinda, ano naman ang kanyang kilos?
S — Wala ho, basta umiyak lamang siya.
Previous sexual activity indulged in by Vizcarra and Delos Reyes was also disclosed by
the latter:
59. T — Sinong babae ang inyong niyari o ginamit noon kung natatandaan mo?
S — Ang alam ko lamang ay Cely ang kanyang pangalan at doon ko ho siya nakuha sa
may Balintawak, Quezon City.
60. T — Saan lugar ninyo niyari o ginamit si Cely?
S — Doon ho sa Villaverde, Novaliches, Quezon City sa isang lugar na walang bahay at
kagubatan.
61. T — Sino-sino ang yumari o gumamit doon kay Cely na sinasabi mo?
S — Kaming dalawa lamang ho ni Danny Vizcarra. 7
And appellant Salamatin gave his version thus:
28. T — Sino ang nakita mo na may hawak kay Erlinda?
S — Ang natatandaan ko po ay sila Delos Reyes at Fernando.
xxx xxx xxx
40. T — Ng ikaw ay gumamit, naghubad ka ba?
S — Pantalon at carcuncillo ay aking hinubad, inililis ko na lamang ang aking Orlon T-shirt
na ngayon ay suot ko,
41. T — May nakahawak bang ibang kasamahan mo kay Erlinda nang gumamit ka?
S — Wala na po, nag-iisa na lamang ako.
42. T — Ano ang ginawa ni Erlinda ng gumagamit ka na?
S — Hindi na siya kumikibo, libreng libre na ako sa paggamit sa kanya.
43. T — Iyo bang natatandaan kung may sugat o may parte ng katawan ni Erlinda na may
bahid dugo ng ginagamit mo ito?
S — Meroon po, ang kanyang ari ay dumudugo, basa at nang ako ay tapus na at
makauwi, nakita ko na may dugo ang aking karsuncillo at yong kamay ko. 8
In Exhibit H, Salamatin further attested to the fact that, immediately after he and his
companions were taken into custody, i.e., before they had given their statements to the
CIS officers, a televised interview was held in the office of Lt. Col. Pelagio Perez, then
chief of the CIS, and that in the presence of the latter and of several press reporters, he
and his co-appellants spontaneously admitted that they were the ones who raped Erlinda
Manzano. Thus, the written confessions they gave on July 18, 1969 merely reaffirmed
their prior public admissions of culpability.
It further appears that appellants, at the request of the city mayor of Quezon City, were
physically examined by Dr. Ernesto Baylon, medico-legal officer of the Quezon City Police
Department. The latter's findings that he "did not find any visible and palpable sign of
injury" on the persons of the appellants 9 belie their claim of maltreatment and torture.
But even disregarding the appellants' extrajudicial confessions, the testimony given in
open court by state witness Rodolfo Bagtasos, which the lower court found to be "credible,
clear and straightforward," affords adequate basis for their conviction.
Appellants would assail the credibility of Bagtasos by pointing out what they characterized
as "apparent discrepancy" between the latter's extrajudicial statement 10 and his testimony
on the stand as to who held the arms and legs of the victim while his companions took turns in
abusing her. The point raised undoubtedly refers to a very minor inconsistency which tends to
indicate that the witness was not rehearsed. In the absence of proof that the trial court failed to
appreciate significant facts and circumstances that would have altered the result of the case,
We are not disposed to disturb the findings of the court below.
Appellant Vizcarra claims that insofar as he is concerned, the trial court erred in
considering against him the testimony of state witness Bagtasos. He contends that before
Bagtasos' testimony could be admitted against him, proof of the alleged conspiracy must
first be shown by evidence other than such testimony. He cites in support thereof the
provision of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "the act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act."
The argument fails to consider that Section 27 of Rule 130 applies only to an extrajudicial
act or declaration of a co-conspirator, but not to the testimony given by a witness at the
trial where the accused had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 11 Besides, it is
a familiar rule that a co-accused in a criminal case is a competent witness for or against any of
his co-accused. 12
From the evidence on record, there is not a shred of doubt as to the guilt of Danilo
Vizcarra for the crime of rape with homicide. But We cannot agree with the view of the trial
court that his co-appellants Delos Reyes, Fernando and Salamatin were equally
responsible for the death of the victim. It is undisputed that it was Vizcarra alone who
strangled the victim to death. While it is indubitable that all of them conspired and acted
together in the execution of successive rapes, We find the record bereft of any evidence
that it was part of their plan to do away with the victim. The mere passive presence of
Delos Reyes and Fernando and Salamatin at the scene of the crime at the moment
Vizcarra suddenly strangled Erlinda does not make them liable for the act of their co-
accused.
Be that as it may, We see no reason to alter the penalty imposed by the trial court on said
three appellants. The crime of successive rapes is punishable by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964.
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied).
The greater penalty — death — should be imposed, as the commission of the offenses
was attended by the following aggravating circumstances: (1) nighttime, appellants having
purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the execution thereof; and (2) abuse of
superior strength, the crime having been perpetrated by four appellants in conspiracy with
one another. None of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any extenuating
circumstance.

Since four successive offenses were charged and proved, each of them should be
imposed four (4) death sentences for four distinct and separate crimes of rape. The
existence of conspiracy among the appellants, the overwhelming evidence as to the
nature and the number of the crimes committed, as well as the attendance of the
aforementioned aggravating circumstances, fully justify the imposition of four death
penalties. As this Court said People vs. Peralta: 13

The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical
importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible
badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the
imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for
which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real
dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no
small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as
a deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter
delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious
restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.

Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to
Pardon (one of the presidential prerogative which is almost absolute) deems it proper to
commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical
effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life
sentences. If one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment,
the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life
sentence.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in the sense that each and
everyone of the appellants, namely: Danilo Vizcarra, Leobino Salamatin, Jose delos
Reyes and Liberato Fernando, is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties. The
judgment is affirmed in an other respects, with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77865 December 4, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL OLIVARES, JR. and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Involved in this case is the crime of robbery with homicide committed during the season of
yuletide. The facts as narrated in the People's brief are as follows:
Prosecution witness Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo testified that he took the statements of
appellant Rafael Olivares, Jr. and one Purisimo Macaoili and verbal investigation of
appellant Danilo Arellano because the latter refused to give any statement.
Prosecution witness Cpl. Tomas Juan of the Valenzuela Police Station V testified that in
the morning of December 28, 1981, he was assigned by his station commander to follow-
up the robbery with homicide that took place at Tanada Subdivision, Gen. T. De Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. He learned from Patrolman Bote that a regular employee of the
Cardinal Plastic Industries (where the crime was committed) had not yet reported for work.
With that information, Cpl. Juan, accompanied by Pat. Rodriquez Acharon, and Reyes
proceeded to the business establishment and were able to confirm from the workers that
appellant Danilo Arellano failed to report for work since the commission of the crime,
Melchor Salle (cousin of appellant Arellano) volunteered to bring them to Danilo Arellano,
in a factory situated in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thereat, Melchor Salle was able to secure
information from the "barkada" of appellant Arellano who turned out to be appellant
Olivares, Jr. Appellant Olivares accompanied them to Broadway, Barangay Kristong Hari,
Quezon City, where they found appellant Arellano. After being ask about the incident that
took place at the Cardinal Plastic Industries, appellant Arellano readily admitted to the
police authorities his participation in the commission of the crime. Thereafter, appellant
Arellano was invited to the police station (pp. 4-9, TSN, November 3, 1982). On further
direct examination, Cpl. Juan identified in open court the Sanyo cassettes, the tapes and
the wristwatch they recovered from the place where appellant Arellano pointed to them.
Said items were turned over to the police station (pp. TSN, Nov. 17, 1982).
Prosecution witness Purisimo Macaoili testified that he found the dead body of Mr. Sy (Tiu
Hui) in the morning of december 26, 1981 inside the building where the business
establishment is situated. Mr. Sy was residing alone inside his room because at that time
his wife was in Hongkong. Some of the workers also reside inside the business
establishment. Mr. Macaoili also saw the dead body of the father of Mr. Sy (Zie Sing Piu)
in the same building inside the establishment which was at that time registered as
Foodman & Company, a candy manufacturer (now Cardinal Plastic Industries). The bodies
of the victims were about eight (8) to ten (10) arms-length apart. Thereafter, his
companion Erning phoned Mr. Sy's brother who was then residing near Malacañang and
informed him about the incident. Mr. Sy's brother arrived in the factory at around 6:30-
o'clock in the morning and saw the bodies of the victims. The same brother asked for the
assistance of the police who arrived at the scene of the crime and who conducted on-the-
spot investigation. Later on and upon the direction of the police, the bodies of the victims
were brought to the morgue. Mr. Macaoili did not notice any missing personal belongings
of the victims at that time inside the building (pp. 4-13, TSN, Aug. 6, 1982). Further, Mr.
Macaoili testified that he came to know that the wristwatch, the cassettes, and other
personal items of the victims were missing when appellants were apprehended. He knew
the cassette and the wristwatch because said items had been used by the victim, Tiu Heu.
He knew appellant Arellano because he is his barriomate at Tuburan, Iloilo and was a
laborer at Foodman Industries long before December 26, 1981. He also knew appellant
Olivares, Jr. as they are also barriomates and worked somewhere in Quezon City. He
testified that appellant Olivares, Jr. twice visited the factory before December 26, 1981 and
he saw him two or three weeks before said date. He also saw appellant Arellano inside the
compound of Foodman Industries on December 25, 1981. Appellant Arellano resides
inside the compound of the factory staying in the other room with other co-workers apart
from the room of Mr. Macaoili and the members of his family. He stated that the wristwatch
worn by victim Tiu Heu was mortgaged to the latter by the former's friend named Raul (pp.
5-11, TSN, August 20, 1982).
Prosecution witness, Sgt. Eduardo Marcelo of the PNP, Valenzuela, Metro Manila testified
that he conducted an investigation on the person of Rafael Olivares, Jr. at about 10:45
o'clock in the morning of December 29, 1981. Sgt. Marcelo apprised him of his
constitutional rights. When informed, appellant Olivares, Jr. declined any assistance of a
lawyer during the investigation considering that he will tell the truth about the incident. Mr.
Melchor Salle and the chief of Sgt. Marcelo were present during the police investigations.
Sgt. Marcelo prepared a statement (Exhibit B) signed by appellant Olivares, Jr. relative to
the investigation (pp. 4-11, TSN, October 8, 1982).
Prosecution witness Sika Chong testified that the victim Tiu Hu is his brother and other
victim Zie Sing Piu is his father. On December 26, 1981, the victims were residing inside
the factory situated at Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Sika Chong did not
witness the commission of the crime. He personally knew the two (2) radio cassettes
belong to his father as said items were his birthday gifts sometime in 1977 (Exhibit C) and
in 1980 (Exhibit D). He bought the cassettes (Sanyo brand) from a store at Cartimar. The
small cassettes costs him P700.00 and the big radio at P800.00. Along with the said items,
he also bought five (5) tapes (Exhibits E, E-1 to E-4) (pp. 5-14, TSN, March 4, 1983).
Prosecution witness Ong Tian Lay testified that victim Zie Sing Piu is his father and victim
Tiu Hu is his brother. The victims were at the time of thier death engaged in sago and
plastic business. When they ceased operation in the sago business, they engaged in
plastic manufacturing until the time of thier death. He spent more than P40,000.00 for the
funeral expenses of the victims and although the total receipts from Funeraria Paz
amounted only to P13,000.00, he also spent other expenses totalling P40,000.00 (pp. 3-8,
TSN, April 22, 1983). On further direct examination, Ong Tian Lay testified that he saw the
publication about the death of his father and brother at the police department of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. He was able to get a clipping of the publication (Exhibit F). He
could not remember the names of the newspaper where the victims' death were published
but could remember that the incident was published in at least three (3) newspapers, one
(1) in the Chinese language and the two (2) in the English language (pp. 4-13, TSN, June
29, 1983).
Prosecution witness Narciso Gador, factory worker of Cardinal Plastics, testified that the
factory is owned by Ka Tiong Sy. He knew that the father of his employer is already dead
as well his brother. He knew appellant Danilo Arellano because the latter is a former
laborer of Cardinal Plastics. He only came to the person of appellant Olivares, Jr. after the
incident. He saw appellants between the hours of 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o:clock in the
evening of December 25, 1981 inside the Delia's restaurant located at BBB, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Narciso Gador and his companions arrived, they ordered beer while seated
at another table. They left the restaurant between the hours of 9:00 o'clock and 10:00
o'clock in the evening of December 25, 1981 ahead of appellants. (pp. 3-6, TSN, June 15,
1983).
Dr. Rodolfo Lizondra conducted the autopsy of the cadaver of the victims. He prepared a
Necropsy Report on victim Tiu Heo Hu (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2) and similar report on victim
Sy Sing Kiaw (Exhibits H-H-1 to H-3) (Decision, Jan. 30, 1987, p. 4.   *
1
For the death of the two victims and the loss of some items, appellants were charge with
the complex crime of "robbery with double homicide" under the following informations:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1981, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Rafael Olivarez, Jr. y Jaba and Danilo Arellano y Montinol, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of again and by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the
persons of Tiu Hu and Zie Sing Piu alias "Sy Sing Kiaw" take, rob and carry away with
them cash in the amount of P1,800.00 two (2) radio cassettes marked "Sanyo", one (1)
wrist watch marked "Citron" and five (5) tape recorder cassettes, belongings to Tiu Hu, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the sum of more than P1,800.00; and that by
reason or on the occasion (sic) of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to
take, rob and carry away the said amount of P1,800.00, two (2) radio cassettes, one (1)
wrist watch and five (5) tape recorder cassettes, the herein accused, in pursuance of their
conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evidence (sic)
premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of their superior strenght, attack,
assault and use personal violence on the said Tiu Hu and Zie Sing Piu alias "Sy Sing
Kiaw", thereby inflicting fatal physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said
Tiu Hu and Sing Piu alias "Sy Sing Kiaw".
That in the commission of the said crime, other aggravating circumstances of nocturnity
and unlawful entry were present. 2
After the trial, the lower court rendered a decision dated Janaury 30, 1987 convicting
appellants of the crime charged, sentence them to suffer the death penalty and to
indemnify the victim' heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
In view of the foregoing circumstancial evidence and not mainly on the basis of the
extrajudicial confession, the Court finds both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide and sentences them to suffer the penalty
imposed by law is death on 2 counts, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P60.000.00 and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 3
On direct appeal to this Court, appellants, who are imprisoned, seek their acquittal on the
ground that their guilt was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Alternatively, they argued that in case their conviction is sustained, the death penalty
should not be imposed on them in the light of the 1987 Constitution.
In the course of the elevation of the records, the Court found that the transcript of
stenographic notes (TSN) for the November 12, 1982  hearing was missing. When the
4
whereabouts of the said TSN could not be traced despite diligent efforts and after
disciplinary measures were imposed on some court personnel, the counsels of both
parties were ordered to submit their respective manifestation if said TSN may be
dispensed with or a retaking of the testimony of the witness should instead be made.  The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agreed to dispense with the TSN.  Counsel for
6
appellants (Atty. Escolastico R. Viola), who failed to comply with the order, was penalized
with fine and later ordered arrested byt this Court.  Thereafter, the Court appointed the
7
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to represent appellants.  The PAO made a similar
8
manifestation as the OSG did with respect to the TSN. 9
Upon a thorough review of the records of the case, appellants' conviction cannot
stand for reasons which were not discussed or even mentioned by appellants'
appointed counsel. The PAO, as the duly designated government agency to
represent and render legal services to pauper litigants who cannot hire their own
counsel, should have exerted more effort on this case. Its pleadings filed before this
court could hardly be considered as the product of an advocate who has the
responsibility to serve his client with competence and diligence.   The preparation
10
of his case is a duty the lawyer owes not only to his client whose property, money
and above all life and liberty he is bound to protect. It is also a duty he owes to
himself, to his own integrity and self-respect at the bar. Nonetheless, the Court is
not powerless to address and consider unassigned issues and relevant facts and
law that may affect the merits and justifiable disposition of the case.
Initially, the categorization by the prosecution of the crime of robbery with double
homicide is erroneous because the word "homicide" in Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) should be taken in its generic sense.  absorbing not only acts
11
which results in death (such as murder) but also all other acts producing anything
short of death (such as physical injuries) committed during the robbery.  and
regardless of the multiplicity of the victim which is only considered as an
aggravating circumstances.  The indictable offense is still the complex crime of
13
robbery with homicide (which is its proper nomenclature), the essential elements of
which are:
a.) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person;
b.) the property thus taken belongs to another;
c.) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
d.) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide which
5
is therein used in a generic sense, was
committed.  14
In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery and; thus, no
direct evidence points to appellants criminal liability. The prosecution's principal
evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who
arrested, investigated and subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when
juxtaposed with appellants' constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking
of confessions leads to a conclusion that they cannot he held liable fort the offense
charged despite the inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not
because they are not guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are
inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
First, appellants were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest and their arrest
cannot even be justified under any of the recognized exceptions for a valid
warrantless arrest mentioned in Section 6, (now section 5) Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which prior to its amendment in 1998  provides:
15
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit an offense in his presence;
12
b) when the offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or/place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
None of the foregoing exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest concurs herein. At
the time appellants were apprehended, two days had already lapsed after the
discovery of the crime — they were not doing nor had just done any criminal act.
Neither were they caught in flagrante delicto or had escaped from confinement.
Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they made the arresting officers
testified that appellants were merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation,
however when construed in the light of the circumstances is actually in the nature
of an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an interrogation.  Mere 16
invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is
intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation. Thus, pursuant to
Section 4(2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which was in effect at that time, "any
evidence" obtained in violation of their right under Section 3, Article IV (pertaining
to invalid warrantless arrests)  "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
17
proceeding."  By virtue of said constitutional protection any evidence obtained,
18
including all the things and properties alleged to be stolen by appellants which were
taken by the police from the place of the illegal arrest cannot be used as evidence
for their conviction. In the same manner, all the products of those illegal arrest
cannot be utilized to sustain any civil liability that they may have incurred by reason
of their acts. This is the clear mandate of the Constitution when it provides that
those illegally obtained evidence being "the fruits of the poisonous tree" are
"inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding". The foregoing constitutional
protection on the inadmissibility of evidence (which are the product of an illegal
search and arrest) known as the eclusionary rule, applies not only to criminal cases
but even extends to civil, administrative and any other form of proceedings. No
distinction is made by the Constitution; this Court ought not to distinguish.
Even assuming arguendo that by entering a plea without first questioning the
legality of their arrest, appellants are deemed to have waived any ojection
concerning their arrest:  yet the extrajudicial confession of appellant Olivares, Jr.
19
on which the prosecution relies, is likewise inadmissible in evidence. Under the
Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right, among other to have a counsel,  which right can be validly waived. In
20
this case, the said confession was obtained during custodial investigation but the
confessant was not assisted by counsel. His manifestation to the investigating
officer that he did not need the assistance of counsel does not constitute a valid
waiver of his right within the contemplation of our criminal justice system. This
notwithstanding the fact that the 1973 Constitution does not state that a waiver of
the right to counsel to be valid must be made with the assistance or in the presence
of counsel. Although this requisite concerning the presence of counsel before a
waiver of the right to counsel can be validly made is enshrined only in the 1987
Constitution, which further requires that the waiver must also be in writing,  yet
jurisprudence is replete even during the time of appellants arrest where it has been
categorically ruled that a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel shall not be
valid when the same is made without the presence or assistance of
counsel.  Consequently, the valid waiver of the right to counsel during custodial
22
investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether verbal or non-
verbal,  obtained in violation thereof as also "inadmissible in evidence"  under
23 24
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution  which provides:
25
. . . . Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used aginst him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence. (emphasis supplied).
Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be: 26
1.) express and categorical; 27
2.) given voluntarily,  and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal
28
significance of his act;29
3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel; 30
4.) in writing; and in the language known to and understood by the confessant;  and31
5 signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write thumbmarked by
him.32
In this case, the absence of the third requisite above makes the confession
inadmissible. The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the
slightest coercion  as would lead the accused to admit something false.  What is
33 34
sought to be avoided is the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with
which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.  These constitutional guarantees
35
have been made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological,
if not physical atmosphere of such investigation.  In any case, said extrajudicial
36
confession of one accused may not be utilized against a co-accused unless they are
repeated in open court or when there is an opportunity to cross-examine the other
on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay as against said accused
21 under the rule on res enter alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. 37
Aware of the abuses committed by some investigating and police agencies on a
criminal suspect to get leadings confessions, information and evidence just so they
can claim to have speedily resolved a crime and fulfilled their duty, all at the
expense of the basic human rights guaranteed by the Constitution the Court cannot
turn a blind eye by disregarding the constitutional rights accorded to every accused
and tolerate official abuse. The presumption that a public officer had regularly
performed his official duty,  which is only a matter of procedure, cannot prevail over
38
the presumption of innocence stated in the highest law of the land — the
Constitution. As a contract between and among the people, the provisions of the
Constitution cannot just be taken lightly.
With the inadmissibility of the material circumstancial evidence which were
premised on the likewise extrajudicial confession upon which both the prosecution
and the lower court relied to sustain appellants' conviction the remaining
circumstances cannot produce a logical conclusion to establish their guilt. In order
to sustain a conviction based on circumstancial evidence, it is necessary that the
same satisfies the following elements:
1. there is more than one circumstances;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. 39
Simply put for circumstancial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time incosistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that the guilt.
40
The findings of the trial, to wit:
Both accused are barriomates from Iloilo which means that there is a common
factor for them to come together and act on a plan hatched by them during a
drinking spree. It would not be remote for Melchor Sali who was questioned by the
police and on whose statement the police made a start to investigate, would be a
part of the plan to rob two or three weeks before the incident, because he is also a
barriomate of the two accused. The truth of the testimony of Narciso Gador that
both accused were seen by him on Christmas night at Delia's restaurant between
9:00 and 10:00 o'clock at night which is corroborated in the statement of Rafael
Olivarez, Jr. is not remote and is more credible than the defense (sic) alibi of the
Olivarez brothers that they were together sleeping in an employer's house. Another
matter to consider was the failure of Danilo Arellano to report for work after the
killing that was from December 26, 1981 until he was arrested. His having left his
place of employment and residence without explanation is an evidence of flee from
the scene of the crime. Flee without anyone pursuing is an indication of guilt.
Another ciscumstantial evidence showing that the crime was perpretrated by both
accused was the recovery of the radio cassettes, tapes and wrist watch by Cpl.
Juan Tomas who testified that the place were recovered was pointed to by Danilo
Arellano (TSN Nov. 17, 1982, p. 4). These stolen articles having been recently stolen
and their whereabouts being known to Danilo Arellano raises the presumption that
he was the one who took the same with intent to gain from their rightful
owner.41
cannot entirely be considered because some of the circumstancial evidence relied
upon by the trial court were, at the risk of being repetitive, based on the
inadmissible extrajudicial confession. The facts which became known only by virtue
of the extrajudicial confession pertains to how the victims were killed, how
appellants gained entrance into the premises, and how the alleged stolen properties
were found in the house where one of them was arrested. Without the foregoing
facts a combination of the remainder of the circumstancial evidence cannot sustain
a conviction beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt: hence, the absence of the
third requisite. Forthwith the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof and
consequently to rebut with the required quantum of evidence  the presumption of
42
innocence  fundamentally enjoyed by both appellants. For it is a basic evidentiary
43
rule in criminal law that the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the
guilt of the accused. El incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts — not he
who denies — must prove. Likewise, it is settled that conviction must rest on the
weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution.  Accordingly,
44
circumstancial evidence with has not been adequately established cannot, by itself,
be the basis of conviction.
45
WHEREFORE, appellants' conviction is herein REVERSED and both are ACQUITTED
for the crime charged. The person detaining them is ordered to IMMEDIATELY
RELEASE appellants UNLESS they are held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122142 May 17, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila, finding
1  Recto Avenue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. At about 10:20 a.m., accused-appellant came back
accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims Nena Berjuega and
Remedios Hitta in the amount of P50,000.00 each and to pay the sum of P4,000.00
representing the amount of money stolen.
The information alleged —
That on or about August 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with one, whose true name, identity and present
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, to wit: the said accused take, rob and carry away the amount of P4,000.00
cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will, to the damage and prejudice of said
owner in the aforesaid amount of P4,000.00 Philippine Currency; that on the occasion
thereof and by reason of the aforesaid robbery, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the
person of NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to death, thereby
inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of their death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has
been at large. When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial
ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Pat. Benjamin Ines, Dr. Marcial G.
Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pat. Ines of the Western Police District
investigated the robbery with homicide. The gist of his testimony is to the following effect:
Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business was
selling chickens to customers. Cabosas's business was located in Blumentritt Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila.
In the morning of August 11, 1989, accused-appellant was asked to deliver dressed
chickens to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer at Room 4-D Gatlin Building, 1344 C.M.
and turned over to his employer the amount of P2,000.00. Pat. Ines testified that after
receiving report of the killing, he and Pfc. Ricardo Sibal went to see Angie Cabosas from
which they learned that the latter has received a call from Emma Cabrera informing Angie
that her house had been robbed and her two maids killed. They were told that accused-
appellant had gone to Pangasinan allegedly to attend the burial of his grandfather. Pat.
Ines said he and P/Lt. Villamor Valdez, Pfc. Sibal, Pfc. Edmundo Cabal and Pat. Renato
Gutierrez went to Rosales, Pangasinan but failed to find accused-appellant. They were
told by the sister of accused-appellant, Merly Asuncion, that accused-appellant had gone
to La Union. According to Pat. Ines, accused-appellant confided to his sister that he had
allegedly done something wrong in Manila.
Pat. Ines identified two sworn statements, both executed on August 11, 1989, one of
which, he said, had been executed by Helen N. Moral, a househelp of Emma Cabrera, and
the other by Angie C. De los Reyes. In her statement marked Exhibit I, Moral said that
upon arriving in the house at about 12:20 p.m. that day, she and her employer's nephew,
Carlos Emerson, found the bodies of the victims sprawled on the floor. She told Pat. Ines
that accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed chicken to their place.
On the other hand, in her sworn statement given on August 14, 1989 and marked as
Exhibit L, Anita C. De los Reyes stated that on August 11, 1989, she had seen accused-
appellant and Ronnie Liwanag, their hands covered with blood, coming out of the Gatlin
Building on C.M. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.  2
Pat. Ines testified that on March 3, 1990, he and his group received information from Pat.
Alfredo Que of the Urdaneta Police Station that accused-appellant was in Cataban,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Accordingly, they went to the place indicated and the next day,
March 4, 1990, they were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they brought to
Manila. Pat. Ines said accused-appellant was positively identified by Anita De los Reyes
as one of those whom she saw running down the stairs of the Gatlin Building on C.M.
Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila with blood in his hands. 3
Pat. Ines testified that on that same day, March 4, 1990, accused-appellant gave a
confession (Exh. O) in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los
Reyes, in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and Remedios
Hitta. Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit (Exh. P) stating the circumstances of
accused-appellant's arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and
information sheet. 
4
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession was presented in evidence as Exhibit O.  In5  there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds by using a single bladed
it, accused-appellant said he started working for Angie Cabosas in the latter's business on
Blumentritt Street, Manila three or four months before the incident. Cabosas and accused-
appellant's sister Merly Asuncion, had been neighbors in Rosales, Pangasinan. Accused-
appellant's work was to deliver dressed chicken. Emma Cabrera was a regular customer
to whom he made deliveries in the morning. On August 10, 1989, his fellow employee,
Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma in order to be able to go to La Union to
visit his family. On August 11, 1989, after learning that only two helpers were then at the
residence of Emma Cabrera, accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to pull the heist.
Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from shouting but, as she
tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her. Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-
appellant who stabbed the younger maid Remedios Hitta from which she died. Thereafter,
the two proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie had taken from the
house of Emma Cabrera. From Blumentritt Street, Ronnie went to La Union, while
accused-appellant proceeded to Pangasinan. The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog
and signed by accused-appellant in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes.
The prosecution next presented Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the WPD
Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila. He said that on March 4, 1990, he happened to be at
Station 7 of the WPD, representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was asked
by Lt. Generoso Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist accused-executing an
extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los Reyes, he apprised accused-appellant
of his constitutional rights, explaining to him that any statement made by him could be
used against him in court, but accused-appellant said he was willing to give a statement as
in fact he did, confessing to the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide. 
6
The other prosecution witness was Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, medico-legal officer who
conducted autopsies on August 11, 1989 on the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios
Hitta. After proper identification (Exh. D) by the victim's employer, Antonio Cabrera, Dr.
Cenido prepared a postmortem report (Exh. A) that Nena Berjuega suffered 16 stab
wounds from which she died.
Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 16 stab wounds which affected her vital
organs, specifically the right and left lungs and the heart, causing her death. Six of these
wounds were fatal so that she could not survive despite immediate medical attention. He
concluded that the assailant and the victim could be facing each other when wounds nos.
1, 3 and 5 (Exhs. B-1, B-2, and B-4, respectively) were inflicted and that the assailant may
have been on the left lateral side of the victim when he inflicted wound no. 8 (Exh. B-5)
and at the victim's back when assailant inflicted wound no. 16 (Exh. B-6). He said that
weapon.  7
Dr. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem report (Exh. F) that Remedios Hitta suffered
12 stab wounds from which she died.
Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 12 stab wounds with seven fatal ones that
caused her death. The fatal wounds damaged her left and right lungs and the heart that
she would not survive despite immediate medical attention. He observed that in wounds
nos. 1, 2 and 3 (Exhs. G-1, G-2, and G-3, respectively), the assailant and the victim could
be facing each other, while in wounds nos. 4, 9 and 11 (Exhs. G-4, G-6, and G-7,
respectively), the assailant could have been at the back of the victim. He said that there
could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds using a single bladed weapon.  8
Dr. Cenido prepared the certificates of death of the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios
Hitta (Exhs. C and H). He stated that the weapon used on both victims could have been
the same and that both victims sustained multiple stab wounds.  9
With the testimonies of Pat. Ines, Atty. De los Reyes, and Dr. Cenido and the extrajudicial
confession (Exh. O), as well as the sworn statements of Helen Moral (Exh. I) and Anita De
los Reyes (Exh. L), the prosecution rested its case.
The defense presented, as its sole witness, accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla.
Accused-appellant testified that he had worked for Angie Cabosas in Blumentritt Street for
four (4) months before the incident in this case. Angie was a neighbor of his sister, Merly
Asuncion, in Pangasinan. Angie's business was selling dressed chickens. Accused-
appellant said that at about 9:00 a.m. on August 11, 1989, he delivered dressed chickens
to Emma Cabrera's residence on C.M. Recto Avenue. He came back from his errand at
around 10:20 a.m. and remitted the amount of P2,000.00 which had been paid to him. He
denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that he was arrested
without a warrant in Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being informed of the charges
against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute an
extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen Atty. De los Reyes before and
stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he
signed because he does not know how to read.  10
On August 31, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and punishable under
Article 294(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law. He is further
condemned to pay the heirs of the victims, Remedios Hitta and Nena Berjuega the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each as civil indemnity for their death and the
additional sum of P4,000.00 as the amount of money taken, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
His immediate transfer to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa is hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this instant appeal. Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial
confession which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide.
He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his confession, was not
the counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he refused to sign the
booking and information sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial confession five times as
a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him.
Art. III, §12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional
provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of §12, and (2) those
which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of
paragraph 1 of the same §12.
Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. Aside from
this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. He did
not seek medical treatment nor even a physical examination. His allegation that the fact
that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it.
To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five times is not the
same confession (Exh. O) but different parts thereof. He signed his name on page 1 to
acknowledge that he had been given the Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then, he signed
again as proof that after being given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a statement.
(Exh. O-6) Next, he signed again his name at the end of page 2 to authenticate that page
as part of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third page at the end of his
confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name again on the third page in which the
jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh. O).
We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that it was
signed by accused-appellant five times.
Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that
accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he were simply
forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no reason
the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The inference rather was
that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the confession, otherwise, he
could also have been forced to sign the booking and information sheet.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive
evidence showing the declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such
confession will be sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have
given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he who killed the
younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed the crime together
with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon given to him by Q And who was that lawyer that was provided by you?
Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena Berjuega), details
which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the two A Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, sir.
victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon. It has been held that
voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which Q And who personally took down the statement of the accused?
could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence
which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied.  When 11 

A I was the one who personally took the statement of accused Obrero.
the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been
concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of
maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant Q Do you know what was the gist of that statement that was given to you, what was it all
evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is about?
admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be
voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential A It's all about the admission of Jimmy Obrero, the gruesome slaying of two househelps.
facts contained in such confession.  12

But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that
accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution,
an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from which Art. III,
§12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar
environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police
interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial
interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to
remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against
him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him.  1
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Before having taken down the admission of Jimmy Obrero, what investigative steps did
you undertake relative to his constitutional right, patrolman?
A I informed Jimmy Obrero of his constitutional right to remain silent, to have an attorney;
that everything that he will say will be used for or against him. He, however, consented to
proceed with the written statement.
Q Now, Patrolman, did you indicate his constitutional rights that you stated in this written
statement of Jimmy Obrero?
A Yes, sir, I put it on the statement which he voluntarily gave.

In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los Reyes to establish Q And will you please tell us which part of the statement of Jimmy Obrero is it indicated,
that the above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when accused-appellant the consent which he gave after having pointed out to him his constitutional right?
executed his extrajudicial confession. Pat. Benjamin Ines testified: 14

A This portion sir, this "sagot-opo" and then it was further affirmed by his signature over
Q What happened during the investigation of the accused? his typewritten name, sir.

A He consented to give a written statement to me, sir. For his part, Atty. De los Reyes testified:  15

Q Now, when accused Jimmy Obrero consented to give statement, Patrolman, was he Q: Were you able to confront the suspect at that time, herein accused?
assisted by counsel?

A Yes, sir, we provided him with a lawyer.

A: Yes, sir, I told him for the purpose of investigation — custodial investigation I can render
my services to him and afterwards avail the services of another lawyer and I told him his
rights under the law, sir.
Q: What was the reply of Jimmy Obrero, the accused, in this case at that time you
confronted Jimmy Obrero?
A: He is willing at that time and [voluntarily] gave his affirmation that he wanted to secure
my services, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q After having manifested that he will retain your services as counsel for the investigation,
Atty. De los Reyes, what happened next?
A I told him the rights under the Constitution, the right to remain silent, the right to secure
lawyer, the right not to give statement, the right not to be placed in any identification
procedure in a police line up, and I told him that all the evidences he might give will be
utilized against him in the court with respect to the case — and despite of that, he said he
wanted to give his statement to the police in my presence.
Q Was he able to give statement to the police?
A Yes, sir. I was there inside the room with the client and observing fairly [when he] gave
statement voluntarily.
Q Was that statement taken down into writing?
A In a question and answer form, sir.
Indeed, the waiver signed by accused-appellant reads:
MGA KARAPATAN AYON SA ATING BINAGONG
SALIGANG BATAS:
Ikaw, JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, ay aking isasailalim sa pagsisiyasat sa salang
Pagnanakaw na may kasamang Pagpatay, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga
karapatan ayon sa ating Binagong Saligang Batas:
1. Karapatan mo ang manahimik at huwag sagutin ang mga itatanong ko sa iyo;
2. Karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong sariling pili na maaaring
makatulong sa iyo sa imbistigasyon na ito at kung hindi ka makakakuha ng iyong abogado
ay bibigyan ka namin ng isa na walang bayad para makatulong sa iyo;
3. Karapatan mo rin na malaman na ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin dito sa iyong salaysay
ay maaaring gamiting katibayan o ebidensya laban o pabor sa iyo o sa kanino mang tao
sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.
Ngayon na naipaalam ko na sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan, nais mo pa bang magbigay
ng iyong malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
SAGOT : (ni Jimmy Obrero y Corla) Opo.
TANONG: Kung ganoon ay sabihin mo ulit ang iyong pangalan at lagdaan mo ito sa
ibabaw ng iyong pangalan na ipipirma o imamakinilya ko?
(Sgd.) JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant
without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so,
whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind
of giving of warnings, in several decisions  of this Court, has been found to be merely
16 
ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in
this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that
accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished
the fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in People v.
Januario: 17
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's
relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers
engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship
between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.  18
Moreover, Art. III, §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial
interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by
Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an
"independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station
commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. On this point, he
testified as follows:
Q Now, whenever there is a crime committed wherein the member of police to which you
belong or working but could not solve the crime and then you were designated as counsel
to extend legal assistance to a suspect who is under a custodial investigation and in that
conference with the suspect you may have inquired confidential information, what would
you do, will you keep it to yourself or you must have to divulge that to your co-policeman
because you know that?
A If I am the lawyer, then all the testimonies and declaration is my preferential right, I can
divulge it even to my fellow officer.
Q Now, by the way, do you have authority to practice the law profession, did you get
approval or permit from the civil —
A Previously, when I was at the JAGO, we are authorized verbally [as long as] it will not
hamper our time, we will not work our time during the police duty, ma'am.
Q According to you, you were extending legal assistance to your client who was charged
of illegal recruitment, do you not consider that conflict of duty because no less than your
organization was the one investigating that?
A I am extending my legal assistance to the client I am handling the case because if it is
true that he committed the crime then I will back out, if I found suspicion and there is no
proof at all, I go to the litigation.
ATTY. ALISUAG:
That is all, Your Honor. 19
The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled:
As shown in Exhibit "O", accused consented to giving his extrajudicial confession after he
was informed of rights under custodial investigation, by affixing his signature thereto
(Exhibit "O-3"). And absent any showing that the assisting lawyer, though a station
commander but of another police station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, this Court
holds that the proceedings were regularly conducted. In fact, he testified that he first asked
the accused if he is accepting his legal services (TSN, March 5, 1991, p. 4); that he
informed the accused of his Miranda rights and despite the warning, he decided to give his
confession just the same; that he was at all time present when the accused was being
interrogated with the accused giving his answers voluntarily (Ibid, p. 4); that he read to the
accused the questions and answers before he signed his extrajudicial confession (Ibid, p.
8). Clearly shown was the fact that Atty. De los Reyes was equal to his duties as a lawyer
than a member of the police force, when he lend his assistance to the accused during his
in-custody interrogation.  20
This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula,  the independent counsel required by Art.
21 
III, §12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or
counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case,
Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the
police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted
accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow
such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during
custodial investigation. 
22
For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot stand.
The prosecution tried to introduce circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's guilt
consisting of the sworn statements (Exhs. I and L) of Helen Moral, the househelp who said
accused-appellant used to deliver dressed chickens to the Cabrera residence, and Anita
de los Reyes who said that on March 11, 1989 she was passing in front of the Gatlin
Building where the killing took place when she saw accused-appellant running down the
stairs with blood in his hands. These statements are likewise inadmissible for being
hearsay. Consequently, there is no identification of accused-appellant.
And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no
evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. O) of accused-appellant which, as
already stated, is inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object to
the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not
satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. We cannot thus affirm
the conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities committed
during custodial investigation and the trial of the case. It may be that by this decision a
guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the
principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single
innocent person.

WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-82187 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of
robbery with homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on
the ground of reasonable doubt.

The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-
appellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court
accordingly within ten (10) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110397 August 14, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,
vs.
ARMANDO BINAMIRA y ALAYON, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In acquitting the accused, this Court stresses two doctrines: (1) a violation of the accused's
right to retain a counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation renders his
extrajudicial confession inadmissible even where such confession was extracted on
October 3, 1985, i.e., before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, and (2) to sustain a
conviction anchored on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must convincingly prove
an unbroken chain of events from which only one fair and reasonable conclusion can be
inferred — that of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where such
circumstances can be the subject of two possibilities, one of which is consistent with
innocence and the other with guilt, then such evidence has not fulfilled the test of moral
certainty and the constitutional presumption of innocence must thus be upheld.
Statement of the Case
Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon  appeals the May 5, 1989 Decision  of the Regional
1 2
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 164,  in Criminal Case No. 19504 convicting
3
him of the crime of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Jessie Flores y Cledar,  P30,000.00 as
4
indemnity and P25,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.
On October 7, 1985, an Information,  dated October 4, 1985, was filed by Second
5
Assistant Fiscal Dennis M. Villa Ignacio accusing appellant of robbery with homicide
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of October, 1985, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with a fan knife, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and divest from
one Jessie Flores y Cledera her 14K Gold Necklace worth P1,000.00 and One (1) Lady's
Citizen wrist watch worth P1,000.00 all belonging to Jessie Flores y Cledera in the total
amount of P2,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned
amount of P2,000.00; that on the occasion of said robbery, the accused stabbed the said
Jessie Flores y Cledera on her neck, as a result thereof, the said victim suffered mortal
wound which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on October 25, 1985, the accused, assisted by Counsel de Oficio Elpidio R.
Calis, pleaded not guilty to the charge.  Trial ensued in due course.
6
Based on circumstantial evidence and on Appellant Binamira's extrajudicial confession,
the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and hereby sentences him to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of
P30,000.00 for the death of Jessie Flores and P25,000.00 as actual or compensatory
without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED. 7
Aggrieved, appellant interposed this appeal.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The prosecution presented four witnesses; namely, NBI Medico-Legal Officer Nieto
Salvador, who testified on the autopsy results; Nicasio Rosales, a security guard who
testified on the arrest and turnover to the police authorities of Appellant Binamira; Makati
Police Officer Wilfredo Cruz, who testified on the custodial investigation and extrajudicial
confession of appellant; and Narciso Flores, the husband of the deceased, Jessie Flores y
Cledera. In the appellee's brief, the Solicitor General summarized the facts as presented
by the prosecution, thus:
On 02 October 1985, at about 6:50 P.M., in Magallanes Village, Makati, Metro Manila,
Security Guard Nicasio Rosales of the RAPSA Security Agency assigned thereat together
with his co-guards were alerted by a report regarding the death of a woman by the name
of Jessie Flores y Cledera at No. 68 Margarita St., Magallanes Village, Makati. They
hurried to the scene of the crime where they saw the lifeless body of a woman lying on the
ground (pp. 4-6, tsn, February 14, 1986).
They immediately conducted a search of the immediate surroundings hoping to find the
person responsible for the killing and they saw a man wearing short pants, walking very
fast. When the guards approached him, the man who turned out to be herein appellant,
casually pretended to be urinating. Suspicious, they searched him and found a pair of
pants and undershirt inside his bag soaked with blood (pp. 6-7, id).
Thereupon, the guard brought appellant to the Galleria de Magallanes Hall where he, as
well as the bloodied clothing, were turned over the Police Investigator Wilfredo Cruz whom
they had called to respond to said incident. On the same day, appellant was brought to the
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the Makati Police Station for further investigation
(pp. 7-8, id).
On the following day, 03 October 1985, Cruz conducted an investigation of appellant's
complicity in the Magallanes robbery-killing incident. Before the investigation proceeded,
Pfc. Cruz first apprised appellant of his constitutional rights while under custodial
investigation by explaining to him his right to counsel, his right to remain silent and, that
any statement that he would give during the investigation may be used for or against him
in any court of law, and that in case he did not have a lawyer, the State would provide him
with one who will assist him in the investigation. At this juncture, the services of Atty.
Romeo P. Parcon of the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of Makati was offered to
which appellant agreed (pp. 5-7, tsn, 1986; pp. 4-6, tsn, May 14, 1986; pp. 84, Record).
While being investigated with the assistance and presence of Atty. Parcon, appellant
readily cooperated to give his statements. He admitted that he stabbed the victim in the
neck with a fan knife after divesting her of one (1) wristwatch and a gold necklace.
Appellant revealed that he killed the victim when she began screaming for help despite his
instructions to keep silent. Midway during the investigation, Pfc. Cruz showed to appellant
a gold necklace and asked him the connection thereof to the investigation to which
appellant, despite being told that he was at liberty not to proceed with the investigation,
admitted that the necklace was the same one he took from the victim. After the
investigation, the extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to by appellant (Exh.
"C" to "C-2") before the office of the then Fiscal of Makati (pp. 84-84, Records; p. 10, tsn,
March 21, 1986; p. 7, tsn, May 14, 1986).
Dr. Nieto Salvador, the NBI Medico-legal Officer, who conducted an autopsy examination
on the body of the victim on October 3, 1985, found as per autopsy report no. N-85-2078
(Exh. "F" to "F-3") dated December 2, 1985, the following:
Lips and nailbeds, pale. Abrasions, reddish brown, 1.5 x 0.5. cm. right infraclavicular
region.
Wound stab, 2.0 cm. in size, lower extremity rounded, running downward and medially,
edges clean cut; located at the left side of the suprasternal, 1.0 cm. to the left anterior
median line directed backward, downward and laterally, involving skin, underlying soft
tissues, cutting carotid artery and vein, approximate depth artery and vein, approximate
depth, 7.0 cm.
Other visceral organs pale.
Stomach is filled up to 2/3 with partially digested food particles.
Dr. Salvador testified that the victim's cause of death was due to acute hemorrhage on
account of a frontal stab wound she sustained at the base of her neck just above the
subtraclavicular notch. He further opines that the instrument used in the stabbing is a
sharp pointed object. Appellant's clothings soaked with the victim's blood were also
submitted to Dr. Salvador for examination (pp. 6-9, tsn, April 25, 1986).
8
According to the Defense
Appellant, as lone defense witness, admitted his presence at Magallanes Village that
fateful night but unequivocally denied participation in the crime. The following counter-
statement of facts is narrated in Appellant's Brief:
The evidence for the defense eloquently shows that accused-appellant was formerly
connected with the National Food Authority (NFA) as messenger from 1983 to 1985. On
October 2, 1985, coming from his work at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila, at around
7:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, he went to Magallanes Village at the back of
Bulwagang Pilipino for the purpose of taking a merienda which he usually did after office
hours. While walking all alone at the vicinity of Magallanes Village, accused-appellant did
not notice any unusual incident nor seen (sic) anybody until the security guards who,
without legal and justifiable grounds searched and apprehended him. Accused-appellant
was brought by the security guards at their headquarters where they beat, mauled,
maltreated and tied him to the post. They forced him to admit that he was the one who
killed the woman whose body was lying at their guardhouse. But the accused-appellant
maintained his innocence. After the lapse of several minutes, the security guards untied
the accused-appellant from the post and they brought them back to their headquarters.
The security guards then pointed to accused-appellant a person lying at their guardhouse.
They forced accused-appellant to carry the dead body to be placed inside the funeral car.
Helpless, accused-appellant followed their order. After he has placed the body at the
funeral car, the security guards ordered him to take off the clothes he was wearing.
Accused-appellant consented. Afterwards, the security guards brought him once more to
their headquarters where accused-appellant saw Pfc. Willy Cruz. From their headquarters,
they brought him to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Makati Police Station for
interrogation.
At the Makati Police Station, the police investigators assigned that time investigated the
accused-appellant relative to the death of a woman at the Magallanes Village, Makati,
Metro Manila. When the investigation was being conducted by the police investigator,
accused-appellant did not see one of his relatives at the police station nor was he provided
a lawyer of his choice. Subsequently, the police investigators blindfolded him. He was
thereafter mauled by the police investigators, forcing him to admit the commission of the
crime which happened in Magallanes Village. After maltreating the accused-appellant,
they detained him and was made to sign a statement the following day.
When his wife visited him at the detention cell, accused-appellant told her what the
security guards and police officers did to him during the apprehension and investigation.
The wife, due to fear, did not report the maltreatment committed on the accused-appellant
to the higher authorities.
Accused-appellant denied having divested Jessie Flores of one gold necklace worth
P1,000.00 and Ladys's (sic) Citizen wrist watch also worth P1,000.00 or a total of
P2,000.00 and having stabbed Jessie Flores on her neck which resulted to her untimely
death. On August 2, 1986, accused-appellant wrote his lawyer on record reiterating
thereto the mishandling committed by the security guards and police investigator when he
denied the killing of a woman whose body was found in Magallanes Village, Metro-Manila.
(Exh. "1"). (TSN, September 11, 1987, pp. 3-11) 9
The Issues
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I isang pangyayari na kung saan ang isang babaing biktima ay namatay dahil sa isang
The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to thhe [sic] testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses despite of [sic] its improbabilities.
II
The trial court gravely erred in holding that the extrajudicial confession of accused-
appellant Armando Binamira is admissible in evidence.
III
The trial court gravely erred in totally disregarding the defense interposed by the accused-
appellant.
IV
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10
In the ultimate, the foregoing boil down to whether the evidence on record establishes
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Appellant Binamira. Two points will be addressed:
first, the admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial confession; and second, the sufficiency of
the circumstantial evidence to sustain appellant's guilt.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Extrajudicial Confession Inadmissible
Appellant Armando Binamira contends that his extrajudicial confession marked as Exhibit
"C" is inadmissible in evidence because it was improperly taken during the custodial
investigation.  He contends that he "was not informed of his right to counsel of his own
11
choice nor assisted by counsel of his own choice"  and that this was evident from
12
the Pahiwatig of his extrajudicial confession, which reads: 13
PAHIWATIG: Ikaw ARMANDO BINAMIRA ay nahaharap sa isang pagsisiyasat tungkol sa
saksak sa kanyang leeg.
Bilang isang malayang mamamayan ng ating bansa, ikaw ay may ilang mga karapatan sa
ilalim ng ating bagong umiiral na Saligang Batas gaya ng mga sumusunod;
Na, karapatan mo ang manahimik o ang hindi pagbibigay ng pahayag tungkol sa
pagsisiyasat na ito.
Na, karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado o manananggol na siyang
mamamatnubay sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito at kung ikaw ay walang abogado ay
bibigyan ka namin ng isang manananggol o abogado.
Na, karapatan mo rin ang hindi pagsagot sa mga ipagtatanong ko sa iyo na inaakala mo
na makasama sa iyo.
Nais ko rin ipaalam sa iyo na ano mang sasabihin mo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maari ring
naming gamitin laban sa iyo sa aling mang hukuman dito sa ating bansa.
TANONG: Matapos kong maipaliwanag sa iyo ang ilan sa iyong mga karapatan, ikaw ba
ay magbibigay ng isang malayang salaysay sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
SAGOT: Opo. A.B. 14
T. Dahilan sa ikaw ay walang manananggol o abogado sa pagsisiyasat na ito, ikaw ay
bibigyan namin ng isang abogado sa katauhan ni Atty. ROMEO P. PARCON ng Makati
CLAO office na siyang mamamatnubay sa iyo ngayon. Pumapayag ka ba na itong si
ATTY. ROMEO P. PARCON ang siyang mamamatnubay sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
S. Opo. A.B. [handwritten]
T. Ikaw ba ay magbibigay ng isang malayang salaysay sa harap ni Atty. Romeo P.
Parcon? (Emphasis supplied.)
Significant in assessing this contention of the appellant is the Solicitor General's candid
admission that "Exhibit 'C' (the extrajudicial confession) does not show that appellant was
informed of his right to have a counsel preferably of his own choice as required under the
present Constitution." 15
The prosecution however justified such failure to inform appellant of his right to counsel of
choice and to give him the opportunity to retain one by arguing that the questioned
extrajudicial confession was obtained on October 3, 1985, whereas the 1987 Constitution,
which expressly provided for such
rights,  took effect only on February 2, 1987  and could not be given retroactive effect
16 17
pursuant to Magtoto vs. Manguera.  Thus, the Solicitor General postulates, "(a)t the time
18
said confession was made, appellant was not yet entitled to be informed of the right he is
now invoking simply because there was none at the time. The right to counsel preferably
of one's own choice during investigation for the commission of an offense is a new
provision."19
We do not agree. Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution mandated that ". . . (a)ny
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. . . . Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." Parenthetically, this
constitutional provision was an "acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona." 20
Significantly, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile   promulgated on April 26, 1983, the Philippine
21
Supreme Court, applying said provision of the 1973 Constitution, laid down for the first
time the guidelines to be observed strictly by law enforcers during custodial
investigation,  and there had occasion to state that ". . . No custodial investigation shall be
22
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or anyone on his behalf. . . ."  (Emphasis supplied.) This doctrinal pronouncement was
23
reiterated in People vs. Galit,  promulgated on March 20, 1985, and other cases.
24
In People vs. Jimenez  pomulgated on December 10, 1991 and which dealt with an
25
extrajudicial confession given during a custodial investigation on September 16, 1985, this
Court through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa held that "a
person being investigated by the police as a suspect in an offense has the right, among
others, 'to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice' and if
he 'cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one;' and
that said right 'cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.' . . . In
one case, the confession of an accused was rejected there being no showing that the
lawyer of the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) called by the National Bureau of
Investigation to assist the accused was his counsel of choice." 26
In its evolution, the right to engage a counsel of choice and its companion rights had been
initially a "judge-made"  law, the definitive ruling having been first down by this Court
27
in Morales, reiterated in Galit and subsequent cases and eventually incorporated in the
1987 Constitution. Ineludibly, these rights may not be given retroactive effect pursuant to
Article 4 in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code and, by parity of reasoning, Magtoto.
Consequently, they do not cover extrajudicial confessions made prior to April 26, 1983, the
promulgation date of Morales.  Since Appellant Binamira executed his extrajudicial
28
confession on October 3, 1985, or after April 26, 1983, he was correct in invoking the right
to be informed of his right to engage a counsel of his own choice and to be afforded the
reasonable opportunity to retain one. On this basis the prosecution's argument, pointing to
our ruling in Magtoto, is flawed. For, clearly, the facts obtaining in the present case do not
justify the application of the doctrine on non-retroactivity or prospectivity of laws, including
this Court's interpretation of the same as enunciated in Magtoto.
In addition, the factual antecedents of Magtoto are not on all fours with that of the present
case. The former case contemplated a right previously absent under the 1935 Constitution
and which was granted for the first time only by the 1973 Constitution. The instant case
involved a right which, although not then expressly worded in the 1973 Constitution,
already existed as a "judge-made" law when the incident happened and its application was
claimed by the appellant.
Father Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, writes that "the
brief sentence in the 1973 version was expanded (in the 1987 Constitution) in order
to clarify the scope of the right."  Indeed, the present Constitution did not create a new
29
right; it merely affirmed its scope as already explained in existing jurisprudence. The
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. Felicitas S.
Aquino, another member of the Constitutional Commission, proclaimed that "[l]ikewise, the
amendment of incorporating 'PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE' reasserts that the
freedom to choose and the freedom to refuse belong first to the detainee."  This Court had
30
occasion to explain the rationale of this right as follows:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all
organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of
1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under
the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused,
deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment
based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent
and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court
stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
"contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's
relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers
engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect; as in many areas, the relationship
between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. 31
Clearly, the right to counsel preferably of one's own choice and the right to be informed
thereof were extant when Appellant Binamira was investigated by the Makati Police on
October 3, 1985, or more than two years after the promulgation of the "judge-made law"
in Morales.
In the present case, Appellant Binamira was not adequately informed of his constitutional
right to engage a counsel of his own choice, much less afforded an opportunity to exercise
such right. This much, we repeat, is admitted by the Solicitor General.
Moreover, the extrajudicial confession itself shows that, in the course of the custodial
investigation, Appellant Binamira was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights. While
he was perfunctorily informed of his right to be represented by counsel, it was not
explained to him that he may choose that counsel. More important, he was not given the
chance to actually retain such counsel of his choice. Furthermore, he was supposedly
"informed" of these rights through two kilometric sentences punctuated by similarly two
terse answers of "Opo" initialed by him.  It was demonstrated that appellant understood
32
his constitutional rights; and the Pahiwatig itself, which is obviously of martial law vintage,
shows that the investigating officers did not exert sufficient effort to explain such rights.
Verily, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights
contemplates "an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is
conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the
accused has been 'informed' of his right." 33
Finally, the CLAO lawyer appointed by the police to assist appellant did not provide
effective or adequate legal assistance to the latter. He did not display any measure of zeal
commensurate to the magnitude of his responsibility. Said counsel even failed to object to
the apparent illegal arrest and unlawful search on appellant who was simply walking when
"arrested" by Nicasio Rosales, a security guard, on the sole ground that he looked
"suspicious." Unquestionably, Rosales did not witness the robbery or the killing and did not
see appellant commit, or about to commit, the crime charged. 34
The evidence shows that said counsel was present only during the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. The record is bereft of any indication that said counsel explained
anything to or advised the appellant of the consequences of his confession. Although it is
clear that appellant had been "investigated" by the police as early as October 2, 1985, the
counsel's presence was established by the prosecution only during the actual signing on
October 3, and not during the investigation itself. Prosecution Witness Rosales testified
that the Magallanes Village security guards turned over the appellant — as a suspect in
and not as a witness to the killing — to the Makati Police on the night of October 2.
Pfc.  Wilfredo Cruz also testified that he investigated appellant on October 2. Appellant
35
himself confirmed that the "investigation" started as soon as he arrived at the police
station. The extrajudicial confession, however, was signed only on the following day. In
spite of appellant's allegation of irregularities committed in the course of the
investigation, i.e., before and during the actual signing of the confession, the prosecution
miserably failed to present rebuttal evidence. To clarify all these, Atty. Romeo P. Parcon
should have been presented on the stand. Such failure or lapse denigrates the
prosecution's cause.
As this Court held in People vs. Deniega, "[I]f the lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a
mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein
compliance with the accused's constitutional rights, the constitutional standard . . . is not
met."  Under the circumstances of this case, appellant's extrajudicial confession does not
36
merit our imprimatur.
The prosecution also hammers on the fact that neither Appellant Binamira nor his wife or
other relatives ever reported to the authorities the physical abuse appellant suffered in the
hands of the security guards and the police investigating him. However, such failure does
not prove the voluntariness of Binamira's confession. It is not very difficult to understand
the apprehension, even the refusal, of appellant and his wife — poor folks not highly
educated, if at all — to report these violations of appellant's rights, for Binamira suffered
these wrongs from the very same persons who were supposed to protect him. The fact
that he was able to divulge these abuses only to his wife and Atty. Calis cannot by itself
destroy the credibility of his claim. Indeed, the Constitution also proscribes the
admissibility of any confession or admission from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense it such admission was obtained through torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will.  However, the Court will
37
not take up appellant's allegation that he was tortured and maltreated by the investigating
police and the security guards, because such consideration is no longer necessary in view
of our holding on the violation of his right to counsel of choice. Where a confession is
extracted contrary to the accused's Miranda rights, it is ipso facto inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, there is no more need for the appellant to prove duress or intimidation to attain the
same objective of outlawing the confession.
Circumstantial Evidence Insufficient
In view of the inadmissibility of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the prosecution's case
rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Under Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court,
"[c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt." The well-entrenched doctrine is that:
. . . a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person, that is, the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
38
In the case at bar, we find that the totality of circumstantial evidence does not support the
conviction of the accused. The only circumstances proven in this case were: (1) the mortal
stabbing of the victim, Jessie Flores; (2) the presence of Appellant Armando Binamira in
Magallanes Village where the crime occurred; 3) his arrest by the three RAPSA security
guards, on the ground that he was walking suspiciously fast; and (4) the alleged recovery
of bloodied clothes from appellant's bag.
The prosecution also pointed out that a necklace belonging to the victim was recovered
from the appellant. This is highly dubious. According to the testimony of Police Officer
Cruz, the appellant allegedly surrender the necklace to a CID personnel at the police
station after the investigation had already started.  This is incredible, for no such necklace
39
or any other piece of stolen jewelry was found in appellant's possession when he was
apprehended and searched by the security guards. Additionally, this Court wonders why
appellant, who would not even hold on to his loot of jewelry, would lug around in his bag
bloodied clothes which inexplicably were not presented in evidence during the trial.
All in all, these circumstances do not form an unbroken chain adequate to justify the
inference beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. These
circumstances can be the subject of two possibilities: one consistent with the guilt of the
accused and the other consistent with his innocence. The hornbook principle is that ". . .
when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence, in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence, has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a
conviction." 
40

Sufficiency and Weight of Evidence

In view of appellant's admission that he was at the locus criminis when the offense was
committed, his defense of denial is admittedly weak. However, it should not be
automatically disregarded either. It may turn out to be true specially in this case where the
appellant's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence and the remaining pieces of
circumstantial evidence are sorely insufficient to convict him. In any event, the burden of
proof is on the prosecution and unless such burden is discharged properly, the appellant
has no duty to prove his innocence.

In closing, we must stress that mere suspicions and speculations can never be the bases
of a conviction in a criminal case. Our Constitution and our laws dearly value individual life
and liberty and require no less than moral certainty or proof beyond reasonable doubt to
offset the presumption of innocence. Courts — both trial and appellate — are not called
upon to speculate on who committed the crime. The task of court, rather, is to determine
whether the prosecution has submitted sufficient legally admissible evidence showing
beyond reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed, and that the accused
committed it. In this case, the prosecution has failed to present adequate proof
demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon was
the culprit who robbed and killed Jessie Flores y Cledera.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Armando Binamira y Alayon is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ORDERED unless he is detained for some other valid cause.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in
his capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No.
7309, which among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly
accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon
and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-
Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a
land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were
sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment,
however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He
had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama
when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the
appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the
scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which
provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."  The
1
claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was
denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not
sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad
blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the
convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably
guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary
of Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of
unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed
such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is
not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No.
7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of
Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court
resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under
sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of
which he was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language
of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant
was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in
itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to
say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified.
Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases and
that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the
presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for
requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation
for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is
acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly
convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's
professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be
given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word
"unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned
but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned."
The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that
the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of
reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside.
For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but
because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the
complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of
proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for
damages.  In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with
2
homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have
sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages
and ordered deported.  In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been
3
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the
complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to
compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of
innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the
prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"  so is the presumption of
4
innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be
innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he
is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize
that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional
presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. 5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of
his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted
because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an
"unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence
the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand,
correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends
entirely on the innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael
C. Climaco   applies:
6
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty,
that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any
public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice
which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists
in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which
cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and
reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the
legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the
accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused
must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and
then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of
the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also
wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based
on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not
necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case
in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether
"there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not
an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an
unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by
the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross
negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-
accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama
and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only
that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their
way into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that
he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all.
Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a
conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail and
flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo
Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that
night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the two
defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two
counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes?
Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of the dark shadows of that
night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by
concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why
did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood
between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be
passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his
claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was
released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances
respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of
its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.