EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000.]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents.

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the
four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271
SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in
Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions
and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance
for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-
Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National
Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without
the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process
still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:

. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain
instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is
by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the
employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the
due process rights of the respondent.

EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524. January 26, 2000.]
formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 97-420-RTJ
LUCIA F. LAYOLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE BASILIO R. GABO, Jr., respondent.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J p:
At bar is an administrative case initiated by the sworn affidavit-complaint 1 of Lucia F.
Layola, dated 12 August 1997, charging Presiding Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. of Branch
11 of the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, with a violation of Section 3 (e),
R.A. 3019, 2 for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of the
law. Complainant sent said affidavit-complaint to Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,
BGen. Manuel B. Casaclang (Ret.), of the Office of the Ombudsman who, in turn,
indorsed the same affidavit-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
appropriate action. dctai
As culled by the OCA, 3 the facts that matter are as follows:
"On June 4, 1996, herein complainant Lucia F. Layola filed a complaint with the Office
of the Deputy of the Ombudsman for the Military, charging SPO2 Leopoldo M. German
and PO2 Tomasito H. Gagui, members of the Santa Maria Police Station, Santa Maria,
Bulacan, with homicide for the death of complainant's son."
"On January 24, 1997, a resolution was handed down by the Ombudsman Investigator
recommending the indictment for murder of SPO2 German and PO2 Gagui. The
corresponding information for murder was drafted and thereafter, the case was indorsed
to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan for filing with the appropriate court. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 209-M-97 and raffled to the sala of respondent Judge
Basilio R. Gabo,[sic] RTC, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan."
"Sometime in March, 1997, a petition to take custody of accused SPO2 Leopoldo M.
German was filed by the Chief of Police of the Sta. Maria Police Station based on the
following grounds:
1. "that pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree 971, Presidential Decree
1184 and Executive Order No. 106, police personnel who are charged of any crime
before any court of justice may be placed under the custody of his immediate superior
officers upon request, [who shall] be responsible for the appearance of [such] police
officer . . . during trials and when needed by the court; and
2. "that the . . . case is service connected and within the ambit of the above
provisions of P.D. 971, 1184 and E.O. No. 106, because the offense imputed against [the
accused] stemmed from the death of Pablo Loyola [sic], a violator of the law, who was
then inside the cell of the Municipal Jail of Sta. Maria, Bulacan."
"Respondent Judge, relying on the provisions of law cited in the petition for custody,
resolved to grant the petition through an order dated April 7, 1997."
"A motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned order was filed by the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, bringing to respondent's attention the applicable
and relevant laws. However, the said motion for reconsideration was denied in an order
dated June 25, 1997." dctai
To repeat; respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. stands charged with a violation of
Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust interlocutory order, and with gross
ignorance of the law. According to the complainant the respondent judge directed that
accused SPO2 German be held in the custody of his immediate superior, the Chief of
Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans any legal and factual basis, instead of
ordering the arrest of the said accused being indicted for murder, a heinous and non-
bailable crime. Thereafter, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration
interposed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.
Asked to comment by the Court Administrator in the latter's first indorsement, dated
October 27, 1997, the respondent judge, tried to justify his action; pointing out that:
"1. The questioned order dated April 7, 1997 was issued in the light of the Comment
of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, to whose office the prosecution of the case was
indorsed by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military. Said Comment by the
prosecutor interposes no objection to the release of the accused to the custody of the
petitioner Chief of Police, on the ground that from the records of the case, accused's
"indictment was based on circumstantial evidence", hence, not so strong as to deprive the
accused of his right to bail."
"2. The motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned order filed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military "did not raise strong arguments on why the order should be
modified," hence, the denial of said motion." llcd
"3. The disputed order is now the subject of a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals initiated by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military."
The OCA found the charges of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019 and of issuing an unjust
interlocutory order, barren of merit but respondent judge was adjudged guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
As regards the charge of violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, the OCA stressed that the important element of the offense, which is damage or
injury to the complainant, or manifest partiality shown to any party, is anemic of
evidentiary support. There is no allegation of any injury suffered by the complainant as a
result of the conduct or actuation of the respondent judge, nor was there any showing of
undue benefit or advantage given to the adverse party under the orders complained of.
With respect to the alleged rendering of an unjust interlocutory order, in connection with
the denial by respondent judge of the motion for reconsideration of the order granting the
petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take custody of accused SPO2
German, the OCA found such a charge to be unfounded.
Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) that the
offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he knowingly
renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a manifestly unjust
interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. 4
The OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned order
knowing it to be unjust; and neither is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice.
As to the propriety of the act of respondent judge in releasing accused SPO2 German to
the custody of the immediate superior instead of ordering the arrest of said accused, the
OCA found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law for failing to conduct a
summary proceeding to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against subject
accused was strong, considering that the charge of murder is a non-bailable offense.
Thus, the OCA recommended:
1. That Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr., RTC, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan be FINED
P20,000 for granting bail in a capital offense without a hearing, with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely;
2. That the charges of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) and issuance of an unjust interlocutory order be DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
The aforestated recommendation of OCA is sustainable.
It is a settled doctrine that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be established beyond cavil that the judgment adverted to is unjust,
contrary to law or unsupported by the evidence, and that the same was rendered with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 5 In other words, the quantum of proof
required to hold respondent judge guilty for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019 and Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the
evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to
convict. 6 Here, the allegations of the complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated.
Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounced guilty on the basis of bare
allegations. There has to be evidence on which conviction can be anchored. The evidence
must truly be beyond reasonable doubt.
On the matter of gross ignorance of the law, records on hand decisively warrant a finding
against the respondent. Section 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, provides: LexLib
"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution."
Respondent judge was acting upon a case of murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Murder being a capital offense, respondent judge should have been mindful that
bail cannot be allowed as a matter of right. In the case of Baylon vs. Sison, 7 it was
succinctly held, "Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court, in
cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing
called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the
discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in
appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused. It
follows that any order issued in the absence of the requisite evidence is not a product of
sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. 8
In the case of Cortes vs. Catral, 9 the Court held:
". . . Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, it may rightly be exercised only after
the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited
or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, . . ."
The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the
very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that
judicial discretion is exercised in determining whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and
within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of
sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. 10 Granting
bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the law. 11
That the prosecutor interposed no objection to the release of the accused to the custody of
the petitioner Chief of Police, on the ground that from the records of the case, accused's
"indictment was based on circumstantial evidence," did not and should not excuse
respondent judge from his judicial duty to conduct a summary proceeding to determine
the strength of evidence against the accused, as to entitle him to post bail. What is more,
as the Information itself categorically states that no bail is recommended for accused, 12
the respondent judge should have been alerted to conduct a summary hearing.
Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, i.e., that the Court may impose its authority upon
erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance
of the law, or misconduct, is obviously applicable in the instant case. 13

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Basilio R. Gabo GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P20,000.00, with the stern warning that a
commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charges of graft and corruption under Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and of issuing
unjust interlocutory order are DISMISSED for lack of merit and for insufficiency of
evidence. llcd
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ .,
concur.

Ocamp v. Buenaventura 154 Phil. 253 (1974) demonstrates the importance of the
requirement that the case maliciously commenced should be terminated before a claim
for damages arising from the filing of such case should be presented. In that case, a
complaint for damages arising from the alleged malicious filing of an administrative case
for serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority and commission of a felony, was held to
be premature during the pendency of said administrative case before the then Police
Commission (POLCOM). Observing that the complaint for damages was based on the
claim that the administrative case brought before the POLCOM was malicious,
unfounded and aimed to harass the respondents, the Court there held:
". . . The veracity of this allegation is not for us to determine, for if We rule and allow the
civil case for damages to proceed on that ground, there is the possibility that the court a
quo in deciding said case might declare the respondents victims of harassment and
thereby indirectly interfere with the proceedings before the POLCOM. The respondents'
case for damages before the lower court is, therefore, premature as it was filed during the
pendency of the administrative case against the respondents before the POLCOM. The
possibility cannot be overlooked that the POLCOM may hand down a decision adverse to
the respondents, in which case the damage suit will become unfounded and baseless for
wanting in cause of action. Of persuasive force is the ruling in William H. Brown vs.
Bank of the Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas, 101 Phil. 309, 312, where this Court
said: LibLex
". . . In effect, plaintiff herein seeks to recover damages upon the ground that the detainer
case has been filed, and is being maintained, maliciously and without justification; but
this pretense affects the merits of said detainer case. Should final judgment be eventually
rendered in that case in favor of the plaintiffs therein, such as the one rendered in the
municipal court, the validity of the cause of action of said lessors against Brown, would
thereby be conclusively established, and necessarily, his contention in the present case
would have to be rejected. Similarly, we cannot sustain the theory of Brown in the case at
bar, without prejudging the issue in the detainer case, which is still pending. Until final
determination of said case, plaintiff herein cannot, and does not, have, therefore, a cause
of action — if any, on which we do not express our opinion — against the herein
defendants. In short, the lower court has correctly held that the present action is
premature, and, that, consequently, the complain herein does not set forth a cause of
action against the defendants." 53

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130442. April 6, 2000.]
THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE
BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, petitioners, vs. C/INSP. LAZARO
TORCITA, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:
Before us is a Petition for Review by way of Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43872, which set aside the Decision of the Regional
Director (RD) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Iloilo City, through its
Summary Dismissal Board (SDB), suspending herein respondent C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita
from the service for twenty (20) days for "Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty
under Section 41 of R. A. 6975." LLpr
The antecedents are as follows:
On July 6, 1994, the following verified complaints were filed against C/Insp. Lazaro
Torcita, herein respondent, by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey, Alex Edwin del Rosario:
1) Administrative Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-01- for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer filed by Jesus H. Puey in a complaint dated June 25, 1994;
2) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-02- for Grave Threats filed by Jesus H. Puey;
3) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-03 for Abuse of Authority and Illegal Search
filed by Jesus H. Puey;
4) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-04 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of
Domicile filed by Jesus H. Puey;
5) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-05 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Jesus H. Puey;
6) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-06 for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer
filed by Manuel H. Puey;
7) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-07 for Illegal Search filed by Manuel H. Puey;
8) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-08 for Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation
of Domicile filed by Manuel Puey;
9) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-09 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Manuel Puey;
10) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-10 for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer
filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario;
11) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-11 for Abuse of Authority and Grave Threats
filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario;
12) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" 94-12 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario.
The twelve administrative complaints were the subject of administrative hearings before
the Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP. At the pre-trial, the parties and their
respective counsels agreed that the twelve cases shall be consolidated into one "major
complaint" for "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II,
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 pursuant to RA 6975 2 . The statement of the case by
the Summary Dismissal Board is as follows:
"That sometime last April 26, 1994, after attending the birthday party of Miss Jessie
Vasquez, Alex Edwin del Rosario, together with Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and
Cristita Dawa boarded Mazda pick up with plate nr. HHP-808 and driven by Reynaldo
Consejo, proceeded towards the direction of Cadiz City.
While nearing Crossing Cadiz in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, the aforementioned
Mazda pick-up driven by Consejo overtook a red Cortina Ford driven by Major Lazaro
Torcita; That on board the motor vehicle driven by Torcita were three females sitted at
the back;
That Major Lazaro Torcita signaled the passengers of the Mazda pick-up to stop,
however, the driver of the Mazda pick-up refused to abide by the signal and instead
accelerated and proceeded to Hda. Aimee without stopping.
That upon reaching Hda. Aimee Major Lazaro Torcita, entered the compound and was
approached by two persons in civilian clothes which prevented him from further
proceeding; Moments after, the patrol car of Cadiz PNP arrived and together with Major
Torcita, approached Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario, inquiring as to the
identity of the persons who accosted him;
The complainants alleged that Major Torcita approached and entered the compound of
Hda. Aimee, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted Jesus
H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario as who stopped him at the gate, shouting in a very,
very loud voice, invectives and remarks;
That such act of Major Lazaro Torcita constitute Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer not
worth of respect;
In his answer, the respondent, Lazaro R. Torcita, while admitting that he entered the
premises of the complainants, the same was done on a regular, lawful and proper way for
he was in the performance of his official duties in pursuing the suspect who committed a
crime in his presence;
From the affidavits of the witnesses and testimonies presented by the complainants and
the counter affidavits and the counter testimonies of the respondent, the ISSUE before the
Board is whether the respondent is guilty of Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer
under Republic Act 6975 as implemented by Memorandum Circular 92-006 of the
National Police Commission under Rule II Section 3, Paragraph C, committed thru a
series of illegal acts consisting of Grave Threats, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority,
violation of Domicile and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban."
The complainant presented documentary evidence and witnesses Congressman Manuel
Puey, Rosita Bistal, Alex Edwin del Rosario and Reynaldo Consejo. Respondent Torcita
testified in his behalf and presented Nehru Java, a member of the PNP Cadiz, who was
with him during the incident in question.
The Summary Dismissal Board made the following findings of facts:
"That sometime last April 26, 1994, at about 10:30 in the evening, a red Cortina Ford,
driven by C/Insp. Lazaro H. Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, in the front seat and
his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a mazda pick-up, in the
vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, about 10 kilometers from crossing Cadiz, owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the
persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, the executive assistant and financial analyst of
Congressman Puey, three (3) helpers employed under the Congressman, namely, Rosita
Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa;
That both parties came from the Municipality of Victorias where they attended some
social functions on the occasion of the town fiesta;
After the mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, it accelerated speed and
proceeded to Hda. Aimee, a sugarcane plantation in Cadiz City, also owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey; The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it
reached Hda. Aimee where C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java alighted and the confrontation
with Alex Edwin del Rosario and Jesus Puey, occurred;
The Complainant tried to establish the fact that nothing unusual occurred or transpired
between the parties in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig and that Torcita has no business
pursuing them; However the Board is more inclined to give credence to the affidavits
(exhibit 5 & 6) and the testimony of C/Insp. Torcita that a vehicular collision almost took
place due to reckless driving of the driver of the mazda pick-up;
That it was the duty inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as
deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulation to prevent
chaos and accidents in roads and highways of the country (exhibit 13); This observation
is further bolstered by the testimony of Reynaldo Consejo, the driver of the mazda pick-
up, that he was able to overtake the red Cortina Ford only after the latter car hit the
shoulder of the road and after overtaking he increased his speed (tsn page 131, August
30, 1994 );
This sudden increase in speed of a driver involved in a vehicular accident is a classic
move for one who wants a fast get away from the scene, to escape responsibility;
Further, Alex Edwin del Rosario testified that upon reaching Hda. Aimee, he instructed
the guard to be on look-out for a car might be following them and might enter the
compound (TSN page 70 August 30, 1994 ). This conduct would show that witness is
anticipating that red Cortina Ford would follow them because of the incident in Sitio
Puting Tubig which could have ended in a vehicular collision and finally no proof was
presented to show that no other reason exist as to why C/Insp. Torcita would pursue the
Mazda pick up other than near occurrence of a vehicular collision;
The Complainant presented the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo
and the Affidavit of Alex Edwin del Rosario, jointly taken, may be considered as proof
that C/Insp. Torcita has committed act or series of acts that would constitute Grave
Threat, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority, Violation of Domicile and Violation of
COMELEC Resolutions regarding the gun ban, thus CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A
POLICE OFFICER; llcd
That in the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo (exhibit c; exhibit 2),
Bistal attempted to establish the fact that C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java illegally entered
the gate of the compound but were stopped by the guards armed with cane stick or batuta,
however in her testimony given during the hearing (tsn page 32, August 30, 1994) she
stated that she did not know what transpired between the two men approaching and the
guards near the gate because she, together with her companions, were busy unloading
kitchen utensil from the pick-up to the kitchen and Consejo categorically stated that this
portion of their affidavit, specifically paragraph 7, is NOT TRUE; Alex Edwin del
Rosario, in his testimony given in the hearing, corroborated this fact that he also did not
see or hear what happened for he was in some distance away and he cannot see them
clearly (TSN page 73, August 30, 1994 );
The only piece of evidence presented in connection with the incident which happened
near the gate of the compound is the affidavit of C/Insp. Torcita and his testimony given
in the hearing of the case that when he was walking towards the compound together with
his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, two armed civilian guards stopped and threatened him; He
identified himself however, the same had no effect, and PO2 Java whispered that there
are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this
point, they radioed for back-up; Since no proof to the contrary was presented by the
Complainant nor was there any witness or witnesses presented to rebut this allegations,
the Board had no other choice except to consider these allegations as proof; (Exhibit 5 &
6); The Board also resolve to take note that a metropolitan newspaper with nationwide
circulation and with unquestionable credential, had published a news item about the
presence of armed security personnel of Congressman Manuel Puey (exhibit 14); This
evidence give more credence to the fact that there were really armed men in the premises
where the aforementioned incident happened; That this is corroborated further by the
affidavit of PO2 Nehru Java (exhibit 17);
This observation of the Board that there were really armed men in the premises of Hda.
Aimee, is further enhance by the fact that Major Torcita felt their presence when he
desisted from further entering the compound, a feeling which was developed and
nurtured by years of living under combat conditions and finally the Board also feels that
the presence of armed persons in the offices and properties of high government officials
is accepted as a necessary consequence for their protection due to the greater risks they
are expose to;
That because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which was further aggravated by the
confrontation near the gate of the compound of Hda. Aimee, C/Insp. Torcita upon the
arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus
Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were; This fact is not disputed by the parties;
xxx xxx xxx
Chief Insp. Lazaro Torcita does not deny having taken alcoholic drink; However, not to
the point of drunkness; The Board is more inclined to believe this allegation for no sane
person will risks the life of a member of his family by deliberately driving when he is
mentally and physically incapable; Further, C/Insp. Torcita was able to drive from
Victorias to Cadiz City, a distance of forty kilometers, on a dark night and raining and
was able to avoid collision of the vehicles involved by sheer reflex action despite the
admitted fact that his tire hit the shoulder of the road;
Further, at the time Chief Inspector Torcita entered the compound he was fully aware of
the presence of armed men and reacted to this by exercising prudence while approaching
the compound of Hda. Aimee; The foregoing facts would show that C/Insp. Torcita was
in full command of his senses and was not affected by the numbing effect of alcohol for a
drunk person does not show any caution and behaves irrationaly."
The Board did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody
with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties. The Board
also found that there was no sufficient evidence that the urinating incident took place, and
held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. The
Board found that Lazaro Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the
incident happened; however, he committed a breach of internal discipline by taking
alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same. The dispositive portion of the decision
of the Board reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint for CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER under Memo Cir. Nr. 92-006 pursuant to Sec.
42, RA 6975, be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence, however finds C/Insp.
Lazaro R. Torcita to have committed SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY under Sec. 41, RA 6975, in relation to NAPOLCOM
Memo Cir. Nr. 91-002 and is hereby ORDERED SUSPENDED for twenty days (20) and
forfeiture of salary for the same period of time effective upon receipt of this Decision
under Rule 7, Section 2, Sub-par. b of the same Memo Circular."
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI,
Iloilo City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; Thus,
"Under the applicable provisions of Section 45 of R. A. 6975, however, the disciplinary
action imposed by the Regional Director upon a PNP member shall be final and
executory except those involving demotion in rank or dismissal from the service. The
appealed decision being that of suspension from the service with corresponding forfeiture
of pay only the same is not subject to review by this Board." 3
Whereupon, C/Insp. Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the regional trial court of
Iloilo City, Branch 31, questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which
he was not charged, "which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due
process of law."
Public respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The regional trial court
granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned
decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of
duty.
Public respondent appealed from the above-mentioned decision of the regional trial court,
by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that
the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that "the twelve (12)
cases treated as Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were eventually dismissed."
The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the
aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:
"1. THE OFFENSE OF "SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
DUTY" IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE CHARGE OF "CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER."
2. THE DECISION OF THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD (SDB) AND THE
NAPOLCOM REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY." 4
The petitioners submit that the offense of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer" is
broad enough to include any act of an officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace
to the PNP organization, and Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty is one act
which brings such disgrace and dishonor as contemplated by law. Moreover, the
dismissal has become final and executory and the trial court erred when it proceeded with
the petition in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In his comment, respondent Torcita insists that his right to due process of law was
"corrosively abridged and impaired", and pleads for an affirmance of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The appeal has no merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the
trial court granting the petition for certiorari.
The administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or charges against
any member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) is laid down in Republic Act No.
6975, otherwise known as the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
1990." This law defines the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and Regional
Directors, among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a police officer." 5 Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the "Rules and
Regulations in the conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP
members" and defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3 (c), Rule
II, as follows:
"Conduct unbecoming of a police officer" refers to any behavior or action of a PNP
member, irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or
otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his character and
standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of
moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial
or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a
gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as
morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization."
On the other hand, the acts constituting "simple irregularity in the performance of duty"
are defined in Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. It is a light offense, incurred, among
others, by a member of the PNP who shall, among others, be found to "have the odor or
smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic beverages on his
person, police vehicle, post or office." (Sec. 2.A, Rule VI).
As above-stated, the Summary Dismissal Board absolved the C/Insp. Torcita of the
consolidated charge of "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" but found him guilty of
simple irregularity in the performance of duty under Sec. 41, R.A. No. 6975, in relation
to Napolcom Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and imposed a penalty of suspension for
twenty (20) days and forfeiture of salary for the same period.
We are unable to sustain the theory of the petitioners that the definition of "conduct
unbecoming of a police officer" as earlier granted, is broad enough to include any act of
an officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization, and that
there is "no legal prohibition" which would prevent the Summary Dismissal Board from
finding petitioner guilty of the lesser offense. While the definition of the more serious
offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter
how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced
without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.
The series of twelve complaints filed against C/Insp. Torcita were solely based on the
incident that occurred on April 26, 1994 at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, wherein
Torcita, who was off-duty and was in civilian clothes, riding in his private vehicle with
members of his family, chased another vehicle which overtook his car in a reckless
manner and in violation of the Traffic Code; the hot pursuit ended at the Hacienda
Aimee, where he allegedly entered the place without lawful warrant and while inside,
belligerently shouted invectives, challenging everyone to a fight, pointed his gun at
somebody and urinated in full view of the persons therein. The Dismissal Board found
the above charges unsubstantiated and held that Torcita was in the performance of
official duty when the incidents happened. "However, he committed breach of internal
discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same." dctai
It is glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases filed
against C/Insp. Torcita, earlier quoted, that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or
made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official
duty. The records do not bear out the specific acts or conduct constituting the
charge/offense in the twelve cases which were consolidated at the pre-hearing conference
into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer." Thus, the Board defined
the issue before the Board as "whether the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of
a police officer under Republic Act 6975, as implemented by Memorandum Circular No.
92-006 of the National Police Commission under Rule II, Section 3, Paragraph c,
committed though a series of illegal acts consisting of grave threats, illegal search, abuse
of authority, violation of domicile or violation of Comelec Gun Ban." Notably, there is no
indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita
was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic
drinks while in the performance of his duties.
The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for
which he was not notified nor charged. Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by
specific requirements of notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and
other attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with
supporting documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the duration of
the hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that
sworn statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination
is confined only to material and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory
proceedings shall not be entertained. (Section 4, Memorandum Circular No. 92-006).
However, notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the
specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being charged with
being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation
squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be
heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of
specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper
observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process (Alonte vs.
Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245).
It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was
decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the Court (ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454). Memorandum
Circular No. 92-006 specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief
statement of the material facts and the findings of the summary dismissal authority as
well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board
that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this
particular offense. As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he
was not drunk and found that he was in full command of his senses where he tried to
apprehend the driver of the maroon Mazda pick-up. Although Torcita did not deny that
he had taken a shot of alcoholic drink at the party which he attended before the incident,
the records show that he was then off-duty and the party was at the Municipality of
Victorias, which was outside of his area of police jurisdiction. On the other hand, the hot
pursuit incident occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz City with the
members of his family. As observed by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was
motivated by the duty "inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as
Deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations, to
prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways" (Decision, p. 76). The Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of
duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the
performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor;
he was on a private trip fetching his wife.
Premises considered, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the decision
of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent
Torcita was found guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged. A decision
is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of
being heard (Palu-ay vs. CA, 293 SCRA 358). A void judgment never acquires finality
(Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA 255 SCRA 672; Fortich vs. Corona, 298
SCRA 678). Hence, aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September l, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. prLL
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Seventeenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Angelina-Sandoval-
Gutierrez as Chairman, Bernardo LL. Salas, (ponente), and Omar U. Amin; Rollo, 31-47.
2. "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for other purposes" otherwise
known as the "Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990".
3. Order dated January 16, 1995.
4. Rollo, p. 15.
5. "Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors.
The Chief of the PNP and regional directors, after due notice and summary hearings, may
immediately remove or dismiss any respondent PNP member in any of the following
cases:

a. When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;

b. When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged
and there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges; and
c. When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police
officer."
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129914. May 12, 2000.]
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) NATIONAL APPELLATE
BOARD (SECOND DIVISION) and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP),
petitioners, vs. POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J p:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals setting
aside the decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police Commission
affirming the summary dismissal of Police Chief Inspector Leonardo W. Bernabe as
ordered by the Chief, Philippine National Police for grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming a police officer. The Court of Appeals ordered respondent reinstated,
entitled to payment of his salary and allowances withheld from him by reason of the
erroneous dismissal, unless suspended for some other lawful cause. 1
The facts are as follows: LLphil
1. On March 03, 1993, there appeared an article in a newspaper that respondent
headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants of PC soldiers, policemen, firemen and
jail personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended and separated from the service.
2
2. On March 03, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos instructed the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government to conduct an investigation and prosecute respondent if
necessary. 3
3. Acting thereon, the Secretary referred the directive to the PNP Director General,
who ordered the Criminal Investigation Service Command to investigate the charges. 4
4. On the same day, respondent was informed of the Batuigas article with the
President’s marginal note on it and S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through
affidavit. 5
5. On March 5, 1993, respondent submitted his affidavit answering point by point
the charges against him. He alleged that all the cases against him were either dismissed
by the Ombudsman or pending resolution, except one which was pending before the
Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of seven treasury warrants. 6
6. On March 18, 1993, CICS Director Angel Quizon submitted to the Chief, PNP, a
memorandum which stated:
"As a backgrounder, in January 1989, then PC Captain Leonardo W. Bernabe, along with
several other officers, enlisted personnel and employees of the 16th Finance Service Unit
(FSU) in Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila was charged by the CISC
of several counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Documents in five (5) separate cases filed
before the Constabulary JAGO. These cases involved some THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY SIC (376) pieces of treasury warrants (TWs) of AWOL, deceased,
discharged, separated and terminated PC/INP personnel for the pay period of 1-15 and
16-30 April 1988. These TWs, which were supposedly cancelled but were fraudulently
encashed by the officers, were identified and turned-over to the CIS Investigators by the
Auditing/Investigating team of the PC/INP Finance Center. Later on, the cases were
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman when former PCA waived Military jurisdiction
over the suspected officers. At present, however, only one of the cases involving seven
(7) TWs is being tried at the 3rd Division of the Sandiganbayan. The other four (4) cases
are pending resolution at the Office of the Ombudsman." 7
7. On April 23, 1993, by command of the Police Deputy Director General,
respondent was suspended from the police service for a period of ninety (90) days
effective April 23, 1993. 8 Subsequently, he was given notice of complaint/charge and
order to answer within five days from receipt of the complaint. 9
8. On March 31, 1993, respondent filed a motion for bill of particulars. 10
9. In reply, the CICS submitted a manifestation asserting that the technical
procedures obtained in the regular courts are strictly applicable to administrative
proceedings; hence, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to enable respondent to
file an intelligent answer. 11
10. On April 26, 1993, the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer issued a resolution
recommending for respondent’s dismissal from the PNP service. 12
11. On July 13, 1993, the PNP Inspector General concurred with the recommendation
of the Summary Dismissal Officer. 13
12. On July 20, 1993, the Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of respondent from the
police service based on the following facts:
". . . That he is in the head of the payroll syndicate; that this syndicate was responsible for
the encashing of PC/INP treasury warrants for personnel on leave, AWOL, deceased or
terminated from the police service; that the TWs were supposed to be cancelled not to be
encashed; that members of this syndicate are strategically assigned in various PC/INP,
now PNP units which are dealing with money matter; that subject officer was able to
transfer from one finance unit to another inspite of the dozens of criminal and
administrative cases filed against him. The investigation also disclosed that subject
officer has unexplained assets or wealth consisting of three (3) mansions, two (2)
condominium units, three (3) residential lots, ten (10) passenger jeeps, three (3) big cargo
trucks, fish pens at Laguna de Bay, residential houses at Legaspi City, coffee and coconut
plantations at Basilan City and a big furniture shop at Sucat, Parañaque, Metro Manila;
that his total assets, mostly hidden in the names of his blood and in-law relatives, can
reach hundreds of millions of pesos. As early as 1989, CISC already filed against then
CINSP BERNABE, three (3) other officers and six (6) EPs, all of 16th Finance Support
Unit, METROCOM, five (5) cases of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents
before the JAGO, PC/INP. The cases were later forwarded to the Ombudsman and out of
these cases the latter office filed seven (7) information or charges before the
Sandiganbayan (Annex "D"). Four (4) other cases against CINSP BERNABE, a case of
Viol. of Secs. 7 and 8, RA3019 (Unexplained Wealth) which case is still pending
resolution thereat. Upon the effectivity of the PNP Law, another case of Viol. of AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming of An Officer and A Gentleman) was forwarded by GHW, AFP
against CINSP BERNABE, to the Directorate for Investigation (DIN) GHW, PNP
(Annex "E"). CINSP BERNABE was also charged before the Board of Accountancy,
Professional Regulations Commission (PRC), after CISC found out that he falsified his
transcript of records with the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), that he
was a graduate of Commerce, major in accounting, when in fact his name does not appear
in the school records that he graduated thereat. In fact, school records show that he was
still lacking of 16 subjects before he could graduate. Likewise he was able to present a
diploma that he was a graduate of the school. The administrative case for dishonorable
misconduct was filed before the PRC (Annex "F"). The criminal aspect of the PUP case
was filed before the Manila Prosecutor’s Office, for falsification of public documents,
under I. S. No. 91-06895. However, Manila Assistant Prosecutor Jacinto Delos Reyes, Jr.
recommended dismissal of the case. In his resolution, Asst. Prosecutor Delos Reyes, Jr.
declared that Atty. Manuel Cruz of the Legal Div. CISC withdr(e)w the case from further
prosecution, allegedly with understanding with Supt. Lucas Managuelod, PNP, then
Chief, NCR CISC, which office initiated the filing of the case (Annex "G"). CINSP
BERNABE, in his counter-affidavit submitted before the Summary Hearing Officer,
denied point by point the allegations contained in the Ruther Batuigas newspaper column;
that he is not untouchable; that he is asking for a bill of particulars as regards the
administrative charges against him; that these cases be consolidated with his other cases
pending resolution with the Ombudsman (Annex "H"). That these various anomalies and
irregularities (had) placed (the police organization in) a bad light, with more reason that
PNP now is in "cleansing" process to get rid of undesirables." 14
13. On August 30, 1993, respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate
Board. 15
14. On October 18, 1994, the National Appellate Board, Second Division, rendered a
decision sustaining the summary dismissal of respondent from the PNP, as follows: cda
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Director General, PNP
summarily dismissing respondent-appellant Police Chief Inspector LEONARDO
BERNABE from the police service is hereby affirmed. Further, the Director General is
hereby directed to investigate the seemingly anomalous dismissal of the administrative
case for Dishonorable conduct filed against respondent-appellant before the Board of
Accountancy, Professional Regulation Commission as recommended by the Office of the
Inspector General in its DF dated July 13, 1993 to the Chief, PNP, including the other
recommendations therein, with the instruction that this Board be informed accordingly of
the result of the action taken thereof.
"SO ORDERED." 16
15. On February 28, 1995, the National Appellate Board denied his motion for
reconsideration. 17
On July 31, 1995, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review
challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of due process
and the unconstitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975.
After due proceedings, on March 13, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
upholding the constitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975, but setting aside the decision of
the National Appellate Board for failure to comply with the due process requirement of
the Constitution. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Appellate Board is SET ASIDE.
Let the original records be remanded to the Chief, PNP for proper compliance with the
Summary Dismissal Proceedings provided for in NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular
No. 92-006. In the meantime, petitioner is ordered reinstated, entitled to payment of his
salary and allowances withheld from him by reason of the erroneous dismissal, unless he
is suspended for some other lawful cause in another forum.
"No costs.
"SO ORDERED." 18
On April 7, 1997, petitioners moved to reconsider the decision. 19 However, on July 11,
1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. 20
Hence, this appeal. 21
On December 24, 1997, respondent filed his comment. 22
In his comment, respondent submitted that the case was decided by the Chief, PNP
without the benefit of a hearing, and therefore he was not given the opportunity to fully
present his evidence and was denied the opportunity to cross-examine his accusers. 23
At issue in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the
decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police Commission, on the ground
that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of the charges
filed against him.
We regret that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the issue raised. As we held
quite recently, "On the question of due process, we find that the requirements thereof
were sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional precept does not always
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard,or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." 24
In this case, the record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges
against him and an opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by
point the charges against him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP
dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a
memorandum.
Consequently, respondent was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side.
Hence, there was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process. 25
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari and
SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of
the Chief, PNP dismissing respondent Police Chief Inspector Leonardo W. Bernabe from
the police service. No costs.
SO ORDERED. Cdpr
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. In CA-G.R. SP No. 37993, Austria-Martinez, J., ponente, Paras and Salas, JJ.,
concurring, promulgated March 13, 1997, Rollo, pp. 44-63.
2. Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, p. 66.
3. See handwritten instruction, bottom portion, Annex "C", supra.
4. Petition, p. 3, Rollo, p. 9.
5. Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 37993, pp. 8-9.
6. Petition, Rollo, p. 9.
7. Petition, Rollo, pp. 9-10.
8. Petition for Review, Annex "J" in CA-G.R. SP No. 37993, CA Rollo, p. 105.
9. Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, p. 72.
10. Petition, Annex "G", Rollo, p. 73.
11. Petition, Rollo, p. 14.
12. Ibid., p. 15.
13. Ibid.
14. Petition, Rollo, pp. 15-18.
15. Petition for Review, Annex "N", in CA-G.R. SP No. 37993, CA Rollo, pp. 127-
134.
16. Petition, Rollo, p. 18.
17. Petition, Annex "M", Rollo, pp. 128-130.
18. Petition, Annex "A", CA Decision, Rollo, pp. 44-63.
19. Petition, Annex "R", Rollo, pp. 207-227.
20. Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, p. 65.
21. Petition filed on September 8, 1997, Rollo, pp. 7-41. On October 08, 1997, the
Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice
(Rollo, p. 228)
22. Rollo, pp. 233-253.
23. Comment, Rollo, p. 251.
24. Libres vs. NLRC, 307 SCRA 675, 683 (1999), citing Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company vs. NLRC, 175 SCRA 437 (1989). Cf. Lagatic vs. NLRC, 285
SCRA 251 (1998); Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 284 SCRA 656, 664-665 (1998)
25. Libres vs. NLRC, supra.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127625. May 31, 2000.]
PO1 VIRGILIO FLORA CARA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Fourth
Division), THE HONORABLE RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (Regional Appellate Board)
PEOPLE'S LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD, DISTRICT III, QUEZON CITY, AND
TEODORO B. CHUA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J p:
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus instituted by petitioner
seeking to set aside his dismissal from the police service and his reinstatement to the
Philippine National Police with all the rights and privileges allowed by law. 1
The facts are as follows:
On March 7, 1993, at around 6:30 in the morning, petitioner Cara and his companion,
Abraham Rosagaran, went to a bakery store located at the intersection of Anonas Street
and Kamias Road, Quezon City. He parked his owner type jeep in front of the bakery.
While buying bread, petitioner noticed that a blue Nissan Bluebird car with plate No. PN-
113, owned and driven by respondent Chua, sideswiped the jeep.
Despite hitting the jeep, respondent Chua continued driving on his way and stopped only
when petitioner Cara and his companion gave chase and signaled him to pull over.
Momentarily, respondent Chua alighted from his car; petitioner's companion Rosagaran
approached him. An argument ensued and respondent Chua hit Rosagaran on the face
with his fist.
Petitioner introduced himself as a police officer (Police Officer I) and invited respondent
Chua to the police station. In quick response, respondent Chua immediately pummeled
petitioner Cara on the face. He fell to the ground. cdtai
Still dazed, petitioner saw respondent Chua and Rosagaran engage in a fist fight. Soon,
policemen from the Anonas Sub-station arrived at the scene and pacified the protagonists.
On April 14, 1993, the People's Law Enforcement Board, (PLEB) Quezon City,
subpoenaed petitioner Cara for a hearing of an administrative case that respondent Chua
leveled against him. 2
The PLEB conducted hearings at which both parties presented their respective evidence.
On July 19, 1994, the PLEB rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the Philippine National Police effective
immediately. 3
In due time, petitioner Cara appealed to the Regional Appellate Board, National Police
Commission (Napolcom). On May 22, 1995, the Board rendered a decision sustaining the
findings of the People's Law Enforcement Board and dismissing the appeal. 4 Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied in the Napolcom's resolution dated August 15,
1995. 5
On January 18, 1996, petitioner filed with the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government Rafael M. Alunan III, a petition for review or appeal from the resolution
dated August 15, 1995 of the Regional Appellate Board. 6 However, on February 2,
1996, the Napolcom denied the petition because the decision was not appealable to the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government. 7
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, to set aside the Napolcom's order dismissing him from the service and to
compel his reinstatement to the Philippine National Police. 8
On May 10, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition.
9
Hence, this appeal. 10
On April 28, 1997, we required respondents to comment on the petition within ten ( 10)
days from notice. 11
At issue in this appeal is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition for review of the resolutions of the National Police Commission dismissing
petitioner from the service of the Philippine National Police.
The grounds raised in the petition involve an appreciation of the evidence adduced
against petitioner in the administrative case instituted against him. cdrep
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that certiorari and mandamus as special civil actions
are remedies for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. 12 The
Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that even considering the petition one for review,
the petition must be dismissed because it was filed out of time. 13
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition, for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J ., took no part.
Footnotes
 1. Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 38-40.
2. Adm. Case No. 93-108, Teodoro B. Chua vs. PO1 Virgilio Cara.
3. Petition, Annex "D", Rollo, pp.88-92.
4. Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 78-83.
5. Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 75-77.
6. Petition, Annex "E-1", Rollo, pp. 103-129.
7. Petition, Annex A-2", Rollo, pp. 42-43.
8. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40269.
9. Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 38-40.
10. Filed on January 21, 1997, Petition, Rollo, pp. 3-36.
11. Rollo, p. 157.
12. Purefoods Corp. vs. NLRC, 171 SCRA 415, 426 [1989], citing Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Galauran and Pilares Construction Co., 118 SCRA 644 [1982];
Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624, 642 [1988]; Cebu Woman's Club vs. de la Victoria,
G.R. No. 120060, March 9, 2000; Medina vs. City Sheriff, Manila, 276 SCRA 133
[1997].
13. Revised Supreme Court Adm. Circular No. 1-95.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 96409. February 14, 1992.]
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; STATUTES; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6975; DATE OF
EFFECTIVITY. — With the aforequoted provision in mind, Congress passed Republic
Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated version
of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463. The Act took effect after fifteen days
following its publication, or on January 1, 1991.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE PRESIDENT HAS CONTROL POWERS
OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT; DOCTRINE OF
QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY AS COROLLARY RULE THERETO. — It is a
fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the President has control of
all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule
to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As
the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and
in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members, who in turn and
by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions
in the executive department.
3. ID.; ID.; THE PRESIDENT, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, IS NOT A
MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES. — The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is
not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the
Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon
him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle
that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." (Article II, Section 3,
1987 Constitution.)
4. POLITICAL LAW; PLACEMENT OF NAPOLCOM AND PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MERELY AN ADMINISTRATIVE REALIGNMENT. —
The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the
citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety
agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part
subsidized by the national government.
5. ID.; NATIONAL POLICE FORCE; ADMINISTERED AND CONTROLLED
BY NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION; LOCAL EXECUTIVES ACT ONLY AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF NAPOLCOM. — The national police force shall be
administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact,
the Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at the commission
level. We agree, that "there is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM
under Section 51 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local
executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. As such deputies, they
are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions
under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid
and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM." It is significant to note that the local officials,
as NAPOLCOM representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of
eligibles (those who meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) to be
recommended by PNP officials. The same holding is true with respect to the contention
on the operational supervision and control exercised by the local officials. These officials
would simply be acting as representatives of the Commission.
6. ID.; ID.; INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
UNDERSCORES ITS CIVILIAN CHARACTER. — As regards the assertion involving
the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that the questioned provisions, which
read: "Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. The Appointment of the
officers and members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner: a.) Police
Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV. Appointed by the PNP regional director for regional
personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for national headquarters personnel and attested by
the Civil Service Commission; b.) Inspector to Superintendent — Appointed by the Chief
of the PNP, as recommended by their immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil
Service Commission; c.) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General —
Appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chief of the PNP, with proper
endorsement by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission . . . . Sec. 32.
Examinations for Policemen. The Civil Service Commission shall administer the
qualifying entrance examinations for policemen on the basis of the standards set by the
NAPOLCOM." precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force,
and will undoubtedly professionalize the same.
7. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT; REASON AND CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. — It
thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives
muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police
force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is
subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. Consequently,
Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply
provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would
gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State.
Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers.
8. ID.; NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM); EXERCISES
APPELLATE JURISDICTION THRU REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARDS. —
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional
appellate boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so under
Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the implementing
guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the PLEB for the conduct of its hearings, and
it may assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs
(Section 43-d4, d5).
9. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; EVERY PRESUMPTION
INDULGED IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. — We find light in the principle
of constitutional construction that every presumption should be indulged in favor of
constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in question should
give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental
law."
10. ID.; PEOPLE'S LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARDS (PLEB); PURPOSE FOR ITS
CREATION. — As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's
complaints against erring officers and members of the PNP, the establishment of PLEBs
in every city and municipality would all the more help professionalize the police force.
11. ID.; SPECIAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE; SOLE FUNCTION THEREOF. —
The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and
tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or
absorption" into the Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved
agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with the phases of implementation already
laid down in Section 85 of the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the
committee itself would cease altogether. As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions
it exercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power
of control which properly belongs to the President. What is more, no executive
department, bureau or office is placed under the control or authority of the committee.
12. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS; NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE. —
Under the Constitution, there are the so-called independent Constitutional Commissions,
namely: The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on
Elections. (Article IX-A, Section 1). As These Commissions perform vital governmental
functions, they have to be protected from external influences and political pressures.
Hence, they were made constitutional bodies, independent of and not under any
department of the government. Certainly, they are not under the control of the President.
The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on Human
Rights." (Article XIII, Section 17[1]). However, this Commission is not on the same level
as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is independent like the
latter Commissions. It still had to be constituted thru Executive Order No. 163 (dated
May 5, 1987). In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory
creation of a national police commission that will administer and control the national
police force to be established thereunder. This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in
the same category as the independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the
other constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human
Rights.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
At the very outset, it should be well to set forth the constitutional provision that is at the
core of the controversy now confronting us, thus:
Article XVI, Section 6:
"The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law." 1
With the aforequoted provision in mind, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled
"AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated version of House
Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463. LibLex
Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C. Aquino on December 13,
1990, it was published on December 17, 1990. 2
Presently, however, petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar
sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on December 20, 1990,
seeking this Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975 with prayer for
temporary restraining order. Cdpr
But in an en banc resolution dated December 27, 1990, We simply required the public
respondents to file their Comment, without however giving due course to the petition and
the prayer therein. Hence, the Act took effect after fifteen days following its publication,
or on January 1, 1991. 3
Before we settle down on the merits of the petition, it would likewise be well to discuss
albeit briefly the history of our police force and the reasons for the ordination of Section
6, Article XVI in our present Constitution.
During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus of
the Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The
PC was made part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional control
was handled by the then Department of the Interior. After the war, it remained as the
"National Police" under the Department of National Defense, as a major service
component of the AFP. 4
Later, the Integration Act of 1975 5 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under
the Office of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the
civilian components. The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent
Director-General of the INP, exercised command functions over the INP. 6
The National Police Commission 7 (NAPOLCOM) exercised administrative control and
supervision while the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction
over the INP units assigned within their respective localities. 8
The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component,
which is the PC, severely eroded the INP's civilian character and the multiplicity in the
governance of the PC-INP resulted in inefficient police service. 9 Moreover, the
integration of the national police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the
military component had superior benefits and privileges. 10
The Constitutional Commission of 1986 was fully aware of the structural errors that beset
the system. Thus, Com. Teodulo C. Natividad explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. NATIVIDAD. . . . The basic tenet of a modern police organization is to remove it
from the military. 11
xxx xxx xxx
Here in our draft Constitution, we have already made a constitutional postulate that the
military cannot occupy any civil service position [in Section 6 of the Article on the Civil
Service 12 ]. Therefore, in keeping with this and because of the universal acceptance that
a police force is a civilian function, a public service, and should not be performed by
military force, one of the basic reforms we are presenting here is that it should be
separated from the military force which is the PC. 13
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the civilian police cannot blossom into full profession because most of the key
positions are being occupied by the military. So, it is up to this Commission to remove
the police from such a situation so that it can develop into a truly professional civilian
police . . ." 14
Hence, the "one police force, national in scope, and civilian in character" provision that is
now Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
And so we now come to the merits of the petition at hand.
In the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated
the National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the
Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were placed.
15
We do not share this view.
To begin with, one need only refer to the fundamentally accepted principle in
Constitutional Law that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus,
and offices 16 to lay at rest petitioner's contention on the matter.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over
all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk 17 and has been held
by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 18 to mean "the power of [the
President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive." 19
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
"Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise
his control powers all at the same time and in person, 20 he will have to delegate some of
them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, 21 "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive." 22 (emphasis ours).
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department." 23
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government is merely an
administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation
among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and
public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in
large part subsidized by the national government. LLjur
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the
national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police
commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for
administration and control at the commission level, as shown in the following provisions,
to wit:
"Sec. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical
requirements, communications, records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime
prevention and crime reporting;
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel
disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon
members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the PNP;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over
administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits;
LibLex
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 26. The Command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the Chief of the
PNP. . . . Such command and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to
subordinate officials with respect to the units under their respective commands, in
accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 35. . . . To enhance police operational efficiency and effectiveness, the Chief
of the PNP may constitute such other support units as may be necessary subject to the
approval of the Commission . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 37. . . . There shall be established a performance evaluation system which
shall be administered in accordance with the rules, regulations and standards, and a code
of conduct promulgated by the Commission for members of the PNP . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the
NAPOLCOM over the PNP, RA 6975 vested the power to choose the PNP Provincial
Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors and Mayors, respectively; the power
of "operational supervision and control" over police units in city and municipal mayors;
in the Civil Service Commission, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior
Superintendent to Deputy Director-General as well as the administration of qualifying
entrance examinations; disciplinary powers over PNP members in the "People's Law
Enforcement Boards" and in city and municipal mayors. 25
Once more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions.
It is true that when the Constitutional Commissioners of 1986 provided that the authority
of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law,
they intended that the day-to-day functions of police work like crime investigation, crime
prevention activities, traffic control, etc., would be under the operational control of the
local executives as it would not be advisable to give full control of the police to the local
executives. 26
They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordism, bossism, and sanctuaries for
vices and abuses. 27
It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power to choose the
officers in question, the Act went beyond the bounds of the Constitution's intent.
Not so. We find light in the principle of constitutional construction that every
presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering
the validity of the statute in question should give it such reasonable construction as can
be reached to bring it within the fundamental law."28
Under the questioned provisions, which read as follows:
"D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE PNP.
Sec. 51. Powers of Local Government Officials over the PNP Units or Forces.
Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. As such, the local executives shall discharge the
following functions:
a.) Provincial Governor — (1) . . . .
The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director from a list of three (3)
eligibles recommended by the PNP Regional Director.
4) . . . City and municipal mayors shall have the following authority over the PNP
units in their respective jurisdictions:
i.) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles
recommended by the Provincial Police Director. . . . (Emphasis ours).
full control remains with the National Police Commission.
We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that "there is no usurpation
of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very
same provision, it is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of
the NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for
their actions in the exercise of their functions under that section. Thus, unless
countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the
NAPOLCOM." 29 It is significant to note that the local officials, as NAPOLCOM
representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles (those who
meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) 30 to be recommended by
PNP officials.

The same holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational supervision and
control exercised by the local officials. These officials would simply be acting as
representatives of the Commission.
As regards the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that the
questioned provisions, which read:
"Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. — The Appointment of the
officers and members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:
a.) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV. Appointed by the PNP regional
director for regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for national headquarters
personnel and attested by the Civil Service Commission;
b.) Inspector to Superintendent — Appointed by the Chief of the PNP, as
recommended by their immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service
Commission;
c.) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General — Appointed by the President
upon recommendation of the Chief of the PNP, with proper endorsement by the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission . . .
Sec. 32. Examinations for Policemen. — The Civil Service Commission shall
administer the qualifying entrance examinations for policemen on the basis of the
standards set by the NAPOLCOM."
precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will
undoubtedly professionalize the same. cdrep
The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law Enforcement
Boards" (or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the
Commission's power of control over the PNP.
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional
appellate boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so under
Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the implementing
guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the PLEB for the conduct of its hearings, and
it may assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs
(Section 43-d4, d5).
As a disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's complaints against
erring officers and members of the PNP, the establishment of PLEBs in every city and
municipality would all the more help professionalize the police force.
Petitioner would likewise have this Court imagine that Section 12 of the questioned Act,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense.
— During a period of twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present role of preserving the internal
and external security of the State: Provided, that said period may be extended by the
President, if he finds it justifiable, for another period not exceeding twenty-four (24)
months, after which, the Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the
primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to the AFP its primary role of
preserving external security."
xxx xxx xxx
constitutes an "encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President
of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers."
That We are not disposed to do for such is not the case at all here. A rejection thus of
petitioner's submission anent Section 12 of the Act should be in order in the light of the
following exchanges during the CONCOM deliberations of Wednesday, October 1, 1986:
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. RODRIGO.
Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief
of all the armed forces.
MR. NATIVIDAD.
Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO.
Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not suppose
they come under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the Philippines.
cdtai
MR. NATIVIDAD.
They do, Madam President. By law they are under the supervision and control of
the President of the Philippines.
MR. RODRIGO.
Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.
MR. NATIVIDAD.
He is the President.
MR. RODRIGO.
Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that the
President is Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.
MR. NATIVIDAD.
No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.
MR. RODRIGO.
There are two other powers of the President. The President has control over
departments, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments. Under which
does the police fall, under control or under supervision?
MR. NATIVIDAD.
 Both, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO.
Control and Supervision.
MR. NATIVIDAD.
Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the President."
(CONCOM RECORDS, Vol. 5, p. 296).
It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives
muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police
force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is
subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. cdrep
Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers.
It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police
would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the
State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It
would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose
duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." 31 His
position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the
constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military."
(Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution.).
Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee" under
Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members
(namely: the respective Chairman of the Committee on Local Government and the
Committee on National Defense and Security in the Senate, and the respective Chairman
of the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on National Defense
in the House of Representatives) is an "unconstitutional encroachment upon and a
diminution of, the President's power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices."
But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control under Section
84. The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established
and tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or
absorption" into the Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved
agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with the phases of implementation already
laid down in Section 85 of the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the
committee itself would cease altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its creation and the
functions it exercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of
the power of control which properly belongs to the President. What is more, no executive
department, bureau or office is placed under the control or authority of the committee. 33
As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution, there
are the so-called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections. (Article IX-A,
Section 1).
As These Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be protected
from external influences and political pressures. Hence, they were made constitutional
bodies, independent of and not under any department of the government. 34 Certainly,
they are not under the control of the President.
The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on Human
Rights." (Article XIII, Section 17[1]). However, this Commission is not on the same level
as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is independent like the
latter Commissions. 35 It still had to be constituted thru Executive Order No. 163 (dated
May 5, 1987).
In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a
national police commission that will administer and control the national police force to be
established thereunder.
This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent
Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally created
independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human Rights. LLpr
By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit,
Elections) and the additional commission created by the Constitution (Human Rights) are
all independent of the Executive; but the National Police Commission is not. 36 In fact, it
was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations that this commission would be under the
President, and hence may be controlled by the President, thru his or her alter ego, the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.
WHEREFORE, having in view all of the foregoing holdings, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. 1987 Constitution.
2. Dec. 17, 1990 issue of Philippine Star.
3. Section 96, RA 6975.
4. Textbook on 1987 Constitution by Hector S. De Leon. 1989 Ed., p. 598, Footnote
21a.
5. PD No. 765 (Aug. 8, 1979).
6. The Constitution by De Leon, Supra, at p. 598.
7. First created by RA 4864 under the Office of the President. Under RA 6975, the
National Police Commission created thereunder is a collegial body within the Department
of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) with the DILG Secretary as Ex Officio
Chairman of the Commission.
8. The Constitution by De Leon, Supra, at p. 599. See also Exec. Order No. 1012, as
amended by EO Nos. 1027 and 1040, dated July 10, 1985.
9. Id, at p. 599, citing "The Police Under the New Constitution", by Com. Teodulo
C. Natividad, Manila Bulletin, October 1986.
10. Ibid, at p. 599-600.
11. CONCOM RECORDS, Vol. 5, p. 294.
12. Now Article XVI, Section 5, par. 4.
13. CONCOM Records, Supra, at p. 293.
14. Ibid at page 294.
15. Rollo, pp. 4 and 47.
16. Article VII, Section 17.
17. The Constitution, A Commentary. By Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., Vol. II, 2nd Ed.
(1988), p. 203-204.
18. 97 Phil. 143 (1955).
19. The Constitution by Bernas, Supra, at p. 204.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., at p. 204, citing Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 464 (1939).
Also Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967).
23. De Leon vs. Carpio 178 SCRA 457 (1989), thru Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
24. Declaration of Policy, Section 2, R.A. 6975.
25. Rollo, p. 4.
26. CONCOM Records, Vol. 5, p. 293.
27. Ibid, at p. 293.
28. In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37.
29. Rollo, p. 26.
30. Sec. 30, RA 6975. General Qualifications for Appointment. - No person shall be
appointed as officer or member of the PNP unless he possesses the following minimum
qualifications:
(a) A citizen of the Philippines;
(b) A person of good moral conduct;
(c) Of sound mind and body;
(d) Must possess a formal baccalaureate degree for appointment as
officer and must have finished at least second year college or the equivalent of seventy-
two (72) collegiate units for appointment as non-officer or an equivalent training or
experience for those already in the service upon the effectivity of this Act:
(e) Must be eligible in accordance with the standards set by the
Commission;
(f) Must not have been dishonorably discharged from military
employment or dismissed for cause from any civilian position in the Government;
(g) Must not have been convicted by final judgment of an offense or
crime involving moral turpitude;
(h) Must be at least one meter and sixty-two centimeters (1.62 m.) in
height for male and one meter and fifty-seven centimeters (1.57 m.) for female;
(i) Must weigh not more or less than five kilograms (5 kg.) of the
standard weight corresponding to his or her height, age, and sex; and
(j) For a new applicant, must not be less than twenty-one (21) not
more than thirty (30) years of age.
31. The Constitution, A Commentary, by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., Vol. II, p. 212.
32. COMMENT of the Solicitor General, Rollo, p. 32.
33. Ibid.
34. The Constitution by Bernas. Supra at p. 325.
35. Ibid., at p. 501; CONCOM RECORDS, Vol. IV, p. 30.
36. Under the Administrative Code of 1987 (specifically Section 70, Subtitle III of
Title VIII), the old NAPOLCOM was placed under the Office of the President. Prior to
that, it was, for a time, placed under the Ministry of Justice. EO 1040 (1985) then
transferred it back to the Office of the President.

C o p y r i g h t 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 9 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 109638. March 31, 1995.]
PNP FLORENCIO D. FIANZA, petitioner, vs. THE PLEB (PEOPLE'S LAW
ENFORCEMENT BOARD) of the CITY OF BAGUIO, the NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM), SPO3 FERNANDO SEGUNDO, PO3 METODIO
AQUINO, PO3 BENJAMIN NAKIGO, PO3 SALVADOR GALISTE, PO3 ROMEO
BAUTISTA and PO3 ALFREDO MATIAS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 109639. March 31, 1995.]
PNP SUPT. JULY CORDOVIZ, petitioner, vs. The PLEB (PEOPLE'S LAW
ENFORCEMENT BOARD) of the CITY OF BAGUIO, the NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) and PAT. RAY EKID, respondents.
Pablito V . Sanidad for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Jimmy R. Pablito & Solomon Chungalo for private respondents in G.R. No. 109638.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6975; PEOPLE'S LAW
ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB); COMPOSITION AND FUNCTION. — The PLEB,
established pursuant to Sec. 43 of Republic Act No. 6975, (Republic Act No. 6975, "AN
ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.'' Approved December 13, 1990; 87
O.G. No. 3) is part of the PNP's administrative disciplinary machinery. Each PLEB is
composed of a member of the sangguniang panglunsod/bayan chosen by his respective
sanggunian; barangay captain of the city or municipality concerned chosen by the
association of barangay captains: and three other members who shall be chosen by the
peace and order council from among the respected members of the community known for
their probity and integrity. Membership in the PLEB is a civic duty: however PLEB
members may be paid per diem as may be determined by the city or municipal council
from city or municipal funds. (Republic Act No. 6975. Sec 43 (a), (b) & (c)) For
emphasis, the abovecited provision of laws states that the PLEB has jurisdiction to hear
and decide citizen's complaints or cases against erring officers and members of the PNP.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECTIVE. — One of the avowed objectives of the PLEB is to
enhance civilian participation in the disciplinary process of errant PNP members. The
PLEB is part of the system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and PNP provided for in the law creating the Philippine National Police.
(Republic Act No. 6975, Sec. 2).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CITIZEN'S COMPLAINANT; DEFINED; CONSTRUED; CASE
AT BAR. — Rule II, Section 1 of the PLEB Rules defines a citizen's complaint as
pertaining to "any complaint initiated by a private citizen or his duly authorized
representative on account of injury, damage or disturbance sustained due to an irregular
or illegal act committed by a member of the PNP." A citizen's complaint, then, is one
filed by a private citizen against a member of the PNP for the redress of injury, damage
or disturbance caused by the latter's illegal or irregular acts. The citizen's complaint
envisioned under Republic Act No. 6975 normally pertains to complaints by private
individuals against PNP men and not by PNP men against their co-members or officers in
a professional capacity. An example used in the Bicameral Conference Committee
hearings is that of a policeman who takes fish from the market without paying for it.
Aside from the criminal liability attaching to the act of the policeman cognizable by the
courts, the private party prejudiced can sue him before the PLEB. However, respondent
policemen are not absolutely excluded from bringing citizen's complaints with the PLEB.
PNP members can file suit a private citizens only when they do so in their private
capacity and not as members of the PNP. This means that the complaining PNP personnel
can sue on matters of private concern and not on matters properly cognizable by the PNP
chain of command. If a policeman complains against another colleague before the PLEB,
he can do so when the subject matter of the complaint is one that can similarly be raised
by a private individual or citizen.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVATE CITIZEN, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — The
Court ruled that although respondent policemen continue to be citizens, as public
respondents contend, they are not the "private citizens" referred to in the laws cited
above. Clearly, the term "private citizens" does not ordinarily include men in uniform,
such as the respondent PNP men. This is particularly evident in the PNP law which uses
the term "members of the PNP" as well as private citizens" to refer to different groups of
persons and not interchangeably. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is applicable in this situation. When the words of a statute are clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. The term "private citizen" in the PNP Law and PLEB Rules is
used in its common signification and was not meant to refer to the members of the PNP,
such as respondent policemen.
5. ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); FORUM FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL DISCIPLINE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
WITHIN ITS RANKS. — If the subject of the complaint bears a direct relation to the
office of the complainant-policeman as member of the PNP, it can hardly be considered
as a citizen's complaint and is, therefore, neither cognizable nor triable by the PLEB. This
conclusion is ineluctable as the PNP is the proper venue for matters involving its internal
organization or discipline. The PNP hierarchy possesses the power and responsibility
over its men in these matters. Section 81 of Republic Act No. 6975 reads: "SEC. 81,
Complaints and Grievances. — Uniformed personnel shall have the right to present
complaints and grievances to their superiors or commanders and have them heard and
adjudicated as expeditiously as possible in the best interest of the service, with due regard
to due process in every case. Such complaints or grievances shall be resolved at the
lowest possible level in the unit of command and the respondent shall have the right to
appeal from an adverse decision to higher authorities." (Also see Sec. 26 and Sec. 41 (b)
of Rep. Act No. 6975) No better forum for the resolution of internal discipline and
administrative matters can be found than the organization (PNP) itself, particularly in the
enforcement of its professional code of conduct. In matters pertaining to their job or
office, PNP men are afforded the proper channel for their complaints against colleagues,
superiors or commanding officers. The Chief of Police, Provincial Director, Police
Regional Director and PNP Chief are the proper conduits for offenses involving internal
discipline, such as simple misconduct or negligence, insubordination, frequent absences
or tardiness, habitual drunkenness and gambling prohibited by law. (Sec. 41 (b), Rep. Act
No. 6975) Even the PLEB Rules provide that jurisdiction over offenses involving breach
of internal discipline (or any offense committed by a member of the PNP involving and
affecting order and discipline within the ranks of the police organization) belongs to the
duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP. The Chiefs of Police,
Provincial Directors, Police Regional Directors or their equivalent supervisors and the
PNP Chief exercise disciplinary powers for breaches of internal discipline committed by
any regular member of their respective commands. (Secs. 3 and 4, Rules of Procedure
Before the PLEB) Having dealt with the areas over which the PLEB exercises
jurisdiction, the next step is to determine whether the cases at bench fall within the ambit
of said jurisdiction.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Before us are consolidated petitions for prohibition and declaratory relief with a prayer
for temporary restraining order involving the issue of whether the People's Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) has jurisdiction over complainants filed by PNP personnel
against their superiors. cdrep
The salient facts bearing on these petitions follows.
In the first case (G.R. No. 109638), petitioner, police superintendent Florencio D. Fianza
was assigned as Provincial Director of Benguet (including the City of Baguio) with
headquarters at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet. 1
SPO3 Jesus Mason, SPO3 Fernando Tafaleng, PO3 Octavio Pawingi, PO3 Fernando
Segundo, PO3 Metodio Aquino, PO3 Benjamin Nakigo, PO3 Salvador Galiste, PO3
Romeo Bautista and PO3 Alfredo Matias, hereinafter referred to as the respondent
policemen, were members of the PNP assigned to the Baguio City Police Station.
On June 19, 1992, respondent policemen filed an Amended Complaint with the Baguio
PLEB against herein petitioner Supt. Florencio D. Fianza for "Grave Misconduct and
Irregularity in the Performance of the Duty," docketed as Administrative Case No. 007-
92. The case also named as respondent PNP Supt. Camilo S. Dugayen, who is not a party
to the instant petition.
The amended Complaint 2 reads in part:
"AMENDED COMPLAINT
The undersigned, all of legal age, Filipino Citizens and organic members of the Baguio
City Police Stations/PNP and with residence at Baguio City, Philippines, accuse POLICE
PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO D. FIANZA for Grave Misconduct and
Irregularity in the performance of duty in violation of Rule VI, paragraphs b and c of the
Napolcom Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 in relation to Secs. 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of
republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the Philippine National Police (PNP) law and
Police Superintendent CAMILO S. DUGAYEN of Grave Misconduct, Neglect of Duty,
Incompetence, Dishonesty, Irregularity in the performance of duty in violation of Rule
VI, paragraphs b, c, d, and f of the Napolcom Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 in
relation to Secs. 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Law committed as follows:
1. That on January 13, 1992, respondent CAMILO S. DUGAYEN issued Special
Order No. 04-92 dropping the names of SPO3 FERNANDO TAFALENG, PO3
OCTAVIO PAWINGI, PO3 BENJAMIN NAKIGO, PO3 EUSEBIO BENMAHO, PO2
FERDINAND SEGUNDO AND PO3 LORENZO TALLEDO from the rolls of the
Baguio City Police Station without benefit of due process of law;
1-a. That the aforestated unwarranted action of the respondent CAMILO S.
DUGAYEN was supposedly in total and blind obedience to an unlawful and illegal order
from his superior officer, respondent FLORENCIO D. FIANZA, who was then the
Provincial Director of the PNP Benguet Provincial Command and who issued SPECIAL
ORDER No. 01-92 directing respondent CAMILO S. DUGAYEN to transfer the
following persons from the Baguio City Police Station to Makanyan Police Station, to
wit:
— SPO3 FERNANDO S. TAFALENG
— PO3 OCTAVIO D. PAWINGI
— PO3 BENJAMIN NAKIGO
— PO3 EUSEBIO D. BENMAHO
— PO2 FERNANDO SEGUNDO
— PO2 LORENZO TALLEDO
2. That on January 18, 1992, respondent CAMILO S. DUGAYEN issued Special
Order No. 06-92 dropping from the following: SPO3 JESUS MASON, PO3
SALVADOR GALISTE, PO3 ROMEO BAUTISTA, PO3 ALFREDO MATIAS AND
PO2 METODIO AQUINO without formal investigation;
2-a. That the aforestated unwarranted and irregular action of the respondent Camilo S.
Dugayen, was supposedly in total and blind obedience from his superior officer,
FLORENCIO D. FIANZA, directing him to transfer the following non-officers from the
Baguio City Police Station to:
— Kibungan Police Station:
— SPO3 Jesus T. Mason
— PO3 Salvador M. Galiste
— Tuba Police Station
— PO3 Romeo M. Bautista
— Baguias Police Station
— PO3 Alfredo A. Matias
— PO2 Metodio J. Aquino
2-b. That the orders of the respondent FLORENCIO D. FIANZA are highly irregular
and illegal having been issued in utter and total disregard to the provisions of R.A. 6975
otherwise known as the PNP Law and the provisions of Napolcom Memorandum
Circular No. 91-002 evidencing grave misconduct and irregularity in the performance of
duty on his part; cdlex
2-c. That respondent CAMILO S. DUGAYEN cannot find shelter and defense by
simply invoking orders of a superior officer of which he is not duty bound to obey being
contrary and violative of the PNP Law and the Napolcom Memorandum Circular No. 91-
002 of which he is expected to know by heart being a ranking officer mandated by law to
know the same;
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent policemen, in their complaint, allege that their transfer from the Baguio City
Police station to other stations and their being dropped from the rolls were irregularly and
illegally made. The orders issued by Supt. Camilo S. Dugayen, apparently upon the
direction of Supt. Florencio D. Fianza, herein petitioner, were according to respondent
policemen, instigated by or made in retaliation to the raids they conducted on jueteng
operations in Baguio. The policemen claim that Supt. Dugayen, their Station
Commander, twice castigated them for conducting said raids and ordered the release of
the cash and paraphernalia seized, as well as persons accosted, as a consequence of the
raids. 3
Petitioners contended, through counsel, that cases of this nature are not within the
competence and jurisdiction of public respondent PLEB since it involves an internal
organization matter of the PNP. Petitioner argued that:
"This is not a 'citizen's complaint' against the members of the PNP. Rather it is a case of
PNP members versus PNP members/officers. Although there is an ambigous if tricky
allegation of a purported 'dropping from the rolls,' there is no question that the case
essentially involves some PNP members who have decided to resist or contest their
transfer or reassignment and selected this forum wherein 'to wash their dirty linen' in an
evident attempt to harass or embarass (sic) their superior officers.
You will agree that the power to direct technical and strategic deployment, placement
and/or specific utilization of individual PNP members is vested in the various levels of
PNP commanders and is not within the purview of the 'operational supervision and
control' now exercised by local civilian officials." 4
Petitioners further claimed that the PLEB can entertain only citizen's complants and not
complaints lodged by PNP personnel. llcd
Public respondent PLEB, in an order dated November 13, 1992, ruled that it had
jurisdiction to try and hear Admin. Case No. 007-92 for Grave Misconduct and
Irregularity of Performance of Duty. it held that the complaint of the policemen can be
considered a citizen's complaint since the policemen have the same rights as other
citizens. Furthermore, the PLEB reasoned:
"(T)he charges contained in the complaint are very grave and deserve to be heard. To rule
otherwise would mean that there would be no remedy for the policemen who have
legitimate grievances against their superiors." 5
Upon the request of petitioners, 6 the Baguio PLEB referred the matter of its jurisdiction
to public respondent National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). The latter, through the
Acting Regional Director for the Cordillera Administrative Region, rendered an opinion
upholding the PLEB's assumption of jurisdiction: prcd
". . . . It must be noted that the word, 'CITIZEN'S COMPLAINT,' is a misnomer and do
(sic) not necessarily signify to a complaint filed by a private party or ordinary citizen
alone but rather the phrase includes or embraces also all complaints filed by any citizen
of the Philippines whether he or she is a government employee or an ordinary person." 7
As a consequence, the PLEB continued to assume jurisdiction, ordered the submission of
counter-affidavits and set the case for hearing on April 30, 1993.
Petitioners brought the instant petition (G.R. No. 109638) for prohibition and declaratory
relief with prayer temporary restraining order to restrain the Baguio PLEB from trying
said administrative case 8 for lack of jurisdiction over the same.
In the other petition (G.R. No. 109639), petitioner Supt. July Cordoviz likewise claims
that the PLEB has no jurisdiction over the administrative case 9 filed against him by Pat.
ray Ekid, for allegedly threatening the latter and his family if he would not report to the
former's office. 10
In an Order dated March 19, 1993, 11 public respondent PLEB denied petitioner's motion
to dismiss and ruled that it has proper jurisdiction over the said administrative case.
LibLex
Supt. Cordoviz then brought this original action for prohibition and declaratory relief
with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
In support of their contention that the PLEB has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed
by respondent policemen, petitioners advance the following arguments:
In the first place, the PLEB has jurisdiction over citizen's complaints but not over matters
involving internal discipline within the PNP. Cases against PNP members are either
citizen's complaints or breaches of internal discipline. 12
A citizen's complaint is one initiated by a private citizen qua private citizen. Since
respondent policemen have filed their complaints against petitioners, not their capacity as
private citizens but as members of the PNP, complaint cannot be denominated a citizen's
complaint.
This is not to say that they are left with no recourse of relief for complainants involving
breaches of internal discipline may and should be raised with their superiors or
commanders. 13 Respondent policemen's complaint concerning petitioner's issuance of
illegal and irregular transfer and dismissal orders is an internal organizational affair of the
PNP, involving as they do transfers, reassignment or deployment orders which, under
Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 6975, 14 are under the command and direction of the Chief
of the PNP and may be delegated to subordinate officials. 15
In the second place, Rule VI, Section 2A, B & C of the PLEB Rules 16 enumerates acts
constituting simple, less grave and serious irregularities in the performance of duties as
well as simple, less grave and serious misconduct. Petitioner Fianza's alleged issuance of
illegal transfer or reassignment orders are not among the acts constituting either
misconduct or irregularity in the performance of duty. LexLib
In their consolidated comment, 17 public respondents, People's Law enforcement Board
of Baguio City and the NAPOLCOM, assert the jurisdiction of the PLEB to take
cognizance of the uniform they wear.
Nothing in the law, of Republic Act No. 6975, justifies the conclusion that PNP members
no longer have the right to file a citizen's complaint.
After conceding that offenses by PNP men may be classified either as citizen's complaint
or as minor offenses involving internal discipline, public respondents contend that
complainants against members of the PNP are not necessarily classified as merely
offenses involving internal discipline.
In G.R. No. 109638, the accusation against petitioner Fianza concerns protection of
jueteng operators, which, under the PLEB Rules, constitutes a grave offense. It may even
be considered as maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution for the punishment
of violators of the law or tolerating the commission of criminal offenses under the
Revised Penal Code. 18
In G.R. No. 109639, public respondents contend that the complaint against petitioner
Cordoviz is covered by Rule VI-H (r) of the PLEB Rules, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
r. Thereaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the
latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime (Grave Threats — Art. 282);
xxx xxx xxx
Since respondent policeman in this case was never under petitioner's command the
complainant cannot plausibly be a matter involving internal discipline.
Finally, public respondents assert that the policy of the law is for wider civilian
participation in PNP affairs. The Constitution envisions a police force civilian in a
character. The PLEB, as an avenue for greater citizen involvement in the police force,
must be deemed to have broad jurisdiction to effectuate this constitutional policy and
promote people empowerment. cdll
The issue then before us in these twin petitions involves a clarification of the jurisdiction
of PLEB as applicable to the specific facts of this case and not merely as a petition for
declaratory relief over which this court has no jurisdiction.
In G.R. No. 109638, it is whether or not the PLEB may take cognizance of a case for
grave misconduct and irregular performance of duty filed by nine (9) policemen against
their superior, Supt. Florencio D. Fianza.
In G.R. No. 109639, at issue is whether or not the PLEB may hear and try a case for
"Threats, Grave Abuse of Authority and conduct Unbecoming an officer" brought against
Supt. July Cordoviz by a policeman outside the ambit of his command.
At this point, a review of the PLEB's organic law is an order. The PLEB, established
pursuant to Sec. 43 of Republic Act No. 6975, 19 is part of the PNP's administrative
disciplinary machinery. LLphil
Sec. 43 reads, in part:
"Sec. 43. People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). — (a) Creation and Functions
— Within thirty (30) days from the issuance of the implementing rules and regulations by
the Commission, there shall be created by the sangguniang panglunsod/bayan in every
city and municipality such number of People's Law Enforcement Boards (PLEBs) as may
be necessary: Provided, That there shall be at least one (1) PLEB for every municipality
and for each of the legislative districts in a city. The PLEB shall jurisdiction to hear and
decide citizen's complaints or cases filed before it against erring officers and members of
the PNP. There shall be at least one member for every five hundred (500) city or
municipal police personnel.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Each PLEB is composed of a member of the sangguniang panglunsod/bayan chosen by
his respective sanggunian; barangay captain of the city or members who shall be chosen
by the peace and order council from among the respected members of the community
known for their probity and integity . Membership in the PLEB is a civic duty; hoewever
PLEB members may be per diem as may be determined by the city or municipal council
from city or municipal funds. 20
For emphasis, the above cited provision of law states that the PLEB has jurisdiction to
hear and decide citizen's complaints or cases against erring officers and members of the
PNP.
Petitioners, PNP Superintendents Fianza and Cordoviz, are in effect asking us to rule that
the jurisdiction because they cannot be considered as citizen's complaints. LLphil
Under Sec. 41 (a) of the PNP's enabling act, a citizen's complaint is "any complaint by an
individual person against any member of the PNP." Penalties imposabble include
witholding of privilages, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forefeiture of salary,
any combination thereof or dismissal. When the penalties imposable do not brought
before the Chief of Police; and if for a period not less than sixteen but not exceeding
thirty days, before the city or municipal mayors. It is when the period exceeding thirty
days or by dismissal, that the complaint should be brought before the PLEB.
Section 41 paragraph (b) provides:
"(b) Internal Discipline. — In dealing with minor offenses involving internal
discipline found to have been committed by any regular member of their respective
commands, the duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP shall, after
due notice and summary hearing , exercise disciplinary powers as follows:
(1) Chiefs of police or equivalent supervisors . . . ;
(2) Police directors or equivalent supervisors . . .;
(3) Police regional directors or equivalent supervisors . . .;
(4) The Chief of the PNP . . . ."
Nowhere in the aforecited provision is the PLEB granted jurisdiction over offenses
concerning internal discipline. prLL
Rule II, section 1 of the PLEB Rules defines a citizen's complaint as pertaining to "any
complaint initiated by a private citizen or his duly authorized representative on account of
an injury, damage or disturbance sustained due to an irregular or illegal act committed by
a member of the PNP."
A citizen's complaint, then, is one filed by a private citizen against a member of the PNP
for the redress of an injury, damage or disturbance caused by the latter's illegal or
irregular acts. cdasia
Petitioner contends that since the complainants are PNP policemen, they cannot be
classified as "private citizens" for purposes of filing a "citizen's complaint." Public
respondents disagree and claim that respondent policemen, notwithstanding their
uniforms, do not cease to be citizens.
On this point, we rule that although respondent policemen continue to be citizens, as
public respondents contend, they are not the "private citizens" referred to in the laws cited
above. Clearly, the term "private citizens" does not ordinarily include men in uniform ,
such as the respondent PNP men. This is particularly evident in the PNP law which uses
the term "members of the PNP" as well as "private citizens" to refer to different groups of
persons and not interchangeably. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is applicable in this situation. When the words of a statute are clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its interpretation. 21 The term "private citizen"
in the PNP Law and PLEB Rules is used in its common signification and was not meant
to refer to the members of the PNP, such as respondent policemen.
One of the avowed objectives of the PLEB is to enhance civilian participation in the
disciplinary process of errant PNP members. 22 The PLEB is part of the system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and PNP provided for
in the law creating the Philippine National Police. 23
The citizen's complaint envisioned under Republic Act No. 6975 normally pertains to
complaints by private individuals against PNP men and not by PNP men against their co-
members or officers in a professional capacity. An example used in the Bicameral
Conference Committee hearings is that of a policeman who takes fish from the market
without paying for it. 24 Aside from the criminal liability attaching to the act of the
policeman cognizable by the courts, the private party prejudiced can sue him before the
PLEB.
However, respondent policemen are not absolutely excluded from bringing citizen's
complaints with the PLEB. PNP members can file suit as private citizens only when they
to do so in their private capacity and not as members of the PNP . This means that the
complaining PNP personnel can sue on matters of private concern and not on matters
properly cognizable by the PNP chain of command. If a policeman complains against
another colleague before the PLEB, he can do so when the subject matter of the
complaint is one that can similarly be raised by a private individual or citizen.
But if the subject of the complainant bears a direct relation to the office of the
complainant-policeman as member of the PNP, it can hardly be considered as a citizen's
complaint and is, therefore, neither cognizable nor triable by the PLEB.
This conclusion is ineluctable as the PNP is the proper venue for matters involving its
internal organization or discipline. The PNP hierarchy possess the power and
responsibility over its men in these matters. Section 81 of Republic Act No. 6975 reads:
"SEC. 81. Complainants and Grievances. — Uniformed personnel shall have the
right to present complaints and grievances to their superiors or commanders and have
them heard and adjudicated as expeditiously as possible in the best interest of the service,
with due regard to due process in every case. Such complainants or grievances shall be
resolved at the lowest possible level in the unit of command and the respondent shall
have the right to appeal from an adverse decision to higher authorities. 25
No better forum for the resolution of internal discipline and administrative matters can be
found than the organization (PNP) itself, particularly, in the enforcement of its
professional code of conduct.
In matters pertaining to their job or office, PNP men are afforded the proper channel for
their complainants against colleagues, superiors or commanding officers. The Chief of
Police, Provincial Director and PNP Chief are the proper conduits for offenses involving
internal discipline, such as simple misconduct or negligence, insubordination, frequent
absences or tardiness, habitual drunkness and gambling prohibited by law. 26 Even the
PLEB Rules provide that jurisdiction over offenses involving breach of internal discipline
(or any offense committed by a member of the PNP involving and affecting order and
discipline within the ranks of the police organization) belongs to the duly designated
supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP. The Chiefs of Police, provincial
Directors, Police Regional Directors or their equivalent supervisors and the PNP Chief
exercise disciplinary powers for breaches of internal discipline committed by any regular
member of their respective commands. 27
Having dealt with the areas over the PLEB exercises jurisdiction, the next step is to
determine whether the cases at bench fall within the ambit of said jurisdiction. Cdpr
Respondent policemen in the first petition accuse petitioner Fianza of issuing illegal
orders pertaining to transfers of assignment and dropping from the rolls without and
formal investigation. They accuse of issuing these orders in retaliation for their raids on
jueteng operations protected by him.
The merits of the case are not disputed in the instant petition. What is at issue is where
the case should be adjudicated. cdasia
Though the policemen impute ill motives to petitioner for issuing illegal orders, there is
no question that the principal and basic issue is the wrongful issuance of such order . In
other words, accusations of "coddling" or protecting jueteng operators do not alter the
fact that the main dispute refers to the ensuing transfer in the PNP.
We pointed out earlier that the Chief of the PNP and his subordinates have power to
transfer and utilize PNP personnel in accordance with their strategy. 28 The issuance of
the questioned orders comes within the purview of the abovementioned power. Hence,
the propriety or illegality of the orders should be raised before the proper superiors or
commanding officers 29 and not before a civilian body like the PLEB. to repeat, nowhere
in the law creating the PLEB is this power or function mentioned. 30
For the foregoing reasons, we rule that the PLEB has no jurisdiction over the
administrative case 31 was for threats made by a superior officer of the PNP against
another PNP policeman who is not under his command.
Again, the same cannot be considered as a citizen's complaint because the conduct
complained of pertains to their work and offices. That the alleged threats were made in
connection with private respondent policeman's position is shown by the following
allegation in his complainant:
". . . he pointed his right forefinger at me and shouted the following and I quote: 'SIKA,
NO SAAN DA NGA AG-REPORT KANIAK IDIAY OPISINA, ITULOY KO DIAY
ILLEGAL SEARCH NGA DEMANDA KANYAM'; meaning: YOU, IF YOU WILL
NOT REPORT TO MY OFFICE, I WILL CONTINUE THE ILLEGAL SEARCH
CHARGES AGAINST YOU;
xxx xxx xxx
Although complainant below was a policeman who did not belong to petitioner Cordoviz'
command, the controversy between them continues to be a festering internal disciplinary
matter. Who can better understand the standard of conduct imposed in the PNP than the
members of the PNP themselves? Certainly, it is doubtful whether a civilian body like the
PLEB can better police the ranks of the policemen. Accordingly, we rule that the
complaint, like in the preceding case, is one which properly lodged with their common
superior or commanding officer and not with the PLEB. dctai
WHEREFORE, the petitioners are hereby GRANTED. The People's Law enforcement
Board of Baguio is directed to CEASE and DESIST from further trying Adminstrative
Case No. 007-92 (Jesus Mason, et al. v. Supt. Florencio Fianza and Supt. Camilo
Dugayen) and Adminstrative Case No. 042-92 (Pat. Ray Ekid v. Col. July Cordoviz).
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. At the time the petition was filed, however, petitioner had already been re-
assigned as the Provincial Director for the province of Batangas.
2. Rollo, pp. 20-21.
3. Rollo, pp. 21-22.
4. Letter of Counsel for the Respondent in Adm. Case No. 007-92 dated July 31,
1992 and Reply dated November 17, 1992, quoted in part in the Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo,
pp. 6-7.
5. Rollo, p. 30.
 6. Motion to Refer Issue of Jurisdiction to the Napolcom Hearing Officer and/or the
National Police Commission, dated February 24, 1993; Rollo, p. 31.
7. Letter of Acting Regional Director Nestor A. Quintos, March 19, 1993; Rollo, p.
42.
8. Adminstrative Case No. 007-92.
9. Administrative Case No. 042-92.
10. Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
11. Rollo, p. 23.
12. Rollo, p. 9.
13. Id.
14. Republic Act No. 6975, "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
Approved December 13, 1990; 87 O.G. No. 3.
15. Sec. 26 of Rep. Act No. 6975 reads in part:
"Sec. 26. Powers, Functions and Term of Office of PNP Chief. —
The command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the Chief of the PNP who shall
have the power to direct and control tactical as well as strategic movements, deployment,
placement, utilization, of the PNP or any of its units and personnel, including its
equipment, and direction of the other resources. Such command and direction of the
officials with respect to the units under their commands, in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Commission. . . . ."
16. Rules of Procedure Before the People's Law Enforcement Board, NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-002, Procedure in the Investigation and Disposition of
Adminstrative Complaints Against Members of the Philippines National Police (PNP)
Before the PLEB.

17. Rollo, p. 73.

18. Article 208, Revised Penal Code; Rule VI-H (a), Rules of Procedure Before the
PLEB.
19. Supra, note 14.
20. Republic Act No. 6975, Sec. 43 (a), (b) & (c).
21. R. AGAPITO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 94 (2nd ed., 1990).
22. Conference Committee Reports, May 15, 1990, p. 4.
23. Republic Act. No. 6975, Sec. 2.
24. Ibid., May 29, 1990, p. 39.
25. Also see Sec. 26 and Sec. 41 (b) of Rep. Act No. 6975.
26. Sec. 41 (b), Rep. Act No. 6975.
27. Secs. 3 and 4, Rules of Procedure Before the PLEB.
28. Sec. 26, Rep. Act. No. 6975.
29. Such as those who are not involved in the controversy.
30. Sec. 41 (a) and Sec. 43, Rep. Act No. 6975.
31. Adminstrative Case No. 042-92.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119645. August 22, 1996.]
SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. HON.
RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government & Chairman, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS
CANONIZADO, Commissioner, NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman LEODEGARIO
ALFARO, Regional Appellate Board VIII; Regional Director EDMUNDO LAVILLA
LARROZA Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII; and MARIO
VALDEZ, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; APPEALS
THERETO FROM DECISIONS OF A BUREAU OR OFFICE MAY INITIALLY BE
FILED BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT CONCERNED. — Section 45 of the DILG Act
of 1990 specifically provides that if a RAB fails to decide an appeal within the
reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed decision becomes final and executory
without, however, prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary
of the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as regards the availability of an
appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period. This gap in
Section 45 cannot be construed to prohibit appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered
within the reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section is worded Finality of
Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein that explicitly bars any further appeal.
Complementary laws on discipline of government officials and employees must then be
inquired into considering that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that the
PNP must be national in scope and civilian in character, it is now a part, as a bureau, of
the reorganized DILG. As such, if falls within the definition of the civil service in Section
2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. For this reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of
1990 provides. The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990
is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section
47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where the decision rendered by a
bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to
the department and finally to the Commission.
2. ID; DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT OF
1990; APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD
AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD; MUST BE FILED BEFORE THE
SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. — Only the Secretary of the DILG can
act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the
appeal and the petition for review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the
DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within
the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such jurisdiction because
Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides the NAPOLCOM exercises
appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in
personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed
by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and
over decisions on claims for police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions
rendered by the NAB and the RAB. Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the
power or authority to issue, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March
1995 decision denying due course to the appeal and petition for review filed by
petitioners Cabada and De Guzman, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction because of
Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23,
Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules
suggest that the NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of
the RAB if the latter has not decided the appeal within the reglementary period of sixty
days. Such a suggestion is flawed because it would allow a ridiculous situation where the
NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG
Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the
NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a Chairman and four
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of the DILG Act of 1990.
3. ID; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; NOT APPLICABLE
IF THE DECISION IN QUESTION IS A PATENT NULLITY. — The plea of the Office
or the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary of
the DILG was the one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner
Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section
91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be filed
with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to the Comment of
the OSG that their case falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
Administrative remedies.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS, CERTIORARI; FILING OF A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH IF THE
QUESTIONED DECISION IS A PATENT NULLITY. — In light of the foregoing, the
petitioners could properly invoke our original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annual and set aside the
NAPOLCOM's decision of 24 March 1995. It being a patent nullity, the filing of a
motion its reconsideration before the institution of this special civil action may be
dispensed with.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EVERY STATUTE MUST BE SO
CONSTRUED AND HARMONIZED WITH OTHER STATUTES AS TO FORM A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF JURISPRUDENCE. — In view then of the aforementioned
gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the provisions of the Civil Law and the rules
and regulations implementing it must be taken into account in light of the maxim
interpretare concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide
an appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed
decision is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal
therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal
within the sixty-day period, its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the
DILG.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 1 to set
aside the decision (in the form of a letter) of 24 March 1995 2 of public respondent
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which denied due course for lack of
jurisdiction the appeal and the petition for review filed by petitioners SPO3 Noel Cabada
and SPO3 Rodolfo G. de Guzman, respectively. Challenged in the said appeal and
petition for review were the decision of 15 August 1994 3 and resolution of 25 October
1994 4 of the Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional Command (RAB 8),
which affirmed their dismissal from the service.
The pleadings and annexes filed by the parties disclose the following factual and
procedural backdrop of this case:
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary
Detention, and Dishonesty was filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights
in Tacloban City by private respondent Mario Valdez. 5 The complaint was referred to
the Philippine National Police Eight Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after
the conducting its own investigation, filed an administrative charge of Grave Misconduct
against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings.
On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision 6
finding the petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the
police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April 1994, 7
was issued ordering, among other things, the dismissal of the petitioners from the service.
The petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the decision
and that they were able to secure a copy thereof "thru their own effort and initiative" only
on 13 June 1994. 8 However, they received a copy of Special Order No. 174 on 26 April
1994.
Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was Special Order No.
174, 9 petitioner Cabada stated under oath in his Appeal 10 filed with the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) that he in fact seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who,
however, failed or refused to act on the said motion, and that he asked that the said
motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.
In its decision of 15 August 1994, 11 the RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional
Director. In its resolution of 25 October 1994, 12 it denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners received a copy of this resolution on 26
January 1995.
Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG
and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their "Appeal" 13 dated 5 February 1995 and
"Petition for Review" 14 dated 4 February 1995, respectively.
In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, denied due course to the petitioners' appeal and petition for review for lack
of jurisdiction "it appearing . . . that both the Decision and the Resolution of the Regional
Appellate Board had long become final and executory and there being no showing that
the RAB failed to decide respondents' appeal within the reglementary period of sixty (60)
days." 15 In support thereof, the NAPOLCOM cited Section 23, Rule IV of
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and Section 5, Rule III of
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows:
Section 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. — Failure of the Regional Appellate
Board to decide the appeal within the reglementary period shall render the decision final
and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with
the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. — The decision of the Regional
Appellate Board on an appealed case shall become final and executory after ten (10) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the appellant, if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed
within said period.
A motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision rendered by
the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case, provided that the same is filed within
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the decision in question. However, only one (1)
Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of
prematurity because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they should
have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section 47,
Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), which vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of
government personnel where the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal from office. The
said provision reads:
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal
all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension
for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in
rank or salary or transfer, or removal or dismissal from office. . . .
(2) The Secretaries . . . shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. . . .
In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially appealed to the Department and finally to the Commission and
pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which
case, the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
The Office of the Solicitor General opines that this provision covers PNP personnel, like
the petitioners; consequently, they should have appealed to the CSC. It also advances the
view that the instant petition should have been filed with the proper forum, the Regional
Trial Court.
The core issues that present themselves for our determination are whether
(1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for
lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners' appeal from and petition for review of the decision
and resolution of the RAB 8; and
(2) this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to
exhaust administrative remedies.
I
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 16 provides for the finality of disciplinary actions
against members of the PNP as follows:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. — The disciplinary action imposed upon a
member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action
imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from
the service may be appealed to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from
receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary
action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be
appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof:
Provided furthermore, That, the regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may
be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal:
Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within
said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to
the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary. (emphasis supplied)
The last proviso of this section is restated in Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. And Section 3, Rule III of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 provides:
Section 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of RAB/NAB
Decisions. — The NAPOLCOM appellate board concerned shall decide the appealed
cases within sixty (60) days from receipt of the entire records of the case from the PNP
summary dismissal authority. However, failure of the NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate
Board (RAB) to act on the appeal within said period renders the decision final and
executory without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by the respondent-appellant with
the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The decision
rendered by the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board (NAB) disposing an appealed
case shall be final and executory unless a timely Motion for Reconsideration is filed
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, in which case, it shall become final and
executory upon receipt by the respondent-appellant of the resolution of the aforesaid
board denying, modifying or affirming the decision.
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides that if a RAB fails to decide an
appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed decision becomes final
and executory without, however, prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to
the Secretary of the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as regards the
availability of an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary
period.
This gap in Section 45 cannot be construed to prohibit appeals from decisions of the RAB
rendered within the reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section is worded
Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein that explicitly bars any further
appeal. Complementary laws on discipline of government officials and employees must
then be inquired into considering that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution
that the PNP must be national in scope and civilian in character, 17 it is now a part, as a
bureau, of the reorganized DILG. 18 As such, it falls within the definition of the civil
service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. 19 For this reason, Section 91 of
the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. — The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.
The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of
Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where the decision rendered by a
bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to
the department and finally to the Commission.
The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of
the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 known as the Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated by the CSC. Section 31
and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows:
SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the
Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating
to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
SEC. 32. The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.
Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary. In case the
decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same
may be initially appealed to the department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board,
and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except
when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 262, 20 the Secretary of the DILG has the power of
supervision and control of his Department. His powers and functions thereunder are
recognized and affirmed in Section 10 of the DILG Act of 1990. 21
In view then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and the rules and regulations implementing it must be
taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 22
As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an appealed
case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is
deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to
the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-
day period, its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
In the instant case, Cabada's appeal was addressed to "the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government . . . as Chairman and Presiding Officer
of the National Police Commission," 23 while De Guzman's petition for review was
addressed to "the Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
and Chairman, National Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila." 24
We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary of the
DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM
did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review, and just because both
mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the
NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter
does not have such jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently
provides as follows:
SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel
disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon
members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over
administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police
benefits. . . .
This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on
the following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions
involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and
(b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for
police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and
the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue, through
Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995 decision denying due course to the
appeal and petition for review filed by petitioners Cabada and De Guzman, respectively,
for lack of jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular
No. 91-002. The reference to these rules suggest that the NAPOLCOM believes it has
jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the RAB if the latter has not decided the
appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days. Such a suggestion is flawed because
it would allow a ridiculous situation where the NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an
appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG Act of 1990. Moreover,
Commissioner Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the NAPOLCOM because it is a
collegial body composed of a Chairman and four Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13
of the DILG Act of 1990.
In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke our original jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annual
and set aside the NAPOLCOM's decision of 24 March 1995. It being a patent nullity, the
filing of a motion for its reconsideration before the institution of this special civil action
may be dispensed with. 25
II
The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it
if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or dismissed the
appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then,
pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Section 31 and 32 of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be
filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to the
Comment of the OSG that their case falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
In view of all the foregoing, a discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners
relating to the merits of the case and on the issue of due process is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision (in
the form of a letter) of the National Police Commission of 24 March 1995 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government is DIRECTED to RESOLVE with reasonable dispatch the appeal and
petition for review of petitioners SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE
GUZMAN, respectively, from the decision of 15 August 1994 and resolution of 25
October 1994 of the Regional Appellate Board, Eighth Regional Command, if the same
were filed on time.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Melo, Francisco, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Mistakenly designated by the petitioners as a "Petition for Review by Certiorari
under Rule 65. Rules of Court."
2. Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 33-34. Per NAPOLCOM Commissioner Alexis C.
Canonizado.
3. Annex "C," Id.; Id., 65-70. Per RAB Chairman Atty. Leodegario J. Alfaro; P/Sr.
Supt. Antonio G. Dadula, Deputy Regional Director for Administration; and Regional
State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr..
4. Annex "F," Petition; Rollo, 74-76. Per P/Sr. Supt. Antonio G. Dadula and
Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr., with RAB Chairman Atty.
Leodegario J. Alfaro, dissenting.
5. The private respondent also instituted three criminal cases against the petitioners,
viz., (1) for arbitrary detention; (2) for violation of R.A. No. 7438 (An Act Defining
Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation As Well
As the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing
Penalties for Violations Thereof); and (3) for robbery. The first was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 94-05-15 in Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Tacloban City, but was dismissed on 10 August 1994 upon motion of the petitioners who
invoked their right to speedy trial, considering the private respondent's non-appearance
during the previous setting and the difficulty met by the sheriff in serving the subpoena
upon the latter (Annex "M" of Petition; Rollo, 89, per Judge Marino S. Buban). The
second was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-05-278 in Branch 7 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, but was dismissed on 5 October 1994 upon a finding by
the trial court that the constitutional rights of the private respondent during custodial
investigation were not violated by the petitions (Annex "N," Id., Id., 90-91; per Judge
Pedro S. Espina). The third was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-08-309 in Branch 8 of
the RTC of Tacloban City which was provisionally dismissed on 7 December 1995 upon
motion of the petitioners who invoked their right to speedy trial (Annex "A" of the
petitioners' Memorandum; Id., 158; per Judge Mateo M. Leanda).
6. Annex "D" of Petition; Id., 71-72.
7. Annex "E," Id.; Id., 73.
8. Petitioners' Memorandum, 8; Rollo, 154.
9. Paragraph 12 of Petition; Id., 17.
10. Annex "B-1," Id.; Id., 51. It may also be pointed out that in its decision of 15
August 1994 (supra note 3), RAB 8 stated that the appeal interposed by the petitioners is
based on the following grounds: (a) errors of law and irregularities have been committed
during the investigation prejudicial to their rights; (b) the findings of facts are not
supported by substantial evidence; and (c) the denial of their motion for reconsideration
is contrary to law and jurisprudence. This shows that the petitioners appealed from the
decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 and not from Special Order No.
174, and that the motion for its reconsideration was denied.
11. Supra note 3.
12. Supra note 4.
13. Annex "B-1" of Petition; Rollo, 51.
14. Annex "B," Id.; Id., 35.
15. Annex "A." Petitioner; Rollo, 33-34.
16. R.A. No. 6975.
17. Section 6, Article XVI, 1987 Constitution.
18. Section 6, DILG Act of 1990, provides:
Section 6. Organization. — The Department shall consist of the Department
Proper, the existing bureaus and the offices of the Department of Local Government, the
National Police Commission, the Philippine Public Safety College, and the following
bureaus: the Philippine National Police, the Bureau of Fire Protection, and the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology.
19. It provides as follows:
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
20. Entitled "Reorganizing the Department of Local Government and for Other
Purposes," issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987.
21. The said section reads in part as follows:
Sec. 10. Specific Powers and Functions of the Secretary. — In addition to
his powers and functions as provided in Executive Order No. 262, the Secretary as
Department head shall have the following powers and functions . . . .
22. Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211, 232 [1994], citing RUBEN E. AGPALO,
Statutory Construction 192 [2nd ed., 1990].
23. Rollo, 51.
24. Id., 35.
25. See FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. I [1988] 460,
citing cases.

Indeed —
" . . . bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions
from the accused are not sufficient in view of the standing rule enunciated in the cases of
People v. Mada-I Santalani; 52 People v. Balane; 53 and People v. Villanueva, 54 that
where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on
their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths;
where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these were considered by this Court as factors indicating
voluntariness." 55