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Poverty as politics: The Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Programme in Sri

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DOI: 10.1080/00291959508543417

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Poverty as politics: the Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Programme in Sri

Lanka
Kristian Stokke

To cite this Article Stokke, Kristian(1995) 'Poverty as politics: the Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Programme in Sri Lanka',
Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian Journal of Geography, 49: 3, 123 — 135
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 Poverty as politics: the Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation
Programme in Sri Lanka
KRISTIAN STOKKE

Stokke, K. 1995. Poverty as politics: the Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Programme in Sri Lanka.
Norsk geogr. Tidsskr. Vol. 49, 123-135. Oslo. ISSN 0029-1951.
One characteristic feature of the recent presidency of Ranasinghe Premadasa in Sri Lanka was the
Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Programme. This program, aimed at initiating a process of accumula-
tion from below, enjoyed widespread support within and outside Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, it has been
rapidly dismantled. This article argues that the rise and dismantling of Janasaviya were the outcome
of changes in development theory and continuities and changes in the Sri Lankan postcolonial state
formation. The first argument holds that Janasaviya was formulated as an effective response to the
critique of the public interest view of the state while being presented as a radical agenda for
empowerment. The second argument claims that Janasaviya was rooted in postcolonial class- and
Downloaded By: [Stokke, Kristian] At: 16:35 9 April 2010

network-based politics.
Krislitm Slokke, Department of Geography, University of Bergen, Breiviken 2, N-S03S Bergen-Sand-
viken, Norway.

Poverty is the greatest social disease of many countries.
It has reached epidemic proportions in much of the
Third World. Epidemics are emergencies. Emergencies
do not have the luxury of leisurely solutions. (President
Ranasinghe Premadasa, 25.5.1991, quoted from Jay-
atilleka & Gunasekara 1994, p. 17)
Poverty alleviation means making the weak and the
poor strong and capable. Even though poor, our people
have many talents and capabilities. But they do not
have the basic facilities necessary to fully exploit these
talents and capabilities. It is to fulfil that need that we
are implementing the Janasaviya Programme. (Presi-
dent Ranasinghe Premadasa, 4.9.1989, quoted from
Jayatilleka & Gunasekara 1994, p. 14)
The Sri Lankan parliamentary election in August
1994 and the presidential election in November
1994 marked the transfer of government from the
conservative United National Party (UNP) to the
social democratic People's Alliance (PA). The
UNP had held power since 1977, under the lead-
ership of three presidents; J. R. Jayawardena
(1978-1988), R. Premadasa (1988-1993) and D.
B. Wijetunga (1993-1994). One dominant fea-
ture of the recent and turbulent presidency of
Ranasinghe Premadasa was the Janasaviya
Poverty Alleviation Programme. This program
was inaugurated in October 1989 and soon be-
came a lead program of Premadasa's govern-
ment. The major aim of Janasaviya was to
transform impoverished households into sustain-
able economic units through credit entitlements
and increased cash and subsistence transfers
(Karunatilake 1989). The expectation was that
increased transfers in the short run would initiate
a long-term process of accumulation from below
(Hewavitharana 1994, Janasaviya Department
1992). Throughout Premadasa's presidency this
program was given much publicity and was
widely celebrated as a radical program for allevi-
ating poverty and empowering the poor. The
absence of public critique of Janasaviya in all
spheres of political and civil society was striking.
The Janasaviya Programme was first neglected
and then revigorated by the government of Presi-
dent D. B. Wijetunga. The current People's Al-
liance government, led by President Chandrika
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, has announced that
Janasaviya will be phased out and replaced by
their own poverty alleviation program, called The
Sanmrdhi Movement (Fernando 1994). In effect,
this means the end of Janasaviya, but also the
continuation of its basic ideas under a new guise.
How do we make sense of this rise to promi-
nence and rapid decline of the Janasaviya Pro-
gramme? As for general interpretations of the
Janasaviya experience, two major views exist in
contemporary Sri Lanka. The first, and most
common interpretation, sees Janasaviya as a mas-
sive personal propaganda show orchestrated by an
authoritarian populist President. In a context of
severe social and political crises in the late 1980s,
Ranasinghe Premadasa, a 'self-made' populist
political leader from a 'humble background', rose
from the relatively anonymous position of Prime
 124 K. Stokke NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995)

Minister to President at the presidential election
in 1988. Thereafter, Premadasa used the central-
ized power of the presidency, guaranteed by the
Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978, to establish an
authoritarian populist style of leadership. Pre-
madasa's presidency soon became characterized
by a growing use of state force for the suppres-
sion of the Janakthi Vinwkthi Perannma (JVP, a
radical Sinhalese nationalist movement), inten-
sified factionalism with unprecedented levels of
politically motivated violence between and within
the parliamentarian political parties, and large-
scale emphasis on empowerment of marginalized
groups and alleviation of poverty.
This contradictory combination of centralized
authoritarianism and stafe-led local empower-
ment has often been explained by reference to
Downloaded By: [Stokke, Kristian] At: 16:35 9 April 2010
January 1990) and President Premadasa, the
guardian of the poor was assassinated (May
1993), the elites were free to go on with their
business as usual. As argued by the former Com-
missioner of Janasaviya, Susil Sirivardana:
The main problems have been with the statist elements,
the elites and the established business echelons. With
hindsight it is now clear that they never really came to
terms with the systemic issues thrown up by the na-
tional crisis. Their understanding of it was nil or totally
superficial. The moment the crisis was overcome, they
returned to doing business as usual. They did not
realize that what the revolting youth were trying to say,
was something fundamental to the way of life of the Sri
Lankan establishment and the structural contradictions
of our society. (Sirivardana 1994, p. 21)
Whereas the first interpretation emphasizes the
characteristics of political actors at the top of the

personal characteristics of the President himself. state formation, the second interpretation focuses
As expressed by a human rights activist from a on grassroots mobilization in civil society and the
core JVP-area in Hambantota District: systemic conflicts between oppressed groups in
That's the kind of man Premadasa was. On the one
civil society and dominant elites controlling the
hand, he did all sorts of terrible things. On the other state. Both interpretations seem, however, to con-
hand, he presented himself as the man of the people tain some serious weaknesses.
who gave out goods to the poor. (An anonymous hum- The major shortcoming of the first interpreta-
an rights activist, personal communication, November
1994)
tion is its lack of any consideration of the eco-
nomic, social and political context of person-
The lack of public critique of Janasaviya prior to alized authoritarian populism in Sri Lanka.
May 1993, according to this actor-orientated in- It is overly simplistic to analyze Sri Lankan
terpretation of events, was the outcome of fear politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s as
and political weakness among the legal political primarily a matter of specific character traits of
opposition and hence a matter of false compli- the late President Premadasa. Interestingly, the
ance with the authoritarian President rather than 'Premadasa political legacy' was rediscovered re-
genuine support for his policies. cently by the 'anti-Premadasa' faction within
The second interpretation of the rise and de- UNP after the party had been defeated in the
cline of Janasaviya, which is presented mainly by Southern Provincial Election in 1994 (Counter-
actors who were close political affiliates of Presi- point 1994c). Likewise, the present People's Al-
dent Premadasa, sees Janasaviya as a movement liance government has declared its commitment
in civil society for the true empowerment of the to an 'open economy with a human face', which
poor (Sirivardana 1993). In this view, President means a continuation of basic elements in Pre-
Premadasa was a guardian of the poor and a madasa's economic and social policies (Counter-
facilitator for empowerment. Such a role for the point 1994b). These appearances suggest that
President was made possible by the systemic Premadasa's economic and social policies, e.g.
crises, which created a political space for radical the Janasaviya Programme, were not just the
measures for poverty alleviation and empower- outcome of the President's personal agenda, but
ment. According to this interpretation, the Sri actually served specific needs in the Sri Lankan
Lankan elites complied for fear of a more radical social and political formation.
outcome of the crises. However, the movement The problem with the second interpretation lies
for empowerment of the poor, it is argued, would in the claim that Janasaviya was an authentic
sooner or later run counter to the interests of grassroots movement for the empowerment of
well-established dominant social and political oppressed groups in civil society. In reality, the
groups in Sri Lanka. When the threat from op- Janasaviya Programme was initiated at the top of
pressed groups in civil society was quelled with the state formation and continued to rely on.
the crushing defeat of JVP (December 1989- organizational and material support from the
 NORSK. GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995)
state. In any case, the movement for local em-
powerment at the bottom of civil society never
reached a level where it could entail any real
threat to the vested interests of dominant social
and political groups.
The basic argument of this article is that the
Janasaviya Programme was initiated at the top of
the state formation. However, the top-down pol-
icy of poverty alleviation should not be seen as
merely the outcome of the personalized authori-
tarian populism of President Premadasa. Instead,
the article seeks to place Janasaviya within the
Sri Lankan postcolonial social and political con-
text. This will be done in three steps. The first
section provides a brief summary of recent
changes in development theory regarding the role
of the state in development. It is argued that the
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current policies for poverty alleviation within a
macroeconomic framework' of economic liberal-
ization have been shaped by right and left cri-
tiques of the public interest view of the state.
These critiques have provided an impetus for
'privatized' poverty alleviation through grass-
roots mobilization, non-governmental organiza-
tions and local empowerment. The second section
presents the basic elements of Janasaviya. Here it
is argued that Premadasa's government managed
to rally support from the international aid com-
munity and disarm the political opposition ex-
actly because it responded to these critiques of
the public interest view of the state. The third
section relates Janasaviya to the social founda-
tion of the Sri Lankan postcolonial state forma-
tion. The general argument here is that Jana-
saviya must be seen as an outcome of a particular
kind of accumulation regime, revolving around
state-centered accumulation and political rivalry
between competing networks of patrons and
clients.
The critique of the state and the
question of empowerment
In the optimistic post-war beginnings of develop-
ment theory, the ideology of 'developmentalism'
and the concept of the interventionist 'public
interest state' were inseparable (White 1988,
World Bank 1988). Mackintosh argues that at its
simplest, this public interest view of the state has
three elements: '1. It is possible to identify a
"public interest." 2. The state is competent to
identify that public interest. 3. The state will in
Poverty as politics, Sri Lanka 125
practice serve (or at least, can be made to seek to
serve) that public interest' (Mackintosh 1992, p.
65). The public interest was commonly defined
with reference to the market. Owing to the mar-
ket's failure to ensure economic efficiency,
growth, macroeconomic stability and poverty al-
leviation, the state was assigned a key role in
economic development:
Market mechanisms may . . . produce insufficient
growth as well as macroeconomic imbalances, such as
balance of payments deficits and unemployment. Ac-
cording to the public interest view, these market failures
need to be corrected by governments - through public
provision of goods and services, through public savings
and investment, and through taxes, subsidies, and regu-
lations. This approach reserves a special place for gov-
ernment in influencing the distribution of income and
alleviating poverty. (World Bank 1988, p. 49)
The economic justification for the strong link
between interventionism and developmentalism
has been the claimed severity of 'market failure'
in the Third World. This mode of reasoning has
been used widely to justify economic planning
and industrial production by postcolonial states.
The 1980s brought a dramatic shift away from
this public interest view of the state. Instead of
being the 'engine of development' the state now
came to be seen as the central problem. Mackin-
tosh (1992) points out that the public interest
view of the state came under heavy attack from
both the political left and the political right. The
radical critique of the public interest view of the
state has mainly attacked the first assumption;
the existence of a single, identifiable public inter-
est, ignoring class, ethnic and gender divisions in
civil society. This critique leads to an analysis of
postcolonial state formations which emphasizes
social relations in civil society (Stokke 1994b).
Neo-liberals, on the other hand, focus their cri-
tique on the second and third assumptions, the
competence and motivation of the state. This
critique, which is often described as a 'private
interest view' of the state, argues that govern-
ments, like markets, can 'fail' to work. This can
happen if the organization of governments allows
individuals to exercise undue power and exploit
political positions for rent-seeking, or if the bu-
reaucracy and the state are allowed to grow and
become overextended (Bates 1988):
Tracing its roots back to the classical liberal economists,
especially Adam Smith, the private interest view starts
with the presumption that individuals, whether in or out
of government, use the resources and influence at their
disposal to further their private interests, rather than any
 126 K. Stokke NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995)

abstract notion of the public interest. Although the - Devolving control of state services to groups of
pursuit of private interests allocates resources efficiently private employers.
in competitive markets, this generally does not occur - Devolving response to need to the voluntary sector
when individuals use the monopolistic powers of govern- such as private charities.
ment to their own advantage. Politicians, bureaucrats, . . . Those Concerned with class and power, who believe
and many private interests gain from a growing govern- the state serves the powerful, see voluntary organiza-
ment and greater government expenditure. So, it is tions as a countervailing force. Such organizations do
argued, the government's necessary role as provider of not only offer responsiveness and diversity. They can
public goods needs to be carefully circumscribed. Other- also be a means of empowerment of those with least
wise, inefficient public and private provision of goods power, by acting for, on behalf, and under the control
and services is sure to follow. (World Bank 1988, p. 49) of them. (Mackintosh 1992, pp. 82-83, emphases in
original)
So just as 'market failure' suggested.a role for
government in the early days of development This very brief summary of some recent changes
theory, so 'government failure' led back to the in the conceptualization of the role of the state in
market in the 1980s. This analysis has been the development has some important implications for
intellectual underpinning of various attempts to the further discussion of the Janasaviya Pro-
reduce the role of the state, through cuts in state gramme. Left and right critiques of the public
activities, privatization of state assets and public interest view of the state has generated an appar-
Downloaded By: [Stokke, Kristian] At: 16:35 9 April 2010

corporations, contracting out to private and chari- ent consensus on the importance, if not the
table organizations, cuts in social benefits, and means, of devolution of power. Related to this,
increased consumer charges for social services. the conceptualization of poverty alleviation has
More recently, the World Bank has modified some shifted from the state as a provider of a social
of the early dogmatic criticism of the public interest security net to an emphasis on mobilization of
view of the state. The essence of this reappraisal is actors and institutions in civil society for local
a division of responsibility between state and mark- empowerment.
et; governments need to do less in areas where mar-
kets work and more in areas where markets alone
cannot be relied upon. The latter case includes,
among other things, social development in the form The Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation
of investments in education, health, nutrition, Programme
family planning, and poverty alleviation (i.e. 'ad- The reformulations of the role of the state in
justment with a human face', Cornia et al. 1987). social development are reflected in the recent
This analysis, originating in a conservative cri- emergence of new strategies for poverty allevia-
tique of the state, has found paradoxical echoes tion in Sri Lanka. Three recent events are partic-
among left critics of the public interest view of ularly relevant here: (1) the formulation of a
the state who also emphasize grassroots mobiliza- pro-poor planning strategy in social housing
tion, non-governmental organizations and local (Sirivardana 1994), (2) the formulation of an
empowerment (Friedmann 1992, Bebbington & action plan for poverty alleviation through peo-
Thiele 1993).,In pursuit of quite different objec- ple-based development (Government of Sri
tives, both left and right critics of the public Lanka 1988), and (3) the formulation of a South
interest view of the state have advocated devolu- Asian strategy for poverty alleviation (SAARC
tion of state activities and decision-making to 1992).
actors and institutions in civil society. Conse-
quently, Mackintosh observes that the 1980s saw The formulation of a pro-poor planning strat-
an unexpected alliance against the state: egy in social housing was an early forerunner for
the Janasaviya Programme. Between 1977 and
1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa was the Minister of
In proposals for devolution, the 'private interest' re-
Housing and Construction, Minister of Local
formers meet those concerned with class and power.
For the neo-liberal right, the idea of devolution arises Government and Prime Minister (Sirivardana
from an admission that some public action remains 1994). In these positions, he initiated a large-scale
necessary, coupled with pessimism about government program for housing for poor people, called the
failure. The market alone cannot do everything. There- Million Houses Programme, and later the 1.5
fore if bureaucrats are too self-interested to respond to
needs, the answer lies in devolving decision-making
Million Houses Programme. This program was
('policy') as well as action to bodies with reasons to be formulated as a radical departure from earlier
more responsive. The neo-Iiberals see two possibilities: strategies and presented as a shift from provider-
 NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995) Poverty as politics, Sri Lanka 127

based to support-based housing. The basic idea playing an essentially complementary and catalytic role
here was that the state should be a mere facilita- through the full-scale practice of Devolution and De-
tor, while the poor themselves should make the centralization. (Government of Sri Lanka 1988, p. 9,
emphases in original)
decisions and implement the actual housing con-
struction: These formulations of'pro-poor' and 'community
What does the state do in this program? It supports, action' planning (Sirivardana 1994) were given a
strengthens and complements the mainstream. It facili- more coherent form and transformed into a wider
tates and supports both individual homebuilders and agenda for the entire South Asian region through
communities, provides plots and loans, eases con- the report of the Independent South Asian Com-
straints, informs builders and trains both participants
and staff. It will intervene only when individuals and
mission on Poverty Alleviation (SAARC 1992).
communities cannot solve problems on their own. So The point of departure of this report was that the
while the state is the supporter and facilitator, the magnitude and complexity of poverty in South
individual families will be doers and decision-makers. Asia was staggering and that current structural
(Sirivardana 1994, p. 6) adjustment policies were most likely to put further
This new role of the state in social development strains on the poor in the shorter term. Next, the
for the poor was summarized in the slogan for Commission observed that conventional state in-
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the Million Houses Programme: 'minimal inter- tervention over the past had created too little and
vention, maximal support by the state: maximal too slow growth to alleviate poverty automati-
involvement of the builder families' (Sirivardana cally, while producing an over-extended state that
1994, p. 6). jeopardized economic stability and growth. In
order to correct these failures, the Commission
The next relevant event came as a formulation
called for a two-legged strategy of economic mod-
of an action program on poverty alleviation
ernization and poverty alleviation:
through people-based development (Government
of Sri Lanka 1988). This report was based on the
experiences of the housing program, while outlin- The pro-poor plan, which is recommended by the Com-
mission, requires moving unambiguously on two fronts,
ing the basic elements of a more general strategy two equally strong strategic fronts - one the modern-
for poverty alleviation. In a conceptual paper ization/industrialization front and the other, the
written by President Premadasa, 'People-Based poverty eradication front - and marks a fundamental
Development' was presented as a new framework departure from the hitherto adopted conventional de-
for development, fundamentally different in form velopment patterns. (SAARC 1992, p. 130)
and content from conventional development,
since it 'puts people first, especially the poor and The role of the state in this strategy would be to
poorest of the poor; considers human beings as play an all-encompassing lead role. However, the
the primary resource; is self-reliant and bottom- state was not to undertake poverty alleviation
up; is culturally harmonious; can realize truly activities as it did in the past. Rather, such activ-
islandwide scale and stability' (Government of Sri ities should be carried out mainly by ' . . . organi-
Lanka 1988, p. 8, emphasis in original). The zations of the poor, community organizations,
essence of this new framework for development is support organizations, non-governmental organi-
thus an emphasis on mobilization and participa- zations, the new style banking systems and the
tion of the poor in the process of development. private sector, who would be partners in the
Again, the complementary role of the state is process in areas such as provision of labor-inten-
emphasized. The state should operate as a facili- sive industries and marketing' (SAARC 1992, p.
tator for a program 'where families and commu- 131). The role of the state was thus primarily to
nities both decide and act, while the State be a facilitator and an enabling institution; In
supports them in areas beyond their sphere of this process, decentralization of powers was seen
resolution' (Premadasa 1988, p. 4, emphasis in as necessary to ensure that ' . . . decision-making
original). Consequently, poverty alleviation was is passed on to the people, that resources are
to be achieved through a new policy framework, deployed for their optimum benefit, that priori-
penetrating all institutions of government, and tization of fund allocations and activity plans
focusing on: meet with the aspirations and needs of the people
and that there is proper targeting to prevent
misdirection, misappropriation and waste'
The empowering of local groups and communities to
devise their own solutions to problems, with the State (SAARC 1992, p. 132).
 128 K. Stokke
Achievements of the Janasaviya Programme
Sri Lanka is often mentioned as a low-income
country with a remarkable comparative record on
social development. These achievements are com-
monly attributed to a general, albeit changing,
emphasis on social welfare schemes and poverty
alleviation programs. The proponents of Jana-
saviya argue that this program was different from
previous social development programs in one spe-
cific aspect, namely that it was explicitly designed
not to be a mere dole or charitable handout. On
the contrary, Janasaviya has been presented as an
investment in human capital, a program designed
to alleviate poverty through creation of new em-
ployment opportunities and increased productiv-
ity in small production units (Indraratna 1989,
Downloaded By: [Stokke, Kristian] At: 16:35 9 April 2010
Premadasa 1989, Wijetunga 1989). The basic idea
of Janasaviya was to transform impoverished
households into sustainable economic units
through investments in the human base in order to
build up their asset-bases and utilize their assumed
latent capacities (Janasaviya Commissioner's De-
partment 1989). The basic means for this were
credit entitlements and increased cash and subsis-
tence transfers. Families that were identified as
eligible for Janasaviya support, based on income
levels and productive assets, were granted access
to a pool of resources valued at 2500/- Sri Lanka
Rupees (Rs.) per month (Rs. 50/- are approxi-
mately equal to 1 USD). This pool of resources
consisted of a Human Development Component
of Rs. 1458/- paid monthly for twenty-four
months, and an Investment and Income Genera-
tion Component of Rs. 1042/- made available in
the form of credit entitlements at the end of the
twenty-four-month period. The Human Develop-
ment Component was paid in two portions of Rs.
1000/- and Rs. 458/-, the prior being in the form
of coupons for the purchase of essential food and
non-food goods from local cooperative stores, and
the latter in the form of cash which the recipients
were encouraged to save for productive invest-
ments (Janasaviya Commissioner's Department
1993). The Investment and Income Generation
Component was made available in the form of a
Certificate of Entitlement ofRs. 25 000/- at the end
of the twenty-four month period. This certificate
of entitlement was only usable in the designated
banks and could not be transferred to any person
other than the spouse of the holder. The under-
lying rationale was to provide a consumption
component for a limited time period until the
NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995)
identified recipients could become economically
viable through increased investments in produc-
tive activities:
The consumption component is essential until such time
the recipient is able to invest his savings component
in a productive enterprise to generate self-sustained
growth of income and thereby eliminate the need for
any further Janasaviya consumer allowance. This is
expected to happen within 24 months of the commence-
ment of the JSP (Janasaviya Programme). (Indraratna
1989, p. 12)
In return for the credit and cash transfers, one
member of each Janasaviya family was obliged to
participate in productive work for twenty days
each month. They were also obliged to devote a
further four days each month in collective
community review and planning. The fact that
most of the transfers were given in the form of
coupons for the purchase of locally produced
essential goods or as credit entitlements for invest-
ments in increased productivity and employment
creation, was expected to hold back the inflation
that could have been induced by the increased
consumption capacity of poor households (Fer-
nando 1989, Indraratna 1989).
The Janasaviya Programme was implemented
at the village or hamlet level. The poor families
were identified through an open and community-
based procedure (Sirivardana 1989). In this pro-
cess the villagers themselves classified households
into categories of very poor (monthly incomes
below Rs. 700/-), less poor (monthly incomes
between Rs. 700/- and Rs. 1500/-) and old and
disabled (no earning capacity) (Janasaviya Com-
missioner's Department 1991b). Only the very
poor households were granted access to Janas-
aviya benefits (Janasaviya Commissioner's De-
partment 1993, SAARC 1992). In every village or
hamlet where a Janasaviya Programme was oper-
ational the Janasaviya families were to select a
Support Team (Sahaya Kandayama) in charge of
planning and coordinating community develop-
ment schemes. On the other hand, the Commis-
sioner of Janasaviya was responsible for
organizing and mobilizing a local Support System
consisting of banks,financialinstitutions, cooper-
ative societies, political representatives, local gov-
ernment institutions, non-governmental organiz-
ations, public officials, religious dignitaries and
teachers, etc. This support system organized by
the Commissioner was set up to:
(a) actively support and guide persons receiving relief
to enable them to achieve higher incomes; (b) assist
 NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995)
such persons to discover their latent capacities and
organize themselves through an effective program of
social mobilization; (c) inculcate in such persons dignity
and self-respect, moral values and righteousness; (d)
assist such persons to identify viable projects, finance,
monitor and assist in the implementation of such
projects; (e) assist such persons to secure funds needed
for the implementation of the Janasaviya Hamlet
Development Plan; ( 0 impress upon such persons the
need to repay or service any loans obtained by them
and advise them on the consequences of any default in
such repayment; (g) advise such persons as to the use of
their Certificates of Entitlement to obtain funds for
approved projects; (h) guide, assist and monitor such
approved projects so as to ensure a proper utilization of
any payments received through their Certificates of
Entitlement. (Janasaviya Commissioner's Department
1993, p. 3)
Owing to financial and administrative con-
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straints, the Janasaviya Programme was planned
to be implemented in eleven rounds, where at
least one Assistant Government Agent (AGA)-
Division in each of the 25 Districts was included
in each round. During the first three years of
implementation (October 1989-October 1992),
73 AGA Divisions were covered in three rounds
of implementation. These three rounds included
8231 hamlets with 347 716 families (Janasaviya
Department 1993). The total savings generated in
these areas totalled Rs. 2141.5 million, of which
93.4% originated in the Rs. 458/- component. On
the credit side, the program had channelled a
total of Rs. 1194.3 million, 94.7% of which origi-
nated in formal credit sources (i.e. banks) and
5.3% originating in informal mobilization of
common funds (Janasaviya Department 1993).
The recovery rate of the loans varied from the
first to the third round, with an overall recovery
rate of approximately 60% by May 1992
(SAARC 1992). In Hambantota District, infor-
mal credit mobilization has been successfully or-
ganized through the Janashakthi Bangku
Sangam, a poor women's bank modelled after the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Wanigasundara et
al. 1992, Hewavitharana 1994). Consequently, it
can be argued that the Janasaviya Programme at
least destroyed the common myth that poor peo-
ple are unable to save money and repay loans (de
Silva 1990, Susil Sirivardana, personal communi-
cation, October 1994).
Any critical analysis of the Janasaviya Pro-
gramme will be hampered by weaknesses in the
available information about the program. Docu-
mentation from the Janasaviya Programme as
well as the media coverage of the program are
Poverty as politics, Sri Lanka 129
commonly assumed to be heavily influenced by
political rhetoric. No in-depth academic analysis
of the program has been presented to date. As for
identifiable achievements, two data books of pro-
gress produced by the Janasaviya Department
present summary information on various forms
of basic needs satisfaction (Janasaviya Depart-
ment 1993, 1994). Assuming that the information
is reliable, the data books demonstrate that cer-
tain achievements were made in terms of social
development, cither in the form of individual
needs satisfaction (new or improved houses,
wells, toilets, etc.) or community needs satisfac-
tion (community centers, pre-schools, wells,
roads, channels, school playgrounds, etc.). The
achievements in production are not well docu-
mented, but appear to be less impressive. Despite
the fact that increased productivity through more
efficient use of un- and underutilized human and
non-human resources was identified as the
essence of Janasaviya (Janasaviya Commission-
er's Department 1991a), the direct positive im-
pacts on the productivity of the poor seems
questionable. The overall impression is that
Janasaviya may have assisted some marginalized
producers to increase their productivity with ex-
isting technology (Sirivardana 1992). However,
little has been done to alter the production rela-
tions or to introduce new and improved systems
of production and marketing. Consequently,
some family enterprises may have been stabilized
within the frame of existing production relations
but very few seem to have been transformed into
viable economic units (Susil Sirivardana, per-
sonal communication, October 1994).
In accordance with contemporary hegemonic
theories of Third World regional development,
the Janasaviya Programme worked under the as-
sumption that growth in small-scale production
among impoverished households could be
achieved within existing production relations
through self-help and grassroots mobilization
(Weerasinghe 1989). Unfortunately, but not sur-
prisingly, such models are proving themselves to
be overly optimistic (Stokke et al. 1991, Stokke
1992, 1994a). Given the somewhat predictable
performance of the Janasaviya, how could this
program rise to prominence and remain unchal-
lenged for most of Premadasa's presidency? One
answer to this question comes out of what has
been presented in this and the previous section;
the hegemony of a new set of development theo-
ries and strategies. The Janasaviya Programme
 130 K. Stokke
was formulated in agreement with basic elements
of the neo-liberal critique of the public interest
view of the state. The formulation of the
Janasaviya Programme successfully combined
themes emerging from this critique; a two-legged
strategy of economic liberalization and invest-
ments in human development (Fernando 1990a)
and self-help for local empowerment of the poor.
This means that the program was formulated as
an effective response to the rethinking of the state
while being presented as a radical agenda for
empowerment.
In turn, the government of President Pre-
madasa was successful in rallying support from
the international aid community for the Jana-
saviya Thrust Fund as well as in obtaining inter-
national recognition for its innovative approach
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to poverty alleviation (Fernando 1990b, Jana-
saviya Department 1992, Staff Reporter 1994a).
This efficient harnessing of hegemonic trends in
international development theory might also have
been one of the reasons for the absence of public
critique of the program in Sri Lanka. The evident
economic and social costs of state regulation dur-
ing S. Bandaranaike's United Front government
(1970-1977) and of unlimited economic liberal-
ization during J. R. Jayawardena's UNP-govern-
ment (1977-1988), had left the opposition forces
without a convincing and attractive alternative
development model. Consequently, a political
space for the Janasaviya Programme was created
by a combination of changes in development
theory and Sri Lanka's past development experi-
ences. Nevertheless, the efficient utilization of
changes in development theory alone cannot ex-
plain the rise and dismantling of the Janasaviya
Programme in Sri Lanka in this particular time
period. This calls for a critical analysis of the
social foundation of the Sri Lankan postcolonial
state formation, i.e. a questioning of the first
assumption of the public interest view of the
state.
The postcolonial state formation
The essence of the left critique of the public
interest view of the state is a questioning of the
'public' as a homogeneous category. Marxist ana-
lysts argue that the capitalist state and its policies
are reflections of and functional to either specific
class interests in civil society or to the general and
long-term needs of the capitalist mode of produc-
NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995)
tion. Driver (1991) observes that such political
analyses often show unfortunate tendencies to-
wards functionalism and economism. Hence,
there is a need for serious considerations of the
historical and geographical specificities of post-
colonial politics, its social basis and ideological
legitimation (Manor 1991).
The French political scientist Jean Francois
Bayart's (1993) analysis of postcolonial state for-
mations seems particularly relevant here (Stokke
1994b). Regarding the question of the social
foundation of the state, Bayart argues that one
basis for social stratification is commonly found
in the tertiary sector, where the postcolonial state
itself is an arena for accumulation. Nevertheless,
the identification of a dominant class of state
bourgeoisie is premature in many postcolonial
societies where a private sector, and hence a
private bourgeoisie, clearly exists. But the com-
mon dichotomy between a state and a private
bourgeoisie is misleading. The central mechanism
of accumulation in many postcolonial societies is
that of straddling between salaried jobs, particu-
larly in the public sector, and private investments.
This means that 'there is a relationship of com-
plementarity and hybridization between private
and public capital, rather than a relationship of
exclusion and competition' (Bayart 1993, p. 98).
Regarding political action, Bayart sees the
postcolonial state formation as a site for quests
for hegemony by different social groups. The
quest for hegemony is situated between two ideal
type scenarios: 'firstly, that of conservative mod-
ernization whereby the already established domi-
nant groups maintain their power . . . and
secondly, that of social revolution, which brings
about the downfall of the dominant groups and
the rise of at least a section of the subordinate
groups' (Bayart 1993, p. 119). In reality, political
power is negotiated through compromises. Such
negotiations bring together various regional, po-
litical, economic and cultural segments of the
elite around a political pole. Political action
around this political pole is itself rooted in the
actors' struggle for accumulation of wealth. This
creates opportunities for political entrepreneurs
as patrons of networks as well as for subordinate
groups as receivers of political patronage. The
' resulting political patron-client networks are
highly flexible constructed entities, which do not
rest upon fixed identities but selectively mobilize
group identities as instrumental arguments at the
service of political actors.
 NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995)
Following from this, a special attention should
be paid to two systemic features in the postcolo-
nial state formation, namely state-centered accu-
mulation and political networks of patrons and
clients.
State-centered accumulation and political
networks in Sri Lanka
At the time of independence in 1948, Sri Lanka
was characterized by a classical form of a colo-
nial economy and a political system dominated
by a small, wealthy and westernized elite. The
domestic dominant classes had their basis in the
colonial economy, most notably in plantation
agriculture and the colonial administrative sys-
tem. Their political project entailed a typical ex-
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ample of conservative modernization, which ' . . .
essentially meant the continuation of the status
quo of the economy with an optimistic belief in
Sri Lanka's slow but eventual entry to the path of
industrial growth' (Uyangoda 1993, p. 181). The
principal political opposition, advocating some
form of social revolution, came from Marxist
political parties representing an alliance between
a competing segment of the elite and the working
classes in plantations and urban areas (Lerski
1968, Jayawardena 1971, 1972).
This polarized political situation combined
with the granting of universal franchise in 1931,
facilitated a process of passive revolutions where-
by the Sinhalese segment of the dominant classes
made concessions to the rural Sinhalese segment
of the subordinate classes in order to be returned
to political positions. This political project was
pioneered by Dudley S. Senanayake in the 1930s
in the form of peasant colonization schemes in
the dry zone, and has been continued in one form
or another by all subsequent governments
(Moore 1985, 1989). Nevertheless, the colonial
economic and political system was continued un-
til at least 1956, when a Sinhalese nationalist
movement won a sweeping victory at the Parlia-
mentary elections (Jupp 1978, Manor 1989). This
popular revolution was in many ways the logical
outcome of the electoral power assigned to the
rural Sinhalese masses and thepoliticization of
the peasantry through land policies in the two
decades prior to the 1956 election.
At the ideological level, the political changes in
the early post-independence years were reflected
in the development of a Sinhalese national myth,
allocating a specific role to the peasantry ('the
Poverty as politics, Sri Lanka 131
sons of the soil'), Buddhism and the Sinhalese
language (Samaraweera 1981, Tambiah 1986,
Moore 1989). Since 1956, Sri Lankan politics has
been dominated by a hegemonic ideology of Bud-
dhist peasant-based socialism. De Silva (1981)
points out that this populist version of socialism
was ideologically acceptable for most segments of
Sinhalese society, and as such served to provide a
coherence to an emerging Sinhalese historic bloc.
Furthermore, the ideological hegemony of Bud-
dhist peasant-based socialism implied that the
political power of the Sinhalese dominant classes
should be extended and used to improve the
socio-economic conditions of the subordinate
classes within the Sinhalese historic bloc. In real-
ity, and in agreement with the public interest view
of the state, a gradual increase in state interven-
tion in the economy occurred in the post-1956
period. Beginning in the late 1950s and continu-
ing throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the state
appropriated an increasing proportion of the
economy through nationalization, expansion of
the public sector and restrictions on the private
sector (Gunasinghe 1984, 1990, Jayasekera &
Amerasinghe 1987). The appropriated surplus
was redistributed through agricultural and gen-
eral welfare programs (Wiswa Warnapala &
Woodsworth 1987). In this period the Sri Lankan
accumulation regime thus evolved around state-
regulated, state-centered accumulation under the
ideology of Buddhist peasant-based socialism
(Gunasinghe 1990).
The emergence of state-centered accumulation
and concessional politics had some crucial im-
pacts on the character and v importance of pa-
tron-client networks. Colonial feudal patron-
client networks were local and based on the
patron's personal wealth. After 1956, as the state
expanded, they came to be based on access to the
resources of the postcolonial state. With this
increased role of the central Government in dis-
bursing patronage, the need to have a Member of
Parliament (MP) with contacts in Colombo
arose. The patrons ability to extend patronage
became contingent on being a party or state
official and on overall economic conditions
(Jayanntha 1992). In the 1970s, when the state
regulation was at its height and political discrim-
ination became more common, the power of the
local MPs to allocate or take away resources
from people at the local level was quite consider-
able (Obeyesekere 1984, Perera 1985). One exam-
ple, provided by Dilesh Jayanntha, provides a
 132 K. Stokke
good description both of this tranformation of
patron-client relations and of the new political
patrons' dependence on the external economic
environment:
The electoral demarcation of 1959 made Red Town a
far more urban electorate than before. Don Dip's
largely rural-based network in the east and northeast
was excluded, and he was forced to leave the area. The
new MP, Ten Voo, was from a relatively humble
background. His rise had been facilitated by the rela-
tively greater importance of State institutions in this
urban context . . . , even in the early 1960s. This, and
the absence of traditional rural patron-client networks,
meant that a poor individual with organizational talent
and access to these State bodies could rise, in a way not
possible in an agrarian context. Voo was able to build
up his support through the local State network and his
post as Chairman of the Red Town Council area. On
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becoming MP, he was able to further consolidate and
extend this. However, he was circumscribed in this by
two factors. First, it was not until 1970 that he held a
portfolio, and then, too, it was one with relatively little
scope for patronage disbursement. Secondly, his own
non-elite background impeded his access to the Prime
Minister and her inner circle, further limiting his ability
to develop his electorate. These factors, coupled with
the poor economic performance of the U F regime,
which hit urban areas such as Red Town particularly
hard, meant a large swing to the Opposition UNP to
the 1977 General Election. The new MP, Tali Gip, was
an outsider. Since his election, he has been attempting
to use his position as a Minister to develop the elec-
torate and extend his support. However, he has been
circumscribed in this by the non-availability of Govern-
ment funds and the liberalized economic policy. Thus,
like Voo, Gip's ability to generate goodwill has been
curtailed by factors outside his control. In Voo's case
these were largely dictated by national politics, in Gip's
by international. (Jayanntha 1992, p. 181)
The late 1970s marked a second dramatic transi-
tion in postcolonial state-centered accumulation
and political patron-client relations. Through-
out the post-World War II period the Sri Lankan
economy experienced worsened terms of trade
and problems of a saturated import-substitution
economy, leading to a deep structural crisis in the
1970s and a landslide victory for UNP in the
parliamentary election in 1977 (Ponnambalam
1980, Dunham & Abeysekera 1987, Karunatilaka
1987, Moore 1990, Nicholas 1992). Immediately
after the election, measures of economic liberal-
ization and reductions in state expenditures on
welfare were undertaken following a standard
neo-classical prescription (Dunham & Abeysek-
era 1987, Karunatilaka 1987). Not surprisingly,
the continued unemployment crisis, the uneven
social and regional development and the reduc-
tion in welfare transfers which followed the eco-
NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995)
nomic liberalization contributed to the increased
ethnic and social consciousness and violence in
the 1980s (Committee for Rational Development
1984, Gunasinghe 1984, Manor 1984, Social Sci-
entists' Association of Sri Lanka 1985, Abeysek-
era & Gunasinghe 1987).
Did this transition mean the end to state-cen-
tered accumulation and network-based politics?
The answer to this must be in the negative. The
retreat of the state from the economy occurred in
selected policy domains, particularly in social
welfare and price control (Uyangoda 1992).
However, the total share of government expendi-
ture in the country's gross domestic product re-
mained at more or less the same level as before
the opening of the economy (Central Bank of
Ceylon 1978, 1979, Central Bank of Sri Lanka
1987, 1988, 1994). Large-scale investments in ex-
port-oriented agriculture in the Accelerated Ma-
haweli Programme and in a new housing
program seem to have balanced the reductions in
state-provided social welfare and privatization of
public enterprises. These programs created a
state-initiated construction boom in the late
1970s and a similar boom towards the end of the
1980s. In the latter case, large defense expendi-
tures and investments in poverty alleviation pro-
grams came in addition to the active construction
sector. So there is little reason to believe that
economic liberalization in Sri Lanka meant the
end of state-centered accumulation. However, the
character of state-centered accumulation appears
to have undergone some important changes. In
line with the neo-liberal prescription for reducing
state intervention, various state activities were
implemented through systems of privatization
and state contracts placed in the private sector
rather than further development of the public
sector. This meant that developmentalist state-in-
vestments created attractive opportunities for
both foreign suppliers and local contractors.
These changes also meant that political positions
could more directly be translated into private
accumulation. For instance, economic corruption
became quite common in Sri Lanka in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Such economic corruption
was protected and perpetuated by abuse of polit-
ical power in the context of prolonged emergency
regulations {Counterpoint 1993a, 1993b, 1994a).
It has already been observed that patron-
client networks were transformed into political
networks after independence. The concessionary
politics of political networks is a matter of nego-
 NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT 49 (1995) Poverty as politics, Sri Lanka 133

tiation, where the clients as voters also control
considerable bargaining power. With the deep-
ened economic crisis and the transition to an
open economy, the patrons' ability to deliver the
expected concessions was considerably reduced.
In this context, two new changes took place.
First, there was an increased emphasis from the
political top on ideological mobilization based on
ethnic identities. Second, there was a growing use
of force by the state. This was seen as rule by
emergency regulations under the United Front
government in the 1970s and as overall central-
ization of political power and continued use of
emergency regulations and armed force by the
UNP government after 1977. In this context, a
new kind of patron-client network also emerged,
namely those of political thugs operating under
Downloaded By: [Stokke, Kristian] At: 16:35 9 April 2010
southern areas. The social contract between dom-
inant and subordinate classes in Sri Lanka was
violated in the early years of economic liberaliza-
tion, setting off the political crises in the 1980s.
The speed and scale at which Janasaviya was
implemented was a direct consequence of these
processes. As such, Janasaviya should be seen as
a class project of passive revolutions, spear-
headed by a populist President and enjoying pas-
sive support within the dominant classes. In
agreement with this, the President repeatedly em-
phasized that Janasaviya was and had to stay
above party politics, in political debates as well as
in the selection procedures at the village level.
However, postcolonial Sri Lanka society has
also been characterized by factional politics. By
the late 1980s, this had escalated to an intensified

the patronage of powerful politicians. These were rivalry between competing political networks for
used to control labor unrest in the late 1970s, to the gains of state-centered accumulation. Hence,
instigate ethnic riots in 1983 and as armed body- Janasaviya should not be seen just as a straightfor-
guards, vigilante groups and hired assassins in ward class project for the dominant classes to
the late 1980s. A leading political analyst in Sri quell an uprising from below. It was also widely
Lanka has described this as a reconstitution of perceived as the program of an identifiable Pre-
the old phenomenon of patron-client networks madasa faction within the ruling party. The
in the form of new gangster-politician networks: Janasaviya Programme was used for all its worth
to create political capital for the President and his
They represent entirely new networks and structures of political network. This was particularly evident in
political patronage, capital accumulation, and means of massive advertising campaigns and various Jana-
coercion and repression. They have access to modern
weapons and the state is aware of it; yet, they are not dis-
saviya-related ceremonies and celebrations. After
armed, although their actions run parallel to those of the the defeat of JVP, it seemed reasonable to argue
formal and conventional institutions of state power. that the common perception was that Janasaviya
That is precisely how they define themselves: as the sub- was primarily a factional project rather than one
terranean agents of certain components of the state that serving the common interest of,\the dominant
are born and exist underground. (Uyangoda 1993, p. 16)
classes or society at large. Consequently, the anti-
In short, it can be argued that the social founda- Premadasa political faction led by President D. B.
tion of the postcolonial state is to be found in such Wijetunga was quick to dismantle the Janasaviya
continuities and changes in state-centered accumu-Programme and Premadasa policies in general
lation and political patron-client networks. This is when they advanced to top political power in
also the context within which the Janasaviya 1993. However, the Southern Provincial Council
Poverty Alleviation Programme should be under- Election in 1994 again demonstrated the dominant
stood. classes' dependence on electoral support from
The Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Pro- their political clients {Counterpoint 1994d). Conse-
gramme continued a process of postcolonial pas- quently, the Premadasa legacy and the Janasaviya
sive revolutions, whereby the dominant classes in kind of poverty alleviation, were 'rediscovered'
the Sri Lankan society remained dominant and seemingly for opportunistic electoral purposes by
retained control of the postcolonial state by mak- the anti-Premadasa faction in 1993 {Counterpoint
ing economic concessions to the subordinate 1994c, Staff Reporter 1994b).
classes. By the late 1980s, the contradictions of
Sri Lankan society had escalated to full-scale civil
wars between the armed forces and militant sepa-
ratist movements in the Tamil-dominated north- Conclusion
eastern areas, and between the armed forces and This article has presented the rise and demise of
the JVP movement in the Sinhalese-dominated the Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Programme as
 134 K. Stokke
the outcome of changes in international develop-
ment theory and continuities and changes within
the Sri Lankan postcolonial state formation. The
major thrust of the first argument is that the
Janasaviya Programme was formulated as an
effective response to the rethinking of the state
while being presented as a radical agenda for em-
powerment. This resulted in international finan-
cial support and recognition and a disarming of
the domestic political opposition. The core of the
second argument is that the Janasaviya Pro-
gramme was rooted in the interconnectedness and
contradictions of class-based and network-based
postcolonial politics. The rise of the Janasaviya
Programme and the continuation of its basic
ideas could be interpreted as moments in a pro-
cess of passive revolutions, whereby the dominant
Downloaded By: [Stokke, Kristian] At: 16:35 9 April 2010
classes manage to remain dominant by making
concessions to subordinate classes within political
networks. The dismantling of Janasaviya, on the
other hand, can be attributed to factional poli-
tics, dividing the dominant classes into rivalling
political networks.
Acknowledgements. - I have found inspiration for my studies of
Sri Lankan social and political formations in the profound
writings of several Sri Lankan scholars, most notably those of
Newton Gunasinghe, Kumari Jayawardena, N. Shanmugarat-
nam and Jayadeva Uyangoda. I am very grateful to Lakshman
S. Yapa for encouraging me to study the politics of poverty in
Sri Lanka and to Susil Sirivardana and Gamini Batuwitage for
sharing their immense insights with me. My fieldwork in Sri
Lanka has been funded by the Norwegian Research Council.
The responsibility for the interpretations and any mistakes
presented here is entirely mine.
Manuscript accepted February 1995 ~
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