JULY SUPREME COURT CASES

G.R. No. 212520

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO P. MAGNO, JR. AND
MELCHOR L. OCAMPO, JR., RESPONDENTS.

July 03, 2019

FACTS:

Complainant-appellee Ocampo alleged that he was hired by Coca-Cola on 1 May 1988. During the course of
his employment he was rewarded with promotions and incentives until he reached the position of District Sales
Supervisor. Complainant-appellee Magno was employed on 15 December 1988. His last position was as Territory
Sales Manager. complainants-appellees were meted a suspension for one month because of the charge that two (2)
hauler trucks belonging to one Tirso B. Tablang , the dealer of Coca-Cola's products, and whose operation is under
Ocampo's district and Magno's territory, were found to be distributing soon-to-expire products in Manila, which is
outside of his dealership area. Respondents-appellants claimed that Magno and Ocampo who were charged with
engaging in fictitious sales transactions and violation of the "no encroachment" policy; and they were placed on
preventive suspension and dismissed from service in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10 and 12, Rule 005-
85 of the CCBPI Rules in relation to Article 282 of the Labor Code on loss of trust and confidence. Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., on the other hand, claims that Magno and Ocampo were legally dismissed for cause. Magno
and Ocampo allegedly violated Sections 10 and 12, Rule 005-85 of Coca-Cola's Code of Disciplinary Rules and
Regulations (the CCBPI Rules), which provided penalties for fictitious sales transactions and analogous cases.

LA, in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-03-13268-08, declared Coca-Cola guilty of illegally suspending and
dismissing Magno and Ocampo. The NLRC ruled that Magno and Ocampo were legally dismissed, but their
suspension was illegal. The CA's 7 March 2012 Decision upheld the legality of Magno's and Ocampo's dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether CA ruled contrary to law and jurisprudence when it sanctioned the execution against the company of
amounts in excess of respondents’ entitlement by way of accrued reinstatement wages.

RULING:

Components of Magno's and Ocampo's Accrued Backwages are the third paragraph of Article 229 of the
Labor Code provides: "In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee
shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The LA is tasked to determine the
specific allowances and benefits, as well as the corresponding amounts, that Magno and Ocampo have been receiving
at the time of their dismissal. The LA should also determine the last day when Magno or Ocampo received the amount
for such allowance or benefit. Following this computation, the LA should then deduct the amount that Coca-Cola
previously paid Magno and Ocampo in the course of this case. The resulting amount, being in the form of a judgment
for money, shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein." and
Article 294 of the Labor Code further provides: "x x x An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement."
 G.R. No. 217529

DIGITEL EMPLOYEES UNION, PETITIONER, VS. DIGITAL TELECOMS PHILIPPINES, INC.,

RESPONDENT.

July 03, 2019

FACTS:

The present petition is a continuation of the protracted collective bargaining dispute within Digital
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., which has previously come before this Court in 2012. By virtue of a
certification election, DEU became the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of DIGITEL in
1994. DEU and DIGITEL then commenced collective bargaining negotiations which resulted in a bargaining
deadlock. DEU threatened to go on strike, but then Acting Labor Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute and eventually directed the parties to execute a CBA.

However, there was no CBA that was forged between DIGITEL and DEU. Some DEU members abandoned
their employment with DIGITEL. DEU later became dormant. In accordance with the 13 July 2005 Order of the
Secretary of Labor, the unfair labor practice issue was certified for compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, which,
on 31 January 2006, rendered a Decision dismissing the unfair labor practice charge against DIGITEL but declaring
the dismissal of the 13 employees of Digiserv as illegal and ordering their reinstatement.

In a Resolution dated January 21, 2013, the Court affirmed its decision in G.R. Nos. 184903-04. On January
28, 2013, DIGITEL announced that it was terminating all of its employees on the ground of redundancy arising from
the acquisition by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company of DIGITEL's telecommunications network. In
response, on February 7, 2013, DEU filed a Request for Preventive Mediation with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB).

On July 17, 2013, DEU filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for the suspension of the termination of the
DIGITEL workers, the implementation of the Court's decision in G.R. Nos. 184903-04, and the reinstatement of
DIGITEL workers in the payroll pending the implementation of the aforementioned decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing DEU’s motion for
reconsideration despite DEU’s submission of the proof of compliance such as the compliance itself and
the certification of Mandaluyong, Manila and Maksti post offices.
2. Whether or not the CA committed manifest and serious error and gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the petition which if not corrected would cause irreparable damage to DEU and the workers.

RULING:

It is clearly evident that the balance of the evidence, as required by Rule 13, Section 12 of the Rules of Court,
tilts in favor of DEU, which submitted a notarized affidavit of the person who did the mailing, along with
certifications issued by competent authorities attesting to the fact of postage, mailing and delivery of the registered
mails as required by the appellate court. Since DEU received the Resolution dated November 15, 2014 on December
10, 2014, it had five days from December 10, 2014, or until December 15, 2014, to file a compliance. This DEU was
able to accomplish, by the filing and service of its Compliance through registered mail on December 15, 2014.

The jurisprudential rules governing the submission and contents of the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping were summarized in Altres, et al. v. Empleo, et al., viz.:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
 pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike

in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence
of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by
his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on
his behalf.

Tested against these parameters, the Court finds the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
DEU's petition for certiorari to be substantially compliant with the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 222939

MECO MANNING & CREWING SERVICES, INC. and CAPT. IGMEDIO G. SORRERA, Petitioners Vs.
CONSTANTINO R. CUYOS, Respondent
July 3, 2019

FACTS:

Cuyos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and claims for salaries and other benefits for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract, damages, and attorney's fees against International Crew Services, Ltd.
Constantino alleged that on December 11, 2007, MECO, for and on behalf of its principal, ICS, hired him as the
Second Marine Engineer of the vessel "M/V Crown Princess." The employment was for a period of eight months
commencing on December 10, 2007. On February 14, 2008, Constantino was shocked when the Third Mate of the
vessel handed him an electronic plane ticket and informed him that he must disembark at Cristobal, Panama, where a
reliever would take his place. After inquiring for the reason why he was suddenly being relieved, Captain G. Kolidas
(Capt. Kolidas), the Master of the Vessel, told him that he would call their head office in Greece. After the said
communication, however, Capt. Kolidas told him that it would be better for him to just go home as he did not have a
good relationship with Vera. Petitioners claimed that Constantino's dismissal was necessitated by reason of his
unsatisfactory performance evaluation, violation of his contract of employment as he violated the provisions on
insubordination and inefficiency, his angry and provocative utterances and his attempt to physically assault his
superior.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It ratiocinated that the pieces of evidence
presented by the petitioners clearly showed that Constantino defied the lawful orders of his superior officer. This,
according to the Labor Arbiter, constituted serious misconduct and willful disobedience which are legal causes for
termination of an employee. The NLRC affirmed the February 12, 2009 Labor Arbiter's Decision. The appellate court
did not share the conclusions reached by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Instead, it ruled that the petitioners failed
to present substantial evidence to prove that Constantino's dismissal was made for a valid and justifiable cause.

ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals erred when it ruled that Constantino R. Cuyos was illegally dismissed from employment.

RULING:
Petitioners failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that Constantino's dismissal was grounded on just and valid
causes. It is settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is
for a just and valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. For this purpose, the
employer must present substantial evidence to prove the legality of an employee's dismissal.

It must be recalled that in their attempt to prove the validity of Constantino's dismissal, one of the documents
presented by the petitioners is Capt. Kolidas' facsimile message dated February 1, 2008. As observed by the appellate
court, however, the said document is dubious considering that it was transmitted only on February 20, 2008, or 6 days
after Constantino was informed of his dismissal.

The appellate court also properly disregarded Vera's January 6, 2008 letter-report as self-serving. As correctly
pointed out by the appellate court, the letter was unsubstantiated by any other evidence. Moreover, the letter-report is
inconsistent with all the other pieces of evidence presented by the petitioners. In fine, the pieces of evidence presented
by the petitioners to establish the validity of the dismissal are either unreliable or plainly insufficient to prove that
Constantino is guilty of insubordination and serious misconduct. Thus, the appellate court correctly reversed the
NLRC's and Labor Arbiter's decisions considering that they were not duly supported by substantial evidence.

Nevertheless, the appellate court erred when it did not include in its award the Seniority Pay at the rate of
US$99.00 per month, the Supplement Bonus at the rate of US$464.00 per month, and the Vacation Leave Pay at the
rate of US$495.00 per month. The Court notes that Seniority Pay and Supplement Bonus are included under the item
for "Basic Monthly Salary" under Constantino's employment contract. Further, they do not appear to be dependent
upon any contingency. Thus, they must form part of Constantino's guaranteed benefits. From these considerations, it
is clear that Constantino is entitled to backwages in the total amount of US$13,782.00 computed as follows -
US$13,782.00 = (US$1,239.00 + US$99.00 + US$464.00 + US$495.00) x 6 months. These money awards are further
subject to the payment of interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the decision.28

The same could not be said with respect to the SMB or Special Maintenance Bonus at the rate of US$330.00
per month although it is also listed under the Basic Monthly Salary in the employment contract. This is because the
aforesaid bonus is contingent upon the performance of certain maintenance duties on board the vessel as provided for
under Section 11.2, Article 11 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement29 between petitioner MECO and the
Associated Marine Officers & Seamen's Union of the Philippines, in which Constantino is a member.

Section 17(D) is inapplicable to this case because the alleged offenses by Constantino have not been
established by substantial evidence. Assuming for the sake of argument that the aforesaid infractions have been duly
shown, Section 17(D) would still be inapplicable because Capt. Kolidas failed to conduct the required investigation
under Section 17(8). Finally, it is clear from Section 17 that it is only the second notice or the notice of dismissal
which may be dispensed with under exceptional circumstances - the first written notice could never be dispensed with.
The seafarer-employee should always be furnished with the written notice informing him of the charges against him
and the date, time, and place of the formal investigation. Very clearly, the petitioners failed to afford Constantino with
procedural due process prior to his termination.
G.R. No. 233781

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), Petitioner vs. KENTEX MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION and ONG KING GUAN, Respondents

July 8, 2019

FACTS:

On May 13, 2015, a fire broke out in the factory located in Valenzuela City owned by Kentex. The fire
claimed 72 lives and injured a number of workers. As part of its standard procedures, personnel of the DOLE
Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas and Valenzuela (DOLE CAMANAVA) Field Office went to Kentex's premises. In the
course of the investigation, it was discovered that Kentex had contracted with CJC Manpower Services (CJC) for the
deployment of workers. Meanwhile, during the mandatory conference set by the DOLE-NCR, CJC's representatives
admitted that there was no service contract between CJC and Kentex; that CJC had deployed 99 workers at the Kentex
factory on the day of the unfortunate incident; that there were no employment contracts between CJC and the workers.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in releasing or discharging Ong from liability. It argues that, since the
June 26, 2015 DOLE-NCR Order had already become final and executory, there being no appeal made or perfected
from said order to the DOLE Secretary, the CA could no longer alter the subject Order. Respondents Kentex and Ong
counter that the CA Decision correctly released or discharged Ong from monetary liability because a corporate officer
has a juridical personality entirely separate and distinct from the corporation. They moreover claim that the DOLE-
NCR Order was a void judgment because they were deprived of due process; they assert that they could not expect a
fair decision if they appealed because the then DOLE Secretary had previously announced that cases would be filed
against Kentex, an announcement that was clearly designed for media consumption and to gain publicity mileage.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Ong King Guan is liable for the monetary awards

RULING:

Both the DOLE-NCR and the CA correctly ruled that the June 26, 2015 Order had already become final and
executory in view of the failure of respondents Kentex and Ong to appeal therefore to the Secretary of Labor. Notice
ought to be taken of the fact that, at the time the DOLE-NCR rendered its ruling, Department Order No. 131-13 Series
of 2013 was the applicable rule of procedure. Neither was there merit in respondents' claim that they had been denied
or deprived of due process. The facts clearly disclose that they had substantially participated in the proceedings before
the DOLE-NCR from the mandatory conference up to the filing of a position paper where their side was sufficiently
heard. It is axiomatic that "[t]he observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of
procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this
means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of."

  A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability
precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to
dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the
power of adjudication.

Thus, it is self-evident that the CA committed a serious error when it ordered the discharge or release of Ong
from the obligations of Kentex. The reason is elemental in its simplicity: contrary to settled, unrelenting
jurisprudence, it unconsciously and egregiously sought to alter and modify, as indeed it altered and modified, an
already final and executory verdict.
G.R. No. 236496

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. JOSE B. GALANDEZ, DOMINGO I. SAJUELA, AND
MARLON D. NAMOC, RESPONDENTS.

July 08, 2019

FACTS:

Galandez, Sajuela and Namoc were employed as warehouseman purchaser, and welder, respectively, by
petitioner F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. (petitioner), a company engaged in the construction business. Sometime in April and
May 2011, respondents were issued notices of termination on the ground of retirement. petitioner, together with the
impleaded officers, denied that respondents were illegally dismissed. It claimed that respondents were merely notified
of their retirement.

Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of respondents declaring them to have been illegally dismissed. NLRC, and
in a Decision dated July 17, 2012 (NLRC) Decision) affirmed the LA's ruling finding respondents to have been
illegally dismissed. The CA pointed out that the subject quitclaim did not include a waiver of respondents' right to
reinstatement or separation pay given that the latter had repeatedly demanded for their reinstatement after its
execution as mandated under Article 279 [now Article 294] of the Labor Code, as amended.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed any reversible error in ordering the remand of the case to the NLRC for re-
computation of respondents' backwages until their actual reinstatement, or to pay separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.

RULING:

It is not disputed that the NLRC Decision had already become final and executory, declaring respondents to
have been illegally dismissed, and accordingly, ordered petitioner to: (a) pay respondents their unpaid 13 th month pay,
backwages in accordance with Article 294 of the Labor Code, and attorney's fees (monetary aspect); and (b) reinstate
respondents or pay their separation pay should reinstatement be no longer viable. It is likewise not denied that
respondents immediately sought for the enforcement of the foregoing final and executory NLRC Decision in their
letters dated February 1, 2013 and March 14, 2013.

Be that as it may, the Court is aware that "there may be instances where reinstatement is not a viable remedy
or where the relations between the employer and employee have been so severely strained that it is not advisable to
order reinstatement, or where the employee decides not to be reinstated. In such events, the employer will instead be
ordered to pay separation pay." Thus, this case must be remanded to the NLRC for a determination of whether or not
any of the foregoing instances obtain so as to render reinstatement non-viable and hence, instead order petitioner to
pay respondents separation pay, as may be deemed appropriate.
G.R. No. 193136

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HONORATO C. HILARIO,

SUBSTITUTED BY GLORIA Z. HILARIO, AND DINDO B. BANTING, RESPONDENTS.

July 10, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of international and local broadcasting
of television and radio content. ABS-CBN's Scenic Department initially handled the design, construction and
provision of the props and sets for its different shows and programs. Subsequently, petitioner engaged independent
contractors to create, provide and construct its different sets and props requirements. One of the independent
contractors engaged by petitioner was Mr. Edmund Ty (Ty). On March 6, 1995, respondent Honorato was hired by
CCI as Designer. He rose from the ranks until he became Set Controller. Respondent Banting, on the other hand, was
engaged by CCI as Metal Craftsman in April 1999. He likewise rose from the ranks and became Assistant Set
Controller.

The Directors and stockholders were provided with the latest financial statements of the Corporation which
reflect that it is merely breaking-even in its operations. This fact, in addition to the retirement of Mr. Ty whose
expertise and service is considered vital to the Corporation's operation, prompted the Directors and stockholders to
consider concluding the operations of the Corporation. After thorough discussions, it was unanimously approved that
the Corporation cease its operations and that all employees thereof will receive their statutory and legal benefits as a
result of the cessation of operations of the Corporation. Respondents Banting and Hilario served their respective
notices of the closure of CCI effective October 5, 2003. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) issued a Decision dated March 1, 2006 finding respondents to have been illegally
dismissed. The LA held that the purported closure of business operation of CCI was undertaken for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of the Labor Code, particularly Article 279 thereof which guarantees the security of
tenure of workers. Hence, the LA ordered the reinstatement of respondents with full backwages. The NLRC affirmed
the decision of the LA in finding petitioner and CCI jointly and severally liable to pay respondents their back wages
and other allowances. The CA rendered a Decision dated March 4, 2010 which affirmed the finding of illegal
dismissal of respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents' termination of employment due to cessation of business operations was valid.

RULING:

One of the authorized causes for dismissal recognized under the Labor Code is the bona fide cessation of
business operations by the employer. Article 298 (formerly Art. 283) of the Labor Code explicitly sanctions
terminations due to the employer's cessation or business or operations – as long as the cessation is bona fide or is not
made "for the purpose of circumventing the employee's right to security of tenure."

While the CCI has complied with the requirements of service of notice of cessation of operations one month
before the intended date of closure and the payment of termination pay, it was not sufficiently proven that its closure
of business was done in good faith. As correctly noted by both the LA and the NLRC, as well as the appellate court,
CCI failed to satisfactorily show that its closure of business or cessation of operations was bona fide in character and
not intended to defeat or circumvent the tenurial rights of employees. Clearly, respondents' termination of
employment was illegal as it was done in bad faith and in circumvention of the law.
 G.R. No. 209735

STANFILCO - A DIVISION OF DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND REYNALDO CASINO, PETITIONERS,

VS. JOSE TEQUILLO AND/OR NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION - EIGHTH DIVISION,
RESPONDENTS.

July 17, 2019

FACTS:

Stanfilco (petitioner) is a duly organized domestic corporation that operates a banana plantation in Lantapan,
Bukidnon. On the other hand, Tequillo was a Farm Associate who worked on petitioner's plantation from January 5,
2004 until he was terminated on May 24, 2010 for mauling his co-worker, Resel Gayon (Gayon), and consuming
intoxicating beverages within company premises and during work hours. However, petitioner found his explanations
unsatisfactory, and eventually terminated him on May 24, 2010 on the ground of serious misconduct.

LA rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. In ruling Tequillo's dismissal to be valid, the LA held that the
drinking and fighting incident had been duly proved. According to the NLRC, Tequillo was illegally dismissed since
he was not performing official work at the time he mauled Gayon. It followed, then, that Tequillo's act could not be
work-related. The CA affirmed the NLRC's resolution through the assailed Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that no grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRC's decision declaring
Tequillo's dismissal illegal.

RULING:

Under the law, an employee's termination may be justified on the ground of serious misconduct. Misconduct
is generally defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." In labor cases, misconduct, as
a ground for dismissal, must be serious—that is, it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant. In addition, the act constituting misconduct must be connected with the duties of the employee
and performed with wrongful intent.

Hence, for an employee's termination to be justified on the ground of serious misconduct, the following
requisites must concur:
(a) the misconduct must be serious;

(b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties, showing that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer; and
(c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.

In this case, the CA refused to characterize Tequillo's acts as work-related because he was not a participant in
the "Kaibigan Fellowship." As may be recalled, Tequillo absented himself from the gathering to go on a drinking
spree with several other farm workers. Although the Court has recognized that workplace violence may constitute
serious misconduct, it has also held that not every fight within a company would automatically warrant dismissal from
service. Tequillo's violent act amounted to serious misconduct. The incident disturbed the peace in the farm and
breached the discipline expected by petitioner from its employees. That Tequillo is ill-suited to continue working is
shown by his perverse attitude and by the possibility that the attack may be repeated. On the other hand, his wrongful
intent is shown by the arbitrary and unfounded manner in which he attacked Gayon. Hence, all the requisites of
serious misconduct are present in this case.
G.R. No. 213009

BOOKMEDIA PRESS, INC. AND BENITO J. BRIZUELA, PETITIONERS, VS. LEONARDO * SINAJON**
AND YANLY ABENIR, RESPONDENTS.

July 17, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner Bookmedia Press, Inc. (Bookmedia) is a local printing company. Petitioner Benito J. Brizuela
(Brizuela), on the other hand, is the president of Bookmedia. Bookmedia hired respondents Yanly Abenir (Abenir)
and Leonardo Sinajon (Sinajon) in 1995 and 1996, respectively, as in-house security personnel. Brizuela received a
report from one Larry Valdoz (Valdoz), a security guard of Bookmedia, which claims that respondents, earlier in the
day, had left the company premises moments after punching-in their respective time cards.the respondents admitted to
punching-in their time cards and then leaving work early on July 20, 1997, but explained that they merely did so
because they held to attend to some emergency in their respective homes on that day. The next day, or on July 22,
1997, Bookmedia fired both respondents.

LA rendered a Decision finding as illegal the dismissal of the respondents due to the failure of the petitioners
to prove otherwise. The LA pointed out that petitioners really presented no evidence to support their accusation that
respondents have repeatedly been leaving work early after punching-in their time cards.

ISSUE:
Whether the actions of the respondents on that solitary incident on July 20, 1997 constituted just causes for the
dismissal of the respondents.

RULING:

The law enumerates what it considers as just causes for the dismissal of an employee. Article 297 of the
Labor Code. We agree with the LA, the NLRC and the CA in holding that the actions of the respondents on July 20,
1997 do not qualify as just causes for the latter's dismissal. Such actions, taken with the attendant circumstances of
this case, cannot be considered as serious misconduct, willful disobedience of an employer's lawful order, or fraud.
The just causes of serious misconduct, willful disobedience of an employer's lawful order, and fraud all imply the
presence of ""willfulness" or "wrongful intent" on the part of the employee. Hence, serious misconduct and willful
disobedience of an employer's lawful order may only be appreciated when the employee's transgression of a rule, duty
or directive has been the product of "wrongful intent" or of a "wrongful and perverse attitude," but not when the same
transgression results from simple negligence or "mere error in judgment."

The actions of the respondents on July 20, 1997, to our mind, lack the elements of willfulness or seriousness
so as to warrant their dismissal. All in all, and considering the fact that this is the first and only time that the
respondents had committed any infraction against Bookmedia, we are constrained to approve the liberal stance of the
LA, the NLRC and the CA. Respondents have been illegally dismissed.
G.R. No. 226369

ISABELA-I ELECTRIC COOP., INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, ENGR. VIRGILIO
L. MONTANO, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE B. DEL ROSARIO, JR., RESPONDENT.

July 17, 2019

FACTS:

On January 29, 1996, petitioner Isabela-I Electric Cooperative, Inc. hired respondent Vicente B. Del Rosario,
Jr. as Financial Assistant. The latter quickly rose from the ranks. After just three (3) months, on April 26, 1996, he got
promoted as Acting Management Internal Auditor. petitioner approved a reorganization plan declaring all positions in
the company vacant. Respondent, along with other employees signed a Manifesto to oppose the reorganization.
Despite this opposition, petitioner proceeded to implement the reorganization in June 2011. Additionally, petitioner
informed its employees in writing that they were on a "hold-over capacity."

On January 30, 2013, respondent filed the complaint below for illegal dismissal and damages. He claimed he
was unlawfully demoted and was therefore constructively dismissed. It was true that the respondent requested to be
reappointed to his former position. But it was also equally true that the respondent was given a fresh appointment
since all positions in the company were declared vacant as a result of the reorganization.

ISSUE:
Was the respondent constructively dismissed when he got appointed to the new position of Area Operations
Management Department Manager in lieu of his former position as Management Internal Auditor?

RULING:

Demotion involves a situation in which an employee is relegated to a subordinate or less important position
constituting a reduction to a lower grade or rank, with a corresponding decrease in duties and responsibilities, and
usually accompanied by a decrease in salary. This was exactly what happened to the respondent.

Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from employment shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to his actual reinstatement. Considering that respondent ought to be reinstated to his former position, he
must also enjoy the salary that comes with it. Undeniably, when petitioner moved or appointed respondent to a lower
position without any justifiable cause, petitioner was deemed to have acted in bad faith. Consequently, the award of
moral and exemplary damages to the respondent is in order.
G.R. No. 220434

SM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JOANN HIZON, ATTY. MENA OJEDA, JR., AND ROSALINE
QUA, PETITIONERS, VS. TEODORE GILBERT ANG, RESPONDENT.

July 22, 2019

FACTS:

The records show that the respondent was hired by SMDC as its Project Director in December 2006. In his
complaint, he alleged that sometime in January 2012, he applied for a two-week vacation leave, from March 30, 2012
to April 15, 2012, which was approved by Qua. On March 20, 2012, Atty. Ojeda, Jr. and Hizon called him for a
meeting where he was informed that the management, without stating specific reasons, wants him to resign from his
current work. In the Show Cause Notice dated April 16, 2012, he was charged with gross and habitual neglect of
duties and loss of trust and confidence. On May 17, 2012, he informed Hizon that his suspension was over and he will
report back to work; but he received a phone call from the HRD Manager that he does not need to report to work
because he was already dismissed. Consequently, he filed a case for illegal dismissal with money claims against the
petitioners.

The LA found that there was substantial documentary evidence showing that there was a just and valid cause
for respondent's dismissal on the grounds of incompetence and gross and habitual neglect of duties. The NLRC held
that the respondent's position as a Project Director is imbued with trust and confidence. The charges and violations, as
well as his neglectful acts, were inadequately met by his explanations; thus, he was dismissed for loss of trust and
confidence. The CA found that the respondent has been illegally dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent may be dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

RULING:

In the present case, the respondent was holding an executive position in SMDC as Project Director of Chateau
Elysee and Field Residences, both in Parañaque City. As Project Director, respondent was the overall head of the
project where he was assigned with the responsibility of ensuring that the expectation and objectives set by
management on the project are properly implemented and achieved in terms of business planning, sales, marketing,
planning and construction, permits and licenses, finance, sales documentation, property management, customer
service, inventory management and legal concerns and requirements.

Clearly, there is no doubt that the respondent is a managerial employee. As such, he should have recognized
that such an intricate position requires the full trust and confidence of his employer. Due to the nature of his
occupation, respondent's employment may be terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c) of the Labor
Code. As firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of
employment, is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by
management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The betrayal of this trust is the
essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.

The Court holds that respondent was validly dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. Respondent was
not an ordinary company employee. His position as one of SMDC's Project Director is clearly a position of
responsibility demanding an extensive amount of trust from petitioners.
G.R. No. 234446

VICTORIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, PETITIONER, VS. VICTORIA

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

July 24, 2019

FACTS:

VMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the textile business. Aside from dyeing and finishing fabrics, it
manufactures laces, embroidered and knitted fabrics, and hooks and eyes. On the other hand, VMCEU is the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the permanent and regular rank-and-file employees within the pertinent bargaining unit
of VMC. The BIR opined that VMCEU's members were not exempt from income tax, as what they were earning was
above the statutory minimum wage mandated by Wage Order No. NCR-18. As a result, VMC withheld the income
tax due on the wages of VMCEU's members.

On May 8, 2015, VMC and VMCEU held a grievance meeting to settle various issues, including the
company's decision to withhold income tax from the wages of the union members who were earning the statutory
minimum wage. Unfortunately, the parties failed to resolve the issue.

The VA rendered a Decision in favor of VMCEU, ruling that VMC erroneously withheld income tax from the
wages of the union's members. Ratiocinating that the subject employees were statutory minimum wage earners, it was
held that they were exempt from the payment of income tax. The CA rendered the challenged Decision, reversing the
VA's ruling. The appellate court, after brushing aside VMC's resort to the wrong remedy, held that the jurisdiction of
VAs is limited to labor disputes. As such, the VA could not validly rule on the propriety of VMC's decision to
withhold the income taxes of VMCEU's members, a matter properly within the competence of the BIR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly set aside the VA's decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

The CA's decision is sustained. Jurisdiction is the power of a court, tribunal, or officer to hear, try, and decide
a case. Relevantly, the Labor Code vests in VAs the power to hear and decide labor disputes.
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies x x x. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other
labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also
hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

In this case, VA has no jurisdiction to rule on the legality of VMC's act of withholding income tax from the
salaries of VMCEU's members. As mentioned above, jurisdiction is conferred by law. As a result, absent a statutory
grant, the actions, representations, declarations, or omissions of a party will not serve to vest jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a court, board, or officer. Simply put, "judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction cannot be conferred
upon a tribunal by the parties alone."
G.R. No. 240254

RODESSA QUITEVIS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. SINTRON SYSTEMS, INC. AND/OR JOSELITO
CAPAQUE, RESPONDENTS.

July 24, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodessa Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was hired by respondent Sintron Systems, Inc. (SSI) as Sales
Coordinator on July 4, 2001. The conflict between the parties arose when SSI received an invitation letter for a
factory visit with training from its supplier in Texas, USA scheduled on October 22-24, 2013. The parties had
different versions of the events succeeding this.

According to Rodriguez, she attended the training in the USA without any condition imposed upon her
attendance. However, when she returned for work on November 7, 2013, SSI asked her to sign a training agreement
which required her to remain with SSI for three years, otherwise, she was to pay a penalty. When she reported back to
work on November 21, 2013, she was surprised to learn that Capaque sent emails to clients stating that Rodriguez had
abandoned her job and accused her of intentionally harming the reputation of SSI to the latter's clients. Rodriguez
filed the present complaint for constructive illegal dismissal.

According to SSI, Rodriguez was never maltreated, verbally or otherwise, and she failed to adduce proof
thereof. Hence, Rodriguez was not constructively dismissed. She merely preempted what would have been a valid
dismissal by going on unapproved absences. SSI informed Rodriguez that the act of deleting information and files
from her company-issued computer and the removal of company documents constitute serious misconduct, willful
disobedience to a lawful order and dishonesty or breach of trust which are just causes for dismissal under the Labor
Code.

According to the Labor Arbiter, Rodriguez failed to prove by substantial evidence the unbearable working
environment which supposedly forced her to go on several absences. Hence, there was no constructive dismissal.
According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter's findings that SSI did not dismiss Rodriguez is supported by substantial
evidence on record. The CA agreed with the labor tribunals as to the lack of substantial evidence presented that
Rodriguez was constructively dismissed. The CA concluded that since there was neither dismissal nor abandonment,
the remedy would have been reinstatement without payment of backwages. However, the CA noted that the
relationship between the parties is already strained. Hence, reinstatement may no longer be ordered.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in finding that there was neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment; and
2. If so, whether the CA committed reversible error in finding that reinstatement of Rodriguez is no longer
feasible, hence, the parties must just bear their own losses.

RULING:

The CA was correct in affirming the NLRC's ruling that Rodriguez was not dismissed. In illegal dismissal
cases, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first
establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Obviously, if there is no dismissal, then there
can be no question as to its legality or illegality.

Rodriguez is not guilty of abandonment of work. Abandonment of employment is a deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment, without any intention of returning. While it is not expressly
enumerated under Article 297 of the Labor Code as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, it has been recognized
by jurisprudence as a form of, or akin to, neglect of duty. It requires the concurrence of two elements: 1) failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and 2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship as manifested by some overt acts. The rule is that one who alleges a fact bears the burden of proving it.
Here, respondents failed to prove that Rodriguez abandoned her work.

The Court has clarified that "reinstatement," as used in such cases, is merely an affirmation that the employee
may return to work as he was not dismissed in the first place. It should not be confused with reinstatement as a relief
proceeding from illegal dismissal as provided under Article 279 of the Labor Code. In the present case, considering
that there has been no dismissal at all, there can be no reinstatement as one cannot be reinstated to a position he is still
holding. Instead, the Court merely declares that the employee may go back to his work and the employer must then
accept him because the employment relationship between them was never actually severed. Moreover, as there can be
no reinstatement in the technical sense of Article 279, the doctrine of strained relations likewise has no application.
This doctrine only arises when there is an order for reinstatement that is no longer feasible.

In sum, the Court affirms the factual findings of the lower tribunals that Rodriguez failed to substantiate her
claim that she was dismissed by SSI, constructively or otherwise. SSI likewise failed to prove by substantial evidence
that Rodriguez had abandoned her work. Moreover, the doctrine of strained relations does not apply in the present
case and may not excuse the parties from resuming their employment relationship or justify the award of separation
pay. This being the case, SSI must be ordered to reinstate Rodriguez to her former position without payment of
backwages.
G.R. No. 209072

ARLENE A. CUARTOCRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. ACTIVE WORKS, INC., AND MA. ISABEL E.
HERMOSA, BRANCH MANAGER, RESPONDENTS.

July 24, 2019

FACTS:

On June 4, 2007, Arlene A. Cuartocruz (petitioner) and Cheng Chi Ho, a Hong Kong national, entered into a
contract of employment whereby petitioner shall work as the latter's domestic helper for a period of two years.
Petitioner was tasked to do household chores and baby-sitting, among others, for a monthly salary of HK$3,400.00
and other emoluments and benefits provided under the contract. Respondent Active Works, Inc. (AWI), a Philippine
corporation engaged in the recruitment of domestic helpers in Hong Kong, is petitioner's agency, and respondent Ma.
Isabel Hermosa is its Branch Manager.

On August 11, 2007, petitioner received a warning letter from her employer, stating that she is required to
improve her attentiveness in performing her work within one month, failing which the letter shall serve as a written
notice of the termination of her employment contract effective September 11, 2007. On the same day, the petitioner
wrote a reply, apologizing for giving false information by stating in her bio-data that she is single when in fact she is a
single parent. She also asked for a chance to improve so she can continue with her work. However, in a letter dated
August 16, 2007, Cheng Chi Ho informed the Immigration Department of Wangchai, Hong Kong that he is
terminating the contract with the petitioner.

The Executive LA (ELA) rendered a Decision finding the termination of petitioner's employment contract
without notice as valid and legal. The ELA held that the petitioner was already warned by her employer to improve
her work, yet she did not show improvement in her work performance and attitude. The NLRC issued a Resolution
nullifying and setting aside the ELA Decision. It held that there is insufficient proof of petitioner's alleged poor work
performance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provision in Section 10, RA 8042, which prescribes the award of salaries
equivalent to the "unexpired portion of [the] employment contract or x x x three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" to illegally dismissed overseas employees.

RULING:

Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before the termination of their employment.
They may not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law, and without going
through the proper procedure. The purpose of these two-pronged qualifications is to protect the working class from
the employer's arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of its right to dismiss.

In this case, respondents failed to prove by substantial evidence that there was just or authorized cause for the
termination of petitioner's employment. The grounds cited for the termination of the petitioner's employment contract
are considered just causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but only if respondents were able to prove them. The
burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer, who must affirmatively show rationally
adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for
termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.

Here, no evidence was presented to substantiate the employer's accusations. There was no showing of
particular instances when the petitioner supposedly disobeyed her employer and refused to take care of his baby. The
provisions in the employment contract and the employer's conduct are patently inconsistent with the right of security
of tenure guaranteed to local or overseas Filipino workers under the Constitution and the Labor Code. Security of
tenure guarantees workers substantive and procedural due process before they are dismissed from work. It is a right
which cannot be denied on mere speculation of any unclear and nebulous basis. Undeniably, the NLRC properly ruled
that the petitioner was illegally dismissed on both substantive and procedural grounds.
G.R. No. 194403

SPOUSES HIPOLITO DALEN, SR. AND FE G. DALEN, EVERLISTA LARIBA AND THE MINOR
BEVERLY T. LARIBA, MAGDALENA F. MARPAGA AND THE MINORS MIKE ANTHONY AND
THOMIE MAE, BOTH SURNAMED MARPAGA, AGNES C. MOLINA AND THE MINORS SHEILA,
SIMOUN, STEPHEN JOHN AND SHARON ANN, ALL SURNAMED MOLINA, EMMA C. NAVARRO
AND THE MINORS RAYMOND, MARAH, AND RYAN ALL SURNAMED NAVARRO, RUTH T. SULAM
AND THE MINOR JEINAR REECE T. SULAM, PETITIONERS, VS. MITSUI O.S.K. LINES DIAMOND
CAMELLA, S.A., RESPONDENT.

July 24, 2019

FACTS:

It was found that Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, a non-resident corporation, not doing business in the Philippines, was
the charterer of MV Sea Prospect while Diamond Camellia, S.A., another non-resident corporation, not doing
business in the Philippines, and of Panamian registry is the registered owner of the said vessel. Upon inspection, it
was found that the cargo was very wet so the Captain ordered to fill the ballast tanks, thus achieving the vessel's
stability. He then ordered a change in the course of the vessel to the Island of Okinawa to seek refuge. While nearing
the Island of Okinawa, the vessel listed again 3 to 5 degrees then to 90 degrees, taking water in the bridge, the engine
stopping and the electric power being cut. After 30 minutes, MV Sea Prospect sunk, drowning 10 crew members.

Respondents alleged that on November 4, 1998, November 5, 1998 and December 10, 1998, petitioners who
are heirs and beneficiaries of the missing seafarers received full payment of death benefits based on the employment
contract as well as the International Transport Workers' Federation-Japan Seaman Union Associated Marine Officers
and Seafarers Union of the Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Moreover, the LA found that the action filed by petitioners has already been prescribed. The Labor Code
provides that all money claims arising from employer employee relationship accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. The petitioners appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but it was dismissed through a Resolution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners' cause of action has prescribed; and
2. Whether the settlement agreement, receipt and general receipt and release of rights barred petitioners from
filing the complaint.

RULING:

The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over tort cases. Before going into the issues raised by the parties, it is
necessary to first settle whether the claim for damages based on tort filed by petitioners before the LA was proper.
The Labor Code provides that:

Art. 224. [217] Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. – x x x

xxxx

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations

In this case, petitioners' claim for damages is grounded on respondents' gross negligence which caused the
sinking of the vessel and the untimely demise of their loved ones. Based on this, the subject matter of the complaint is
one of claim for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction.
Therefore, the LA has no jurisdiction over the case in the first place; it should have been filed to the proper trial court.

Moreover, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that they received less of what they are really entitled
to based on said Settlement Agreements. They wanted the Court to believe that since their cause of action is for
damages and what they received in accordance with the Settlement Agreement was only those under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract and the overriding CBA, then they are not barred from filing the instant complaint.
Petitioners are misled. As discussed above, the Settlement Agreement signed by petitioners are comprehensive
enough to include even causes of action arising from quasi-delict.
G.R. No. 225586

THE PENINSULA MANILA AND SONJA VODUSEK, PETITIONERS, VS. EDWIN A. JARA,
RESPONDENT.

July 29, 2019

FACTS:

Respondent Edwin Jara worked at petitioner The Peninsula Manila from 2002 until his dismissal in 2011. He
became its captain waiter in 2009. The termination of Jara's services spawned from the incident which happened on
July 22, 2011. Due to the discrepancy, Jara had an overage of P6,500.00 cash. Assistant Supervisor Michelle Jardines,
tried to correct the error but there was still an excess cash on hand. Consequently, Jara informed his supervisor Jimmy
Tabamo of his failure to balance the actual cash on hand and the transaction receipts. In truth, however, Jara was
unable to reconcile the excess cash on hand with the cash transaction receipts but he did not turn over the excess cash
of P6,500.00 and kept the same in his office locker. When he reported for work on July 25, he informed the hotel's
internal auditor about the overage of P6,500.00. The latter advised Jara to surrender the excess cash to his supervisor.
Instead of complying with this directive, Jara turned over the money to the captain waitress instead, for safekeeping in
the safety deposit box. Jara was informed of his termination for misappropriation or falsification of hotel receipts and
dishonesty in violation of the Hotel's Code of Discipline. Consequently, Jara filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the respondent.

Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez found Jara to have been illegally dismissed. the NLRC reversed. It
found the dismissal valid, resulting from Jara's dishonesty and misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals reversed. It
held that Jara's lapses cannot be considered grave, let alone, indicative of intentional or willful breach of his
employer's trust.

In his Comment, Jara reiterated that to be validly dismissed based on Article 282 (now Article 296) of the
Labor Code, the employee involved must hold a position of trust and confidence. Jara claims that his position as
captain waiter is classified as rank and file Level 8-A under the existing CBA, not a position of trust and confidence,
thus, he could not be held liable under Article 282 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE:
Was Jara illegally dismissed?

RULING:

The Court is constrained to reverse the Court of Appeals' factual findings and legal conclusion. Article 297
(formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination of employment. For dismissal
due to cause under subsection (c), certain requirements must be complied with, viz: (1) the employee concerned must
be holding a position of trust and confidence and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence.
Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust and
founded on clearly established facts. The basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary. Here, the record bears significant details pointing to the willfulness
of Jara's action showing the breach of the trust reposed in him by the petitioner. That due to the irreconcilable cash
count and transaction receipts, Jara deliberately made it appear that the same tallied and even misrepresented such fact
to his supervisor. To be able to do this, Jara tampered with the transaction and sales receipts to come up with a
balanced cash sales record at the end of his shift. This is pure dishonesty and clearly a violation of the trust reposed in
him by his employer.

More, Jara did not immediately report the overage which he kept in his custody. He waited for two days
before finally informing the respondent's internal auditor about the incident. This casts doubt on Jara's real intention
and compromised his alleged good faith. We are mindful of the fact that loss of confidence as a ground for dismissal
is prone to abuse because of its subjective nature. It is necessary that the loss of confidence must be founded on
clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work. Hence, when the breach of trust or
reason for the loss of confidence is clearly borne by the records, as in this case, the right of the employer to dismiss an
employee based on this ground must be upheld.
G.R. No. 237246

HAYDEN KHO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. DOLORES G. MAGBANUA, MARILYN S. MERCADO, *

ARCHIMEDES** B. CALUB, MARIA E. ONGOTAN, FRANCISCO J. DUQUE, MERLE *** G. RIVERA,
DOLORES A. PULIDO, PAULINO R. BALANGATAN, JR., ANAFEL L. ESCROPOLO, PERCIVAL A.
DEINLA,**** JERRY C. ZABALA, ROGELIO C. ONGONION, JR., HELEN B. DELA CRUZ, CENON
*****
JARDIN, AND ROVILLA L. CATALAN, RESPONDENTS.

July 29, 2019

FACTS:

Respondents claimed that they were employed by the Corporation in the Tres Pares as cooks, cashiers, or
dishwashers. They posited that on January 14, 2011, Spouses Kho's daughter, Sheryl Kho, posted a notice in the
company premises that the restaurant would close down on January 19, 2011. Fearing the loss of their jobs, they tried
to seek an audience with Kho about the closure, but to no avail. The restaurant closed as scheduled; thus respondents
filed the complaint for illegal dismissal. For their part, Spouses Kho argued that they had no employer-employee
relationship with respondents, as the latter's employer was the Corporation, and that they cannot be held liable for the
acts of the Corporation, the same having been imbued with a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders,
directors, and officers.

The LA ruled in favor of respondents, and accordingly, ordered the Corporation and Kho to solidarity pay
respondents. The LA found that not only did the Corporation fail to prove that it closed down its business due to
financial distress as it did not offer financial documents to corroborate its claim, it also failed to comply with the
notice requirement prior to such closure as laid down under Article 298 (formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code. The
NLRC reversed and set aside the LA Decision and dismissed the complaint as against Kho. It ruled that Kho cannot be
held solidarily liable with the Corporation, absent any allegation and proof from respondents that he committed any
act that would justify piercing the veil of corporate fiction. The CA agreed with the LA in awarding separation pay
and nominal damages to respondents following Article 298 (formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code, as amended,
and jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, and accordingly held
Kho solidarity liable with the Corporation for the payment of respondents' money claims.

RULING:

The Court finds that the CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, as the
tribunal correctly found that Kho should not be held solidarity liable with the Corporation, considering that his claims
are in accord with the evidence on record, as well as settled legal principles of labor law. The evidence on record does
not support the findings of both the LA and the CA that Kho was the Corporation's President at the time of its closure,
and that he assented to a patently unlawful act, thereby exposing him to solidary liability with the Corporation.
G.R. Nos. 220526-27

PNOC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PDMC) PETITIONER, VS. GLORIA V.

GOMEZ, RESPONDENT.

July 29, 2019

FACTS:

Gomez is a lawyer who used to work as Legal Manager of Petron Corporation (Petron) and availed of early
retirement on April 30, 1994 when the company was privatized. On May 1, 1994, she was appointed by Filoil
Refinery Corporation (Filoil) as its Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel with the rank, compensation and benefits
she used to enjoy in Petron. In the meantime, Filoil was reorganized and renamed to PNOC Development and
Management Corporation and, as a result, the task-force was abolished and its members were given termination
notices on March 5, 1996.

The Labor Arbiter issued a Decision finding Gomez to have been illegally dismissed, the NLRC affirmed in
toto the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter in a Resolution. Finding illegal dismissal, the CA dismissed
PDMC's petition for failure to prove a misconduct on the part of Gomez as basis for the claim of loss of trust and
confidence.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA gravely erred when it dismissed PDMC’s petition in spite of showing that there are valid and
analogous grounds for termination of Atty. Gomez’s services.
2. Whether the CA gravely erred when it partly granted Atty. Gomez’s petition, notwithstanding the fact that
there is no basis in granting additional benefits, legal interest and attorney’s fees.

RULING:

It bears to stress at the outset that Gomez, as Administrator of PDMC, is a regular managerial employee
whose appointment as such, both original and for the term beyond the age of retirement, does not require prior Board
approval and, therefore, valid and incontestable.

PDMC claims that Gomez was terminated based on loss of trust and confidence and on causes analogous thereto,
under paragraphs (c) and (d), Article 282 of the Labor Code. Verily, termination of employment by an employer for
just causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code implies that the employee concerned has committed, or is guilty of,
some violation against the employer – be it misconduct, neglect of duty, breach of trust, or a crime or offense
committed against the employer or his family or representatives. Thus, it can be said that when the employee's
dismissal is based on any of these just causes, it is the employee himself that initiated the dismissal process by giving
a just cause therefor.The rules in the application of loss of trust and confidence as a just cause for termination vary
between fiduciary rank-and-file employees and managerial employees.
G.R. No. 237020

DOMINIC INOCENTES, JEFFREY INOCENTES, JOSEPH CORNELIO AND REYMARK CATANGUI,

PETITIONERS, V. R. SYJUCO CONSTRUCTION, INC. (RSCI) / ARCH. RYAN I. SYJUCO,
RESPONDENTS.

July 29, 2019

FACTS:

In their Position Paper, they claimed that RSCI, a construction corporation, employed them as construction
workers with shifts from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. every night. Despite this work circumstance, they purportedly never
received night differential, overtime pay, rest day pay, service incentive leave pay, ECOLA, 13 th month pay as well as
holiday premium pay; and, neither did they receive the mandated minimum wage. Petitioners further alleged that on
separate dates in September 2015, Reymark (September 9), Jeffrey (September 19), Joseph and Dominic (September
24) went to work but they were denied entry at the jobsite. The security guard instead informed them that they were
already terminated. Petitioners insisted that they asked for reconsideration but only to be told to leave the premises.
Hence, they filed a case for constructive dismissal and money claims against respondents.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal but nevertheless
ordered RSCI to pay all petitioners the underpayment of salaries, overtime pay as well as 13 th month pay; and, to also
pay Dominic and Joseph holiday premium pay. The NLRC partly granted the appeal ruling that petitioners were
regular employees and that RSCI illegally dismissed them. According to the CA, as evidenced by the summary of
their project assignments, petitioners were project employees because they were informed of the nature and duration
of their work and the project at the time of their engagement.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA committed serious and reversible error of law in reversing the decision and resolution of
NLRC, ruling that there was no illegal dismissal.
2. Whether the CA committed serious and reversible error of law in reversing the decision and resolution of
NLRC, ruling that they are entitled to their money claims.

RULING:

Article 295 of the Labor Code, as amended and renumbered, defines a regular employee as (a) one that has
been engaged to perform tasks usually necessary or desirable in the employer's usual business or trade — without
falling within the category of either a fixed, a project, or a seasonal employee; or (b) one that has been engaged for a
least a year, with respect to the activity he or she is engaged, and the work of the employee remains while such
activity exists. On the other hand, a project employee is one whose employment has been fixed for a specified project
or undertaking, the completion or termination of which is made known at the time of the engagement of the employee.
Respondents did not prove that they informed petitioners, at the time of engagement, that they were being
engaged as project employees. There being none that was adduced here, the presumption that the employees are
regular employees prevails. Notably, considering that respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove that
petitioners were project employees, the NLRC properly found them to be regular employees. It thus follows that as
regular employees, petitioners may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause and upon observance of due
process of law. As these requirements were not observed, the Court also sustains the finding of the NLRC that
petitioners were illegally dismissed.
G.R. No. 232669
Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines v. Macapagal
July 29, 2019

FACTS:

Respondents were employed by Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines at its plant as part of the Product Availability
Group. Later, the company announced its plan to outsource the functions of the group to The Redsystem Company.
They received letters terminating their employment due to redundancy. Thus, they filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, arguing that the program was done in bad faith to undermine their right to security of tenure. They allege
that Redsystem is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company.

The company denied the claims arguing that it is engaged in the manufacture and selling of beverage items,
while the group’s work involved coordination with external distribution channels. To improve efficiency and
effectiveness, it resolved to outsource. Notices of the redundancy program were given to the employees and the
DOLE at least 30 days prior to separation, and paid more than the required separation pay and other benefits to
respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the redundancy program of the company is valid.

RULING:

Yes. Redundancy is an authorized cause for dismissal under Article 298 of the Labor Code. The
determination of whether the services are no longer necessary or sustainable is an exercise of business judgment.
However, management must not violate the law nor declare redundancy without sufficient basis. Thus, employers
must prove their good faith in abolishing the redundant positions as well as the existence of fair and reasonable
criteria in the selection of employees who will be dismissed. Substantial proof that employees are in excess of what is
required of the company is required.

Here, dismissal of respondents was due to the simplification of the distribution systems to reach the
customers. Since the company’s operating income still posted negative figures despite improvement in sales volumes,
it identified areas where cost may be reduced, as well as opportunities for operational efficiency. Based on this, the
company decided to abolish all positions under the group. Good faith is further shown by its act of giving separation
packages more than what is required by law.
G.R. No. 191902

MARINO B. DAANG, G.R. No. 191902 Petitioner, Vs. SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC. and
COMMERCIAL S.A.

July 30, 2019

FACTS:

Skippers United Pacific, Inc. hired petitioner Marino B. Daang (Daang) as chief cook on board MV Merry
Fisher. Daang strained his back while lifting a 50 kilo bag of flour. He was eventually repatriated to the Philippines
and was referred for an MRI procedure. Based on the results of the procedure, Daang was found to be suffering from
degenerative changes of the lumbar spine. Daang however was declared fit to work, with the advice to refrain from
lifting heavy weights/objects and to maintain proper posture as necessary.

Daang sought reemployment with respondents. In its course, he executed an Affidavit/Undertaking and a
handwritten declaration freeing respondents from any liability in case he incurs another disease in relation to his back
injury. While undergoing the requisite pre employment medical examination, Daang discovered that he had
gallbladder polyps and eventually decided to forego reemployment. He was found "partially and permanently disabled
with Grade 6 (50%) impediment based on the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard
Employment Contract.

Daang thereafter demanded payment of disability benefits from respondents. When his demands went
unheeded, he filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits and damages before the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Daang's favor and ordered respondents to pay total and permanent disability
benefits.On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA. Skippers elevated the NLRC’s ruling to the CA. The CA
reversed the NLRC. The CA also upheld the Release and Receipt executed by Daang for lack of proof that it was
entered involuntarily. Daang sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA. Pending resolution of his action
before the Supreme Court, Daang filed an urgent manifestation with motion to dismiss, alleging that the parties jointly
executed and filed with the NLRC a "Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment with urgent motion to cancel appeal bond
all without prejudice to the pending petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

Daang claims that he received from respondents the amount of P2,985,129.00 as "conditional payment of the
judgment award of the [LA] xx x only to prevent imminent execution" of the NLRC ruling. Under this Conditional
Satisfaction of Judgment, both parties prayed that the same be made of record and that respondents' appeal bond be
cancelled.

It also appears that Daang submitted a notarized affidavit where the former committed, among others, not to
file any complaint or prosecute any suit or action Skipper after receiving the payment which he will return in case of
reversal of the NLRC Decision in his favor.

Skipper filed a counter manifestation, claiming that the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment should not be
taken against them because it was the only protection available to them to prevent the execution proceedings before
the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a conditional settlement of a judgment award which is highly prejudicial to the employee will be
treated as a voluntary settlement of his/her claim that operates as a final satisfaction in his/her favor.

RULING:

YES. We find respondents to be in bad faith and should therefore bear the consequence of their actions; the
conditional payment of the judgment award to Daang will be treated as a voluntary settlement in full satisfaction of
the NLRC's judgment. With the judgment award satisfied as of March 10, 2009 when the parties signed and filed the
Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment with the NLRC, respondents' petition before the CA became moot and
academic.

The facts and circumstances of the case before Us appear to be on all fours with those in Hernandez v.
Crossworld Marine Services, Inc.2were the Supreme Court held that a conditional payment of a seafarer's claim
should be treated as a "voluntary settlement" in full satisfaction of the NLRC's judgment which consequently rendered
the employer's petition before the CA moot and academic.

Under the parties' agreement, in the event of a reversal of the NLRC ruling, Hernandez not only committed to
return what he received, he also waived his right to judicial recourse, thereby leaving him with the proverbial empty
bag. Thus, We ruled in Hernandez that this kind of agreement is unfair and against public policy.

In a nutshell, the documents above enabled respondents to prevent the execution of the NLRC Decision,
maintain their petition before the CA, and, in the event of an unfavorable outcome, seek an appeal before Us. Daang,
on the other hand, would not only be obliged to return all settlement money he received in the event that the CA
reverses the NLRC, by his waiver of his claims and right to prosecute any further action, he also gave up any legal
recourse which would otherwise have been available to him. Clearly, Daang is on the losing end. The terms of the
Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment and the Affidavit, not unlike those considered by this Court in Hernandez, are
highly unfair and prejudicial against him.
AUGUST SUPREME COURT CASES
G.R. No. 194529

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v. FRAULEIN CABANBAN CABANAG AND

JESUS T. PANAL, RESPONDENTS.

August 06, 2019

FACTS:

Respondents Fraulein C. Cabanag and Jesus T. Panal were employed as Principal Chemists Analyst C at the
petitioner's Palinpinon Geothermal Power Plant located at Puhagan, Valencia, Negros Oriental. On November 18,
2002, the National Power Board (NPB) of the petitioner passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 and NPB Resolution
No. 2002-125 pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act or EPIRA).
NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 provided for the termination from employment of all the petitioner's personnel
effective January 31, 2003, as well as their entitlement to separation benefits.

Both respondents sent to the petitioner a letter seeking clarification. They thereby requested the re-evaluation
of the selection and hiring processes under the New NPC Table of Organization (TO), insisting that they were more
qualified than those eventually appointed because the 1997 Revised Quality Standards for the position of Principal
Chemist specifically required a registered chemist, not a chemical engineer. Rodolfo C. Pacaña, then the Senior Plant
Manager at the Palinpinon Geothermal Power Plant, replied that the decision to hire the other applicants for the
positions had been based on "behavioral traits."

The respondents ultimately filed against the petitioner a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Civil Service
Regional Office (CSRO) in Cebu City. The CSC rendered its decision upholding the petitioner's exercise of its
discretionary power as the appointing authority, emphasizing that the positions were deemed abolished during the
reorganization, such that no employee could claim any vested right to the positions. The CSC ruled that it had no
reason to interfere with the petitioner's exercise of its discretionary power. the CA found that the CSC had erroneously
upheld the termination of the respondents pursuant to the reorganization.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed based on the implementation of NPB Resolution No. 2002-
124 and NPB Resolution No. 2002-125.

RULING:

The Court resolved that said resolutions did not only cover the 16 top-level executives as insisted upon by the
petitioner, but all of the petitioner's employees whose dismissals were based on the implementation of NPB
Resolution No. 2002-124 and NPB Resolution No. 2002-125. The respondents herein were illegally terminated at the
close of office hours on February 28, 2003. Accordingly, the respondents are entitled to the judgment awards set forth
in the September 17, 2008 Resolution promulgated in NPC-DAMA.
G.R. No. 241445

REY BEN P. MADRIO, PETITIONER, v. ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

August 14, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner was formerly the Area Sales Manager of AFC from May 1, 2008 until he tendered his resignation
in November 2015, which, however, was not shown to have been approved by the company. At that time, he also
requested for the payment of several monetary benefits, but the same remained unheeded.petitioner attached an
unsigned and unauthenticated typewritten copy of the Retirement Plan and Policy on Separation from Employment to
his position paper, as well as copies of his pay slips to show his monthly pay.

The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner. The LA held that petitioner's entitlement to separation benefits,
among others, was already admitted by AFC itself as evidenced by the tenor of its March 20, 2016 reply-letter
received during conciliation proceedings. the NLRC affirmed with modification the LA's ruling. According to the CA,
the NLRC erred in considering the Retirement Plan as evidence to support the petitioner's claim for separation
benefits. Being unsigned and unauthenticated, there was no way to verify the truth of its contents, and thus, it should
have been rejected as evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the Retirement Plan as evidence, and
consequently, granted the award of separation benefits in favor of petitioner.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the result reached by the CA. It is well-settled that administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, like the NLRC, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, when
it comes to admitting documents as evidence in labor cases, it is nonetheless required that there be some proof of
authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of documents.

The separation benefits under the AFC's company policy is not the separation pay contemplated under the
labor code, but rather, a special benefit given by the company only to upstanding employees. In light of these special
conditions, it is fairly apparent that the separation benefits under the Retirement Plan are not in the nature of benefits
incurred in the normal course of AFC's business, such as salary differentials, service incentive leave pay, or holiday
pay. As such, the burden is on the employee to prove his entitlement thereto; failing m which, the latter should not be
paid the same.

In this case, the petitioner only submitted a copy of the Retirement Plan as proof of his entitlement to the
separation benefits claimed. However, by and of itself, the said document only proves what the retirement/separation
policy of AFC is. It does not, in any way, demonstrate that the conditions for entitlement had already been met by the
employee. Moreover, the petitioner's claim for separation benefits appears to be premature. It is undisputed that the
petitioner left the company while his separation benefits were still being processed and yet to be approved by the
Retirement Committee pursuant to the "company's normal operating procedure." In fine, the Court is unconvinced that
petitioner has proven his entitlement to the separation benefits under AFC's company policy. As such, the CA
Decision is affirmed insofar as it set aside the NLRC's award of separation benefits in favor of petitioner not for the
reasons given by the CA but based on the above discussion.
G.R. No. 227550

UNIVERSITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED BY EMILY DE LEON AS PRESIDENT, DOING BUSINESS

UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE BENGUET PINES TOURIST INN, PETITIONER, V. JOSEPHINE P.
PINERA,[*] YOLANDA A. CALANZA AND LEONORA P. SONGALIA, [**] RESPONDENTS.

August 14, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner University of Manila (petitioner) is an educational institution established by the Delos Santos
Family. It is also engaged in the business of operating hotels and restaurants, which include among others, Benguet
Pines Tourist Inn (BPTI). Respondents Yolanda Calanza (Calanza), Josephine Pinera (Pinera) and Leonora P.
Songalia (Songalia) were all hired by Atty. Ernesto Delos Santos (Atty. Delos Santos) and his mother Cordelia Delos
Santos (Cordelia), to work in BPTI as receptionists and all-around employees.

Sometime in December 2010, Calanza, who was then assigned as front desk clerk in BPTI, was verbally
informed by the personnel of the petitioner that 25 booklets of unused official receipts (with No. 86251-87500) were
allegedly missing. Petitioner insists that Calanza has custody over the booklets and was accountable for the loss.
Aggrieved, respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against the petitioner.

On March 22, 2012, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering petitioner.The
NLRC found that there was no illegal dismissal to speak about. Respondents were dismissed on the ground of
unlawful insubordination to the lawful order of petitioner for their refusal to transfer to Manila although the
procedural due process was not observed. In the appealed Decision dated August 24, 2015, the CA reversed the
findings of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that there was no just cause for the dismissal of
respondents and that procedural due process was not observed.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents were illegally dismissed.

RULING:

Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from employment: (a) the
dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code (substantive aspect); and (b) the
employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect). The onus of proving
the validity of dismissal lies with the employer.

Records likewise show that respondents were not accorded due process. There is a procedural due process in
termination of employment for just cause if the employer gives the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment. Specifically, there should be
a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought, a hearing or an opportunity to be heard, and after
hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss.

Petitioner firmly grasped its belief that it was Calanza who was responsible for the missing booklets of
unused official receipts and verbally informed Calanza about it. She was not formally charged nor investigated before
she was terminated. Verbal notice is not enough. She was not even furnished any written notice particularly stating the
offense which she might have been charged with. As to Pinera and Songalia, while they were made to explain why
they were reporting to Dely's Inn, the due process requirement was not completely complied with. No hearing or
conference was conducted in order for respondents to vent their side and that the second notice was not sent
containing the decision to dismiss and the reasons that justify the dismissal.

It is safe then to conclude that the allegation of insubordination on the part of respondents was merely a
fabrication made by petitioner to justify respondents' dismissal from employment. It bears stressing that not every
case of insubordination or willful disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-related order of the employer or its
representative is reasonably penalized with dismissal.
 The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed
except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process. In the instant case, petitioner was not able
to establish the existence of causes justifying the dismissal of respondents and the observance of due process in
effecting the dismissal.
G.R. No. 242875

AUGORIO A. DELA ROSA, PETITIONER, V. ABS-CBN CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

August 28, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by respondent ABS-CBN Corporation (respondent), a duly organized corporation
engaged in the business of television and radio broadcasting, as a video editor for the latter's television broadcasting at
an hourly rate of P230.00. He was allegedly rehired repeatedly and continuously for the same position, under
purported fixed-term contracts.

Petitioner admittedly reported for work and went to respondent's editing bay while intoxicated. This led to an
incident where a petitioner placed his hands inside a female co-worker's pants and touched her buttocks. Thus, on
August 23, 2013, petitioner was given a show cause memorandum, to which he submitted an answer dated August 28,
2013, explaining that the alleged incident was only accidental, as he just lost balance and fell towards said co-worker.
“Your acts of reporting for work under the influence of alcohol and for committing a lewd act against [your female
co-worker] are likewise considered as serious misconduct which is a ground for the termination of your employment
under Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.”Respondent averred that petitioner was not illegally
dismissed. It maintained that petitioner was engaged only for a fixed period or from March 16, 2015 until September
15, 2015, and consequently, his employment automatically ceased on the end date.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed, The LA ruled that petitioner was a
regular employee of respondent considering that he was engaged to perform an activity that has a reasonable
connection to the business or trade of respondent. Consequently, the petitioner's dismissal due to "end of contract" was
illegal because it is not one of the just or authorized causes provided by law. The NLRC affirmed the LA's Decision
with modification. The CA granted the petition and nullified the findings of the NLRC. It found the petitioner to be a
regular employee who was validly dismissed for a just cause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner was legally dismissed for a just cause.

RULING:

Petitioner was not a fixed-term employee, but rather, a regular employee. Records show that petitioner was
engaged by respondent, through various contracts, as a video editor for the latter's several programs. Case law holds
that the repeated engagement under a contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and desirability of the employee's
work in the employer's business; and if an employee's contract has been continuously extended or renewed for the
same position, with the same duties, without any interruption, then such employee is a regular employee. The Court
agrees with the CA that respondent had a just cause in terminating the petitioner's employment as the latter committed
serious misconduct against a female co-worker.
G.R. No. 232522

CARISSA E. SANTO, PETITIONER, VS. UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, RESPONDENT.

August 28, 2019

FACTS:

In May 1997, respondent University of Cebu hired petitioner Carissa E. Santo as a full-time instructor. During
her employment, as such, she studied law and passed the 2009 Bar Examinations. She continued working for
respondent until she got qualified for optional retirement under respondent's Faculty Manual. In April 2013, she
applied for optional retirement; she was then only forty-two (42) years old but had already completed sixteen (16)
years of service with respondent. The latter approved her application and computed her optional retirement pay at
fifteen (15) days for every year of service per provisions of the Faculty Manual. She asserted, though, that her
retirement pay should be equivalent to 22.5 days per year of service in accordance with Article 287 of the Labor
Code. Respondent refused to accept her computation. Thus, she initiated the complaint below for payment of
retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code, damages and attorney's fees against respondent.

Labor Arbiter Vitto A. Kintanar found that the respondent's retirement package was less than what Article
287 of the Labor Code prescribed. On appeal, the NLRC reversed. It ruled that Article 287 was not intended to benefit
petitioner who voluntarily resigned not to rest in the twilight years of her life but to actively engage in the practice of
the legal profession. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was different from the retirement benefits granted under
Article 287 of the Labor Code which were intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his or her life
after he or she had completely stopped working.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding the computation of petitioner's retirement benefit based on the Faculty
Manual rather than Article 287 of the Labor Code?

RULING:

However, in case the retirement pay from PERAA and/or PAG-IBIG is lower than the institutional
computation as mentioned above, the University shall provide the deficiency or difference as required by DOLE's
1996 Guidelines for the Effective Implementation of the Retirement Pay Law (RA 7641). This policy applies likewise
to the computation of the early retirement pay.

Clearly, the Faculty Manual intends to grant retirement benefits to qualified employees. It entitles an
employee to retire after fifteen (15) years of service or upon reaching the age of fifty-five (55) and accordingly collect
retirement benefits. It even mandates compliance with RA 7641 such that when the computation of its retirement plan
is found to be lower than what the law requires, the respondent is bound to pay the deficiency.

The optional retirement under respondent's Faculty Manual, therefore, should not be taken as anything else
but a retirement benefit within the ambit of Article 287 of the Labor Code. It is apparent that fifteen (15) days' worth
of salary for every year of service provided under respondent's Faculty Manual is much less than 22.5 days' worth of
salary for every year of service provided under Article 287 of the Labor Code. Obviously, it is more beneficial for the
petitioner if Article 287's retirement plan will be applied in the computation of' her retirement benefits. The retirement
benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code, therefore, should be applied in the computation of petitioner's
retirement pay. It is more advantageous to the petitioner and it is what the law commands.
G.R. No. 228231 [Formerly UDK 15531]

PRUDENCIO CLEMENTE, JR., PETITIONER, VS. ESO-NICE TRANSPORT CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

August 28, 2019

FACTS:

ESO-Nice Transport Corporation (respondent) hired a petitioner as bus dispatcher in its Baguio branch. When
its Baguio branch operations were audited in August 2013, respondents found out that numerous collections were not
deposited in its bank account. Petitioner also sent a similar letter to Alex Garcia (Garcia), who admitted using the
money to pay the hospitalization bills of his father. Respondent claimed that petitioner and Garcia admitted to having
fraudulently taken the undeposited collections in the amount of P56,710.46 and P665,090.55, respectively. As proof,
respondent submitted a document denominated as Eso-Nice Transport Corp., Undeposited Collections, January 1 to
August 31, 2013, which shows the petitioner and Garcia's handwritten and signed confession.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner had been illegally
dismissed given that respondent failed to show any valid cause for his termination. Respondent's claim that petitioner
committed qualified theft had not been duly substantiated inasmuch as the prosecutor only found probable cause
against Garcia. The NLRC held that other than petitioner's purported admission, respondent miserably failed to
adduce substantial evidence to justify his termination.

Petitioner insisted that he was illegally dismissed because the twin-notice requirement prior to his dismissal
was not observed. The first written notice given to him did not state with particularity the facts and circumstances that
gave rise to the charge against him, but merely provided him with a general description of the charge. The notice also
failed to state which company rule he violated or which among the grounds under Article 297 of the Labor Code was
he being charged of. Respondent, for its part, maintained the validity of petitioner's dismissal from work. It explained
that the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor against the petitioner for the crime of qualified theft
and the issuance of the corresponding warrant for his arrest by the trial court clearly show that the respondent indeed
had sufficient ground to terminate him.

ISSUE:
1. Whether CA erred in ruling that the petitioner was legally dismissed by the respondent.
2. Whether CA erred in ruling that the petitioner is only entitled to reinstatement but not to back wages or other
monetary benefits.

RULING:

For a dismissal to be valid, the rule is that the employer must comply with both the substantive and the
procedural due process requirements. Substantive due process requires that the dismissal must be pursuant to either a
just or an authorized cause under Articles 282, 283 or 284 (now Articles 297, 298 and 299, respectively) of the Labor
Code. On the other hand, procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the respondent indeed failed to comply with the due
process requirement. The August 22, 2013 Notice given by respondent fell short of the standards set by the law and
jurisprudence. The petitioner's liability would only amount to negligence for not ensuring that funds that came to his
possession were immediately deposited to respondent's bank account or turned over to the personnel in-charge of
collections. Negligence, however, is not among the just cause under Article 297 which would validate respondent's act
of terminating the petitioner from employment.

Given that the petitioner was dismissed without just cause and without due process, he is entitled to
reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement under Article 294 of the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 222233

SKYWAY O & M CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. WILFREDO M. REINANTE, RESPONDENT.

August 28, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner Skyway O & M Corporation (Skyway) hired Wilfredo as Intelligence Officer for a fixed period
from June 26, 2008 to November 25, 2008. Immediately thereafter, on November 26, 2008, Skyway renewed his
services and appointed him as a probationary employee. On May 21, 2009, Wilfredo received a pre-termination notice
from Skyway's Traffic Safety Management and Security Department (TSMSD) for supposedly failing to meet the pre-
performance standards of the company based on the Performance Appraisal Report submitted by his supervisor,
Augusto Alcantara. On May 25, 2009, on his last day as probationary employee, Wilfredo was dismissed. The parties
eventually entered into a compromise agreement/amicable settlement wherein Wilfredo agreed not to file any case
against Skyway and to withdraw the administrative cases he had filed against its security officers. Notwithstanding
demand, TSMSD failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement prompting Wilfredo to
file a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees.

On January 30, 2013, the LA rendered a Decision, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby (sic) ordering respondent Skyway O & M Corporation to pay the complainant.

According to the NLRC, Wilfredo's appraisal report has no basis and was biased. For failure of Skyway to
show by substantial evidence the basis of the said evaluation that led to Wilfredo's termination, the NLRC found his
dismissal illegal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether CA gravely erred in ruling that Wilfredo was illegally dismissed.
2. Whether CA gravely erred in ruling that Wilfredo was entitled to his monetary claims.

RULING:

A probationary employee is one who is placed on trial by an employer, during which the latter determines
whether or not the former is qualified for permanent employment. The essence of a probationary period of
employment lies primordially in the purpose and objective of both the employer and employee during such period.
Though not on the same plane as that of a permanent employee, a probationary employee enjoys security of tenure.
Other than being terminated for a just or authorized cause, a probationary employee may be dismissed due to his or
her failure to qualify in accordance with the standards of the employer made known to him or her at the time of his or
her engagement.

Considering that Wilfredo was not dismissed for a just or authorized cause, his dismissal from employment
was illegal. As properly observed by the CA, the termination of his employment based on his alleged unsatisfactory
performance rating was affected merely as a subterfuge after he discovered the hiring or appointment by Skyway of
an unqualified security officer. In view of Wilfredo's illegal dismissal, he is entitled to backwages and reinstatement.
He should be paid full backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal until the finality of this Decision.
SEPTEMBER SUPREME COURT CASES
 G.R. No. 211522

J' MARKETING CORPORATION, ROGELIO U. SOYAO, EVP-GENERAL MANAGER, PEPITO P.

ESTRELLAN, KALIBO BRANCH MANAGER, PETITIONERS, VS. FERNANDO S. IGUIZ,
RESPONDENT.

September 04, 2019

FACTS:

Respondent Fernando S. Iguiz (Iguiz) was hired as a driver in September 1995 by petitioner J' Marketing
Corporation (JMC). JMC is a company engaged in the business of selling appliances to the general public and has
several branches in the Visayas region. After nine months in JMC's Kalibo Branch, Iguiz was promoted as a
collector/credit investigator.

Iguiz sent a notarized letter-reply dated 14 December 2006 and stated that he failed to make a complete
remittance since the amount of P5,811, representing his collection for 8 December 2006, was lost. On 8 February
2007, Estrellan issued a memorandum to Iguiz asking him to explain within 24 hours why he should not be
reprimanded for loss of trust and confidence for receiving payments of P15,300 and $29 without issuing official
receipts, as per Sonio's audit report. On 7 March 2007, Vangie M. Tionko, JMC's Personnel Manager, issued a
memorandum informing Iguiz that because of (1) dishonesty for collecting P15,300 and $29 without issuing official
receipts, and (2) breach of trust and confidence, he is terminated from employment on the ground of violation of
Article 282, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

On 12 March 2007, Iguiz received the memorandum of termination. Aggrieved, Iguiz filed a Complaint for
illegal dismissal with money claims with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI in Kalibo, Aldan. Labor Arbiter stated that Iguiz's bare, unsubstantiated and
uncorroborated denial of the charges of unremitted collections and non-issuance of receipts justified his dismissal as a
valid exercise of JMC's management prerogative for loss of trust and confidence. In a Decision dated 27 February
2009, the NLRC, 4th Division of Cebu City reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in upholding the finding of the NLRC that Iguiz was
illegally dismissed from his employment and is entitled to backwages, separation pay, damages and attorney's fees.

RULING:

Under the Labor Code, the dismissal of an employee has a two-fold due process requirement: one is
substantive and the other, procedural. For substantive due process, the dismissal must be for a just and authorized
cause as provided under Articles 282, 283, and 284 of the Labor Code; and for procedural due process, the
opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself must be observed.

An employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code
which provides:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
1. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
2. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
3. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
4. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
5. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

In the present case, JMC terminated the employment of Iguiz due to dishonesty and fraud or willful breach of
the trust reposed in him as provided under Article 282(c). The Labor Arbiter found that Iguiz was validly dismissed
for loss of trust and confidence while the NLRC and the CA found that JMC failed to provide the burden of proof
necessary to show that the dismissal was for a just cause. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the
quantum of evidence required is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is the relevant evidence a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

In the present case, both the NLRC and CA found that JMC failed to provide the requisite substantial
evidence to terminate Iguiz's employment. While it is true that loss of trust and confidence is one of the just causes for
termination, such loss of trust and confidence must have some basis. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. It
is sufficient that there must only be some basis for such loss of confidence or that there is reasonable ground to
believe, if not to entertain, the moral conviction that the concerned employee is responsible for the misconduct and
that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his
position.

In the present case, JMC sent Iguiz the first notice - a memorandum dated 8 February 2007 asking Iguiz to
explain why he should not be reprimanded for loss of trust and confidence for receiving payments of P15,300 and $29
without issuing official receipts. Iguiz received this notice on 9 February 2007 and he was able to file a written reply
on 12 February 2007 denying the allegation. JMC then sent Iguiz another notice - a memorandum dated 7 March 2007
terminating his employment. Iguiz received the termination notice on 12 March 2007. At first glance, it seems that
JMC complied with the two notice requirements. However, the succession of events would show that JMC actually
railroaded the termination of Iguiz from the start.

We held that the period of 24 hours allotted to answer the notice was severely insufficient and in violation of
the implementing rules of the Labor Code. Under the implementing rule of Article 277, an employee should be given
"reasonable opportunity" to file a response to the notice. Accordingly, given the illegality of Iguiz's dismissal without
just cause and the non-observance of procedural due process, Iguiz is entitled to reinstatement and backwages as
provided in Article 279 of the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 202851

FEATI UNIVERSITY, PETITIONER, VS. ANTOLIN PANGAN, RESPONDENT.

September 09, 2019

FACTS:

On September 17, 1970, FEATI University (petitioner) hired Antolin Pangan (respondent) as a canteen
bookkeeper. Respondent was later on promoted as Assistant Cashier and then as University Cashier in 1995. Alleging
decline in enrolment for the past 25 years, petitioner offered a voluntary early retirement program to all its employees
on August 27, 2002. This, according to the petitioner, was to ensure viability and to realign its budgetary deficiency.
Prior to the approval of respondent's application to avail of the early retirement program, respondent was re-hired as
University Cashier on August 28, 2002. Alleging, however, that the functions of the University Cashier was
subsequently transferred to the Accounting Department as part of the cost-cutting measures that petitioner undertook,
petitioner re-assigned respondent as Assistant Program Coordinator of the Graduate Studies.

On August 6, 2005, respondent was terminated from employment on the ground of redundancy. According to
the petitioner, respondent's position became redundant due to the progressive decline of enrolment in the Graduate
Program and as such, the Graduate Program Coordinator can adequately handle the tasks without a need for an
assistant.

The Labor Arbiter found that due to the decline of enrollees, the Program Coordinator can adequately meet
the needs of the students without a need for an assistant. Respondent's dismissal on the ground of redundancy was,
thus, justified according to the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's
Decision. While the NLRC found the allegations of decline in enrolment, financial losses, and the redundancy of
respondent's position as Assistant Program Coordinator of petitioner's Graduate Studies substantiated, the NLRC
found respondent's transfer to the said position to be "dubious to the extent of being anomalous."The NLRC
concluded, thus, that respondent was illegally dismissed as petitioner did not fairly and equitably deal with
respondent's severance from employment. The CA, however, affirmed the NLRC's ruling in its entirety, disposing of
petitioner's Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of redundancy.

RULING:

In this case, the petitioner justifies respondent's dismissal on the ground of redundancy. Indeed, in our
jurisdiction, redundancy is a recognized authorized cause to validly terminate employment. The determination of
whether the employee's services are no longer necessary or sustainable, and thus, terminable has been recognized to
be a management prerogative. The employer's exercise of such prerogative is, however, not an unbridled right that
cannot be subjected to the court's scrutiny.

Thus, the Court has laid down certain guidelines for the valid dismissal of employees on the ground of
redundancy, to wit: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) at least one month prior to the intended date of termination; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at
least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in
abolishing the redundant position; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant.

Before the respondent's position as Assistant Program Coordinator was declared redundant, respondent's
position as University Cashier was also considered redundant for allegedly being already absorbed by the Accounting
Department. This led to respondent's transfer to the Assistant Program Coordinator position, which, notably, was
created only for respondent's purpose. Again, aside from petitioner's bare allegation that the tasks of the University
Cashier were absorbed by the Accounting Department, no evidence was presented to support such allegation and to
prove that the position was justifiably redundant.
 In sum, while petitioner may have been able to prove decline in enrolment and financial losses, it severely
failed to prove that it utilized fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining that respondent's position as Assistant
Program Coordinator, as well as his former position as University Cashier, were redundant and/or that it was
necessarily respondent who should be affected by its cost-cutting measures. Respondent's dismissal on the ground of
redundancy, therefore, cannot be sustained.

Having established that respondent was illegally dismissed and considering the NLRC's finding that
reinstatement is not feasible, respondent is indeed entitled to separation pay equivalent to his month's salary for every
year of service. The award of backwages is also sustained pursuant to Article 294 of the Labor Code, which
substantially states that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits, computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.
G.R. No. 199469

GERTRUDES D. MEJILA, PETITIONER, V. WRIGLEY PHILIPPINES, INC., JESSELYN P. PANIS, ET

AL., RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. 199505, September 11, 2019] WRIGLEY PHILIPPINES, INC.,
PETITIONER, V. GERTRUDES D. MEJILA, RESPONDENT.

September 11, 2019

FACTS:

WPI is a corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of chewing gum. It engaged the services of
Mejila, a registered nurse, as an occupational health practitioner for its Antipolo manufacturing facility sometime in
April 2002. Her employment status was initially on a contractual basis until she was regularized effective January 1,
2007.

WPI sent a memorandum to Mejila informing her that her position has been abolished as a result of the
company's manpower rationalization program and that her employment will be terminated effective November 26,
2007. On the same date, WPI notified the Department of Labor and Employment's (DOLE) Rizal Field Office of its
decision to terminate Mejila and two others due to redundancy. In the meantime, WPI engaged the services of
Activeone Health, Inc. to take over the services previously handled by the occupational health practitioners starting
November 1, 2007. The abolition of WPI's in-house clinic services and decision to hire an independent contractor for
clinic operations was part of the management's Headcount Optimization Program designed to improve cost efficiency.

Mejila filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against WPI and its officers, Jesselyn Panis, and Michael
Panlaqui, who are WPI's Factory Director and People Learning and Development Manager, respectively. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that Mejila was illegally dismissed and held that WPI failed to comply with the procedural due process
requirements.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the Labor Arbiter. It held that as early
as February 2007, WPI management had already deliberated on the feasibility of a Headcount Optimization Program
for the purpose of streamlining the organization and increasing productivity. With respect to the due process issue, the
NLRC held that notice to the Rizal Provincial Office is sufficient compliance since it is a satellite office of the
Regional Office.

The CA affirmed the NLRC's finding that Mejila was not illegally dismissed.However, the CA held that WPI
failed to properly serve the notice of termination to the DOLE Regional Office as required by the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code. Thus, the CA awarded nominal damages to Mejila, as well as attorney's fees
pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

The Labor Code recognizes redundancy as an authorized cause for the termination of employment. Article
298 (formerly Article 283) Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the
services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise.
The employer has no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its
business.

The determination that the employee's services are no longer necessary or sustainable and, therefore, properly
terminable is an exercise of business judgment of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not
subject to discretionary review of the labor tribunals and the courts, provided there is no violation of law and no
showing that it was prompted by an arbitrary or malicious act. It must produce adequate proof that such is the actual
situation to justify the dismissal of the affected employees, for redundancy. We have considered evidence such as the
new staffing pattern, feasibility studies, proposal on the viability of the newly created positions, job description and
the approval by the management of the restructuring, among others, as adequate to substantiate a claim for
redundancy.

In the present case. We agree with the CA and the NLRC that WPI substantially proved that its Headcount
Optimization Program was a fair exercise of business judgment. The decision to outsource clinic operations can
hardly be considered as whimsical or arbitrary. Mejila failed to prove her accusation that WPI acted with ill motives
in implementing the redundancy program. The pieces of evidence presented by Mejila to support her allegation were
mainly hearsay and speculative at best. In implementing a redundancy program, Article 298 requires employers to
serve a written notice to both the affected employees and the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of
termination.

Where termination is based on authorized causes under Article 298, substantial compliance is not enough.
Since the dismissal is initiated by the employer's exercise of its management prerogative, strict observance of the
proper procedure is required in order to give life to the constitutional protection afforded to labor. An employer's
failure to comply with the procedural requirements under the Labor Code entitles the dismissed employee to nominal
damages. If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 298 but the employer failed to comply with
the notice requirement, the sanction is stiffer compared to termination based on Article 297 because the dismissal was
initiated by the employer's exercise of its management prerogative. After finding that both notices to Mejila and the
DOLE were defective, We accordingly hold that WPI is liable to pay nominal damages in the sum of P50,000.00.
G.R. No. 201396

YUSHI KONDO, PETITIONER, VS. TOYOTA BOSHOKU (PHILS.) CORPORATION, MAMORU

MATSUNAGA, KAZUKI MIURA, AND JOSELITO LEDESMA, RESPONDENTS.

September 11, 2019

FACTS:

Yushi Kondo (petitioner), a Japanese citizen, applied with and was hired by respondent Toyota Boshoku
Philippines Corporation (Toyota) on September 26, 2007 as Assistant General Manager for Marketing, Procurement
and Accounting. When respondent Mamoru Matsunaga (Matsunaga) took over as President of Toyota, the petitioner
was transferred to the Production Control, Technical Development and Special Project department as Assistant
Manager. Respondent Kazuki Miura (Miura) took over his former post.

On October 13, 2008, Toyota terminated the services of the petitioner's driver. Since the petitioner could not
report for work, he considered himself constructively dismissed. On the same day, he filed a complaint with the
NLRC for constructive dismissal, illegal diminution of benefits, illegal transfer of department, harassment, and
discrimination against Toyota.

On November 25, 2009, Labor Arbiter Michaela A. Lontoc (LA) issued a Decision holding that the petitioner
was constructively dismissed. Consequently, she directed the latter's reinstatement to his old department without loss
of seniority rights, and ordered respondents to pay him back wages, moral and exemplary damages. The LA
concluded that the foregoing circumstances amount to constructive dismissal as they made petitioner's work
conditions unbearable. Further, the removal of his service car, driver and Caltex card amounted to a violation of the
public policy of non-diminution of employee benefits. Consequently, the LA adjudged respondents to be jointly liable
to pay the above mentioned monetary awards to petitioner.

Respondents appealed to the NLRC which, on May 24, 2010 rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside
the LA Decision and dismissing the petitioner's complaint. It held that the award for damages and attorney's fees
should be deleted pursuant to the NLRC Rules of Procedure since these were not asked for in the complaint. There
was no constructive dismissal to speak of since the petitioner claimed to have been "forced to resign" as a result of
respondents' acts. Hence, he had no more intention of going back to work. In fact, despite receipt of notices to report
for work, the petitioner failed to do so. He is considered to have abandoned his job or voluntarily terminated his
employment relations with Toyota

On October 24, 2011,the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition. It held that it is not the
function of certiorari proceedings to review the factual findings of the NLRC, which findings are binding on the court
if supported by substantial evidence.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner failed to allege capriciousness or whimsicality in the issuance of the
Honorable NLRC's assailed decision; and

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction when it concluded that what petitioner brought as issues in the petition for certiorari were
mere errors in judgment.

RULING:

Decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Through this remedy, the Court reviews errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA. On the other hand,
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not an appeal but a special civil action restricted to resolving errors of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment. Decisions of the NLRC are reviewable by the CA
through Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA is tasked in the proceeding to ascertain if the NLRC decision merits a
reversal exclusively on the basis of the presence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner was constructively dismissed, the LA considered only the circumstances of diminution of benefits
pertaining to the withholding of the Caltex card and petitioner's car and driver benefits, and his transfer to another
department. We agree with the NLRC that, "[t]he primary and immediate cause for [petitioner's] claim of
constructive dismissal is the withdrawal of his assigned car and driver," which petitioner claimed as "essential
requisites of [his] continued employment.'' In fact, despite all the allegations in his complaint, the petitioner started to
not report for work on October 13, 2008, the day Toyota terminated the services of his driver. In this case, petitioner
failed to prove that the car and driver benefits were also being enjoyed by other employees who held positions
equivalent to his position, or that the benefits were given by the company itself with voluntary and deliberate intent.
Petitioner did not raise any objections to his transfer prior to the filing of the complaint, nor did he amply demonstrate
why he was unsuited for the new job.

The Court does not agree that the petitioner abandoned his job. For abandonment to exist, two requisites must
concur: a) the employee failed to report for work or was absent without valid or justifiable reason; and b) there was a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. The CA upheld the
NLRC's finding that petitioner's refusal to report for work despite receiving notices from Toyota is tantamount to
abandonment. In the first place, the NLRC should not have considered abandonment as an issue since Toyota never
raised it before the LA. Well settled is the rule, also applicable in labor cases, that issues not raised below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal, because of basic considerations of due process. Moreover, petitioner's prayer for
reinstatement negates the existence of a clear intention to sever the employment relationship. He may have been
mistaken in assuming that he was dismissed, but his vigorous pursuit of this case shows his intent to resume work
with Toyota.

Finally, the petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Moral damages may
be awarded to an employee if his dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave
anxiety and the like resulted therefrom. Here, it was not established that the petitioner was constructively dismissed,
much less that respondents acted in bad faith or in an oppressive or malevolent manner.
G.R. No. 206795

FOODBEV INTERNATIONAL AND LUCILA S. DELA CRUZ, PETITIONERS, v. NOLI C. FERRER,

JEVER BELARDO, FELIX GALELA, ROMEO SISCAR, MICHAEL BALDESCO, RICO ACADEMIA,
EDUARDO DELA CRUZ, RYAN AQUINO, GAUDENCIO PARIO, MARK TRAPAGO, MAIR GOMEZ,
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG FOODBEV INTERNATIONAL, RICHARD EROLES AND
BERNADETTE BELARDO, RESPONDENTS.

September 16, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner Foodbev International (Foodbev) is a partnership engaged in the food service industry by providing
after-sales support for specialized equipment, like hot and cold dispensers and displays. Respondent Foodbev rank
and file employees and members of Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Foodbev International Central
(Samahan), a labor union established on May 31, 2008. Respondent Bernadette Belardo (Bernadette) is a managerial
employee and spouse of respondent Jever. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was consolidated with the
other cases.

From July 3 to 9, 2008, meetings were held between the union members, Foodbev managers, and petitioner
Lucila Dela Cruz (Lucila), Foodbev president. Lucila asked their grievances and reasons in establishing a union, and
threatened to close Foodbev if the union activities persist. Lucila reiterated to stop union activities and to withdraw
from the union for the sake of their jobs. Most of the union members did not resign, so Foodbev castigated them by
conducting a written examination exclusively for union members. It was only after Galela complained that other non-
union-member employees were made to take the examination. Those who failed the examination were considered
guilty of violating Article VI, Section C4 of Foodbev's Code of Discipline on slowing down, dragging or limiting out.
On July 28, 2008, the five ice cream machine technicians filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims
with the NLRC. On August 12, 2008, Eroles returned from Isabela and reported for work at Foodbev's office in
Makati. He requested that his absence on August 11, 2008 be counted against his leave credits. During the hearing,
LA Azarraga advised the respondents to secure the services of a lawyer, move for the dismissal of the case before her,
and to pursue the action filed before LA Que. On August 13, 2008, respondents filed a Notice of Dismissal or
Withdrawal of Complaint without Prejudice. Foodbev drew up a written offer of wage, sack of rice, and canned
corned beef to the 13 union members in exchange for a waiver. Lucila instructed Eroles to take the day off the next
day to convince the 13 respondents to accept their offer.

On August 21, 2008, Eroles informed Foodbev that their offer was rejected. On July 16, 2009, LA Que
rendered a decision dismissing the four consolidated complaints for violation of the rule against forum shopping. The
labor arbiter explained that while the filing of consolidated cases before his branch initially involved dissimilar causes
of action from the cases filed before LA Azarraga, the subsequent amendment of the complaints to include unfair
labor practice, and the failure to inform his branch of the status of the pending complaints was a violation of the rule
against forum shopping.

The NLRC established that respondents failed to disclose in their verification that there were other pending
cases before LA Azarraga, which is a violation of the rule against forum shopping. The NLRC affirmed the dismissal
of the four complaints. The CA affirmed the labor tribunal's finding that respondents committed forum shopping.
However, it deemed appropriate to resolve the substantial issues presented as a dismissal on pure technicalities was
frowned upon. On the claim of unfair labor practice, the CA determined that Foodbev was discouraging the formation
of a union, and committed acts constituting unfair labor practice based on the following evidence: the union's
application for registration, the minutes of the meeting between Foodbev's president and/or managers and union
members, the affidavits of Aquino and Pario, the acts of Carpio and Brosas, the blotter report, the transfer of the union
president to Isabela, the show cause memo, and the notices of termination. The CA ruled that the NLRC arbitrarily
pronounced that there was no unfair labor practice despite the lack of factual and legal bases. The CA resolved that
the burden to prove the validity of the dismissal rests on the employer, and the proof must be based on substantial
evidence. The CA found that there was a dearth of evidence to prove that respondents refused to follow instructions
for their transfer to EMI. It was further revealed that nine of the 11 employees transferred to EMI were union
members, which led the CA to believe that the transfer was made to prevent them from conducting union activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in partly reversing the September 17, 2009 NLRC Decision and
November 17, 2009 NLRC Resolution.

RULING:

Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-organization, are
inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectively and
otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect; and disrupt industrial peace and
hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. As the conscience of the government, it is the
Court's sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with labor rights. Therefore, the CA was correct in setting aside
technical rules on forum shopping to give way to the more important Constitutional and statutory rights of respondent
workers. It is settled that a valid dismissal mandates compliance with substantive and procedural requirements. The
records reveal that Ferrer, Aquino, Trapago, and Pario were individually served with a show cause memo notifying
them of their violation of company rules in order to explain in writing. The Court observes several flaws in the show
cause memo. First, the memo contains a general statement that a cockroach was found in the ice cream machine that
respondents installed at Don Bosco Makati. It does not indicate when and how the pest was discovered, and/or in
which part of the machine was it found. Second, the memo draws a conclusion that the fault lies on the respondents in
the absence of a proper investigation. In sum, the memo does not comply with the requirements laid down by the
King of Kings Transport case. The respondents' dismissal due to gross negligence resulting to loss and damage to the
company's reputation and image, lacks factual foundation and disregards due process.

The memo stated that the three respondents were absent on July 21, 2008. Ferrer and Aquino's memo stated
their accumulated number of absences without indicating specific dates to establish habitual absence.The respondents'
dismissal on the ground of habitual absence lacks factual basis and violates procedural requirements. However, this
memo applies only to the charge of gross negligence, and does not include the charge of habitual absence, serious
misconduct, and willful disobedience. Since respondents were not formally charged of serious misconduct, fraud, and
willful breach of trust and confidence causing serious damage and prejudice to the company, they were unable to
defend their side and present evidence on their behalf. The termination notice clearly violates respondents' rights to
due process.

Article 297 of the Labor Code listed gross and habitual neglect of duties by the employee as a ground for
termination of his/her services. Respondents did not exhibit acts constituting gross negligence, nor did Foodbev cite
other instances when respondents failed to perform assigned tasks, signifying habitual negligence. There was no
showing that respondents had deliberate or thoughtless disregard for the cleaning procedure. If at all, respondents are
liable of simple negligence for failing to use robby vapor in sanitizing the machine. The Court finds that respondent's
dismissal from employment is illegal due to several violations of procedural and substantive requirements of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

Bernadette's verbal termination from employment is a violation of her right to security of tenure, and was
done without just cause and due process under Articles 294 and 297 of the Labor Code. Eroles is susceptible to being
transferred to another branch or company in the guise of training or company practice, or verbal harassment similar to
his dismissed co-workers. The insinuations to resign and the successive termination from employment of union
members had created a hostile working environment, which convinced him to sacrifice his employment and
tantamount to constructive dismissal.

The records reveal several instances to support unfair labor practice, specifically union busting, the Minutes
of the Meetings disclose that as early as July 2008, Lucila and Espeña had been discouraging the employees from
joining the union and in participating in union activities. These evidence on record belie Foodbev's claim of ignorance
on the existence of the union. The fact that the examination was at first limited to union members is in itself an unfair
labor practice because it is discriminatory. Article 298 of the Labor Code mandates the payment of separation pay to
an employee terminated from the service. Here, Foodbev's offer does not include separation pay, which is contrary to
law. The discussions above demonstrate Foodbev's unfair labor practices, which create an unpleasant working
atmosphere for respondent union members and officers. They were targeted to take part in a written examination, or
prone to being transferred to another company or to another branch. They were urged to file for resignation and accept
a measly compensation and goods, instead of full benefits under the law. If these will not work, their employment will
be terminated in order to dissolve the union. The facts undeniably point to interference and restraining respondents'
right to self-organization, and discriminate their terms and conditions of employment, as enumerated in paragraphs (a)
and (e) of Article 259 of the Labor Code.This further supports respondents' allegation that they were targeted because
of their union membership, and confirms that Foodbev is liable for union busting.
G.R. No. 222455

GERRY S. MOJICA, PETITIONER, VS GENERALI PILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,

RESPONDENT.

September 18, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerry S. Mojica (petitioner) used to be a Unit Manager and Associate Branch Manager of
respondent Generali Pilipinas Life Assurance Company, Inc. (respondent). Respondent is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of life and non-life insurance. Respondent sought to collect from petitioner the amount of
P514,639.17 representing unpaid monthly drawing allowances, unpaid Health Maintenance Insurance dues, group
insurance premium and other liabilities, plus legal interest from the time of demand, exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expense. Respondent maintains that under the Unit Manager's Agreement and Associate Branch
Manager's Agreement, executed by the parties on 19 January 2001 and 24 January 2002, respectively, respondent
hired petitioner as an agent and independent contractor, and not as employee of respondent. According to respondents,
the monthly drawing allowance was a start-up fund for petitioners to organize, develop and maintain a strong branch
sales force. The P40,000 monthly drawing allowance, which was later reduced to P30,000, was however subject to
meeting monthly validation requirements and performance standards and must be repaid by petitioner over a period of
eighteen (18) months or less by applying his override commission earnings and commissions on personal business.
Respondent claimed that petitioner failed to comply with the premium production and manpower requirements and 3
did not reach the targets which he himself set in his business plan. As a consequence, respondents stopped releasing
monthly drawing allowances to petitioners, in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement.

Petitioner asserted that he was an employee of respondent, and not its agent or independent contractor.
Petitioner insisted that as an employee of respondent, he had no obligation to liquidate the monthly drawing
allowances and that he was entitled to the P40,000 monthly drawing allowance which was not even enough to cover
all his expenses in maintaining respondent's branch office and the recruitment of insurance agents for respondent.
Petitioner also questioned the trial court's jurisdiction and maintained that the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) has jurisdiction because of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties. Thus, the
petitioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

The trial court held that the contractual relationship between the parties as expressly provided in the Unit
Manager's Agreement, Associate Branch Manager's Agreement, and the Memorandum of Agreement shows that the
petitioner was the respondent's agent and not its employee. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner is an
independent contractor under the terms of the Unit Manager's Agreement and the Associate Branch Manager's
Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner is an independent contractor and in ordering petitioner to
refund the monthly drawing allowances he received.

RULING:

The Supreme court affirmed the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner is an independent
contractor and not an employee of respondent, as clearly stipulated in the contractual agreements entered into between
petitioner and respondent.

The Unit Manager's Agreement dated 19 January 2001 pertinently provides:

xxx. The Unit Manager in performance of his duties defined herein, shall be considered an independent contractor
and not an employee of Generali Pilipinas. He shall be free to exercise his own judgment as to time, place and means
of soliciting insurance.
 As an independent contractor, the petitioner earned through commissions and was not paid a fixed salary or
wage. Petitioner's remuneration on a commission basis is expressly provided under the Unit Manager's Compensation
Schedule which was incorporated in the Unit Manager's Agreement, and the Associate Branch Manager's
Compensation Schedule which formed part of the Associate Branch Manager's Agreement.

Another factor which militates against the claim of petitioner that he is an employee of respondent is the
latter's lack of control over the means and methods employed by petitioner in the performance of his duties. Under the
four-fold test in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship which considers the following
elements: (1) the power to hire; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power to dismiss; and (4) the power to control, the
last is the most important factor. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner carried on the
business of his unit independently and exercised wide latitude in the conduct of his business. In fact, as expressly
stated in the Unit Manager's Agreement and the Associate Branch Manager's Agreement, the petitioner was "free to
exercise his own judgment as to time, place and means of soliciting insurance."
G.R. No. 204782

GENUINO AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ARMANDO G.

ROMANO, JAY A. CABRERA AND MOISES V. SARMIENTO, RESPONDENTS.

September 18, 2019

FACTS:

Respondents averred that sometime in September 2004, the workers were given a work schedule where one
worker was not made to report for work for 15 consecutive days while the six other workers report for work on their
regular schedules. When Romano reported back to work on June 25, 2005 after his 15 days forced leave, he was told
then and there that his employment was already terminated.respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for separation pay against Genuino Ice and Vicar before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
Genuino Ice, for its part, claimed that respondents charged the wrong party as they were never its employees but of
petitioner, its affiliate company.

The Labor Arbiter held that respondents were regular employees of the petitioner since they were performing
functions that were necessary and desirable to the operations of the ice plant. The continuous work of the respondents
as brine men in the plant for several years. While the Labor Arbiter recognized that the company has the prerogative
to close its department, the Labor Arbiter still found respondents' dismissal from employment as illegal inasmuch as
the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence showing that the closure of its block ice production facility had some
basis and that their dismissal was for an authorized cause.

On appeal before the NLRC, petitioner stressed that respondents never questioned its prerogative to retrench
them due to partial closure of its plant and reduction of its personnel, but only questioned the propriety of their
termination for non-compliance with the notice requirement laid down in Article 283 (now Article 298) of the Labor
Code. It argued that it could not be forced to reinstate the respondents whether in their previous positions or in the
payroll because the department where they used to work had already closed and there were no other equivalent
positions available in petitioner's only branch in Navotas. NLRC held that they could not justify respondents'
dismissal on the ground of retrenchment considering that petitioner and Vicar totally disregarded the requirements
laid down in Article 298 of the Labor Code and failed to adduce documentary proof, like an audited financial
statement, to substantiate their claim.

The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in deciding the case as it did and denied
the petition. It held that while retrenchment is one of the recognized authorized causes for the dismissal of an
employee, petitioner failed to discharge its burden of proving that respondents' retrenchment was valid for the reason
that petitioner not only failed to notify them and the DOLE of the retrenchment, it also failed to prove that it was
losing financially. Thus, respondents' dismissal was clearly illegal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC’s decision.
2. Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the NLRC’s decision ordering
reinstatement and payment of full backwages to the respondent.
3. Whether or not Genuino Ice Company can be held solidarily liable with Genuino argo development
corporation.

RULING:

Petitioner avers that the respondents do not question its right to lay off its workers on account of serious
business losses, but only questions the propriety of their termination for non-compliance with the notice requirement
and non-payment of separation pay under Article 298 of the Labor Code. Thus, instead of directing it to reinstate the
respondents and pay them their full backwages, petitioners must instead be ordered to pay respondents their
separation pay. The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.
 Respondents were illegally dismissed from employment, retrenchment not being duly proved. Article 298 of
the Labor Code laid down the authorized causes where the employer may validly terminate the employment of its
employees. Petitioner is correct in saying that retrenchment is a management prerogative to downsize its work force to
avert business losses, which could either be already incurred or impending. The Court has authorized valid reductions
in the workforce to forestall business losses, or even to recognize an obvious reduction in the volume of business
which has rendered certain employees redundant. However, for retrenchment to be valid, certain requisites must first
be satisfied.

The three (3) basic requirements are: (a) proof that the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses or
impending losses; (b) service of written notices to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at
least one (1) month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; and (c) payment of separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay, or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.

Petitioner could have easily proved its dire financial state by submitting its financial statements duly audited
by independent external auditors, but it did not. Its failure to prove these reverses or losses necessarily means that
respondents' dismissal was not justified.it failed to satisfy the notice requirement under Article 298 of the Labor Code.

Article 294 of the Labor Code provides for the reliefs of an illegally dismissed employee. Backwages and
reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee in order to alleviate the
economic damage brought about by the employee's dismissal. Since respondents' termination was illegal, they are
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to their full backwages pursuant to the said article.
However, reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which the employee has been removed is still in
existence or there is an unfilled position of a nature, more or less, similar to the one previously occupied by said
employee. While the CA was correct in its assessment that the NLRC did not abuse its discretion when it ordered
respondents' reinstatement, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may still modify the affirmed judgment
in order to conform to law and justice. Under Article 279 (now Article 294) of the Labor Code, backwages are
computed from the time of dismissal until the employee's reinstatement. However, when separation pay is ordered in
lieu of reinstatement, backwages are computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering
separation pay.

The aforementioned circumstances show that both Genuino Ice and the petitioner have taken turns in
representing each other's common cause and in pursuing remedies to protect its common interest in repelling the
respondents' monetary claims. Hence, for purposes of this litigation and for the satisfaction of the respondents'
monetary claims, both Genuino Ice and the petitioner shall be treated as one and the same entity, and held liable
solidarity for the same.
OCTOBER SUPREME COURT CASES
G.R. No. 230047

Mark Eliseus M. Villola Vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc. and Fernandino T. Lising
October 9, 2019

FACTS:

Villola was employed by UPL as its information technology and communications manager. Villola asserted
that Lising agreed to pay him a monthly salary of 40,000 starting April 1, 2010. Both parties later agreed that Villola
will be paid a monthly salary of 20,000 and an additional 15,000 per month, the cumulative amount thereof to be
released only at the end of the calendar year. Villola’s additional salary of 15,000 per month however, remained
unpaid until his separation from employment with UPL.

Villola received an e-mail message from Mr. Consunji supposedly required Villola to submit to management
a written resignation letter indicating therein the effectivity date of his resignation in which Villola did not comply
with said directive. In a meeting with Villola informed the latter that management may have to declare his position as
redundant to which Villola agreed. Consunji and Villola also agreed that instead of terminating employment with
UPL on the ground of redundancy, he will simply voluntarily cease his employment with the company. Villola
stopped reporting for work however continued to render part time work. Villola on the scanning project did not
materialize thereafter he filed for illegal dismissal and payment of other claims.

The labor arbiter promulgated that it was not illegal dismissal for he voluntarily resigned from his position as
IT. NLRC reversed the decision of LA and held that the supposed resignation was not supported by evidence on
record. CA concluded that Villola voluntarily resigned and was not dismissed from service.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was not illegally dismissed.

RULING:

As much as Villola has the burden of proving that he was in the first place dismissed from employment by
UPL, it is the concomitant burden of respondents to prove that Villola voluntarily resigned from service. The court
agreed with the respondents that Villola resigned from his employment and that he was not dismissed by UPL. The
court finds that Villola failed to discharge the burden of proof required of him to establish that respondents indeed
took action to dismiss him. If indeed respondents unceremoniously dismissed Villola from employment as what he
claims he would have raised his concerns at the very first opportunity. The work rendered after May 31 was made in
his capacity as an independent consultant and not as IT.
G.R. No. 226358

CLARET SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY, PETITIONER, VS. MADELYN I. SINDAY, RESPONDENT.

October 09, 2019

FACTS:

Claret School of Quezon City (Claret) is an educational institution located on Mahinhin Street, UP Village,
Quezon City. Sinday is the wife of Wencil Sinday, one (1) of Claret's longtime drivers. On February 18, 2014, Sinday
filed her Complaint for illegal dismissal against the school.
Sinday narrated that in April 2010, Claret engaged her as a releasing clerk in its book sale, tasking her with the
inventory and release of books to Claret's students. Afterwards, in July 2010, Sinday worked as a filing clerk at
Claret's Human Resources Department. In April 2011, she was posted back as a releasing clerk. She held this position
until July 14, 2011. Sinday claimed that Fr. Renato B. Manubag (Fr. Manubag), the institution director of Claretech,
signed a January 10, 2013 letter, approving the request of Head of Operations Timmy Bernaldez and Program
Coordinator Rosario Butaran to classify her as a regular employee.

Claret asked Sinday to sign a Probationary Employment Contract covering the period of January 16, 2013 to
July 15, 2013. When the contract expired, Sinday asked Leticia Perez, the Human Resources head of Claret, regarding
her employment status, but she was told that her tenure would expire on July 31, 2013 because of the change in school
administration. Claret denied Sinday's claims, averring that she was merely a part-time fixed-term contractual
employee whom the school accommodated because her husband was its longtime driver. It also argued that Sinday
was well aware of her fixed-term employment as confirmed by her application letters and biodata, which showed her
employment's duration.

In a September 11, 2014 Decision, the Labor Arbiter found that Sinday was illegally dismissed: The Labor
Arbiter ruled that the repeated hiring of Sinday for around three (3) years conferred her with regular employment
status The Labor Arbiter found that the conditions for a valid fixed-term employment were absent because Sinday did
"not appear to have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the arrangement." She found that Sinday badly needed a job,
leaving her no choice but to apply from one (1) position to the other. This showed that Sinday and Claret were not on
an equal footing in dealing with the terms of her employment.

Upon appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission, in its January 14, 2015 Decision, reversed the Labor
Arbiter's Decision and found that Sinday was not illegally dismissed: The National Labor Relations Commission ruled
that it was clear to Sinday that her employment with Claret was merely part-time contractual, not regular, as shown in
her biodata. The National Labor Relations Commission found that Claret did not exercise moral dominance over
Sinday since both of them benefited from the fixed-term employment. It likewise found that Sinday did not dispute
that she was not required to regularly report to work.

In a March 30, 2016 Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission and found that Sinday was illegally dismissed the absence of the written contract defeated Claret's claim
because it raised doubts as to whether Sinday was properly informed of the terms of her employment, such as its
duration and scope, as well as her employment status. Further, it found no evidence that Sinday signed an
employment contract explicitly stating that she was hired as a fixed-term employee and that she was duly informed of
the nature of her employment.Hence, Sinday was presumed to be a regular employee under Article 295 of the Labor
Code absent any showing that she knowingly and voluntarily agreed to her employment status.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Madelyn I. Sinday is a regular employee; and
2. Whether or not the respondent is illegally dismissed.

RULING:

Article 295 of the Labor Code categorizes employees into regular, project, seasonal, and casual. It further
classifies regular employees into two (2) kinds: (1) those "engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer"; and (2) casual employees who have "rendered at least one
year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken."
 It is doctrinally entrenched that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving with clear,
accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence that the dismissal was valid. It is therefore the employer which must
satisfactorily show that it was not in a dominant position of advantage in dealing with its prospective employee. The
existence of a contract indicating a fixed term does not preclude regular employment.

This Court held that in determining the validity of a fixed-term employment, the level of protection accorded
to labor is ascertained based on the "nature of the work, qualifications of the employee, and other relevant
circumstances." Hence, the criteria limit the application of Brent to particular cases where the employer and the
employee are on a more or less equal footing in entering into the contract. If none of the aforementioned criteria are
present, this Court will strike down a fixed-term employment contract. Respondent was not in a position to bargain on
the terms of her employment. It was a grave error for the National Labor Relations Commission to find no moral
dominance merely because both parties benefited from the fixed-term employment. There is no genuine freedom to
contract when a fixed-term employment is used as a vehicle to exploit the economic disadvantage of workers like
respondents. Plain wage earners should not be faulted for tolerating jobs they desperately need. Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the respondent is a regular employee.

The acid test in determining regular employment is "whether there is a reasonable connection between the
employee's activities and the usual business of the employer." This is corollary to Article 295 of the Labor Code,
which provides that the nature of work must be "necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer"
to consider the employee as regular. Indeed, the "repeated engagement under contract of hire is indicative of the
necessity and desirability" of the employee's work in the employer's business. In this case, the Court of Appeals found
that the respondent has been engaged to perform activities that are usually necessary or desirable in petitioner's usual
business. Her services as a clerk at the book sale, as a secretary at Claretech, and as a substitute teacher aide are
necessary and desirable to petitioner's business as an educational institution. Petitioner's repeated hiring of
respondents for over three (3) years only strengthens the conclusion that her services are, indeed, necessary and
desirable to its business.

The employer has the burden of proof to show that an employee's dismissal was for a just or authorized cause,
and that the dismissal was not illegal. Unfortunately for the petitioner, it failed to discharge this burden. No notice was
served on respondent informing her of the grounds of her termination. She was not given the opportunity to be heard.
Without complying with procedural due process requirements, the petitioner could not have validly terminated
respondent's services. Petitioner Claret School of Quezon City is ordered to reinstate respondent Madelyn I. Sinday to
her former position or a substantially equivalent designation.
NOVEMBER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
G.R. No. 234296

ERNESTO P. GUTIERREZ, PETITIONER, v. NAWRAS MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., AL-ADHAMAIN

CO. LTD., AND ELIZABETH BAWA, RESPONDENTS

November 27, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner is an Overseas Filipino Worker. He was hired by respondent NAWRAS Manpower Services, Inc.
(NAWRAS) to work as respondent Al Adhamain Co. Ltd.'s (Al-Adhamain) "driver vehicle road" in Saudi Arabia for
two years. At the administrator's office, he was only given a clearance form. In a meeting with Al-Adhamain's owner,
the petitioner was told that his contract would be terminated and he would be repatriated as soon as the petitioner
completes his clearance. Petitioner then called NAWRAS about the pre-termination of his contract but was refrained
from filing a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Labor Office in order to allow NAWRAS to talk to Al-
Adhamain. Petitioner thus proceeded to submit the requirements for his clearance in the last week of February 2014.
On March 15, 2014, petitioner was given his remaining salary (sans 1-month salary) and a refund of his two months'
salary bond. Upon repatriation, petitioner filed a complaint for actual illegal dismissal with claims for underpaid
overtime pay, unpaid salaries, and transportation expenses, termination pay, damages, and attorney's fees against
respondents. Respondents averred that petitioner was validly dismissed because of his poor performance. After
petitioner's three-month probationary period, Al-Adhamain informed him of his unsatisfactory performance.

The LA rendered a Decision finding petitioner illegally dismissed. The NLRC found petitioner illegally
dismissed because of respondents' unsubstantiated claim of petitioner's poor performance. The NLRC reiterated this
Court's ruling that poor performance, equivalent to inefficiency under Article 282 of the Labor Code, must amount to
gross and habitual neglect of duties to be a just cause for dismissal. The NLRC clarified that poor performance does
not necessarily equate to gross and habitual neglect of duties. the CA affirmed the tribunal's finding of illegal
dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
Petitioner is entitled to salary equivalent to the unexpired portion of the contract. This Court is more inclined to
believe that petitioner was able to substantiate his claim of paying SR3,100.00 for his airplane ticket. Petitioner is
entitled to 10% attorney's fees. Petitioner was not given his November 2013 salary because Al Adhamain withheld it
"as [petitioner's] placement fee." The said salary deduction was improper because an illegally dismissed migrant
worker is entitled to a full reimbursement of his/her placement fee.
G.R. No. 236322
Cokia Industries Holdings Management, Inc. and/or George Lee Co, President & Chief Operating Officer Vs.
Beatriz C. Bug-Os
November 27, 2019

FACTS:

Shirley discovered that there was a record of a Pag-Ibig loan in her name even though she did not apply for it.
They began investigating the matter, they discovered several irregularities including forgeries and falsifications of the
Pag-Ibig loan supposedly obtained by Shirley. George issued an office memorandum to Bug-os directing her to
explain and Bug-os submitted her handwritten explanation and denied having any knowledge of the irregularities.

The labor arbiter dismissed Bug-o's complaint and held that her unjustified failure to submit her position
paper is sufficient ground to dismiss her complaint, it ruled that petitioners were able to show that Bug-os voluntarilty
resigned. NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Overall there was no proof of Bug-os constructive
dismissal. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the resolutions of the NLRC in its decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the finding of the NLRC that Bug-os was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

The employer has the burden of proving that an employee voluntarily resigned, however, an allegation of
constructive dismissal must be proven by the employee, especially when he or she has given a resignation letter to the
employer. Bare allegations alone are insufficient to establish constructive dismissal. The court therefore disagreed
with the NLRC and the CA’s ruling that Bug-Os was constructively dismissed. There is a lack of evidence to support
this conclusion. As much, the labor arbiter was correct in dismissing Bug-Os’ complaint.
G.R. No. 237277/G.R. No. 237317

Alaska Milk Corporation Vs. Ruben P. Paez, et al./Asiapro Multipurpose Cooperative Vs. Ruben P. Paez, et al.

November 27, 2019

FACTS:

Alaska Milk Corporation, is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing
dairy products, while Asiapro Multipurpose Cooperative is a duly registered cooperative that contracts out the
services of its worker-members. Respondents worked as production helpers at Alaska’s San Pedro Laguna milk
manufacturing plant. All of them were members of Asiapro until they transferred to 5S manpower services.

The respondents were informed through separate memoranda that their respective assignments at Alaska were
to be terminated later that year. Therefore , they filed with the labor arbiter separate complaints for illegal dismissal.

The LA rendered a decision against respondents, since they were not Alaska's employees, the LA concluded
that there was no illegal dismissal to speak of. The NLRC issued a resolution affirming the LA’s decision in toto. The
CA reversed the NLRC’s decision, saying that the respondents were regular employees of Alaska. It was noted that
the two cooperatives lacked investments in the form of tools and equipment, and that the workers they farmed out
performed functions that were necessary and desirable to Alaska’s operations. Consequently, the respondents were
found to be illegally dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed.

RULING:

The court is firmly convinced that Asiapro is a legitimate independent contractor, the same cannot be said of
5S. Regular employees may only be terminated for just or authorized cause. This applies in cases of labor only
contracting, where the law creates an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the
purported contractor. Bate, combite and oliver were terminated from Alaska due to the expiration of their contracts
with 5S, through which they were assigned to render services at the San Pedro Plant. However, because of the finding
that 5S was engaged in labor only contracting they are considered Alaska's regular employees. Hence, having been
terminated without lawful cause, they are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
In addition to full backwages and benefits pursuant to article 279 of the labor code.
G.R. No. 226908

PASAY CITY ALLIANCE CHURCH/CAMACOP/REV. WILLIAM CARGO, PETITIONERS, VS. FE

BENITO, RESPONDENT.

November 28, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner Pasay City Alliance Church (PCAC) is one of the local churches of its co-petitioner, Christian and
Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines (CAMACOP), a religious society registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Respondent Fe P. Benito (Benito), on the other hand, is a licensed Christian Minister of
CAMACOP. Benito eventually served as PCAC's Head of Fellowship and Discipleship. Benito served without a
written contract. Pastoral Care and Membership is under the supervision of the Church Ministry Team (CMT) and co-
petitioner Reverend William Cargo (Rev. Cargo).

The present controversy stemmed from CAMACOP and PCAC's policy requiring pastors or ministers without
written contracts to tender a courtesy resignation every year. In compliance, Benito tendered her courtesy resignation
as Head of Pastoral Care and Membership on January 30, 2011. The CMT reappointed Benito to the same position for
another year. When the CMT convened the following year, or on February 12, 2012, it then decided not to reappoint
Benito and recommended that she reapply to a more suitable position. The decision not to extend Benito's term was
not immediately pursued by the CMT, and Benito held the post for another year. Benito was informed, through a letter
dated December 15, 2013, of the CMT's decision to uphold its February 12, 2012 recommendation to the District
Ministry Supervisor regarding the non-extension of her engagement as PCAC's Head of Pastoral area and
Membership.

Aggrieved, Benito filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and attorney's fees before the Labor
Arbiter, anchored on the claim that she had already attained regular status by operation of law and entitled to security
of tenure in view of her long years of service with PCAC. PCAC questioned the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction and
asserted that Benito's vocation and ministry are not governed by the Labor Code, but by CAMACOP's Local Church
Administrative and Ministry Guidelines and its By-Laws. It added that the non-renewal or non-extension of Benito's
term is not even identical or tantamount to illegal dismissal as she was not even dismissed as a minister, but she
simply refused to participate in the process of her transfer.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that an employment relationship existed between the parties, in view of the various
letters and memoranda from PCAC concerning Benito's time-in and time-out, work assignments, and performance
evaluations. The Labor Arbiter also considered her payslips and deductions for Social Security System (SSS),
Philhealth, and Pag-ibig contributions. Concluding that Benito was illegally dismissed due to her involuntary
resignation and the lack of evidence to justify non-renewal of her appointment.

The NLRC overturned the Labor Arbiter's Decision, ruling that the non-renewal of Benito's appointment to
her previous position, due to a church policy requiring ministers to tender a courtesy resignation yearly for their
possible reassignment, should be treated as an ecclesiastical matter outside of the labor tribunal's jurisdiction.

When Benito challenged the NLRC's resolutions before the CA, the latter annulled the resolutions. Taking the
view that the decision not to renew Benito's appointment was secular in nature and not an ecclesiastical affair.

ISSUES:
Whether or not CA erred in declaring that the termination of respondent Fe Benito by petitioner PCAC is not in
ecce;esiastical affair but instead a severance of an employer- employee relationship over which the labor arbiter has
jurisdiction.

RULING:

There is no question among the parties in this case that our constitutionally protected policy is non-
interference by the State in matters that are purely ecclesiastical. It is also settled that religious associations can be
employers for whom religious ministers often perform dual roles.
 An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption
and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership,
and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Based on this definition,
an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relates to matters of faith,
religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.

If a church or religious association has the sole prerogative to exclude members perceived to be unworthy in
light of its doctrinal standards, all the more does it have sole prerogative in determining who is best fit to minister to
its members in activities attached with religious significance.

As a licensed minister of CAMACOP, Benito was aware of his policy requiring annual courtesy resignations
that give its local church as free hand in assigning, reassigning or transferring pastors and ministers, subject to
reasonable guidelines and supervision. We cannot interfere with the implementation of the policy, much less subject a
religious congregation to a minister in whom it appears to have lost confidence.
DECEMBER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
G.R. No. 223485
Del Monte Fresh Produce (Phil.), Inc. Vs. Reynaldo P. Betonio

December 4, 2019

FACTS:

DMFPPI is a corporation engaged in the business of providing technical assistance, inspection, and
coordination services to Del Monte Fresh International, INC. bentonio was employed by DMFPPI as its manager for
port operations at Davao Del Norte. Human resource department of DMFPPI received reports or complaints about
Betonio’s inefficiencies in the operation of the port. Betonio was charged with gross and habitual neglect of duties
and breach of trust and confidence.

Bentonio filed labor arbiter for illegal dismissal with money claims wherein LA ruled in favor of Betonio
holding DMFPPI liable for illegally dismissing him. The NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and ruled in favor of
DMFPPI for he may be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence as he was a Senior Manager of
DMFPPI. The CA rendered a decision affirming resolutions of the NLRC in favor of Betonio wherein he should only
be liable for ordinary breach and not for the breach of trust and confidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Betonio was legally dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence

RULING:

The court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the NLRC in the decision that Betonio’s dismissal from
employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence was valid. It is well settled that to justify a valid dismissal
based on loss of trust and confidence, the concurrence of two conditions must be satisfied: 1) the employee concerned
must be holding a position of trust and confidence and 2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence. These two requirements are present in this case.

Betonio as the senior manager for port operations of DMFPPI was expected to be always on top of any
situation that may occur at the port. Such an intricate position undoubtedly required the full trust and confidence of
DMFPPI. Indubitably, Betonio held a position of trust and confidence in the company. Therefore Betonio’s
employment may be terminated for breach of trust under Article 312 of the labor code of the philippines.
 G.R. No. 229703

Editha Salindong Agayan Vs. Kital Philippines Corp., et al.

December 4, 2019

FACTS:

Kital philippines corporation is a domestic corporation in the business of importing and exporting
telecommunications, medical, and dental equipment among others. Ricardo Consunji and Jocelyn Cavaneyro are the
president of kital and head of accounting respectively. Petitioner was hired by Kital to work as the head of
telecommunications wherein she received information of anomalies and dishonesty committed by Cavaneyro.
Petitioner reported such to the pr3sident and he would behave irritably. Eventually, the petitioner was served a notice
to explain and demanded to vacate the company premises. Petitioner claimed that she was illegally dismissed from
employment without just cause due to respondents' disdain for her. Respondents countered that the petitioner
committed several infractions in the course of her employment.

Labor arbiter dismissed petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit. The NLRC modified
LA’s decision and dismissed the complaint. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC decision and finding that petitioner’s dismissal is valid.

RULING:

The court held that the finding of petitioner’s dismissal was valid and has legal basis and is supported by the
evidence on record and jurisprudence. Petitioner’s refusal to provide Consunji the names of the RMs is not justified.
She has no reason to keep the information confidential from the CEO of the company where she worked for.
G.R. No. 202676.

Telus International Philippines, Inc. and Michael Sy Vs. Harvey De Guzman

December 4, 2019

FACTS:

Telus received an escalation complaint from Jeanelyn Flores charging De Guzman of disrespect and ridicule
towards a person. De Guzman was placed on preventive suspension and was directed to submit a written explanation
to answer the charges. Telus however decided to remove De Guzman from his current designation and transfer him to
another practice. De Guzman already filed a complaint for constructive dismissal with monetary claims before the
NLRC notwithstanding that he was still on paid vacation leave and was receiving all benefits during said period.
Telus claimed that De Guzman was not at all dismissed from employment and was in fact scheduled for profile
interviews to facilitate his transfer.

De Guzman averred that he was a regular employee in good standing of Telus and had been with the company
for the last 4 years. De Guzman was shocked that he was being penalized for the exchange of messages he shared with
Rally Boy without first affording him any opportunity to give his side of the story.

The Labor Arbiter in his decision adjudged Telus guilty of constructively dismissing De Guzman. The NLRC
overturned the ruling of the Labor Arbiter wherein De Guzman failed to prove by substantial evidence that he was
constructively dismissed. The CA found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it judged Telud not
guilty of illegally dismissing De Guzman.

ISSUE:
Whether De Guzman was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

The court finds that De Guzman’s security of tenure was disregarded and his employment was illegally
terminated by Telus. The series of acts by the company seriously flouted De Guzman’s right as a tenured employee.
Telus fostered a working environment that was hostile, discriminatory, unreasonable and inequitable that naturally
compelled De Guzman to give up his employment thereat to avoid the difficulties he had to face just to keep his
employment. The actions of Telud show that De Guzman was actually subsequently penalized with a much graver
consequence than the supposed preventive suspension that he had undergone.
G.R. No. 228088

Automatic Appliances, Inc., Samson F. Lim, et al. Vs. Francia B. Deguidoy

December 4, 2019

FACTS:

AAI is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Petitioners Samson Lim,
Buenaventura and Pontillas are the former president, vp and HR respectively of said corporation. AAI hired Deguidoy
as a regular sales coordinator in Cubao Branch. She was tasked with selling merchandise and was required to maintain
a branch sales quota. As a result of decline in sales and economic difficulties Deguidoy was reassigned from the
Cubuo to Tutuban branch. Concerned about Deguidoy’s dismal performance at work the management of AAI urged
her to undergo counseling to improve her performance. This led to the discovery that Deguidoy incurred numerous
absences and had a low sales output. Unknown to AAI, Deguidoy filed a case for illegal dismissal with money claims.

The labor arbiter rendered a decision dismissing Deguidoy’s complaint for illegal dismissal based on its
finding that Deguidoy was not terminated but was simply being transferred to another branch. The NLRC reversed
and set aside the ruling of the LA and held that Deguidoy was constructively dismissed. The CA rendered the assailed
decision affirming the NLRC’s ruling. The CA found that Deguidoy was constructively dismissed by AAI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Deguidoy was constructively dismissed by AAI.

RULING:

Management enjoys the prerogative to transfer its employees and regulate their work assignments. The court
respects the right of the employer to reassign its employees to other stations, provided that the transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient, prejudicial or involves a demotion in rank or a diminution of salaries, benefits and other
privileges. For as long as said conditions are met, the employee may not complain that the transfer amounts to a
constructive dismissal. AAI’s decision to transfer Deguidoy to its ortigas branch was a valid exercise of its
management prerogative. Her intended transfer was not akin to a constructive dismissal.
G.R. No. 220647

Noli D. Aparicio and Renan Clarito Vs. Manila Broadcasting Company

December 10, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioners filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal. They alleged that they worked as radio technicians
with MBC, a corporation engaged in radio broadcasting. They were surprised to receive a notice from the MBC
president terminating their employment. The LA held that petitioners were illegally dismissed. There was no evidence
that MBC suffered from serious business losses and financial reverses. The NLRC found that MBC’s appeal was
timely filed. The CA charged the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for
resolving the appeal in MBC’s favor.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were validly dismissed on ground of redundancy

RULING:

Petitioners were validly dismissed. Petitioners’ employment was validly terminated on ground of redundancy
one of the authorized causes for termination of employment under Article 298 of the Labor Code. redundancy exists
when an employee’s services are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the
enterprise. While a declaration of redundancy is ultimately a management decision, and the employer is not obligated
to keep in its payroll more employees than are needed for its day to day operation, management must not violate the
late nor declare redundancy without sufficient basis.
G.R. No. 200972
Philippine National Bank Vs. Manuel C. Bulatao
December 11, 2019

FACTS:

Bulatao was formerly the senior vice president of the information technology group of petitioner PNB.
Bulatao was one of those who objected to the JVA because of the supposed huge capital exposure on PNB’s end.
Bulatao received a call from the SVP of human resource division who informed him not to report for work as the
board already accepted his resignation. Subsequently he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
Bulatao was induced to retire because the president of PNB offered a retirement option and he retired because he did
not like what was happening in his group. Later he withdrew his retirement letter and resumed working after several
days he was informed that the board approved his resignation. PNB considered his letter as resignation because there
was no retirement scheme in place.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bulatao was illegally dismissed

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled he was illegally dismissed. The promise of retirement to him constitutes promissory
estoppel. If there is doubt as to whether he intended to retire or resign, such doubt shall be resolved in his favor.
Bulatao’s filing of an illegal termination case shows that he has no intention to sever employer-employee
relationships. When there is doubt as to which evidence is true, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the employee.
JANUARY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
G.R. No. 213961

Prime Stars International Promotion Corporation and Richard U. Peralta Vs. Norly M. Baybayan and
Michelle V. Beltran
January 22, 2020

FACTS:

Petitioner argues that respondent beltran voluntarily pre-terminated his employment agreement by signing a
mutual contract annulment agreement. Petitioner said that since they already presented evidence of resignation the
burden of proof now lies with beltran. Petitioners contend that respondents signed an addendum which altered their
employment contract approved by POEA. Therefore they are bound by the addendum.

ISSUE:

Whether Beltran voluntarily pre-terminated his employment agreement.

RULING:

No, because the filing of a complaint at NLRC is inconsistent with resignation. The burden of proof is with
the employer still. The alleged resignation is ambiguous and doubtful. The labor code and POEA rules prohibit
diminution of benefits and alteration of employment contracts approved by DOLE.
G.R. No. 228572

Michael Adriano Calleon Vs. HZSC Realty Corporation, et al.

January 27, 2020

FACTS:

In a decision, the LA declared HZSC and petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal for HZSC’s failure to comply
with the procedural requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code and ordered them to pay respondents their
respective unpaid salary. The NLRC dismissed the appeal of HZSC and petitioner. The CA dismissed the petition for
failure to comply with the required contents and documents which should accompany it.

Petitioner filed his petition for certiorari at CA from an NLRC decision sustaining the labor’s arbiter decision
finding petitioner liable. In his petition, petitioner argues that in the absence of malice or bad faith, he should not be
held solidarily liable with respondent corporation. CA sustained NLRC. petitioner filed motion for reconsideration.
CA denied said motion on the ground that the motion was filed late counting from date the petitioner personally
received a copy of the decision of CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the motion for reconsideration for having been belatedly filed.

RULING:

The Supreme court said the counting of the appeal period must be based on the date counsel received a copy
of the resolution of the CA. Thus SC remanded the case to the CA for further proceedings.