International Phenomenological Society

Introspection and Incorrigibility

Author(s): Charles Raff
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Sep., 1966), pp. 69-73
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106139 .
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 INTROSPECTIONAND INCORRIGIBILITY

In his recentarticle1 D. M. Armstrongoffers four argumentsdesigned

to show that a person's introspectiveknowledge of his currentmental
state is not incorrigible.I propose to show that Armstrong'sarguments
are unsound.
To evaluateArmstrong'sargumentsthree differentsenses of "incorri-
gible" must be distinguished.A statementis incorrigibleif and only if:
(1) "It is logically necessarythat, when the statementis sincerely
made, it is true" (pi 418).
(2) It is necessarythat when the statementis believed to be true,
it is true.
(3) It is necessarythat when the statementis true, it is believed
to be true.
It can easily be shown that introspectionis not incorrigiblein sense (1),
incorrigible-i, but Armstrongfails in his attemptsto show that intro-
spection is not incorrigible-2or incorrigible-3.
No contingenttruthcan be incorrigible-i.Since the statementa person
makes depends in part on the words he utters, to show that introspec-
tion is not incorrigible-i,it is sufficientto note that a person may suffer
a "slip of the tongue"in even the most sincerestatementhe makes about
his own mental state. The possibilityof verbal slips shows-thatthe view
that introspectionis incorrigibleshould not be formulatedin terms of
"incorrigibility-l";nevertheless, Armstrong'sfirst two arguments are
directedagainstthe incorrigibility-iof introspection,and have no force
against views on which introspectionis held to be incorrigible-2or
incorrigible-3.
Armstrong'sfirst argumentis that the thesis of introspectiveincorri-
gibility has this implausibleconsequence:alleged incorrigiblestatements
become subjectto error "in the merestfractionof a second."He argues
that since it is allowed that we have incorrigibleintrospectiveknowl-
edge only of our present mental states,

I "Is Introspection Incorrigible?,"Philosophical Review, 72, 3 (October, 1963),

pp. 417-32. All page references in the text are to Armstrong's article. I am grateful
to R. M. Chisholm and H. Heidelberger for helpful criticism.

69

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70 ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH

What the upholder of the logical indubitability of current introspective reports

has to maintain is that the logical character of our certainty changes as we
move from the past to the present (p. 420).
Armstrongis here calling on defendersof introspectiveincorrigibilityto
explain how a statement,e.g., 'I am in pain now' can be an incorrigible
item of introspectiveknowledge at one moment and a corrigibleitem
of memorial knowledge the next. Defenders of incorrigibility-2or
incorrigibility-3can provide an explanation:a statementwhich is incor-
rigible-2 or incorrigible-3can become subject to error "in the merest
fraction of a second," because our mental states and our beliefs about
our mental states can change in a fraction of a second. We should find
this no more puzzling than the fact that an item of perceptualknowl-
edge can become an item of memorialknowledge in the fraction of a
second duringwhich a light changes from red to green.
Armstrong'ssecond objectionchallengesthe defenderof introspective
incorrigibilityto specify the referentof "now"in the alleged incorrigible
statement'I am in pain now'. "By the time one has finished speaking,"
Armstrongargues, "the moment to which one was.referring is in the
past" (p. 421). Since uttering a statement takes time, there is no
guaranteethat the speaker's mental state will not change during the
uttering.Armstrongsuggests that to meet this objection a defender of
incorrigibilityis forced to appeal to some notion of an "introspective
instant"duringwhich incorrigibilityis preserved.But to meet this objec-
tion a defenderof introspectiveincorrigibilityneed only reject the view
the introspectionis incorrigible-1.The referent of "now" is readily
specified if introspectionis incorrigible-2or incorrigible-3,since the
statement'I am in pain now' is incomigible-2just so,long as the speaker
believes that it is true; and the statementis incorrigible-3just so long
as the speakeris in pain.
Armstrong anticipates our response to his second objection, and
rejects it on the ground that "the alleged indubitabilitywas established
by a considerationof statements"(p. 421) rather than beliefs; conse-
quently, defenders of introspectiveincorrigibilityhave no recourse to
incorrigibility-2or incorrigibility-3but are committed to holding that
introspectionis incorrigible-i.The argumentwhich Armstrongattributes
to the defendersof introspectiveincorrigibilityis, as he states:
If I make the sincere statement 'I seem to be seeing something green now',
then ... it is logically impossible for me to be mistaken in my statement.
I may be lying, of course, but then I will know that my statement is untrue.
For, ... if mistake were a possibility then jt would make sense to say 'I think
I seem to be seeing something green now, but perhaps I am wrong'. But this
is nonsense ... so introspection is logically incorrigible ... (p. 417).
Armstronghas the defenderof introspectiveincorrigibilityargue that if

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 INTROSPECTION AND INCORRIGIBILITY 71

(i) it is nonsensefor me to say that my opinion about my currentmental

state may be mistaken,then (ii) it is logically necessarythat my sincere
statementdescribingmy current mental state be true; hence, (iii) my
statementis incorrigible-i.However, defendersof introspectiveincorri-
gibilityneed not accept (iii), since (i) does not imply (ii), and (i) is false.
In order to accept the inferencefrom (i) to (ii) a defender of intro-
spective incorrigibilitymust assume that the denial of a nonsensical
utteranceexpressesa necessarytruth. This assumptioncan be avoided,
and (i) can be rejectedwithout denyingthat it is absurdfor me to say
that my opinion about my own mental state may be mistaken.
It is absurdto say "I think that I seem to be seeing somethinggreen
now, but perhaps I am wrong" not because the sentence uttered does
not "makesense" but, ratherthat, by utteringthis sentence,the speaker
expressesa doubt about an obvious truth, i.e., the necessarytruth that
if I think that I seem to be seeing somethinggreen now, then I seem to
be seeing somethinggreen now. Thus incorrigibility-2may be invoked
to explain why we find the utterance of certain linguistic expressions
absurd without committingdefenders of introspectiveincorrigibilityto
holding that the incorrigibilityof a statementdepends on the utterance
of any linguistic expressions.Specifically,incorrigibilitycan be invoked
to explain why it is absurdto say "I think I seem to be seeing some-
thing green now, but perhapsI am wrong"without implyingthat intro-
spectionis incorrigible-i.
Armstrong'sthird argumentis an attemptto show that if introspection
is incorrigible,then it is meaninglessto speak of awarenessof one's own
currentmentalstates. He offers his argumentas a versionof the doctrine
that "we can speak of gainingknowledgeonly in cases where it makes
sense to speak of thinking wrongly that we have gained knowledge"
(p. 422). As an objection to holding introspection incorrigible this
doctrineis gratuitous,since, as we noted above, defendersof the incor-
rigibilityof introspectionneed not hold that it makes no sense for a
person to say that his opinion about his current mental state may be
mistaken. Furthermore,none of the definitionsof "incorrigible"listed
above imply that statements which are incorrigible are also known;
although,of course, "knowledge"could be definedto include statements
which are incorrigible.2Armstrong'sversion of this doctrine poses an
objectionwhich must be met in a differentway.
Armstrong'sattemptto show that the thesis of introspectiveincorri-
gibility impliesthat it is meaninglessto speak of awarenessof one's own

2 Alternatively, "incorrigible"could be defined in terms of 'knowledge'. Whether

we should label "knowledge"some correct opinions for which we can provide no
independent evidence is, in part, a terminological question.

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72 PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

currentmental state rests on his establishingthe following principle:In

cases where misclassifyingis impossible, it is meaninglessto speak of
correct classification.In order for a person to be aware that he is in
pain or believe that he is in pain, he must classify his experienceas an
experienceof pain.3 But, Armstrongargues, if introspectionis incorri-
gible it is meaninglessto speak of a person correctlyclassifyinghis own
experience,since
the notions of classifying and misclassifying are coordinate notions; surely
the one can apply only when it is meaningful to apply the other.... Yet,
according to the doctrine of incorrigibility, the application of any concept
except the concept we do apply is logically impossible (p. 422).
It may be granted that misclassifying one's. own current experience is
impossibleaccordingto the doctrineof incorrigibility-2.But Armstrong
fails to show that classifyingand misclassifyingare, in his sense, "coor-
dinate notions."
Armstrongsuggeststhat a pair of predicateswhich expresscoordinate
notions are such that, if it is impossible that one member of the pair
be true of an individual,then it is, meaninglessto predicatethe other
memberof the pair to that individual.(Where'F' and 'G' express coor-
dinate notions, if it is impossiblethat a is F, then 'a is G' is meaning-
less.) If we supposethat the pair 'male' and 'female'express coordinate
notions, application of Armstrong'sdoctrine renders meaningless the
necessarytruth "All brothers are male." Similarly,if we suppose that
'win' and 'lose' express coordinatenotions, it follows that it is meaning-
less to say "Anyone who is checkmatedloses the game."4 But, since
absurditiesresult from our supposingthat 'male' and 'female','win' and
'lose', express corodinatenotions, we may well doubt Armstrong'sclaim
that 'classify' and 'misclassify'express coordinatenotions. Armstrong's
third argumentis inconclusive.
Armstrong'sfinal argument is designed to show that introspection
cannot be incorrigiblein any of the three senses distinguishedabove.
He arguesthat (iv) my believing or apprehendingthat I am in pain is
not identicalwith my being in pain; (v) if individualsa and b are non-
identical,then it is possible that a exists and b does,not exist, and it is
possible that b exists and a does not exist. Therefore,I-can believe that
I am in pain and yet not be in pain, hence, introspectionis not incorri-
gible-2; and I can be in pain and not believe that I am, hence, intro-
3 If introspection is incorrigible-3, not only is it impossible for a person to
misclassify his experience, but it is also impossible for him not to classify his
experience.
4 In general, if 'F' and 'non-F' are construed as a "coordinate"pair of predi-
cates, it follows that all interpretationsof predicates with necessarily empty con-
verse domains are meaningless.

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 INTROSPECTION AND INCORRIGIBILITY 73

spection is hot incorrigible-3.In defense of (iv) Armstrongargues that

The apprehensionof something must be distinct from the thing apprehended.
For, if not, we are faced with a flagrant circularity. Having a pain logically
involves apprehension of - what? The pain itself! This is as bad as saying
that to be a cat logically involves being the offspring of cats (p. 423).
We should accept (iv), Armstrongargues, since if we deny (iv) there is
no way to describemy apprehensionof my pain without describingmy
pain. Far from being a "flagrantcircularity,"this is just what we should
expect if introspectionis incorrigible-2or incorrigible-3.In any case,
Armstrong'spremise (v) is false, since from the nonidentityof a and b
it does not follow that it is possible that a exists without b, or that b
exists without a. Although President Johnson is not identical with his
successor,it is not possible for the successorof Johnsonto exist without
Johnson existing.5 We should reject (v) and Armstrong gives us no
cogent reason for accepting(iv), hence we need not accept Armstrong's
final argumentagainstthe incorrigibilityof introspection.6

CHARLES RAF-F.
BROWN UNIVERSITY.

Compare the following passage from G. E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism,"

Philosophical Studies (London, 1922), pp. 18-19: If we are told that the existence
of blue is inconceivable apart from the existence of the sensation, the speaker
probably means to convey to us, by his ambiguous expressions, what is a self-
contradictory error. For we can and must conceive the existence of blue as some-
thing quite distinct-from the existence of the sensation. We can and must conceive
that blue might exist and yet the sensation of blue not exist. For my part I not
only conceive this, but conceive it to be true...."
6 J. J. C. Smart accepts Armstrong's fourth argument and anticipates our
rejection of (v). He suggests that, although (v) does not hold in general, there is
no reason to suppose that (v) fails in the cases relevant to introspective incorrigi-
bility; consequently, there is no reason to suppose that introspection is incorrigible.
But whether or not there is good reason to hold that introspection is incorrigible-2,
we have been given no good reason to suppose that it is not. See Philosophy and
Scientific Realism (London, 1963), p. 101.

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