Maj Ksoc= 20.000u.m.

=
n*VNAPLICAȚIA4:Osocietateîşimajoreazăcapitalulcu20.000u.m.,emiţând8.000deacţiunilaparitate.Capitalulsocialînaintedemajorareerade500.000u.m,iarrezervelede50.000u.m.Dacăr
atarentabilităţiifinanciarescadedupămajoraredela8%la7%,calculațidiluţiaprofituluipeacţiune.Rezultat final: Dil PPA = 0,03 u.m. VN = 20.000/8.000 = 2,5 u.m.Ksoc 0 = 500.000 u.m. =
VN*NN= 500.000/2,5 = 200.000n= 8.000Kpr0= Ksoc+Rez = 550.000DilPPA=Kpr 0 ∗Rr

hor has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy
and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience;
since, if there be noto end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and so on to posterity.
Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of theese texts include theologically-focused historical accounts, hymns, parables, didactic letters, erotica, sermons, poetry, and
prophecies.

Those books included in the Bible by a tradition or group are called canonical, indicating that the tradition/group views the collection as the true
representation of God's word and will. A number of Biblical canons have evolved, with overlapping and diverging contents from denomination to
denomination.[2] The Hebrew Bible overlaps with the Greek Septuagint and the Christian Old Testament. The Christian New Testament is a
collection of writings by early Christians, believed to be mostly Jewish disciples of Christ, written in first-century Koine Greek. Among Christian
denominations there is some disagreement about what should be included in the canon, primarily about the biblical apocrypha, a list of works
that are regarded with varying levels of respect.

Attitudes towards the Bible also differ among Christian groups. Roman Catholics, high church Anglicans, Methodists and Eastern
Orthodox Christians stress the harmony and importance of both the Bible and sacred tradition, [3][4]
 while many Protestant churches focus on
the idea of sola scriptura, or scripture alone. This concept rose to prominence during the Reformation, and many denominations today support
the use of the Bible as the only infallible source of Christian teaching. Others though, advance the concept of prima scriptura in contrast.[3]

The Bible has had a massive influence on literature and history, especially in the Western world, where the Gutenberg Bible was the first book
printed using movable type. [5][6] According to the March 2007 edition of Time, the Bible "has done more to shape literature, history,
entertainment, and culture than any book ever written. Its influence on world history is unparalleled, and shows no signs of abating." [5] With
estimated total sales of over 5 billion copies, it is widely considered to be the best-selling book of all time. [5][7][8] As of the 2000s, it sells
approximately 100 million copies annually. [9][10]

Contents

• 1 Etymology

• 1.1 Textual history

• 2 Development

• 3 Hebrew Bible

• 3.1 Torah

• 3.2 Nevi'im

• 3.3 Ketuvim

• 3.4 Original languages

• 4 Samaritan Pentateuch

• 5 Septuagint

• 5.1 Incorporations from Theodotion

• 5.2 Final form

• 6 Christian Bibles

• 6.1 Old Testament

• 6.2 New Testament

• 6.3 Development of the Christian canons

• 7 Divine inspiration

• 8 Versions and translations

• 9 Views

• 9.1 Other religions

• 9.2 Biblical studies

• 9.3 Higher criticism

• 10 Archaeological and historical research

• 11 Bible museums

• 12 Image gallery

• 13 Illustrations

• 14 See also

• 15 Notes

• 16 References

• 16.1 Works cited

• 17 Further reading

• 18 External links

Etymology
The word βιβλίον itself had the literal meaning of "paper" or "scroll" and came to be used as the ordinary word for "book". It is the diminutive
of βύβλος byblos, "Egyptian papyrus", possibly so called from the name of the Phoenician sea port Byblos (also known as Gebal) from whence
Egyptian papyrus was exported to Greece.

The Greek ta biblia (lit. "little papyrus books")[11] was "an expression Hellenistic Jews used to describe their sacred books" (the Septuagint).
[12][13] Christian use of the term can be traced to c. 223 CE.[14] The biblical scholar F.F. Bruce notes that Chrysostom appears to be the first
writer (in his Homilies on Matthew, delivered between 386 and 388) to use the Greek phrase ta biblia ("the books") to describe both the Old
and New Testaments together.[15]

Medieval Latin biblia is short for biblia sacra "holy book", while biblia in Greek and Late Latin is neuter plural (gen. bibliorum). It gradually came to
be regarded as a feminine singular noun (biblia, gen. bibliae) in medieval Latin, and so the word was loaned as singular into the vernaculars of
Western Europe.[16] Latin biblia sacra "holy books" translates Greek τὰ βιβλία τὰ ἅγια tà biblía tà hágia, "the holy books".[17]

The English word Bible is from the Latin biblia, from the same word in Medieval Latin and Late Latin and ultimately from Koinē Greek: τὰ
βιβλία, romanized: ta biblia "the books" (singular βιβλίον, biblion).[14]

Textual history
By the 2nd century BCE, Jewish groups began calling the books of the Bible the "scriptures" and they referred to them as "holy", or in Hebrew
‫( כִּתְ בֵי הַ ק ֹּדֶ ׁש‬Kitvei hakkodesh), and Christians now commonly call the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible "The Holy Bible" (in
Greek τὰ βιβλία τὰ ἅγια, tà biblía tà ágia) or "the Holy Scriptures" (η Αγία Γραφή, e Agía Graphḗ).[18] The Bible was divided into chapters in the
13th century by Stephen Langton and into verses in the 16th century by French printer Robert Estienne[19] and is now usually cited by book,
chapter, and verse. The division of the Hebrew Bible into verses is based on the sof passuk cantillation mark used by the 10th-
century Masoretes to record the verse divisions used in earlier oral traditions.[citation needed]

The oldest extant copy of a complete Bible is an early 4th-century parchment book preserved in the Vatican Library, and it is known as the Codex
Vaticanus. The oldest copy of the Tanakh in Hebrew and Aramaic dates from the 10th century CE. The oldest copy of a complete Latin (Vulgate)
Bible is the Codex Amiatinus, dating from the 8th century.[20]

Development
See also: Authorship of the Bible

The Isaiah scroll, which is a part of the Dead Sea Scrolls, contains almost the whole Book of Isaiah. It dates from the 2nd century BCE.

Saint Paul Writing His Epistles, 16th-century painting.

 Professor John K. Riches, Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism at the University of Glasgow, says that "the biblical texts themselves are the
result of a creative dialogue between ancient traditions and different communities through the ages", [21] and "the biblical texts were produced
over a period in which the living conditions of the writers – political, cultural, economic, and ecological – varied enormously". [22] Timothy H. Lim, a
professor of Hebrew Bible and Second Temple Judaism at the University of Edinburgh, says that the Old Testament is "a collection of
authoritative texts of apparently divine origin that went through a human process of writing and editing." [23] He states that it is not a magical book,
nor was it literally written by God and passed to mankind. Parallel to the solidification of the Hebrew canon (c. 3rd century BCE), only
the Torah first and then the Tanakh began to be translated into Greek and expanded, now referred to as the Septuagint or the Greek Old
Testament.[24]

In Christian Bibles, the New Testament Gospels were derived from oral traditions in the second half of the first century. Riches says that:

Scholars have attempted to reconstruct something of the history of the oral traditions behind the Gospels, but the results have
not been too encouraging. The period of transmission is short: less than 40 years passed between the death of Jesus and the
writing of Mark's Gospel. This means that there was little time for oral traditions to assume fixed form. [25]

The Bible was later translated into Latin and other languages. John Riches states that:

The translation of the Bible into Latin marks the beginning of a parting of the ways between Western Latin-speaking Christianity
and Eastern Christianity, which spoke Greek, Syriac, Coptic, Ethiopic, and other languages. The Bibles of the Eastern Churches
vary considerably: the Ethiopic Orthodox canon includes 81 books and contains many apocalyptic texts, such as were found at
Qumran and subsequently excluded from the Jewish canon. As a general rule, one can say that the Orthodox Churches
generally follow the Septuagint in including more books in their Old Testaments than are in the Jewish canon. [25]

Hebrew Bible
Tanakh

[show]
Torah  (Instruction)
Nevi'im  (Prophets)[show]
Ketuvim  (Writings)[show]
•
Main article: Development of the Hebrew Bible canon

The Nash Papyrus (2nd century BCE) contains a portion of a pre-Masoretic Text, specifically the Ten Commandments and the Shema Yisrael prayer.

The Masoretic Text is the authoritative Hebrew text of the Hebrew Bible. It defines the books of the Jewish canon, and also the precise letter-text
of these biblical books, with their vocalization and accentuation.

The oldest extant manuscripts of the Masoretic Text date from approximately the 9th century CE, [26] and the Aleppo Codex (once the oldest
complete copy of the Masoretic Text, but now missing its Torah section) dates from the 10th century.

reflects the threefold division of the Hebrew Scriptures, Torah ("Teaching"), Nevi'im ("Prophets") )‫תנ"ך‬ :Hebrew( The name Tanakh

.and Ketuvim ("Writings")

Torah
Main article: Torah
See also: Oral Torah
 A Torah scroll recovered from Glockengasse Synagogue in Cologne.

The Torah (‫)ּתֹורה‬

ָ is also known as the "Five Books of Moses" or the Pentateuch, meaning "five scroll-cases".[27] Traditionally these books were
considered to have been written almost entirely by Moses himself.[28] In the 19th century, Julius Wellhausen and other scholars proposed that the
Torah had been compiled from earlier written documents dating from the 9th to the 5th century BCE, the "documentary hypothesis".
[28] Scholars Hermann Gunkel and Martin Noth, building on the form criticism of Gerhard von Rad, refined this hypothesis, while other scholars
have proposed other ways that the Torah might have developed over the centuries. [28]

Samaritan Inscription containing portion of the Bible in nine lines of Hebrew text, currently housed in the British Museum

The Hebrew names of the books are derived from the first words in the respective texts. The Torah consists of the following five books:

•Genesis, Beresheeth (‫)בראשית‬
•Exodus, Shemot (‫)שמות‬
•Leviticus, Vayikra (‫)ויקרא‬
•Numbers, Bamidbar (‫)במדבר‬
•Deuteronomy, Devarim (‫)דברים‬
The first eleven chapters of Genesis provide accounts of the creation (or ordering) of the world and the history of God's early relationship with
humanity. The remaining thirty-nine chapters of Genesis provide an account of God's covenant with the biblical
patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (also called Israel) and Jacob's children, the "Children of Israel", especially Joseph. It tells of how God
commanded Abraham to leave his family and home in the city of Ur, eventually to settle in the land of Canaan, and how the Children of Israel
later moved to Egypt. The remaining four books of the Torah tell the story of Moses, who lived hundreds of years after the patriarchs. He leads
the Children of Israel from slavery in Ancient Egypt to the renewal of their covenant with God at biblical Mount Sinai and their wanderings in the
desert until a new generation was ready to enter the land of Canaan. The Torah ends with the death of Moses. [29]

The commandments in the Torah provide the basis for Jewish religious law. Tradition states that there are 613 commandments (taryag mitzvot).

Nevi'im
Main article: Nevi'im
Books of Nevi'im

 
Former Prophets
• Joshua
• Judges
• Samuel
• Kings
Latter Prophets (major)
• Isaiah
• Jeremiah
• Ezekiel
Latter Prophets (Twelve minor)
• Hosea
• Joel
• Amos
• Obadiah
• Jonah
• Micah
• Nahum
• Habakkuk
• Zephaniah
• Haggai
• Zechariah
• Malachi
Hebrew Bible
•

is the second main division of the Tanakh, between the Torah and Ketuvim. It )", romanized: Nəḇî'îm, "Prophets‫נְבִיאִ ים‬ :Hebrew( Nevi'im

), the narrative books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel and Kings ‫נביאים ראשונים‬ Nevi'im Rishonim ( contains two sub-groups, the Former Prophets

.), the books of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel and the Twelve Minor Prophets‫נביאים אחרונים‬ Nevi'im Aharonim ( and the Latter Prophets

The Nevi'im tell the story of the rise of the Hebrew monarchy and its division into two kingdoms, ancient Israel and Judah, focusing on conflicts
between the Israelites and other nations, and conflicts among Israelites, specifically, struggles between believers in "the L ORD God"[30] (Yahweh)
and believers in foreign gods,[31][32] [33][34][35]
 and the criticism of unethical and unjust behaviour of Israelite elites and rulers;  in
which prophets played a crucial and leading role. It ends with the conquest of the Kingdom of Israel by the Assyrians followed by the conquest of
the Kingdom of Judah by the Babylonians and the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem.

Former Prophets
The Former Prophets are the book

ow on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as hor has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the personl our author has been in his attempts, to set up
a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by what has been already said; but were that absolute
monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of
mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.
First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes anhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be
of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that
cannot command; and ideas of governm

§. 82.
How successfu
How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the personl our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute
power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our
author would desire it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world,
unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.
§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes anhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be
of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that
cannot command; and ideas of governm

§. 82.
How successfu

How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the personl our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute
power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our
author would desire it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world,
unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.
§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes anhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be
of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that
cannot command; and ideas of governm

§. 82.
How successfu

How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the personl our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute
power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our
author would desire it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world,
unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.
Secondly, That the princes anhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be
of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that
cannot command; and ideas of governm

§. 82.
How successfu

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to m 

CAPITOLUL 1CARACTERIZAREA GENERALĂ A INSTITUŢIILOR PUBLICE

1.1. Definirea instituţiilor publice
Instituţiile publice au un rol important în cadrul statului deoarece prin intermediul acestorastatul îşi
îndeplineşte funcţiile şi rolul. De asemenea, procesele economice în economia de
piaţă, precum şi în alte tipuri de economii, sunt influenţate de stat prin intermediul sectorului
public.Sfera de cuprindere a instituţiilor  publice este vastă, statul acţionând practic 
în toatedomeniile vieţii economice sau sociale. De asemenea, una din caracteristicile cele mai
importanteale economiilor secolului XX, care se continuă şi în secolul XXI, este
expansiunea sectorului public. Statul, prin intermediul instituţiilor de care dispune
sau prin intermediul întreprinderilor aacţionat, în funcţie de politica urmată în diferite perioade,
asupra redistribuirii produsului intern brutîn economie, a influenţat pozitiv sau negativ desfăşurarea
anumitor activităţi.O primă modalitate de definire a instituţiilor publice o prezintă Legea
privind finanţele publice nr. 500/2002 potrivit căreia "instituţii publice" reprezintă
denumirea generică ce
includeParlamentul,  Administraţia  Prezidenţială,  ministerele,  celelalte organe de s
pecialitate  aleadministraţiei publice, alte autorităţi publice, instituţiile publice autonome, precum
şi instituţiile dinsubordinea acestora, indiferent de modul de finanţare al lor.Instituţiile publice în
sensul Legii 273/2006 privind finanţele publice cuprind „autorităţileunităţilor administrativ-
teritoriale, instituţiile publice şi serviciile publice de interes local, cu personalitate juridică,
indiferent de modul de finanţare a activităţii acestora”.O altă modalitate de a defini
instituţiile publice este aceea legată de caracteristicile bunurilor  produse de către acestea şi modul
de verificare sau, altfel spus, de modul de distribuire a acestoracătre beneficiari. Din acest punct
de vedere, se poate spune că instituţiile publice produc bunuri  publice care se distribuie, de
regulă, în mod gratuit, urmărind satisfacerea la un nivel maxim posibila cerinţelor consumatorilor,
sau la preţuri accesibile consumatorilor. Producerea de bunuri publiceeste, de regulă, obiectul de
activitate al unei instituţii publice. De aceea, fiind legate, din punct devedere financiar, de bugetul
public, instituţiile publice sunt organizate după principiul "non profit".Există şi excepţia
potrivit căreia o instituţie este publică, în funcţie de caracteristicile  prestaţiilor
acesteia, adresându-se publicului larg. Delimitarea unor asemenea instituţii nu ţine seama
în primul rând de caracteristicile finanţării, de dependenţa lor de bugetul statului, ele putândfi chiar
private sau să funcţioneze după principiile finanţelor private.
1.2. Clasificarea instituţiilor publice
Instituţiile publice pot fi clasificate după mai multe criterii, astfel:I. După importanţa activităţii,
instituţiile publice pot fi grupate în :a) Insisfacerea la un nivel maxim posibila cerinţelor
consumatorilor, sau la preţuri accesibile consumatorilor. Producerea de bunuri publiceeste, de
regulă, obiectul de activitate al unei instituţii publice. De aceea, fiind legate, din punct devedere
financiar, de bugetul public, instituţiile publice sunt organizate după principiul "non profit".Există
şi excepţia potrivit căreia o instituţie este publică, în funcţie de
caracteristicile  prestaţiilor acesteia, adresându-se publicului larg. Delimitarea unor
asemenea instituţii nu ţineseama în primul rând de caracteristicile finanţării, de dependenţa lor
de bugetul statului, ele putândfi chiar private sau să funcţioneze după principiile finanţelor private.
1.2. Clasificarea instituţiilor publice
Instituţiile publice pot fi clasificate după mai multe criterii, astfel:I. După importanţa activităţii,
instituţiile publice pot fi grupate
în
:a) Instituţiile  administraţiei  publice centrale ce cuprind: Parlamentul,  Preşedenţia 
României, Guvernul, ministerele şi celelalte autorităţi centrale de specialitate ale
administraţiei publice şiinstituţiile din subordinea lor directă. b) Instituţii ale administraţiei
publice locale ce cuprind: consiliile comunale, orăşeneşti, judeţene
şiConsiliul General al Municipiului Bucureşti, ca autorităţi deliberative, şi primarii, preşe
dinţiiconsiliilor judeţene şi primarul general al municipiului Bucureşti, ca autorităţi executive.II.
După statutul juridic, instituţiile publice se clasifică în:a) Instituţii publice cu perso
 
CAPITOLUL 1CARACTERIZAREA GENERALĂ A INSTITUŢIILOR PUBLICE
1.1. Definirea instituţiilor publice
Instituţiile publice au un rol important în cadrul statului deoarece prin intermediul acestorastatul îşi
îndeplineşte funcţiile şi rolul. De asemenea, procesele economice în economia de
piaţă, precum şi în alte tipuri de economii, sunt influenţate de stat prin intermediul sectorului
public.Sfera de cuprindere a instituţiilor  publice este vastă, statul acţionând practic 
în toatedomeniile vieţii economice sau sociale. De asemenea, uown who has a right to direct me, and whose
prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that
they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over
them.

§. 82.
How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in A

In both these rights, there being supposed an exclusion of all other men, it must be upon some reason peculiar to Adam, that
they must both be founded.

That of his property our author supposes to arise from God’s immediate donation, Gen. i. 28. and that of fatherhood from the
act of brld with things fit for food and raiment, and other necessaries of life, subservient to his design, that man should live and
abide for some time upon the face of the earth, and not that so curious and wonderful a piece of workmanship, by his own
negligence, or want of necessaries, should perish again, presently after a few moments continuance; God, I say, having made
man and the world thus, spoke to him,ugh to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but
there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be
obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that
power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is
without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men
too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who
has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an
obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person
who by right is vested with this power over them.

§. 82.
How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I
am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not
only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.

ugh to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and
knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any
power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there
would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns
and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I
am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not
only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.

§. 82.
How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I
am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not
only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.

ugh to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and
knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any
power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there
would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns
and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I
am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not
only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.

§. 82.
How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I
am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not
only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.

(that is) directed him [102] by his senses and reason, as he did the inferior animals by their sense and instinct, which were
serviceable for his subsistence, and given him as the means of his preservation. And therefore I doubt not, but before these
words were pronounced, i. Gen. 28, 29. (if they must be understood literally to have been spoken) and without any such
verbal donation, man had a right to an use of the creatures, by the will and grant of God: for the desire, strong desire of
preserving his life and being, having been planted in him as a principle of action by God himself, reason, which was the voice
of God in him, could not but teach him and assure him, that pursuing that natural inclination he had to preserve his being, he
followed the will of his maker, and therefore had a right to make use of those creatures, which by his reason or senses he could
discover would be serviceable thereunto. And thus man’s property in the creatures was founded upon the right he had to make
use of those things that were necessary or useful to his being.

§. 87.
This being the reason and foundation of Adam’s property, gave the same title, on the same ground, to all his children, not only
after his death, but in his life-time: so that here was no privilege of his heir above his other children, which could exclude them
from an equal right to the use of the inferior creatures, for the comfortable preservation [103] of their beings, which is all
the property man hath in them; and so Adam’s sovereignty built on property, or, as our author calls it, private
dominion, comes to nothing. Every man had a right to the creatures, by the same title Adam had, viz. by the right every one
had to take care of, and provide for their subsistence: and thus men had a right in common, Adam’s children in common with
him. But if any one had began, and made himself a property in any particular thing, (which how he, or any one else, could do,
shall be shewn in another place) that thing, that possession, if he disposed not otherwise of it by his positive grant, descended
naturally to his children, and they had a right to succeed to it, and possess it.

§. 88.
It might reasonably be asked here, how come children by this right of possessing, before any other, the properties of their
parents upon their decease? for it being personally the parents, when they die, without actually transferring their right to
another, why does it not return again to the common stock of mankinhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be
governmentment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of
government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of
men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men,
unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this
dominion over othersent in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to
the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settegetting: now in all inheritance, if the heir succeed not to the reason
upon which his father’s right was founded, he cannot succeed to the right which followeth from it. For example, Adam had a
right of property in the creatures upon the donation and grant of God almighty, who was lord and proprietor of them all: let
this be so as our author tells us, yet upon his death his heir can have no title to them, no such right of property in them, unless
the same reason, viz. God’s [101] donation, vested a right in the heir too: for if Adam could have had no property in, nor use of
the creatures, without this positive donation from God, and this donation were only personally to Adam, his heir could have no
right by it; but upon his death it must revert to God, the lord and owner again; for positive grants give no title farther than the
express words convey it, and by which only it is held. And thus, if as our author himself contends, that donation, Gen. i. 28.
were made only to Adam personally, his heir could not succeed to his property in the creatures; and if it were a donation to any
but Adam, let it be shewn, that it was to his heir in our author’s sense, i. e. to one of his children, exclusive of all the rest.

§. 86.
But not to follow our author too far out of the way, the plain of the case is this. God having made man, and planted in him, as in
all other animals, a strong desire of self-preservation; and furnished the woegetting: now in all inheritance, if the heir succeed
not to the reason upon which his father’s right was founded, he cannot succeed to the right which followeth from it. For
example, Adam had a right of property in the creatures upon the donation and grant of God almighty, who was lord and
proprietor of them all: let this be so as our author tells us, yet upon his death his heir can have no title to them, no such right of
property in them, unless the same reason, viz. God’s [101] donation, vested a right in the heir too: for if Adam could have had
no property in, nor use of the creatures, without this positive donation from God, and this donation were only personally
to Adam, his heir could have no right by it; but upon his death it must revert to God, the lord and owner again; for positive
grants give no title farther than the express words convey it, and by which only it is held. And thus, if as our author himself
contends, that donation, Gen. i. 28. were made only to Adam personally, his heir could not succeed to his property in the
creatures; and if it were a donation to any but Adam, let it be shewn, that it was to his heir in our author’s sense, i. e. to one of
his children, exclusive of all the rest.

§. 86.
But not to follow our author too far out of the way, the plain of the case is this. God having made man, and planted in him, as in
all other animals, a strong desire of self-preservation; and furnished the woegetting: now in all inheritance, if the heir succeed
not to the reason upon which his father’s right was founded, he cannot succeed to the right which followeth from it. For
example, Adam had a right of property in the creatures upon the donation and grant of God almighty, who was lord and
proprietor of them all: let this be so as our author tells us, yet upon his death his heir can have no title to them, no such right of
property in them, unless the same reason, viz. God’s [101] donation, vested a right in the heir too: for if Adam could have had
no property in, nor use of the creatures, without this positive donation from God, and this donation were only personally
to Adam, his heir could have no right by it; but upon his death it must revert to God, the lord and owner again; for positive
grants give no title farther than the express words convey it, and by which only it is held. And thus, if as our author himself
contends, that donation, Gen. i. 28. were made only to Adam personally, his heir could not succeed to his property in the
creatures; and if it were a donation to any but Adam, let it be shewn, that it was to his heir in our author’s sense, i. e. to one of
his children, exclusive of all the rest.

§. 86.
But not to follow our author too far out of the way, the plain of the case is this. God having made man, and planted in him, as in
all other animals, a strong desire of self-preservation; and furnished the woling of order, and establishment of government in
its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have
this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us
whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am
never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to
know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And
therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction
and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there
is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right
belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person
who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful
princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of
violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person
cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s
consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the
world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.ent in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never
so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and
establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the
person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection
and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy
and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience;
since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself,
as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but
submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to
convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom
this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be
satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction
between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would
become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they
do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow.
To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a
power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.ent in the fancy, though never
so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the
settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught
how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to
talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to
be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my
obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may
be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies
nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a
subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person
to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can
be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction
between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would
become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they
do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow.
To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a
power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.ent in the fancy, though never
so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the
settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught
how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to
talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to
be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my
obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may
be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies
nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a
subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person
to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can
be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction
between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would
become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they
do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow.
To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a
power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.ent in the fancy, though never
so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the
settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught
how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to
talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to
be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my
obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may
be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies
nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a
subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person
to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can
be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction
between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would
become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they
do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow.
To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a
power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.. It is in vain then to talk of
subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be
magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my
obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may
be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies
nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a
subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person
to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can
be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no
distinctiotment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of
government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of
men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men,
unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this
dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I
never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it
appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him
that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to
government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have
authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but
there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be
obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that
power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinctiotment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men
cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so
right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and
establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the
person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection
and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy
and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience;
since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself,
as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but
submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to
convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom
this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be
satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no
distinctiotment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of
government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of
men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men,
unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this
dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I
never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it
appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him
that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to
government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have
authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but
there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be
obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that
power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinctiotment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men
cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so
right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and
establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the
person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection
and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy
and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience;
since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself,
as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but
submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to
convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom
this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be
satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinctiod;
yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no
marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other.
And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the
direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that
there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of
right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the
person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and
lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would hough it be never so
plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be of our author’s mind, that divine appointment
had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in
the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would
be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there
were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over
others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would hough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should
all men be of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any
thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give
laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of
government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it
belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience
without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the
world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be
no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any
other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to
the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him
that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal
power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is
the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates
and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would hough it be never so
plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be of our author’s mind, that divine appointment
had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in
the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would
be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there
were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over
others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would hough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should
all men be of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any
thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give
laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of
government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it
belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience
without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the
world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be
no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any
other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to
the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him
that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal
power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is
the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates
and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would