G.R. No.

199439 April 22, 2014 CITY OF GENERAL

SANTOS, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 199439               April 22, 2014

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R.

ANTONINO-CUSTODIO Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

NATURE:

This is a special civil action for certiorari  filed by  the city of General Santos asking to find grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Audit (COA).which affirmed the findings of its
Legal Services Sector in its Opinion No. 2010-021 declaring Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as
illegal. 

FACTS:
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and regulations,
designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the
incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package." 6

This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested
by respondent Commission on Audit.

In response to the endorsement of the city audit team leader, respondent Commission’s regional
director agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to respondent Commission’s Office of
General Counsel, Legal Services Sector.

The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. Respondent Commission on
Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on
ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive
Orders by the city mayor.  Moreover, nowhere in Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
26

known as the Local Government Code, does it provide a specific power for local government units to
establish an early retirement program.

ISSUE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED ORDINANCE NO. 08, SERIES OF 2009, IN THE NATURE
OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAM REQUIRING A LAW AUTHORIZING IT FOR ITS
VALIDITY

HELD:
The Court agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as the invalidity of Section 5
of the ordinance is concerned.

Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits – Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of
this program shall be entitled to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a
retiring government employee.

Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided under this
program at the rate of one and one-half (1 1/2) months of the employee’s latest basic salary for
every year of service in the City Government. 9

Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of which is pegged on the
beneficiary’s years of service in the city government. The ordinance provides that only those who
have rendered service to the city government for at least 15 years may apply.  Consequently, this
75

provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit. Applying the definition in Conte, it is a form
of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the city government, and it is intended to help the
employee enjoy the remaining years of his or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.

Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or
retirement plan – other than the GSIS – for government officers and employees, in order to prevent
the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. x x x. To ignore this and rule otherwise would
be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own
supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial assistance. 71

The Court declares Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.

Case Digest: Pelizloy v. Benguet
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner,
vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.

G.R. No. 183137, 10 April 2013.

LEONEN, J.:

Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which has facilities like
swimming pools, a spa and function halls.

In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59, the tax
ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools,
bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."

Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before the
Secretary of Justice. Upon the Secretary’s failure to decide on the appeal within sixty days, Pelizloy filed
a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the RTC.

Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of local
government units under Section 133 (i) of the Local Government Code, which provides that the exercise
of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or
services except as otherwise provided.

The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 (a) of
the LGC encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since Article
131 (b) of the LGC defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion and entertainment synonymous to
relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."

RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction
for lack of merit. Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper remedy. However, it
gave credence to the Province of Benguet's assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 of
the LGC.

ISSUE:  W/N provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being "amusement places" under the
LGC.

RULING: NO.
Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not barred from levying amusement
taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. The levying of percentage taxes is
prohibited "except as otherwise provided" by the LGC. Section 140 provides such exception.

Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on "the proprietors,
lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of
amusement."

However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those
places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the
determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to these places hinges on
whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs, and tourist spots.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word
or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."

Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places" include theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.

As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of something,
typically an impressive one"; while ‘performance’ means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a
concert, or other form of entertainment." As such, the ordinary definitions of the words ‘show’ and
‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active
doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly)
perceived by an audience.

Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots
cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or
viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually
engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or
present shows and/or performances.
De Lima et.al vs. Gatdula Case Digest
G.R. No. 204528
Feb. 19, 2013
En Banc

FACTS:
Respondent Gatdula filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila, directed
against petitioners.

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo or not, the judge issued summons and
ordered the petitioners to file an answer.  He also set the case for hearing.

The counsel for petitioners manifested that a Return and not an Answer is appropriate for Amparo cases
but the Judge opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied since an Amparo case is
summary in nature, thus, required an Answer.

The hearing was conducted and the judge ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda.

RTC then rendered a decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs prayed for
namely: Temporary protection, production and inspection orders.

The decision was assailed by the petitioners through a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 as
enunciated in Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of an Answer was appropriate?
2. Whether or not the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure apply in a Petition for Writ of Amparo?
3. Whether or not the holding of the hearing on the main case was proper?
4. Whether or not the filing of the memorandum was proper?
5. Whether or not the decision granting the privilege of the Writ and the interim reliefs was correct?
6. Whether or not the mode of appeal under Rule 45 availed by the Petitioners was correct?

RULING:
1. No. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo.

2. The Revised Rules of Summary Procedures apply only to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how
this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the
application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special
proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is
not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is
seriously misplaced.

3. No. The holding of the hearing without the Return was not proper. There will be a summary hearing
only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.

4. No. A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

5. No. The decision was not correct.  This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since
the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition
is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of
Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not
totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.

6. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order. A Petition for
Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause
grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

HELD:
(1) NULLIFY all orders issued by the Judge in relation to this Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
case;

(2) DIRECT the Judge to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution
whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached
affidavits.

Penned by: Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

MENDOZA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 195395,
September 10, 2013
Fact: Petitioner Mendoza is the general manager of Talisay Water District in
Talisay City, Negros Occidental. The Water District was formed pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 198, otherwise known as the “Provincial Water
Utilities Act of 1973.” The Commission on Audit disallowed a total amount of
P3 80,208.00 which Mendoza received as part of his salary as the Water
District’s general manager from 2005 to 2006. The Commission found that
petitioner Mendoza’s salary as general manager “was not in consonance with
the rate prescribed under the Salary Standardization Law  On July 6, 2009,
the Commission on Audit issued the “Notice of Finality of COA Decision”
informing petitioner Mendoza of the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s.
The Commission then instructed the Talisay Water District cashier to
withhold petitioner Mendoza’s salaries. Petitioner Mendoza filed his Motion
for Reconsideration of the “Notice of Finality of COA Decision.” He assailed
the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s, arguing that he had not personally
received a copy of this. This deprived him of the opportunity to answer the
Notice immediately. The Commission on Audit denied petitioner Mendoza’s
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner Mendoza filed
Petition to set aside the Commission on Audit’s Decision.

Issue: Whether the Petitioner was afforded due process even if he did not
personally received the notice of Disallowance.

Held: The Notice of Disallowance/s became final and executory. Petitioner

Mendoza was afforded due process despite his claim that he had never
personally received a copy of the Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file
the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due course to the
Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly
afforded an opportunity to explain his side and seek a reconsideration of the
ruling he assails, which is the “essence of administrative due process.”
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 171428,
2013-11-11
Facts:
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. It was
incorporated on April 23, 1979 to operate ocean-going vessels engaged primarily in foreign
trade.[2] Ruperto V. Tankeh applied for a $3.5 million loan from public... respondent
Development Bank of the Philippines for the partial financing of an ocean-going vessel
named the M/V Golden Lilac. To authorize the loan, Development Bank of the Philippines
required that the following conditions be met:

1.

A first mortgage must be obtained over the vessel, which by then had been renamed the
M/V Sterling Ace;

2.

Ruperto V. Tankeh, petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Jose Marie Vargas, as well as
respondents Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and Vicente Arenas should become liable jointly
and severally for the amount of the loan;

3.

The future earnings of the mortgaged vessel, including proceeds of Charter and Shipping
Contracts, should be assigned to Development Bank of the Philippines; and

4.

Development Bank of the Philippines should be assigned no less than 67% of the total
subscribed and outstanding voting shares of the company. The percentage of shares
assigned should be maintained at all times, and the assignment was to subsist as long as...
the assignee, Development Bank of the Philippines, deemed it necessary during the
existence of the loan.[3]
On June 16, 1983, petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh saying that he
was severing all ties and terminating his involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
P... etitioner filed several Complaints[15] against respondents, praying that the promissory
note be declared null and void and that he be absolved from any liability from the mortgage
of the vessel and the note in question.
Issues:
whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent Rupert V. Tankeh did not
commit fraud against the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Petition is partly granted.
Before disposing... he main issue in this case, this Court needs to address a procedural
issue raised by respondents. Collectively, respondents argue that the Petition is actually
one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court[43] and not a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.[44] Thus, petitioner's failure to show that
there was neither appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy merited the
dismissal of the Complaint.
Types of Fraud in Contracts
Fraud is defined in Article 1338 of the Civil Code as:... x x x fraud when, through insidious
words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a
contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
This is followed by the articles which provide legal examples and illustrations of fraud.
Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties
are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud. (n)
Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to
know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n)
Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, unless made by an
expert and the other party has relied on the former's special knowledge. (n)
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such
misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual. (n)
Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error.
(n)
The distinction between fraud as a ground for rendering a contract voidable or as basis for
an award of damages is provided in Article 1344:
In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should not have
been employed by both contracting parties.
Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. (1270)
There are two types of fraud contemplated in the performance of contracts: dolo incidente
or incidental fraud and dolo causante or fraud serious enough to render a contract voidable

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ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 171428,
2013-11-11
Facts:
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. It was
incorporated on April 23, 1979 to operate ocean-going vessels engaged primarily in foreign
trade.[2] Ruperto V. Tankeh applied for a $3.5 million loan from public... respondent
Development Bank of the Philippines for the partial financing of an ocean-going vessel
named the M/V Golden Lilac. To authorize the loan, Development Bank of the Philippines
required that the following conditions be met:

1.

A first mortgage must be obtained over the vessel, which by then had been renamed the
M/V Sterling Ace;

2.

Ruperto V. Tankeh, petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Jose Marie Vargas, as well as
respondents Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and Vicente Arenas should become liable jointly
and severally for the amount of the loan;

3.

The future earnings of the mortgaged vessel, including proceeds of Charter and Shipping
Contracts, should be assigned to Development Bank of the Philippines; and

4.

Development Bank of the Philippines should be assigned no less than 67% of the total
subscribed and outstanding voting shares of the company. The percentage of shares
assigned should be maintained at all times, and the assignment was to subsist as long as...
the assignee, Development Bank of the Philippines, deemed it necessary during the
existence of the loan.[3]
On June 16, 1983, petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh saying that he
was severing all ties and terminating his involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
P... etitioner filed several Complaints[15] against respondents, praying that the promissory
note be declared null and void and that he be absolved from any liability from the mortgage
of the vessel and the note in question.
Issues:
whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent Rupert V. Tankeh did not
commit fraud against the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Petition is partly granted.
Before disposing... he main issue in this case, this Court needs to address a procedural
issue raised by respondents. Collectively, respondents argue that the Petition is actually
one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court[43] and not a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.[44] Thus, petitioner's failure to show that
there was neither appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy merited the
dismissal of the Complaint.
Types of Fraud in Contracts
Fraud is defined in Article 1338 of the Civil Code as:... x x x fraud when, through insidious
words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a
contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
This is followed by the articles which provide legal examples and illustrations of fraud.
Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties
are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud. (n)
Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to
know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n)
Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, unless made by an
expert and the other party has relied on the former's special knowledge. (n)
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such
misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual. (n)
Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error.
(n)
The distinction between fraud as a ground for rendering a contract voidable or as basis for
an award of damages is provided in Article 1344:
In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should not have
been employed by both contracting parties.
Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. (1270)
There are two types of fraud contemplated in the performance of contracts: dolo incidente
or incidental fraud and dolo causante or fraud serious enough to render a contract voidable

People vs. Gutierrez

G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014

FACTS: The victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student at
Camp 7 Elementary School in Baguio City testified that on November 29,
2005, she went home from school at around 12 noon to have lunch. On the
way home, she met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his room and laid
her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He
pulled down his pants and then inserted his penis into her vagina. According
to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew
his penis, white liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (P5.00) before
she went back to school.

AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap,
asked her where she came from because she was tardy. AAA initially did not
answer. When asked again why she was tardy, AAA admitted she came from
“Uncle Rod.” She also admitted that she went there to ask for money. Chapap
then brought AAA to Rona Ambaken, AAA’s previous teacher. Together, they
brought AAA to the principal’s office. AAA was brought to the comfort room
where Ambaken inspected her panties. The principal was able to confirm that
AAA was touched since AAA’s private organ was swelling. Her underwear was
also wet.

Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to Baguio General

Hospital where her underwear was again inspected. Dr. Anvic Pascua also
examined her. On the way to the hospital, Dalisdis passed by the barangay hall
and the police station to report the incident. AAA also disclosed during trial
that the accused-appellant had done the same thing to her about 10 times on
separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten (P10.00) or five
(P5.00) pesos.

The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as an expert witness. Dr.
Ogues was the superior of Dr. Pascua who examined AAA. Dr. Ogues testified
based on the medical certificate issued by the examining physician that there
was blunt force penetrating trauma that could have been caused by sexual
abuse. She also stated that there was another medico-legal certificate issued by
Dr. Carag, surgical resident of the Department of Surgery of Baguio General
Hospital, showing findings of some hematoma in AAA’s legs.

Crime charged: statutory rape

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape Rodrigo appealed to

the Court of Appeals claiming that AAA’s testimony fell short of the
requirement of the law on the quantum of evidence required. He argued that
she did not cry for help when her family’s house was just nearby, which was
cause for reasonable doubt that the trial court failed to appreciate.
CA: affirmed RTC’s decisionISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant was guilty of
statutory rape punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
(YES)

HELD: Accused-appellant is guilty of statutory rape.

People vs. Teodoro explained the elements of statutory rape committed under
Article 266- A, paragraph (1) (d): What the law punishes in statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force,
intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations;
the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot
have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.

The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the time of
the incident. What is critical in this case, therefore, is whether there is a
showing that Rodrigo had carnal knowledge of AAA.

AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was
done to her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to
court, her testimony deserves full weight and credence.