Aruelo vs CA 227 SCRA 311

FACTS:
Gatchalian and Aruelo were rivals for the office of the Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan in the May
11, 1992 Elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed Vice-Mayor by a margin of four votes on May 13, 1992.

On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul Gatchalian’s
proclamation on the ground of “fraudulent alteration and tampering” of votes in the tally sheets and the
election returns. He also filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan an election protest.

When Gatchalian received the summons, instead of filing an answer, he filed a motion to dismissw
on the following grounds: (a) the petition was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending pre-proclamation
case before the COMELEC, hence the protest was premature; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed
fees.

On August 11, 1992, Gatchalian submitted before the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest
and Counterclaim, alleging inter alia, that Aruelo was the one who committed the election fraud and that
were it not for the said fraud, GatchalianÊs margin over Aruelo would have been greater. Gatchalian
prayed for the dismissal of the petition, the confirmation of his election and the award of damages. On the
day the answer was filed, the trial court issued an order admitting it, and without GatchalianÊs specific
prayer, directed the revision of ballots in the precincts enumerated in GatchalianÊs Counter-Protest and
Construction. For this purpose, the trial court ordered the delivery of the contested ballot boxes to the
Branch Clerk of Court.

Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent
therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule
35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the
filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the
five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

Issue:
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period
prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Held:

NO. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343- M-92) with the Regional Trial Court,
whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the
regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the
COMELEC.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases
pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in
the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235

FACTS:
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino·reorganization of the
various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, tranfers of personnel
effected. At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the
National Children’s Hospital. On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of
Health that he would be re-appointed “Medical Specialist II.” Considering this to be a demotion by no less
than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH
Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission.

Dr. de la Fuente’s case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution dated August 9,
1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the following conclusion and disposition, to wit:

“The Commission declares the demotion/transfer of appellant dela Fuente, Jr. from Chief of
Clinics to Medical Specialist II as null and void: hence, illegal. Considering further that since the National
Children’s Hospital was not abolished and the positions therein remained intact although the title or
the position of Chief of Clinics was changed to ‘Chief of Medical Professional Staff’̂ with substantially
the same functions and responsibilities, the Commission hereby orders that:

1. Appellant dela Fuente, Jr. be retained or considered as never having relinquished his position of
Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights; and
2. He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and housing allowances and such other
benefits withheld from him from the date of his illegal demotion/transfer.”

No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal therefrom essayed to
the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed therefor by the Constitution. Consequently, the
resolution became final, on September 21, 1988.

Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any
indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would be obeyed. So, he instituted in the
Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of “mandamus and damages with preliminary
injunction” to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to
comply with the final and executory resolution of the Civil Service Commission. The CA granted the
decision insofar as his restoration to his former position but denied De la Fuente’s prayer for damages on
the ground that the petitions for mandamus are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of
said damages.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by de la Fuente arguing that CA has the power to grant
damages in a mandamus action by virtue of BP 129 which gave the SC, CA and RTCs concurrent jurisdiction
over such petitions and that CA was given the power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve
factual issues.

CA eventually granted the MR and ordered setting a date for reception of evidence on the la
Fuente's claim for damages. It based its judgment on the last phrase of Sec. 3 Rule 65 ROC which expressly
allows the award of damages in a mandamus petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of
damages in a special civil action of mandamus.
HELD:
Yes. CA has jurisdiction to award damages in mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court explicitly authorized the rendition of judgment in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant." The provision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant's
wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of
1940 had an identical counterpart provision. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a
mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable,
for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a
mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably
linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.