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Fear and Loathing in Organization Studies

John Van Maanen,

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 Fear and Loathing in
Organization Studies 1
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John Van Maanen
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Rhetoric is the master-word for this reply to a reply
and my main point is simply that Iike it or not we live
in a rhetorical world. This is a conclusion that is
inevitable once we remove literal meaning as a re-
straint on what we say (or write) because this first-step
down the interpretive path contains all the others. This
is not to say I put forth my reply without restraint-such
a condition is unimaginable-but merely to signal that
the restraints that are in place are not fixed but flexi-
ble, subject always to alteration through persuasive
appeals.
That said, let me turn to the prickly pages of Pfeffer's
"Mortality, Reproducibility and the Persistence of
Styles of Theory." In this piece, I am portrayed as
something of a villain for refuting certain arguments in
Pfeffer (1993) that now appear to him to be "scarcely
controversia! with respect to their empírica! founda-
tions and probably not even [controversial] in the logic
of the argument" (Pfeffer 1995, p. 682, emphasis and
parenthesis mine). Given his remarks about our "too-
pluralistic" field and the advantages he attributes to
paradigm consensus, such a statement strikes me as
either disingenuous or nai've. But, whatever the case, it
does present an explicit and easily identifiable move in
our respective Ianguage game and as such falls neatly
into the argumentative web I spin here.
This essay is my brief answer to why Jeffs position is
so very controversial (and so very wrong). 1 must admit
however to feeling serious readers may very well anticí-
pate my arguments for they are largely rehashings of
points I put forth in "Style as Theory" (Van Maanen
1995). But, be that as it may, one always yearns for the
last word in the academic blood-sport called debate. 2
And, more to the point, 1 find the challenge issued in
Jeffs reply to be as appealing as his scholarship is
appalling. So into rhetorical politics I again plunge.
No Exit
In the first few paragraphs of Jeffs response, I am
taken to task for utilizing an emotionally Iaden, explic-
itly political, heated-up, purple and provocative lan-
ÜRGANIZATION Sc1ENCE/Vol. 6, No. 6, November-December 1995
Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
guage. We are told that Peter Frost's characterization
of my article as '" 'less restrained than we are used to'
was an understatement" (Pfeffer 1995, p. 681; emphasis
mine). Guilty as charged. Yet the phrase "less re-
strained,. is a sneaky one and when it is used as an
opprobrium to reasoned discourse and used as a
hroadside to undercut arguments that are otherwise
ignored, a reader must ~urely wonder why a "more
restrained" piece of writing is to be preferred? This is
indeed an odd complaint sincc Jcffrey initiated this
skirmish in the first place in a pitch hardly dcsigned to
be placating. Are we not allowed to be annoyed-and
show it? And, if annoyed, must we resort to the imper-
sonal, formulaic and dull discourse so Ioved by journal
editors? My response was, after ali, published in a
forum called Crossroads where sorne of the pinched
constraints of the "scientific articlc" are supposedly
lifted.
Perhaps the application of thc label "lcss restraincd"
suggcsts just how impoverishcd, stiff, sanitized and
humorless our scholarly discourse has becomc; in
Perrow's (1985) memorable tcrm, "asphaltcd." Are only
terms associated with calm reason and cool calculation
to be found in print? Must our passions be put forth
impassionaiely, our interests displayed with disinterest,
our personal views given impersonally, our selective
use of facts cloaked by scientific ideals of a century
long past?
On the surface then this is a most stilted critique.
For one thing, comedy, parody, satire. travesty, farce,
jest and irreverence of ali kinds are regular attendants
in the service of persuasion and reality construction.
Unusual phrasings, word play, puns, fresh analogies
and metaphors, stylistic signatures of all sorts offer to
invert the order of thing~. to unsettle acccpted modes
of thought, to render the taken-for-granted world a
little topsy-turvy, a point 1 made with respect to sorne
essays by Karl Weick though apparently a point missed
completely by Jeff. The work such writings accomplish
can be corrosive of dogma and thus protect conscious-
ness and thought. The wholesale disparagemcnt (and
ban) of those genres and styles that seek to inform as
687
 JOHN VAN MAANEN Crossroads
well as to amuse, jibe, startle and otherwise stand apart
from the taken-for-granted, technocratic language of
the field is perhaps the real threat presented by Jeffs
cranky response that elevates reproducibility, consen-
sus and dogged perseverance above insight, crcativity
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and principled tolerance for ideas not easily slipped
into a paradigm file.
Below the surface however lurks a more serious
matter. Jeff implies that my speech is somehow in-
fected with a rhetoric that is absent from his own. This
is a kind of argument much beloved by keepers of the
scientific flame. It is also apparently of great attraction
to Jeff for a reader can almost hear him chortle as he
plunks it down with an attitude that it is a point so
irrefutable, so rock solid that no one can get around it.
Despite Jeffs smugness and intellectual chutzpah, it is
a point easily dislodged. In a nutshell, there is no form
of speech, argument, representation that is free from
rhetoric. Every scientist or scholar, regardless of field,
relies on common devices of rhetoric: On metaphors;
on premises left unargued; on word games; on invoca-
tions of authority (Nelson et al. 1987, p. 32); on appeals
to the "good sense" of readers; on using forms of
evidence that sometimes ignore the concerns, back-
grounds and resources available to readers; on política!
correctness (or its intentional violation); on purposely
undefined or vague concepts; on strategic silences and
the use of bland euphemisms; on tricks of writing
masquerading as reason (e.g., "it is evident ... "); and
on and on (and on).
Standing behind an anti-rhetorical stance is often a
powerful elitism associated with paradigmatic cer-
tainty. For those in possession of such certainty (and
the clout they assume their due), any break in the
institutionalized forms of discourse is seen as a regret-
table descent into rhetoric. The anti-rhetoric crowd
would have it that they use a neutral, transparent
language uncolored by any personal or partisan agen-
das. Language marked by personal reference and pref-
erence, for example, or language that calls attention to
itself via stylistic gesture is thus polluted by a treacher-
ous subjectivity, by individual agendas and desires that
distort whatever facts are communicated. This is the
kind of language that makes one, in Jeffs phrase, a
"master rhetorician." By rejecting flourish, stylc, un-
conventional phrasing and formats for a "natural" lan-
guage of temperance and studied indifference, a writer
becomes a reliable, trustworthy and (more or less)
objective reporter of the way things are. An elegant
play to be sure. But, in these textually sophisticated
days, it is a ploy all too familiar and no longer carries
great force. 3 To accept a sharp distinction between
688 ÜRGAN!ZAT!ON Sc1ENCE/Vol. 6, No. 6, November-December 1995
Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
rhetorical and non-rhetorical speech is to trade in our
late twentieth century understandings of language and
language use for those of the seventeenth century.
In brief, the contemporary argument-which can be
traced from the icy mountain tops of universal reason
and clear-eyed objectivity to the steamy valleys of so-
cially-embedded knowledge and negotiated meanings
-is that one is never free from rhetoric. Even the
most unpreposing, flat, minimalist, just-the-facts, Plain
Jane prose proclaims itself as rhetoric as clearly as
charged, stylistically innovative, loud, colorful, Calamity
Jane prose. The whole range of intended or unin-
tended ornament in speech-from zero to ten-is
equally rhetorical, equally deep, equally superficial.
When anti-rhetorical types hear this argument they are
likely to regard it as another rhetorical trick designed
to take us down that slippery slope to anarchistic
relativisim. And when the friends of rhetoric hear
claims of language transparency, they too suspect dis-
honesty, though not necessarily a dishonesty marked by
foresight and malice. 4 And so it goes, an endless round
of accusation and counteraccusation in which truth and
honesty are claimed by ali. There is no escape.
The question is of course what rhetoric will prevail?
Is path analysis always more persuasive than a moral
argument? Is a controlled experiment more persuasive
than an ethnography? Do soft, vague theories invari-
ably lose out in the end to hard, precise ones? I doubt
it. While these are often audience-specific matters,
competing truth claims come down to rhetorical con-
tests as I demonstrate by moving to the contest at
han d.
1 have three lines of criticism to open up. The first
concerns the normative or moral grounds of Jeffs
arguments. This is akin to a critical theorist's perspec-
tive and raises a few (of many) questions as to whether
or not our synthetic, rather rag-tag and multiple
paradigm field of organizational studies would be well
served working toward (or in) paradigmatic consensus.
My second set of concerns requires a quick but close
look at a few of the meanings-intended or not-to be
extracted from Jeffs response and thus necessitates
something of a literary or deconstructive tale of his
text. My third line of critique is to challenge and deny
the reality of the so-called objective world Jeff tries to
argue into existence. Here I challenge severa! proposi-
tional truths and validity claims put forth in his reply.
Normative Implications
Jeff seems to live in a Hobbsian world where power
equals knowledge. Certainly success-as indicated by
 JOHN VAN MAANEN Crossroads
journal space, recruitment of students, tenure slots and
so farth-is given most weight as the measure of a
paradigm's worthiness. Matters of value, creativity, ap-
peal, scope, paradigmatic change and innovation are
given short shrift. It is a most utilitarian perspective
and curiously mimics the very self-seeking premises of
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approaches he otherwise claims to find limiting.
Paradigmatic consensus may provide blissful relief from
the ambiguity and contentiousness of our field and
(arguably) protect us from threatened take-over at-
tempts by the barbarians at our gates, but the costs in
scholarly and human terms of achieving such a state
are not much considered.
We do get sorne hints at what a cozy but suffacating
world paradigm consensus might be through the exam-
ples Jeff provides of those organizational studies sub-
fields he considers fine-tuned, fit and successful:
behavioral decision theory, population ecology, net-
work analysis and so farth. Here the words and phrases
he uses to describe these areas are most revealing of
the kind of scholarly world that appears to exist behind
paradigmatic consensus; a world Jeff would have us
emulate. Consider just a few: "domination (of a field)"
(p. 682), "efficient in training graduate students"
(p. 683), "scholarship more predictable"(p. 683), "taken
over (majar journals)" (p. 683), "more efficient and
effective research programs" (p. 683), "theoretical
hegemony" (p. 683), "ability to readily reproduce"
(p. 684), "technology far analysis" (p. 685), and "repli-
cable, teachable, transferable concepts and methods"
(p. 685). This is a call far the industrialization of
scholarship, not its advancement. It is a call to further
stratify our field by narrowing the legitimate research
tapies, theories and methods as deemed appropriate by
those who build and articulate the chosen paradigm.
This of course begs the questions of how and why
such a consensus could be brought about in the first
place? How would we go about "enlisting others" to
the cause? Just how draconian the measures to be
taken to achieve a paradigm consensus can he inferred
by the sense of urgency Jeff introduces into his story:
The economists are coming! The economists are coming!
If we are to survive, any number of worlds and activi-
ties will have to be curtailed or excluded and there is
apparently no time to waste. Thus it seems to Jeff that
what looks to me like a broad and healthy field-a
loosely-knit community that is not standing still but
changing its shape through growing numbers of active
researchers who are exploring new territories, sharing
their findings and projects with one another in an
expanding number of books and journals, meeting reg-
ularly in small and large groups to explain, debate,
ÜRGANIZATION ScIENCE/Vol. 6, No. 6, November-December 1995
. _____________Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
proselytize-is really a field in poor health. Such
widespread professional activity apparently disperses
the power and authority that would otherwise be cen-
tralized under a paradigmatic banner and needed to go
toe-to-toe, eyeball-to-eyeball with the economists and
others of like ilk.
In simple moral terms, the idea that we should
somehow look toward paradigmatic consensus far our
salvation is wrong. Even if such a world were possible
(which it is not, see below), it would be a most uncom-
fortable place to reside. It would be a world with little
emancipatory possibilities. a world with even tighter
restrictions on who can be published, promoted, fired,
celebrated, reviled than we have now. Sturm und Drang
und Tenure. The image of a large research community
characterized by the kinds of traits Jeff associates with
paradigm consensus is that of a clean California re-
search park where nothing is out of place and all is
governed by a corporate logic focused on productivity,
competitive advantage and the good old bottom line.
This is not scholarship. On normative grounds alone,
paradigm consensus can be rejected.
Authorial Style
Jeff seems to Iook out on our field as if he were on the
bridge of a battleship moving toward action at flank
speed. However the enemies it seems are not those of
rational choice persuasion or necessarily dreaded
economists for their assumptions and approaches are
hardly criticized at all (save one sentence on p. 682).
lndeed, rat choice as a paradigm is put farward to be
admired for its clockwork efficiencies and single-
minded aims and methods. It is ironic that we must
mimic the opposition in order to survive even though
we are told the results of their grand theories are
trivial. 5
Across the severa! research fields (and subfields)
that Jeff associates with paradigmatic consensus, cer-
tain features are common: Formalism, operationalism,
methodological canons, deductive models, apparent
theoretical coherence with a stress on theory testing,
and a restricted range of topically legitimate issues.
These features are presumably keys to a paradigmatic
consensus and ali the material and social benefits it
will provide. That it just so happens Jeffs own research
work is Iargely of the same sort is apparently a mere
coincidence and unworthy of mention. The call far
paradigm consensus may be then a call for a Pfeffer-
digmatic research community so reduced in scope that
its borders are those of Palo Alto.
689
 JOHN VAN MAANEN Crossroads
Such a reading is possible because Jeff maintains a
strategic silence on matters of critica! importance to bis
program. Like consensus, the term paradigm is central
to bis concems but it is undefined and unmarked. 6 lt
stands as a glossed, generic and misty signifier. At best,
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we can pick up clues as to what kind of paradigm he
has in mind (and favors) only from the narrow range of
examples he presents. Nothing is said of course about
other currently powerful intellectual movements such
as the anti-theory of postmodemism which, as a move-
ment, is far more important and visible as it sweeps
through the social sciences, the humanities, the arts
than, say, conversational analysis or behavioral deci-
sion theory. What of the interpretive or linguistic swings
taking place in many fields including our own? What of
the loose, eclectic and ramshackle character of institu-
tionalization theory whose lack of heavy-handed theo-
retical discipline may be part of its appeal and, in the
long run, the key to its success? Without definition or
exemplary specification we are left holding the end of a
question mark like the handle of an umbrella.
We know of course that one of the most common
tactics of elite groups of all sorts is to refuse to discuss
-to label as uninteresting or vulgar-issues that are
uncomfortable for them. 1 argued that theory makes its
way in intellectual communities (and beyond) as much
by its style as by its theoretical claims, logic, sweep,
empirical evidence or methodological strictures. My
points are not countered by Jeff. Sorne of them are
incorporated into his story-sotto voce-through his
linking of "styles of theory" (what we might call re-
search genres) to social influence. But, alas, Jeff fails to
consider both the reception of texts and the audience
specificity of such reception(s).
Could it be that the very rhetoric of, say, organiza-
tional econornics-with its familiar reductionism, ab-
stract character, mathematical simplicity, worries about
self-seeking, guile and lack of trust-is what accounts
for its appeal in this society? 7 Does rational choice
theory have appeal because it is individualistic, techni-
cally neat and apparently easy to grasp, use and pub-
lish? Is this success or scandal? How well does such
work travel? My point is simply that Jeffs analysis ends
at precisely the point where it should begin. Why (and
where) do certain "styles of theory" achieve promi-
nence (for a time)? Even if we were to accept Jeff's
strange argument that "(Weick's) insight, richness, lu-
cidity, virtuosity, creativeness and style is inevitably
disadvantaged in the market place of ideas," (p. 684,
emphasis mine), what are we to make of it beyond its
claimed inevitability? This is the rhetoric of naturaliza-
tion and essentialism applied to the social world of
690 ÜRGANIZATION ScrnNCE/Vol. 6, No. 6, November-December 1995
Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
reading, interpretation and meaning. lt is not persua-
sive.
Propositional Truths
Consider now the evidence Jeff presents in support of
his theories. Are his arguments backed up by data we
can trust? All data are of course imperfect and selec-
tive but here 1 think we have an extreme case that is
easy to dismantle. Four points, made hastily, will suf-
fice.
First, the matter of theoretical coherence. Eco-
nomics is presented as an exemplar of paradigmatic
consensus. This, to adopt McCloskey's (1983, p. 494)
tribal categories, should quickly be communicated to
the Chicago modemists, the NYU Austrians, the Mas-
sachusetts Marxists, the Berkeley neoclassicists and the
Texas institutionalists. If Jeff is worried about an agency
theory or transaction cost take-over in organizational
studies, perhaps we should enlist a few economic purists
to whom such approaches are a hoot. Nor is it the case
that in-house squabbles and theoretical disputes lead
to a fall. Anthropology is a convenient example of a
diffuse and multiparadigm field. lt has been in "crisis"
for more than a decade. lt lives contentiously with its
cultural, social, symbolic, material, political and eco-
nomic anthropologies as well as its anthropologies of
religion, work, family, medicine and so forth. Yet it is
growing in both numbers and influence. The "disci-
pline" has a gaggle of celebrated names, is at the
leading and bleeding edge of social science, and finds
its ideas taken up in history, cognitive science, literary
studies, philosophy as well as the applied arts of educa-
tion, social work, marketing, urban planning, even
nursing. Crisis it seems can be a cash cow.
Second, the matter of citations rates and take-overs.
Several joumals, even leading ones, do not make a
field. Do we really believe that the increased number
of population ecology papers appearing in ASQ in
1992 and 1993 represents "disproportionate impact"
(p. 683) independent of joumal policy presumably in-
fluenced by the editor during this period, pop ecology
crusader John Freeman? Is the apparent "capture" of
a journal by behavioral decision theorists as suggestive
(and alarming) as Jeff indicates? Measuring disci-
plinary or field "domination"by citation rates in one or
two journals over a short period of time is imaginative
but fanciful. Paradigms rise and fall and a move in
either direction is not necessarily a measure of schol-
arly worth or value.
Third, the issue of Karl Weick's influence. Jeff asks
"how easy would it be for others to employ Weick's
 JOHN VAN MAANEN Crossroads
style or even to build on his work?" (p. 684). With no
data whatsoever, he answers in the negative. This is
bullshit! The Social Psychology of Organizing is one of
the field's major works and in the 25 or so years since
its publication, it has changed the language we use in
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talking about organizations. An admiring book re-
viewer noted recently that the book remains his top
candidate for ferocious, desert island reading: "a won-
derful rattlebag of ideas ... that on rereading you see
things you haven't seen before" (Colville 1994, p. 222).
Enactment, equivocality, interpretive systems, casual
maps are concepts that are part of our working vocabu-
lary. Sorne ideas may turn out to be loopy, others solid,
but they attract attention and make us think. There is
no paradigm here but enormous influence.
Finally, the matters of technology and method. Jeff
argues that "for writing to be influential, it must not
only suggest what to do in general terms but how to go
about it in very specific terms" (p. 685). This perspec-
tive would have it that Freed Bales (and his mechanical
interaction counters) is more influential than Erving
Goffman or that the ubiquitous Gert Hofsteader (and
his power distance scales) is more influential than
Clifford Geertz. Goffman and Geertz provide no
method manuals, offer no technology but their writings
continue to mesmerize students. Jeff considers a very
limited-within paradigm--kind of influence; a sort
relatively unconcerned with creativity, insight, opening
up new ways to think and see. Even if technical refine-
ments increase the attractiveness of a research pro-
gram, this hardly indicates substantive progress or
knowledge accumulation. Matters of technical develop-
ment and method are embedded within paradigms and
cannot, by definition, advance or change them.
What Now?
To bring this to a close, 1 think it highly unlikely any
paradigm will trump or unite our field. Various re-
search programs guided b)' adventurous theories both
old and new will wax and wane and we should welcome
such programs (if only to combat them). These are
deprovincialized times in social science (and else-
where) and, as a result, organizational analysis is con-
tentious and difficult. Paradigmatic competition has
been the norm for 50-odd years but it is becoming
more intense as schools of thought multiply and our
numbers grow. Put bluntly, we are quite likely to be in
each other's faces more than ever. The question is what
to do about it?
In Style as Theory, 1 suggested that learning to cope
with and perhaps learn from one another is a most
ÜRGANIZATION ScIENCE/Vol. 6, No. 6, November-December 1995
Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
critical matte1. We cannot conjure up a paradigm of
sufficient appeal to voluntarily unite the organization
studies community. Nor can we legislate or impress
into existence the paradigmatic unity Jeff longs for. On
the other hand, it is pernicious and beside the point to
suggest we stick to our own claustrophobic ways with
each of us camped by our own totem pole. We need
ways of talking across research programs and theoreti-
cal commitments. Weick's elevates style in his writings
through his almost Flaubertian obsession for le mot
juste and, as a result, attracts readers from many
paradigmatic camps. Less eloquently, this debate be-
tween Jeff and me provides another way of talking
across paradigms (about paradigms). Other possibilities
are open as well.
Jeff thinks our fencing about form and discourse is a
"sideshow." 1 think it a main event. Arguably, there
may be a few short-run instrumental advantages associ-
ated with the paradigmatic unity of the sort that Jeff
identifies. But to seek these ends is to admit that the
owl of Minerva has taken wing. To me the wager Jeff
puts to us is intuitively clear. We are offered a degree
of clout at the expense of open (and disorderly) in-
quiry. Style, breadth, theoretical and methodological
innovation are impedance factors, not aims if we place
our bets with Jeff. This is not an attractive wager. It is
one we should energetically-with heat-refuse.
Endnotes
1
The usual suspects helped me in drafting this response. The lineup
includes Peter Manning, Gideon Kunda, Bob Thomas, Colleen
McCalhon, Lotk Bailyn. John Jerm1er, John Weeks and a number of
part1cípants m severa! seminars who were subjected to my take on
the issues raised in th1s debate. I am sure few if any would take the
same stance and spin as I do in this paper but they nonetheless
pushed me to posítion myself. I am grateful.
2
As a genre of pubhc d1scoursc m an open community, debate 1s a
comerstone. AnJ it is in th1s genre of thrust and parry that Jeff and I
write (and talk). Debate 1s often energized by the taste of victory of
course and much postdebate conversat1on turns on JUSt who "won"
and "lost." But. I would argue that a goal of equal if not greater
importance is simply to enhance understanding of the issues under
contention m the commumty at large. In theory, readers or listeners
(though not necessanly the part1c1pants to a debate who are often
smothered by cnnvict10ns not fully shared by others) should gam a
better grasp of the issues at stake if ideas are tested. argued, refuted
than íf they are left unchallenged.
1
Had Jeff pursued Edclman (1964, 1971) m more depth he would
have discovered that even exphc1tly ant1-political language can be
and is used as a rhetoncal front to disguise highly political a1ms; a
tactíc made much use of by so-called political outsíders who would
have us beheve that their agendas are above mere pohtics. To label
my language as ''pohtical" and h1s (by imphcation) as "reasoned and
691
 JOHN VAN MAANEN Crossroads
scientific" is simply a move in our argument and an appeal to the
audience to swallow a false distinction without thinking. Both of us
are equally political in trying the persuade our readers. Gusfield
(1976) is a must read in this regard.
4
The friends of rhetoric across severa! disciplmes who make the
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above argument far more eloquently than I include White (1973),
Edmondson (1984), Nelson et al. (1987), Simmons (Ed.) (1988), and
Fish (1989). For an illuminating essay on the role of rhetoric in
organizat10n studies, see Gergen (1992).
5 the Practice of Theory in Ltterary and Legal Studies, New York:
Could 1t be that the triviahty (of findings) is related to the structural
and d1sc1plinary features of those social sc1ence paradigms Jeff more
or less honors as having achieved consensus? Perhaps such a matter
is not explored in the original paper or m the response for good
reason since it would be deadly as a rallymg cry for parad1gm
consensus.
6
Jeff is in good company on this matter. Kuhn (1964) uses the term
paradigm in a variety of ways. When pressed by critics on the issue,
he responded by saying in his 1970 postscript that there were three
broad ways the term could be defined in his work but he favored one
more than the others: paradigm as exemplar. Using the term
paradigm to refer to shared examples suggests that 1t 1s a matter
more likely to be insinuated than fiercely taught with lots of rules to
obey and authorities to respect. My reading of Jeffs use of the term
is that he is more comfortable with the definitions Kuhn rejected:
paradigm as structure and/or paradigm as discipline.
7
0n this matter, I have a theory. Many social scientists m the
U.S.-like the general population-are rather absolutist about
American values and ideals; to somehow equate them with human
nature and proper conduct and thus treat social theories that deviate
from individualistic, pragmatic, self-seeking, egalitarian assumptions
as perverse. In the comparative context of world ethnology and
history, such assumptions may well be uncommon, perhaps eccentnc
But, for us, they are part of the air we breathe. The appeal of certain
econom1c theories, rational choice theory, behavioral decis1on theory
and many others 1s then a highly contextual (and cultural or subcul-
tura!) matter. Mauro Guillen (1994) has wonderful stories to tell
about the cross-cultural appeal-or lack thereof-carried by severa!
highly visible and, for a time, widcly accepted (in th1s country)
management theories.
692
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ÜRGANIZATION Sc1ENCE/VoL 6, No. 6, November-December 1995