Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Optimization of facility location and reallocation in an industrial plant

through a multi-annual framework accounting for economic and
safety issues
 María Ponce-Ortega a, *,
poles-Rivera a, Jose
Juan Martinez-Gomez a, Fabricio Na
lez , Mahmoud M. El-Halwagi , c
Medardo Serna-Gonza a b

a
Chemical Engineering Department, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicola s de Hidalgo, Morelia, Michoacan 58060, Mexico
b
Chemical Engineering Department, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA
c
Adjunct Faculty at the Chemical and Materials Engineering Department, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The industrial layout traditionally has been addressed accounting for the facilities distribution and
Received 25 February 2014 installation since the first day of operation of the plant; this is, without considering future expansions
Received in revised form that involve additional facilities in the future operation years. This way, this paper proposes a mathe-
13 November 2014
matical programming formulation for the optimal facility sitting and reallocation in an industry ac-
Accepted 29 November 2014
Available online 2 December 2014
counting for future expansions and involving simultaneously economic and safety objectives. The
proposed formulation is based on a multi-annual framework and this corresponds to a multi-objective
mixed integer linear programming problem. The proposed optimization approach was applied to a
Keywords:
Retrofit
case study for the facility sitting (office buildings and control rooms) in an ethylene oxide plant. The
Facility location economic objective function involves the minimization of the total annual cost accounting for the value
Multi-objective optimization of the money through the time and the safety objective function involves the minimization for the
Facility layout accumulated risk over the operation time. Results show the applicability of the proposed approach.
Risk minimization © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction layout. Penteado and Ciric (1996) reported a mixed-integer

During the last decades several accidents have occurred in in-
dustrial facilities, which have represented several fatalities and
high economic losses. The inadequate facility layout has been
identified as one of the most important causes of such accidents.
Usually, the techno-economic aspect has been the main factor
considered in the selection of the layout of a plant, where short
distances commonly are preferred because low costs for piping,
pumping and interconnection. In this context, Jayakumar and
Reklaitis (1994) proposed an approach for optimizing the plant
layout via graph partitioning for a single level, which was then
extended for multiple levels by Jayakumar and Reklaitis (1996).
Georgiadis and Macchietto (1997) proposed a formal optimization
approach for layout process plants. Papageorgiou and Rotstein
(1998) presented a mathematical model for the optimal plant
layout involving continuous domains. Georgiadis et al. (1999) re-
ported a mathematical programming approach for process plant
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: jmponce@umich.mx (J.M. Ponce-Ortega).
nonlinear programming optimization approach for safe process
plant layout. Patsiatzis and Papageorgiou (2002) reported an opti-
mization model for multi-floor process plant layout, which was
then improved by Patsiatzis and Papageorgiou (2003). Guirardello
and Swaney (2005) incorporated the pipe routing in the plant
layout optimization. Park et al. (2011) reported a mathematical
model for the optimal multi-floor plant layout involving safety
distances. The main disadvantage for these layouts is the high
associated risk; this is because of the short distance between
dangerous units and the high number of workers that can be
affected by an accident. To overcome previous limitation, recently
some methodologies have been proposed for the facility layout
accounting simultaneously for economic and safety aspects. In this
context, Patsiatzis et al. (2004) reported a mixed-integer linear
programming model to safe process plant layout. Grossel (2004)
reported some guidelines for facility siting and layout for chemi-
cal plants accounting for safety issues. Taylor (2006) incorporated
safety issues in modeling LNG facility siting. Tugnoli et al. (2008a)
reported an approach for safety assessment in plant layout, which
was then applied by Tugnoli et al. (2008). Díaz-Ovalle et al. (2009)
reported a study for comparing deterministic versus stochastic

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.11.021
0950-4230/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
130 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139
Fig. 1. Proposed superstructure for retrofit and facility location.
approaches in facility layout, and Díaz-Ovalle et al. (2010) incor-
porated the use of the worst case scenario. Jung et al. (2010)
incorporated mapping risk in the facility layout optimization, and
Jung et al. (2011) incorporated then fire and explosion scenarios.
Vazquez-Roman et al. (2010) presented a stochastic optimization
approach for the optimal facility layout under toxic release in
process facilities. Han et al. (2012) incorporated the risk index
approach to human in the optimal layout of chemical processes,
and this approach was then improved by Han et al. (2013). Baesi
et al. (2013) presented the application of a multi-plant QRA for
investigating the risk impact. Lira-Flores et al. (2013) implemented
a mixed-integer nonlinear programming model for layout designs
based on the domino hazard index. Martinez-Gomez et al. (2014)
presented a multi objective optimization approach for the
optimal sitting in industrial facilities. Medina-Herrera et al. (2014)
reported a mathematical programming model for the optimal
layout considering quantitative risk. In these methodologies, the
risk was associated to the accidents for fire and explosion (BLEVE
and VCE), as well as the accidents associated to toxic gas release
scenarios. One important accident is the associated to the domino
effect, where an accident in a given unit affects the adjacent facil-
ities producing a more dangerous effect. It should be noted that fire
and explosion are the main accidents associated to the domino
effect (Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011), and several approaches have
been reported for quantifying the risk associated to the explosion in
a domino effect. In this context, Cozzani and Salzano (2004a) pre-
sented a quantitative assessment for domino effects caused by
overpressure, which was applied then by Cozzani and Salzano
(2004b). Salzano and Cozzani (2005) analyzed the domino effects
associated to cloud explosions. Whereas, Cozzani et al. (2005;
2006a; 2006b; 2007) reported different approaches for quanti-
fying the domino effect. Tugnoli et al. (2008a) reported an index for
inherent safety which was then applied by Tugnoli et al. (2008b) to
analyze the domino effect. Landucci et al. (2009) presented an
assessment of damage probability of storage tanks in domino
events. Antonioni et al. (2009) reported applications of domino
effects in quantitative risk assessment. Darbra et al. (2010) reported
the main futures and accident sequences in domino effects due to
chemical accidents. Lo  pez-Molina et al. (2013) incorporated some
domino effects in the optimal facility layout. Landucci et al. (2013)
presented detailed studies about the domino scenarios. Reniers and
Cozzani (2013) presented guidelines for managing domino effects,
and Reniers and Faes (2013) examined the futures of escalation
scenarios. Kadri et al. (2013) presented a method for quantitative
assessment of the domino effect in industrial facilities. Bernechea
et al. (2013) presented a model to estimate the impact associated
to the domino effect in storage facilities. Hemmatian et al. (2014)
examined the significance of the domino effect in the chemical
accidents. However, previously reported methodologies have not
considered the multi-annual facility layout optimization account-
ing for the future expansions of the plant, which is a very common
industrial practice where the future expansions are projected since
the beginning of the process. In the future expansion of the plants,
usually new facilities are needed to handle additional flows and
stored materials; this way, it is required to consider the accumu-
lated risk through the entire operation time as well as the value of
the money through the time. An unappropriated facility layout can
be obtained if the future plant expansions are not considered since
the installation of the new project. Therefore, in this paper is pro-
posed an optimization formulation for the optimal facility layout
accounting for the installation and reallocation of facilities (office
buildings and control rooms) through the time into a multi-annual
framework involving the future expansions of the plant. The pro-
posed optimization formulation is a multi-objective optimization
model in combination with a quantitative risk analysis (QRA),
which considers the simultaneous minimization for the accumu-
lated cost and the minimization for the associated installation and
reallocation costs accounting for the value of the money through
the time. The domino effect is an important factor that is consid-
ered in the proposed optimization formulation.
2. Problem statement
Most of the previously reported methodologies for facility
layout optimization have not considered future projections, which
include the possibility of reallocation and addition of new facilities
(in this case, office buildings and control rooms). Fig. 1 shows the
configuration of a plant, which is divided in discrete rectangular
grids with coordinates (i,j) that represent the center of each grid.
Notice in Fig. 1 that for an initial time (t0), a set of facilities and
process units must exist, units usually operate at a lower capacity
than the maximum specified in their design; however, after a
period of time due to an increase in the product demand, it is
needed an increase in the operation capacity of the process and
storage units in such a way that the demand can be satisfied.
However, if the demand continues increasing, the capacity of the
existing equipment will not be sufficient and consequently it will
be necessary to add more facilities to satisfy this new demand. On
the other hand, the increase in the used capacity of the process
facilities or the addition of new facilities will cause an increase in
the risk, because it will increase the amount of raw material to be
processed, the inventories, etc. This way, the affected area
 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139 131

associated to an incident will also be greater, and the reallocation of
certain facilities to different grids, that represent safer positions
with respect to their previous positions, will be necessary. Then, the
problem consists in finding the coordinates (i,j), in different periods
of time, in which facility e must be added or reallocated, consid-
ering simultaneously the minimization of the accumulated cost and
risk. In this paper, only the reallocation of facilities different than
the process or storage units is considered, this way the risk map is
fixed during the operation of the plant and can be calculated
outside the optimization step.
3. Optimization formulation
Firstly, the sets used in the model are defined, i, i0 j and j0 (where
isi0 , jsj0 ) represent the coordinates in the center of each discrete
grid, where a facility (in this case no process units) can be installed
or reallocated. Subscript e represents the facility that can be added
or reallocated, t represents the period in which new facilities are
reallocated or added. The model formulation is based on the rep-
resentation shown in Fig. 1. For modeling purposes, existing facil-
ities are treated as new facilities that require to be installed in new
locations; it should be noted that the installation cost for these
facilities in the current location is zero. Then, the following
disjunction is formulated.
facility Yi,j,e,t is installed at the same time than the facility Yi0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t0 ,
the interconnection between these facilities will exist, if Zi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 t is
true, there will be an interconnection cost (IntCoste,e0 ,t) and an
interconnection risk (IntRiske,e0 ,t); otherwise, if it is false, the inter-
connection cost and risk will be zero. The interconnection cost
between existing facilities must be zero. In the previous disjunc-
tion, UECi,j,e,t, UERi,j,e,t, UICi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t and UIRi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t represent pa-
rameters that are calculated before the optimization process.
The previous disjunction is reformulated as algebraic relation-
ships, where the Boolean variables are transformed in binary var-
iables. Thus, when the Boolean variable (Yi,j,e,t) is true, the
associated binary variable (yi,j,e,t) takes the value of 1, and when the
Boolean variable is false (:Yi,j,e,t) the corresponding binary variable
(yi,j,e,t) is 0. The same applies for the binary variable zi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t. The
convex hull reformulation is used to reformulate previous
disjunction (see for examples Raman and Grossmann, 1994; Ponce-
Ortega et al., 2008) to convert the disjunction in algebraic re-
lationships. First, the continuous variables are disaggregated as
follows:
XX
ERiske;t ¼ DERiski;j;e;t ; ce2E; ct2T (2)
i j

2 3
Yi;j;e;t
6 ECoste;t ¼ UECi;j;e;t 7
∨ 66 ERiske;t ¼ UERi;j;e;t
7
7 ce2E
icI 6
62 Z
3 2 3 7;
7 ct2T (1)
0 0
; ; 0
;t :Zi;j;e; i0 ; j0 ; e0 ;t
jcJ 6 7
i;j;e; i j e
4 4 IntCoste; e0 ;t ¼ UICi;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t 5∨4 IntCoste;e;t ¼ 0 5; ce2E; 0
ct2T 5
ce 2E; e < e0
IntRiske; e0 ;t ¼ UIRi;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t IntRiske;e;t ¼ 0

XX
ECoste;t ¼ DECosti;j;e;t ; ce2E; ct2T (3)
i j

XXXX
IntRiske;e0 ;t ¼ DIntRiski;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t ; ce2E; ce0 2E0 ; ct2T; e < e0 (4)
i j i0 j0

XXXX
IntCoste;e0 ;t ¼ DIntCosti;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t ; ce2E; ce0 2E0 ; ct2T; e < e0 (5)
i j i0 j0

In the first level of the disjunction, the Boolean variable Yi,j,e,t is

associated with the addition of a new facility at coordinates (i,j), at Then, the equations are written in terms of the disaggregated
the begin of time period t. If it exists, then it means that the Boolean variables:
variable Yi,j,e,t is true, and there is a risk of installation (ERiske,t)
associated with this facility and a cost of existence (ECoste,t). If the
facility already exists, then the cost is zero. In the second level
(nested disjunction), the Boolean variable (Zi,j,e,i ,j ,e t) is associated
0 0 0
DERiski;j;e;t ¼ UERi;j;e;t yi;j;e;t ; ci2I; cj2J; ce2E; ct2T (6)
with the existence of interconnection for the new facility. If the
132 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139

To avoid overlapping of a new facility with respect to another,

the following constraint is proposed, which establishes that only
DECosti;j;e;t ¼ UECi;j;e;t yi;j;e;t ; ci2I; cj2J; ce2E; ct2T (7)
one facility can be installed in the coordinates (i,j):
XX
yi;j;e;t  1; ci2I; cj2J (13)
e t

DIntCosti;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t ¼ UICi;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t zi;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t ; ci2I; cj2J; ce2E; ci0 2I 0 ; cj0 2J 0 ; ce0 2E0 ; ct2T; e < e0 (8)

DIntRiski;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t ¼ UIRi;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t zi;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t ; ci2I; cj2J; ce2E; ci0 2I 0 ; cj0 2J 0 ; ce0 2E0 ; ct2T; e < e0 (9)

The projection of sales provides information about the pro-
duction required in the different periods over the time horizon;
with this information, the capacity for the process and storage units
as well as the facilities required in the different periods of time can
be determined. This way, it is possible to determine the time period
t as well as the facilities e that must be installed in the period t by
the binary parameter UNITexist e;t . Equation (10) is associated to the
existence of the facility e that must be installed at the time period t,
remaining as unknown only the location (i,j).
XX
yi;j;e;t ¼ UNITexist
e;t ; ce2E; ct2T
i j
where UNITexist
e;t is a binary parameter, which takes the value of 1 if
it is needed to install facility e at the time period t.
The activation of the binary variable zi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t is implemented by
the following relationship:
 
2  yi;j;e;t  yi0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t þ zi;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t  1 ; land conditioning, decommissioning of facilities and also the losses
ci2I; cj2J; ce2E; ci 2I ; cj 2J ; ce0 2E0 ; ct2T; e < e0
0 0 0 0
The locations for the facilities that already exist are fixed as
follows:
yi;j;e;t ¼ 1; ci2I; cj2J; ce2FE; ct2T (14)
The value of money through the time is associated with the
unitary costs multiplied by a factor to adjust the money to a present
value and this is calculated as follows.
First for the installation cost:
UECi;j;e;t ¼ kFðtÞ UECosti;j;e ; ci2I; cj2J; ce2E; ct2T (15)
(10)
The above equation represents the product of the facility cost
and the factor used to annualize the inversion kF(t) which is
expressed as a function of time, such that it is possible to calculate
the interconnection cost for different periods of time. In the same
way, the interconnection cost is multiplied by the factor kF(t).
UECosti,j,e,t is the sum of the fixed cost of the new facilities, land cost
and cost for conditioning, where the latter represents the cost for
due to reallocation. kF(t) is obtained by the following expression:

(11)
kFðtÞ ¼ ð1 þ intÞ½ordðTÞðtþ1Þ ; ct2T (16)
Previous relationship implies that when the facilities e and e0 are
added at the same time, both binary variables yi,j,e,t and yi0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t take where int is the interest rate.
the value of one, so that the first term of the relationship will be The model is formulated as a multi-objective optimization
equal to zero and thus activating the variable zi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t. However, it problem for simultaneously minimizing the TAC and TRisk and this
is necessary to establish additional constraints to represent the is represented by the following expression:
existence of the interconnection zi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t from the existence of OF ¼ {min TAC; min TRisk}. It should be noted that these objectives
facilities e and e0 . contradict each other, because for greater separation between the
The existence of the binary variable zi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t is given by Equa- facilities, the total cost increases due to an increment in the inter-
tion (12), where, similarly to Equation (10), is possible to fix the connection cost; on the other hand, for a greater separation the risk
interconnection between facilities e and e0 as well as the time decreases because facilities are installed on safer areas.
period t in which there is interconnection by the binary parameter
IBUExist
e;e0 ;t :

XXXX
zi;j;e;i0 ;j0 ;e0 ;t ¼ IBUExist
e;e0 ;t ; ce2E; ce0 2E0 ; ct2T; e < e0 (12)
i j i0 j0
 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139 133

Table 1
Projection for installing the new facilities for the case study.

Period Facility New Existing Population Fixed cost

(e) ($)

1 E1 Control room 10 1,000,000

E2 Administrative 15 300,000
building
Storage tank (TA1)
Stock
Unit reaction RU
(65%)
Storage tank (TA2)
2 E11 Control room 9 1,000,000
E12 Management Unit reaction RU 11 1,000,000
building (100%) Fig. 4. Post-incident event tree.
3 E10 Quality control 10 100,000
laboratory

where TAC is the total annual cost ($/year), which is equal to the
sum of the existence cost (ECoste,t) and the cost of interconnection
The objective function for the total annual cost is expressed as between the new facilities (IntCoste,e0 ,t).
follows: The total risk associated with the layout of facilities is calculated
XX X X X as follows:
TAC ¼ Ecoste;t þ IntCoste;e0 ;t (17)
e t e e0 t
XX X X X
e < e0 TRisk ¼ ERiske;t þ IntRiske;e0 ;t (18)
e t e e0 t
e < e0

where TRisk (fatalities) is the sum of the risk associated to the

installation of the new facilities (ERiske,t) and the one associated to
the interconnection of facilities (IntRiske,e0 ,t).
The constraint method is used to determine the Pareto optimal
solutions that compensate both objectives. The basic strategy of
this method consists in transforming the multi-objective problem
into a series of problems with one objective by selecting one of the
objective as the goal to minimize (in this case the TAC), and by
establishing the other one as constraint (TRisk); this strategy allows
knowing from a value of TRisk (fatalities) the minimum required
cost.
It is worth mentioning that the reallocating of facilities adds a
risk, this is due to the actions associated to the reallocation ac-
tivities such as dismantling, conditioning and construction. This
risk is considered in the model by the term (Ri,j,t) in Equation (21).
This term is associated with the risk due to SIMOPS and can be
expressed in terms of fatalities, which are associated to exposed
workers. Thus, if a facility is reallocated, two risks can be

Fig. 2. Initial plant layout.

Fig. 3. Pre-incident event tree. Fig. 5. Propagation probability for a capacity of 65%.
134 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139

identified, the risk related to the new position of the facility and
the risk associated to the reallocation process itself (SIMOPS). The
first risk is permanent as is related to the permanent personnel
working in the facility, whereas the risk associated to the instal-
lation process is temporary as it only occurs during the realloca-
tion of the facility due to the additional personnel and materials
required for this task.

4. Case study

The application of the proposed methodology is shown through

a case study of the ethylene oxide process. Table 1 shows the pro-
jection of the new facilities that need to be installed, the existing
facilities and the used capacity for all facilities over all time periods.
Fig. 2 shows the existing facilities inside the plant, which was
divided in 100 discrete grids of 100 m2. The projection was planned
for 3 periods of five years each one. It should be noted that the
installation of the new facilities is carried out at the beginning of
the period. The considered facilities for reallocation in this paper
are those containing high population densities such as adminis-
trative buildings and control rooms, which is more practical and
economical with respect to the reallocation of a processing or Fig. 6. Vulnerability map for a capacity of 65%.
storage unit. Also the reallocation of process units would require n!/
(nr)! risk maps, this is the number of possible permutations
without repetition of process units in the grid map, for the process
shown in Fig. 2, with 100 grids and 3 process units, the number of
risk maps is 970,200 for each period of time in which the amount of
materials processed change. In the present form, only one grid map
for each period of time is required, and is calculated outside the
optimization step. A domino accident is considered in this process,
which involves three explosions in the reaction facility (RU), the
storage tank 1 (TA1) and the storage tank 2 (TA2). The considered
initialization event is an explosion due to BLEVE in the reaction unit
(see Figs. 3 and 4, where the pre-incident and post-incident trees
are shown) propagated to the storage tanks 1 and 2, producing
explosions due to the overpressure. It should be noted that me-
chanical failure of a pressurized reaction vessel can be caused by an
increment in the internal pressure; this sudden increase in pressure
can be derived from many factors being one an uncontrolled
exothermic reaction. Reaction for the production of ethylene oxide
is characterized by a highly exothermic reaction, thus the reactor
must be provided with a cooling system, the failure of this can lead
to a sudden increase of pressure and resulting in explosion of the
reactor. Furthermore, this particular reaction has a tendency to
polymerize, one of the substances that catalyzes this polymeriza-
tion is iron oxide, if the catalyst is contaminated with this sub-
stance, it can yield a sudden increase in temperature and pressure Fig. 7. Vulnerability map for a capacity of 100%.
resulting in a runaway reaction and consequently the explosion of
the reaction unit. It should be noted that contamination in the
reactor by iron oxide can happen due to corrosion problems in Table 3
Frequency of failure of a single equipment.
pipes or accessories that feed the reactor. There are antecedents
about incidents associated with the ethylene oxide, such is the case Unit e fs PEP(65%) PEp(100%)
of what happened on April 17, 1962 in Brandenburg, Kentucky USA, UR 2.50E-06 …… …..
TA1 2.50E-07 0.867 0.942
TA2 2.50E-07 0.941 0.979

Table 2
Mass in kg for the facilities involved in the domino effect.

Period Capacity Facility e Mass kg Mass TNT where BLEVE was the primary event. Also notice that Khan &
1 65% RU 2925 1209.53 Haddara. (2004) reported that between the reaction unit and
TA1 1300 537.57 storage units for the production of ethylene oxide, the reaction unit
TA2 1300 537.57
represents the greatest danger due to the value obtained in terms of
2 100% RU 4500 1860.81
TA1 2000 827.03 fire and explosion as well as controllability. Furthermore, Lo pez-
TA2 2000 827.03 Molina et al. (2013) considered that the reaction unit is one of
 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139 135

Table 4 PEscalation ðURÞ ¼ 2:5  106 þð0:867Þð2:5  107 Þ þ ð0:941Þ

Probabilities of escalation. ð2:5  107 Þ  ½ð5:43  1013 Þ þ ð5:88  1013 Þ þ ð5:10  1014 Þ
Unit e Capacity PEscalation þ1:27  1019 ¼ 2:95  106 . Table 4 shows the values of PEscalation
UR 65% 2.95E-06
for the units involved in the domino accident at different capacities.
100% 2.98E-06 The plant lifetime L was assumed to be 50 years. Previous calcu-
TA1 65% 2.99E-06 lation was performed for each of the 100 grids that conform the
100% 2.99E-06 terrain. This calculation was done considering the capacity used in
TA2 65% 2.97E-06
each period of time, this way for evaluating the risk associated to
100% 2.99E-09
the time period 1, the capacity of the plant was considered as 65%,
using this capacity is possible to calculate the associated mass in
each unit and this way calculate the associated risk for this period.
the main units capable of producing the domino effect. In this work,
For the other periods, the same approach was used. The intercon-
the term BLEVE is reserved only for the explosive rupture of a pez-Molina
nection cost (UIIi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t) was assumed as 166/m (Lo
pressure vessel and the flash evaporation of liquefied gas, the
et al., 2013), the unit cost for the terrain was assumed as $5/m2.
resulting fireball formation is not taken into account. This way,
The interconnection risk was neglected considering that the in-
elongated tanks and the vulnerability threshold model were
cidents (loss of containment) mostly occur in junctions, which are
considered for the estimation of the propagation probability. Fig. 5
located mostly near the storage or process units. Table 5.
shows the propagation probability associated to damage in the
primary event due to an overpressure generated by an explosion of Y ¼ 12:22 þ 1:65 ln P (19)
the reaction unit; Fig. 5 also shows the probability of escalation
given the primary event for a 65% of capacity. The probability of   
Y 5 jY  5j
escalation, was estimated through the Probit function given by Pi;j;t ¼ 50 1 þ erf pffiffiffi (20)
Equation (19), where the Probit value is converted then in the jY  5j 2
probability through Equation (20) (See Crowl and Louvar, 2011),
0
where P is the overpressure generated by the primary event. The X
3 X
3 X
3 
overpressure was evaluated using the TNT equivalent model. It UERi;j;e;t ¼ Ge L@ fi Pf ;i þ fj Pjk Pf ;k þ Ri;j;t (21)
should be noted that TNT equivalents are frequently used for the i¼1 j¼1 k¼1
assessment of VCEs; however, this provides an acceptable
approximation for the calculation of pressure due to BLEVEs, in Y ¼ 39:1 þ 4:45 ln J (22)
such a way that these have been used in works such as the ones
reported by Planas-Cuchi et al. (2004), Abbasi and Abbasi (2007),    ðg1Þ=g !
Birk et al. (2007) and Jung et al. (2011). Table 2 shows the mass 0:021PV Pa
WTNT ¼ 1 (23)
and TNT equivalent for each unit over the different operation pe- g1 P
riods considered. The operation period 2 is equivalent to the period
3. The risk parameter (UERi,j,e,t) was calculated by Equation (21) (see r
Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010), where the term ze ¼ (24)
P3 P3 P3 WTNT
1=3
i¼3 fi Pf ;i þ j¼1 k¼1 fj Pj;k Pf ;k represents the individual risk taking
into account the domino effect, and Ri,j,t is the risk due to SIMOPS,
Ge is the population exposed of each facility and L is the lifetime of h  2 i
ze
p0 1616 1 þ 4:5
the plant.
¼ rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
 2 rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
 2 rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
 2 (25)
The total vulnerability probability PTotal, is calculated using pa ze ze ze
Equation (26), the probability value is obtained by the Equation 1 þ 0:048 1 þ 0:32 1 þ 1:35
(20), which represents the transformation of the Probit values (Y)
to probability, the Probit values were calculated from Equation (22). " ! #
X
H
J is the specific impulse and this corresponds to the product of the PTotal ¼ min Pprimary þ Pd;i ; 1 (26)
overpressure by the time duration of the explosion (i.e., 80 ms). The i¼1
overpressure generated by BLEVE was evaluated by TNT equiva-
lence (see Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007). The mass of TNT was calcu-    
lated using Equation (23). With the equivalent mass of TNT, the ff ;i ¼ fs single equipment þ ff domino failure (27)
scaled distance can be obtained from Equation (24). Finally, Equa-
tion (25) provides the over pressure profiles. The previous calcu-  
ff domino failure ¼ PEscalation fPrimary event (28)
lation must be performed for each of the scenarios involved in the
domino effect according to Equation (26). Figs. 6 and 7 show the
It should be noted that Equation (22) corresponds to a Probit
vulnerability maps for periods 1 and 2-3, respectively. The failure
function associated to affected population due to lesions for
frequency of the unit was obtained by Equation (27). Frequency
displacement and collision of bodies over obstacles (taken from
data for a single equipment failure fs( single equipment) and the
Crowl and Louvar, 2011), this Probit function was considered
event tree (see Fig. 4) were extracted from the “Purple Book” (see
because most workers are inside the facility, where they may be
Hagg and Ale, 2005), Table 3 shows the frequencies of failure for all
impacted by the objects.
the units involved in domino effect at different capacities.
Finally, it should be noticed that most of BLEVEs result in the
Equation (28) represents the frequency of failure due to domino
formation of fireball, especially when flammable substances are
effect, which can be obtained as the product between fPrimary event
involved. However, the reason for not taking into account the
(frequency of the primary event occurrence) and probability of
fireball is due to the fact that in the circumstances in which
escalation (PEscalation). Where PEscalation was calculated considering
instantaneous material release occurs in this process (Runaway
that the events are not mutually exclusive (see Cozzani et al., 2005).
reaction), it is possible that the pressure and temperature condi-
Taking as an example the UR, the formulation is:
tions are not sufficient for the material to ignite, as seen in the
136 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139

Table 5
Results comparison for the identified solutions in the case study.

Solution Period Annual cost for period ($/y) Interconnection cost per period ($/y) TRISK TAC TRISK

A 1 1,384,502 84,502 0 2,646,348 0

2 1,136,057 116,057 0
3 125,789 46,789 0
B 1 1,342,666 42,666 0 2,613,383 5.98  104
2 1,143,202 123,202 0
3 127,515 48,515 5.98  104
C 1 1,339,982 39,982 1.49  102 2,612,652 1.49  102
2 1,129,907 109,907 0
3 142,763 63,763 0
D 1 1,337,845 37,845 1.04  102 2,611,694 1.93  102
2 1,119,804 99,804 1.49  103
3 154,045 75,045 7.45  103

Fig. 10. Final layout of Point B.

Fig. 8. Pareto curve for the case study.

The proposed optimization model was coded in the software

GAMS (Brooke et al., 2014), where the CPLEX solver was used for
solving the associated mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
problem. The problem consists of 1,983,593 binary variables,
3,971,072 continuous variables, 12,734,345 constraints and each
point of the Pareto curve was solved in 113.69 s of CPU time using
an Intel core i7 at 2.2 GHz processor with 8 GB of RAM.

5. Results

Fig. 8 shows the Pareto set of optimal solutions identified with

the proposed approach; this Fig. 8 shows the tradeoffs between risk

Fig. 9. Final layout of Point A.

accident in Brandenburg, Kentucky USA, where BLEVE was the

primary event. Ignition can occur instantly after only if it reaches an
ignition source. Thus, the effect of the fireball (if it occurs) is
delayed with respect to the overpressure wave. Here, it is consid-
ered that the main cause of lesions are due to displacement and
collision of bodies over obstacles, because most of the workers are
inside the facility. This is a common assumption as shown in the
works by Jung et al. (2010), Lo  pez-Molina et al. (2013), Lira-Flores
et al. (2013), in which only the overpressure is considered.
Fig. 11. Final layout of Point D.
 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139 137

and TAC, where the risk was plotted only in terms of consequence. linear programming model than can be solved without numerical
The extreme points A and D represent the solutions for the mini- complications.
mum risk and minimum TAC, respectively. There is a significant The proposed formulation was applied to a case study for the
difference between the solutions of points A (Fig. 9) and B (Fig. 10), ethylene oxide production, and results show that there is a
where the last one represents a significant reduction in the TAC and compromise between the contradicting objectives, where the so-
the risk does not increase significantly. This way, the solution lution for the minimum TAC represents short distances between
associated to point B seems a very attractive solution, where the the facilities but the risk increases, and the solution with the
total annual cost is $32,965/y lower than the one of point A. In minimum risk represents long distances between facilities but with
solution B, it is needed to install facilities E1 and E2 at the beginning the maximum cost; the main contribution for this difference in the
of period 1, the location for these facilities in the first period is cost is associated to the interconnection cost. Furthermore, the
shown in Fig. 10, the associated cost for this period one is proposed methodology allows identifying solutions that compen-
$1,342,666/y, from which $42,666/y corresponds to the intercon- sate these two extreme solutions, and very attractive solutions
nection cost. Due to the increment in the production during period since the economic and safety points of view can be identified.
2, facilities E12 and E11 are installed as shown by Fig. 10; it should The proposed methodology is general and this can be applied to
be noted that these new facilities are located far to the previous different case studies.
installed facilities, which represents an interconnection cost of
$123,202/y. During the last period the unit E10 is installed, where Acknowledgments
the associated interconnection cost is $48,515/y. The total annual
cost associated to the three periods is $2,613,383/y and the asso- The authors acknowledge the financial support from the
ciated risk is 5.98  104. Table 3 shows the results comparison for Mexican Council for Science and Technology (CONACyT) and the
the risk and TAC for the different periods of the solutions identified Scientific Research Council of the Universidad Michoacana de San
in the Pareto curve of Fig. 8. It should be noticed that the solution s de Hidalgo.
Nicola
associated to Point A represents almost no risk because the facilities
are installed too far from each other (as can be seen in Fig. 9, for Nomenclature
periods 1, 2 and 3), however this solution also represents the
highest interconnection cost as well as the highest TAC. On the
other hand, the solution associated to the point D is the cheapest Scripts
one because the facilities are located closer (as can be seen in Fig. 11 e new facility.
for the periods 1, 2 and 3), reducing this way the interconnection e0 new facility different than e.
cost but affecting drastically the associated risk. Finally, solution of i coordinate of each grid center.
Point B seems to be attractive solutions that compensate the two i0 coordinate of each grid center different than i.
objectives considered. j coordinate of each grid center.
It should be noted that the previous results do not include the j0 coordinate of each grid center different than j.
risk due to SIMOPS and this risk should be considered generating t time period.
appropriate scheduling procedures during the reallocation of fa-
cilities, also the uncertainty associated with the realistic repro- Sets
duction of the proposed accident consequence assessment E set for facilities e.
generates some degree of error, which may affect the prediction of E0 set for facilities e0 .
the consequences; however in order to reduce this error and to FE set for fixed facilities.
yield realistic calculations related to cost and risk, the data used for I set for coordinates i.
the risk assessment are statistics of accidents that have occurred. In I0 set for coordinates I0 .
addition, the events and conditions of the proposed accidents were J set for coordinates j.
extracted from previously reports, which were obtained using J0 set for coordinates j0 .
rigorous methods. In the same way, the data used for the cost were T set for time periods.
extracted from previously reported papers. On the other hand, the
models used for the risk calculations have been widely studied and Binary parameters
used, which have demonstrated to be good approximations. IBUExist
e;e0 ;t binary parameter to indicate the interconnection
Therefore, the provided model may provide realistic solutions, between different facilities over time t.
which can be useful for decision makers. UNITexist
e;t binary parameter to indicate the existence for the
facilities e over the time t.

6. Conclusions Parameters
fs frequency of failure of a single equipment.
This paper has proposed an optimization approach for the ff frequency of the primary event occurrence.
optimal facility siting accounting simultaneously for economic and Ge population of the facilities.
safety aspects. The main novelty of this contribution is the inclusion int interest rate.
of a multi-period framework, which incorporates the possibility to J specific impulse (N s/m2).
include the siting and reallocation of new and existing facilities kf(t) factor used to annualize the inversion and to account for
(limited to facilities that are not processing and storage) in the the vale of the money through the time.
different periods to minimize the accumulated risk and the total P peak overpressure (N/m2).
annual costs accounting for the value of the money through the Pa atmospheric pressure.
time. The domino effect was considered in the formulation during PEscalation probability of escalation given the primary event.
the evaluation of the risk. This formulation can be useful to consider Pri,j,t probability of affectation due to incident outcome.
the planned capacity expansion of a plant. The proposed optimi- r distance between the center of each grid and the center of
zation formulation is a multi-period multi-objective mixed-integer the facility.
138 J. Martinez-Gomez et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 33 (2015) 129e139
UECi,j,e,t facility installation cost for facility e in location i,j at time t
that accounts for the value of the money through the
time.
UECosti,j,e facility installation cost for facility e.
UERi,j,e,t facility installation risk for facility e in location i,j at time t.
UICi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t facility interconnection cost between new facilities e
(i,j) and e0 (i0 ,j0 ).
UIRi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t facility risk of interconnection between new facilities
in the time t.
V vessel volume.
WTNT TNT mass.
Y Probit value associate to injuries from impact.
ze scaled distance.
g ratio of specific heats.
Binary variables
yi,j,e,t selection of existence of a new facility (e) in the
coordinates (i,j) in time t.
zi,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t binary variable associated with the existence of
interconnection between the new.
Continuous variables
ECoste,t accumulated installation cost of the new facility e in time
t.
ERiske,t accumulated risk of installation of the facility e in time t.
DECosti,j,e,t disaggregated installation cost.
DERiski,j,e,t disaggregated installation risk.
DIntCosti,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t disaggregated interconnection cost.
DIntRiski,j,e,i0 ,j0 ,e0 ,t disaggregated interconnection risk.
0 dustries 23, 824e830.
IntCoste,e,t interconnection cost between new facilities in time t.
IntRiske,e0 ,t interconnection risk between new facilities in time t.
TAC total annual cost associated to the different periods of
operation.
TRisk total accumulated risk over the different periods of
operation.
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