Women, Islam and the State

Author(s): Deniz Kandiyoti

Source: Middle East Report, No. 173, Gender and Politics (Nov. - Dec., 1991), pp. 9-14
Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc. (MERIP)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012623
Accessed: 27-12-2017 15:33 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc. (MERIP) is collaborating with JSTOR
to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle East Report

This content downloaded from 181.29.37.226 on Wed, 27 Dec 2017 15:33:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 STOR

MERIP Middle East Report

Please Note: A number of pages in this article were originally published

such that a portion of text and some images run across two facing pages.
JSTOR has presented these pages as they appear in the source material,
with no missing content. For ease of reading we recommend that users
print the article.

Please click on "Next Page" (at the top of the screen)

to begin viewing this article.

This content downloaded from 181.29.37.226 on Wed, 27 Dec 2017 15:33:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 WOMEN,
ISLAM
AND THE
STATE
Deniz Kandiyoti
Mostassigns
East commentary on gender
a central place to Islam,and
but politics in the Middle
there is little
agreement about the analytic weight it carries in accounting
for the subordination of women or the role it plays in relation
to women's rights.1 Using the Quran, the hadith and the lives
of prominent women in the early period of Muslim history as
sources, conservatives confirmed that existing gender
asymmetries are divinely ordained, while feminists discerned
possibilities for a more progressive politics of gender based on
the egalitarian ideals of early Islam. These exegetical exercises
mainly showed that, for both feminists and anti-feminists,
Islamic doctrine continued to provide the only legitimate
discourse within which to debate women's rights.
Contemporary analysts have renounced these treatments as
essentialist, ahistorical and lacking in class perspectives.2
These newer studies focused on the processes of socioeco?
nomic transformation accompanying the region's incorpora?
tion into the world economy; the concerns of Middle East
scholars started mirroring those of Third World "women and
development" specialists.3 The influence of feminist theory
also made itself increasingly felt. Debates about the subor-
Deniz Kandiyoti, a senior lecturer in the Social Sciences Division of Richmond
College, London, is the editor of Women, Islam and the State (Temple University
Press, 1991).
Middle East Report ? November-December 1991
This content downloaded from 181.29.37.226 on Wed, 27 Dec 2017 15:33:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
dination of women now occurred in a more complex theoreti?
cal field, in which the analytic primacy of Islam was temporar?
ily eclipsed.
The rise of Islamist movements has stimulated new interest
in the relationship between religion and politics in the region,
and the role of the state in expressing and implementing this
relationship. The most immediate and visible targets in "Is-
lamization,, programs were the dress, mobility and general
status of women, putting the question of Islam and women's
rights back on the agenda with a renewed urgency. For
Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi, Muslim fundamental?
ism is an assertion of identity in the face of rapid social
changes threatening existing authority relations (especially
between genders), and a response to the boundary problems
created by the intrusions of colonialism, new technology,
consumerism and economic dependency.41 have argued else?
where that socioeconomic transformation has aggravated so?
cial inequalities, dislocating local communities and producing
massive migratory movements and the influx of women into
the labor force. All of this has dealt a severe blow to the
material and normative underpinnings of patriarchy, increas?
ing the attractions of compensatory, conservative ideologies.6
While such arguments may account for part of the popular
appeal of Islamist ideologies, they cannot explain the differen-
tial incorporation of these ideologies into actual state policies. institutions of the Pahlavi state. Unlike the Ottoman clerical
Significant variations in the condition of women in Muslim establishment, the clergy in Iran remained strong enough both
societies derive from, among other things, the different politi? economically and in its mass-based networks to reenter the
cal projects of modern nation-states. The ways in which political arena after the 1960s.8
women are represented in political discourse, the degree of State-building projects in the Arab world have ranged from
formal emancipation they have achieved, their forms of par? experiments with "Arab socialism" to continuing monarchic
ticipation in economic life and the nature of the social move? rule. Despite reforms permitting educational, juridical and
ments through which they express their demands are closely state institutions greater autonomy from religious authorities,
linked to state-building processes. Studies on women in Mus? shari'a-inspired legislation in family and' personal status
lim societies have not always acknowledged the extent to codes persists even where secular laws have been adopted in
which aspects of state practice define and mediate the place of every other sphere. Equal citizenship rights of women guaran?
Islam itself. teed by national constitutions are circumscribed by personal
Relationships between Islam, the state and the politics of laws granting men special privileges in the areas of marriage,
gender comprise at least three distinct components: 1) links divorce, custody, maintenance and inheritance. Does this
between Islam and cultural nationalism; 2) processes of state conservatism in the areas of women and the family derive
consolidation and the modes of control states establish over from the centrality of Islam to Arab cultural nationalism, and
local kin-based, religious and ethnic communities; and represent
3) an attempt to preserve Arab cultural identity in the
face of Western imperialism as many Arab commentators
international pressures that influence priorities and policies.
maintain?7 Al-Khalil takes issue with the notion that Arab
nationalism, at least in its Ba'thist version, could ever embody
Cultural Nationalism & Women's Rights a secular project. He argues that the demarcation of Arab
national identity was made possible through arguments about
All Muslim societies have had to grapple with the problems ofthe primacy of the Arabs within Islam, and that a particular
establishing modern nation states and forging new notions of version of Islam, Sunnism, was made co-terminus with na?
citizenship. Diverse processes of nation-building have pro?tional identity.8 The fact that Sunnism and Shi'ism can be
duced a spectrum of distinct, shifting and actively contestedmobilized as the respective markers of Arab and Iranian
syntheses between cultural nationalism and Islam. Women's national identities was made amply evident and was fully
rights were debated and legislated in the search for newexploited during the Iran-Iraq war.
ideologies to legitimize emerging forms of state power. The tensions and juxtapositions between Islam and na?
Tbrkey stands out with its early experience of secularism, astional identity are clearest in the South Asian subcontinent.
the multi-ethnic Ottoman empire dissolved in favor of anPakistan emerged from partition as a state that claimed its
Anatolia-based nation state. Kemal Ataturk not only disman?separate identity and sovereignty on the grounds of religion;
tled the central institutions of Ottoman Islam by abolishing Islam was constitutive of nationhood in itself. Although Paki?
the Caliphate, but took additional measures to heighten Tur?stan originated as a homeland for the Muslims of India rather
key's "Turkish" national consciousness at the expense of than a as an Islamic state, Islam was increasingly evoked as the
wider identification with the Muslim umma. The nationalist legitimizing ideology of Pakistani unity. The "Islamization"
alliance that brought Kemal to power included men of religion package introduced by General Zia ul-Haq gave legal sanction
to crude forms of sexual discrimination, which Pakistani
who resisted any changes in the position of women, but
collaboration between the Ottoman Islamic establishment women's organizations loudly protested.
and Allied occupation forces after World War I had under? This emphasis on control of women as a means of establish?
mined their legitimacy. The abrogation of the sharVa, ingthe
Islamic credentials must be set in the historical context of
adoption of a secular Civil Code in 1926 and the enfranchise?pre-partition India. Ayesha Jalal argues that conservative
ment of women in 1934 became part of a broader struggle entrenchment
to on issues pertaining to women and family life
liquidate the institutions of the Ottoman state and establishlay at
a the heart of Muslim cultural resistance to both Hindu?
republican notion of citizenship. Despite the growth of Islam?
ism and British colonialism.9 The Bengalis, on the other hand,
ist political platforms in recent years, the TXirkish state has a linguistic and cultural nationalism in order to wrest
favored
not, to date, acted to reverse the legislative reforms of thetheir
early independence from their Pakistani co-religionists; Ban?
republican era. gladesh emerged from the conflict of 1971 as a secular People's
Republic. State secularism subsequently eroded under
In Iran, Reza Shah openly claimed to derive inspiration
from Mustafa Kemal's reforms. His ban on veiling in 1936 successive
was regimes until finally General Ershad declared Ban?
certainly more drastic than KemaPs pedagogic and indirectgladesh an Islamic state in 1988. The Islamization policies of
approach. However, at the point of modern state-building Bangladesh, though, have remained more tentative than those
Iran was a much more fragmented polity than the Ottoman of Pakistan, continuing to express the contradictions of its
empire. Reza Shah's regime, furthermore, was not the heirnationalist
of a history, of its varied internal constituencies and of
war of national liberation but a military-based monarchy,the conflicting agendas of various foreign aid donors.10
with a much shallower basis for legitimacy. While Reza Shah In India, the question of Muslim women's rights easily
consolidated his rule by eliminating alternative sources turnsofinto a confrontation of minority (Muslim) and majority
(Hindu)
power, the Shi'a clergy was able to resist co-optation into the interests. As a result, any progressive attempts to

10 Middle East Report ? November-December 1991

This content downloaded from 181.29.37.226 on Wed, 27 Dec 2017 15:33:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
redefine or expand these rights is thwarted by the logic of Ottoman empire remained limited compared to the dramatic
communal politics.11 expansion of state power in this century.
The attempts of post-independence states to absorb and
transform kin-based communities in order to expand their
State Consolidation & Family Legislation control had an important bearing on policies relating to
women and the family. Mounira Charrad argues that varia?
tions in the balance of power between the national state and
The fact that women represent the "inner sanctum" of diverse
national collectivities and the focal point of kinship-based
locally based communities in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria
solidarities, as opposed to a more abstract and problematic
during accession to independence account for significant dif?
allegiance to the state, has presented a dilemma for the ferences in family legislation.12 In Iraq, the Ba'th had an
"modernizing" states of the Muslim world. Modern states interest both in recruiting women into the labor force in the
have had to confront and to some extent eradicate the local context of a continuing labor shortage, and in wresting wom?
particularisms in order to create new forms of civic conscious?en's allegiance away from loyalties to kin, family or ethnic
ness and to liberate all available forces of development, includ?group and shifting that allegiance to the state-party. Women
ing the labor potential of their female citizens. Depending onwere recruited into state-controlled agencies and put through
the nature of their political projects, states have variouslypublic education as well as vocational training and political
challenged, accommodated or abdicated to local/communal indoctrination. The 1978 Personal Status law, although lim?
patriarchal interests, with important consequences for familyited in its objectives, aimed at reducing the control of ex?
legislation and more general policies affecting women. tended families over women. In Lebanon, governments for?
Muslim modernists at the turn of the century put familymally relinquished matters of family and personal status to
reform high on their agendas. They denounced sex segrega?the religious authorities of existing communities. This was
tion, arranged marriages, repudiation and polygamy and ar?part of the strategy of Lebanon's ruling elite to maintain the
gued that the subjugation of women hinders national progress.balance of sectarian power in the state.13 The People's Demo?
Such views remained in the realm of polemic in societies withcratic Republic of Yemen, by contrast, introduced the 1974
small urban populations, weak industrial bases and vast ruralfamily law which, despite numerous concessions to Islamic
or tribal hinterlands. The limited outreach of pre-modern laws and local customs, aimed to free women from traditional
states left many aspects of their citizens' lives untouched; forms of kin control and create possibilities for their emer?
regulation of marriage and family life remained under localgence as economic and political actors in the service of
kin control. Attempts at greater state penetration of societynational development.14
under Muhammad Ali in 19th century Egypt and in the late Other considerations that have a bearing on state policies

Middle East Report ? November-December 1991 11

This content downloaded from 181.29.37.226 on Wed, 27 Dec 2017 15:33:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
relating to women include the extent to which states are
pressed to mobilize their internal resources.15 Oil states, which
were until recently able to recruit foreign migrant labor, were
clearly less reliant on female labor than, say, Turkey or Egypt,
though recent developments in the Gulf may force a partial
redefinition of the existing sexual divisions of labor. Con?
versely, states whose foreign earnings are highly contingent on
remittances from male international migrants may increas?
ingly rely on female labor in their domestic economies. This is
particularly true in countries that have shifted their industrial
priorities from import-substitution to export-led strategies of
development which stimulate the recruitment of low-paid
female labor.
The interventionist measures of post-independence states,
either through family legislation or education, employment
and population control policies, were primarily geared to
national development. Their record with respect to the eman?
cipation of women is quite mixed. Typically authoritarian and
dirigiste regimes did not encourage the creation of democratic
civil societies in which women's gender interests could be
autonomously represented. Women's attempts at indepen?
dent organizations were considered divisive and actively dis?
couraged. This was the case during the single-party regime in
Turkey, under the Pahlavis in Iran, and under Nasir in Egypt
who, immediately after granting women suffrage in 1956,
outlawed all feminist organizations.16 Instead, state-sponsored
Syria.
women's organizations were set up which were generally the
docile auxiliaries of the ruling state-party. Nonetheless, in
regimes as diverse as those of Ataturk, Reza Shah and Nasir, police or even other unrelated men, who take it upon them?
an emphasis on national consolidation and unity and the selves to monitor the dress and conduct of women.18 One of
creation of a modern, centralized bureaucracy were congruent the deepest ironies behind this emphasis on the control of
with the mobilization of women to aid the expansion of new women is the fact that the ties of economic and political
cadres and the creation of a uniform citizenry. dependence in which most states are enmeshed restricts their
Some regimes have recently reversed what appeared to be autonomy quite severely in almost every other sphere. This
the steady expansion of women's rights in the early stages of brings us to a consideration of the international context in
national consolidation. Others are expecting legitimacy crises, which state policies are formulated and implemented.
the political outcomes of which may also encroach on wom?
en's rights. The expansion of women's citizenship rights
coincided with the secularist thrust of nationalist state-build? The International Context
ing projects. The political and distributive failures of such
projects in Pakistan and India, for example, have aggravated At the regional level, the cleavages between oil-rich and
conflicts expressed in religious, ethnic and regional terms. resource-poor countries had an important effect on the flow of
States have themselves used and exploited sectional rivalries migration, aid and political influence in the Muslim world.
in their patronage networks and distributive systems, expos? Migrants went from poorer countries such as Egypt, Yemen,
ing any initial universalist pretensions as shallow and fragile. Bangladesh, Turkey and Pakistan to the oil countries of the
Radical Islamist discourse typically identifies these failures Gulf, while a reverse flow of cash and political influence
not as merely political ones but as "moral" failures, requiring astrengthened the cultural and political prominence of local
complete overhaul of the world views underpinning them. As Islamist tendencies. This prompted diverse accommodations
religious and ethnic identities become increasingly politicized, with Islam in aid-dependent countries. Internal Islamist con?
they tend to sacrifice women's hard-won civil rights on the stituencies either received a measure of acceptance and favor
altar of a politics of identity that prioritizes control of women.from ruling parties or governments, or created pressures
Governments struggling to shore up their legitimacy maypushing governments to declare their own commitment to
choose tactically to relinquish control of women to theirreligious orthodoxy as a means of upstaging more radical
immediate communities and families, thus depriving female Islamist platforms.
citizens of full legal protection.17 Meanwhile, international monitoring of local economies
In those cases where the state itself sponsors religious reached unprecedented levels with the adoption of structural
fundamentalism, as in Iran, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, theadjustment packages and stabilization measures imposed by
exercise of patriarchal authority extends to the clergy, the the International Monetary Fund and diverse development

12 Middle East Report ? November-December 1991

This content downloaded from 181.29.37.226 on Wed, 27 Dec 2017 15:33:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 cal capital by championing the causes of the women and
development lobby. However, he also needed the support of
rightwing constituencies, including the army, to counter the
opposition of the Awami League.
Oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, joined the
ranks of major aid donors and increased their influence
considerably. Zia embarked on an Islamization program
which culminated in General Ershad's declaration of Bangla?
desh as an Islamic state in 1988. Both Zia's and later Ershad's
strategies strove to balance the conflicting gender ideologies
implicit in different aid packages: the development projects
encouraged women's participation in the labor force and
public life, while aid from wealthier Muslim countries
strengthened religious education and the pro-religious parties
advocating stricter controls over women. The government,
which supports US-funded attempts at population control,
also funds Islamic organizations condemning them.19
Parallels may be found in other countries, where we see
local machinery channeling development funds into projects
designed to empower women against a background of increas?
ingly conservative ideologies, and sometimes policies, con?
cerning their appropriate roles. Donor governments and fund?
ing agencies aim to harness women directly to their vision of a
more effective, though not necessarily more equitable, inter?
national economic order. The very manner in which the
recipients of aid are integrated into this order encourages the
rise of unstable and repressive regimes.
The development policies favored by such regimes have by
projects sponsored by Western donor agencies. The shift from and large led to more visible disparities in wealth, fueling
tight state control over the economy to private sector and widespread popular resentment and discontent, often in the
foreign investment initiatives, and the adoption of export-led absence of adequate democratic channels of expression. Islam?
development strategies, had significant gender effects, notably ist tendencies and movements enter this equation in ways
a significant increase of the female labor force in the low-paid, specific to each context, which does not invite easy generaliza?
casual and non-unionized sectors of the economy. tions. A conclusion that does seem permissible is that when
Since the International Women's Year in 1975 and the they do become a factor, tighter control over women and
United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985), the women- restrictions of their rights constitute the lowest common
and-development lobby has exerted pressure on national denominator
gov? of their policies. ?
ernments to recognize the role of women in combating pov?
erty, illiteracy and high birth rates and to eliminate all forms
of legal discrimination based on sex. Since 1973, the Percy
Footnotes
Amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act has required 1 A debate indicative of these disagreements may be found in Mai Ghoussoub, "Feminism?
that bilateral aid should promote projects integrating women
Eternal Masculine?in the Arab World," New Left Review 161 (January-February 1987), pp
Rema Hammami and Martina Rieker, "Feminist Orientalism and Orientalist Marxism," Ne
into development efforts. Monitoring bureaucracies wereLeftsetReview 170 (July-August 1988), pp. 93-106.
up within the US Agency for International Development,2 Nikki
the R. Keddie, "Problems in the Study of Middle Eastern Women," International Jou
Middle East Studies 10 (1979), pp. 225-40; Judith E. Tucker, "Problems in the Historiogra
World Bank and the foreign aid departments of the main Women in the Middle East: The Case of Nineteenth Century Egypt," International Journ
European donor nations. Although these initiatives are still
Middle East Studies 15 (1983), pp. 321-36.
3 See the themes in: "Women and Work in the Middle East," MERIP Reports #95 (March-
marginal to mainstream development funding, they indicate
1981); "Women and Labor Migration," MERIP Reports #124 (June 1984); "Women and Pol
the success of international women's movements in placingMERIP Reports #138 (January-February 1986).

gender issues on policy agendas. The "official" feminist rheto?

4 Fatima Mernissi, "Muslim Women and Fundamentalism," MERIP Reports #153 (July-Au
1988), pp. 8-11.
ric of modernizing, post-independence states has now been
5 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Islam and Patriarchy: A Comparative Perspective," in Nikki Ked
appropriated by supra-national monitoring bodies, but with Beth Baron, eds., Shifting Boundaries: Women and Gender in Middle Eastern Histor
Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming 1992).
contradictory consequences at the local level.
6 Afsaneh Najmabadi, "The Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideolo
Bangladesh, an impoverished country with a high levelContemporary
of Iran," in Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., Women, Islam and the State (London: Macm
and Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).
dependence on foreign aid, offers interesting perspectives on
7 Nadia Hijab, Womanpower (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Nawal el Saa
the interaction between local politics and international influ?
"The Political Challenges Facing Arab Women at the End of the 20th Century," in Nahid T
ences. The declaration of the United Nations Decade for ed., Women in the Muslim World (London: Zed Books, 1988); Leila Ahmed, "Early Fe
Movements in Turkey and Egypt," in Farida Hussain, ed., Muslim Women (London: C
Women in 1975 coincided with the military coup that brought
Helm, 1984); Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil (London: Al-Saqi Books, 1985).
Zia ul-Rahman to power. Zia accumulated considerable politi-
8 Samir Al Khalil, The Republic of Fear (London: Hutchinson, 1989).

Middle East Report ? November-December 1991 13

This content downloaded from 181.29.37.226 on Wed, 27 Dec 2017 15:33:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
9 Ayesha Jalal, "The Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State of Pakistan," in 151 am grateful to Suad Joseph for calling my attention to this consideration in her comments on
Women, Islam and the State. an earlier paper.

10 Natta Kabeer, "The Quest for National Identity: Women, Islam and the State of Bangladesh,"
in Women, Islam and the State.
11 Amrita Chhachhi, "Forced Identities: The State, Communalism, Fundamentalism and
Women in India," in Women, Islam and the State.
12 Mounira Charrad, "State and Gender in the Maghrib," in Middle East Report #163 (March-
April 1990), pp. 19-24.
13 Suad Joseph, "Elite Strategies for State Building: Women, Family, Religion and the State in
Iraq and Lebanon," in Women, Islam and the State.
14 Maxine Molyneux, "The Law, the State and Socialist Policies with Regard to Women: The
Case of PDRY 1967-1990," in Women, Islam and the State.
16 For an extensive discussion of women's movements in Egypt see: Margot Badran, "Competing
Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in 19th and 20th Century Egypt," in Women, Islam and
the State.
17 This was the case in India, where Muslim women's access to secular law in matters of divorce
was blocked by the Muslim Women's Act of 1986. Another significant but little noticed, and
subsequently denied, development was the Iraqi government's legal exemption for Iraqi men
announced in March 1990 entitling them to kill female members of their family if they suspect
them of adultery.
18 Amrita Chhachhi, op.cit. See also Eleanor Abdella Doumato, "Women and the Stability of
Saudi Arabia," in Middle East Report #171 (July-August 1991), pp. 34-37.
19 Naila Kabeer, op.cit.

The Philip Shehadi

New Writers Award
NEW WRITERS AWARD, to be awarded annually for the best essay submitted to the
On the occasion of its 20th anniversary, MERIP is pleased to announce the PHILIP SHEHADI
editors of Middle East Report by a new writer. The award will include a public citation,
a prize of $500, and publication in Middle East Report.
Essays should focus on the contemporary Middle East and/or the region's relations with other
states and societies. They should reflect an innovative approach, new thinking, and an ability
to communicate ideas effectively. Topics include, but are not limited to, questions of political and
social transformation, state and society, popular culture, gender relations and environmental issues.
Submissions should be between 3,000 and 5,000 words in length; please send three double-
spaced typed copies.
Deadline for submissions: June 30,1992.
For more information, write:
Philip Shehadi Award
MERIP ? 1500 Massachusetts Ave NW, ttl 19
Washington DC 20005

Liberation & Alienation

in Algerian Cinema
Nine renowned festival films available for touring as a
package or individually.
Alia Arasoughly ? P.O. Box 891 ? Cambridge, MA 02238 ? 617-354-1241

14 Middle East Report ? November-December 1991

This content downloaded from 181.29.37.226 on Wed, 27 Dec 2017 15:33:56 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms