TM

DET NORSKE VERITAS

APPENDIX B

HAZID

REPORT NO./DNV REG NO.: 2013-4091 / 17TLT29-5

REV 1, 11.06.2013
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Table of Contents Page

1 BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF WORK ...................................................................................... 2

2 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................. 4

3 PARTICIPANTS ................................................................................................................................. 6

4 SUMMARY OF HAZARDS IDENTIFIED ....................................................................................... 6

5 HAZID LOG ....................................................................................................................................... 7

6 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 11

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Conclusion of the review on the 17.05.2013:

After review of the HAZID inputs and conclusion delivered on the 18.05.2012, DNV assessed that no
update is required as the concept design used as basis for the HAZID has not changed in the detail
engineering phase.

1 BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF WORK

A one day HAZID workshop was carried out in June 2011 for the design at that stage of LNG
bunkering station in Risavika, ref. /1/. As the design has changed considerably since then, an update of
the HAZID was carried out on February 16 2012.

The objective was to identify and assess potential hazards for the LNG bunkering station, with focus
on safety. Risks reducing measures were identified and assessed where possible.

Like the HAZID in 2011, this update focuses only on hazards associated with bunkering of LNG to
ferries on jetty 38. This includes equipment and operations both inside and outside the LNG Base Load
Plant, ref. Figure B - 1 and Figure B - 2, respectively.

For remaining hazards associated with the LNG Base Load Plant, reference is made to the QRA from
2009, ref. /2/.

The HAZID does not take into account the risks due to ship or truck LNG loading to the ferry.

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Figure B - 1 Equipment associated with the bunkering system located inside the plant

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Figure B - 2 Route of the underground pipe and bunkering station on jetty 38

2 METHODOLOGY
HAZID (Hazard Identification) is a systematic review of installations and/or operations in order to
screen potential hazards. The HAZID review on February 16 2012 was run in a workshop with
participants from Skangass, Fjordline and DNV. Each hazard was assigned a likelihood and
consequence category, so that each hazard could be ranked in accordance with a predefined risk
matrix, see Table B - 1. This risk matrix is the same as the one used in HAZID in June 2011.

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Table B - 1 Risk matrix

Consequence Categories Likelihood
1 2 3 4 5 6
Failure is Never An Has been Occurs Occurs
Severity

not heard of in incident experienced several several

Reputation
Downtime
Environ-

expected Industry has by most times times

People

Delay /
ment

occurred Operators per year per year

< 10-5 10-4 - 10-5 in 10-2 - 10-3 per per
Industry Operator facility
10-3 - 10-4 10-1 - 10- >10-1
2

Slight
Slight effect impact; local
No or
on public
1 superficial < 2 hours L L L M M M
environment, awareness
injuries
< 1 BBL but no public
concern
Limited
Slight Minor effect impact; local
injury, Non- public
2 < 1 day L L M M M H
a few lost compliance. concern –
work days < 5 BBL may include
media
Considerable
Localized
impact;
Major effect
regional
injury, Spill 1 - 10
3 public/slight L M M M H H
long term response days
national
absence required.
media
< 50 BBL
attention
National
Major Effect impact and
Single
Significant public
fatality or 10 - 60
4 spill concern; M M M H H H
permanent days
response, mobilization
disability
<100 BBL of action
groups
Massive
Extensive
effect
negative
Multiple Damage
5 > 60 days attention in M M H H H H
fatalities over large
international
area,
media
>100 BBL

Risk Definition:
High Actions must be taken to reduce risk to at least the medium level
Risk reduction measures must be taken if their respective costs are not disproportionately high as compared to their
Medium
attained benefits (ALARP principal); actions need to be taken to manage and measure risk.

Low Monitoring actions required to identify whether the risk rises to medium level

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3 PARTICIPANTS
Table B - 2 Participants at the HAZID workshop March 16 2012
Name Company Position / role in HAZID
Camilla Gautestad Skangass Process Manager, Gas & LNG projects
Gunnar Helmen Skangass Key Account Manager, LNG Industry & Marine
Åsbjørn Folvik Skangass Process engineer, LNG Industry & Regulations
Morten Larsen Fjordline Technical & Nautical Director
Erik Skramstad DNV HAZID facilitator
Jon Magne Ofte DNV QRA Project Manager
Jean-Baptiste Berthomieu DNV Scribe

4 SUMMARY OF HAZARDS IDENTIFIED

The new design of Skangass’ bunkering system is considered an improvement in terms of safety, as it
mitigates or eliminates some of the hazards identified in the HAZID from June 2011: The likelihood of
a leak is reduced by introducing underground, double wall pipeline and by eliminating buffer tanks and
flare.
Since the HAZID in 2011, the number of hazards with criticality High is reduced to one:
 1-4 Leaks from the loading arm during bunkering operations, caused by fabrication or material
defects; weld defects, leaking seals and swivels. Possible consequences are fires if ignition
sources on and around bunkering ferry (under ro-ro operation) are present; risks to ship
passengers.
The main changes include the lower criticality of the following hazards, due to reduction of likelihood
and/or consequence:
 Criticality changed from Medium to Low:
o 1-1 Release of N2 and HC from vents on the ship (ship-side)
o 1-2 Inability of purging N2 from the loading arms
o 1-12 Damage to loading arms with possible release of LNG (New: No crane operations
during bunkering operations.)
o 3-1 Loss of LNG supply capacity
o 3-2 Damage to piping system inside the LNG plant
 Criticality changed from High to Medium:
o 1-10 Loss of control during filling of ship (New: ESD has been provided; the system
will fail in a safe position.)
Other changes since the HAZID in 2011 do not move hazards from one criticality level to the next.
All changes are marked with text in red in the HAZID log in the next chapter.

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5 HAZID LOG
(Text in red has been revised since HAZID June 2011)
ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE DETECTION SAFEGUARDS / COMMENTS

Consequence

Likelihood

Criticality
Category
CONSEQUENCES CONTROL MEASURES

1-0 Loading area – loading arm – from LNG Base Load Pant to ship
1-1 Release of N2 and HC N2 purging of loading arms Fire hazard if ignition Design of cold vent; 1 3 L This could be a problem when
from vents on the ship into the ship's main header sources on and around minimise purging through simultaneous passenger and cargo
(ship-side) vent system bunkering ferry (under ro- better control of the "offloading" are being carried out
ro operation) are present process; design of fire
fighting system (foam etc.)
1-2 Inability of purging N2 Pollution of fuel in the Control of the purging 1 2 L
from the loading arms ship's fuel tank process
1-3 Release of N2 and HC Unintended releases during Minor fire with HC release Demonstration to authorities 1 3 L Neighbouring pressure relief valves
from the loading arms connection and preparation on this (safe?) design can be connected to this onshore
(shore-side) for the LNG transfer header vent system. With the current
procedure, the release is small, then
the consequences will be small as
well.
1-4 Leaks from the loading Fabrication or material Gas dispersion Manual detection Gas detectors and 2 3 M Consider visual indication of closed
arm during bunkering defects; weld defects; possible but not immediate / automatic shut- connections; hydraulic backup
operations leaking seals and swivels reliable (due to down system of the loading arms should be
surrounding noise considered
pollution during
work)

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ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE DETECTION SAFEGUARDS / COMMENTS

Consequence

Likelihood

Criticality
Category
CONSEQUENCES CONTROL MEASURES

1-5 Fires if ignition sources Visual detection Immediate / automatic shut- 4 4 H Address radiation level and fire
on and around bunkering (continuously down; elimination of ignition effects on personnel and passengers
ferry (under ro-ro operated during sources in classified areas; on the open-bridge and open decks
operation) are present; ship loading) fire-fighting during the bunkering; Consider
risks to ship passengers access control to the open-deck and
fire protection on the bridge.
1-6 Embrittlement Spill protection (for the steel 3 3 M
on the deck)
1-7 Frost burns PPE mandatory 3 3 M
1-8 Unplanned disconnection Excessive ship motions due Refer to consequences in Manual detection Berthing control of the ship; 3 3 M Emergency procedures to be
of the loading arms, with to failure in engine control ID 1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07 weak link/quick release addressed in the overall operation
possible damage to system on the ship; failure coupling will minimise procedures as well as during training
equipment and release of in mooring; passing ships; damages to the loading arm etc.
LNG weather
1-9 Overfilling of fuel tank Control failure (instrument; Release of LNG through Level alarm Operational procedures and 4 3 M This is linked to the ship design, it will
(ship) operational etc.) tank relief valves, and NG controls tank protection system be designed according to the IMO
through pressure relief (level indicators) guidelines (ESD link will be provided)
valves. Refer to
consequences in ID
1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07
1-10 Loss of control during Loss of power Abortion of the filling Loss of power / This has to be addressed in 2 3 M ESD has been provided; the system
filling of ship process in an unsafe black-out should the ESD philosophy will fail in a safe position.
state be easily detected (including the back-up of
power supply)
1-11 Damage to loading arms Impacts from trucks and Fire hazards (trucks Manual detection Concrete or other protective 4 1 M
with possible release of crane arms acting as potential ignition barriers and traffic rules
LNG sources). Injuries to (speed limits etc.); no traffic
facility operators and ferry during bunkering operation

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ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE DETECTION SAFEGUARDS / COMMENTS

Consequence

Likelihood

Criticality
Category
CONSEQUENCES CONTROL MEASURES

1-12 Dropped objects on loading
arms from cranes loading
the ship
1-13 Ship collision / impact Human error and / or
from other passing technical failures, leading to
vessels loss of navigational control
1-14 Damage to loading arms Truck traffic; dropped
when disconnected containers; collision impact
from other vessels
passengers. Refer also to
consequences in ID
1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07
Structural damage to the
ship. Possible damage to
the loading arms cannot
be disregarded.
Material damage to the
(normal stainless steel)
arm and possible release
of LNG (before LNG has
evaporated)
Manual detection No crane operations during 3 1 L Crane activities should be carried out
bunkering operations at a safe distance from loading
manifold (or vice versa)
Manual detection Port traffic controls 3 2 M Harbour traffic control (especially due
to the increased sea traffic opposite
to LNG bunkering facility) - Refer to
DNV Risk Analysis on Risavika
Harbour
Visual observation Shut-down valves at both 2 3 M Low probability (and minimal spillage
/ inspection the ship-side and onshore of LNG); Loading arm will contain
tank-side of the filling line; LNG shortly after loading; safety zone
consider possibility to empty around the loading arm; access is
loading arm after restricted to limited (trained)
disconnection personnel; protection equipment by
personnel present at that area

1-15 Unplanned abortion of External fire (on ship, Damage to equipment Visual observation Fire detection and fire- 3 3 M To be addressed as part of the ESD
fuelling operation building and truck) (including escalation); fighting; ESD and procedures
delay emergency plans
1-16 Sabotage and terrorist Covered as part of meeting the
attacks international regulation requirements
(ISPS)
1-17 Failure of the vacuum- Material fabrication defects Shut down and need for Loss of vacuum Design of culvert, pipe 3 3 M
insulated transfer line repairs (detected in the support and draining
control room) system of the culvert,
ventilation system if culvert
is closed

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ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE DETECTION SAFEGUARDS / COMMENTS

Consequence

Likelihood

Criticality
Category
CONSEQUENCES CONTROL MEASURES

1-18 LNG releases in the Double barriers failure; Fire and explosion Gas detectors (if Minimise valves / flange 4 1 M Valves / flange connections should
culvert digging activities; flooding; flanges are connections inside the preferably be outside the culvert
Fatigue; improper present inside the culvert
installation; excessive loads culvert); otherwise
of traffic activities; vacuum detectors
vibrations; settlement. / monitoring
should be
adequate
2.0 LNG Buffer Tank(s) (top and bottom filling inlets) & its filling lines No longer part of the design
3-0 Main LNG plant - 42-TR-101 tank & truck loading bay
3-1 Loss of LNG supply Loss of fuelling capacity, Visual Revise the operational 1 3 L
capacity i.e. breakdown of facility's manual so as to consider
reliability the reliability of the truck
and Buffer tank(s) filling
3-2 Damage to piping system Release of LNG in Truck Process control Ensure that piping system is 1 3 L Vapour return line to be considered?
inside the LNG plant Loading Bay; fire and and gas detectors designed for situation with
explosion (due to ignition at the Truck back-flow in the system
sources from the trucks) Loading Bay
3-3 Failure of liquid lines from Increased frequency of use The increased use of this pump
pump 42-PS-101B should be reflected in the QRA

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6 REFERENCES
/1/ Risikovurdering av LNG bunkring av RoPax ferje i Risavika havn, DNV reg. no. 12PABXZ-
21, 26.08.2011
/2/ QRA for Skangass LNG plant, DNV report no. 2009-0068, rev 1, 08.05.2009

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