Tuzon and Mapagu v.

CA and Jurado
G.R. No. 90107; August 21, 1992; Cruz, J.
Digest by Donna (Edited by Jackie Canlas)

FACTS
 March 14, 1977 – The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted Resolution No. 9 authorizing the
Municipal Treasurer to enter into agreement with all thresher operators who will apply for a permit to donate 1%
of all the palay threshed by them.
o This fund-raising scheme was adopted to help finance the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center in
the municipality.
o Pursuant to the resolution, Lope Mapagu, the municipal treasurer, prepared a document for signature of all
thresher owners/operators applying for a mayor’s permit. The “agreement” provides that the operators
voluntarily agree to donate to the municipality 1% of all palay threshed by them.
 Saturnino Jurado sent his agent to Mapagu’s office to pay the license fee for thresher operators but Mapagu
refused to accept the payment and required him to first secure a mayor’s permit. However, Mayor Domingo Tuzon
said that he should first comply with the Resolution and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued.
 Jurado filed a petition for mandamus with actual and moral damages to compel the issuance of the mayor’s permit
and license. He thereafter filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Resolution for being illegal either as
a donation or as a tax measure.
 RTC upheld the Resolution but dismissed the claims for damages of both parties.
 CA affirmed the validity of the Resolution and the agreement but found Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted
maliciously and in bad faith thus holding them personally liable for damages. Only the herein petitioners appealed.

ISSUE/HELD: WON the petitioners are liable in damages for having withheld the mayor’s permit and license - NO.

RULING: The CA decision is REVERSED in so far as it holds the petitioners liable in damages.

RATIO:
Jurado assails the Resolution for compelling the thresher to donate something which he does not yet own and he also
contends that the measure contravenes the limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs under Sec.5 of the Tax Code.

 Since Jurado did not appeal from the decision sustaining the Resolution, it is final and binding as to him. Thus, the
Court is not concerned with the validity of the Resolution and the agreement. However, the Court made the
following observations as to the CA decision:
o The CA only cited Sec. 5, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution and Art. 4, Sec. 29 of PD 231 as basis for the issuance
of the Resolution. It has not offered any explanation for its conclusion that the challenged measures are valid
nor does it discuss its own concept of the nature of the resolution.
o Although it appears that the municipality merely intends to “solicit”, the implementing agreement seems to
make the donation obligatory and condition precedent to the issuance of mayor’s permit which goes against
the nature of a donation.
o If it is to be considered as a tax ordinance, then it must be shown to have been enacted in accordance with
the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure
and its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, in addition to the usual requisites for publication of
ordinances in general.

The petitioners are not liable for damages.

 Jurado anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the Civil Code. One purpose of this article is to end the
bribery system, where the public official, for some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty
until he gets some kind of pabagsak.
 The provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public officer to perform his official duty is attributable
to malice or inexcusable negligence.
 o However, in this case, it cannot be said that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by
personal spite or were grossly negligent. It was not even alleged that the refusal to issue the permit was an
attempt to compel Jurado to resort to bribery to obtain approval on his application. There was also no
evidence to show that he was singled out for persecution. On the contrary, the record discloses that the
resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without discrimination or preference.
 As a rule, a public officer is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the
scope of his official authority and in line of his official duty. An erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not
constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award of damages.
 The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the scope of their authority ad in consonance with their
honest interpretation of the resolution. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as
long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts.
 Jurado complains that he was prevented from operating his business and earning substantial profits, but he could
have just signed the agreement under protest and later challenge it in court to relieve him the obligation to
“donate”.