1
SECOND DIVISION the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial
G.R. No. 144057             January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of
the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the
decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch 8, of
Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated
February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration
of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent
herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and
married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-
Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land
situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is
designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP –
060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters.
The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s
imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the
application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government,
and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles,
opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of
Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on
February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default
against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles
and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon
Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until
1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in
favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he
renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the
sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or
1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started
occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her
attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and
gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were
then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on
the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding
the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the
from any private person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public
prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to
present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear
during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC
rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought
under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. 6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The
OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from
Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
VI.7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in
an order dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nét
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of
the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26,
1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. 9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12,
2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed
decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of
law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000. 10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending
that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no
need for the government’s prior release of the subject lot from the
public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable
within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in
possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the
required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before
could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that the property which
is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be
alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on
October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to
1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original
registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.. . . .
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application
for registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as
used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a
bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely
located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the

public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by
the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section
14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June
12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v.
Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." 15 In that
case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable
and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact
that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927,
sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the
subject property was released and certified as within alienable and
disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had
been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands
in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the
bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the
claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before
the property was declared alienable and
disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case, where the application
was made years after the property had been certified as alienable
and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
2
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which
form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes19 the
possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is
elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court
of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof,
no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question was
undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the
ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower
courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary
registration proceedings. The right to file the application for
registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register
their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced
from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A.
No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership
must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this
time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June
12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to
"agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain." It must be noted though that the
Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion,
such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus,
even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a
date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the
right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having
been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. 27 The
inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the
required period. The argument begs the question. It is again
hinged on the assertion—shown earlier to be unfounded—that

there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to
1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for
registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such
conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects
the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession
since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to
60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well
as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at
least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that
the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by
the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-
interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50)
years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired
title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of
the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in
the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without
any opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of
protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987               April 29, 2009
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,  A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal
is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands
are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in
the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.
xxx
3
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from
Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title
these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One
reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America
can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have
means of proving property ownership to each other which are not
the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements,
and their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly
stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business
transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to
Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a different
dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private
property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the
government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an
"informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system
does not know how to recognize. ` - examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also
Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in
possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine
government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was
accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive
clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the
relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but
also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of
untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has
spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet
our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily
to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the
legal principles that have developed our public land law, though
our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the
endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for
land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-
Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC)
Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the
State.4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the
hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino.
After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco.
It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-
[knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given
by Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did
not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which
stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982."7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration
Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A
and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred
Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the record of this case,
in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with
residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of
Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to
the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since
the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property
was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was based on the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in
Republic v. Naguit,11 which was handed down just four months
prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in
Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum
since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the
registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place
since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the
controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is
agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any
possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession
to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property
Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11
November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable
as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur
at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
4
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable
be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest
lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code
on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in
their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective
positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the
analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the
provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in
Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum,
since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio
due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit
and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation
by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the
OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land
should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12
June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the
subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman
Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and Republic v. Imperial
Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure
converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the
coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter
whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of
the application, the property had already been "converted" into
private property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section
14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113
of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the
State refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks
of "private lands." It observes that the Court has yet to decide a
case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the
period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The
OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive
period can run against public lands, said period should be
reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the
particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property
and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to
be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
has, since its enactment, governed the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral
lands.20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b)
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or
(d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section
11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable
for agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial
legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants
that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when

prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording
in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two
significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First,
the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG submits that this
amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be
registered.23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the
Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands
of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently,
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger
class than only "agricultural lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from
possession for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing
of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier."
The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register
their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced
from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A.
No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership
must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this
time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June
12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No,
141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws
relative to the registration of property, including lands of the
public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the
registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision
reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
5
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree
and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act
has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or
their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance
may have led to the impression that one or the other is a
redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has
somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant
comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may
apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives: x x x
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more
descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to
presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the
right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino
citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title
by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his
ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate
of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the
notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public
Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of
the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12
June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding
original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section
48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within
which one may exercise the right to seek registration under
Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most
recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided,
That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does
not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in accordance
with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall
not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under
this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive
right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31
December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree,
the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right
to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim
of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared also as of 12
June 1945. Following the OSG’s approach, all lands certified as
alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered
either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity
of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as
used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a
bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely

located.25 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by
the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section
14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June
12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1)
is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement
in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the
application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it
would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable
prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under
a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto.
This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory
passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration
proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack
of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is
6
no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the
Court’s acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the
Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of
possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was]
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession…" That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is
certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in
Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2).
The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish
any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby
precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent
from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their
position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not
before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling
Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section
14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in
Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the
applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court’s
interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the
resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or
Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is
now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell
v. Court of Appeals27 since in the latter, the application for
registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable
or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the
better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its
ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned
the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of
possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land
that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza
cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the
mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should
have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated
November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating
that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A,
per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private
respondents’ application. Further, the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the
observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to
contest the application of appellees on the ground that the
property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law would
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not
err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first
requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned,
for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents
were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a
rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is
one of them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member
who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section
48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable
thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling
difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was
filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable
or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine
(9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable.
That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to
contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent
seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect
to Section 14(2). The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
x x x (2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning
Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to
be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for
further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code.[30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31 ] With such conversion,
such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus,
even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a
date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the
right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in
this case where petitioners have based their registration bid
primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively
establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is
in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the
provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on
prescription as the possible basis for application for original
registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113
which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible
of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or
7
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public
domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to
acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription
are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself
proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning
the acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership
of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten
(10) years,32 or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
years.33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith,34 as well as just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly
provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it
unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the
registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the
critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2)
does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial
property of the State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated
jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public
land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period,
additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how
exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct
origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which
amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the
right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through
possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x x x x x x (b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D.
1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for
the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior
to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep.
Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by
implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil
Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note
that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Code–
ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through
uninterrupted adverse possession… for thirty years, without need
of title or of good faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep.
Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only
legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription
under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However,
there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule
operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil
Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code
provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-
year possession period immediately preceding the application for
confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the
property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and
continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is
neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No.
1942 had mandated such a requirement,38 similar to our earlier
finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b),
which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year
possession period as basis for original registration became Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those
"who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription

under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original
registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule
on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the
entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which
does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the
principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we
are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set
forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2).
There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section
14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is
thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
The identification what consists of patrimonial property is
provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally
includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of
prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of
man.39 Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable
and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a
declaration by the President or any duly authorized government
officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public
domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be
converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by prescription.
8
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty
of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible
to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes
clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and
thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared
alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide
possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State,
although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and
ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of
the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance
with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law,
which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very
well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to
liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by
an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act
Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, etc.," is more commonly known as the BCDA
law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military
reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila,
including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of
effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA)40 which in turn is authorized to
own, hold and/or administer them.41 The President is authorized to
sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military
lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of
government properties."43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military
lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands
did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly
makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to
raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at
Clark and Subic.44Such purpose can be tied to either "public
service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article
420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status
as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized
under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public
dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are
declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated
proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into
patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in
favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling
that the period of possession before the public domain land
becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion
property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for
registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework
of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possession during the time that the land was still classified as
public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section
14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1)

mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section
14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration
under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration
under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year
period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period
under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of
possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil
Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil
Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding
the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of
numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes
such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is
not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code
when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a
clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that
provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with
respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth
today is seeing how our land registration procedures correlate
with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one
of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the
State may be acquired by private persons through prescription.
This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll
things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription," and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables
may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires
possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article
1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is
9
nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring
patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a
rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites–good
faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the
application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127
of the Civil Code,45 provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the
purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized
by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right." Dr.
Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of
ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership
if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one
cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange,
donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily
precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to
patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that
"the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership
to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession."47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed
that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The
grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary
acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription
or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding
the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot
be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after
the property has been become patrimonial, the period of
prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the
requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1)
the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land;
and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under
the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of
the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the
owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is
the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should
be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of
acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of
ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of
the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the
registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition
of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What
the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title
brought about by the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following
Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No.
1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the
requisites for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not
preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap was lamentable,
considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership
over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the
prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed
with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977,
with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original
registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws,
that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and
confirms that "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession,
the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject
to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. 51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government.
The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at
least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners
can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—
the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year
1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable
or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of
the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as
property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the
legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless,
discomfiture over the implications of today’s ruling cannot be
10
discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the
country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications
cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its
social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the
law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared
alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and
cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third
World" countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground.
The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative
means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as
through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to
limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or
alienation of said properties.52Judicial confirmation of imperfect
title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as
revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have
individually or exclusively held residential lands on which they
have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and
made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They
have been regarded for generation by their families and their
communities as common law owners. There is much to be said
about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such
virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the
law itself considered such lands as property of the public
dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase
of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement
of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil
Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public
dominion property into patrimonial.
One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect
of well-being not only of that individual, but also to the person’s
family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood
are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome
closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2
October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 158630               September 4, 2009
JOYCE Y. LIM, represented by her attorney-in-fact
BERNARDO M. NICOLAS, Petitioner, 
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 162047
JOYCE Y. LIM, represented by her attorney-in-fact
BERNARDO M. NICOLAS, Petitioner, 
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Joyce Lim (petitioner) filed on September 7, 1998 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City an Application for
Registration of Title (LRC Case No. TG-857) over Lot 13687, a
9,638-square-meter parcel of land located in Adlas, Silang,
Cavite.1
Petitioner also filed on September 7, 1998 another application for
registration of title (LRC Case No. TG-858) before the same RTC,
this time over adjacent Lot 13686 containing 18,997-square-
meters.2
Petitioner, declaring that she purchased both lots on April 30,
1997 from Spouses Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan (Spouses
Pagkalinawan) as evidenced by a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Lubusan
ng Lupa,"3 sought the application of Presidential Decree No. 1529
or the Property Registration Decree for both applications,
claiming that she and her predecessors-in-interest Trinidad
Mercado, Fernanda Belardo, Victoria Abueg and the Spouses
Pagkalinawan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupancy of the lots under a bona fide
claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. Petitioner
alternatively invoked the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, or the Public Land Act as basis of her
applications.
In LRC Case No. TG-857, petitioner presented the following
documentary evidence to support her claim of ownership over Lot
13687: original tracing cloth,4 technical description of the lot,5 tax
declarations,6 official receipts showing real estate tax
payments7 and a March 13, 1997 Certification from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
that no other application/patent has been filed on the lot and that
there is no adverse claimant thereto.8
She likewise appended a February 3, 1999 CENRO Certification
reading
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot 13687,
Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Ms. Victoria Abueg
situated at Brgy. Adlas, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 9,638
sq. meters more or less as shown and described on the plan on the
other side hereof is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable Land per Land Classification Map No.

3013 established under Project No. 20-A FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In LRC Case No. TG-858 involving Lot 13686, petitioner offered
the same documentary evidence presented in the other case except
the original tracing cloth and technical description of the lot, and
another dated February 3, 1999 CENRO Certification reading
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot 13686,
Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Ms. Victoria Abueg
situated at Brgy. Adlas, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
18,997 sq. meters more or less as shown and described on the plan
on the other side hereof is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable Land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 198210(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots as required
under the law, petitioner offered the testimony of Domingo
Destura (Destura) as a common witness for both applications. 11
Destura, who was 71 years old at the time he took the witness
stand on March 17, 1999, testified that he was 13 years old when
he became a helper at his father’s farm which adjoins the subject
lots; that he is familiar with Trinidad Mercado, the then owner of
the lots as far back as the year 1941; that Trinidad Mercado’s
daughter, Fernanda Belardo, inherited them; and the latter’s
daughter, Victoria Abueg, in turn inherited it from them; and that
the lots were eventually sold to Edgardo Pagkalinawan sometime
in the 1990s.12
Herein respondent Republic of the Philippines (the Republic or
respondent), represented by an assistant provincial prosecutor, did
not present evidence to oppose the applications. 13
By Decision of October 21, 1999, Branch 18 of the RTC granted
petitioner’s application in LRC No. TG-857, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration
Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-012230 and containing an
area of Nine Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Eight (9,638) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part
of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in
the name of JOYCE Y. LIM who is of legal age, single and with
postal address at 333 Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila.
11
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
By a separate Decision of October 21, 1999, the same court also
granted petitioner’s application in LRC TG-858, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration
Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-012229 and containing an
area of Eighteen Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety Seven (18,997)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of JOYCE Y. LIM who is of legal age,
single and with postal address at 333 Juan Luna Street, Binondo,
Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, appealed the
decisions to the Court of Appeals on the ground that petitioner
failed to comply with the provisions of the Property Registration
Decree and Article 1137 of the Civil Code both laws of which
require at least 30 years of adverse possession.14
By Decisions of November 20, 200215 and April 28, 200316 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67231 and CA-G.R. CV No. 67232, respectively,
the appellate court reversed and set aside the decisions of the RTC
and dismissed petitioner’s applications.
In finding for the Republic in CA-G.R. CV No. 67231, the
appellate court noted that petitioner’s possession was short of the
30-year period of possession.
[I]n the case at bench, it is beyond dispute that [petitioner]
acquired the subject land through purchased [sic] from Spouses
Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan on April 30, 1997. In addition,
[petitioner’s] predecessors-in-interests have been in possession of
the subject land only as early as 1967 as evidenced by the Tax
Declaration No. 1980 (Record, p. 92, Exhibit "R-8-B"); Tax
Declaration No. 1981 (Record, p.80, Exhibit "R-5-C") and Tax
Declaration No. 1982 (Record, p.84, Exhibit "R-7") issued in their
names. However, said possession of [petitioner’s] predecessors-
in-interest in 1967 could not be used as the basis for the reckoning
of the thirty (30) years period [sic] in view of the Certification
dated February 3, 1999 (Record, p. 101) issued by the CENR
Office declaring that subject land is "within the Alienable or
Disposable Land Per Land Classification Map. No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982", hence, the reckoning period should be March 15, 1982
and not 1967.
Applying March 15, 1982 as the date when the subject land was
classified as alienable, it can be concluded that since [petitioner]
filed this Application on September 7, 1998 (Record pp. 1-5) and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
land for only sixteen (16) years, short of the thirty (30) years
possession as required by P.D. [No.] 1529, the application for
registration of title should have been denied by the court a quo.
Moreover, the number of years from 1967 to 1982 or fifteen (15)
years to be exact cannot be credited or included in the
computation of the thirty (30)[-]year period since during that time
(1967-1982) the subject land was still inalienable and belongs
[sic] to [the] public domain. x x x.
x x x x17 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Whereas, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67232, the appellate court also
noted that petitioner’s possession was short of the 30-year period
of possession.
[I]n the case at bench, it is beyond dispute that [petitioner]
acquired the subject land through purchased [sic] from Spouses
Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan on April 30, 1997. In addition,
[petitioner’s] predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the subject land[s] only in 1994 as shown in the Tax Declaration
No. 18582 (Record p.10, Annex "A") issued in their name
(Spouses Pagkalinawan). No other evidence was adduced by
[petitioner] that her predecessors[-]in[-]interest have been in
possession of the subject land earlier than 1994. As such, the
possession of [petitioner] and her predecessors[-]in[-]interest
was only for a period of 3 years (from 1994-1997). This falls short
of the required 30 years period [sic] of possession in order to have
the land registered and titled.
Assuming arguendo that [petitioner’s] predecessors-in[-]interest
have been in possession of the land for a period of 30 years, the
application of said period is misplaced because per Certification
dated February 3, 1999 (Record, p. 101) issued by the CENR
Office, the subject land was declared as "within the Alienable or
Disposable Land Per Land Classification Map. No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982", hence, the reckoning period should be March 15, 1982.
Deducting the year 1997 (date of purchase) from 1982 (the year

the land was classified an [sic] alienable and disposable),
[petitioner] have [sic] been in possession of the subject land only
for a period of 15 years, x x x.
x x x x18 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Her motions for reconsideration having been denied,19 petitioner
lodged the present petitions for review. By Resolution20 of
September 6, 2006, the Court consolidated both petitions which
fault the appellate court as follow:
I. . . . IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT
PERFORMED ALL THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO A
GOVERNMENT GRANT AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 48 (B)
OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, THAT
IS, THE OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR AT LEAST THIRTY (30)
YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE FILING OF HER
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, THUS,
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CONFIRMATION OF
HER INCOMPLETE AND IMPERFECT TITLE OVER [THE]
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II. . . . IN FINDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT, REQUIRING
OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE, AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION OF ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS
OF [THE] PUBLIC DOMAIN, UNDER A BONAFIDE CLAIM
OF OWNERSHIP, PRIOR TO 12 JUNE 1945, MAY DEFEAT
PETITIONER’S RIGHT THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN
VESTED PRIOR TO PROMULGATION THEREOF.21
22
Petitioner maintains in her Memorandum  that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the properties
since 1941. She draws attention to the testimony of Destura as
well as the documentary evidence pointing to the payment of real
property taxes as far back as 1967 in the name of Trinidad
Mercado.23
Respondent, on the other hand, posits that petitioner herself
submitted evidence that proves fatal to her applications, citing the
CENRO February 3, 1999 Certifications which reflect the failure
to satisfy the requirements of the law regarding classification of
the lots as alienable and disposable land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, or for 30 years or more at the time of the filing of the
applications in 1998.
12
Respondent emphasizes that the lots were classified to be
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, hence,
petitioner’s possession or occupancy of the lots could only be
reckoned from said date onwards.24
Respondent further posits that, in any event, petitioner failed to
prove that possession was continuous from 1941 up to the filing
of the applications in 1998 as no factual evidence thereof was
proffered, the testimony of Destura having only established the
transfers of ownership over the lots.25
The petitions fail.
The twin applications for registration were decided by the trial
court on the basis of the Public Land Act "and/or" the Property
Registration Decree.
The Property Registration Decree involves original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings. Under Section 14 (1) of
said law, the requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title are: that the property in question is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.26
As the Solicitor General proffers, the alienable and disposable
character of the lots should have already been established on June
12, 1945 or earlier; and given that they were declared alienable
only on March 15, 1982, as reflected in the CENRO
Certifications, petitioner could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit,27 the Court declared that Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree
…merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable,  as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v.
Court of Appeals. Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." In that case,
the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and
disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable
status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to
allow the application for registration of the said property. In the
case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property
was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone
in 1980 by the DENR 28 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the CENRO Certifications, the lots were
verified to be alienable or disposable lands on March 15, 1982.
These Certifications enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence.1avvphil
In another vein, there is no sufficient proof that petitioner’s
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and adverse
possession of the lots since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner’s
reliance on the testimony of Destura does not lie.
Petitioner’s witness Destura merely recounted petitioner’s version
of the chain of ownership of the lots. His testimony consists of
general statements with no specifics as to when petitioner’s
predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the lots. It did
not establish the character of the possession of petitioner and her
predecessors-in-interest over the lots. Consider his following
testimony:
Q. When you were 13 years old, do you know who was the
owner of these parcels of land?
A. Trinidad Mercado, ma’m.
xxxx
Q. Do you know what is the nature of these parcels of land?
A. Agricultural, sir.
Q. And why do you say that this is agricultural?
A. It is planted to seasonal crops.
Q. After Trinidad Mercado, Mr. Witness, do you remember who
became the owner of these parcels of land?
A. After the death of Trinidad in 1970, it was inherited by
Fernanda Belardo.
Q. Why? Who is this Fernanda Belardo?
A. She is the only daughter of Trinidad Mercado.
xxxx
ATTY. PINEDA:
Do you know of any crops being planted by this Fernanda
Belardo?
A. The previous crops that they are planting there [sic], ma’m.
 13

Q. Until when did Fernanda Belardo own these parcels of land? The same holds true with respect to the testimonies of petitioner’s confirmations of imperfect titles, the same fails too. The Public
A. Up to [sic] 1990s. other witnesses –Fernando Cortez, who is the caretaker of the lots Land Act provides:
Q. Do you know who became the owner of these parcels of land since 1997,30 and Bernardo Nicolas, the liaison officer of the law
sometime in the 1990s? firm engaged by petitioner to trace back the lots’ previous owners Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
A. What I know, Victoria Abueg, the daughter of Fernanda and secure the requisite documents and certifications from occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
Belardo. government agencies and offices. Both witnesses’ testimonies are such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
Q. And do you know how this Victoria Abueg became the owner extraneous as they failed to even mention a single act of dominion perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of this land? over the lots on June 12, 1945 or earlier. of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
A. Since I am an adjacent owner of the property, I know that the claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
children partitioned the property among themselves. As Republic v. Alconaba 31 holds: Land Registration Act, to wit:
Q. Are you saying that these properties were inherited by Victoria The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words
Abueg from her mother Fernanda? are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law
A. That is what I know. x x x x (b) Those who by themselves or through their
is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
xxxx broader than occupation because it includes constructive
Q. When was this property sold, if you know? and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
A. In the 1990s. seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
Q. And do you know to whom these parcels of land were sold ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
to? [sic] exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
A. To Edgardo Pagkalinawan. prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
xxxx a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
Q. Do these properties continue to be agricultural at the time of Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis and underscoring
Edgardo Pagkalinawan? party would naturally exercise over his own property. (Emphasis,
A. Yes, ma’m. supplied.)
italics and underscoring supplied)32
ATTY. PINEDA:
Why do you say so, Mr. Witness? When Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended by
A. Because the same crops were planted on the properties by As for petitioner’s reliance on the tax declarations and receipts of Presidential Decree No. 1073,39 which made June 12, 1945 as the
Edgardo Pagkalinawan. realty tax payments, the documents - tax declarations for Lot No. cut-off date, the amendment made the law concordant with
Q. After this Edgardo Pagkalinawan, who became the owner of 13687 and Lot No. 13686 which were issued only in 1991 and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
these properties? 1994,33 respectively, are indicia of the possession in the concept of
A. I came to know that it was sold to Joyce Lim. an owner.34 There is no showing of tax payments before these
years. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the
xxxx Property Registration Decree vary, however, with respect to their
Q. Are there any crops still being planted on this parcel of land? operation since the latter operates when there exists a title which
WITNESS: Furthermore, an examination of the tax declaration marked as only needs confirmation, while the former works under the
The same seasonal crops like the previous ones like pineapple and Exhibit "R-10" reveals that the realty taxes on Lots 13686 and presumption that the land applied for still belongs to the State. 40
coffee. 13687 from 1982 to 1991 were paid only on August 1,
xxxx 1991.35 And while the tax declarations marked as Exhibits "R" to
Q. And you said you and your father are working on the property "R-4" specifically pertain to Lot 13687 with an area of 9,638 As earlier discussed, while the subject lots were verified to be
belonging, adjoining to these properties [sic], is that correct? square meters,36 Exhibits "R-5" to "R-9-D" neither contain the alienable or disposable lands since March 15, 1982, there is no
A. Yes, sir. cadastral lot number nor the total area of the lot covered thereby. sufficient proof that open, continuous and adverse possession over
Q. Not on these properties? Additionally, these Exhibits relate to a lot located in "Biluso," not them by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest commenced on
A. No, sir. in "Adlas" in Silang, Cavite, the adjacent lots or boundaries of June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner’s applications cannot thus be
FISCAL VELAZCO: which are not even detailed.37 granted.
The property that adjoins the parcels of land subject of the
application is owned by you, or you just work on it? An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere While a property classified as alienable and disposable public land
A. As a tenant, sir. conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress may be converted into private property by reason of open,
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)29 thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of at least 30
ownership and possession of the land.38 years,41 public dominion lands become patrimonial property not
Clearly, Destura’s avowals are at best hearsay. Even if he were a only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable but
helper of his father-occupant of an adjoining lot, he does not also with an express government manifestation that the property is
As for petitioner’s alternative invocation of the provisions of the already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use, public
appear to have personal knowledge of the ownership and Public Land Act to have her applications considered as
possession of the subject lots or any adverse claim thereto. service or the development of national wealth. 42 And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period

for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.
While the subject lots were declared alienable or disposable on
March 15, 1982, there is no competent evidence that they are no
longer intended for public use or for public service. The
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain does not change its status as properties of the
public dominion. Petitioner cannot thus acquire title to them by
prescription as yet.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decisions and
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 67231
and 67232 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
February 17, 2016
G.R. No. 175760
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  January 17, 1986, pursuant to Forestry Administrative Order No.
vs. SOGOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a judicial confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the land subject of the application needs only to
be alienable and disposable as of the time of the application,
provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land
dates back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to annul and set
aside the Decision2 dated August 25, 2005 and Resolution3 dated
November 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals Cebu City in CA-G.R.
CV No. 72389.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed5 the Decision
dated May 10, 2001 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu, which granted respondent Sogod
Development Corporation’s (Sogod) application for original
registration of title over Lot No. 2533, Cadastre 827-D, situated in
Tabunok, Sogod, Cebu.6
On December 9, 1999, Sogod filed an application for registration
and confirmation of land title over Lot No. 2533, Cad. 827-D with
an area of 23,896 square meters and situated in Brgy. Tabunok,
Municipality of Sogod, Province of Cebu.7 The case was docketed
as Land Registration Case No. 016-SO.8
Sogod claimed that it purchased the land "from Catalina Rivera
per deed of absolute sale dated Oct[ober] 28, 1996[.]"9 It also
averred that "by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest[,]
[it had] been in open, continuous, exclusive[,] and notorious
possession and occupation of [the land] since June 12, 1945[.]"10
14
On February 11, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General moved
to dismiss the Petition11 on the ground that Sogod was disqualified
from applying for original registration of title to alienable lands
pursuant to Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. 12
The trial court issued an Order dated June 15, 2000 pronouncing a
"general default against all persons except against the Solicitor
General[.]"13
On September 19, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VII,
Banilad, Mandaue City filed an Opposition on the ground that the
land was previously forest land and "was certified and released as
alienable and disposable only on January 17, 1986."14 Thus, it
could not be registered without violating Section 48, paragraph (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.15
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Sogod also
presented witnesses Celedonio Campos, Jr., Bonifacia Sugarol,
and Ranito Quadra to prove its ownership and possession of the
land.16 According to their testimonies, the land "was originally in
the possession of Ignacia Rivera, the mother of
Catalina."17 "Catalina inherited this land from her mother[.]" 18 On
October 28, 1996, Catalina sold the land to Sogod.19 "A tax
clearance dated July 30, 1999 was issued by the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, certifying that all taxes over the land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 043-6156 had been
paid."20 "Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 11096 A was issued in
the name of [Sogod]."21
The Office of the Solicitor General did not present any
controverting evidence.22
On May 10, 2001, the trial court rendered the Decision23 granting
the application.24 The Decision stated, in part:
The facts presented show that the applicant corporation and its
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and undisturbed possession of the land, subject of this
application for registration of title for not less than fifty (50) years
or since time immemorial. The state did not present evidence to
controvert these facts.
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed facts which are
supported by oral and documentary evidence, the court finds and
so holds that the applicant, Sogod Development Corporation
represented by Celedonio Campos, Jr. has a registrable title to the
land sought to be registered, hereby confirming the same and
ordering its registration under Act 494, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529 over Lot 2533, Cad 827-D, situated
in Tabunok, Sogod, Cebu, Island of Cebu, Philippines, as
described in Plan As-07-001393, and strictly in line with its
Technical Description, upon the finality of this decision. 25
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals.26 According to the Office of the Solicitor General, the
trial court erred in allowing the titling of Lot No. 2533 because:
(1) Sogod failed to prove its open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12,
1945 or earlier;27
(2) The tax declarations presented by Sogod "are of recent
vintage"28 and are "not accompanied by proof of actual possession
. . . since June 12, 1945[;]"29
(3) The land was only declared alienable and disposable on
4-1611,30 "making it impossible for [Sogod] and its predecessor-
sin-interest to have possessed the land in concept of an owner
since June 12, 1945 or earlier[;]"31 and
(4) "Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution disqualifies
private corporations from applying for original registration of title
to alienable lands."32
On August 25, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
affirming the Decision of the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu.33 It ruled that Sogod was able to
prove that "it and its predecessors-in-interest ha[d] been in
possession of [Lot No. 2533] since June 12, 1945 or earlier and
the land sought to be registered is an agricultural
land[.]"34 Upholding the corporation’s right to file the application
before the court a quo, the Court of Appeals held that lands
possessed in the manner and for the period required by Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 become ipso jure private
lands.35 Judicial confirmation in this case would only be a
formality to confirm "the earlier conversion of the land into
private land[.]"36
The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration 37 of
the Court of Appeals Decision. In the Resolution dated November
7, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.38 Hence, the present Petition for
Review was filed. Respondent Sogod Development Corporation
assigns the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE

TITLING OF LOT NO. 2533 DESPITE RESPONDENT’S
FAILURE TO SHOW THAT IT AND ITS PREDECESSORS-
ININTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND
OCCUPATION OF ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER A BONAFIDE CLAIM OF
OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR PRIOR THERETO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION, GRANTING RESPONDENT’S APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF LOT NO. 2533 IN VIEW OF THE
OPPOSITION DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 2000 OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR) STATING THAT SAID PROPERTY
WAS ONLY DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
ON JANUARY 17, 1986.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
GRANTING RESPONDENT’S APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF TITLE SINCE ARTICLE XII, SECTION 3
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION DISQUALIFIES PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS FROM APPLYING FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF ALIENABLE LANDS.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DATED
AUGUST 2, 2001, GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF THE RESPONDENT ON THE
BASES OF TAX DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE OF RECENT
VINTAGE.39
Respondent filed its Comment,40 to which petitioner filed its
Reply.41 On May 30, 2011, the court gave due course to the
Petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.42
Petitioner and respondent filed their memoranda on January 4,
201243 and October 15, 2014,44 respectively.
Petitioner raises the following issues in its Memorandum:
First, "whether the occupation of forest land prior to its
classification as alienable and disposable land may be considered
for purposes of complying with the requirements for judicial
confirmation of title[;]"45 and
Second, "whether [respondent] and its predecessors-in-interest
have possessed the property in the manner and length of time
required by law."46
15
Petitioner contends that since the "application for registration was
filed on December 9, 1999, respondent could only be considered
in bona fide possession for a period of 13 years from the time [the
land] was classified as alienable and disposable [in 1986]." 47 It
adds that any possession or occupation of the land prior to its
declaration as "alienable and disposable cannot be counted for
purposes of acquisitive prescription because forest lands are not
susceptible of [private appropriation]."48 It further argues that
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
"applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public
agricultural land[,] [and] [f]orest lands are excluded." 49
Moreover, petitioner contends that possession in good faith "is
important in the consideration of whether the applicant has
acquired a grant of registrable title from the government." 50 "The
alienable nature of the land is essential to the bona fide claim of
ownership and possession since June 12, 1945."51
Even if the court’s ruling in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic52 is applied, respondent’s possession would allegedly be
short of the length of time required by law.53 The earliest tax
declaration presented by respondent is 1947, which was "short of
the June 12, 1945 requirement of [the] law."54 According to
petitioner, "[a] statement that a tax declaration for the year 1945
existed does not equate to clear and convincing proof of
possession required by law considering further that the person
who declared the property [could not] be precisely
determined."55 Petitioner also "point[s] out that the total area . . .
declared by respondent’s predecessor’s-in-interest [sic] [was] at
most 21,000 square meters as opposed to the area of
23,45656 [square] meters [that was] sought to be
registered."57 Finally, according to petitioner, "it does not appear
that respondent submitted a document proving that Catalina
Rivera inherited the property from her mother."58
On the other hand, respondent’s application, even when
considered under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
"must still be dismissed for failure to prove the existence of an
express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial."59
Respondent counters that factual issues could not be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari, and the findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals "that the respondent and its predecessor-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious,
and adverse possession of the . . . land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier"60 must be respected.61
Respondent contends that it sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the law. First, the land applied for was alienable
and disposable when it filed its application in
1999.62 Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit,63respondent contends that "it [was] enough that the land
[was] declared as alienable and disposable prior to the filing of the
application for registration and not at the start of
possession[.]"64 Second, it and its predecessor-in-interest
"occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership
since [June 12,] 1945 or earlier."65
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, respondent stresses that it was able
to present the tax declaration for 1945.66Moreover, "the various
tax declarations, which prove continuity and without intermission,
and the tax clearance all in the name of Catalina Rivera[,] support
the claim that [she] was in possession of the . . . land since 1945
and even earlier[.]"67 Respondent adds that "both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals found that the . . . land was planted with
corn[.]"68 "[P]lanting of corn requires cultivation and fostering[,]
which proves that the possession by Catalina Rivera was actual,
open and continuous."69
We deny the Petition.
The main issue revolves around the proper interpretation of
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended,70 otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which
requires possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 for a judicial confirmation of title:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
. . . .(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)

A similar provision is found in Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, which reads:
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
This court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic71 has
clarified that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 qualifies possession
and occupation, not land classification, as alienable and
disposable.72 The agricultural land subject of the application needs
only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicant's possession and
occupation of the land dates back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier.73 Thus:
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the
land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise
have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or
reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the
fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed
over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was
the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that
said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no
other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of
the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret
only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the
legislators.1avvphi1
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the
land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the application
as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
16
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or
title over it. Alienable public land held by a possessor, either
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory
period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as
long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by
operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason
that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not
be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time
of the 0application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.74 (Citations omitted)
The ruling in Heirs of Malabanan adopted the earlier
interpretation in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit75 that
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree "merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed."76 This court also emphasized in Naguit the absurdity that
would result in interpreting Section 14(1) as requiring that the
public land should have already been characterized as alienable by
June 12, 1945.77
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by
the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section
14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June
12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. 78
Untenable is petitioner’s reliance on Republic v. Diloy,79 which
pronounced that the period of possession before the declaration
that land is alienable and disposable agricultural land should be
excluded in the computation of possession for purposes of
confirmation of imperfect title.80 Diloy was based on Republic v.
Herbieto,81 which was expressly declared in Heirs of
Malabanan to be incorrect and without precedental value with
respect to Section 14(1). The court declared that:
[T]he correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was
adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover
lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under
a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto.
This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
....
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular
ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to
Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded
in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved [a] situation wherein
the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court’s
interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the
resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court
on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.82
Petitioner’s claim that "[t]he alienable nature of the land is
essential to the bona fide claim of ownership and possession since
June 12, 1945"83 is likewise untenable. In AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) v. Republic:84

Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in
the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined
by courts, it has more to do with a person’s belief in good faith
that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is
occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable
or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore,
be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the
determination that the property is alienable and disposable
agricultural land. His or her rights, however, are still to be
determined under the law.85
We proceed to the second issue relating to the sufficiency of
evidence showing the nature and length of respondent’s
possession over the land. As a rule, factual findings of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding on this court.
Petitioner did not show the existence of any exceptions for us to
depart from this rule.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that respondent
applicant had sufficiently proved its and its predecessors-in-
interest’s continuous possession of the land tracing back to June
12, 1945 or earlier. Possession since 1945 was established through
testimonies of respondents’ witnesses, the unbroken chain of tax
declarations in the name of Catalina Rivera, the person from
whom respondent bought the property in 1996,86 and a
certification from the municipal treasurer that all previous taxes
had been paid.87 Tax declarations or realty tax payments constitute
at least proof that the holder has a sincere and honest claim of title
over the property.88 Moreover, witness Bonifacia Sugarol, the
owner of the adjoining land, stated that the land was owned by
Ignacia Rivera and inherited by Catalina; and the land was planted
with corn and had many tenants.89
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, respondent was able to present in
evidence the tax declaration for 1945. What were not presented
were tax declarations before 1945 because as testified by a
representative from the Office of the Municipal Assessor of
Sogod, all its records before the war were destroyed. This was
discussed by the Court of Appeals, thus:
The applicant also presented a representative from the Office of
the Municipal Assessor of Sogod in the person Ranito Quadra
relative to the tax declaration history of Lot 2533. The oldest tax
declaration on file in the said government office was TD 04024
(marked and submitted as Exh. "CC") for the year 1945. In the
said tax declaration, a notation was placed in the entry –
I (a) Land (Agricultural/Mineral)
ASSESSOR’S FINDINGS
17
Kind Area Class Unit Market JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO
Value Value ESPINEDA and DAISY ALIADO MANAOIS, represented in
this act by their Attorney-in-Fact, MA. WILHELMINA E.
Cornland 4.0000 3a   P800.00 TOBIAS, Petitioners, 
vs.
Maguey 2.0000 1a   120.00 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Pasture 4.0169     120.50
RESOLUTION
         
          REYES, J.:
Total 10.0169     P1040.50
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Decision1 dated
July 6, 2009 and Resolution2 dated August 12, 2010 Resolution of
As can be gleaned from the face of this evidence, the land was the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88995. The facts
already devoted to the planting of corn, maguey and the rest was leading to its filing are as follows:
pastureland.1âwphi1 Also, i[t] appears that TD 04024 cancelled
the previous tax declaration with number TD 1417. A testimony
On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
was also adduced by the same witness that the previous tax
Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application for land registration
declarations covering the property cannot be produced anymore
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of
because all of their records prior to the Second World War were
Indang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and
destroyed.
with an area of 6,920 square meters.3 The petitioners alleged that
they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula
Analyzing the above-quoted testimony as well as the documentary pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and
evidence submitted, it can be clearly surmised that the land was they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
devoted to agriculture in 1945 and even prior to that year. Based continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property in the
on human experience, the area planted with corn and maguey is a concept of an owner for more than 30 years.4
considerable tract of land that it presupposes that the land ceased
to be a forest land. Such that, even if the land was declared to be
After trial and hearing, the RTC issued a Decision on July 29,
alienable and disposable only in the year 1986, the actual use of
2006, granting the petitioners’ application, thus:
Catalina Rivera of this tract of land was already
agriculture.90 (Citations omitted)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming
its previous Order of general default, decrees and adjudges Lot
Thus, respondent had established (by itself and through its
No. 9972 consisting of 6,920 square meters, Cad. 459-D, Indang
predecessor-in-interest) its possession in the concept of owner of
Cadastre and its technical description as herein above-described
the property since 1945. It is further undisputed that the property
situated in Brgy. Bancod, Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the
was declared alienable and disposable in 1986 prior to
provisions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. 1529, as it is hereby
respondent's filing of its application in 1999.91 The Court of
decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the names
Appeals, therefore, did not err in affirming the Municipal Circuit
of Jean Tan, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at
Trial Court Decision granting respondent's application for original
Room 54 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila; Roseller C. Anaci[n]to,
registration of title.
of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at Moncario
Villag[e], Ampid-1, San Mateo, Rizal; Carlo Loilo Espineda, of
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Court of legal age, Filipino, with postal address at Cluster F. Cogeo,
Appeals Decision dated August 25, 2005 and Resolution dated Antipolo, Rizal and Daisy Aliado Manaois, of legal age, Filipino
November 7, 2006 are AFFIRMED. and resident of Panghulo Road, Malabon, Metro Manila.
SECOND DIVISION Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued by the Administrator, Land Registration
G.R. No. 193443               April 16, 2012 Authority.

SO ORDERED."5
The CA gave due course to the appeal filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. By way of the assailed Decision, the CA ruled that
the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property for the
requisite period of 30 years. The CA posit:
We now determine if appellees have the right to register their title
on such land despite the fact that their possession commenced
only after 12 June 1945. Records show that the appellees’
possession over the subject property can be reckoned only from
21 June 1983, the date when according to evidence, the subject
property became alienable and disposable. From said date up to
the filing of the application for registration of title over the subject
property on 14 June 2001, only eighteen (18) years had lapsed.
Thus, appellees’ possession of the subject property fell short of
the requirement of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least 30 years.
Moreover, there was no adequate evidence which would show that
appellees and their predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of
dominion over the subject land as to indicate possession in the
concept of owner. The testimonies of appellees’ witnesses
regarding actual possession are belied by the absence of evidence
on actual use of or improvements on the subject property.
Appellees presented only various tax declarations to prove
possession. However, except for the Certification, showing
payment of tax due on tax declaration for the year 2003, there are
no other evidence showing that all the taxes due corresponding to
the rest of the tax declarations were in fact paid by appellees or
their predecessors-in-interest.
In sum, appellees were unable to prove that they or their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized
as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an
owner. Appellees failed to discharge their duty of substantiating
possession and title to the subject land.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision
dated 29 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic,
Cavite, Branch 15 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.6 (citation omitted)
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was denied by
the CA in its August 12, 2010 Resolution.7
18
The petitioners question the conclusion arrived at by the CA,
alleging that the evidence they presented prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation
of the subject property for more than 30 years. The petitioners
claim that the following sufficed to demonstrate that they acquired
title over the subject property by prescription:
a. the testimony of their attorney-in-fact, Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias,
stating that:
i. the petitioners have been in actual, notorious and open
possession of the subject property since the time they
purchased the same in 1996;
ii. the petitioners have regularly paid the taxes due on
the subject property;
iii. the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, Victorio
Garcia, Felipe Gatdula and Gregonio Gatdula, had been
in possession of the subject property for more than 30
years and had religiously paid the taxes due thereon;
and
iv. the subject property is agricultural, alienable and
disposable;
b. the testimony of the caretaker of the subject property, Margarito
Pena, stating that:
i. he resides near the subject property;
ii. he witnessed the execution of the deed of sale that petitioners
entered into with Gregonio Gatdula; and
iii. the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property for more than 30 years;
c. the testimony of Ferdinand Encarnacion, a clerk in the Docket
Division of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), stating that:
i. no opposition to the petitioners’ application was filed before the
LRA;
ii. an examiner of the LRA found nothing wrong with the
petitioners’ application; and
iii. no title covering the subject property was previously issued;
d. Tax Declaration Nos. 2935, 2405 and 1823 for the years 1961,
1967 and 1974 in the name of Victorio Garcia;8
e. Tax Declaration Nos. 1534 and 3850 for the years 1980 and
1985 in the name of Felipe Gatdula;9
f. Tax Declaration Nos. 22453-A and 2925 for the years 1991 and
1994 in the name of Gregonio Gatdula;10
g. Tax Declaration Nos. 21956-A, 22096-A, 22097-A and 97-
05078 in the name of the petitioners;11
h. Resolution No. 69, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Indang, Cavite, which approved the reclassification of several
lots, including the subject property, from agricultural to
residential/commercial;12
i. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of
2000, issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform on July 13,
2000, which converted several parcels of land, including the
subject property, from agricultural to residential/commercial; 13
j. Certification issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) – CALABARZON dated October 29,
2002, stating that "the subject area falls within the Alienable and
Disposable Land Project No. 13-A of Indang, Cavite per LC Map
3091 certified on June 21, 1983".14
Issue
This Court is faced with the lone issue of whether the petitioners
have proven themselves qualified to the benefits under the
relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
Our Ruling
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the "Public
Land Act" governs the classification and disposition of lands
forming part of the public domain. Section 11 thereof provides
that one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes is by "confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles". Section 48 thereof enumerates those who are
considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over
an alienable and disposable public land.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known
as the "Property Registration Decree", is a codification of all the

laws relative to the registration of property and Section 14 thereof
specifies those who are qualified to register their incomplete title
over an alienable and disposable public land under the Torrens
system. Particularly:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law.
As this Court clarified in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the
Philippines,15 and Republic of the Philippines v. East Silverlane
Realty Development Corporation,16 Section 14(1) covers
"alienable and disposable lands" while Section 14(2) covers
"private property". Thus, for one’s possession and occupation of
an alienable and disposable public land to give rise to an
imperfect title, the same should have commenced on June 12,
1945 or earlier. On the other, for one to claim that his possession
and occupation of private property has ripened to imperfect title,
the same should have been for the prescriptive period provided
under the Civil Code. Without need for an extensive
extrapolation, the private property contemplated in Section 14(2)
is patrimonial property as defined in Article 421 in relation to
Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code.
Going further, it was explained in Heirs of Malabanan and East
Silverlane, that possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil
Code will not convert it to patrimonial or private property. There
must be an express declaration that the property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of national wealth.
In the absence thereof, the property remains to be alienable and
19
disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus:
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the
periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically
convert said property into private property or release it from the
public domain. There must be an express declaration that the
property is no longer intended for public service or development
of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of
the State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty
of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible
to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes
clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth".
(emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the
State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2)
and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is
primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first
established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the
classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered
in determining the completion of the prescriptive period. 17
The petitioners’ application is obviously anchored on Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 as they do not claim to have possessed, by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest, the subject property
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. That it was thru prescription that
they had acquired an imperfect title over the subject property is
the foundation upon which the petitioners rest their application.
Unfortunately, this Court finds the evidence presented by the
petitioners to be wanting. The petitioners failed to demonstrate
that they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the property
in the requisite manner, which this Court explained as follows:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under
conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should
be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse
possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription.18
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of
actual possession for purposes of prescription. More so, if the
payment of the taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and
random such as in this case. Indeed, how can the petitioners’
claim of possession for the entire prescriptive period be ascribed
any ounce of credibility when taxes were paid only on eleven (11)
occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to 2001? In Wee v.
Republic of the Philippines,19 this Court stated that:
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax
declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a
claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-
1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged
ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence
of other competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively
establish either possession or declarant’s right to registration of
title.20 (emphasis supplied and citation omitted)
In East Silverlane, it was emphasized that adverse, continuous,
open, public possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion
of law and the burden to prove it by clear, positive and convincing
evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper

on the basis of tax declarations if unaccompanied by proof of
actual possession.21
While there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by
testimonial evidence, the same is futile and frivolous. The
testimonies of Margarito Pena and Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias do not
merit consideration and do not make up for the inherent
inadequacy of the eleven (11) tax declarations submitted by the
petitioners. Such witnesses did not state what specific acts of
ownership or dominion were performed by the petitioners and
predecessors-in-interest and simply made that general assertion
that the latter possessed and occupied the subject property for
more than thirty (30) years, which, by all means, is a mere
conclusion of law. The RTC should have tackled evidence of such
nature with a disposition to incredulity, if not with an outright
rejection.1âwphi1
Furthermore, the petitioners’ application was filed after only (1)
year from the time the subject property may be considered
patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99,
Series of 2000, was issued by the DAR only on July 13, 2000,
which means that the counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive
period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under
Section 14(2) can only start from such date. Before the property
was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order, it
cannot be acquired by prescription. This is clear from the
pronouncements of this Court in Heirs of Malabanan quoted
above and in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo, 22which states:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application
for registration because his claim of ownership and possession
over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However,
it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of
prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration
of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins
from the moment the State expressly declares that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial.23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The July 6, 2009 Decision and August
12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160453               November 12, 2012
20
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made
through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the
owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms.
The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up
river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not
to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some
other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten
years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan)
applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the
property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City.
The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or
less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and
was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to
respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast
by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. 1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land
registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of
the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accretion and had been in their
joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession
for more than 30 years.2
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land
registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20
meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property
was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could
not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the
property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted
from accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC
registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants,
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS,
JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and
ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is
situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with
an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or
less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a
portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC
Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names
with the following technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the
corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the
RTC,5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN
ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY
APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE
ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY
WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL
FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE
RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE
APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE
SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE.

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES
HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS,
OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN
THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion on October 20, 2003.7
Issues
8
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:
I opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT
WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER
ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS
CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE
PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD
AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF
THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN
OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL
TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
21
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY,
PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code
was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents could
claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to
respondents’ benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the
waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court
finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.,
are the owners of the land subject of this application which was
previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard
after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins
the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.,
after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother,
Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of
the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters."9
The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457
New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and
Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was
previously part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard
after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same
property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the
latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both
lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the
face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish
accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.
The Republic’s submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the
burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by a
preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that
is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in
property as their own and apply for its registration under the
Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property
was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the
banks of rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion,
must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the
effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the
elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for
land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof.
They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition
of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed
Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was
the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the
RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the
land which was previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and)
became an orchard after it dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not
yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their
mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only
thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque
River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and
sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the

current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot
4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one,
respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the
river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river
bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of
the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the
uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words,
respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had
formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the
effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that
the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land
with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a
gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in
the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening
between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their
deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in
existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness
Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to
have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for
the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up
bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was
Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property was
previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and
become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform
conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been
formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the
consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein
described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River
Bed."14
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the
location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot
4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent
Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the
Northeast."15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river
bed as an accretion that became respondents’ property pursuant to
Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land
involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and
the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks
through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did
22
not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents
as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of
Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language
of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to
accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where
the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room
for interpretation; there is only room for application. 16 The first
and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law. 17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested
of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly
declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of
the State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-
B, continue to belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express
law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to
some other person.19
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration
covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken possession of
the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for
more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being
the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It
rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants
became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more
than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river
bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes,
had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L")
which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and
the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the
subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to
grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in
this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the Department of
Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court
finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the
requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and
is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their
favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not
entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which
pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in
the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of
imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land
forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that
respondents "took possession of the same property continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years." 22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the
highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on
appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the
Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this

rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the
CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made
by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public
and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the
RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant
became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more
than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river
banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty
taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh.
"L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services
and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC – Chief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the
subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to
grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed
possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their
predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject
parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts
respondents had performed showing their possession of the
property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that
length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid
realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made.
That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings,
because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively
prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were paid
23
for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a
claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the
property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public
and adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the
gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of
possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that
instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium
to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit
created by the current of the water becomes manifest 27 has no
applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not
formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land
adjacent to the river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest
did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to
acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open,
public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even
validated or preponderantly established. The admission of
respondents themselves that they declared the property for
taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from
199928 signified that their alleged possession would at most be for
only nine years as of the filing of their application for land
registration on March 7, 1997.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents
possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character
they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription
or by other means without any competent proof that the land was
already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government.
Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part
of its public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being
either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of
the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public
dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article
502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds
are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive
prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor
of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a case involving the
registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the
natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:
As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land,
admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1)
her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her
predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October
22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same
must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of
man and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only
after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of
an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending
from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As
such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the
Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the
public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the
government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by
itself, alter its inalienable character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the
present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not
belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters
ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to
acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the
present Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the
Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the
subject land became dry as a result of the construction an
irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in
Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for
interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change
in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to
man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that
adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering
our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub
was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows
that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the
Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian
owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which
cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has
been a change in the course of a river, not where the river simply
dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains
property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing
of a title from the State.31Occupation of public land in the concept
of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code
(which declares river beds that are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives
to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the
abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of
the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters
only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of
public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the Government to be
alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not
shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable,
respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property
through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already
classified as alienable and disposable by the Government. They
24
cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the
following notation found on the survey plan, to wit:33
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD
BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of
the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER
dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified
as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3,
1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B
was "inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof
of the property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence
of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or
statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability
and disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap34 that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that
the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission
that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof."
(Emphasis supplied)
In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v.
Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the issue of whether the
notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish
the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the
printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable
and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No.
2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,"
appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in
this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person
by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside
alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a
positive government act validly changing the classification of the
land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the
said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven
that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the
sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial Environmental
Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer
(CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable
and disposable in the following manner, viz:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the
certifications submitted by respondent.1âwphi1 The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented before
the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should
not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the
facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly
issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated
in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the
certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and
25
date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey
plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey
is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already
classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents
could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003;
DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos,
Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a
total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in
Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and
DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for
being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116290               December 8, 2000
DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONOR
LOZANO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision dated June 30, 1994 of the Court
of Appeals affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 555-89, of petitioner’s
complaint for recovery of possession with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No.
415, a 146,900 square meter agricultural land situated in Ma-a,
Davao City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15757
particularly described as follows:
…Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. 419 and 416; on the SE by
the Davao River; on the SE., (sic) by Lots Nos. 1092 and 1091;
and on the NW., by Lots Nos. 413 and 418…1
Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of
land located across and opposite the southeast portion of
petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River. Lozano acquired and
occupied her property in 1962 when his wife inherited the land
from her father who died that year.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint2 for Recovery of
Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession by
Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162 square
meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to
Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the recovery of a land
area measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo allegedly
lost when the Davao River traversed her property. Bagaipo
contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river,
her property became divided into three lots, namely: Lots 415-A,
415-B and 415-C.
In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415
and presented before the trial court a survey plan3prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno. The survey plan allegedly
showed that: a) the area presently occupied by Bagaipo, identified
as Lot 415-A, now had an area of only 79,843 square meters; b)
Lot 415-B, with an area measuring 37,901 square meters, which
cut across Bagaipo’s land was taken up by the new course of the
Davao River; and c) an area of 29,162 square meters designated as
Lot 415-C was illegally occupied by respondent Lozano. The
combined area of the lots described by Engineer Magno in the
survey plan tallied with the technical description of Bagaipo’s
land under TCT No. T-15757. Magno concluded that the land
presently located across the river and parallel to Bagaipo’s
property still belonged to the latter and not to Lozano, who
planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old
abandoned river bed.
Bagaipo also presented Godofredo Corias, a former barangay
captain and long-time resident of Ma-a to prove her claim that the
Davao River had indeed changed its course. Corias testified that
the occurrence was caused by a big flood in 1968 and a bamboo
grove which used to indicate the position of the river was washed
away. The river which flowed previously in front of a chapel
located 15 meters away from the riverbank within Bagaipo’s
property now flowed behind it. Corias was also present when
Magno conducted the relocation survey in 1988.

For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is
actually an accretion to their titled property. He asserted that the
Davao River did not change its course and that the reduction in
Bagaipo’s domain was caused by gradual erosion due to the
current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is also because
of the river’s natural action that silt slowly deposited and added to
his land over a long period of time. He further averred that this
accretion continues up to the present and that registration
proceedings instituted by him over the alluvial formation could
not be concluded precisely because it continued to increase in
size.
Lozano presented three witnesses: Atty. Pedro Castillo, his
brother-in-law; Cabitunga Pasanday, a tenant of Atty. Castillo;
and Alamin Catucag, a tenant of the Lozanos.
Atty. Castillo testified that the land occupied by the Lozanos was
transferred to his sister, Ramona when they extra-judicially
partitioned their parents’ property upon his father’s death. On
September 9, 1973, Atty. Castillo filed a land registration case
involving the accretion which formed on the property and
submitted for this purpose, a survey plan4approved by the Bureau
of Lands as well as tax declarations5 covering the said accretion.
An Order of General Default6 was already issued in the land
registration case on November 5, 1975, but the case itself
remained pending since the petition had to be amended to include
the continuing addition to the land area.
Mr. Cabitunga Pasanday testified that he has continuously worked
on the land as tenant of the Castillos since 1925, tilling an area of
about 3 hectares. However, the land he tilled located opposite the
land of the Lozanos and adjacent to the Davao River has
decreased over the years to its present size of about 1 hectare. He
said the soil on the bank of the river, as well as coconut trees he
planted would be carried away each time there was a flood. This
similar erosion occurs on the properties of Bagaipo and a certain
Dr. Rodriguez, since the elevation of the riverbank on their
properties is higher than the elevation on Lozano’s side.
Alamin Catucag testified that he has been a tenant of the Castillos
since 1939 and that the portion he occupies was given to Ramona,
Lozano’s wife. It was only 1 hectare in 1939 but has increased to
3 hectares due to soil deposits from the mountains and river.
Catucag said that Bagaipo’s property was reduced to half since it
is in the curve of the river and its soil erodes and gets carried
away by river water.
On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection. It
concluded that the applicable law is Article 4577 . To the owners
of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
26
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.7 of the New Civil Code and not Art. 4618 The reduction in
the land area of plaintiff was caused by erosion and not by a
change in course of the Davao River. Conformably then, the trial
court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.9
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in:
....NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE
RELOCATION SURVEY (EXHIBIT "B") PREPARED
BY LICENSED GEODETIC ENGINEER GERSACIO
MAGNO. THE CASE OF "DIRECTOR OF LANDS
VS. HEIRS OF JUANA CAROLINA" 140 SCRA 396
CITED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT IN
DISREGARDING EXHIBIT "B" IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
....NOT FINDING THAT ASSUMING WITHOUT
ADMITTING THAT THE QUESTIONED LOT 415-C
(EXHIBIT "B-1") OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT
LEONOR LOZANO WAS THE RESULT OF AN
ACCRETION, THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCRETION
CANNOT AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THE
INSTANT CASE TO FAVOR SAID RESPONDENT
BECAUSE SAID LOT 415-C IS WITHIN AND FORM
PART OF PETITIONER’S LAND DESCRIBED IN
TCT NO. 15757 (EXHIBIT "A")
....FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES
WHEN SHE INSTITUTED THE SUIT.
....NOT ORDERING RESPONDENT LEONOR
LOZANO TO VACATE AND SURRENDER LOT
415-C IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER AND FOR HIM
TO PAY PETITIONER DAMAGES FOR ITS
UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION THEREOF.
....NOT HOLDING PETITIONER ENTITLED TO
THE ABANDONED RIVER BED.10
For this Court’s resolution are the following issues: Did the trial
court err in holding that there was no change in course of the
Davao River such that petitioner owns the abandoned river bed
pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code? Did private respondent
own Lot 415-C in accordance with the principle of accretion
under Article 457? Should the relocation survey prepared by a
licensed geodetic engineer be disregarded since it was not
approved by the Director of Lands? Is petitioner’s claim barred by
laches?
On the first issue. The trial court and the appellate court both
found that the decrease in land area was brought about by erosion
and not a change in the river’s course. This conclusion was
reached after the trial judge observed during ocular inspection that
the banks located on petitioner’s land are sharp, craggy and very
much higher than the land on the other side of the river.
Additionally, the riverbank on respondent’s side is lower and
gently sloping. The lower land therefore naturally received the
alluvial soil carried by the river current. 11 These findings are
factual, thus conclusive on this Court, unless there are strong and
exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported by the evidence on
record, or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of
facts.12 These factual findings are based on an ocular inspection of
the judge and convincing testimonies, and we find no convincing
reason to disregard or disbelieve them.
The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding
expansion of respondent’s property were the combined effect of
erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old
abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbed’s
former location cannot even be pinpointed with particularity since
the movement of the Davao River took place gradually over an
unspecified period of time, up to the present.
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner
when the following requisites are present: 1) That the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of
the current of the water; and 3) That the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. 13 These requisites
were sufficiently proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of
evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or
that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the
change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion. 14
As to Lot 415-C, which petitioner insists forms part of her
property under TCT No. T-15757, it is well to recall our holding
in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, 135:

… The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to
plaintiff’s estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title,
cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof.
Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become
the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the old Civil
Code; Art. 457 of the new). Such accretions are natural incidents
to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the
Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land
Registration Act.15
Petitioner did not demonstrate that Lot 415-C allegedly
comprising 29,162 square meters was within the boundaries of her
titled property. The survey plan commissioned by petitioner
which was not approved by the Director of Lands was properly
discounted by the appellate court. In Titong vs. Court of
Appeals16 we affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give probative
value to a private survey plan and held thus:
…the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands
in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the
Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said
law ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes,
computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece
of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and
approval.1âwphi1 A survey plan not verified and approved by
said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due
execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance
that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to
its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts
shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to
believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other…
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary now to discuss
the defense of laches. It is mooted by the disquisition on the
foregoing issues.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated June 30, 1994, of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G. R. CV No. 37615, sustaining the
judgment of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
27
[G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997] for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1988,
gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano
DECISION Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the decision of the Director
of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
who, however, affirmed the grant. The then Executive Secretary,
acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an
affirmed the grant.
applicant in a Land Registration case by oppositors thereto, the
Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does
ownership of land formed by alluvium. On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso
Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the
parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in
land sought to be registered. His registered property is bounded on
Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square
the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River,
meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his
and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the
property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and
Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on
boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the
the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the
west.
Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and
tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's registered property is meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on
bounded on the north by the Manila Bay. Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso
Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed
an accretion in the sense that it naturally accrues in favor of the
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the
riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?
Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision [1] and neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed
(2) two subsequent resolutions[2] of the Intermediate Appellate sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of
Court[3] (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the
N-84,[4] the application over which was filed by private Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason
deceased, before the Court of First Instance [5] (now the Regional as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the
Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of
Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
Forestry become the sole oppositor.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an default excepting the Director of Lands and the Director of
application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land Forestry.
in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately
seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general
15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.
default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon
filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now the land sought to be registered has always been part of the public
deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was
Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by
foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and
application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he had already
that the property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.

During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on
November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for
ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their
privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and
possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the
subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The defendants in
the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus
they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be
registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants
to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual
appealed to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil
Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the parties and the
subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated
with the land registration case and was jointly tried by the court
a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases,
Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and was substituted
by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was
substituted by his heirs, the herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment
finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part
of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration
proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's
complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land
registration over the land in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 2873 and as applicant in Land Registration Case
No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances."[6]
The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent
appellate court, assigned the following errors:
28
"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an
accretion by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the
land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private
respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is
foreshore land.
3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and
is controversy in favor of applicants-appellants [private
respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-
appellants [private respondents] are entitled to eject the oppositor-
appellee [petitioners]."[7]
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the
court a quo and granted the petition for registration of the subject
property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2
towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5
towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this
wise:
"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by
the parties in their respective briefs is whether or not the land
sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether
or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of
Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed
by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is
accretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is
foreshore land.
xxx
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents]
owned the land immediately adjoining the land sought to be
registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is
bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the
Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay
and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing downstream
towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between the Talisay
River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with
both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of
both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The
subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private
respondents'] land adding thereto the land now sought to be
registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed
that the subject land is immediately attached to appellants' [private
respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said
land immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the
sea. We can understand therefore the confusion this case might
have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy
problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed
by the action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since
the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing
appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite easy to
conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial
property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule x x x .
xxx
It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents']
land lies between these two rivers and it is precisely appellants'
[private respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing
these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two rivers is
downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are
deposited at their mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have
been the cause of the deposit thereat for in the natural course of
things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge
[sic] inland. It would not therefore add anything to the land but
instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves and the
wind. It is then more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing
towards the bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their
mouths, thus causing appellants' [private respondents'] land to
accumulate therein.
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do
[sic] not seem to accept this theory and stated that the subject land
arose only when x x x Pascual planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan'
trees thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see
how this act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the
land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the same
came from the sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that
it were the few trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then the land
that grew would have stopped at the place where the said trees
were planted. But this is not so because the land mass went far
beyond the boundary, or where the trees were planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants' [private
respondents'] clearly show that the land that accumulated beyond
the so-called boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for
is dry land, above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees x x x.
The existence of vegetation on the land could only confirm that
the soil thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for

what could the sea bring to the shore but sand, pebbles, stones,
rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the two rivers would be
bringing soil on their downward flow which they brought along
from the eroded mountains, the lands along their path, and
dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private
respondents'] land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower
court's finding. While it is true that the subject land is found at the
shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents']
land, said land is not foreshore but an accretion from the action of
the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the
Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in the following report of
the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:
'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration
made on June 11, 1960, it was found out that the said land is x x x
sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers x x x These two rivers bring
down considerable amount of soil and sediments during floods
every year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private
property of the applicant [private respondents]. About four-fifth
[sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are planted
palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of
these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land x x x
subject of this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by
accretion. And having been formed by accretion, the said land
may be considered the private property of the riparian owner who
is the applicant herein [private respondents'] x x x .
In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the
government should be withdrawn, except for the portion
recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May 2,
1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. x x x'
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General
representing the Bureau of Lands withdrew his opposition dated
March 25, 1960, and limited 'the same to the northern portion of
the land applied for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide along
the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part of
the foreshore' x x x.[8]
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court
ordered the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in
the name of private respondents and the reversion to private
respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject
property included in Navarro's fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The Director of
Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same
29
decision. Both motions were opposed by private respondents on
January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court
promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its
decision, to read, viz:
"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to
vacate that portion included in their fishpond permit covered by
Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion to
applicants-appellants, if the said portion is not within the strip of
land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern
portion of the land subject of the registration proceedings and
which area is more particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters
from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner
5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181. x x x[9]
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General,
acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry, an extension of time
within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the
decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate
court and of the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of
Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled, "The Director of
Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." [10] We, however, denied the
same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition
having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of
Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside
the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an
entry of judgment stating that the decision dated November 29,
1978 had become final and executory as against herein petitioners
as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of
the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of
Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration
of the decision dated November 29, 1978 was filed by petitioners'
new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a
resolution granting petitioners' request for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court
denied petitioners' second motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section
1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion for
reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is
imputed to have palpably erred in appreciating the facts of the
case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law
relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the accretion formed
on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which
brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and
bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in
1948.
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the
Civil Code, private respondents vigorously argue that the disputed
14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern
and western boundaries, respectively, of private respondents' own
tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said
Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river. [11] Accretion is the process
whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited
on the estate fronting the river bank; [12] the owner of such estate is
called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking,
distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. [13] The
alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is
automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the
soil deposit can be seen[14] but is not automatically registered
property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.[15]
Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed
property under the principle of accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land
reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Private
respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the
Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action,
private respondents insist, is to account for the accretion on their
land. In fact, one of the private respondents, Sulpicio Pascual,
testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the
disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had
 30

planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be The conclusion x x x is not supported by any reference to the
to rise.[16] considered an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. evidence which, on the contrary, shows that the disputed land was
formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the Pascual, one of the heirs of the original applicant, testified on
disputed land; (b) private respondents' own tract of land; (c) the Applicant Pascual x x x has not presented proofs to convince the
Court that the land he has applied for registration is the result of cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore
Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Private and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the land was
respondents' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan the settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other
deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion beginning to get higher after he had planted trees thereon in 1948.
Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the xxx
disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no
accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been of the bay."[18] x x x it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries Bay at high tide could reach as far as the dike of appellants'
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the fishpond within their titled property, which dike now separates
of private respondents' own tract of land, not on the northern foregoing observation is that the disputed land is part of the
portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly this titled property from the land in question. Even in 1948 when
foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public appellants had already planted palapat and bakawan trees in the
lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that thedomain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the
alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is land involved, inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves
fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and of the sea could still reach the dike. This must be so because in x x
adjacent to the river bank. Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed land x the survey plan of the titled property approved in 1918, said
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private must be an accretion formed by the action of the two rivers titled land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila
respondents' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila because private respondents' own land acted as a barricade Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the planting
Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled preventing the two rivers to meet and that the current of the two of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to
as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila rise or to get higher in elevation.
remembered that we held that: Bay which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land. These
conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the light of the
one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited, not on The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer
"Appellant next contends that x x x Manila Bay cannot be either the eastern or western portion of private respondents' land of the sea water and at the same time a kind of block to the
considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is where a river each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners' strained sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very
part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same: land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are waves that brought them to the former shore at the end of the dike,
further eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural which must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry up
'Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all experience in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the
sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the northern land in question."[19]
distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea boundary of their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting
or of a lake.' 7 C.J. 1013-1014."[17] reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in of palapat and bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of
his dissenting opinion when he stated that: Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank
but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila
Bay which adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the "As appellants' (titled) land x x x acts as a barricade that prevents Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern
northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the the two rivers to meet, and considering the wide expanse of the boundary of private respondents' own tract of land.
Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. boundary between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some
593.00 meters x x x it is believed rather farfetched for the land in The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not question to have been formed through 'sediments of sand and salt being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property
difficult to discern from the facts of the case. As the trial court [sic] . . . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of
correctly observed: the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the the public domain.
sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths,' why then
would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila
"A perusal of the survey plan x x x of the land subject matter of
northern portion of appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay Bay and Laguna de Bay.
these cases shows that on the eastern side, the property is bounded
instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two
by Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands
rivers? That being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of
southern side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by Manila and Valeriano[20] that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes
appellants' titled [land] was not caused by the current of the two
Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers of determining which law on accretion is to be applied in
rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the
meet a certain portion because the two rivers both flow towards multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as
Manila Bay. The Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River rivers empty. accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.
is a little bit meandering and there is no portion where the two
rivers meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is
 31

In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San The decision of the Court of First Instance (now the
Jose,[21] Republic v. Court of Appeals, [22] Republic v. Regional Trial Court), Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, is hereby
Alagad[23], and Meneses v. Court of Appeals,[24] we categorically ORDERED REINSTATED.
ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the
mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, Costs against private respondents.
belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto. SO ORDERED.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling
for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of
Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866
provides as follows:

"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits

caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain.
When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service,
the Government shall declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law,
unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this
controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for
all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the
public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public
uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national
domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express
authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority."[25] Only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the right and the power to make the declaration
that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary
for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of
special industries or for coast guard services. [26] Petitioners utterly
fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has
already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of private
respondents as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED.
The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) in CA G.R. No. 59044-R dated November 29,
1978 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution
dated November 21, 1980 and March 28, 1982, respectively,
promulgated by the Intermediate Appellate Court are likewise
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.