SPOUSES SAMUEL ULEP (Deceased) and SUSANA REPOGIA-ULEP; SAMUEL ULEP is substituted by his

surviving spouses SUSANA REPOGIA-ULEP and his children: SALLY, RENATO, RODELIO and RICHARD, all
surnamed ULEP, and VALENTINA ULEP, petitioner

Vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, former Eight Division, IGLESIA NI CRISTO, MAXIMA RODICO and
spouses WARLITO PARINGIT and ENCARNACION PARINGIT- GANTE, respondents.

Facts:

Principal petitioners SAMUEL ULEP, now deceased and substituted by his heirs, and VALENTINA
ULEP are brother-and-sister. Together with their siblings, namely, Atinedoro Ulep and Rosita Ulep, they
are children of the late Valentin Ulep.

Valentin Ulep is the owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot 840 with an area of 3,270 square
meters, located at Asingan, Pangasinan. Sometime in 1950, the Valentin Ulep sold the one-half (1/2)
eastern portion of Lot 840 to respondent Maxima Rodico, while the remaining one-half (1/2) western
portion with the same area, to his son Atinedoro Ulep married to Beatriz Ulep, and to his daughter
Valentina Ulep. On June 5, 1952, all the transferees of Lot 840 were jointly issued in their names
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12525.

On June 18, 1971, Atinedoro Ulep, his wife Beatriz, and sister Valentina Ulep sold the one-half
(1/2) portion of the area (817.5 sq m) to their brother Samuel Ulep and his wife, Susana Repogia-Ulep,
herein petitioners. The document of sale was registered with the Office of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan. Later, an area of 507.5 square meters of the western portion of Lot 840 was sold by the
spouses Atinedoro Ulep and Beatriz Ulep to respondent Warlito Paringit and the latters spouse
Encarnacion Gante. All the foregoing transactions were done and effected without an actual ground
partition or formal subdivision of Lot 840.

In June 1977, respondent Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) begun constructing its chapel on Lot 840. In the
process, respondent INC encroached portions thereof allegedly pertaining to petitioners and blocked
their pathways. Petitioners make inquiries with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. They
discovered that a deed of sale dated December 21, 1954, was purportedly executed by their brother
Atinedoro Ulep his, wife Beatriz and their sister Valentina Ulep in favor of respondent INC over a portion
of 620 square meters and that on the basis of said deed, INC was issued TCT No. 12689 on September
23, 1975. Samuel was further shocked to find out that on July 9, 1975, an affidavit of subdivision was
executed by respondents INC, Maxima Rodico and the spouses Warlito Paringit and Encarnation Gante,
on the basis of which affidavit Lot 840 was subdivided into four (4) lots, namely: (1) Lot 840-A, in his
(Samuels) name that of his wife, Susana Repogia-Ulep; (2) Lot 840-B, in the names of Warlito Paringit
and his wife Encarnacion Gante; (3) Lot-C 840, in the name of INC; and (4) Lot 840-D, in the name of
Maxima Rodico.

Petitioner filed their complaint for Quieting of Title, Reconveyance and Declaration of Nullity of
Title and Subdivision Plan with Damages against respondents INC, Maxima Rodico and the spouses
Warlito Paringit and Encarnacion Gante. They denied having executed a deed of sale in favor of
respondent INC, claiming that their signature was forged. Respondent INC asserted that it purchased
from the spouses Atinedoro Ulep and Beatriz Ulep and their sister Valentina Ulep the portion containing
620 square meters of Lot 840 on December 21, 1954, as evidenced by a deed of sale duly registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.

The trial court renders judgment in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents
declaring Deed of sale dated December 21, 1954 as null and void. CA modified the trial court’s decision
declaring the deed of sale executed between Atinedoro Ulep and his wife Beatriz Aguilar, and his sister
Valentina Ulep in favor of respondent INC as valid.

Issue:

1. Whether or not there is a double sale.

2. Whether or not spouses-petitioner has the better right to the parcel of land in question.

Held:

1. Yes. As the Court sees it, the present controversy is a classic case of double sale. On December
21, 1954, Atinedoro Ulep, his wife Beatriz Ulep and sister Valentina Ulep sold the disputed area
(620 square-meter) of Lot 840 to INC. Subsequently, on January 18, 1971, a second sale was
executed by the same vendors in favor of spouses Samuel Ulep and Susana Ulep.
2. No. The respondent INC has the better right. The sale of the disputed 620 square-meter portion
of Lot 840 to respondent INC was made on December 21, 1954 and registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Pangasinan on January 5, 1955.
On the other hand, the conveyance to the spouses Samuel Ulep and Susana Repogia-
Ulep happened on January 18, 1971 and the spouses registered their document of conveyance
only on February 22, 1973. Clearly, not only was respondent INC the first buyer of the disputed
area. It was also the first to register the sale in its favor long before petitioners Samuels and
Susanas intrusion as second buyers. Although Samuel and Susana thereafter registered the sale
made to them, they did so only after 18 years from the time INC caused the registration of its
own document of sale. Registration means any entry made in the books of the Registry which
records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. However, mere
registration is not sufficient. Good faith must concur with registration, else registration becomes
an exercise in futility.[16] In the instant case, the registration made by respondent INC of its
deed of sale more than satisfies this requirement.
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovable transfers ownership
to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally,
the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. Jurisprudence teaches that the governing
principle is primus tempore, potior  jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by
the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where the second
buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the provision of
the Civil Code.
 Here, the spouses Samuel Ulep and Susana Ulep were fully aware, or could have been, if
they had chosen to inquire, of the rights of INC under the deed of sale duly annotated on the
common title of the spouses Atinedoro Ulep and Beatriz Ulep and Valentina Ulep. Verily, the
sale to INC should prevail over the sale made to spouses Samuel and Susana because INC was
the first registrant in good faith.
Petitioners allegation of forgery relative to the deed of sale executed on December 21,
1954 by the spouses Atinedoro Ulep, his wife Beatriz and sister Valentina Ulep over the 620
square-meter portion of Lot 840 cannot be sustained. Here, petitioners claim of forgery is
unsupported by any substantial evidence other than their own self-serving testimonies.
LEONCIO and ENRIQUETA, both surnamed BARRERA, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. PALABASAN, respondents.

Facts:

Azalia Salome (Salome) owned a house and lot located at No. 2641 Bonifacio St., Bangkal,
Makati City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 61772. Salome mortgaged the property to
Country Bankers Insurance and Surety Company to secure a P10, 000.00 loan. On July 1, 1966, Salome
sold the property to respondent Rosendo C. Palabasan and a new TCT was issued in the name of the
respondent.

Petitioner Leoncio and Enriqueta Barrera (spouses Barrera) filed with the Regional Trial Court
Makati City a complaint against the respondent for Reconveyance with damages. They alleged that they
had been in possession of the property since 1962 by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage which was not notarized but Salome subsequently executed a notarized deed in their favor In
March 31, 1966. Pursuant to this notarized deed they settled Salome's obligations with the Country
Bankers Insurance and Surety Company. They tried to redeem the property but were not able to do so
because Palabasan had done so and the title to the property was released to Palabasan. In 1970, they
signed a blank document which was supposed to become respondent Palabasan's authority to sell the
land for them but in 1975, they were surprised to learn that the blank document which they had signed
turned out to be a contract of lease wherein they were the lessees and Palabasan was the lessor of the
property.

Respondent asserted in his answer to the complaint that he had bought the property from
Salome after he had paid the obligation of Salome with Country Bankers Insurance and Surety Company
that the spouses Barrera were in possession of the property as lessees of Salome; and that a contract of
lease was executed by and between the spouses Barrera and Palabasan in 1970. Consequently, he
claimed that the spouses Barrera had no legal right to claim reconveyance of the property in question.

On February 23, 1993, after trial, the lower court rendered a decision declaring Palabasan to
have validly acquired title to the property in question. The trial court, ruling that the case is one of
double sale of an immovable, applied the second paragraph of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. On October
25, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.
The appellate court, however, found Article 1544 of the Civil Code inapplicable to the case as there was
no sale between the spouses Barrera and Salome because Salome's testimony given in a previous case.

Issue: Whether or not there is a double sale of an immovable property covered by Article 1544 of the
Civil Code.

Held: NO. The Court held that there is no sufficient proof on the sale between Salome and petitioners.
There is no double sale that would warrant the application of Article 1544 of the Civil Code. the evidence
petitioners adduced to prove the sale was the notarized deed executed on March 31, 1966. However, a
perusal of the deed would show that the sale is conditioned on the payment by the petitioners of
Salome's obligation with the Country Bankers Insurance and Surety Company under the contract of
mortgage.

Petitioners submitted no evidence to show that they complied with the condition given. Hence,
there was no consummation of the contract which would transfer ownership of the property to the
petitioners. Likewise, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the earlier transaction in 1962 ever
materialized. The only sale that materialized in this case was the sale by Salome to respondent
Palabasan that was evidenced by a deed of absolute sale that enabled respondent Palabasan to redeem
the property from Country Bankers Insurance and Surety Company and consequently to secure Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 167387 in his favor over the same property.
THOS B. AITKEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JULIAN LA O, as administrator of the estate of Apolonia
Remigio, deceased, Defendant-Appellee.

[G.R. No. 11198. March 20, 1917. ]

Facts:

Chinaman named To Jan Co erected a store building on a parcel of land belonging to Apolonia
Remigio, under an agreement, one-half of the rents were to go to her and one-half to To Jan Co.
Apolonia Remigio did not received the rents agreed upon, hence, instituted an action on September 21,
1908 against To Jan Co and one of the occupants of the building to recover these rents. Thereafter the
house was purchased by Remigio at the sheriff’s sale and took possession. Defendant Julian Lao is the
administrator of the estate of Apolonia Remigio deceased and is now in possession of the house and the
land upon which it stands.

On October 6, 1908, not long after the filing of the complaint, To Jan Co executed an
unregistered deed of sale of the said building in question to another Chinaman named To Cun, reserving
therein To Jan Co’s right to repurchase within ninety days. This right was never exercised and To Cun
(the second Chinaman) never took possession under this deed. To Cun later executed an unregistered
deed of sale of the house to the plaintiff Thos Aitken on October 22, 1912.

Petitioner Aitken instituted this action wherein he prays a judgment for possession of the house,
and for an accounting of the rentals collected thereon since the first day of September, 1908, alleging
that his one-half share of these rentals amounts to P2,485. Plaintiff alleged that he is the owner of the
said building.

From the evidence introduced by the plaintiff, it appears that the building in question is not
properly a house, but a camarin of four doors or apartments; that it was erected by the Chinaman To Jan
Co on the lot that now belongs to the estate of Apolonia Remigio.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Aitken has the better right under the unrecorded deed of sale.

Held: No. The sale of the building to To Cun and the later sale of same by To Cun to plaintiff Aitken
cannot be upheld because To Jan Co, the original vendor, had no right to sell it to To Cun after having
lost the right to do so, and the latter had no right to make the sale to Aitken. To Cun acquired no right in
the building; consequently he could convey nothing to the purchaser. As the plaintiff Aitken acquired no
right whatever in the building, still less in the rentals produced by it, this action will not lie.

The transaction evidenced by the deed of sale with reserved right of repurchase from To Jan Co
to To Cun was not a bona fide conveyance of the house; and that whatever rights in or to the house
which To Cun may have acquired by virtue of the transaction were abandoned and surrendered by him
long prior to the date of the execution of the deed of conveyance to the plaintiff in this action. We
prefer to rest our judgment affirming the dismissal of the complaint upon the express provisions of
article 1473 (now 1544) of the Civil Code.
"If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be personal property.

"Should it be real property, it shall belong to the person acquiring it who first recorded it in the registry.

"Should there be no entry, the property shall belong to the person who first took possession of it in
good faith, and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith."

Granting, for the sake of argument, that the sale from To Jan Co to To Cun was a valid and binding
transaction, it is evident that the house has been sold as his property to two different vendees, and the
sale to To Cun not having been recorded in the registry, the property belongs to the estate of Apolonia
Remigio, the purchaser who first took possession in good faith.

It has been suggested that since To Jan Co, the judgment debtor, had conveyed all his right, title and
interest in the house to To Cun prior to the date of the sheriff’s sale to Apolonia Remigio, she took
nothing thereunder, because, as it is said, she could acquire merely such interest in the property as
remained in the judgment debtor at the date of the sale. It will readily be seen, however, that analogous
reasoning would defeat a claim of title by the second purchaser of real estate in each and all of the cases
wherein such right is secured to him under the provisions of the above cited article of the Code.