Ecological Aesthetics
Ted Toadvine
The emerging subdiscipline of ecological aesthetics
concerns the aesthetic appreciation of the world in its
entirety, including both the natural and built environ-
ments, and is consequently the broadest category of
aesthetics. This area of study emerged as a distinct
field in the latter half of the twentieth century, although
its historical roots may be traced to eighteenth century
British and Scottish theories of natural aesthetics, espe-
cially their treatment of the picturesque in landscape
painting, which culminated in Kant’s analysis of the
beautiful and sublime in nature. During the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, aesthetic theory tended to
focus almost exclusively on artworks and other objects
of human design. But encouraged by increasing con-
cern with environmental issues among philosophers
and the general public, a new interest in the aesthetics
of nature and its relationship to the built environment
has emerged over the last several decades. Ecological
aesthetics today incorporates studies of the aesthetics
of nature, including natural objects and larger wholes
such as ecosystems, gardens and landscape architec-
ture, environmental and earth art, architecture and
urban planning, and the relations between the different
modes of aesthetic appreciation appropriate to these
different domains. This extension of aesthetic consid-
eration to both natural and built environments has led
to a reconsideration of traditional aesthetic categories
and of central tenets of aesthetic theory.
Explicitly phenomenological work in ecological
aesthetics is still in its infancy, but the insights of many
of the major figures in the tradition are applicable to
this new field of study. EDMUND HUSSERL’s concept
T. Toadvine ()
University of Oregon, Charleston, OR, USA
H.R. Sepp, L. Embree (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics, Contributions to Phenomenology 59
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2471-8_17, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
of intentionality and his descriptions of the intuitively
given experiential lifeworld, for example, provide a
concrete framework for understanding aesthetic expe-
rience as a basic and pervasive quality of everyday
life.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER ’s appreciation of the role of
earth in the formation of the artwork, his critique of
the enframing character of modern technology, and his
description of poetic dwelling as an alternative to mod-
ern technological civilization suggest parallels with
contemporary environmental concerns and a critique
of the humanistic limits of modern aesthetic theory.
MAX SCHELER proposes the aesthetic value of nature
as a paradigmatic example of the nonrelativity of val-
ues. MAURICE MERLEAU - PONTY’s investigations of
embodied perception and his later ontology of flesh
hold implications for the epistemological and meta-
physical foundations of an environmental aesthetics,
and many of his writings on art address the relation-
ship between the painter’s vision and our perceptual
experience of nature. MIKEL DUFRENNE recognizes in
pure aesthetic experience an incipient phenomenologi-
cal reduction that brings to the fore the intentional bond
between subject and world, suggesting the particular
appropriateness of the phenomenological approach for
formulating a general aesthetic theory. His description
of aesthetic objects as expressive “quasi-subjects” and
of the sensuous as a common act of the sensing and
the sensed also pave the way for an elaboration of
aesthetics into a philosophy of nature.
Arnold Berleant, a leading figure in the devel-
opment of a specifically ecological aesthetics, has
been the strongest proponent of the phenomeno-
logical approach in this field. His “aesthetics of
engagement,” inspired by Husserlian intentionality and
Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of embodied experience,
85
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challenges core assumptions of traditional aesthetics.
According to Berleant, the “doctrine of disinterested-
ness” that pervades aesthetic theory entails the separa-
tion of a spectator, conceived as passive and primarily
visual, from an aesthetic object lacking any practical
connections with the wider natural and cultural con-
text (Berleant 1988: 1992). In contrast, he holds that
the human perceiver is embedded in the aesthetic envi-
ronment and continuously interacts with it in an active,
engaged, and multisensory fashion. This “participatory
model” of aesthetic experience treats the environment
as “a field of forces continuous with the organism, a
field in which there is a reciprocal action of organ-
ism on environment and environment on organism and
in which there is no real demarcation between them”
(Berleant 1988: 93). This general model of aesthetic
experience is equally applicable, he suggests, to works
of art, the built environment, and the natural environ-
ment. In fact, given the continuity between the human
perceiver and the surrounding world, the cultural and
historical formation of the concept of nature, and the
extension of our technological influence to every part
of the natural world, it follows for him that there is
no real distinction between nature and culture: “the
natural world is no independent sphere but is itself a
cultural artifact” (Berleant 1992: 167). On the basis
of this aesthetics of engagement, Berleant develops a
theoretical framework for negative aesthetic judgments
and suggests a new model for education and aesthetic
community that gives central place to continuity, “con-
nectedness within a whole rather than a link between
discrete parts” (Berleant 1997).
Although Berleant has been the first to offer a
comprehensive phenomenological theory of ecologi-
cal aesthetics, other themes relevant to the field have
also received extensive treatment by phenomenologists
in recent years. Investigations of the role of place,
for instance, have combined philosophy with cultural
geography and environmental design to form a new
area of study that David Seamon calls “phenomenolog-
ical ecology” (Seamon 1993; Seamon and Mugerauer
1985). Edward S. Casey (1993) argues for a renewed
appreciation of the role of place in human experience,
which he sees as long obscured by our cultural and
philosophical privileging of space and time, and he
explores the lived body’s role in the formation of place
and the distinct characters of built, cultivated, and
wild place-worlds. His intellectual history of the hid-
den role of place from ancient creation myths through
T. Toadvine
the twentieth century devotes considerable attention
to the phenomenological tradition, especially the con-
tributions of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty
(Casey 1997). Starting from the “originative thinking”
of Heidegger, Ingrid Leman Stefanovic (2000) grants
an ontological primacy to place in her proposal of
alternatives to received notions of sustainable devel-
opment. Gary Backhaus and John Murungi (2002)
present phenomenological analyses of the systemic
transformations of urban and suburban landscapes
through their dialectical interaction with human activi-
ties. Eduardo Mendieta (2001) maintains that our very
idea of philosophy, including its account of rationality
and social agency, is informed by urban spatializing
practices, a point that he illustrates by taking JEAN -
PAUL SARTRE ’s phenomenology as a paradigmatic
example.
Other relevant topics of recent phenomenologi-
cal investigation include the intersection of built and
natural environments in gardening and environmen-
tal art, as well as the representation of the earth
within literature and the fine arts. Collections edited
by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (2001, 2003) address
the representation and role of earth in literature and
human existence and the phenomenological experience
of gardens, especially as figures of infinity and the
sublime, across a span of cultural and literary tradi-
tions. James Hatley (2003) finds in the Land Art of
Andrew Goldsworthy a renewed interrogation of the
relation between technē and physis that, rather than
leaving nature untouched, approaches nature “in such
a manner that our touching is also touched by what we
touch,” suggesting an aesthetics as well as an ethics of
wilderness (Hatley 2003: 14).
Central to contemporary ecological aesthetics is
the question of the relation between the aesthetic
appreciation of artworks and of nature. Berleant, as
noted above, stresses a continuity of all forms of
aesthetic appreciation that is grounded on the activ-
ity of the engaged and participatory human per-
ceiver. In contrast, Allen Carlson (1993, 2000, 2004,
emphasizes the difference between these two types of
appreciation, holding that common sense or scientific
knowledge is necessary for the aesthetic appreciation
of nature. According to his “natural environmental
model,” nature is “an environment and thus a setting
within which we exist and that we normally experience
with our complete range of senses as our unobtrusive
background” (Carlson 2004: 72). Nature becomes an
Ecological Aesthetics
aesthetic object when we shift our attention to cer-
tain foci within this all-embracing background, which
are then experienced as forming an “obtrusive fore-
ground.” Conceptual knowledge of nature is needed to
guide our selection of appropriate foci and boundaries
for this shift of attention.
Stan Godlovitch (2004), on the other hand, holds
that such positions as Berleant’s and Carlson’s arbi-
trarily adopt the human scale of perception, thereby
failing to appreciate nature on its own terms. As an
alternative, he proposes an “acentric” aesthetic aloof-
ness, the leveling of all viewpoints to an anonymous
uniformity within which the human standpoint holds
no particular privilege. Only such an acentric view
is capable of grounding moral respect for nature,
Godlovitch holds, since it leaves nature “fundamen-
tally inaccessible and ultimately alien” (Godlovitch
2004: 113). Clarification of this debate requires, first,
a phenomenological account of aesthetic experience
in general, and second, an account of what apprecia-
tion of nature “on its own terms” can mean within the
context of human experience.
Aesthetic experience always involves a perceptual
or sensuous core, which may take as its focus one
sense in particular or a combination of senses and
corporeal experiences. When viewing a painting or lis-
tening to a symphony, for instance, cultural convention
teaches us to exclude as irrelevant everything but what
the single focal sense conveys. By contrast, a stroll
through a stand of old-growth Douglas fir combines
sights, smells, sounds, tactile impressions, and the
kinaesthetic sense of movement in a single aesthetic
experience. (This sensuous core of aesthetic experi-
ence may also be supplied by memory or imagination
rather than by present perception, e.g., remembering
a musical performance or imaginatively anticipating a
walk through the forest.)
Because the core of an aesthetic experience is
always sensuous, such experience is always relative to
the perceiver’s spatial and temporal scale. The range
of human spatial and temporal perception is a function
of our sensory organization and may differ signifi-
cantly from the spatial or temporal organization of
the Umwelten of other sentient creatures. The aes-
thetic appreciation of works of art generally dictates a
certain spatial or temporal context: we look at a paint-
ing from a certain distance and listen to a musical
performance at a certain tempo. We may alter these
contexts at will in some cases, and they may also be
87
changed by habituation (familiarity with a city changes
our spatial context for appreciating the architecture of
a certain building) or conceptual knowledge (aware-
ness of geological timescales may alter our aesthetic
appreciation of erosion patterns on the rocky Oregon
coast). The spatiotemporal limits prescribed by human
perceptual organization may also be expanded tech-
nologically, e.g., by microscopes and telescopes or by
time-lapse photography, which requires the translation
or annexation of these broader or narrower spatial and
temporal contexts to those that we are able to experi-
ence directly. In addition to such spatial and temporal
contexts, the sensory aspect of our aesthetic experience
essentially involves “framing,” the selection of certain
foci as aesthetically relevant against a broader back-
ground or horizon. Such selection reflects traits of the
perceiver, such as concentration, attention span, expec-
tations, personal history, and habituation, and it may
also be guided by cultural norms and conventions.
Framing of artworks is typically guided by con-
vention, as with the literal frame of a painting or the
edge of a theatrical stage, and cultural framing con-
ventions are not entirely absent when we look beyond
the world of art: directional markers and rain gut-
ters are not the intended objects of appreciation on
a nature trail, and signs along the highway mark the
appropriate stops for a “scenic overlook” of the land-
scape. But aesthetic experience often extends beyond
objects designed for that purpose or scenes that are
culturally endorsed, leaving us with less well-defined
guidance in our framing selections. The appreciation
of sounds in nature, for instance, involves numerous
selections that may be shaped as much by individual
as by cultural preferences: how long we should lis-
ten, what counts as a foreground or background sound,
whether human-produced sounds should be excluded,
and even whether we should parse natural sounds into
relatively distinct melodies in a serial structure (Fisher
2004). The appreciation of landscape also highlights
the importance of such framing, since a landscape
exists only as seen from a particular point of view; the
landscape scene is a “subjective object” rather than a
real part of nature (Crawford 2004b: 257).
The sensuous core of the aesthetic experience is
therefore essentially relative to the perceiver. But aes-
thetic appreciation is not reducible to this sensuous
core, since evaluation, at least of a tacit sort, must be
involved. Although both Berleant and Carlson restrict
aesthetic appreciation to humans, we clearly share with
88
many animals such sensory pleasures as basking in
the sun or enjoying a thirst-quenching drink, which
are candidates for rudimentary aesthetic apprecia-
tion. In many cases, human aesthetic experience will
also include what Ronald Hepburn calls a “thought-
component,” which is introduced “as we implicitly
compare and contrast here with elsewhere, actual with
possible, present with past” (Hepburn 1993: 66–67).
This “thought-component” is not limited to conceptual
thought and need not involve self-conscious awareness
or reflection. Rather, it indicates that the sensuous core
is accompanied by a mixture of emotion, imagination,
conceptualization, and metaphorization, and may also
include elements of what Hepburn terms “metaphys-
ical imagination,” a “seeing as...” that interprets the
present perception in terms of its metaphysical rele-
vance for the whole of experience (Hepburn 2004).
Watching a frog have its innards sucked out by a giant
water bug, as Annie Dillard describes in Pilgrim at
Tinker Creek, may provoke a grim realization of the
“chomp or fast” law of life, extending to a view of
the cosmos as essentially conflictual. A swim in the
warm and calm waters off the Florida coast, on the
other hand, might carry with it a sense of metaphysical
immersion and fluid interconnection with all things.
Such metaphysical imagination, and the “thought-
component” more generally, cannot be treated as a
superficial addition to the aesthetic experience; “it is
fused with the sensory components, not a medita-
tion aroused by these” (Hepburn 2004: 128). Despite
the terminology, such “components” are not separa-
ble parts or layers added on to an unchanged per-
ceptual substratum, but integral aspects of a single,
holistic experience from which they are separable
only abstractly. Emotions, imagination, and conceptual
knowledge may even guide the sensuous framing of
experience by directing one’s attention to what may
have otherwise escaped attention, so that the sensu-
ous components and the thought-components of an
aesthetic experience engage in a mutually informing
dialectic.
This account of aesthetic experience incorporates
in a limited way both the perceptual engagement
described by Berleant and the influence of concep-
tual information stressed by Carlson. But the emphasis
on spatial and temporal scale and the role granted to
framing underscores Godlovitch’s concerns: does aes-
thetic experience so described allow for appreciation
T. Toadvine
of nature in its own right, or is it merely an anthro-
pocentric projection? Donald Crawford (2004a) distin-
guishes between three senses of nature: (1) unrestricted
nature, a metaphysical view of nature as “unlimited
and all-encompassing” dating from the mid-nineteenth
century and including humans and cultural creations
such as works of art; (2) Aristotelian nature, charac-
terized by having an internal rather than an external
source of change and consequently to be contrasted
with the artifactual, which would include human nat-
ural functions but exclude contingent natural events
or “accidents” as parts of nature; and (3) pure nature,
defined negatively by the absence of any human influ-
ence whatsoever, which would exclude our bodies,
works of art, and culture, but would include what
Aristotle considered to be “accidents.” The claim of
Godlovitch that subjecting nature to our human per-
ceptual scale thereby degrades it therefore takes nature
in the latter sense as its ideal.
But nature in the pure sense cannot function as a
standard for aesthetic appreciation. It is questionable,
first, whether any part of the earth remains unaltered
by human activity, and the activities that we consider
to be aesthetic appreciation of nature are often directed
toward objects that bear the mark of human influence
(Crawford 2004a). More fundamentally, the emphasis
on “pure nature” suggests a questionable metaphysi-
cal division between humans and nonhuman nature,
as Berleant (1992) has noted. Finally, if respecting
“pure nature” excludes any relationship with a per-
ceiver or experiencer, then there would not seem to
be any reason to consider this relationship “aesthetic”
or even an “experience,” since the aesthetic relation
is an intentional one and involves a sensuous aspect.
Nevertheless, the notion of “pure nature” does have
a foundation in our experience. Our aesthetic experi-
ence recognizes a relative distinction between objects
of human design and those relatively free from human
intervention: an old-growth forest trail will show signs
of human intervention, but it remains less designed
than an arboretum, and this in turn is relatively more
natural than a potted Norwegian spruce. “Pure nature”
arises as an ideal extension of the experience of per-
ceived naturalness, much like the examples of meta-
physical imagination discussed above. Godlovitch’s
characterizations of nature as mysterious and aloof
thus remain tacitly indebted to our perceptual experi-
ences of nature.
Ecological Aesthetics
Furthermore, the relativity of aesthetic experience
to a perceiver does not entail that such experience is an
anthropocentric projection. The aesthetic significance
of a part of nature depends on the elements revealed
by the perceiver’s perspective and framing, but these
elements are still features of nature, not subjective pro-
jections. Crawford makes this point concerning the
appreciation of natural scenery: “A landscape, as an
object of aesthetic appreciation, is in fact an expanse
of the surface of the earth...; and although its quali-
ties are those we determine by looking at it from a
particular viewpoint, that does not preclude it from
being a part of nature” (Crawford 2004b: 257). We may
become aware, of course, that our perceptual experi-
ences are framed in an inappropriate way by limited
or inaccurate conceptual knowledge, or by the impo-
sition of personal or cultural expectations that fail to
accord with what nature actually presents. For exam-
ple, our appreciation of English ivy in a Northwestern
forest may alter when we learn that it is an invasive
species crowding out native trilliums, and we may lis-
ten to birdsongs differently after becoming aware of
the Western tendency to privilege narrative musical
structures. But this ability to revise our concepts and
framings relies on an expansion of experience, not
on the rejection of experience altogether in favor of
aloof mystery. Even our awareness of the limitations of
human spatial and temporal scale takes our perceptual
experience as its starting point, varying this imagi-
natively as we conceive of other possible scales and
perspectives. There is no contradiction, then, between
holding that all aesthetic appreciation is experiential,
i.e., relative to a perceiver, and that it may engage
with nature on its own terms. Each particular aesthetic
experience is open to evaluation concerning its success
in taking nature on its own terms, and our judgments
along these lines will always be open to revision in
light of further experience.
Among non-phenomenological contributions to
ecological aesthetics, the dominant line of develop-
ment has been the cognitive approach espoused by
Carlson, according to which scientific knowledge is
central to aesthetic appreciation of nature. He argues
that twentieth century philosophy of art downplayed
formal qualities to emphasize the role that art his-
tory and criticism play in art appreciation, so our
appreciation of nature should be guided predomi-
nantly by natural-historical and scientific knowledge
89
(Carlson 1993, 2001). This emphasis on natural-
historical knowledge follows in the tradition of John
Muir, Henry David Thoreau, and Aldo Leopold, who
tied the aesthetic value of nature to its ecological har-
mony and integrity, a position that has been refined
in Baird Callicott’s “land aesthetic” (Carlson 2004,
Callicott 1987). Because of its prioritization of sci-
entific knowledge, the cognitive approach has drawn
criticism for underestimating the importance of non-
conceptual factors in our aesthetic appreciation of
nature, such as emotions (Carroll 2004), imagination
(Brady 2004, Hepburn 2004), and the ambient dimen-
sion of experience (Foster 2004). Debate has also
centered on what forms of knowledge may be appro-
priate for aesthetic guidance, with suggestions that
scientific knowledge be complemented by Indigenous
traditions, folklore, and myths (Saito 2004), as well
as by literary treatments of nature (Sepänmaa 1993).
Carlson has refined his position in light of these sug-
gestions and proposes that the cognitive approach be
extended beyond consideration of natural aesthetics to
provide a model for aesthetic appreciation of the world
at large (Carlson 2000, 2001).
Carlson criticizes Berleant’s “aesthetics of engage-
ment” for focusing primarily on sensory and formal
qualities, thereby making aesthetic appreciation of
nature trivial and subjective and potentially isolat-
ing the appreciation of art from that of the larger
world, since contemporary art appreciation clearly
involves conceptual knowledge and understanding
that goes beyond the merely sensuous and formal
qualities of the object (Carlson 2001: 429). The
phenomenological approach to aesthetic experience
sketched above avoids these criticisms while incorpo-
rating the best features of both Berleant’s and Carlson’s
positions. Since all aesthetic experience is founded
on a sensuous core, Berleant’s descriptions of our
continuous perceptual engagement with an aestheti-
cally charged surrounding world are appropriate. But
Berleant overlooks the phenomenologically valid dis-
tinction between objects of human design and those
relatively free of human intervention. This distinction
suggests that aesthetic appreciation of these different
objects, and of the cases that range between them, may
be informed by conceptual knowledge, and even that
such conceptual knowledge may direct our perceptual
scale and framing of these objects. Contra Carlson, the
phenomenological view does not prioritize conceptual
90
knowledge over the many other aspects of our com-
plete aesthetic experience, including emotional, imag-
inative, ambient, and metaphysical aspects, and does
not exclude other sources for conceptual knowledge
apart from the scientific, such as traditional knowledge
or literature.
While for Carlson, “Science is the paradigm of
that which reveals objects for what they are and with
the properties they have” (Carlson 1993: 219), phe-
nomenology sees natural science as an abstraction
from lifewordly experience oriented toward certain
theoretical and practical pursuits. The most funda-
mental disclosure of objects as what they are is as
they are experienced pre-theoretically within the life-
world, although this experience may be informed
by the conceptualizations and sedimentations of the
natural sciences. The contributions of the cognitive
approach to ecological aesthetics are therefore not at
odds with phenomenological insights, starting from a
basic description of aesthetic experience that would be
applicable both to art and nature. The two accounts
may be fruitfully combined for a richer understanding
of our holistic aesthetic engagement with the world.
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