[A.C. No. 6788. August 23, 2007.

]
(Formerly, CBD 382 )

DIANA RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG,respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension 1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
THE COMPLAINT
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R.
Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos. 2 She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt
for P5,000 only. 3
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told
her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing
had been cancelled and rescheduled. 4 This happened six times and for each "appearance"
in court, respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally
inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna.
She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and
that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 5
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from
the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned
as counsel for the complainant's daughter. 6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses. 7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an
indigent, he declined. 8Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim
Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. 9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept
the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon. 10 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained
adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on
hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of
Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee. 11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because
one of her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the
respondent for safekeeping. 12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued
a receipt dated July 15, 1992. 13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. 14 A few months later or in September
1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses.
Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint.
However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant. 15
RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP
1
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On
November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of
Governors.16
The CBD noted that the receipt 17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still
with the PAO. 18 It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd
businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the
complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued
one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a
friend's request. 19 It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government
lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their
salaries. 20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel
a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years
and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which
was substantiated by the receipt. 21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent
violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however,
modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing
interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the
total amount, an additional suspension of six months.22
THE COURT'S RULING
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. 23More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as
they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public
servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. 24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For
this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7 (b) (2) of the Code of
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx

2
 (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official
function. 25
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected
to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on
July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship. 26 Respondent's admission that he accepted
money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he
accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly
violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was
created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. 27 Section
14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. . . .
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free
legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and
other quasi-judicial cases. 28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.29 Respondent violated the
prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1. — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. 30 This undertaking includes the observance
of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted
the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services.
Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting
attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail
to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done),
respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the
complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts
constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. 31
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of
all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of
public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his
brethren in private practice. 32

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of
the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for
3
the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment
obligation in favor of the client) 33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as
amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). 34Nevertheless, respondent should return the
P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to
accept them. 35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000
with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this
resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ramos v. Imbang, A.C. No. 6788, [August 23, 2007], 557 PHIL 507-517)

4
 G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005.]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

(PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN,
CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS,
DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF
BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG
POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME
KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG,
ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED
BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,
ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS,
INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE
CORP., MARANAW HOTELS & RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO
REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS,
INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA,respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J p:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one
hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on
the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its
interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development
Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central
Bank. 1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans
to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59%
was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the Central
Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310
million. 3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On
March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
and ordering its liquidation. 4 A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March
26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid. 5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the
then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts
of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987,
filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of
Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe
5
Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola,
William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation
(Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings
Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp.,
Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing
Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying
Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings &
Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don
Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan. 6 In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. HaIESC
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. 7 After the
filing of the parties' comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases,
respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005 8 and 0096-0099. 9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General 10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General,
he advised the Central Bank's officials on theprocedure to bring about GENBANK's
liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005. 11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It
further ruled that respondent Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No.
6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a
former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. 14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayan's Second Division to the Fifth Division. 15 In its resolution dated July 11,
2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG's motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza. 16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22,
1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to
disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its
motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17

6
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001
and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. 18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that:
1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer
from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the
prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection
to respondent Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply. 19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the
import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal
profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive
issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service."
I.A.
The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble
modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly
were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards
the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in
litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties
were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court
of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic
duties — competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the
poor — originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects
of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England
was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England
varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation
fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the
effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in
the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized
as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the
duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States.
By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David
Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set
of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties
became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time,
7
legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers
were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about
legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a
lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field
Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations — e.g., the "do no
falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions — persisted in some states. Procedural law
continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law
of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.
Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its
underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of
service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive
statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their
discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal
ethics. 21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were
detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the
bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office.
Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the
official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became
extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local
bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the
early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again,
picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations,
most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed
on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. 22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics.
The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states' codes, and it was the
foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. 23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to
attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that
year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics. 24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in
private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in
government service." 25 These concerns were classified as "adverse-interest conflicts" and
"congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the
former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a
matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the
current and former are adverse. 26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation
conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers. 27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through
new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended
one canon and added thirteen new canons. 28 To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-
interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts." 29 The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer's largely discretionary
actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government

8
client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice
clients. 30Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon
the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity. TDcAaH
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ
should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added
Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively. 31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics. 32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for
the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons.
The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because
the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and
were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise
observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with
the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. 33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of
conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b) 35 became
the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of
Delegates approved the Model Code. 36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the
conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format
was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only
enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad
canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments
after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts
of interests. 37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence
of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm's
indefinite nature. 38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the
bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 — A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.

9
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive
phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.
0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains
the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B.
The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to
in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former
government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following
acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz: 40
The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated
July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of
GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said
bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila. TaCDAH
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977
prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior
Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special
Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Assistant to the
Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial
and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March
28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza),
who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor
General and he advised that the following procedure should be taken:
1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board
reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last
examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed
that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so

10
 that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
depositors and creditors and the general public.
2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the
liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation
and approve a liquidation plan.
3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank
of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and
praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the
Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies
of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with
the court the petition for assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent
portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy
of the subject memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together
with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and
Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of
Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and
Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,
1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265,
as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the
Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine,
the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule
6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section
29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. — Whenever, upon examination by
the head of the appropriate supervising or examining department or his
examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the
condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business
11
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of
the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the
department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the
Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take
charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not
limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
xxx xxx xxx
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its
liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have
jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary
to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an
official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking
or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver
previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator
shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money
or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties
for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name
of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court
to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution. ICTDEa
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the
Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of
this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining
the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof
that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith
and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which
the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an
amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a
bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in
an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned
that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the
refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New
Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
12
 Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay
its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an
otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial
community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the
appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with
the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16,
1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
"drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
"matter" and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it
may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain
facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate
in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in
informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the
courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First
Instance.The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is
related to but is different from the subject “matter” in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on
the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of
stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the
dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due,
among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words,
the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed,
the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule
6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . .
. 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in
or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur
or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an
intervening river . . .) 41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
13
 1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may
affect the interests of others. 42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first
interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene"
only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. 44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word
"intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history.
The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does
an act which can be considered as innocuous such as ". . . drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law."HTCAED
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36
provided that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while
in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has
investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers.
The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to
a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility."
The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a
lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyerparticipated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long
number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that
the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as
a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not
that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable
effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As
aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR
9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values
of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on
government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government
to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be
able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the
government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the
experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private
practice. 45Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service
would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging

14
in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. 46Indeed, "to make government
service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter." 47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of
motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of
counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic
was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and
academic commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the
Court of Appeals' description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In the
case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after
the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar
was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. 50 At the very least, the
circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put
petitioner's motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the
client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably
an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified
lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. 52 The effects
of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can
result in denial of due process. SIHCDA
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule
on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan:
"An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon
leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she
believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks
this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He adds: "Any
system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any
limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence." 54 The case at bar involves the
position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be
overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree
of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend
acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend
officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of the
Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the
freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of
a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. 55 Former
government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions
is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to untoward results. 57 No less
than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the
15
government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. 58 Notably, the
appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 59 and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on
Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the
interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger
that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the
act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be
sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is
no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still
in government service. 61 The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a
lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting
might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the cautionary words of the Association
of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment
conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of
aggressive administration of government policies." 63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this
concern as "probably excessive." 64 He opines ". . . it is hard to imagine that a private firm
would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client — the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the 'best'
government lawyers — the ones who were hardest to beat — not the least qualified or least
vigorous advocates." 65 But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar.
There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to
liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank.
Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et
al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the "excessive influence of former officials" or their "clout." 66 Prof. Morgan again warns
against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much
of what appears to be an employee's influence may actually be the power or authority of his
or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government . . ." 67 More,
he contends that the concern can bedemeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: ". . . The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship
rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-
worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem
justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their
friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism." 68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent
interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a
prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
16
respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP
and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after
the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom,
the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive
period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court. TaEIAS
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December
5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
(Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12,
[April 12, 2005], 495 PHIL 485-619)

17
 [A.C. No. 6707. March 24, 2006.]

GISELA HUYSSEN, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRED L.

GUTIERREZ, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

This treats of a Complaint 1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty.
Fred L. Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens,
applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told
complainant that in order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID
they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which could be
withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant
deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total
amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received
the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts
despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of
US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to
return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member)
sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1
March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing
to comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In
response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the
alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two blank
checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the
amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same
were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter,
respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for
stopping payment on the checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the
assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated
checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent. After respondent
made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount, complainant referred the
matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained
unheeded.
Thus, a complaint 2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline,
required 3 respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001, 4 respondent denied the allegations in the
complaint claiming that having never physically received the money mentioned in the
complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was
used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines.
Respondent explained thus:
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the
complainant, the latter was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of
Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself
18
and three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two others were
still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they have been staying
in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G)
they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related
polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such
for ten (10) years after which they could no longer extend their said status and
have to leave the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they
better secure a permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration
Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter, provided them with list of
the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant
must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son Marcus
Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the same amount of show
money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while her
two minor children would be included as her dependents in her said visa
application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested
me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their application, which I did and
contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the
complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty.
Mendoza until the same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa
were obtained by the complainant and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen
was given an independent permanent visa while the other two were made as
dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of the papers and
becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between
complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would
request for whatever purpose was coursed through me which request were
then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of money given by the
complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason
why my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for
services of a lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my
curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him regarding the matter and
the following facts were revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the
bank is not really her money but money of World Mission for Jesus,
which therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration Law as there
was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later when the said
entity sent their demand letter to the undersigned affiant and which is
attached to the complaint-affidavit; ECISAD
2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very
same amount used by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his
separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and her son
could have been a ground for deportation and likewise constitute
criminal offense under the Immigration Law and the Revised Penal
Code. These could have been the possible reason why complainant was
made to pay for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became
very close to undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their
residence several times;

19
 f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money
given and surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate,
Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died sometime 1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden
and that the amount of money is now being sought to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the
consequences of having signed the same and therefore I had to answer for it
and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the present my standby
loan application has not been released and was informed that the same would
only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been
released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount
to be paid, according to the complainant has now become doubled plus
attorney's fees of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her
Formal Offer of Evidence on 25 August 2003.
On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent's evidence but the
scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was
allegedly out of the country to attend to his client's needs. Reception of respondent's evidence
was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear,
despite due notice and without just cause.
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her
report 5 recommending the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in
this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent
received the amount of US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself
admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant) showing
his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that
he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said
amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is
untenable considering the documentary evidence submitted by complainant.
On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World
Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the
deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended that the thing would happen
that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly the
death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death
prevented us the needed papers for the immediate release. It was only
from compiling all on the first week of January this year, that all the said
papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started
though some important papers were already finished as early as the last
quarter of last year. We are just going through the normal standard
operating procedure and there is no day since January that I do not make
any follow-ups on the progress of the same."

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated
thus:
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount
deposited by your good self in connection with the procurement of your
permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more time
before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent
papers are being still compiled are being looked at the files of the late
20
 Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart
attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the
documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was
officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However,
if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent
to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts
therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent
issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if
said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All
these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same
for his personal use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to
establish that the "late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really
exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa
application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified
that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking
advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused
damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that
respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties."
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved 6 the Investigating
Commissioner's report with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent's violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARREDfrom the practice
of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the
money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is
to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. 7
It is undisputed that respondent admitted 8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant
as shown by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers 9 and receipts 10 he prepared, on the
false representation that that it was needed in complainant's application for visa with the BID.
Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that he
delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their
application for visa in the BID. 11Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to
submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not
present the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting
the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but
21
downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. 12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell
short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the
charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without
any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his
evidence despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial
is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of
non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted
the charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to
complainant:
1) Letter 13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is
forthcoming, the latest of which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on
said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my personal money on
said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the
office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the
Bureau or from my own personal money. cDECIA
2) Letter 14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount
deposited by your goodself in connection with the procurement of your
permanent visa and that of your family.
It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as
some other pertinent papers are still being compiled and are being looked at
the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who
died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as
all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.
xxx xxx xxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one
dated April 6, 1999 and the other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount
vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their due dates the peso
equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent
of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable
me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount but don't worry as
the Lord had already provided me the means.
3) Letter 15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:
Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done
my very best for the early return of your money but the return is becoming bleak
as I was informed that there are still papers lacking. When I stopped the
payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is fine,
but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to
personally return the money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end.
This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me financially but it would set me
free from worries and anxieties.
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last
Saturday the releases of which are on the following:

22
 May 4, 1999 — 200,000
May 11, 1999 — 200,000
May 20, 1999 — 200,000
June 4, 1999 — 200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I
assure you will be sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my
aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of these checks, is
returned, don't call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I
just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. . . .
4) Letter 16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first
check I issued. In fact I stopped all payments to all other checks that are
becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference to the check I issued
to you.
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of
returning the other checks I requested for stop payment — instead honored
them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very big surprise to me
and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which
I initially plan to withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same
amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your place considering that
its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately deposit
today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money
of another. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not
have issued his personal checks if said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is
an admission of misconduct.
Respondent's act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter's pending
application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest,
or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code which
bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private
interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. 19 Respondent's
conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence
of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on

committing another by issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct, 20 as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation
23
of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately
reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." 21
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time
of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of
moral turpitude. 22
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of
complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and
issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being a
member of the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must
faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation
of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions
which includes suspension and disbarment. 23 More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 24
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish
and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice
by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from
the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath have proven them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 25 These
pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was
a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that
government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust.
As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as
their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye. 26
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict
demands and high standards of the legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do
so. 27
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, 28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
In Lim v. Barcelona, 29 we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving
and counting money extorted from a certain person.
Respondent's acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the
high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession,
respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers. 30

24
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his
receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts
and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Huyssen v. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 6707, [March 24, 2006], 520 PHIL 117-134)

25
 [A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000.]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a member of the bar, sent a letter-complaint dated February 8, 1997
to this Court. He alleged that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for a number of years had not
indicated the proper Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Official Receipt Numbers and data (date and place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at
all, he only indicated "IBP Rizal 259060," but he had been using this for at least three years
already. This matter was being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
a that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law." In his comment, Atty. Llamas claimed that since 1992, he publicly made it
clear in his Income Tax Return that he had only a limited practice of law and his principal
occupation is farming. And being a senior citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 in the payment of taxes. Thus, he honestly believed in
view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only a limited practice, the subsequent
payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. Nonetheless,
despite such honest belief, he was ready to tender such fulfillment on payment.
The Court ruled that respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues,
and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4,
grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that
their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues. Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and
his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merited the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his
dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, the Court believed that the penalty
of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever
is later, was appropriate.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos,
Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate
sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years
now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date &
place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal
259060" but he has been using thisfor at least three years already, as shown
by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and
1997: (originals available)
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995
in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

26
 Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996
in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque,
MM
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997
in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law." There is also Rule 139-A, Section
10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action
on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant
and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to
be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes,
he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of
these courts). cdtai
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as
shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No.
1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated
February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what
appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP
Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2dated February 14, 1995, issued
by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for
violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent
alleged: 5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995,
1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is
automatically no longer a member in good standing.

27
 Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of
the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision
of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316
RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside
and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay
City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787
was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return,
up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his
Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30
hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took
effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice
of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues
with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never
exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption
and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed
and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and
pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties.
He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his
skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by
the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality
for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all good faith,
to the contrary. prLL
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the
decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the
proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C"
of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at
least three years."
28
 The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of
his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992,
he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect
in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that
the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax
Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par.
4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court
about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent
in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without
having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted
by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his
IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were
filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes
in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A.
No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval
of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members
thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section
12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A.
No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined
by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption
does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to
the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
29
 CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed
in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced
age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the
law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. LLjur
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in
the land.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, [January 20, 2000], 379 PHIL 569-578)

30
 [B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005.]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION

FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, 1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP
dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005.
He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA
in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and
neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia: that membership
in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included
in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of
Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has
been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy
of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the
cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have
done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could
have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved
by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment
of the annual dues. EcSaHA
In his reply 4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the
IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership
dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice.
He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues
suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is
without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of
annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process
of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is
neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the
community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.

31
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of
his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the
Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership
in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar
as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to
be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of
the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by
the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of
the offending member. 5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers. 7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in
the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 — which power required members of a privileged class,
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of
the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, 9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that
the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax
purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar
program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that
the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience
to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no
one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as

32
long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type
of practice, the member is engaged in. DSIaAE
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership
dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the
Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in
the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of
their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, 10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one
that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions, 11 one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any
of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He
is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the
years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision,
with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law. HSaEAD
SO ORDERED.
||| (Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., B.M. No. 1370, [May 9, 2005], 497 PHIL 535-544)

33
 [A.C. No. 1162. August 29, 1975.]

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk

of Court, respondent.

[A.C. No. 1163. August 29, 1975.]

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
[A.C. No. 1164. August 29, 1975.]
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. MANUEL MONTECILLO, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and
ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Disbarment proceedings were filed against the Bar Confidant, Victorio Lanuevo and a 1971
bar candidate, Ramon Galang, and disciplinary action against five bar examiners for acts and
omissions committed in the 1971 bar examinations.
Based on a confidential letter from a bar flunked, The Supreme Court checked the records of
the 1971 bar examinations. As a result thereof, the grades in five subjects of an examinee
(Ramon Galang) were found to be charged, which, however, were the properly initialed and
authenticated by each of the examiner concerned. Upon investigation, the Bar Confidant
admitted in his sworn statement having brought back the five examination notebooks to the
examiners for re-evaluation. In turn, the five examiners admitted, in their individual sworn
statements, having re-evaluated and re-checked the notebooks involved (all of which had
failing marks) upon the representation made to each of them separately and individually by
the Bar Confidant that examiners were authorized to do so and that the examinee concerned
failed only in his (examiner concerned) particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing. On the other hand, Ramon Galang denied any knowledge of the actuation's of the
Bar Confidant.
The Supreme Court, holding that the Office of the Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do
with the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the
passing mark before or after the notebooks are submitted by the examiners and, that,
therefore, the deception made by the Bar Confidant was in violation of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, disbarred the Bar Confidant and ordered his name stricken from
the roll of attorneys.
With respect to respondent Ramon Galang, the Supreme Court likewise disbarred him
because of the highly irregular manner of his passing the bar which was effected through an
authorized re-evaluation of his examination notebooks, and on the ground that he fraudulently
concealed and withheld his pending criminal case for slight physical injuries in all his seven
applications to take the bar examinations which indicates his lack of the requisite attributes
of honesty, probity and good demeanor.
Respondent Bar Examiners were reminded to exercise the greatest or utmost care and
vigilance in the performance of their duties as such.

DECISION

34
MAKASIAR, J p:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang,

alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian,
Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo
Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar
Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answers to the 1971 Bar Examinations questions, Oscar
Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of
70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starting
fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for
one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p.
2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein
stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent alterations — to raise the grades — prior to the
release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or requests from the
proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the bar examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so
now when proper request and motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment,
for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination?
Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its
conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential
Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public
International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however,
were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check
of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1967,
1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%,
68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a
grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court resolution making 74%
as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn
statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the
five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under
which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to
him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the
Court required, in a resolution dated March 5,1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
35
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court
likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to require him "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163,
p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.)
while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March
19,1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the
hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition
to, and in amplification of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and compliance
came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110, rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo
who re-evaluated and/or rechecked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political
Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, who was asked to
help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of
this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remained as a respondent for it was
also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also
underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1622 turned
out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further
investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a
notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 47% to
50%. This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate
by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were
summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigating Officer, showed that one
Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel
L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973
(Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having
been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries. Because of this denial, a summons
was issued to Eufrosino F. de Vera, who narrated the circumstances surrounding the case
and identified respondent Galang as the very same person charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in that case (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his applications to take the bar examinations, did not make
mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on
October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda.
Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on
November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in
Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to
testify.

36
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence
only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier
submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answers, which they offered as their direct testimony
in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondents-examiners recounted the
circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks
in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
"2.That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting
the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that
it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo)
make a review of the grades obtained in all segments and if he finds that
candidate obtained an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather
low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for
re-evaluation and change of grade;
"3.That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according
to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider this
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
"4.That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation indoing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the grade to 75%;
"5.That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is number '95';
"6.That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were
based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others;
thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%;
No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10%"
(underscoring supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his
April 11, 1972 affidavit with the following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
"3.. . . . However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered
as it is no longer possible to make the reconsideration of these answers
because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10
remained at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
"4.That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 95 I
did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
"5.That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty.
Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
"a)Since I started correcting the papers on or about October
16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had
developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him
and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of
37
 the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have
no alternative but to take his words;
"b)That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real rules and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for
fear that I might he identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

"e)That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me
in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to
reconsider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made the original correction of the
same" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law
and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
"On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from
me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers
1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came
to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme
Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an
examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenities, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine
the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of
57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly,
in remedial law.
"I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to review or re-examine the
notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was
authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority
as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the
code number decoded and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case presented hearing
code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have
been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
"Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me,
and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the
said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answers, and
graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the
grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority
to correct the grades and as he had assured me that the code number of the
examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, . . . I
therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached
thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades
(from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy of the
grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied).

38
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent
Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and repleaded therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier
sworn statement and in addition alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
"3.At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did not know the name of the examinee. In fact, I
came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973;
now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and
that I have never met him even up to the present;
"4.At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such
review and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized
to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed, the Bar
Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of official business which thus convinced me because there was
no express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner,
and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless
called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the
Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. . . .;
"5.At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representation were unauthorized or
suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the
Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which
was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it
was about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
"7.Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as
when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code
numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not
to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it
did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the other subjects; I presumed that, as Bar Confidant, he was in
the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:
"8.In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee
with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by
9 points, resulting in a final grade of 661. Still, the examinee did not pass the
subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. . . .
"9.I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee,
which according to my diary was on February 8, 1972, the committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed
the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still
did not know the names of the candidates.
"10.In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. I had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office,
39
 and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contact with
him before or after the review and even up to the present" (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12,
1972:
"1. . . .
"2.That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination
books to my then residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
"3.That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books
in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in
another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in
Criminal Law saving that particular examinee had missed the passing grade
by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.
"4.That seeing the justification, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise
of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised
also the mark in the general list.
"5.That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word
of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the
examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor
did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972,
that:
xxx xxx xxx
"2.Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1912,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house
at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to
him. He informed me that he and others (he used the word 'we') had reviewed
the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the
examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general
average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if
the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted
to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention
to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would
reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within
my discretion.
"3.Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded to re-read and re-evaluate each and
every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the
answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other
items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that
after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-

40
 evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.

. . ." (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents
of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"5.In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total
grade of the examinee concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to
74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be
faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —
"a)Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he
was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not
within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to
request or suggest that the grade of a particular examination
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume,
owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar
Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
"c)In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned,
herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written
in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the
Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of
Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that the said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also
be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee,
from 9.25% to 9%" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17,
1972:
xxx xxx xxx
"That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the
Bar Examinations were held, I was informed the one Bar examinee passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law;
"That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-
evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;
"That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook
(No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
"That I reviewed the who]e paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
"That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the
grade sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; italics supplied).

41
 In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents
of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
"2.Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-
evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
"3.Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that
I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee" (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
"As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing
and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evaluation on the basis of the
memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that.
. . . in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should
then be given to clarity of language and soundness of reasoning (par.
4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation and/or re-checking.
"It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of
the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them
would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now,
we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are readying for
submission to the Honorable Court.
"Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have
to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and
irrevocable.
"It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me
to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation"
(Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; italics supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
"That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in
his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was
not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did
he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to
his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the
Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who

42
 obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile
Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising
the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one
surnamed 'de la Cruz' or 'Ty-de la Cruz'.
"Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir
such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did
it in all good faith.
". . ." (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
"1.That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the
fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so
merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked
as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)
which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order;
"2.That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:
"Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part
of February, 1972, on my way hack to the office (Bar Division) after
lunch, I thought of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it
a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any
object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the
basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I
saw was '954' boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building
from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the southeastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High School (photograph of the
number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-
Lanuevo and the number '954' as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
"With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta.
Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually,
I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to '954'. This number became doubly impressive to me
because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was '27', a
number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat
instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible.
Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of
examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as
bar confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number '27' (or
'227') or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and
marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure '27' at the beginning of the
list, as Exh. 5-a-Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and
the figure '227' at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970
Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure '227' at the beginning
43
 of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-
Lanuevo and the figure '227' at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-
Lanuevo).
"The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of
these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with
the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at
the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled,
the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many
casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility
of being among the casualties; (b) On February 27, 1946, I was able
to get out of the army by way of honorable discharge; and (c) on
February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children
the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

"Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the

ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of
the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks
bearing the office code number '954'. As the number was still fresh
in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the
contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby,
believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned
Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)
that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took
them back to the respective examiners for possible review recalling
to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the
matter to their discretion and judgment.
"3.That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to
either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the Committee during
the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examiners, namely:
"(a)That of an examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law (the
notebooks of this examinee hear the Office Code No. 110, identified
and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law
bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 47%
increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
"(b)That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general
average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject
which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the
office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified
and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the
original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh.
10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (Exh. ----- Pardo).

44
"4.That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph,
only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only
Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and
pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
"5.That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review
or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the
Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade
after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome
since the subject carries the weight of only 10%" (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact
that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972,
he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang,
because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first
notebook" as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked
him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing
office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
"1.That herein respondent is not acquainted with former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
"4.That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
'failure' cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
'passing' case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary
course of official business?
"It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests
a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
"5.That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution
dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
"But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated
in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded
to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-
evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination
Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards
the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the
re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then
it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the
percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation
that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the
fact that Bar Confidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's
45
 benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be
disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the
Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these
inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and
which only goes to show said narration of facts as unworthy of credence, or
consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
"7.This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation
is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance
of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of
this case.
". . ." (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically
and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme
Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent
Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the
latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as Bar Confidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back to the examiner
concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 34, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examinee will
get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word
and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his
further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper
and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code
Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent
Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33,
55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects
including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could
not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion
Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent
46
Manalo had previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given,
explaining and representing that "they" had reviewed the said notebook and that the
examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively
low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average
of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet
find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also
particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo
called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum
that read as follows:

"4.Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal

fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a
test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given
to clarity of language and soundness of reasoning."
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing
that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and
further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's
answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that
particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated
with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The
said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in
his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2-Manalo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, examinee Galang could not make the
passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went
to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination
papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearingExaminer's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular
examinee who owns the said notebookseems to have passed in all other subjects except in
Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-
evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar
examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the respondent
Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who
are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told
the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated
the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78%
from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the changes made. This notebook
with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below
the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought
back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former
informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and
Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in
47
his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook
had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal
Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade.
Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did
not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the
grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the
mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code
Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71;
Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent
Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers
Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but
had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing
the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a
copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested
by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol.
V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a
passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law.
For the revision of examinee Galangs notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo
neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the
Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law to re-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and
the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1161, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was
informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile
Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the other members,
who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness to
re-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of
61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter
officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-11; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented
to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.). Respondent Montecillo
likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his
personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was
around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. Respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook
bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said
48
notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examinee who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial
Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examinee concerned, resulting in
an increase of grade from 57% to 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code
number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re:Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINEE RAMON E.
GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, alias IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the
passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that
enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making
74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent
(50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute
that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the
said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang
failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, respondent
Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of
the Confidential Memorandum (Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p.
51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar
Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief
that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or
betray the trust reposed in him as Bar Confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision
. . ." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of
the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the
re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian —
whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by
respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case
No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation
and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is
patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo took undue advantage of the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as Bar
Confidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus
deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang

49
 in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to
be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-
studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five
examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, before the unauthorized re-evaluations
were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while
his general average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it
be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of
passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with a grade of 81%. The averages and individual
grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized reevaluation are as follows:
B A I
1. Political Law and Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
B A I
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 11 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 74.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises 81% 81% = no re
evaluation made.
———————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the
five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of
66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage
and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other
examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-
evaluated for each of the latter two — Political Law and Public International Law for-Quitaleg
and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-
evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark
before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual
grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average.
That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and
failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and
on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73,
etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
50
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiner concerned. He is
not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the Examiner. Any request
for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes
himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention
of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly
invite belief in the face of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-
evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better
averages ranging from 70% to 73 9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101,
rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays
respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to
the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of
66.25%, of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than
ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice
to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other
examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates.
And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or
even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and
increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of
Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz was to give his
actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the
reevaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his supplemental sworn
statement (Exh. 3-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for
support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August
27, 1973 or a period of more than five (5) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973
(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-
thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ' NOTEBOOK IN MERCANTILE
LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO
AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO
EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE
INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and
Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz
and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed
that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first
meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners
concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz (Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent

51
Lanuevo further claimed that the data of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper
which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51,
rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by
respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the data of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by
respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the
Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp.
28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in
the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet or record (Exh.
X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 14, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 2931, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one
notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by
his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's
examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p. 35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of
Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee
and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when
respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner
Code Number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case
No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of
Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp.
23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an

examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in
one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the
subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject,
but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.). Further, Pardo declared that
he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who
got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-
17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to
return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an
examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said
notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code
Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that
was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee
(Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was
referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto
Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the
members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all
the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should reevaluate or recheck
the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred
back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as
follows:
52
 Labor Laws 73%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in
Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
——————————
Average (weighted) — 73.15% —
74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing
grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as
follows:
B A

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
————————————————
Weighted Averages — 74.95% — 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz
in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February,
1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination
Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-
53
evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and
Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under
the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law
as subsequently reevaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar
examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause
and the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized
reevaluation of his answers in five (5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International
Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession,
which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules
and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals;
and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re:
Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar — 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly
involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee,
composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar
who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting
as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the
individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same
time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with
the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be
in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final
approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily
confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the
Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered
to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent
Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by respondent
Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence
reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled
respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the
matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-correction or whether the
Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited
was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance
with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others,
with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every
54
applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be . . . of good moral character . . . and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and
that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before
the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable
the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity
of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme
Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving
moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of
which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent
Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure
of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court
all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the
ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's
criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's
moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal
case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction,
has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application
form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare
under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal
of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature
against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the
application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal
all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form,
the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense
before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by
any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to
intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries
which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly
omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in
1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in
court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court,
respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times
and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the
fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation
of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
"[1]It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court,
to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter
as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases
55
 cited)."[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge
to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither
the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
"(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710)."
The license of respondent Podell was revoked and annulled, and he was required to
surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the
roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
"[1]The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be
informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The
finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the
time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the
court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was
reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court" (165 NYS, 102, 104; italics
supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite
his having been apprised by the Investigator of some of the circumstances of the criminal
case including the very name of the victim in that case (he finally admitted it when he was
confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure
for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate
his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore
unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court
requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the
Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed
the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate
and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del
Rosario:
"The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its
confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member
of the Bar (citing American cases)" [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present
case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the
past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the
grounds, among others, of (a) misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the
requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the
basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation,
Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478]; (black of good moral character [In
re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People
56
vs. Romualdez — re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People
vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court
found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE:Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI
Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian (Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now
deceased) Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-
correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent Bar Confidant
Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the
grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said
notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These
the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed
the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or recorrection in good faith and without
any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members
to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised
greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the
request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the
Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At
least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or
show them the complete Fades and/or the average of the examinee represented by
respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was
on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was
really so circumstanced. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared
under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased
grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the reevaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it
would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely
because of the misrepresentations of respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular
examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot
remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. . . ."
(Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: ". . . he told me that this particular
examinee seems to have passed in all other subjects except this subject and that if I can re-
evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular
examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he
said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing
in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I
will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what I did was to go over the book and tried
to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what
I did was to be more lenient and if the answer was correct although it was not complete I
raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading
sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that
the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a
57
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent
Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
"QAnd by reason of that information you made the reevaluation of the paper?
"AYeas, your Honor.
"QWould you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence
of such information?
"ANo, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V; p.
33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April
17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated March 19,
1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —
"3.That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law for reevaluation because according to
him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
"4.That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was
just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I reevaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; . . ." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 55, rec.); and
"5.That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty.
Victorio Lanuevo, . . ." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
"(c)In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook.
Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that
it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher
grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. . . ."
(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
". . . I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial law, if I
recall correctly. . . ." (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce
the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly
claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper
influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given
after the said reevaluations (Galangs memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
58
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners,
which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the reevaluation of
the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained
to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members
to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity
of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost care and
vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,
claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending
undue assistance or support thereto . . . was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho
and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations" (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo,
Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late
Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute
Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense." His pretension that he did not
make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred
the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho
before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be
misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this
case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does
not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of
respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law Examiner
Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar examinations.
Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol.
V, pp. 6-7, rec.). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after
the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a
member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute
adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed in unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to
his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1.On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less.
for the amount of P84,114 00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but
was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2) mortgages covering the said house and
59
lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First —
mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972,
date of inscription — April 20, 1972; Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No.
90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%,
more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114,00. Respondent Lanuevo
claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received
by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII,
pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan
from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank
deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank
deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows
therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under
Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of
P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not
realized because the transaction therein involved did not push through
(Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972;
Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount
of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he
allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $2000 was not
even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to
respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not
seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed
upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo
promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said
promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is
no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top
earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion,
therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten
or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF
Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No.
4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 23, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20, 1975, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2,
1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also
redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20,
1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is
P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same.
In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection
with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as

60
 an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in
the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).

2.Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956

VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between
January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no
such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971
or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total
assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000 00, while in
his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding
the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to
link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galangs examination papers
or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of
the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his
passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent
Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar
Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter of resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring
from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but
after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to
January 15, 1973, obtaining the cash value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00.
He initially claimed at the investigation that he used a part thereof as a down payment for his
BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e)
in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
"a)Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
"(e)Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions."
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer
once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary
as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property. . . ." (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

61
It should he stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of
Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were
examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon
E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter became the
Bar Confidant.
1.Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up
to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to
1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine
Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans
including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, respondent
Lanuevo successively held the positions of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator,
Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9,
Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct
contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational
benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31,
1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended
to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila
taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent
Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical
assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.). [Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol.
VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28,
1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of
the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution
effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished
to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the
Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even
know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I.
Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every
semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he
has gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to
take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court
building.
2.Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he
investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and
disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties
as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met
him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3.Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry
operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war(Vol. VII,
pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board (Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

62
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerillas, to which Galang's father belonged.
During the Japanese occupation, his guerilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had
no communications with other guerilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and
does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed
with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and
Corregidor (Vol. VII, p. 519 rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed
at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there
when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
(Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member
thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached
and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division US army stationed at
Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of
recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization" (Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to
the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior
authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of
the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.
LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT
RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND
HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
||| (In re Lanuevo, A.C. No. 1162, 1163, 1164, [August 29, 1975], 160 PHIL 935-988)
[B.M. No. 810 . January 27, 1998.]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M.

CUEVAS, JR.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His oath-taking was held
in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution which permitted him to take the Bar
Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court due to his previous conviction
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's
participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a
neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner
applied for and was granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he was discharged from probation
and his case considered closed and terminated.
In this petition, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's
most convenient time" attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting
63
to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before
acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the
deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon.
The Court stated that it shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates
with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "he is
not, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit and submits
petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious
discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing
petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the
senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise
indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice
of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual
and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants,
as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the
profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner
that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the
lawyer's oath. The Court then resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas Jr. to take the
lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the
payment of appropriate fees. STcADa

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J p:

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations, 1 His oath-
taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which
permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass
the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court .
. ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The
conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS
FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September
1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted
upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he
was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated. LLjur
In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to
take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order
dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from
his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character
issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of
Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman
and officers (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General
of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral
Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting
on petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the
deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the
Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:
"1. He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing
him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's
oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture.

64
 "2. He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its
resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of
severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate
Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such
injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the
criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable
not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the
neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were "beaten and
kicked to death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of
confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery (People
vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).
"3. He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to the
lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the
petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who
went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging
for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy
Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that the father of one of the
accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the
case. cdll
"4. As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the
criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in
whom he has high hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still
feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner
of taking his life. This he cannot forget.
"5. He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has
become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely
submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court." 3
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates
with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[he]
is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit . .
." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession or law to the sound and
judicious discretion of the Court.

The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing
petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the
senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise
indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice
of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual
and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants,
as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the
profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner
that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the
lawyer's oath. 4
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the
attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful
and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his
deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The
Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein
petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare
of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to
65
conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the
sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712,
March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society". 6
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to take
the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject
to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal
records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. prLL
SO ORDERED.
||| (In re: Cuevas, Jr., B.M. No. 810 (Resolution), [January 27, 1998], 348 PHIL 841-847)

66
 [B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE

HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI'A BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J p:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while
the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition 1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002
Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Nos. 15685 and 15686, both
for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez' wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling
used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with
the OBC.
In his Answer, 3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him
by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be
settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from
a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling
denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation 4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in
his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known
that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired
judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
67
 pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain
his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made
under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters
is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him
also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar." 5
As regards Meling's use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the
Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have
typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the
fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing
fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209,
the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable
for indirect contempt of court. 6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath
and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
recommended that Meling's membership in the Shari'a Bar be suspended until further orders
from the Court. 7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not
pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent
Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari'a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted
upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are
also known to possess good moral character. 8 The requirement of good moral character is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession
is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any
act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
68
him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at
that. IaDcTC
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are
pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with
the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the
applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Meling's concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him
speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the
privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari'a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its
use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya, 11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the
impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari'a Bar who are not
likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court
of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his
private capacity. The Court declared that:
. . . persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to
the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney."
The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction. 12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of
service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent
and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything
short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity
to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application
to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result,
we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and
suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari'a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari'a Courts in the country for their
information and guidance. SO ORDERED.
||| (In re Haron S. Meling, B.M. No. 1154, [June 8, 2004])

69
 [A.C. No. 5768. March 26, 2010.]

ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN Z.

FERRER, SR., respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J p:

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives
upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-
affidavit 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of
appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the
following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff's counsel in Civil Case 7040,
filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive,
offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon
presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case
7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly
falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date
when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines
Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document. TDESCa
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty.
Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang
lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte,
ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa
Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without
bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross
ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed
to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against
repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a
related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and
grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty.
Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who
worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of
Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him
with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination,
Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against him. These

70
 charges came about because Atty. Ferrer's clients filed a case for falsification
of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed
that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against
Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that
the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct
contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty.
Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law
profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his
character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty.
Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the
charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment
case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal
cases.
In his reply affidavit, 2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He
alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board
his son's taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the
tricycle's passengers. 3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the
victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed
the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting
the accident to the authorities. 4 DTAIaH
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been
dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its
Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as
judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the
qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge" and that he
was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an
employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-
CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of
Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove
Atty. Ferrer's violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the
plaintiff's affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been
falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also
found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of
other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-
225, 6 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its
Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter
to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case
to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 8On May 22, 2008
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation 9 of
the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors' IBP
Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008. 11 On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat
71
 Atty. Ferrer's comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment, 12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP.
Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte that
warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him;
and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Court's Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating
Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of
legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability. 14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code
provides:
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer's actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that
he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in
Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that
the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. aHIDAE
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum
and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote
portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation
and "FALSIFICATION" of documents, committed to mislead this
Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel
for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court,
for presenting a grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath
of office as a government employee and as member of the Bar, for the
reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the
"SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in
view whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative defenses,
there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth
of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere
fabrications, sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one responsible
for said falsification and distortions.” 15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their
pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. 16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:

72
 Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer's drunken invectives at Atty.
Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing
evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification
from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly made.
Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded
his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng
pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito
ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty.
Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of
hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The
Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 17 Atty.
Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral
righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation. SaIEcA
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer's allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due
process. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 18 So long as
the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process
are satisfactorily complied with. 19 Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave Atty.
Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty.
Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are
mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly. 20 Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer
of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics
that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z.
Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer's personal record as an
attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP
and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 5768, [March 26, 2010], 630 PHIL 524-533)

73
 [A.C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002.]

ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO

PEFIANCO, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, District Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office in San Jose,
Antique filed a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to
assault complainant in the latter's office. In his Comment, respondent Pefianco said that the
sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted
him to take up her defense. He said that he resented the fact that complainant had ordered
an employee to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from hanging around in the Public
Attorney's Office. Accordingly, the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he
violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For this reason, it recommended
that respondent be reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same will be dealt with
more severely in the future.
The Court found the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well
taken. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty
bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.
In this case, respondent's meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the
untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case
of the woman had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain
the matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case. Thus, considering
that this is the first offense, Atty. Pefianco was fined in the amount of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) and reprimanded.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the
bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault
complainant. IASTDE
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public
Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that on May 18,
2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them.
Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested
that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At
this point, respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and
shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying,"Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang
imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala." ("Why do you settle that case? Have
your client imprisoned so that he will realize his mistake.")
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefianco's outburst and asked him to cool
off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to
74
respondent that it was the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could
be settled because she was no longer interested in prosecuting the same. Respondent
refused to listen and instead continued to scold Atty. Salvani and the latter's client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to take it easy
and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he
again started shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent,
complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting
anyone from interfering with any activity in the Public Attorney's Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard
respondent Pefianco saying: "Nagsiling si Atty. Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa
PAO, buyon nga klase ka tawo." ("Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO,
what an idiot.") Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and
repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear. At this point, according to
complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to
leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said respondent resented this and
started hurling invectives at him. According to complainant, respondent even took a menacing
stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the Chief
of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice
came to take respondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondent tried to
attack complainant and even shouted at him, "Gago ka!"("You're stupid!") Fortunately, the
guards were able to fend off respondent's blow and complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario,
Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate
his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying
woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up her
defense. He said that he resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee,
Napoleon Labonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from hanging round in the
Public Attorney's Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the woman's case,
complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of the Public Attorney's
Office. He claimed that two security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take
respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainant's claims, however, respondent said that
it was complainant who moved to punch him and shout at him, "Gago ka!" ("You're stupid!")
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against complainant. However, the
complaint was dismissed by the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found that
respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to
deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for his actions. For this
reason, it recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that repetition of the
same act will be dealt with more severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who provoked the
incident in question. The affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm complainant's
allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani
and even attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).

75
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 1 admonishes lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty
bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times. 2

In this case, respondent's meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the
untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case
of the woman had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain
the matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband had been
murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case because she needed the money.
Be that as it may, respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not give
him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the
criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was being pacified, respondent
did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two of the
witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the Public Attorney's Office
because they heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been
summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public
estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had
was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted
by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in
the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future
will be sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Alcantara v. Pefianco, A.C. No. 5398, [December 3, 2002], 441 PHIL 514-520)

76
 [A.C. No. 3149. August 17, 1994.]

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER H.

LIM, respondent.

DECISION

PADILLA, J p:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the
latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain
Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of
assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly received from the United
States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment
states that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise
executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her
pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above documents were
apparently prepared and notarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned
special power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was
revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complainant
for injunction with damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as
counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for
complainant (as defendant).
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on 23 January 1985, preventing
complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later
filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of court for attempting to
circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address to Mandaue city. Upon motion
by Yap, the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expanding all post offices in the
Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the
pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainants' counsel of record
but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney Alexander H. Lim.
On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without
the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that
complainant Cerino B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was likewise
stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly
installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40% per annum discounted every
six (6) months. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August
1985.
On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, based
on the following allegations:
"7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance,
advise and signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was
furnished to either of them or at least to complainant herself despite the latter's
pleas to be furnished copies of the same;

77
 8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for
her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only
jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense
if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d)
she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e)
complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any
event respondent already took care of everything;
9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of
fraud, deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her
respondent;
10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent
complainant and connived in her defeat; . . ." 1
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant, Atty. Roland B. Inting had
abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado,
did not actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of complainant and another
debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was informed
that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers. Complainant
stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement
and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed
grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.
Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4 October
1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest
to be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on the promissory note
was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the
loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985, complainant's
debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10)
months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) per annum. In
addition, the compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be payable
in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great
amount of mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the compromise
agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise
agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting
and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her
lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this
decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the
compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court
of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel, respondent
saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the
compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently
disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.
Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
78
 "9. Negotiations with opposite party.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his
counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to the law."
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty.
Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court.
Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not
only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice
from being attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately
upon his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Likong v. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, [August 17, 1994])

79
 [A.C. No. 6290. July 14, 2004.]

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-

TENORIO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza,
a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged
the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself
to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with
another woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract, 1 which states that they were
married on 10 February 1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila 2 and
the National Statistics Office (NSO) 3 prove that no record of marriage exists between them.
The false date and place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of
their two children, Donnabel Tenorio 4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III. 5 But in the birth certificates
of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio 6 and John Cedric Tenorio, 7 another date and
place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina
Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the
complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the
respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member
of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led
to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family
on 24 January 2000 with the statement "Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging
respondent's illegal activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of
deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married
on 12 February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of
the Civil Registry of Quezon City. 8 Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with
another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the
dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the
contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally,
the complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati
on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good name and
reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the
Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of
Registration of Business Name. 9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the
estafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996
80
issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 10 The respondent likewise
denied that she threatened the complainant with the words "Isang bala ka lang" on 24 January
2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant
to get even with her. She terminated complainant's employment after receiving numerous
complaints that the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of
processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise.
Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire
the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did and for
which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received
numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She
then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit
a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply.
The parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would
constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants. 11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal
practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead ofCristal-Tenorio Law
Office 12 where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2)
a Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card 13signed by the respondent as
Chairperson where her husband is identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added
that respondent's husband even appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her
husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance
that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The
letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband
is one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Officebearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are
named as senior partners because they have investments in her law office. 14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February
1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not
registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence
a certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General
and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children
as to the place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight. 15
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly
realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation
of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted
upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the
charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following
evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of "Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18
June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729–20734,
wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for
81
the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to appear and for
lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended
that the respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
San Juan. The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension
from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would
be dealt with more severely. HAaDcS
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and
adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by
complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney
is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should
proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not
substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his
case by convincing evidence. 17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the
charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted
thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling, 18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based on
the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for
the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent
himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 — A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.

82
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public
as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.
Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating
oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. 19 Such acts constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His
wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal
profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as
senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed
in the letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have investments in her
law office. 20 That is a blatant misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the
respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a
lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears
the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of
the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in
aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to
aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record as attorney
in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, A.C. No. 6290, [July 14, 2004], 478 PHIL 378-389)

83
 [A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.]

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, complainant, vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F.

BUSMENTE, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana
(Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides,
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso).
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso's deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case
No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where
Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso
where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court,
projecting herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of
the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8
February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified
Dela Rosa as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon
verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that
Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. IDTSaC
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal
assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment with him ended
in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the
help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente's former secretary. Busmente alleged
that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer 1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation, 2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as
Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while
Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no
proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC
San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente's designated
office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente's only excuse was that Dela Rosa
connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not
reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez),
Busmente's staff, alleging Macasieb's failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil
Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to
Ulaso's case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed
Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted

84
 that Macasieb was still working at Busmente's office in November 2003 as shown by the
affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if
Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005,
which belied Busmente's allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using
his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa's connivance with
Macasieb. As regards Busmente's allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged,
the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report
from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to submit
the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente's suspension from the practice of law for
not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, 3the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with
modification by reducing the period of Busmente's suspension to six months. DaESIC
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4 from the NBI
stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures
submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by one and the same person. In
its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied
Busmente's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting
Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of
law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or
in consideration of his services. 5 The Court further ruled that holding one's self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law. 6
The Court explained:
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is
to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 7 ESCacI

85
 In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the
Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284.
The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her
illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment in his office ended in 2000 and that
Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with
Macasieb, another member of Busmente's staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD,
Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa
continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmente's office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa's practice should have
ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente's office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No.
9284. The 7 December 2004 Order 8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge
Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still
representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary
conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for
Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente's claim that
Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmente's office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,
submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in
Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written
by one and the same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI
the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there
were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14
November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-
Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as
three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property,
all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other
documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and
he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its
status. Busmente's allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by
Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that: cEAHSC
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address
at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which
have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her
sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before
Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in
the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the
notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken
against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are
made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic), she was
handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any
pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those
were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just
accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;

86
 f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation
to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following
elements of the offense are not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely
false; SIDTCa
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the
narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which
is not so in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we
never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the
Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her
qualification; we just presumed that she has legal qualifications to
represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave
us paralegal assistance[.](Emphasis supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence
to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice
of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, [November 23, 2011], 677 PHIL 1-9)

87
 [A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.]

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, complainants, vs. ATTY.

CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint filed by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and
Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. Jarder (Atty Jarder) for violation
of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross
Dishonesty, and Harassment. HICATc
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint
for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices
filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint 1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on
behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based
in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed
Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced
Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolo's affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-
affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed
the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel's signature posed a prejudicial question
to the Complaint's validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases
for Falsification of Public Document 2 and Dishonesty 3be filed against Divinagracia, with
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he
falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence
an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo,
that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's case and that the Complaint filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's
instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for
falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo
and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and
Rustia.

88
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive portion states: IaDTES
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper
complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and
Tapay.
SO ORDERED. 4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a complaint 5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated
further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report 6dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for
other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo
were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only
were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also
involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to
Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted
that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before
the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases
were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the
assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings
and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office.
Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against
them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary
Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties
were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference
scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to
25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment
complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to
have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were
directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants' position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents' position paper dated
23 October 2006. AHDaET
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
89
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the
practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain
responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
. . . . In his answer[,] respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his
signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants' Rodrigo E.
Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the
secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the
various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule
9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is
guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was
busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all
respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The
Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and
undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover,
respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack
of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine[s'] Commission on Bar
Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility
as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities
over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed
to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having
passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself
out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates
Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find
out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner[,] it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other
documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could
have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent Atty. Bancolo's violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. HAEDCT
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of
Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby

90
 AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit. 8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion
for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration and Comment
Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants' and Atty. Bancolo's motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation
of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 9 where we
held: AacDHE
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is
to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the preparation and signing
of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively
for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo's authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he
may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court,counsel's signature
serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for
delay. 11 Thus, by affixing one's signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe
that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional
91
trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not
take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his
signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an
opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty.
Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation
of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did
not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer.
Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses,
the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his
secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading.
This violation is an act of falsehood which is a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable. AHSaTI
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. Jarder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. Jarder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is herebySUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this
Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tapay v. Bancolo, A.C. No. 9604, [March 20, 2013], 707 PHIL 1-10)

92
 [G.R. No. L-23467. March 27, 1968.]

AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M.

JAVIER, for Himself and as General President, ATTY. JOSE UR.
CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Jose Ur. Carbonell and for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEY'S FEES; DISPUTE MERELY INCIDENTAL TO A

MAIN CIR CASE; CIR HAS JURISDICTION. — The CIR has authority to adjudicate
contractual disputes over attorney's fees, where as in this case, the said controversy over
attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR Case No. 70-
ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. This is so, because once the Court
of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it
retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related
thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; INVALIDITY OF AGREEMENT THAT UNION PRESIDENT SHOULD SHARE IN
THE ATTORNEYS' FEES. — The alleged oral agreement that the union president should
share in the attorneys' fees is immoral. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement
in terms clear and explicit. The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may
seek compensation only as such president.
3. ID.; ID.; STIPULATED FEES MUST NOT BE EXCESSIVE; DUTY OF COURT. — Because
of the inequality of the situations between lawyers and laborers, courts should go slow in
awarding huge sums by way of attorney's fees based solely on contracts. Contracts for legal
services between laborer and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair
share of the benefits be not denied the former. Considering the circumstances of this case
the 30% stipulated attorneys' fee is excessive. An award of 25% is reasonable.

DECISION

SANCHEZ, J p:

Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union, Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said union, lodged a
complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor practices specified in
Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were their former
employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president
and general manager; Gonzalo Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent;
and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its president.
93
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated June 30, 1956
and July 6, 1956), 2 respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957, answered
and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed their answer
dated July 12, 1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared and testified. Two
of these ten were permanent (regular) employees of respondent company; the remaining
eight were seasonal workers. The regular employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel
Magtubo. Seasonal workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio
Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and Brigido Casas.
On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered judgment,
which provides, inter alia that the two regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be reinstated
"to their former positions, without loss of seniority and other benefits which should have
accrued to them had they not been illegally dismissed, with full back wages from the time of
their said dismissals up to the time of their actual reinstatements, minus what they have
earned elsewhere in the meantime," and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted to
their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company (Biscom), with back wages as
seasonal workers from the time they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling
season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually reinstated, less the amount earned
elsewhere during the period of their lay-off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this Court. 3 On March 28,
1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not seek
reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962. The judgment became final.
Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to determine the actual
money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its Examining Division
to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the backwages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back wages due the ten
complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for reconsideration:
Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in
the same case — CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu — a "Notice of Attorney's Lien." He alleged
therein that he had been the attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case 70-ULP-Cebu
"since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on
appeal, as chief counsel thereof that he "had actually rendered legal services to the laborers
who are subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956,
more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to give [him], representing his
attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement
is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and
proper taking into consideration the length of services he rendered and the nature of the work
actually performed by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which
in part reads:
"3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on February
3, 1956, had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel herein,
representing his Attorney's fees on contingent basis, such amounts as
equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever money claims that may be
adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement, in the local
Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English language are
hereto attached as annexes 'A' 'A-1' hereof;
4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above entitled Case was already
decided in their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are also
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 Complainants in this Case begged from the Undersigned Counsel herein that
he reduce his attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only for the
reason that they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the
equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%) although the latter's actual services
rendered was so insignificant thereof;
5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the President
of said Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and consented
that his attorney's fees be reduced to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of
Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon in 1956."
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a document
labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and dismissal — thru a union
board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof — of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as
one of the lawyers of the complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective February
28, 1963.
On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds for his discharge
specified in the board resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and ungratefulness"
and that the unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated contract for attorneys'
fees.
On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and complainants'
motions for reconsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and also respondent
Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien. Judge Martinez' order reads in part:
"(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount
representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as attorney's
fees;
xxx xxx xxx
"(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the
respondent company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez, and he may collect the same from the Cashier of the Court upon
the finality of this order, subject to existing auditing procedure; . . ."
Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order with respect
to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to
determine the matter in question, and that the award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty.
Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by
CIR en banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution was filed by
Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the motion of June 11,
1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the Cashier of the
court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81 representing attorneys' fees and
deducting therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit.
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the ten
employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate
contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts
for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within
CIR's authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which
CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said
court's jurisdiction.
95
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the
main case, CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And,
it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a
case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely
decided, including all the incidents related thereto. 5 Expressive of the rule on this point is
this —
"4. It is well settled that:
'A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual incidental
powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court
has power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of
its judgments and mandates,even though the court may thus be called
upon to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as
original causes of action.
'While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers
necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the
absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In re Stingers' Estate, 201 P.
693), and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every
regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So
demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out
of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined since such jurisdiction
is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court
may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original
causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp.
136-138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958,
and Serrano vs. Serrano L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the court having
jurisdiction over the main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental
thereto, even if they would otherwise, be outside its competence." 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would
only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually
the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court which renders the
judgment 8 And, it has been observed that "[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien
has attached to a judgment or where money has been paid into court, is for the attorney to
file an intervening petition and have the amount and extent of his lien judicially
determined." 9 Appropriately to be recalled at this point is the recent ruling in Martinez vs.
Union de Maquinistas, 1967 A Phild. 142, 141, January 30, 1967, where, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of
the opinion that since the Court of Industrial Relations obviously had jurisdiction over the
main cases, . . . it likewise had full jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral
thereto, such as claims for attorney's fees made by the members of the bar who appeared
therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point — the ten (10) successful complainants in CIR
Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by the
court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.
96
Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30% attorneys' fees.
He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and one of the 10
successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25% since "they have to share and
satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty.
Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3, 1956 — before the 48
employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of whatever
amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract was signed only by 8 of the 10
winning claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union intervene in the
signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez
required the ten to sign the contract only after the receipt of the decision.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered into by the union
and its officers thru its President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty.
Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees shall be divided equally ("share and share alike")
amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the union president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys' fees to
respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution of the
above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the Supreme Court,"
and that petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was the
counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It noted, too, that petitioner Atty.
Carbonell did not file any notice of Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the
attorney's fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and
explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer,
based upon a division of service or responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for
the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a
union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we
emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive
in a suit "should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court,
as to its reasonableness." 11
Lately, we said: 12
"The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it
is found under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable,
is now deeply rooted in this jurisdiction . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum
meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable,
or unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the
duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties,
and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Nor should it be
ignored that sound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for
counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the
expense of the debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe et al. vs. Gochangco, L-
12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action is
between the debtor and the creditor, and not between attorney and client. As
courts have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must
necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a
mortgage contract, is valid, Bachrach vs. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138."
In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and unconscionable. With
the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other successful
97
complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering
the long period of time that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these
laborers looked up to the favorable money judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic
malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of
this judicial antidote.
The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to assume that
they have not reached an educational attainment comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell
or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers. Because of the inequality of
the situation between laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by
way of attorneys' fees based solely on contracts. 14 For, as in the present case, the real
objective of the CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the complainant
laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from service. While it is true that laborers should
not be allowed to develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them, still lawyers
should not be permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor.
What is to be paid to the laborers is not a windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow.
Contracts for legal services between laborer and attorney should then be zealously
scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.
5. An examination of the record of this case will readily show that an award of twenty-five per
cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably compensates the whole of the legal services rendered
in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and
respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all, they are the counsel of record of the complainants.
Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this fact. The pleadings filed even at the early
stages of the proceedings reveal the existence of an association between said attorneys. The
pleadings were filed under the name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common
effort of the two. It cannot be denied though that most of those pleadings up to judgment were
signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by respondent Fernandez.
We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez and
Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962, complained to CIR
that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor to inform him about the
incidents of this case." He there requested that he be furnished "separately copies of the
decision of the court and other pleadings and subsequent orders as well as motions in
connection with the case."
Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift in their
professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official
Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" was
also registered in the same court. Although filed under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez,"
these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell.
On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for Reconsideration"
was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion for
Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding the basic pay of Arsenio
Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider
Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other pleadings that were fled later were signed solely
by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was
correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of the court battle was fought by respondent
Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes to the legal services also rendered by Atty.
Carbonell. For, important and numerous too, were his services. And, they are not negligible.
The conclusion is inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-
five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein. As to how much, this is a function
pertaining to CIR.
6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo
C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the event
payment actually was made, he should be required to return whatever is in excess of the
amount to which he is entitled in line with the opinion expressed herein. 15
98
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees
solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 10, 1964 and affirmed
by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside;
and the case is hereby remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to
conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of Attorney Leonardo C.
Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as
attorneys' fees for both.
No costs. So Ordered.
||| (Amalgamated Laborers Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-23467,
[March 27, 1968], 131 PHIL 374-386)

[A.C. No. 7054. December 4, 2009.]

CONRADO QUE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA,

JR., respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

In a complaint for disbarment, 1 Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty.

Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee
on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following
violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:
(1) The respondent's abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for
annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for
annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail
and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial
Court 2 (MeTC) and RTC 3 in the unlawful detainer case rendered
against the respondent's clients. The respondent in this regard,
repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC
knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful
detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the
complainant's and his siblings' titles over the property subject of the
unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondent's commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases
in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of
justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the
complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments
in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondent's lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the
courts by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and
impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted
falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition
for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by
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 the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to
dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant
alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation;
the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in
supporting the above falsehood. 4 HAEDIS
(4) The respondent's willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and
defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo
Catolico (Aty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondent's clients.
(5) The respondent's deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in
court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of
whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondent's willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition
for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines
without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52)
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
In his Answer, 5 the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan
Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the
less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He
agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these
cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the
complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondent's present clients were
the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed
his sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these
petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted
that these petitions were all based on valid grounds — thelack of jurisdiction of the
MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud
committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and theextrinsic fraud committed by the
complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained
property did not really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The
respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a
petition for declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all
parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the
disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his
observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding
judge dictated in open court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court
(with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately
rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of
judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed
the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The
respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the
second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no
allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his
clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition
embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the
case. 6 ATHCac
100
 The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust,
wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he
acted in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn
duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients.
The respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the
complainant's counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy(Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings 7 before the IBP that the present
complaint violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were
also the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed
by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that
the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and
reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in
Civil Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G.
Cunanan 8(Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the
respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the
cause and rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command,
yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity,
authority and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is
not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru means,
inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage
multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping. 9
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the
execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainee case
against his clients. 10
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the
respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment
and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the
final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping. 11
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample
evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown
in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty.
Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. 12 IcSHTA
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the
respondent's explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the
litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment
(Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely
glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of
the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The
Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondent's argument regarding
his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very
well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the
amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its
Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended
that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. 13 On

101
reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the respondent's suspension from the
practice of law to one (1) year. 14

The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable
for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
The Court's Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed
involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been
filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., 15 we
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of
a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially
imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced
the suspension to six (6) months. 16
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is
guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his
clients from the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful
detainer case against these clients: AIDcTE
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
53892) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In
dismissing the respondent's petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper
remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily
demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City over the ejectment case. 17
Second, notwithstanding the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the
respondent again questioned the MeTC's and the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis
of the motion to dismiss filed. 18
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainant's title to
the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions
were both dismissed "for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs" to file the
petition. 19
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the
petitions for annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings
from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case.
The respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainant's title because
the property is a part of forest land.

102
 Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four
petitions he had filed in several courts — the petition for certiorari, the petition for
annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainant's title and the
petition for declaratory relief — reveal the respondent's persistence in preventing and
avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in
the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondent's repeated attempts go beyond the
legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his
client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer
to "observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice." By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties
in that case. 20 aHSAIT
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, 21 as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of
which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both
violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of
justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure; 22 and add to the congestion of the
heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 23
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts' jurisdiction
may be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondent's
subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only
demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious
objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the
unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the
petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing
the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and
deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101,
Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment
sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected
to file the proper remedy alien available after receipt of the denial of their
Motion for Reconsideration . . . thus corruptly sold out the interest of the
petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in
complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and
fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact,
have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the
prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) . . . 24
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion
for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he
believed "that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and
void." 25 These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of
supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated
attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately
discuss below. CEHcSI
103
 Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his
second petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent
the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public
lands 26 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a
private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients
requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the
Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its
consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone
stood as counsel for the "plaintiffs." In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought
to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and
unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of
the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to
the court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this
wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that
after both counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the
Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the
hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of
the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND
DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE
COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD. 27 [Underscoring and
emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was
actually for the respondent's application for temporary restraining order and was not a
hearing on the adverse party's motion to dismiss. 28 The records also show that RTC-
Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondent's application for injunctive relief pending the
resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party. 29 As stated in the order of
the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of
stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate
that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.
. . . how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the
factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there
are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of
the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court
session. [Underscoring theirs]

The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations,
the respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients
(who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false
claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. 30 cCTaSH
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the
Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyer's duty to observe candor and
fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a
lawyer "never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement
104
of fact or law." 31 The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the
court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice, 32 and that
he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work. 33 His duty as a lawyer
obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner,
no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. 34 In case of conflict, his duties
to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court. 35
In defending his clients' interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01,
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 — A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 — A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his clients . . .
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means
as are consistent with truth and honor. 36 He should not prosecute patently frivolous and
meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. 37 The recital of what the
respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he
actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment,
the respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty.
Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the
counsel for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon
his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only
participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the
same time, the respondent's petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no
second motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC
decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the
said decisions were null and void ab initio. aTIEcA
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair
in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to "conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues." He was unfair
because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis
therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend
himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan's finding that the respondent
twice represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment
of judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title. 38
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for
annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while
the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondent's off-hand
explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification
of non-forum shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for
the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed
by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law
for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly
declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms
with which he was previously associated. 39 As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan
found, the respondent's explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-
105
forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper
authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of
title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the
Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an
amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without
its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably,
he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs — his clients and the
Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that
a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latter's
representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court. 40 The willful
unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious
conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional
misconduct. 41
The Respondent's Defenses
We find no merit in the respondent's defenses.
"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious
advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood,
faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another,
even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious." 42 Bad faith,
on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose. 43 As both concepts are
states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more
particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject
of inquiry. HaIESC
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests
of his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious
recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and
experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading
the soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the
MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories
in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the
sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his
objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondent's allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy,
it is not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment
case. 44 As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyer's discretion in acting
for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited
case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to
his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion
on the merits and probable results of his client's case with the end in view of
promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must
106
 always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he
'will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit nor give aid nor consent to the same'; and that he 'will conduct [himself] as
a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.' Needless to state, the lawyer's
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and
common sense. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests
of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions against the other party. 45
We cannot give credence to the respondent's claim that the disbarment case was
filed because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him.
We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present
disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has
filed his own separate disbarment case against the respondent. cAEDTa

The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment
proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer
of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice — an issue where the
complainant's personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment
proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged
wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . . disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of
an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney
is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor. 46
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the
complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts
of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-
year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondent's multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed,
and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and
to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that
107
 the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the
law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has
disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not
even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him.
Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession
and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate. CcAHEI
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent's first ethical
infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court;
for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then
by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience
and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondent's professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the
interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-
2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December
11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as
respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyer's Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02
and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Sections 20 (d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However,
we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should
be DISBARRED from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Que v. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 7054, [December 4, 2009], 622 PHIL 1-25)

108
 A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004.]

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES

BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as
a lawyer "by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order." 1
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Hueysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate
spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living
separately from each other. They have two children — namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five
years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old — both of whom are in
complainant's custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of
marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
54235 entitled, "James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al."
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant's residence in
Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by
the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child
custody. 2 Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not
received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent. HEITAD
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution
closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001.
Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived
and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to
forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of
the National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could
be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in
the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate court's resolution/order. 3 In order to diffuse the tension,
complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition
that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the
presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco,
among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived
at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed
until later in the morning.
109
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch
31, a verified petition 4 for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to
custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals' Resolution. In the
meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification
dated January 18, 2002 5 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not
appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney's
oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals' Resolution in and
outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privilege granted
to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a
warning that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. 6 On June 23, 2003,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable
for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is
belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious Resolution several times. As
pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by
respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, 7which he filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to
have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would
be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will
have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal
in the defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. 8 Thus, the
Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice. CaDEAT
Rule 10.02 — A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or
the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer's language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession. 9 The lawyer's arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to
both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed
110
by one gentleman to another. 10 By calling complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well
as a "vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech
demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute
gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However,
we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser
period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby
imposed on respondent. TSEcAD
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of
the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Hueysuwan-Florido v. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, [January 20, 2004], 465 PHIL 1-8)

111
 [G.R. No. L-25503. December 17, 1966.]

LEON DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO

CHINGCUANGCO, Associate Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA and TOMAS
IMPERIO, respondents.

Manuel A. Cordero for petitioner.

Angel C. Imperio for respondents.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J p:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction principally assailing an order of the
Court of Agrarian Relations denying a motion to stay execution of its judgment dispossessing
the tenant until he is indemnified for alleged expenses and improvements.
As leasehold tenant, petitioner, Leon del Rosario, occupied a parcel of land owned by
respondent Tomas Imperio, situated in Cabocbocan, Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Said land became
the subject matter of litigation between said parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Fourth regional district, in CAR Cases Nos. 2652-NE '61 and 2902-NE '62. And on July 12,
1963, a decision was rendered therein, the dispositive portion running as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) ordering the ejectment of
Leon del Rosario from the landholding in question subject to Section 43 and
Section 50, paragraph (a), R.A. No. 1199, as amended by R.A. No. 2263; and
(2) ordering Tomas Imperio to pay Leon del Rosario the value of the excess
rentals received by him for the agricultural years 1961-62 and 1962-63."
Said judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on March 26, 1965.
Subsequently, on October 26, 1965, Imperio filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations a
motion for execution of the aforestated judgment. Del Rosario however opposed it, on the
ground that he has a right of retention over the land until he is indemnified for expenses and
improvements, alleging that in the present case he is entitled thereto. Acting thereon, the
Court of Agrarian Relations, on November 18, 1965, issued an order for the issuance of a
writ of execution, stating that the judgment had become final and executory, and that Del
Rosario's claim for indemnity, if any, should be filed with said court for determination, but
cannot stop execution of said judgment. Del Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration but
this was denied by the same court on December 14, 1965. And on December 16, 1965, the
corresponding writ of execution was issued.
Petitioner Del Rosario then filed, on December 27, 1965, the present special civil action
herein.
Respondents, on January 4, 1966, were required by Us to answer the petition; and on
January 8, 1966, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction addressed:
"To: Hon. Bienvenido Chingcuangco (reg.-Spl.-del.)
Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations
Cabanatuan City

The Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija

112
 (reg.-spl.-del.)
Cabanatuan City"
stating:
"NOW, THEREFORE. until further orders from this Court, You, your agents,
your representatives and/or any person or persons acting in your behalf are
hereby restrained from implementing the Writ of Execution dated December
16, 1965, in CAR Cases Nos. 2652-NE-61 and 2902-NE-62 of the Court of
Agrarian Relations of Cabanatuan City entitled 'Leon del Rosario, plaintiff,
versus Tomas Imperio, defendant.' "
On January 20, 1966, respondents filed their answer. Further developments came by way of
two petitions for contempt: First, a petition filed by respondent Imperio dated February 5,
1966, to declare petitioner's counsel in direct contempt, on the alleged ground that in his
petition herein said lawyer cited a fictitious authority. Second, a petition filed by Del Rosario,
dated June 20, 1966, to cite for contempt respondent Imperio, and three non-parties, the
Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija (Eduardo Dumlao), and policemen
Remigio Baldonado and Romeo Miguel, for having allegedly sought to eject Del Rosario from
the land in question notwithstanding this Court's preliminary injunction. To this a
supplementary petition for contempt was filed, dated July 25, 1966, alleging further that with
the full backing of said policemen, Imperio caused the plowing and harrowing Or the
landholding and prevented Del Rosario from reaping the crops therein.
After the respective parties had filed their comments to the petitions for contempt, We
deferred their resolution until consideration of this case upon the merits.
At issue on the merits of this petition for certiorari is the proper interpretation or application of
Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act) which provides:
"SEC. 43. Rights and Obligations of Tenant-Lessee. — With the creation of the
tenancy relationship arising out of the contract between the landholder-lessor
and tenant-lessee, the latter shall have the right to enter the premises of the
land, and to the adequate and peaceful enjoyment thereof. He shall have the
right to work the land according to his best judgment, provided the manner and
method of cultivation and harvest are in accordance with proven farm
practices. Upon termination of the relationship, he shall be entitled to one-half
of the value of the improvements made by him, provided they are reasonable
and adequate to the purposes of the lease." (Emphasis supplied)
in relation to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, stating:
Rule 15. — Writ of Execution.
"Section 1. Requisites for Issuance of Writ of Execution in Case of Final
Judgment Ejecting Tenant. — In cases where the dispossession is authorized
by final judgment no writ of execution shall issue unless upon certification of
the corresponding Judge that the tenant has been fully indemnified of his claim
under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199 in case of share tenancy or under
Section 43 thereof in case of leasehold tenancy."
It is the position of respondents that Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 merely grants the tenant
the right to recover one-half of the value of improvements he made on the land, without giving
him any right of retention over the land until he is so reimbursed. As to Section 1 of Rule 15
of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, they contend that the same had been
superseded with the advent of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844), effective
August 8, 1963, which replaced the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations with the 'Rules
of Court (Sec. 115, R.A. 3844). And, they emphasize that there can be no vested right on
procedure, arguing that petitioner's right under the former Rules of the Court of Agrarian
Relations cannot be anything more than procedural.
113
There is no merit to the view that Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian
Relations is not applicable in this case for having been abrogated with the enactment of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Said Code, it is true, provides that the Court of Agrarian
Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (Sec. 155,R.A. 3844). And neither the
Rules of Court then obtaining nor the present Rules of Court contain a similar provision
requiring payment to the tenant of one-half of the value of his improvements before there can
be execution of a judgment dispossessing him. Nonetheless, since the Rules of Court were
applied to the Court of Agrarian Relations only on August 8, 1963, pursuant to Republic Act
3844 as aforestated, its effectiveness to pending cases as of that time, such as the instant
case, should follow the norm set forth in Rule 133 therein; "These rules . . . shall govern all
cases brought after they take effect, and also all further proceedings in cases then pending,
except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application would not be feasible or
would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply."
Should it turn out that indeed petitioner tenant had made improvements on the landholding,
— a point not for Us now to decide — then Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 clearly gives him
the right to one-half of their value, thereby imposing upon the landholder dispossessing him
the correlative duty of paying the same. The rule prevailing during the pendency of this case
in the Court of Agrarian Relations required that this account be settled before any judgment
of ejectment can be executed. It is therefore not difficult to see that to apply the Rules of
Court, which do not contain a similar provision, would be unjust to the tenant. In this event,
the former procedure is to be followed, namely, Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court
of Agrarian Relations.
Respondent Imperio's argument that petitioner failed to show that improvements were in fact
made, should be addressed to the Court of Agrarian Relations. The point is that the tenant's
claim for reimbursement under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 should first be threshed out,
determined and resolved before the tenant can be dispossessed by writ of execution. This
recourse is but in accordance with the policy of the law to protect the rights of tenants upon
the principle of social justice (Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199).
The petition for contempt filed by respondent Imperio charges petitioner's counsel of having
cited a fictitious case and a non-existing ruling. The record bears out that petitioner's counsel
alleged in page 5 of the petition for certiorari herein, thus:
"Section 1, Rule 15, Rules of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, predicated on
Section 43 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, supra, has been upheld to
be valid by this Honorable Tribunal so that now no writ of execution can be
issued unless it is complied with first (Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad,
et al., G.R. No. L-121447). This ruling, in effect, created and established or
confirmed the prior substantial right of a tenant to indemnification before he is
finally ejected from his holding."
Petitioner's counsel obviously had in mind this Court's decision in Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs.
Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957. Although he cites as docket number L- 121447
instead of L-12147, the same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not sufficient to
place him in contempt, especially because the names of the parties were given correctly.
As to said counsel's interpretation of this Court's decision in said case, or of what the ruling
therein "in effect" created, established or confirmed, the same are mere arguments fully
within the bounds of earnest debate, rather than a deception urged upon this Court. The
first petition for contempt is therefore without merit.

The second petition for contempt is against respondent Imperio and three others, not parties
herein: the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Eduardo Dumlao;
policeman Remigio Baldonado; and, policeman Romeo Miguel. Said petition as well as the
supplemental petition thereto, allege that respondent Imperio, with the aid of the three law
enforcement officers, disturbed petitioner in the possession and cultivation of the land, on

114
June 13, 1966; caused its plowing and harrowing on June 27, 1966; and prevented the
petitioner from reaping the second rice crop on July 16, 1966. The foregoing acts, if true,
would be a ground for contempt only if at the time this Court's writ of preliminary injunction
was issued, respondent court's writ of execution had not yet been carried out. From the
sheriff's return, 1 however, it would appear that respondent Imperio was placed in possession
of the land by virtue of the writ of execution as of December 18,* 1965. This Court's
preliminary injunction, restraining implementation of the writ of execution, was issued only on
January 8, 1966. Respondents, therefore, may not be held in contempt. Nonetheless, the
premature implementation of the writ of execution being illegal, petitioner should be restored
to peaceful and undisturbed possession of the landholding, until his claim for payment of
improvements (one-half of their value) is settled by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, respondent court's orders of November 18, 1965 and December 14, 1965,
denying petitioner's motion to stay execution pending settlement of his claim for one-half of
the value of alleged improvements, as well as the writ of execution already issued, are hereby
set aside; respondents are ordered to restore petitioner to the landholding, and to proceed
according to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the former Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, by
first determining petitioner's claim for improvements under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199,
before issuing a writ of execution for the said tenant's dispossession. The petitions for
contempt are denied for lack of merit. No costs. So ordered.
||| (Del Rosario v. Chingcuangco, G.R. No. L-25503, [December 17, 1966], 125 PHIL 279-
287)

115
 [G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998.]

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS B.

NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen,
Northern Samar and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN
MAGLUYOAN, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Nine informations for violation of Section 261 (i) of the Omnibus Election Code were filed with
the RTC of Northern, Samar by the COMELEC against private respondents who are public
school teachers for having engaged in partisan political activities. Respondent RTC Judge
Tomas B. Noynay motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and
directed the COMELEC to file the cases with the appropriate MTC on the ground that
pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended byR.A. 7691, the Regional Trial Court
has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases
does not exceed six years of imprisonment. In this Special Civil Action for Certiorari with
mandamus, petitioner contends that public respondent erroneously misconstrued the
provisions of R.A. 7691 in arguing that the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 28 of the Omnibus Election Code and
the Supreme Court's ruling in Alberto vs. Judge Lavilles, Jr., Regional Trial Courts have the
exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It held that by virtue of the exception
provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A.
7691, the exclusive original jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs, does not cover those
criminal cases which by specified provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of RTCs and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. In short,
even if those expected cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years,
jurisdiction thereon is retained by the RTC or the Sandiganbayan as the case may be. The
Supreme Court took the opportunity to remind respondent judge as well as other judges, of
his duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional
competence.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with mandamus is
whether R.A. No. 7691 1 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election
offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years. LLpr
The antecedents are not disputed.
In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and
Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in
partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to
handle the prosecutions of the cases. cdrep
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed
with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, and docketed therein
as follows:
116
 a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents
Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.
b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and
Ruben Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel
Chua only.
d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent
Diosdada Amor only.
In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding
judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and
directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial
Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No.
7691, 3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum
imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent
portions of the Order read as follows:
[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for [sic]
Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264
of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more
than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus
disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as
Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases — Except [in] cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal

ordinance committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and
other penalties including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature,
value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses
including damages to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. cda
In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases
filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6)
years.
The two motions 4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director
of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been denied
by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997, 5 the petitioner filed this special
civil action. It contends that public respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the provisions
of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses" because pursuant to Section 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code and this Court's ruling in "Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.,"
Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.
117
On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that it is
"adopting" the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent
"are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence."
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel
for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and
defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional
Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6
years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and
orders inconsistent with it provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then
conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not
more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
We resolved to give due course to the petition.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the
Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. 6 It reads as
follows:
SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. — The regional trial court shall have the
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of
failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal
will lie as in other criminal cases.
Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261
thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i)
of said Section, thus:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. — Any officer or employee in
the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee,
or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special
forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-
military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly
or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan
political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace
officer.
Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code, except
that of failure to register or failure to vote, is "imprisonment of not less than one year but not
more than six years" and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. LLjur
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. — Except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

118
 (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal
ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals 7 that by virtue of the exception
provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not
cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty
prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or
arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan, as the case may be. cdphil
Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; 8 and
(4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, 9 as amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also
fall within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside
the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the
plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress
may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and
determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an
exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be
considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend
specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not
have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress
never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably
evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129 providing for the exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as
other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, 10 to administer his office with
due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,11 to be faithful to the law, and to
maintain professional competence. 12
Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioner's Law Department,
must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge
Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration 13 he filed with the court below, Atty.
Balbuena stated:
As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case of
AlbertoNaldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5,
1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:

119
 "A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to
Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the Code and the RTC shall have the
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way
of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to
register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand together with the
provisions that any election offense under the code shall be punishable
with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject
to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is the
special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over
election cases as a matter of exception to the general provisions on
jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does
not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses
despite its expanded jurisdiction." (Emphasis ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto vs Judge Juan
Lavilles, Jr.," 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between
the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:
"With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of
Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus
Election Code the Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigations all election offenses punishable under the
code and the Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of the same. The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception
exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to
vote. Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that
any election offense under the code shall be punishable with
imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to
probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is the
special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court
jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions
on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as
amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 byRepublic
Act No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal
election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.
If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the
complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion
for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA.
Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in
volume 254 of the SCRA.
Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately
made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a little differently,
our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court
Administrator quoted in the decision.
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer
shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. LLpr

120
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged
orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997
in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is
DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further,
ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to
the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
No costs. LibLex
SO ORDERED.
||| (Commission on Elections v. Noynay, G.R. No. 132365, [July 9, 1998], 354 PHIL 262-274)

121
 [G.R. No. 100643. August 14, 1992.]

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Morong, Rizal, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong,
Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO, respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; FINAL UPON LAPSE OF REGLEMENTARY

PERIOD OF APPEAL AND NO APPEAL PERFECTED. — Petitioner fails to refute the ruling
of respondent appellate court that the issues presented in the instant case had been
previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392,
which decision became final and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book
by reason of petitioner's failure to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration.
This is fatal. It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the
lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. The decision therefore
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal
nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a
decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the
same.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING; PROCEEDING IN
REM; PERSONAL NOTICE NOT REQUIRED TO VEST AUTHORITY TO COURT. — As
early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, We already ruled that land registration proceedings
are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal
notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the
courts with power or authority over the res. Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent
by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure,
however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION THEREOF, SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO VEST COURT
JURISDICTION. — In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170,
We said that "[t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in
the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that
whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the
date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe
the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate
claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the
proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CANNOT BE LITIGATED TWICE BY VARYING FORMS
OF ACTION. — Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues
raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which has become res judicata. Verily, petitioner's action to
annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set
aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which
reversal became final and executory due to petitioner's failure to file an appeal within the
reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same
cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

122
5. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; RULE 10.02 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED WHEN LAWYER MISREPRESENTS CONTENTS OF
DECISION. — However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property,
Adez Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is
not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent
Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the
court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead
[Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite
as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as in fact
that which has not been proved] this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful
disregard of a lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

The petition filed on December 28, 1990, by Adez Realty Incorporated before the Court of
Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 23773, sought to annul the order of the
accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, dated November 20, 1984, allowing the reconstitution of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12662. The petition likewise sought to set aside in effect the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 dated July 31, 1990.
On April 30, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals 1 dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On
June 26, 1991, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The respondent court, in
dismissing the petition, said that: (a) the petition is a reiteration of the issues raised before
it 2 earlier in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, and since no motion for
reconsideration or appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court was filed, the same became
final and executory, and consequently entered in the judgment book on October 11, 1990;
and, (b) the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, had jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
issue then being one of venue and not of jurisdiction, which can be waived if not timely
objected to in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner raises
four (4) issues which nevertheless may be simplified into the following: whether the accused-
appellant of Morong, Rizal, may acquire jurisdiction over reconstitution proceedings involving
real property situated in Quezon City, and whether publication of the notice of the petition in
two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette and its posting in the bulletin board of the
accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, is sufficient compliance with Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26.
Wittingly or unwittingly, petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that
the issues presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and executory,
and in fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioner's failure to
seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.
It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. 3 The decision therefore of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion
for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a decision
becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same. 4 In
fact, in Dueñas v. Mandi, 5 We held that the "trial court and the appellate court may have
committed an error in the assignment or partition of the eight parcels of land to the parties in
this case, but considering that their judgments are now final, the error, assuming that one

123
was committed, can no longer be amended or corrected." In Icao v. Apalisok, 6 We ruled that
even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify
correction of the judgment after it has become final. We have also declared that, subject to
settled exceptions, once a judgment becomes final, all the issues between the parties are
deemed resolved and laid to rest. 7 To allow the Court to amend or reverse a decision which
has attained finality will result in endless litigations. 8 Indeed, every litigation, CA-G.R. CV
No. 21392 included, must come to an end.
Moreover, petitioner already had the opportunity to set aside the questioned order of the trial
court when its Motion to Set Aside and/or Annul the Order of Reconstitution, filed more than
a year after the issuance of the questioned order, was granted by the trial court, however
erroneous may be the procedure pursued and the consequently relief granted. Petitioner then
simply failed to maintain vigilance over its perceived rights when it did not file a timely appeal
from the adverse decision of the appellate court, thus allowing the said decision to become
final.
Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 9 We already ruled that land
registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not
necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be
registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. 10Thus, while it
may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial
reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional
defect. 11 In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, 12 We
said that "[t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the
Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that
whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the
date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe
the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate
claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the
proceedings.

Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R.
CV No. 21392 which has become res judicata. Verily, petitioner's action to annul the order of
the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order,
which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which reversal became final
and executory due to petitioner's failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A
party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his
case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated. 13
Be that as it may, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb, as to other matters, the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392,
promulgated July 31, 1990, the same having become final and executory. Accordingly, We
affirm the assailed decision promulgated April 30, 1992, and resolution issued June 26, 1991,
by respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review filed in behalf of petitioner Adez
Realty, Inc., by ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition, counsel
purports to quote, as he does, the questioned decision when he alleges —
"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
'After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the questioned order dated
November 20, 1984, without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
124
 Realty, granting the applicant's petition for reconstitution in the name of the
deceased Elias Eugenio'" (italics supplied)
However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in
the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the
decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It
now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when
actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead 14 this Court, a
serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times
in a manner consistent with truth.
ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice
why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment
of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent
purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to
live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.
Costs against petitioner Adez Realty Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100643 (Resolution), [August 14, 1992],
287 PHIL 690-697)

125
 [G.R. No. 100643. October 30, 1992.]

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, Morong, Rizal, PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City,
and AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS, COUNSEL BOUND BY ACTS OF HIS SECRETARY WHO MERELY

FOLLOWS HIS ORDERS; CASE AT BAR. — After due deliberation, the Court En
Bancbrushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsel's explanation that it was his
secretary who committed the mistake. This "passing-the-buck" stance of counsel was already
aptly treated in Adaza vs. Barinaga (104 SCRA 684), where the Court observed thus —
"Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in
the filing of pleadings, motions and other papers and for the lawyer's dereliction of duty is a
common alibi of practising lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal case, counsel's
shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his
own negligence, incompetence, indolence and ineptitude." The case of petitioner is no better;
it can be worse. For, how could the secretary have divined the phrase "without notice to the
actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," without counsel dictating it word for word?
Could it have been a providential mistake of the secretary as it was very material, and on
which could have hinged the fate of a litigant's cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard,
counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility which borders on falsification of a judicial
record to which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his secretary. Indeed, by no means
can he evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly dictated and signed
the petition. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegations in
their pleadings, more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein
are accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark.
The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other
documents dictated or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks,
before filing them with the court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more
reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders.
The instant case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land.
Section 13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner bases
one of his causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to the
occupants or persons in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a material
requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phrase "without
notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase
intercalated at the right place, making it highly improbable to be unintentionally, much less
innocently, committed; and by the secretary at that. All circumstances herein simply but
strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals
found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject property — when in fact it did not
make such a finding — is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of
the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena
of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter
of litigations.
2. ID.; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; RULE 10.02, CANON 10, CHAPTER
III THEREOF; MISQUOTING OR INTERCALATING PHRASES IN TEXT OF COURT
DECISION, A CLEAR AND SERIOUS VIOLATION OF LAWYER'S OATH; CASE AT BAR.
— The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary,
is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous
126
precedent but, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one's oath as a member
of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility
directs that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved." Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the
text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer's solemn duty to act at all
times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the
court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista vs. Gonzales (182
SCRA 151), We suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among others, submitting to
the lower court falsified documents, representing them to be true copies. In Chavez vs.
Viola (196 SCRA 10), We suspended respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an
Amended Application for Original Registration of Title which contained false statements. The
case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and far-reaching
repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for appeal, should
be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments of inequity and injustice.
Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and fairplay even before
the Highest Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying
the blame on his hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him.
3. ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW; NATURE THEREOF; DUTY OF LAWYERS TO COURT. — It is
well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We have already said — ". . . that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It
cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice . . . A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental
duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer
. . . It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients but
rather to the courts, that they are above all . . . sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice
to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their
clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court."
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF COURT OF APPEALS
GENERALLY BINDING UPON THE SUPREME COURT. — Well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are binding upon this Court.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel

for petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., to "SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the
court a quo 1 thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of
misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar."
In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay "humbly prostrates
himself before the Honorable Court and throws himself at, its mercy," and explains that —
". . . whenever he prepares petitions either for the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, he, dictates to his secretary and if portions of the decision or

127
 order to be appealed from have to be quoted, he simply instructs his said
secretary to copy the particular pages of the said decision or order.
"In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding
pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Somehow, however, some words
were intercalated on a particular paragraph noted by the Honorable Court he
regrettably is at a loss to explain. He remembers, however, that at the time he
was preparing the petition at bar there were other pleadings necessitating
equal if not preferential attention from him which could perhaps be the reason
why his secretary committed a very grievous mistake. Such mistake though he
does not condone and he feels upset at the turn of events." 2
Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex "A" is an Affidavit 3 of Alicia A. Castro, purportedly
his Secretary, stating among others that — cdll
"3. . . . in the preparation of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court, it was Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay who dictated to me the
contents of said petition;
"4. . . . in the preparation of the petition, he told me, as he is wont to do
whenever he prepares a petition, to copy the particular pages in the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 entitled 'Adez Realty, Inc.,
petitioner versus The Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal,
Branch 79 (not 89 as stated in the Affidavit), et al., respondents';
"5. . . . when I copied the particular pages of the decision of the Court of
Appeals as instructed by Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did as instructed, but it
was only after our office received the copy of the decision of the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. 100643 . . . that Atty. Dacanay confronted me and asked me where
I got that portion which was added to the particular paragraph noted by the
Supreme Court, that it was only then that I realized the mistake I committed;

xxx xxx xxx

"7. . . . I surmise that the error could have been due to the fact that ADEZ
REALTY, Inc. has so many cases being handled by the law office that I
presume I could have copied or my intention was distracted by other pleadings
atop my table at the time."
Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the First Division referred his case en
consulta to the Court En Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view of the
possible sanction that may be imposed on a member of the Bar. cdll
After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible
counsel's explanation that it was his secretary who committed the mistake. This "passing-
the-buck" stance of counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza v. Barinaga, 4 where the
Court observed thus —
"Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy
for the delay in the filing of pleadings, motions and other papers and for the
lawyer's dereliction of duty is a common alibi of practising lawyers. Like the
alibi of the accused in criminal cases, counsel's shifting of the blame to his
office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his own negligence,
incompetence, indolence and ineptitude."
The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For, how could the secretary have divined
the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," without
counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have been a providential mistake of the secretary
as it was very material, and on which could have hinged the fate of a litigant's cause?
Whatever be the truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility which
128
borders on falsification of a judicial record to which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags
his secretary. Indeed, by no means can he evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation
as he admittedly dictated and signed the petition.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegations in their
pleadings, more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are
accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark.
The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other
documents dictated or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks,
before filing them with the court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more
reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders. 5
The instant case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of
land. Section 13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner
bases one of his causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to the
occupants or persons in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a material
requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phrase "without
notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty," was just the right phrase
intercalated at the right place, making it highly improbable to be unintentionally, much less
innocently, committed, and by the secretary at that. All circumstances herein simply but
strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals
found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject property — when in fact it did not
make such a finding — is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of
the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena
of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter
of litigations. cdrep
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court. 6 The distortion of facts
committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and
should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent but, rather,
because it is a clear and serious violation of one's oath as a member of the Bar. Rule 10.02,
Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that "[a] lawyer shall
not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a
law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved" (emphasis supplied).
Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard
of the lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer
should never venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws.
Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales, 7 We suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among
others, submitting to the lower court falsified documents, representing them to be true copies.
In Chavez v. Viola 8 We suspended respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an
Amended Application for Original Registration of Title which contained false statements.
The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and far-
reaching repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for appeal,
should be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments of inequity and
injustice. Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and fairplay even
before the Highest Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief by
laying the blame on his hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him. cdll
It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We have already said —
". . . that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege one of those
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid
129
 that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice . . . A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental
duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would
gravely suffer . . . It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their
duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all . . .
sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only
secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For
this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court." 9
WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby altering
its factual findings with the apparent purpose, and no other, of misleading the Court in order
to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to live up to the standards expected
of him as a member of the Philippine Bar. Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
is hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from the practice of law. LibLex
Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay at his given
address at Mezzanine Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road, Quezon City, entered
upon his personal records, and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100643 (Resolution), [October 30, 1992])

130
 [G.R. No. 100643. December 12, 1995.]

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br. 79,
Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and
AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this
Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the
apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment.
Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law. 1
On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer
Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November
1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez
Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly
adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he
would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a
nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial
judge. 2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of a compelling
reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution. 3
On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was
already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he
had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the
exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good
moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel,
Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis.
Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development
Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriguez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-
Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro
P. Regino, RTC — Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC — Br. 86, Quezon
City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC — Br. 35, Quezon City. 4 However, on 11 August
1994 the Court denied the motion. 5
On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging
among others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious
and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal
assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost
humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another
chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court
with a contrite heart." 6
His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while
she did not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court
took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been
traumatized by his disbarment. 7
On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994.
Thus —
131
 I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full
responsibility for it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to
my secretary who was merely following my instructions. The intercalation was
my own act and I am justly punished for it.
Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I
have a wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been
withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for
relief . . .
Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening
the law profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by
admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its
canons . . . 8
On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.
On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement —
It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have
been struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three
children. Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender
who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9
On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995. 10
On 17 November 1995 movant once more wrote the Court —
I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I
was justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago,
but it is my wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression.
Although innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my
punishment. 11
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently,
given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct,
redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of
upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for
compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting
standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the
disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that —
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality
and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions
required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to
discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That
is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . . 12
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is
LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the
required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100643 (Resolution), [December 12,
1995], 321 PHIL 556-561)

132
 [G.R. No. L-27654. February 18, 1970.]

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN in L-27654, ANTONIO H.
CALERO vs.VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J p:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
filed on September 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase,
as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this
Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is
not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
". . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST
with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain
our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice
of the noblest profession."
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus,
on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
"Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it
to expose the tribunal's `unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice
of arbitrarily denyingpetitions or appeals without any reason.
"Because of the tribunal's `short-cut justice,' Almacen deplored, his
client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the
case.
xxx xxx xxx
"There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, `where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity'.

xxx xxx xxx

133
 "He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by
which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court `will
become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions.'" (Italics supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
". . . our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused
to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity,"
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and
that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero, 1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court,
after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen
received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 6, 1966, he moved for its
reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify
the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the
plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court
denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion
for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion
for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966,
upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on
appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:
"Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by
plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the
opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO
DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the
motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1966 (pp. 90-118, printed record
on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof
and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1966), which
did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently,
the appeal was perfected out of time."
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30,
1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
"Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967
and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant-appellant,
praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing
the appeal.

134
 "Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions
between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this
Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the
latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by
the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion,
the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
"There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
"In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the
motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised
herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than
the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which
was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it `without prejudice to
appellee's restoring the point in the brief.' In the main decision in said case
(Rep. vs. Venturanza), the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub
silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety
and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on
the matter in issue."
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration
and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the
second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the said date was ordered expunged
from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition
to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28. 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his
certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act
on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection
with Case G.R. No. L-27654,Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;"
that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative
act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show
cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges
contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing."
This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from
notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived
and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is
"the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions
"in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity
and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has
135
no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was
allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers no apology. Far
from being contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this
time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
"At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7,
St. Matthew: —
" `Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure
you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see
the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam
in thy own eye? Or how canst thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast
out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own
eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and
then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes.
" `Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do
you also to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he
stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that `he will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath
that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual
members of the Court, that they tend to bring the entire court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law
xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER
THOUGHT but only motivated with the highest interest of justice that in
the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to
our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter,
...

xxx xxx xxx

"To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in
the highest interest of JUSTICE — what did we get from this COURT?
One word, DENIED with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the
unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is
plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
"Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the
Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained
unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the
attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.
136
 "Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors
attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason,
NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you,
he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this
the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said:
— `the story is current, though nebulous as to its truth, it is still being
circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be
before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that
justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines.'
xxx xxx xxx
"We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not
the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. . . .
We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were
angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this
Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and
sensing that you have not performed your duties with `circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom', your Respondent rise to claim his
God-given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free
speech.
xxx xxx xxx
"The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the
further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our
President. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that
were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during
the French revolution, `O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name',
we may dare say, `O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, `O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed
in thy name.'
xxx xxx xxx
"We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any
abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a
court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to
curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
"The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be
found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two more
symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members
of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite
of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED,. not one word was spoken or given . . . We
refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only
describe the impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx

137
 "As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our
lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today
may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith
and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
Constitution, and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter."
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms 2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and law, and to spell
out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know
the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours
meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly
frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression
cogency, but fail to withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or Write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
"A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to
the same petition different reasons may read different justices to the same
result . . .
"Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even
confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial.
Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled
to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of
the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last
three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases. respectively, on
their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively,
1,260, 1,105, 1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court
is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for
refusing to take there cases. The time that would be required is prohibitive.
Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time make's review undesirable."
Six years ago, in Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered
view on this matter. There, the petitioner's counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution
violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
"In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question
has been raised before; and we held that these `resolutions' are not
`decisions' within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold
138
 that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the
provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers
have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned
in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
"By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped
the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice
of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely
ordered `dismissed'."
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court
of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons
to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic
that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not
intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule
46 of the Rules of Court which recites:
"Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary. — A review is
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate
the character of reasons which will be considered:
"(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has
decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned
such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power
of supervision."
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination
of the pleadings and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need
for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew
— or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the
period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party
(which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
"The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in
general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides
that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing and shall be
served upon all the parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon
by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, L-18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v.
139
 Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The
reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection,
since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file
his reply or opposition."
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he
has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal,
which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of
his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the
posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty
of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would
thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time
he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given
wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but also
the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority, 4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer. 5 Such right is especially recognized where
the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's actuations are thrown
open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted
right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like
other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public
opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations. 9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who sit as
members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability
into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected
not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is that
"An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to
criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and
the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts."(In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487)

140
 Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the
lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In articles
written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of
courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see the flaws and inconsistencies of the
doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood
in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
"No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the
expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts. . . . To say that an attorney can only
act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to
be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom
he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be entertained. . . .
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor
is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657,
665).
"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity
to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No
class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great
an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench." (State Board
of Examiners in Law v. Hart,116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the
lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty, to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting
judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior
toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the
courts;" 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins
him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not
by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to
the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
141
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to
submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-
respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they
are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar
should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission."
(In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
"We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack
a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right." (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political campaign, 17 if couched
in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So.
2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of
appropriate penalties," adding that:
"It would be contrary to every democratic theory to hold that a judge
or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not
exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at the
destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice is the
direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is
otherwise."
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating
a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and
of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also
DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went. much further than
the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
"The entire publication evidences a desire on the part of the
accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute
with the general public."
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of

142
the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable said
bank to keep that money." Said the court:
"We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit
to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity,
impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the
deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest
courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585,
15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
" 'It may be (although we do not 80 decide) that a libelous
publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could
be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author.'
"Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of
graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our
view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to
enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of
the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of
the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration
of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins 81 Pac. 220."
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill
of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed
libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
"Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so
that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the
cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the
law allows and the case warrants."
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly
work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
". . . Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there
is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and
duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the
public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts
should have the confidence and reject of the people. Unjust criticism,
insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and
the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity,
cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt
to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and
the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the
Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public."
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions
of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
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 "A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the
authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its
judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter
of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. . . .
"Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the
guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom
of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the
courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not
exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an
attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held
responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that
an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights." In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723, 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting
to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which
the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct
justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the
statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The Court said:
"We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in
the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in
the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration
of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by
corrupt or in proper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every
other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial offices for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his
duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges
to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged,
and the person making them protected. . . . While we recognize the
inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of
the public generally, to criticize the decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial offices
in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticized, tends to subvert
the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of
the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of
justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional
misconduct."
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
"I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary observations more or less vituperative, and
finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been
expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here."
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
". . . the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds
of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct,
or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this
court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part
144
 of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to
demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client."
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a
case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

"The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one
most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does
not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the
ethics of the profession. . . .
"The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination as of prime importance under our system and ideals of
government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the
best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he
labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this
right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and
honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client
or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting
the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a
community toward the judiciary by the filthy, wanton, and malignant
misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its
duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and
money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court."
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms "criminal, corrupt,
and wicked conspiracies," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence,"
"criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was
considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer
was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and
his associates in the decisions of certain appeal in which he had been attorney for the
defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained
this paragraph:
"You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better
right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to
reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and
vigilant that the widow got not undue advantage. . . . The point is this: Is
a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the
court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen
from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
145
 researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of
the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct
motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is
stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded
citizen of the state to read it."
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
"The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter
addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose
of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so
directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him due
his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made,
could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would
be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so
assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to
their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused
of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to
assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such
an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words,
oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to
the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury.
`The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person
defamed does not constitute an actionable publication.' 18 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused
of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts
charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different
principles are applicable thereto.
"The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so
far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution
and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has
been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to
be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the
obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to court and
judicial officers. `This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out
of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their official acts.' Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.)
355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the
principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon
a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his
home of elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different
from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think, entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod, supra. while the court in
that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to
criticize rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one
might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case
a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded.
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 `Is it in the power of any person,' said the court, `by insulting or assaulting
the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion
until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his
own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the
insult be taking the law in his own hands? . . . No high-minded, manly man
would hold judicial office under such conditions.'
"That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional
punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. `An attorney
who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial
justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a
justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court.' Matter
of Manheim, 133 App. div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 the same is held in Re
Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter
case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter
to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in a
reference to his decision: `It is not law; neither is it common sense. The
result is I have been robbed of 80.' And it was decided that, while such
misconduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be
`called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney.' `If,' says the court, `counsel learned in the law are
permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or
accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they
may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a
judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice
will fall into bad repute.'
"The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in
this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney
at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter
received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and
which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause
wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held
that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having `willfully failed to maintain
respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached
his oath as an attorney.' As recognizing the same principle, and in support
of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte
Bradley, 7 Wail (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;
Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo.
237, 244, 3 Pac. 66, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 361; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14,
36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

"Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been
so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may
be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. . . ."
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyze him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack
against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general, claiming

147
that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a
case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 669, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession
into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared Over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member
of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign
from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend
to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian' of the morals and
ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for
contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end,
nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion
for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that
"It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and
rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he
is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right
by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,"
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed
". . . an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an
intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged
with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the
rights to the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having
abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's client . . ."
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in
a local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so
148
many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, . . . the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court,"
which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry
from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would
introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good
faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
"But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not
only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices
from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided
the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded. In order to influence the final decision of said case by this
Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But
the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration of justice . . .
"To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices,' that is to say,
that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and
justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution,
the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity
of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation."
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
". . . an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation
to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may
be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty
of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)"
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et
al., supra, where counsel charged this Court With having "repeatedly fallen" into the pitfall of
blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on

149
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct
was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
"As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in
the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably
arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court
rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It
makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blind adhere to
earlier rulings without as much as making `any reference to and analysis
of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error
and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the
law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that
the pronouncements of this court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court
are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity
of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of
the members — and some former members — of this Court to render
justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which
counsel labelled as `so-called' the `rule against splitting of jurisdiction.' "

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest
of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not
after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon
to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no
moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceedings has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled
rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes,21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of
the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that
the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the
validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was
an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran. in his dissent in Alarcon to the
effect that there may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated.
Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
"A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable
by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy
public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way
into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be
shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
150
 important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice
is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to
bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first
there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no
decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending
case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed."
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements
and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's
appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been
perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt
for such post-litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our
Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in
so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his
fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power inherent in our
authority and duty to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve
its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings.
In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no
consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit
to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 ours is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the
Bar. Thus —
"The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is
an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its
existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court
having the right to admit attorneys to practice — and in this state that
power is vested in this court — has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion, to exclude them from practice." 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all
that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —
". . . whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is
no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts,
it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him
one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar,
to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both
the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one
is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a
matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the
exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion." 24

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 Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the
Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question
are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for
and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the
altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be
not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually rakes this
Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent
injustices" and "short cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused
to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the
Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks
and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary
sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose
but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more
important of all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence
in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and
texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct,
gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics.
As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as
the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means
synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must
possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but
also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a
trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
152
officers. 27 Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but
only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can
only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave
hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of
the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot
disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they,
acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The
present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited
upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may
range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess
under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the
purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect
due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will
realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way
of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to
decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude
a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is
lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty.
153
Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall] last. For, at
any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once
again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he
is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take
effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and
the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
||| (In re: Almacen v. Yaptinchay, G.R. No. L-27654 (Resolution), [February 18, 1970], 142
PHIL 353-393)

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 [G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996.]

KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, vs.

HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 134,respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December
17, 1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of
Makati, finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering
Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and
others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which
the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the
defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by
Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a
motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent judge from the consideration of the
case. 1 The motion alleged in pertinent part:
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS
Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver the three (3) successive
postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of Mrs. Remedios
Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not
presented;
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was
eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet
reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS
Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did
not likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally
recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia
Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against
whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although
said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for
Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos' relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and
to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the
last case to recover the partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor
inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle;

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 5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the
first instance that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding
Judge, he should immediately move for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.
Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and contemptuous," respondent
judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to
show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court." 2
In a pleading entitled "Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt
Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel," Atty. Rayos claimed that the
allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed the
motion "in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering," for Kelly Wicker, who
said in a note to him that a "young man possibly employed by the Court" had advised him to
have the case re-raffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new
judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty.
Santos knew who "the judge may be and when he would appear". Wicker's sense of disquiet
increased when at the next two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the
latter's witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were
present. 3
Finding petitioners' explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated
December 3, 1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit
in his order of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners
to appear before him on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.
In their petition 4 before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They
argue that "when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful
manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become
guilty of contempt."

In his comment, 5 respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93
dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was
"personally recruited from the South" by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-
Santos; that he assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions
on October 18, 1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner
Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks
prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive and that he in fact
refrained from implementing the execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable
petitioners to "avail themselves of all possible remedies;" that after holding petitioners in
contempt, he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil
Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos' claim that he was just "lawyering" and acting as "the
vehicle or mouthpiece of his client" is untenable because his (Atty. Rayos') duties to the court
are more important than those which he owes to his client; and that by tendering their "profuse
apologies" in their motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners
acknowledged the falsity of their accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken
inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for
Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be reraffled to another sala of
the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed with the
Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue
hearing the case on the ground that he had a "full grasp of the case."

156
In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted
a reraffle of the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed
the petition with the Court Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading
allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or
judge in which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another
case. The former has been held to be equivalent to "misbehavior committed in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the
meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt. 6
It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt,
the contemnor may be punished only "[a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel," whereas in case of direct
contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the judgment
in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only
judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable. 7
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence
even if petitioners are right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it
involves indirect contempt, they have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a
hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is important to determine now is
whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable
for direct contempt.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it
be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. 8 The
contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to
strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court. 9
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court
sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the
allegations in petitioners' motion for inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out
of his station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported
to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises,
Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise
appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally
recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia
Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against
whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although
said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for
Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos' relief;
leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing
counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his
transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated "easing out" the former judge to make
room for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and
constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They
suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to
their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were
made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely "in the interest of
an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution." 10 This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty.
157
Rayos. After all, as he claims, he "deliberated" for two months whether or not to file the
offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden
to do by his client of whom he was merely a "mouthpiece." He was just "lawyering" and "he
cannot be gagged," even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared
and filed were false since it was his client who verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an
unidentified young man, whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the
opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos
did not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed to come. It would, therefore,
appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been "personally
recruited" by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been "eased out"
were Atty. Rayos' and not Wicker's. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation
of the motion for inhibition.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer,
he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in
the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were
bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. 11 Even a hired
gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.
Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" 12 and "not [to] attribute to a
Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case." 13
After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners' "profuse apologies" and
indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served
on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that "Respondent
Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC
of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City." If nothing else,
this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the "contumacious attitude, a flouting
or arrogant belligerence" first evident in petitioners' motion for inhibition belying their
protestations of good faith.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel: 14
Numerous cases there have been where judges, and even members of the
Supreme Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from
participating in the consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants
punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they based their
motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only
when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence
to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and
disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for
contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the
jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court.
In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering that the
particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have come from
him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80)
and in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker
may have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could not point a court
158
employee who was the source of the same. At least he had the grace to admit his mistake
both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel was also
willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon
petitioners' description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make the grade in
the RTC of Makati, where complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact
that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding City
Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a 1963
graduate of the U.P. College of Law.

In Ceniza v. Sebastian, 15 which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the
judge "corrupt," the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail
sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court for the reason that
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion,
considering the background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in
imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting standard
[of] preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance
sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is the view of the
Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to
P500.00.
The same justification also holds true in this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of
imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P100.00 to P200.00 for each
of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Wicker v. Arcangel, G.R. No. 112869, [January 29, 1996], 322 PHIL 476-489)

159
 [A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. March 8, 2011.]

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING

INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law
professors 1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets
this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly
concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind,
the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was
adequate and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar,
the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand,
are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this
Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to
the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to
their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are
as follows: EDSHcT
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 — A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel,
or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
160
 already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 — A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 — A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the
proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak
their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of
their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the
Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially
during the pendency of a motion for such decision's reconsideration. The accusation
of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this
plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone's attention from the actual concern of
this Court to determine by respondents' explanations whether or not respondent members
of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and
speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as
third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents
themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement, 2 which they
formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court's
proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom
invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in
the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative
cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions
can similarly be applied to respondents' invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is
precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and
mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents' own non-observance of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of
intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court. acHTIC
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents' actuations, it
is apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice
Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated.
On May 31, 2010, the counsel 3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. OUR OWN CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORIES
REJECT THIS HONORABLE COURTS' (SIC) ASSERTION THAT THE
EXECUTIVE'S FOREIGN POLICY PREROGATIVES ARE VIRTUALLY
UNLIMITED; PRECISELY, UNDER THE RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, SUCH PREROGATIVES ARE
PROSCRIBED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
STANDARDS, INCLUDING THOSE PROVIDED FOR IN THE RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF WHICH THE PHILIPPINES IS A
PARTY. 4

161
 II. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS CONFUSED DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION WITH THE BROADER, IF FUNDAMENTAL,
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES TO PROTECT THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ITS
CITIZENS — ESPECIALLY WHERE THE RIGHTS ASSERTED ARE
SUBJECT OF ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS AND PERTAIN TO JUS
COGENS NORMS. 5
On July 19, 2010, 6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr.
(Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a SupplementalMotion
for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge
of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of theVinuya decision. Among
other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE
COURT'S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES — AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW — AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT'S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES
EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION'S CLAIMS. 7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources
by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the
Petition." 8 HEDCAS
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in
the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent's article "A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" 9 (2) Christian J. Tams' book Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in International Law; 10 and (3) Mark Ellis' article "Breaking the Silence:
On Rape as an International Crime." 11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on
July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled
"SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak
website. 12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19,
2010. 13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque's column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted,"
appeared in the Manila Standard Today. 14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that
Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in
the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent,
had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle's response to the post by Julian
Ku regarding the news report 15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law
blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku's blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper's 16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for
reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday.
The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-
in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court's decision contains thirty-four sentences
and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL
article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were
162
 unaware of the petitioners' [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was
filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court's jus cogens
discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against
humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court's decision is available
here:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the
Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in
the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours: SEcTHA
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the
last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am
compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an
advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the
possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international
crime in your esteemed Court's Judgment in the case of Vinuya, et al. v.
Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism
by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative
(MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in
footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also
concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made
in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since
the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for
victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your
esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully
study the arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the
issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis 20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section
13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also
dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to
the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to
comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo. 21

163
 On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity:
A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement),
was posted in Newsbreak's website 22 and on Atty. Roque's blog. 23 A report regarding
the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News
TV 24 and the Sun Star 25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted
at the University of the Philippines College of Law's bulletin board allegedly on August 10,
2010 26 and at said college's website. 27 DHACES
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10,
2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty

from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by
thirty[-]eight (38) 28 members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope
that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the
actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law
professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient
reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously
came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort
women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their
own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up
for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes
crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation
by the Highest Court of the land. TacESD
164
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College
of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual
scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but
also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System.
In common parlance, 'plagiarism' is the appropriation and misrepresentation of
another person's work as one's own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best,
and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else's ideas and
expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing
such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such
ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty,
pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one
that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the
land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws
by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification
of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows
that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers' works and
interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work.
Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court's and no
longer just the ponente's. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the
Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers' names and the
publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case
and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original
articles is a reference to the 'primary' sources relied upon. This cursory
explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors' writings and the
effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with
portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism
since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the
original authors' work of organizing and analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be
familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and
careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of
the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors
Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually
misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that
the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes
against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory
upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet,
the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary
conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works
without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying
works in order to mislead and deceive. DHSEcI
165
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals
with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in
a time of war, and the role of the injured parties' home States in the pursuit of
remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such
opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino
"comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World
War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every
solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed
its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the
petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the
Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and
exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and
nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic
values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court
and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and
legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its
decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards
of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these
undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic
society. Given the Court's recent history and the controversy that surrounded
it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass
without sanction as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the
judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for
justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who
have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the
Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of
pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without
ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is
beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content,
but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible
and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed
and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for
the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward
the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and practical
scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of
administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely
above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of
judicial and professional ethics. aICHEc
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust
reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the
Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral
conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the
Supreme Court;

166
 (2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine
judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the
establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or
equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty
and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution,
it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign
his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may
consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by
which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes
decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide
clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the
highest quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and
adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27
July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law
(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008)
and Professor of Law
REGULAR FACULTY
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL
Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD

DAWAY Assistant Professor
Associate Dean and Associate Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
LECTURERS
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A.
(SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
ALAMPAY
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
167
 (SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA (SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA 29
(Underscoring supplied.)
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known
his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court. 30 We quote Prof. Tams' letter
here: ACcISa
Glasgow, 18 August 2010
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the
University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my
publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court's
Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes.
As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken
almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press
2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the
Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno
Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the
Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of
referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support
the Judgment's cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most
cursory reading shows that my book's central thesis is precisely the opposite:
namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm
place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes
that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the 'very mysterious'
concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein,
the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the
concept is now a part of thereality of international law, established in the
jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work
should have been cited to support — as it seemingly has — the opposite
approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable
Court's Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging
it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable
Court. ICTacD
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams 31
168
 In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares' exhibits during
the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics
Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not
signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.)
beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed
copy of the said Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing. 32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a
copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the
names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from
the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members
appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement
did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice
Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit)
signed the Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the
previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories
to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same
Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was
already under consideration by the Court. 33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following
observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators' opinion on
the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo's explanation on how he
cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary
conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern
for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attackthat lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. ISaCTE
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. . . . .
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Court's alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency
and respect. 34 . . . . (Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining
a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross
the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside

169
 interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty's less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in
the Vinuyacase and undermine the Court's honesty, integrity and competence
in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women's claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runscontrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. 35 . . . . (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring
supplied.) ATSIED
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia
R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J.
Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza,
Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D.
Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the
copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of Canons 1, 36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01,10.02
and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of
G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the
consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction
of the UP Law Faculty Statement. 38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular
administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by
Respondents in Response to the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court,
respondents filed the following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37
respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in
relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa
Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T.
Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in
relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02
and10.03; and HSTCcD
170
 (5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents
(Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof.
Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a
common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common
Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that
"[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the 'solemn duties and
trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,' and as members of the Bar
to speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them." 39 They
likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none
of them was involved either as party or counsel" 40 in the Vinuya case. Further,
respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution's findings and
conclusions were "aprejudgment — that respondents indeed are in contempt, have
breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the Court, and have violated
'Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility." 41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents' alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal
processes 42 and the courts 43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of
influencing the Court 44 in the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their
intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and
to ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly
evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive
action." 45 Respondents' call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise
guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to
'participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice'" (under Canon 4 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal
processes" (under Canon 1, id.). 46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a
"special interest and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation
because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the academe,
especially in our law schools." 47 acHCSD
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring
Integrity Statement as an 'institutional attack' . . . on the basis of its first and ninth
paragraphs." 48 They further clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly drafted
and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation." 49 According to
respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was
reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the
matter; 50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did
nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges." 51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court's indifference
to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that
impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents' position that Justice Del Castillo committed
plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic
writing

171
 A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the
merits of respondents' charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying
on University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals 52 and foreign
materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position regarding
the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are
therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the
Common Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of
Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D., 53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno,
alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a
legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De
Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008
Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and
International Human Rights Law" by Michael O'Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of
their charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper
attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on
Elections. 54
(c) Respondents' belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others
have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues." 55 They identified various
published reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of
respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero; 56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
July 24, 2010; 57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010; 58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine
Star on July 30, 2010; 59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian
Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August 5,
2010; 60 SIDEaA
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010; 61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan's call for the resignation
of Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila
Standard Today on July 31, 2010; 62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on the calls for the
resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the
Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August 11, 2010; 63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a
former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine
Constitutional Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines — Bulacan Chapter published in the
Philippine Star on August 16, 2010; 64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010. 65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out
for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that
172
they may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair
and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed
their position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be
performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law,
but also as citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of
free speech." 66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos, 67 In re:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections. 69 CSAaDE
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their
Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an
institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines
Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national university has the right and
responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology 70 which they claimed
recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy
discussion and communication of a faculty member's field of study without fear of reprisal.
It is respondents' view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility as
teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of students,
professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research
and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that
plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual
integrity has no bearing or relevance to one's conduct." 71
In closing, respondents' Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the
following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm inSalcedo v.
Hernandez, 72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial
course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary
by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of
a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous
bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high
or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate
language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the
outcome of a case. 73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the
Common Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members
of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show
Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents
have: [a] breached their "obligation as law professors and officers
of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, . . . and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13

173
 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility." CcaASE
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing
prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion
of their due process rights, that before final judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or
address the findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause
Resolution (including especially the finding and conclusion of a
lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate
procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined
that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the
production of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28,
2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC);
and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records,
drafts, reports and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who were or could
have been called in In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism,
etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC). 74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof.
Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista
Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the Common Compliance with some
additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to
challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f
the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing." 75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith
and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to
resign." 76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and
sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the
Statement. SEACTH
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence 77 which
in her view highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions
of higher learning such that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who
may teach, what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to
study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools' exercise of discretion
in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has
encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines and other
universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of
respondents' constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when
there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public health or other
legitimate public interest. 78
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Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate
Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof.
Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged
that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in
the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations
not properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a
clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle with
the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith. 79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also
took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to
comment on acts of public officers. He invited the attention of the Court to the following
authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; 80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen; 81 and (c) a
discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d. 82 He claims that he "never
had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or should
influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case" 83 and that "attacking the
integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondent's mind when he signed the
Statement." 84Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported
homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his
Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October
2010, some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit
plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent,
were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the
intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the
academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic
discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that
plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another's work and to pass it
off as one's own. 85 (Emphases supplied.) HCaDIS
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he
"might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the
Statement] and could have been more careful." 86 He ends his discussion with a
respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show
Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner violated his
oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10 in relation to his submission of
a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of
the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:
• "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP
College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the
thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause
Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and
Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
• "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature,
but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members
of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity
II was publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law
175
 on 10 August 2010. Another copy ofRestoring Integrity II was also
officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP
College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing
of Restoring Integrity I.
• "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and
which presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean's Office in the
UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members who
still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty-seven original
signatories to Restoring Integrity Iabove their printed names and the
notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other
members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names. 87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the
discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents. Restoring Integrity III was
never submitted to this Court. IAETDc
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came
about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2. On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement
in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the
draft and circulate it among the faculty members so that those who wished to
may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as
the printed draft's signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring
Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean
Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable
Court's Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April
2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the process
of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen's staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the
members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean's Office to
sign the document or had it brought to their classrooms in the College of Law,
or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for one reason
or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless
conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as soon as
they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity
I had been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to
reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate for posting in the
College of Law. Following his own established practice in relation to significant
public issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only
the names of those who signed the first printed draft would appear, together
with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring
Integrity II thus came into being. 88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the
names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so
much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents." 89 He
likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to
vandals and pranksters." 90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza's name as among the signatories
in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen
176
attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his
Compliance, he narrated that: CHTcSE
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the
reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of
Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not
among those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was
previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the
inclusion of the Justice's name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring
Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to
Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her,
Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also according
to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States the following week. It
would later turn out that this account was not entirely
accurate. 91 (Underscoring and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer,
however, and so placed full reliance on her account" 92 as "[t]here were indeed other
faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate that they were signatories,
even though they were at that time unable to affix their signatures physically to the
document." 93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff
reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza's
signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean's staff talked to Justice
Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign
the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its contents.
However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he authorized the dean to
sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize
the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United States. The
dean's staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the
Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to
sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following
week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza
when he went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his
arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign. 94 SaICcT
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of
the call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed,
Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring
Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S.,
he declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that
time, he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against
the faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due
deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not
wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the
Statement. 95 (Emphases supplied.)

177
 With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit's name in the signature page
of Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and
the erroneous description in Dean Leonen's August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the
Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38members of the UP Law Faculty, it
was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when
it was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean
Leonen's staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity
II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted
signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that
38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice
Mendoza.) 96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of
the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized
that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the
signature pages were not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the
Statement's] essential nature as a 'live' public manifesto meant to continuously draw
adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic . . .
many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting
the same text but with more and more signatories." 97 Adverting to criminal law by
analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to
appear in a document that a person has participated in an act when the latter did not in
fact so participate" 98 for he "did not misrepresent which members of the faculty of the UP
College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had
expressed their desire to be signatories thereto." 99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of
Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court
the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed
with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he
did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the
appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the
latter's information and proper disposition with the hope that its points would be duly
considered by the Honorable Court en banc." 100 Citing Rudecon Management
Corporation v. Camacho, 101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has
not been met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation for the act
complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of the standard
of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 102 cCSHET
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs
as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the
records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch
(Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a
member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He
alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988
and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the
principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that '. .
.[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right
to speak means the right to speak effectively." 104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila
Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr., 105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or
178
speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended recipients
listen" 106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of
repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage
and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers." 107 Relying
on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 108 Prof. Lynch believed that
the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to
remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional
guarantee on free speech). 109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the
other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring
Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of
respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of
expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents' academic freedom as
law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be
disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he
should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules10.01, 10.02
and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and
in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or
presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses
and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)? HCSAIa
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny
respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents' collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show
Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents' constitutionally mandated right to free
speech and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents'
assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize the
Court's decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law
professors' dissenting view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show
that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that
they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It
was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents,
who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor
of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration
of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly
enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under
the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this
Court of the UP Law faculty's Restoring Integrity Statement.

179
 To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that
Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as
"not only as an established fact, but a truth" 111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that
there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations." 112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a
pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. 113The Show Cause
Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that
respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those
portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered
as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern
for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attackthat lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. . . . .
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Court's alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency
and respect. 114 . . . . (Underscoring ours.) SHaIDE
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents' freedom of
expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining
a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross
the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty's less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in
the Vinuyacase and undermine the Court's honesty, integrity and competence
in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women's claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runscontrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. 115 . . . . (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents' submissions,
this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be
balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary
be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only
citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of
this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
180
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common
decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez, 116 the Court found Atty.
Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following
paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo
and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within
our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has
committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly
some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press
publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which
the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire
to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to
state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice. 117 (Emphases
supplied.) SaHIEA
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary
and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many
reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question
were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and
good practice can never sanction them by reason of their natural
tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of
questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated
therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should
follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the
purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which
his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against
the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order
to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that
referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and
increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge,
occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than
contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he
presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did
not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the
fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously. 118 (Emphases supplied.)

181
 Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote
from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements
made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are
neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing
at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents' theory, Salcedo is
authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and
authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred
upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and
160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio
St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor
promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the
source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief. 119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious
statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the
respondents' Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court. cASIED
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their
position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 120 cited in the Common Compliance and the
Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a
member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client
committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he
alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this
Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows
to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the
people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed
must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that:
". . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST
with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain
our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice
of the noblest profession." 121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on
the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon
actuations of public officers, including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine
in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must
conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more
extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view. To quote from that
decision:

182
 But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander
of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. HcDSaT
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and
duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal
profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting
and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts;" and
the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to
the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining
out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley v.
Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of
their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned
lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to
submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and
self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxx xxx xxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality
so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications
or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as
to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action. 122 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.) CacTSI
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto, 123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance,
observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

183
 The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending
cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as
misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and
subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a
constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor.
Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or
interference. . . . .
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing
or modifying its decision. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say,
that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice
is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of
their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to
take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might
be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of
other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation. 124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be
easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson, 125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through
the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the
guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus: cCSTHA
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any
other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers.
This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we
stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court,
he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his
duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31
SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
184
 Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable
to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am
Dec. 657, 665).
xxx xxx xxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned
in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect
to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
xxx xxx xxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom
of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must
be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine
the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA
107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan,
68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless,
and malicious statements in pleadingsor in a letter addressed to the
judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19
January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]). IcEACH
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint
which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the
lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. . . .
. 126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong, 127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of
simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine
upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
185
 CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members
of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified. 128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.
Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act
4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 129 relied upon by respondents in the
Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that
the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging
the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society
preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are
other societal values that press for recognition. . . . . 130 (Emphasis
supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat
to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate,
reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as
much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, 131 where we indefinitely
suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements grossly
disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression
needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interest. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression
itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly
system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. . . . . 132 (Emphases supplied.)

186
 For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that the
Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest. ETIcHa
The Show Cause Resolution does not
interfere with respondents' academic
freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,
guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will
teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the
Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach
and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action
for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of
a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly
done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon
in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also
law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative
proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence
the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court's past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other
bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents
in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the
constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed
by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the
public's faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater
force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad
definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, 134 lawyers when they teach law are considered
engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than
lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical
standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured
against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of
the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that
they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents' proposition in the Common
Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to
"participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in
keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes
and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the
Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations.
With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are
expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
The Court's rulings on the submissions
regarding the charge of violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents' main arguments of freedom of expression and
academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.

187
 With respect to good faith, respondents' allegations presented two main ideas: (a)
the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo,
and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents' staunch
belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court
has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer's
conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the
courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession
into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases
as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with more
reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and
urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement using contumacious language,
which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of
the Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following
paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only
of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the
horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot
coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered
and misinterpreted texts.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein. 135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.) HcTEaA
Whether or not respondents' views regarding the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious
speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly threshed out in
separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to
dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice
Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach
documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in
the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC),
with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of
respondents' submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit,
they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper
procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it
has no bearing on their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was
intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended
recipients listen." 136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in
branding this Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the
basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the
profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to
effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately
quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between
the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth,
these foreign authors are the ones who would expectedly be affected by any perception
188
of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of
this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and
scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the same.
These foreign authors' letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal
professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the
true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort
to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents' noble intention is to spur the Court to take
"constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity.
For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Court's consideration, why was the same
published and reported in the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more
plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and
designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most
controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in
the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents' colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity
and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter
of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time
of the Statement's issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the
Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at
the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the
constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the belief
that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo.
Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement
on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the
Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents' outrage
was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it became
known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents
from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest
of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the
respondents' reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and
the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same
annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the
Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary 137 or contempt 138 action. This Court
takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the
same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession
who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other
interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore
them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the
boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil
liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication
on legal education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance,
considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in
disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the
doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement.
However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious
language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this
Court expounded in Salcedo: HcDSaT
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his
intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect
thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further
comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same
189
 conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of
intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that
the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the
language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a
defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed
and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or
want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this
case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This
court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order
to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following
the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it
imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it
deserves. 139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should,
notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons
1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from intemperate and
offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the
courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his
Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the
respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to
give a straightforward account of how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid
enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the reason
plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the
promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the
uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate
intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may
have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the Statement and could
have used more care. He did all this without having to retract his position on the plagiarism
issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without
baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this
Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that
they recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair.
We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp
the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court
finds Prof. Vasquez's Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of
the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he
should be excused from these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while
he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction
from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any
nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.
The Court's ruling on Dean Leonen's
Compliance regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why
he should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01,10.02
and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of
the signed Statement.
190
 In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was
not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I,
because looking at the text or the body, there were no differences between the two. He
attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the
Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but
expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more
signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not
administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law
faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who
had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto." 140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen's implied view that the
signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or
not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it
should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP
Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it,
since the Statement's persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature
of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents'
explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law
professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case. IEcaHS
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen's predicament is the
fact that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to
this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its
retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out, according to Dean Leonen's
account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his
unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean's office gave the dean
inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among
the signatories ofRestoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the
name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when
in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a
website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated
by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting
of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism
concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a
signed document for the Court's consideration that did not contain the actual signatures
of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed document that is transmitted to the
Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has
not offered any explanation why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the
Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the
dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned
portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions
for court employees are accountable for the care of documents and records that may
come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the
facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor
is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen's explanations yield the answer. In the
course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officer's claim that
Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote
that other professors had likewise only authorized him to indicate them as signatories and
had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was
printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had
not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen's proposition, that is precisely
191
tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an
act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection
and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there
was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having
actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to
sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the
former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe
candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not
have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had
in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document.
If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who
had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the
signatures that he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual
signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted,
they were neither parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required
submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do
at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen's Compliance unsatisfactory.
However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen
to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen's
professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for
failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under
Canon 10.
Respondents' requests for a hearing, for
production/presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in G.R. No.
162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative
reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause
Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the
production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case
against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of,
and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice
Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen's separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-
Bautista's Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring
Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing." 141 It is this
group of respondents' premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded
full due process. EATCcI
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this
case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt
in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority's purported failure to follow the

192
procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition to the Show
Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt
proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As
explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an
administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators. — In proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of
justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to
the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a
referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court.
Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the
procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not
require a trial type hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity
to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had
been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process,
the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. 142 (Emphases
supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v.
Aparicio 143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution.Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 144 (Emphases supplied.)

193
 In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court — Br. 81, Romblon
— On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law, 145 we further
observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or
resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided
the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of
any further investigation after considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor
on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public
interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus
operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the
astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases
sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents'
administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur. HADTEC
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no
evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined
for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
xxx xxx xxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against
and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court
from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the
errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we
stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this
Court. 146 (Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing
and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings.
Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a
hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated whatrelevant evidence,
documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a
formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and
witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuyacase and
in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of this Court which were the
bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related
to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for
their request for access to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only
incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the
submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean
Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the
proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a
separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that
the respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable
during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo,
respondents need to go no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various
versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this

194
Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public
knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language
of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing,
dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness or
evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts.
To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if there is any
evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen's Compliance he narrated how as early
as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del
Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution,
retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the
Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of
action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable
person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement's principles, could
foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the
Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies
respondents' claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their
respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they
were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents' own look-out. Indeed, law
professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines
regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the
consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents' requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and
evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers
passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules
of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be
shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one
lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are
judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and
have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar,
to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from
this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community
or the law school to which they belong. aSATHE
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court
finds his Compliance to be SATISFACTORY.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T.
Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen
G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel
R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica,
Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel
S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty,
Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is
195
 found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are REMINDED of their
lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of theCode of Professional Responsibility, to
give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language
tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the
administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge
of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is furtherADMONISHED to be
more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and
professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is EXCUSED from
these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents' requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, [March 8, 2011], 660 PHIL 1-130)

196
 [A.C. No. 8920. September 28, 2011.]

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MELCHOR A.

BATTUNG, respondent.

DECISION

BRION, * J p:

Before us is the resolution 1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be reprimanded. The
complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of the Bar
with postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao City. DTISaH
Background
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment 2 with the Commission on Discipline
of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 113 and 12 4 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his
motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent
shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt,
the respondent shouted, "Then cite me!" 5 Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and
imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and
shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" 6 Judge
Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for
direct contempt of court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the
courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a threatening
tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!" He kept on
shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers
escorted him out of the building. 7 CDISAc
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued
shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court. 8
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No.
2640, an ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which
he modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision became final and
executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of finality. The respondent filed a
motion to quash the previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the motion to
dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the
respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level
Courts and the latter was merely delaying the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
197
 The respondent filed his Answer, 9 essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who
disrespected him. 10 We quote from his Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against
him once inside the court room when he was lambasting me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I
just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument
because he wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and to
make appear to the public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he
said "YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT"
making it an impression to the litigants and the public that as if I am a
NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE
LAWYER.
25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.] aIAEcD
xxx xxx xxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge
Rene Baculi could have just made an order that the Motion for
Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did was that he
forced me to argue so that he will have the room to humiliate me as he
used to do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la
Rama, Jr. In his Commissioner's Report, 11 Commissioner De la Rama stated that during
the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely reiterated what they
alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that the original copy of the July
24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would be submitted for the Commissioner's
review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and the transcript of stenographic notes on
January 23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows: 12
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the
respondent was calm. He politely argued his case but the voice of the
complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference, it
was also observed that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch
whenever he speaks. In fact, in the TSN, where there was already an
argument, the complainant stated the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty.
Battung, we are very sorry if you do not want to appear before my
court, then you better attend to your cases and do not appear
before my court if you do not want to be corrected! (TSN, July 24,
2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words — "we are very sorry" [— were]
actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge was saying the
quoted portion of the TSN)ESaITA
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions
when the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding
judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure?
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 *
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because
we were asked to present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor,
so, if should we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules
on summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting. (Page 3, TSN July
24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the
complainant.
Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why
he shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the undersigned in
convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their
cases to be called. They must have observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-
affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing, et al., they stood as one in saying
that it was really Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter
cautioned him "not to shout."
The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as
follows:
Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00. AaSTIH
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court
for gross ignorance of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
Court: Next case.
Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like . . . (not finished)
Court: The next time . . .
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear . . .
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in
record. If you want to see me, see me after the court.
Next case.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza
vs. Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain
respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of
Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the courts. The respondent's argument that Judge Baculi
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provoked him to shout should not be given due consideration since the respondent should
not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he created the impression that
disrespect of a judge could be tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to
file an action before the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi
did not act according to the norms of judicial conduct. DAHaTc
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence submitted is insufficient
to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial processes to frustrate the
ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the
modification that the respondent be reprimanded.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the IBP's finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by
shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of litigants
and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even came back to harass Judge
Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that the
respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed
disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after
initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the
ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against the person, the position and
the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly
and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed
duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge,
and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts
and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr. 13 that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an
officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution
would be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter's
role, stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and
brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law
against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculi's competence and in his ability to decide cases. Incompetence
is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under
the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts
the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute. cEITCA
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded,
while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty of six (6) months
suspension.
We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.

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 In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State
Prosecutor, 14 we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05, Canon
11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for violating
the Lawyer's Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in newspapers and radio
programs. In this case, Atty. Battung's violations are no less serious as they were
committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings where the respondent
was acting as an officer of the court, and before the litigating public. His actions were
plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and
offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is
found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Baculi v. Battung, A.C. No. 8920, [September 28, 2011], 674 PHIL 1-10)

201
 [A.C. No. 7828. August 11, 2008.]

JUDGE ALDEN V. CERVANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUDE JOSUE L.

SABIO, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J p:

Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional retirement on November 23, 2005.
Some of the cases lodged in his sala were ejectment cases filed by Extra-Ordinary
Development Corporation (EDC) against the clients of Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio
(respondent). It appears that respondent had filed motions for inhibition of complainant
"on the basis of the fact that EDC gave him a house and lot putting into serious doubt his
impartiality, independence and integrity". The motions were denied. IcESaA
After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated April
6, 2006, 1 sought the investigation of complainant for bribery.
In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
March 6, 2006 of Edwin P. Cardeño, 2 a utility worker in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating
that, inter alia, orders and decisions of complainant were not generated from the
typewriter of the court but from a computer which the court did not have, it having acquired
one only on May 2, 2005; that there had been many times that a certain Alex of EDC
would go to the court bearing certain papers for the signature of complainant; that he came
to learn that a consideration of P500.00 would be given for every order or decision
released by complainant in favor of EDC; and that he also came to know that attempts at
postponing the hearings of the complaints filed by EDC were thwarted by complainant as
he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.
By Resolution of August 30, 2006, 3 this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006
Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) relative to respondent's
complaint against complainant, approved the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss the
complaint for lack of merit, "the complaint being unsubstantiated and motivated by
plain unfounded suspicion, and for having been filed after the effectivity of his optional
retirement" (underscoring supplied).
Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint 4 of
complainant against respondent, for disbarment.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
From the Report and Recommendation 5 of the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
Randall C. Tabayoyong, it is gathered that despite the January 12, 2007 Order for
respondent to file an answer to the complaint, he failed to do so, prompting the
Commissioner to declare him in default.
It is further gathered that after the conduct by the Investigating Commissioner of a
mandatory conference on May 25, 2007, the parties were ordered to file their respective
position papers. In compliance with the Order, complainant submitted his verified position
paper. 6 Respondent did not.
Defined as issues before the IBP were:
(1) Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the complainant
before the Office of the Court Administrator in Admin Matter OCA IPI
No. 06-1842-MTJ was malicious, false and untruthful.
202
 (2) If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondent's complaint against
herein complainant false and untruthful, it noting that respondent's complaint was
dismissed by this Court due to insufficiency of evidence which, to the IBP, merely shows
a "failure on the part of respondent to prove his allegations" against complainant. SIAEHC
Noting, however, this Court's August 30, 2006 Resolution finding respondent's
complaint "unsubstantiated and motivated by plain, unfounded" suspicion, the
Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent "knowingly instituted not only
a groundless suit against herein complainant, but also a suit based simply on his bare
suspicion and speculation". (underscoring supplied)
On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery charge
against complainant, respondent violated the proscription of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against "wittingly or willingly promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit"
including baseless administrative complaints against judges and other court officers and
employees.
The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that:
while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the allegations
in respondent's affidavit-complaint against herein complainant were false, the
evidence nonetheless show[s] that respondent had knowingly
and maliciously instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his unfounded
suspicions against complainant; 7(Underscoring supplied)
and that he violated Canons 10, 8 11, 9 & 12 10 and Rule 11.04 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility under his oath of office.
He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution, 12 informs that on
November 22, 2007, it adopted the following Resolution adopting and approvingwith
modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's violation of Canons
10, 11 and 12 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional responsibility for
filing a groundless suit against complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is
hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. (Emphasis in the original) cTESIa
The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.
Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a lawyer is to
be disciplined, the evidence against him should be substantial, competent and derived
from direct knowledge, not on mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on the basis
of hearsay. 13
No doubt, it is this Court's duty to investigate the truth behind charges against
judges and lawyers. But it is also its duty to shield them from unfounded suits which are
intended to, among other things, harass them.

203
 WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
questioned act will be dealt with more severely. DSEIcT
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cervantes v. Sabio, A.C. No. 7828, [August 11, 2008], 583 PHIL 491-495)

204
 [A.M. No. RTJ-11-2265. September 21, 2011.]
[Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2986-RTJ]

ATTY. EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, complainant, vs. JUDGE EDWIN G.

LARIDA, JR., CLERK OF COURT STANLEE D. CALMA and LEGAL
RESEARCHER DIANA G. RUIZ, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18
Tagaytay City, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

Doubtless, the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the
judiciary. However, it will not hesitate to protect innocent court employees against any
baseless accusation or administrative charge that only serve to disrupt rather than
promote the orderly administration of justice. 1
At bench is an administrative case against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. (Judge
Larida, Jr.), Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma (Atty. Calma) and Legal Researcher Diana G.
Cruz (LR Ruiz), all of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Tagaytay City.
The Facts:
In a Letter-Complaint dated August 26, 2008, 2 complainant Atty. Emmanuel R.
Andamo (complainant), counsel for Cavite Rural Banking Corporation (CRBC), charged
Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz with ignorance of the law.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the letter-complaint and its
attachments as follows:
I.Four (4) Petitions for issuance by the Clerk of Court of Certificates of
Sale under Act 3135, as amended:
1. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Freddie P.
Magno, mortgagor, filed on 28 December 2005 — (Re:
application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March
2003);
2. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Sixto & Norma
Tolentino, mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 — (Re:
application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March
2003); cCAIES
3. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Sps. Jonathan &
Yolanda Peñaranda, mortgagors, filed on 28 December 2005 —
(Re: application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, 01
October 2001);
4. Cavite Rural Banking Corporation, petitioner, Celia Bay, mortgagor,
filed on 28 December 2005 — (Re: application for extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage, 19 March 2003);
II.Four (4) Ex-parte Joint Petitions for the issuance by the Honorable Trial
Court of Writs of Possession under Act 3135, as amended:
1. TG-05-1103, 08 August 2005, Sps. Babestil & Sancha
Pendatum, mortgagors;

205
 2. TG-05-1104, 24 November 2005, Josefina Villanueva, mortgagor;
3. TG-05-1105, 08 August 2005, Sps. Josefa Desipeda & Roqueno
Calderon, mortgagors;
4. TG-05-1141, 28 December 2005, Norma Malabanan, mortgagor;
Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo avers that the aforementioned Petitions
have long been pending before the abovementioned court saying that the
ongoing hearings of said cases may be further extended by the respondent
Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.
Anent TG-05-1103 and TG-05-1105, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo
argues that respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed an error when
he recognized the appearance and participation of Atty. Ireneo Anarna as
lawyer for the oppositors to the said petitions in the hearings thereof, and
thereafter gave due course to the two oppositions filed, both dated 15
November 2005. Respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. committed another
error when he failed to require the oppositors and Atty. Anarna the required
guaranty bonds as mandated by Section 47 of Republic Act 8791. TEDaAc
Likewise, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo bewails the issuance by
respondent Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr. of the Order dated 10 July 2008 in TG-
05-1141 which denied complainant's Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early
Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petitions for the Issuance of Writs of
Possession (in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141) by
ruling that the petitioner has yet to present evidence besides marking of
exhibits. Complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo considers the said Order as
contrary to Sections 7 and 8 of Act 3135 which mandates, among others, that
the trial court shall issue the Writ of Possession regardless of opposition
thereto.
In addition, complainant Emmanuel B. Andamo accuses respondent Diana
Ruiz, as then Officer-in-Charge and Acting Clerk of Court, and Atty. Stanlee
Calma, as the incumbent Clerk of Court, for not having "lifted a finger, say, by
placing the docket of those eight (8) long pending cases beside the other
dockets already placed on the Hon. Court's working table by way of requesting
his Honor for instruction or reminding his Honor of the urgency of action
thereon, and notwithstanding Mrs. Ruiz['s] acknowledged receipt of the written
instruction of the Hon. Supreme Court Administrator, dated November 17,
2005 as to how to act thereon. . . ."
Furthermore, complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo implicated Atty. Ireneo
Anarna, charging the latter of ignorance on the provisions of Act 3135 and for
obstruction of justice for filing misplaced oppositions to non-litigious ex-
parte petitions for issuance of Writ of Possession and for not submitting the
required oppositor's bond. 3
The Joint Comment of respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz dated October 3, 2007 was also
summarized by the OCA, viz.:
Respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo
mainly charges them for the non-issuance of certificates of sale in the
abovementioned extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings which were filed by
Pepito Abueg as Acting Manager of petitioner Cavite Rural Banking
Corporation. Respondents Calma and Ruiz declare that in all the aforesaid
applications for foreclosure, were undated certificates of sale signed by then
Deputy Sheriff Victor Hernandez, and Clerk of Court Analiza Luna. However,
these certificates do not bear the signature of approval of then Assisting Judge
(and eventually Deputy Court Administrator) Reuben P. Dela Cruz.
206
 Likewise, respondents Calma and Ruiz stress that there is an Order in an
undocketed case, entitled Cavite Rural Banking Corporation (then Cavite
Development Bank), mortgagee, v. Sps. Jonathan Peñaranda, Sps. Simon and
Petronila Peji, Celia M. Bay, Sixto and Norma Tolentino and Freddie Magno,
mortgagors. This Order was issued by then Judge Reuben Dela Cruz on 17
March 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the applications for extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda;
Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji; Celia M. Bay; Spouses Sixto and
Norma Tolentino; and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to
comply with the requirements thereto. cCSEaA
SO ORDERED.
Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue that the aforesaid applications for
foreclosure, including the petition for issuance of certificates of sale, were
properly brought before and deliberated by the court. Hence, taking into
consideration the issuance of the 17 March 2004 Order which they cannot alter
or modify, respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that any issuance of certificates
of sale on the subject applications for foreclosure cannot be done.
Respondents Calma and Ruiz further explicate that in a copy of the 17 March
2004 Order, there appears a signature over a handwritten name "Sibano J.
Sibero" dated"3-17-04." Thus suggesting that he received a copy of said Order
in behalf of Cavite Rural Banking Corporation. Hence, respondents Calma and
Ruiz chide complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo for not mentioning in his
complaint the 17 March 2004 Order. Furthermore, assuming ex gratia
argumenti that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo is not aware of said Order,
respondents Calma and Ruiz still blame complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo
that it took him almost seven (7) years before he made a follow up on the
petitions for issuance of certificates of sale. If only their attention were called,
respondents Calma and Ruiz aver that they would have searched for the
records and inform complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo about the Order.
In addition, respondents Calma and Ruiz call as an unfair accusation
complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo's imputation that they were the reason for
the issuance of the 10 July 2008 Order. Respondents Calma and Ruiz argue
that said Order is a judicial action and an exercise of discretion by the court to
which they, being merely the Clerk of Court and the Legal Researcher,
respectively, do not have any control. Moreover, they point out that the said
Order was also given in the other petitions of complainant where there is no
oppositor, thus, rendering complainants' perception as unfounded.
Lastly, while complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo charges respondents Calma
and Ruiz with gross ignorance of Act No. 3135, respondents Calma and Ruiz
find it ironic that complainant Emmanuel R. Andamo misses the entire point of
the issuance of the 17 March 2004 Order which states complainant's failure to
show compliance with the same Act No. 3135. 4
After perusing the records, the OCA found that the allegations in the complaint and the
defenses raised by respondents Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented conflicting factual issues
that could not be categorically resolved merely on the basis of the records submitted. Judge
Larida, Jr. even failed to submit his Comment on the matter. The OCA then pointed out the
necessity for a formal investigation where the complainant and the respondents would be
given the opportunity to adduce their respective evidence. Thus, it recommended that the
administrative complaint against respondents be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative
case, and the same be REFERRED to a Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for

207
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
records. DaTISc
In the Resolution dated January 19, 2011, 5 the Court resolved to: (1) note the letter-
complaint of Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo against respondents Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma
and LR Ruiz, for gross ignorance of the law relative to LRC Case Nos. 05-1105, 05-1104, 05-
1103, and 05-1141 for the issuance of writs of possession under Act 3135, as amended, and
the joint comment dated October 3, 2007 of respondents Clerk of Court and Legal
Researcher; (2) re-docket the instant administrative complaint; (3) refer this case to a
Justice of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the records, and direct the Presiding Justice of the CA to raffle the case among
the incumbent Justices of the CA who shall conduct the investigation and submit the required
report and recommendation; and (4) note the Report dated June 18, 2010 of the OCA.
The case was eventually assigned to CA Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice
Lazaro-Javier) who, as directed by the Court, conducted the corresponding investigation on
the complaint.
Notably, during the initial stage of the proceedings, Judge Larida, Jr. filed his Motion with
Leave of Court to Admit Comment 6 dated April 14, 2011. 7 The same was granted in the
interest of substantial justice. 8 In his Comment, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. denied that he
delayed the resolution of complainant's petitions for issuance of writs of possession in TG-
05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. He claimed that he was unaware of
unacted foreclosure proceedings pending before the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC-Br.
18, Tagaytay City; that he never talked to complainant about the cases in his chambers; that
it was only out of prudence and propriety that he acknowledged the oppositions to
complainant's four (4) petitions as the said oppositions were necessarily part of the
proceedings; and that he eventually set the petitions for hearing since there was a need for
complainant to present evidence to support his entitlement to the four (4) writs prayed for.
Judge Larida, Jr. also informed the Court that per Supreme Court Resolution dated
November 18, 2008, 9 he was detailed as Assisting Judge of RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City.
During the hearing on April 14, 2011, the parties agreed to submit their affidavits with
attachments to constitute their testimony subject to cross-examination. 10
Complainant did not submit an affidavit and opted to adopt his Letter-Complaint as his direct
testimony. He further submitted several documentary evidence. 11
For his part, Judge Larida, Jr. submitted his Judicial Affidavit dated April 18, 2011. He
essentially iterated therein his allegations in his Comment. He also offered various
documentary evidence 12 to refute the charges against him. Cdpr
Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz likewise submitted their undated Joint Affidavit.
Atty. Calma emphasized that then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz had long denied
complainant's undocketed petitions for extra-judicial foreclosure in CRBC v. Magno, in his
Order of March 17, 2004. The grounds for the said denial were: (1) non-payment of entry
fees; (2) non-assignment of docket numbers; (3) absence of proofs of service to the sheriff
and the parties; (4) non-attachment of photocopies of the official receipts to the cases;
and (5) non-payment of sufficient amount of docket fees. Atty. Calma also disclosed that he
was no longer connected with the judiciary as he had opted to engage in the private practice
of law.
Aside from those previously submitted exhibits, Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz presented the
following: (1) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v.
Magno; 13(2) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Spouses
Tolentino; 14 (3) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in CRBC v. Jonathan and
Yolanda Peñaranda; 15 (4) Application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure filed in Celia M.
Bay; 16 (5) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Freddie P.
Magno; 17 (6) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela
208
Cruz; 18 (7) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of Sps. Tolentino; 19 (8) Unsigned
printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz; 20 (9) Certificate of Sale for the
auctioned property of Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda; 21 (10) Unsigned printed name of
Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz; 22 (11) Certificate of Sale for the auctioned property of
Celia Bay; 23 (12) Unsigned printed name of Assisting Judge Reuben dela
Cruz; 24 (13) Order of Judge Reuben Dela Cruz dated March 17, 2004; 25 (14) Certification
dated June 7, 2004 by Judge Reuben dela Cruz; 26 (15) Comment dated October 3, 2007
filed before the OCA; 27 and (16) Joint Affidavit of respondent Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz. 28
The Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, submitted a status report and
certified copies of the pertinent documents in LRC Case Nos. TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-
05-1105, and TG-05-1141. 29
After the formal offer of evidence and the admission of the exhibits, the parties were required
to file their respective memoranda. Only respondent Judge Larida, Jr. complied. HSEcTC
Accordingly, in her Report and Recommendation dated July 25, 2011, Justice Lazaro-Javier
recommended that Judge Larida, Jr., Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz beEXONERATED of the
charges against them for ignorance of the law. In sum, Justice Lazaro-Javier found that:
Complainant's charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondents
remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The evidence which complainant
submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it was he who was
stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the court, as well. The
evidence likewise showed thatcontrary to complainant's accusation,
respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules, and
jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession or allowance
of extrajudicial foreclosure. Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly
inconvenienced and mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into this
unnecessary battle. Precious time, energy and expense were wasted when the
same could have been beneficially used for some other lawful purpose
beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphasis supplied]
Now, the Court resolves.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court agrees with the evaluation and recommendation
of Justice Lazaro-Javier.
Notably, respondents are all charged with gross ignorance of the law for their alleged acts or
omissions, as follows: CHaDIT
Name Cases Acts or Omission
Charged

Judge Edwin Larida, Jr.LRC No. TG-05-1103 Issuing Order dated August
9, 2005 which set the
petition for hearing on
October 21, 2005

LRC No. TG-05-1105 Issuing Order dated August

11, 2005 which set the
petition for hearing on
October 21, 2005

LRC Nos. TG- a) Recognizing the

05-1103 and appearance of Atty.
TG-05-1105 Ireneo Anarna as
oppositors' counsel;
b) Not requiring the

209
 oppositors therein to file
guaranty bonds pursuant
to Section 47 of RA 8791.

LRC No. TG- For issuing Order dated

05-1141 10 July 2008 denying the
Ex-Parte Joint Motion for
Early Resolution of Ex-
Parte Joint Petitions for the
Issuance of Writs of
Possession in LRC Nos.
TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104,
TG-05-1105, and TG-
05-1141 on the ground that
CRBC had yet to present
evidence besides marking of
exhibits.

Atty. Stanlee Calma For not having "lifted a

and finger, say, by placing
Legal Researcher the docket of those eight
Diana Ruiz (8) long pending cases
beside the other dockets
already placed on the Hon.
Court's working table by
way of requesting his Honor
for instruction or reminding
his Honor of the urgency of
action thereon, and
notwithstanding Mrs.
Ruiz['s] acknowledged
receipt of the written
instruction of the Hon.
Supreme Court
Administrator, dated
November 17, 2005 as to
how to act thereon."

As to respondent
Judge Edwin Larida, Jr.
According to complainant, it was Judge Larida, Jr.'s ministerial duty under Act 3135,
specifically Sections 7 30 and 8 31 thereof, to issue the writs of possession in TG-05-1103,
TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141. This being so, there was no need for him to still
require applicant to present evidence as condition for granting them. The fact that he did,
nonetheless, was a clear defiance of his ministerial duty and rendered him guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Complainant is mistaken.
The ministerial character of judicial duty to issue writs of possession in extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings is explained in the case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of
Communications. 32 Thus:
A writ of possession is an order enforcing a judgment to allow a person's
recovery of possession of real or personal property. An instance when a writ of
possession may issue is under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, on
210
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Sections 6 and 7 provide, to
wit: ADCEaH
Section 6. Redemption. — In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is
made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his
successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said
debtor or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the
mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem
the same at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date
of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
section four hundred and sixty-four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of
the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act.
Section 7. Possession during redemption period. — In any sale made
under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of
First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part
thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption
period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the
property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it
be shown that the same was made without violating the mortgage or
without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall
be made under oath and filed in [the] form of the ex-partemotion in the
registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in
special proceedings in case of property registered under the Mortgage
Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative
Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly
registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any
existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of
such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section
one hundred and fourteen of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six,
and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the
property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
From the foregoing provisions, a writ of possession may be issued either (1)
within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the
lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.
Within the redemption period the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for
a writ of possession by filing for that purpose an ex-parte motion under oath,
in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of
property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of an ex-parte motion and
the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue
the order for a writ of possession.
On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of
possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as
the mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed
property. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the
expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the
property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer
needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT.
After consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the mortgagor
to redeem the property, the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of
possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an
211
 extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function.
Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion. ASTIED
Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the
respondent in this case is proper. We have consistently held that the duty of
the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and
the court may not exercise discretion or judgment. The propriety of the
issuance of the writ was heightened in this case where the respondent's right
to possession of the properties extended after the expiration of the redemption
period, and became absolute upon the petitioners' failure to redeem the
mortgaged properties. [Underscoring supplied]
Simply put, after all the requisite elements for issuance of a writ of possession, which
are: (1) consolidation of ownership in the mortgagor's name; and (2) issuance to mortgagor
of a new TCT, shall have been duly established, the trial court has no choice but to issue the
writ prayed for. It cannot withhold, suspend, or otherwise deny this relief from petitioner.
In this case, Judge Larida, Jr. denied complainant's "Urgent Ex-Parte Joint Motion for Early
Resolution of Ex-Parte Joint Petition for the Issuance of Writs of Possession" in TG-05-1103,
TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 precisely because CRBC had yet to present
evidence to establish its entitlement to the writs prayed for. 33 As it was, complainant
negatively reacted to Judge Larida, Jr.'s directive and accused him of gross ignorance of the
law for not instantly resolving the petitions, for ruling that his client had yet to present
evidence and for recognizing Atty. Anarna's appearance as oppositor's counsel.
It is settled that a judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown
that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In
addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption. 34
The reasons cited by complainant, far from constituting gross ignorance of the law, actually
reflect respondent Judge Larida, Jr.'s faithful adherence to his judicial duty to review the
cases, serve due process to all parties concerned, and to eventually decide the petitions
based solely on law and evidence. Be that as it may, respondent Judge Larida, Jr. has nothing
more to do with these cases since his detail to RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City.
At any rate, the filing of this administrative complainant is not the proper remedy for
complainant. Complainant should have sought relief from higher courts. The filing of an
administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies
provided by law; neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions. As regards
this matter, the case of Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis 35 is enlightening:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded
as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in
construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final
order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.)
are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may
be. THIECD
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
212
 judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the
taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether
of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with
finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability
may be said to have opened, or closed.
Complainant also held against Judge Larida, Jr. his alleged failure to require oppositors to
post guaranty bonds in TG-05-1103, TG-05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141.
Complainant invokes Section 47 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. 36
Clearly, the provision cited by complainant refers to restraint of foreclosure proceedings
which requires posting of bond by one who seeks it. It does not apply to the present case
wherein the subject properties had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction. Thus,
petitioner's insistence for imposition of guaranty bonds on the oppositors in TG-05-1103, TG-
05-1104, TG-05-1105, and TG-05-1141 is misplaced. On this score too, Judge Larida, Jr.
cannot be accused of gross ignorance of the law for not imposing these bonds in the cases
mentioned.
As to respondents
Atty. Calma and
LR Ruiz
Records bear out that as early as March 17, 2004, then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz
of RTC Branch 18, Tagaytay City, under Order 37 of even date, had already denied CRBC's
petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Peñaranda, thus:
Hence, it is very evident, therefore, that there is no payment of the entry fees;
there are no docket numbers assigned and stamped on the cases; there are
no proofs of service of the notices of the Sheriff to the parties, particularly the
mortgagors; there are no xerox copies of the official receipts attached to the
cases, except Spouses Peñaranda; and that official receipts issued do not
cover the correct amounts and entries for each pertinent book of accounts, in
violation of RA 3135, as amended and the issuances of the Supreme
Court. EHSADc
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage of Spouses Jonathan and Yolanda Peñaranda,
Spouses Simon and Petronila Peji; Celia M. Bay; Spouses Sixto and Norma
Tolentino and Freddie Magno are hereby DENIED for failure to comply with the
requirements thereto.
SO ORDERED. [Italics supplied]
It is worth noting, too, that there were no pending motions for reconsideration filed or other
incidents initiated by complainant in the subject cases to warrant their entry in the court
calendar. As a matter of fact, complainant does not deny that the assailed Order dated March
17, 2004 had long attained finality. For Atty. Calma and LR Ruiz to put them back in the
court calendar, for no cogent reason at all, is obviously improper.
Finally, the trial court, through then Assisting Judge Reuben dela Cruz, had already spoken
when it denied the petitions in CRBC v. Spouses Peñaranda. As stated, it was beyond Atty.
Calma and LR Ruiz to order the trial court what to do next with these cases. At that time,
complainant had plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available to him under the rules. He
could have filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari from the Order of
denial dated March 17, 2004 but he did not. What complainant failed to do as a judicial
remedy, he cannot revive through an administrative complaint against these court
employees. It bears pointing out that it was only on August 26, 2008 or more than four years
since the Order of March 17, 2004 was issued when, the complainant unfairly turned his ire

213
on these innocent and helpless respondents by wrongly accusing them in this administrative
case.
Clearly, this is a frivolous and baseless complaint. The respondents cannot be held liable for
judiciously performing their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings as provided
by the Rules. Complainant apparently filed this complaint primarily to divert the attention of
his client from his shortcomings as its counsel, if not to simply harass the respondents. At
this juncture, the Court finds it worth quoting again the conclusion of the Investigating Justice
Lazaro-Javier, to wit:
Complainant's charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondents
remains unfounded and unsubstantiated. The evidence
which complainant submitted, instead of helping his cause, showed that it
was he who was stubbornly remiss in his duties to his client and to the
court, as well. The evidence likewise showed that contrary to complainant's
accusation, respondents in fact strictly complied with applicable laws, rules,
and jurisprudence pertaining to issuance of writs of possession or allowance
of extrajudicial foreclosure. Verily, complainant has, among others, unjustly
inconvenienced and mentally tortured respondents by dragging them into
this unnecessary battle. Precious time, energy and expense were
wasted when the same could have been beneficially used for some other
lawful purpose beneficial to the interest of public service. [Emphases
supplied] 2005jur
A repeat of this cannot be tolerated.
This administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judge, the
judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden
responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. "As an
officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to impede or pervert, the
administration of justice." 38 "Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that since
lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to
their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients'
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." 39
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." 40
"A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because, as an officer of the
court, he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload
of the judiciary. Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts." 41
WHEREFORE, as recommended by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-
Javier, the complaint against respondents Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr., Clerk of Court Stanlee
D. Calma and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, for gross ignorance of the law is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. AIHTEa
Complainant Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo is hereby ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should
not be subjected to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and baseless complaint against the
respondent judiciary personnel, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Andamo v. Larida, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-11-2265, [September 21, 2011], 673 PHIL 478-498)

214
 [G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.]

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial

Court, Antique, petitioner, vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.

DECISION

NOCON, J : p

The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint
for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court
of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the
Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court
filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences. Cdpr
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had
falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90
days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and
in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that
petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May,
June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990,
or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension
of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this
Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the
decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his
official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative
215
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by
the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of
the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. prLL
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending
case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to
submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the
question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of
time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this
question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said
question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed
to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the
same to this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Maceda v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, [April 22, 1993])

216
 [A.C. No. 5859. November 23, 2010.]
(Formerly CBD Case No. 421)

ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO,

SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO
MERCADO,complainants, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

For our review is the Resolution 1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional
malpractice and gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment.
The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner, 2 are undisputed.
The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P.
Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an
administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City
Extension Office. 3
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in
favor of Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank
deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario
demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter
refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was
his, as attorney's fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for
disbarment against the respondent. 4
On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding
the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client's funds and
recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law. 5
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series
of lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also
instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporation's accountant and the judge
who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the balance
of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the
chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his
suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege that the respondent
committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of
intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against
the complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family
corporation. 6 They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to
exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP
against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice
and gross misconduct under Section 27, 7 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. aIcDCA
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.

217
 He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado
to file lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George
filed against the complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good
faith and were based on strong facts. 8
Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues
that he was merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely
constrained to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the
civil case so he could justify his attorney's fees.
Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his client's family. He
argues that the case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose
from their perception of unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they
must be held accountable for the public interest.
Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional
language. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to
intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him of "extorting from Rosario shocking and
unconscionable attorney's fees." 9
After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties' submissions,
we find ourselves in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 10 Membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice
law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded
him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney's right to practice
law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney
is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and
thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than
to punish the attorney. 11 In Maligsa v. Cabanting, 12 we explained that the bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A
lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal profession
should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and
trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An
attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. IcaHTA
In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross
misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP
Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the
respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of
his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who
issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former
client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total
of twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City
Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian
Reform; and the Supreme Court. 13

218
 In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which
had previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members
of the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138;
97-139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases
are re-filing of previously dismissed cases. 14
Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in
different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and
without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present
case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former
client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that
the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law.
The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy
with a renegade member of the complainants' family, the defendants named in the cases
and the foul language used in the pleadings and motions 15 all indicate that the
respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage
of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against
his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody
of a client's funds.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz, 16 the Court pronounced that it is professionally
irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate,
however, this right must be exercised in good faith. 17
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary. EHTIDA
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court
itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends — the speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of
final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but
should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct
or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 18 Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit
that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated
his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he
did so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule
21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 19 provides:
CANON 21 — A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.
Rule 21.02 — A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same
to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full
knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and
information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosario's
counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private
219
 documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases
filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the
attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the
Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED. AcDHCS
||| (Alcantara v. De Vera, A.C. No. 5859 (Resolution), [November 23, 2010], 650 PHIL 214-
224)

220
 [A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002.]

SOLEDAD NUÑEZ, represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for

complainant, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.

Ananias B. Co, Jr. for complainant.

SYNOPSIS

This is an administrative complaint filed by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented

by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, seeking the disbarment of respondent. It appeared that
the complainant authorized the respondent to sell her two parcels of land for a commission.
However, after selling the lots he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale despite
complainant's repeated demands. This forced the complainant to file an action for a sum of
money against the respondent and his wife. Thereafter, the court ordered respondent to pay
his obligation to the complainant. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
was dismissed for non-payment of docket fee. In the satisfaction of the writ of execution
issued by the court, the respondent issued four postdated checks, which were later
dishonored because the account had been closed. Again, because respondent ignored the
repeated demands of the complainant to make good the checks, four criminal complaints for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against him and his wife. Because of the failure of the
respondent to comment on the complaint against him, the Supreme Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP investigating commissioner concluded that the respondent had no intention to honor
the money judgment against him and recommended that respondent be declared guilty of
misconduct and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the
amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
The Supreme Court concurred with the findings of the IBP that the respondent was guilty of
misconduct in his dealings with complainant. By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and
lawyers. The penalty of suspension imposed by the IBP was inadequate. For his deliberate
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12.03 and 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings
with the complainant, respondent deserved a graver penalty. The graver penalty is indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATION THEREOF

DIMINISHES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN LAW AND LAWYERS; PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. — There is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion
that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and
committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property.
Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery
of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor.
221
Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been
declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith
attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state,
respondent wanted to prolong the travails and energy and agony of the complainant and to
enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already
unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy thealias writ
of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a
clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged
by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were
drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation
as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not
pay the obligation. All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant
violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. By
violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent
diminished public confidence in the law and lawyers (Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407
[1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and
respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato
v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
2. ID.; ID.; LAWYERS ARE REQUIRED TO AVOID ANY ACTION THAT WOULD UNDULY
DELAY A CASE, IMPEDE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OR MISUSE COURT
PROCESSES; VIOLATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Respondent's act of issuing bad checks in
satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was
a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite
demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22showed his continued defiance
of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent
even had the temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three
motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only
did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure
notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To
the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility
amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval,
344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid
any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for their failure to do so.
3. ID.; ID.; WHEN DELIBERATELY VIOLATED; PROPER PENALTY. — The penalty of
suspension "for at least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both
vague and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific duration.
Besides, under the circumstances of this case a suspension for a year is plainly very light
and inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules
12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his
palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves
a grave penalty. That graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:
222
This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuñez, a
septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct. SIDEaA
From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982
she authorized respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000.
She agreed to give respondent 10 percent of the price as commission. Respondent
succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainant's repeated demands, he did not turn
over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent and
his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052. DaACIH
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was
required to present ex-parte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its
decision (Annex "C" of the Complaint) ordering respondent herein to pay complainant the
sum of P16,000 as principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of
the commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay the costs
of suit.
Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the
appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period
despite notice.
On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance
of an alias writ of execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day,
the alias writ of execution was issued (Annex "B" of Complaint). It appears that only a partial
satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 thereof unsatisfied. In
payment for the latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn against his account
in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.
Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against
which they were drawn was closed (Annexes "D" and "E" of Complaint). Demands for
respondent to make good the checks fell on deaf ears, thus forcing complainant to file four
criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City (Annexes "F", "G", "H" and "I" of the Complaint).
In the "Joint Affidavit" of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor,
Quezon City, respondent admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in
favor of complainant. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been
encashed by complainant, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking
Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that
the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary
arrangements with the bank.

We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable
action on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so
compelled complainant to file on 10 March 2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on
the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the
comment "smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and
a law dean."
In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent
to have waived the filing of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety days
from notice of the resolution.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner
Atty. Milagros V. San Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to "honor" the money
judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance
223
of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which said checks were drawn; and
(3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then recommends that
respondent be declared "guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant" and be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks
issued to the complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved and adopted Atty. San Juan's Report and Recommendation.
We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by
the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave
misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondent's grave
misconduct and notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that
respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed
dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with
palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the
proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then,
despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in
default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended
such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state,
respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the
fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and
unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of
execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a
clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged
by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were
drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation
as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not
pay the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Respondent's claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has
already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26
February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15
March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent
diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busiños v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407
[1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and
respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v.
Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondent's act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money
judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His
failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the
court, was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent
even had the temerity of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three
motions for extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only
did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure
notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To
224
the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility
amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval,
344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000];Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12:04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid
any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for their failure to do so.
The penalty of suspension "for at least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of
the IBP is both vague and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific
duration. Besides, under the circumstances of this case a suspension for a year is plainly
very light and inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1
and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled
with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent
deserves a graver penalty. That graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby
INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant
Soledad Nuñez the amount of P13,800 within ten (10) days from notice of this
resolution. cCaSHA
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record; the Office of the
President; the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts
with copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinezand Corona, JJ., concur.

||| (Nuñez v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 5054 (Resolution), [May 29, 2002], 432 PHIL 131-139)

225
 [A.C. No. 6252. October 5, 2004.]

JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. Atty. EDISON V.

RAFANAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which
are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out
appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint 1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The
Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 2 of the Rules of Court;
and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 3 , Canon 5 4 , and Canons 12.07 5 and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the
allegations of the complainant in this wise:
". . . In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that
Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or
refused to: a) make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community
tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents
in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter
his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation
of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. IaHSCc
"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor
of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was
actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain
date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant
after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm
and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats." 6
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, 7 Atty. Rafanan
filed his verified Answer. 8 He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose
Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-
notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was
allowed.

226
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents
acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases
pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the
affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the
residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija —
some of whom were older practitioners — indicate the affiants' residence certificates on the
documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule
112 9 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the
affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it
was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of
the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could
testify on behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is
essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondent's clients with attempted
murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime
occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice."
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients
after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent
requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001,
which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the
fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications 10 from the
Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit 11 of the two police officers who had
assisted them. DaEATc
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass
him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by
the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondent's Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R.
Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o'clock in the afternoon.
Notices 12 of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date
and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so,
apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001. 13 The hearing was
reset to July 3, 2001 at two o'clock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply 14 to the verified Answer of
respondent. The latter's Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001. 15 It also
received complainant's Letter-Request 16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it
granted that request in its Order 17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner
Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within
fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.
The CBD received complainant's Memorandum 18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent
did not file any.
The IBP's Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-
172 19 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioner's Report that respondent
had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the
entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiant's residence
certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It
modified, however, the recommendation 20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing
the fine to "P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a
heavier penalty."
227
The other charges — violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons
1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR — were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent's Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to
enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. 21They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized
by them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
[them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page
or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded." 22 Failure to perform these
duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public. 23
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public
entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements. SEIcAD
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, 24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization
as follows:
"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It
is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument."
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to
their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be
countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their
duties, 25 which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us — and respondent has readily admitted — that he
violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence
certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not
mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government
agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do
not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au
contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and
inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others
were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification
for breaking the law.

228
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint
Counter-Affidavit of respondent's clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as
their witnesses' Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed
by complainant's brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the
basis of the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary — in the absence of
any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath — to
"certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with
respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that — as counsel for
the affiants — he was not required to comply with the certification requirement. CaAcSE
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. 26 They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the
obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. 27 It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of
their solemn oath to obey the laws. 28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient
excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the
excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. 29Disbarment
will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be
decreed. 30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part
of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is
a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina
an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent's clients, allegedly in
violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
"Rule 12.08 — A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument and the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the
ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial
of the case to another counsel."
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, 31 except
only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client
relationship. 32
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating
their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected
to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans — those
229
who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness
and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one
of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients. TIcAaH
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for
the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the
truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as
disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their
sympathies are against the lawyer's client, they will have an opportunity, not
likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his
own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked
upon as partial and untruthful." 33
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time
counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses,
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active
management of the case. 34
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan
in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following
reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the
latter's life and liberty are at stake. 35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to be
afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all
those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure
that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to
present — by all fair and honorable means — every defense and mitigating circumstance
that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law. 36
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his
clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his
clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged
against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their
testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the
preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. 37 Not being a trial of the
case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing
innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them
from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and
anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions. 38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed
by the trial proper. aDATHC
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from
accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he
may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in
which his testimony may become essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the
profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled
threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare
230
charge cannot be equated with liability. 39 It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but
the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latter's allegations are
corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan
City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a
warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
||| (Santiago v. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, [October 5, 2004], 483 PHIL 94-109)
[A.C. No. 7129. July 16, 2008.]

FIL-GARCIA, INC., represented by its President, Filomeno

Garcia, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERNANDO CRESENTE C.
HERNANDEZ, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J p:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fil-Garcia, Inc.,

represented by its President and General Manager, Filomeno T. Garcia, against
respondent Atty. Fernando Cresente C. Hernandez charging the latter of malpractice,
gross misconduct and for violation of his oath as a lawyer. AHCETa
The facts are of record.
Sometime in 1990, complainant entered into an agreement with Magdalena T.
Villasi (Villasi) for the completion of the construction of a condominium building owned by
the latter located in Quezon City. During the progress of the construction, controversy
arose between complainant and Villasi regarding the billing and payments. On March 11,
1991, complainant filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against
Villasi before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 77. At that stage,
complainant was represented by Atty. Bernardo F. Ligsay (Atty. Ligsay). On June 26,
1996, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of complainant and against Villasi. The
dispositive portion of the Decision 1 states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,865,000.00 as
actual damages and unpaid accomplishment billings;
2. ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P500,000.00
representing the value of unused building materials;
3. ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 as
moral damages and P100,000 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 2
Aggrieved by the RTC's decision, Villasi filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA). On November 20, 2000, the CA granted Villasi's appeal and reversed the decision
of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the Decision 3 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
GRANTED and the appealed decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8187 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
plaintiff-appellee to return to defendant-appellant the sum of P1,244,543.33
as overpayment under their contract, and the further sum of P425,004.00
231
 representing unpaid construction materials obtained by it from defendant-
appellant. Plaintiff-appellee is likewise hereby declared liable for the payment
of liquidated damages in the sum equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the contract
price for each day of delay computed from March 6, 1991. HISAET
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
On December 14, 2000, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 5 This
time, complainant engaged the legal services of a new counsel in the person of
respondent. HCTaAS
In its April 27, 2001 Resolution, 6 the CA denied complainant's motion for
reconsideration and noted the appearance of respondent as counsel for complainant in
substitution of Atty. Ligsay. Respondent received a copy of the resolution on May 8, 2001.
Thus, he had until May 23, 2001 within which to file an appeal in accordance with Rule 45
in relation to Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
However, instead of filing an appeal within the reglementary period, respondent filed
three (3) successive motions for extension of time with the Court.
On May 22, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal
by Certiorari. 7 In his motion, he alleged that he was engaged as counsel by a mayoralty
candidate and a senatorial candidate which required his presence in the canvassing of
votes. Due to the "enormous time pressure from these commitments", 8 respondent
prayed for an extension of thirty (30) days or until June 21, 2001 to file complainant's
appeal. TAIESD
On June 21, 2001, respondent filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appeal by Certiorari. 9 He alleged that "[he] fell ill" 10 and that "[h]e sought medical
consultation, which revealed that he needs extended bed rest." 11 He prayed for an
extension of twenty (20) days or until July 11, 2001 to file the appeal.
On July 11, 2001, respondent filed a Third Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appeal by Certiorari, 12 alleging that "[he] severely underestimated the time needed to
complete the petition because he had to work on other equally urgent legal matters, which
were unattended to during his illness." 13 He prayed for an extension of ten (10) days or
until July 21, 2001 to file the appeal. HSTaEC
Thereafter, respondent filed complainant's Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
July 21, 2001. 14
On August 6, 2001, respondent received a copy of the Court's Resolution 15 dated
July 2, 2001 denying his first motion for extension of time, viz.:
G.R. No. 147960 (Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc., represented by its
President-General Manager Filomeno Garcia vs. Magdalena T.
Villasi). — Petitioner's motion for extension of thirty (30) days from 22 May
2001 within which to file petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for
petitioner's failure to show that it has not lost the fifteen (15)-day reglementary
period within which to appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in view of the lack of statement of
material dates of receipt of the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals and
of filing of the motion for reconsideration of said judgment. 16
Hence, on August 17, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 of the
above resolution.
On August 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution 18 denying respondent's
second and third motions for extension of time considering that the first motion for
extension had already been denied in the resolution dated July 2, 2001. On September
28, 2001, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 19 of the resolution.
232
 On October 1, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution 20 denying respondent's motion
for reconsideration of the resolution dated July 2, 2001 and complainant's petition for
review on certiorari, viz.:
G.R. No. 147960 (Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc., represented by its
President-General Manager, Filomeno Garcia v. Magdalena T. Villasi) —
Acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the resolution of 02 July
2001 which denied its motion for extension of time to file petition for review
on certiorari for lack of showing that it has not lost the 15-day period to appeal
due to lack of statement of the dates of receipt of assailed judgment of the
Court of Appeals and of filing of motion for reconsideration of said judgment,
the Court Resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY, no compelling reason
having been adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought. Respondent's
comment and opposition to said motion is NOTED. TAECSD
In accordance with Rule 45 in relation to Rule 56 and other pertinent
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing
appeals bycertiorari to the Supreme Court, only petitions which are
accompanied by or comply strictly with the requirements specified therein
shall be entertained. On the basis thereof, the Court further Resolves to
DENY the petition for review on certiorari for petitioner's failure to:
a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days
in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in
view of the denial of the first, second and third motions for extension of time
to file said petition in the resolution of 02 July 2001 and 20 August 2001; and
b) state the material date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of
the assailed Court of Appeals decision pursuant to Sections 4 (b) and 5, Rule
45 in relation to Section 5 (d), Rule 56. 21
On November 21, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution 22 denying with finality
respondent's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated August 20, 2001.EICSTa
On November 27, 2001, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment 23 rendering the
decision of the CA final and executory.
As admitted by respondent, he received a copy of the Court's resolution dated
October 1, 2001 denying complainant's appeal on November 15, 2001. 24However,
respondent forwarded a copy of the same to complainant's office only on June 16,
2002. 25
Feeling aggrieved by the fate of its appeal, complainant filed a Complaint 26 for
disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on April 21, 2004.
Complainant alleged that respondent's act of filing three (3) motions for extension of time
within which to file the appeal and his wrong choice in the mode of appeal in the petition
that he belatedly filed exemplify gross incompetence and caused serious prejudice to
complainant. Complainant also alleged that the lapse of seven (7) months from the time
the resolution dated October 1, 2001 was received by respondent before he informed
complainant of the same constitutes inexcusable negligence.
On June 16, 2004, respondent filed his Answer. 27
In his answer, respondent alleged that the filing of a motion for extension of time to
file petition for review is allowed under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provided
that the same is filed and the docket and other lawful fees and deposit of cost are paid
within the reglementary period. Hence, respondent contends that he exercised due
prudence when he filed his first motion for extension of time. Moreover, he was in the
honest belief that the allegation of the date of receipt of the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration would suffice considering that the pertinent rules do not require that a
motion for extension of time must contain a statement of material dates. Respondent
claims that the filing of several motions and within the reglementary period to do so clearly
233
speaks of due diligence of the legal matter entrusted to him. He argues that the filing of
his motions for extension of time was based on meritorious grounds and the denial of the
same was based solely on the ground that his first motion was wanting of material
dates. AETcSa
As to complainant's allegation on his erroneous mode of appeal, respondent claims
that it is speculative at this point since the determination of the same is better left to the
Court.
Lastly, respondent admits that he failed to immediately inform complainant of the
development of the case. However, the said omission was not deliberate nor prompted by
malice or intent to injure the complainant but was brought about by "the sudden
unexpected technicalities that besieged the appeal of the case to the Supreme
Court" 28 which caused him dismay and made it "hard" 29 for him to inform complainant
of the same.
After a mandatory conference, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, the
investigating commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, submitted her report
and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law. IAETDc
The Board, in its Resolution 30 No. XVII-2006-04 dated January 28, 2006, adopted
and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San
Juan. It reduced the penalty of disbarment to suspension for six (6) months; hence, the
transmittal of the case and its records to this Court for final resolution pursuant to Rule
139-B, Section 12 (b) of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Review and Decisions by the Board of Governors. — . . . . (b) If the
Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for final action. ADEHTS
After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to
deviate from the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent's conduct relative to the belated filing of complainant's petition for review
on certiorari falls short of his obligation to serve his client with competence and diligence
under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent's act of filing three (3) successive motions for extension of time to file
the petition on the careless assumption that each motion will be granted by the Court, and
without taking care of informing himself of the Court's action thereon, constitutes
inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the
petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate attempt to salvage the
appeal. aCHDST
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to
"neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable." Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. 31 He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance
would be binding upon his client. Thus, he is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments
of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just
a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty
to the client's cause. 32
While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer
to file a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, he should not presume that his
motion for extension of time will be granted. Well-settled is the rule that motions for
extension of time to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of course but lie in the
234
 sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise
due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by
timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time
running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame. 33
As noted by Commissioner San Juan, respondent alleged in his answer that he
anticipated that he could not file the petition within the reglementary period due to his prior
commitments for the municipal canvassing of votes of a mayoralty candidate. However,
this fact was not called to the attention of the complainant. In doing so, complainant could
have engaged the services of another lawyer who can file the petition in time. 34
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue representing a client should inform
the latter of his predicament and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to
enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who can study the situation
and work out a solution. 35
To make matters worse, it took respondent seven (7) months from the time he
received a copy of the Court's resolution denying complainant's petition to inform
complainant of the same. 36 Under Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer "shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information". aACEID
Finally, the IBP Board of Governors correctly imposed the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months considering that respondent humbly admitted
his fault in not immediately informing complainant of the status of the case. 37
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the January 28, 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors in CBD Case No. 04-1230 is AFFIRMED. cSATEH
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of respondent with
the Office of the Bar Confidant. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all its chapters, and to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez, A.C. No. 7129, [July 16, 2008], 580 PHIL 358-369)

235
 [A.C. No. 1769. June 8, 1992.]

CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRINEO L.

BUNYI, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM : p

This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action

against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, a member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that
respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge
and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then
pending before the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by
Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the
parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of
a farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the
manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears
that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the
aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who
was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del
Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that
complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as
follows:
"Butuan City
23 April 1974.
Atty. Ireneo Bunye
928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila.
Dear Atty. Bunye:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements
(sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and
recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered
to him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.
236
 Very truly yours,
(SGD.) CESAR L. LANTORIA
Major Inf PC (ret)
Executive Director" 5
On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3)
cases, in this wise:
"June 1, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several
letters received, which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by
Judge Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and
other professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to
Mrs. Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has
been reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at
an early date as (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next
hearing of the remaining cases over there. LLphil

Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3)
defaulted defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign
them at once. However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation,
that if the preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am
ready and willing to accept his suggestions or correction to change or modify them
for the better. And to this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or
thinks if he signs them readily and please request for each copy for our hold.
xxx xxx xxx
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our
cases there. Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.
Brotherly yours,
(SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI" 6
Counsel
It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated
04 March 1974, the contents of which read as follows:
"928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz
Manila
March 4, 1974
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope
addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told
me to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to
him as if you have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it.
Unless, of course, if the information comes from him. But, you can inquire from him
if there is a need to wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me,
after he signs them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite receiving
those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him
at his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. Or, at
Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City.
Thanking you for your kind attention and favor.
Truly yours,
(SGD.) ATTY. I. L. BUNYI" 7
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present
administrative case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three
(3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that
237
respondent won the said three (3) cases because he (respondent) was the one who
unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent
of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative
complaint, admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents
thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks
for itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the
insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in
question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation
as a big help to him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as
being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan, and the other, as the acting Judge of
Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit
of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer
inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question
was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the understanding
between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was
entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said
decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal
basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said
decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants lost their
standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers
and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter
of June 1, 1974)

c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as
in fact, the letter mentioned - subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify
for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the same letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in
sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance
in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)"
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General
submitted his report to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was
set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled
hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both
respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the Solicitor General
reported the following development —
"Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979, sworn to
before the investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn,
dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant 'could hardly substantiate' his
charges and that he is 'no longer interested to prosecute' the same. For his part,
respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint
against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness and
elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the
original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he was not prepared
to prove his charges." 10 (emphasis supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent
Bunyi (dated 4 March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent
had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the
Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia
thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had previous
238
communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the
testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of said letters, and
complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as respondent
Bunyi, in his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the
draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and he affirmed the existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical
and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help
promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would
influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent. llcd

In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in
the future he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the
provisions of the canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing
was postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a
manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case since the last setting on
10 December 1980, and he requested that the next hearing be not set until after six (6)
months when he expected to return from the United States of America where he would visit
his children and at the same time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for hearing in this case, respondent Bunyi
and the Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his
memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said
memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions
in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to influence the
Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to the
Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the draft
decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of
the instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint
in the case, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist,
and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may
have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present
administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts
complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of
disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge
Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and
which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got
the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation, for a favor or consideration, the acts of
respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were
enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as
follows:
"3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court.
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled
for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to

239
 misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate
or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves
rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special
personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of
professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the
judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations
between bench and bar." cdphil

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is
rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
"CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor
seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges."
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence
the court where he had pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in
the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the
different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lantoria v. Bunyi, A.C. No. 1769, [June 8, 1992], 285 PHIL 83-93)

240
 [A.C. No. 7199. July 22, 2009.]
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]

FOODSPHERE, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO,

JR., respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J p:

Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat

processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under
the brand name "CDO", filed a Verified Complaint 1 for disbarment before the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio
L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of
tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a
host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a
radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral
conduct; (2) violation of lawyer's oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating
prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a
grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June
27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they
found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Cordero's wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug
Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in
the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the
BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses
Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to
heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any
event, "outrageous".
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses
incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was
turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the
media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In
the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the
front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas
BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 2 which complainant found to contain articles maligning,
discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened
to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the
Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the
Corderos, but respondent turned it down.

241
 Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would
go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed
complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN 3 seeking the withdrawal of their
complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. 4Respondent, who
affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his
articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document. HEcaIC
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking
complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues
at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile 6 of the
television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot
advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b)
spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-
second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in
the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-
second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on
complainant's offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were
disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication of the
articles/columns. 7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B-Batas ng Bayan at
radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said
program, which announcement was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest
si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo,
tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo
babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, ‘aling liver
spread ang may uod?' Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-
nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod
at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan?Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st
433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin
natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver
spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant
in bad light. Thus, in the August 31-September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he
wrote an article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he
wrote "IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!" 9 which appeared in the same
publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its
September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled"DAPAT BANG PIGILIN
ANG CDO." 10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING
HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following
articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread", Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 276); 12 (b) "Uod,
itinanggi ng CDO", Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 277); 13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO",
Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 278); 14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado",
Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 279); 15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod", Setyembre
10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg. 280); 16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy", Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg. 281); 17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards", Setyembre 14, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg. 284); 18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards", Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.
285); 19 (i) "CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP", Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.
287); 20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili", Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg. 288); 21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO", Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.
242
290); 22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO", Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg.
291); 23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero", Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg.
292); 24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO", Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg.
293). 25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published
in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread." 26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television
program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what
complainant claimed to be the "same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against
it. 27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others
for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal
Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The
complaints were pending at he * time of the filing of the present administrative
complaint. 28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of
Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of
Justice, 29 alleging:
xxx xxx xxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City? EDaHAT
xxx xxx xxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for
miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office
would ever act on his complaint?
xxx xxx xxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez,
and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his
boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to
them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice
would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not
because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the
injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in
Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the
past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had
campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products of
the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed
even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain
against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this
Office should investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to
file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant,
and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that
Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here; 30

243
 And in a Motion to Dismiss the case for Lack of Jurisdiction 31 which respondent
filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaperHataw!, before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxx xxx xxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is
inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has
no jurisdiction over this action. 32 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent
and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04, 33 before the Regional Trial
Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order
notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against complainant 34 and to
malign complainant through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his
October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation: 35
I.
xxx xxx xxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio]
Mauricio, et al.", the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the
Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part
reads:
"Anent the plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order included in the instant plaintiff's motion, this Court, inasmuch as
the defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is
constrained to GRANT the said plaintiff's prater, as it is GRANTED, in
order to maintain STATUS QUO,and that all the defendants, their
agents, representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby
restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or
broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant
case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff
and its products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent
by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the
issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof
on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear
directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing,
televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the
instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff
and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with
articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the
December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan — Toro"
(Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint). ISHaTA
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the
Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party."

244
 II.
xxx xxx xxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with
Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice".
In said pleading, respondent made the following statements:
xxx xxx xxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions
on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the
Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the
impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and
did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild
allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his
pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he
[re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould
[i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein
complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed
and signed by herein respondent. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized
that the said "Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by
the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent
dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent
inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to
ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent
published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004
(Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come
out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a
temporary restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such
actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and
submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that
is, to expose the defects of complainant's products to the consuming public.
Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent.
Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainant's failure to give
in to respondent's "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and
television programs of respondent. Complainant's explanation is more
credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage
of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent
consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself
prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was
less than forthright when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned
around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly
already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with
the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges
of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of
245
 respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to
say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20,
2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every
lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession, 37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful
conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his
interest — to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and
advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status
quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any
matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against
complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes". For he defied
said status quo order, despite his (respondent's) oath as a member of the legal profession
to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities".
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, viz.:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper,
by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong: 38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members
of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients. cIECaS
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
246
 with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified. 39 (Underscoring
supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the
legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity
of the legal profession." 40
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be
underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., 41 the therein complainant engaged therein-
herein respondent's services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice
advocacy of respondent, a media personality", 42 only to later find out that after he
demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor
any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over
the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a
certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent's motion for
reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness
when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant. 43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is,
in the premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer's oath and
breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Foodsphere, Inc. v. Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 7199, [July 22, 2009], 611 PHIL 1-16)

247
 [A.C. No. 7006. October 9, 2007.]

RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR

STATE PROSECUTOR

DECISION

AZCUNA, J p:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No.
5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose
Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of
Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the
Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder.
Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond.
Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized
prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of
murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court. 1
In an Order dated August 30, 2002, 2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the
case because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he
"lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the
motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose
Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the
Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which
motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003,
respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to
the Court of Appeals (CA). cDCIHT
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an
article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for
allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a
murder suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a
motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with
murdering a policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But
Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail
out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.
248
 But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it,
Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser
inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.
xxx xxx xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals
and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the
judge.
Bagabuyo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.
"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there
who are displaying judicial arrogance." he said. 3
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent
and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in
court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of
court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with
its lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described
the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case
for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open
court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the
harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent,
in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the
trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was
respondent. 4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser
inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear reason," was
added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez. 5
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to
answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion
to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant
to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 6 The Court's Order dated September 30, 2003
reads: EATcHD
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth
to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.
Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be
cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated
August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published,
is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect contempt of Court pursuant to
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer
the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor
Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 7
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He
appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.

249
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for
interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial
court's disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent
to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held
in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and
why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 8 and Rule 13.02 of Canon
13. 9
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that
the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between
6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October
1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews,
respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a
dictator who does not accord due process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.
On November 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed
ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly
prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of
particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent's actions and
statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor
informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003
cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and
ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not
be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003.
However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004.
Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He,
however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by
someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his
comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that
he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance. He justified his
response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of
speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice. aIETCA
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has
grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave
professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is

hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days
to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with
more severely.

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 Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme
Court for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the]
disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo. 10
The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October
2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING:
Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng panahon ang
samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna
na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed
your mind yet?)
BAGABUYO:
Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang
mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado,
mao kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are
ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That's it.)
xxx xxx xxx
BAGABUYO:
Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna
mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod,
magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa
mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod
nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di mahibalo
nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . .
. Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na,
dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra
gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . .
.
(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant
of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new
jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment case
against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses
his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be
removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his
Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)
xxx xxx xxx
BAGABUYO:
Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon
kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy sa
dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga
P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this
Order was "given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state
the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)
BAGABUYO:

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Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I
have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest
Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to
appeal." Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")
xxx xxx xxx
BAGABUYO:
. . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa. Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang
iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .
(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his
gross ignorance of the law. . . . )
xxx xxx xxx
TONY CONSING:
So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?
(So what is your plan now?)
BAGABUYO: ASHEca
Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa
pagka abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx xxx xxx
BAGABUYO:
Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga
ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . .
. Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that
time I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of
murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is
not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said
was based on the law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of
the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)
xxx xxx xxx
BAGABUYO:
Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may
iyang katuyoan — ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto,
iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero
kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP,
intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod,
naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw
Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law — you
did not accord me due process of law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in
order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me
imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP.
For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read
the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a judge, you are also
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 a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and
everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did not accord me due
process of law. . . .)
TONY CONSING:
So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini, with all
this problem sa Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with
all the problems in the Supreme Court.)
BAGABUYO:
Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang
mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang
pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa
niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na,
madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who
are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law
has he been reading? I heard that he is a
mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying
mahjong. 11
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court,
is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust
in the administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law
under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court 12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec.
27 13 of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to
be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29, 14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9, 15 Rule 139 of the
Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar
Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondent's suspension from the practice of law, dated
July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in
the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and
independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order
dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with
Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that
the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an
opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order of
suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been
reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr. 16 that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney.
Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful
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 disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful
appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover
practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting
in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued
membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as
a consequence. 17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. 18 Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct
by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a
judge to the proper authorities only." cESDCa

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a
press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002
allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying
judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for
allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while
Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which
states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities
only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for
his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the
law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and
that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his] clients."
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example
of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo
v. Gica 19 held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude.
As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for
the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without
such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly
provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the
institution must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating
Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and of violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. IDTSEH
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Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Re: Bagabuyo, A.C. No. 7006, [October 9, 2007], 561 PHIL 325-341)

255