REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT

COMMUTER RAIL (RTDC)

CROSSING WARNING TIME ACTION PLAN
90 DAY LOOK-AHEAD

Revision Issue Date Revision Notes

0 Initial Issue Covering Jan-Mar 2019 For meeting January 17th 2019
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CROSSING WARNING TIME ACTION PLAN
90 DAY LOOK-AHEAD

1. Introduction
On December 14th, 2018, RTDC submitted a Grade Crossing Warning Time Action Plan to the FRA. This
was conditionally accepted on December 21st, 2018 by FRA.

One of the requirements was to produce a ninety day- look-ahead schedule which provides an update
on the specific design and testing activities, approvals and milestones that are being worked on during
the update period.

This document provides the ninety day look-ahead update as follows:

• Specific Task and activity update

• Updated schedule

2. Plan Process
From the original Warning Time Action Plan document issued in December a number of potential causes
of long warning times were identified. These causes may have geographic location or system type
characteristics and the detailed analysis now being conducted is tasked with identifying these.

The process is to identify the most significant contributory causes to long warning times with potential
solutions and initiate the design and engineering change process to progress the solution into a final
design for testing and implementation. Further analysis will be conducted to determine if the solution
delivered the expected improvements in warning time performance.

An example is the analysis of the A line which identified 8 crossing approaches where the number of
long conventional warning times constitutes almost ⅔ of the total number of long warning times. The
proposed solution is to reduce the crossing approach length by changing civil speed limits (see further
detail below). This change will be designed and implemented and further analysis carried out to
determine the expected reduction in long warning times.

The following flowchart illustrates the general process which will be carried out for multiple lines and
locations.

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Long Warning
Warning
Time Root Causes
Time Data analysis
Identified
Data

Select most
significant
cause/location

Determine solution
and Produce
Design,
Engineering and/or
Operational
Change
Documents

Change Reviewed
and Approved

No

Solution Tested
and Implemented

In Revenue
Service
Data Analysis

Warning Time
Performance
Acceptable

Yes

Transfer to Operations
Monitoring

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3. Plan Initiatives (90 day Look-ahead)

3.1.Data Model 8 Software Update
Implementation and test plans for overall system migration to I-ETMS version 6.3.17.1.WCA (Data
Model 8) are under development.

This update will require that application software in the onboard Train Management Computer (TMC)
and Back-Office Server (BOS) be updated, along with changes to the format of the Sub-Division file (track
database). This update brings a number of positive improvements including:

1. Reduction of GPS related enforcements with the implementation of non-comm zones.

2. Reduction of onboard PTC failures. In addition, this will reduce PTC cut-outs and in turn reduce non-
wireless CTWS only grade crossing activations
3. Improved segregation of Sub Div. files.
4. Improvement to “Braking in Progress” banner to reduce nuisance display.
5. Enhancing the PTC activation process to allow for activation while stationary, resulting in improved
crossing warning times when starting from tail track locations. (e.g. Tabor Street)
6. Improvements in the initialization algorithm that will reduce the number of cutout runs due to failed
initialization.
7. Incorporation of additional Engineering Change Requests (ECR) which improve overall PTC
operation.

The test plan for the BOS update is in review with RTDC. It is expected to be submitted to FRA for review
and approval to test by January 18th 2019.

Once the BOS software has been successfully updated the Sub-Div file and the TMC software and can be
tested and implemented. Test Plans are expected to be ready to submit to the FRA for approval by
January 25th, 2019.

Overall completion of this update is forecast to be before April 31st, 2019.

3.2.Review of Express Train Operation

Express train operation is to be dis-continued in the very near future. Express train means a train not
required to stop at a station and therefore expected to travel at the Maximum Authorized Speed
(MAS).This will facilitate the next activity to reduce specific conventional approach lengths.

3.3.Conventional Warning Times and Approach Circuit Length

Conventional system warning times are based on the minimum twenty seconds (MT) mandated by
regulation, plus Clearance Time (CT) based on the geometry of the grade crossing (diagonal dimension,
number of tracks, road traffic lanes etc.), plus a buffer time to ensure the Prescribed Warning Time
(MT+CT=Prescribed Warning Time) is guaranteed.

PWT = (MT + CT) + Buffer; where (MT+CT=PRT). MT is always 20 seconds.

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The approach length of the approach circuit is dictated by the MAS on the approach to the crossing and
the PWT. An additional factor is Pre-Emption time which allows for a call to associated traffic signals to
allow them to cycle and provide red traffic signals for the route across the grade crossing. This typically
adds 30-35 seconds.

The conventional approach circuits are typically 6,000-7000ft in length.

By eliminating express train operations means the MAS changes significantly when a station stop is on
the approach and the crossing approach track circuit can be significantly reduced.

Based on data analysis for the crossings covering from March thru Nov 2018, is a list of the approaches
we are proposing modify on the A line.

• York NB
• Dahlia SB
• Holly NB and SB
• Monaco NB and SB
• Quebec NB and SB

These 8 approaches are responsible for 63% of the conventional activations that are above the target
window. This could potentially reduce the extended conventional activations to almost 1/3 of what we
currently experience. Additionally, these approaches also have the highest occurrence of activations
that go more than 35 seconds over the warning time window (“the really long warning times”). We also
believe that these may show improvements to the wireless activation times although this needs to be
verified.

The tables below show the summary of expected improvements to these 8 approaches.

The schedule for these changes are in review by the current forecast is that these will be complete
before Q3 of 2019. The section on Schedule shows more detail.

This same process is being applied to the G Line now that the final data report has been issued. The
selected crossing approaches will be identified for design solutions before the end of January.

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Notes:

Dwell Time Critical Y/N identifies if the Dwell time is critical to the warning time after modification

ADT = Advance Delay Timer

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Notes:

Dwell Time Critical Y/N identifies if the Dwell time is critical to the warning time after modification

ADT = Advance Delay Timer

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3.4.Human Machine Interface

A review of the first draft of the Wireless Crossing Application – HMI & Dwell Timer Enhancements was
held on Wednesday 9th January to look at:

Replacing the “time to crossing” and “required time to crossing” timer displays and replacing these with
two displays:

Station dwell time indication

Options on Target Speed to next crossing

This was reviewed with the Transportation team to get initial feedback and comments. The paper is
being updated currently.

3.5.Warning Time Analysis Tool

The goal of the Warning Time Analysis Tool (WTT) is to identify and analyze the root causes of crossing
events that do not comply with the -5/+15 second warning-time criterion. While its primary focus is on
long warning times, both long and short times are included to assure that changes do not have
unintended consequences.

Data from crossing event recorders, train logs, back office, and other sources will be combined to allow
a complete analysis of warning-time inconsistency. WTT will allow for aggregation, filtering, and ranking
of events. Early efforts have created static reports showing events on each trip and identify penalty
brake enforcements and operator (see below). Dwell times at stations within the approach of a crossing
and where the warning time is out-of-spec will be annotated. Other annotations will include:

- Forms C and S
- Failures – GPS, PTC, Wireless, Crossing, etc.

Filters and aggregation will include:

- Date/Time
- Train direction
- WCAS or CTWS
- Crossing
- Root Cause
- Operator ID

Early versions of the tool output are expected to be available for review in early February 2019. Below is
an example.

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Trip report with penalty brake enforcements and operator info

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3.6.GPS Improvements
Data Model 8 update is expected to improve GPS reliability on the alignment and at DUS station. Since
the number of initializations impacted by GPS is very small this will be reviewed again after the software
update. The schedule has been modified accordingly.

3.7.Operator Training - Continuous Improvement in Train Handling and

Operator Behavior.
This section highlights sections of the Action Plan (in italics) referring to train handling and operator
behavior and summarizes DTO's current work to achieve continuous improvement in these areas.

• PTC Enforcement. If the PTC system recognizes or predicts that a train will arrive too early at a
crossing, it will enforce a penalty braking application. The train then comes to a stop, the brakes must
release and reset before being able to move. This process takes approximately 2 minutes, during which
time the crossing gates remain down and the actual warning time is extended. If this happens while a
train is on the approaches for multiple crossings, the warning times for all of these crossings are
lengthened.

Action: DTO operations management receives a PTC enforcement report on a daily basis. For each
enforcement, the report provides the date and time, location, operator's name, whether the
enforcement was predictive or reactive, and the reason for the enforcement such as WiMax data drop,
Early Arrival, Poor GPS under Wewatta St. or Excessive GPS location uncertainty. DTO filters the report
every day to identify the enforcements caused or contributed to by operator behavior, including early
arrivals and reactive enforcements. When the same operators appears repeatedly within a few days, a
field supervisor is dispatched to ride with the operator to observe and coach the operator to avoid
enforcements. The central message to the operators is to respond promptly to PTC instructions. This is
the most effective way to avoid enforcements.

• PTC Cut Out. When an operator cannot initialize a train in PTC, because of a PTC failure, a loss in
communication, a loss of GPS signal or other reasons, the Dispatcher may authorize the operator to cut
the train out of PTC. As a result, all crossing activations are under CTWS alone with longer warning times
typically occurring on crossings with stations in their approach.

Historically, this occurs on 2‐3% of trips monthly. This data is available in the monthly PTC RSD reports.

Action: To minimize the number of trains operating with PTC cut out, DTO has adopted the following
practice. If the train cannot be initialized at a terminal station, the dispatcher authorizes the operator to
do a soft cut out of PTC. However, when the operator reaches the next station, the operator repeats
the attempt to initialize in PTC. In this way, DTO can avoid up to 11 conventional activations on the A
Line or 16 on the G Line.

• Station Dwell Times. When station dwell times are significantly extended due to passenger loading or
other factors, warning times are extended for all crossings for which the station is in the approach.

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Action: DTO is addressing dwell times on multiple fronts. First, DTO is examining the berthing locations
for trains at stations on crossing approaches. For example, if the train berths closer to a pedestrian
crossing, this will reduce the time it takes for passengers needing to cross the tracks in front of the train
to walk down the platform and clear the tracks. Second, DTO has begun running 4-car trains on the A
Line. We believe that by spreading the passengers over four cars with 8 doors rather than 2 cars with 4
doors, the boarding and alighting process will be quicker. This will translate into shorter dwell times and
a reduction in warning times.

• Train handling. Trains operating more slowly than predicted after the point of activation will lengthen
warning times. The system does not record all factors that may cause the operator to proceed more
slowly. Weather and poor visibility may be a factor correlated with long warning times.

Action: To improve train handling, DTO will begin to focus on within-range warning times. To date,
DTO's analysis has focused generally on reasons and remedies for longer-than-desired warning times. By
examining the event recorders for within-range warning times, and finding correlations between these
warning times and dwell times, master controller position and speed, it should be possible to model the
train handling most likely to optimize warning times. At the same time, DTO will identify operators with
superior consistency of warning times. DTO will interview the operators with the most success in
keeping warning times with range and develop specific train handling instructions for specific crossing
approaches. These instructions will be relayed with reminders that safety is always the primary
consideration and the operator may need to abandon the model behavior to respond to environmental
considerations such as obstructions, weather, passenger behavior and unusual circumstances.

• Review of Operating Schedule for Effects on Crossing Warning Times and Optimization

There are a number of operating schedule scenarios that can have impacts on crossing warning times.
The operating schedule has timing points to make sure the trains do not leave a station early. There have
been efforts to eliminate extended dwells from the normal operating pattern and this will be re‐studied.
Transitions between single and double track can often cause trains to have to wait for signals to become
clear, termed ‘train meets’. The operating schedule can be adjusted to minimize train meets on a normal
basis although delays to service and delay recovery can still be impacted by train meets.

Action: The review of operating schedules is complete. Trains are scheduled to arrive few seconds late
at stations on crossing approaches so that they will not have to wait for scheduled departure times. This
helps to minimize warning times. In addition, schedules have been evaluated to determine whether
train meets can be moved away from grade crossings to avoid keeping gates down after the passage of
train in one direction until the next train in the following area has cleared the crossing. Unfortunately,
this analysis has not yielded any recommendations to improve warning times. There are two factors
that prevent further improvement in this regard. First, there are so many crossings close to one another
that moving meets to avoid long warning times at one crossing would lead to longer-than-desires
warning times at one or more other crossings. Second, several miles of single-track, there is only one
schedule pattern that provides the 15-minute frequency of service that the system was built to provide.

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4. Updated Schedule
The 90 day look-ahead schedule is shown below.

Analysis of GPS solutions has been adjusted to occur after Data Model 8 implementation as this is
expected to provide improvement in GPS reliability issues.

Analysis of WCAS adjustments (ACAF only) on A line has concluded that the next optimum time to
review will be after the modifications associated with Express Mode Removal and Near Side Crossing
solutions.

Analysis of failures has been extended to include communications network and WiMax drop outs.

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5. Actions from Wednesday 9th Conference Call

5.1.How is the Warning Time shown in the data spreadsheet derived?
The actual crossing warning time is the time that elapses between the activation of the crossing warning
system (lights flashing followed by gates lowering) to the time that the train enters the crossing. The
time the train enters the crossing cannot be determined from system logs and so the activation of the
crossing island circuit is used. The island circuit is typically 50ft in front of the crossing and so there will
be a small difference (½ to 2 seconds depending on train speed) between the calculated warning time
from logs and the observed warning time in the field..

The logic to calculate the crossing warning times is a multistep process. The first step is to gather the
logs from the Electrologixs devices. The logs are downloaded on a daily basis.

A parsing tool is used to go through the Electrologix logs, which are in a textual format recording each
logic event associated with the grade crossing activation circuits, island circuits and gate controller
activation and release as well as UPRR relay input events, to calculate the crossing warning times.

First step is to identify all instances of the island circuit being occupied for track 1 and track 2.

Then all instances of the crossing receiving an ARM (Express mode) event.

Following the ARM event, the parser looks for the WMDR bit to go false (This starts the crossing
activation).

The warning time is calculated by subtracting the timestamp of the WMDR activating the crossing from
the time the island track shows occupied. This corresponds with the grade crossing controller activating
the crossing warning systems.

In the ARM scenario, the WMDR is tied directly to the start of the crossing activation (Lights flashing)
and is not tied to pre-emption. So, the crossing warning time is the start time from the WMDR to the
island occupancy. The locomotive ID is then captured from the PTC event log. This also allows the
warning times to be correlated with an Operator.

It then finds all instances of the crossing receiving an INHIBIT (Station Stop mode) event.

Following the INHIBIT event, the parser looks for the INHIBIT to be removed by the locomotive. The
removal of the INHIBIT from the locomotive causes the crossing to begin its activation cycle. The
activation cycle for an INHIBIT event includes pre-emption. So, to calculate warning time, the INHIBIT
event must be subtracted from the island occupancy and the pre-emption time. The pre-emption time
is a known number from the design and is stored in each crossing’s database table as part of the
configuration.

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The warning time is calculated by subtracting the timestamp of the INHIBIT removal from the time the
island track shows occupied and the pre-emption time. The locomotive ID is then captured from the
PTC event log. This allows the warning times to be correlated with an Operator.

The remaining island track occupancies will be conventional activations. For these activations the tool
captures the timestamps for any XR (Crossing activation) events. (XR is the conventional approach circuit
relay). When an island event is found for the current track, the warning time is calculated using the XR
event as the start time and the island event as the end time. Since the conventional activations are not
PTC events, the locomotive ID cannot be assigned in this event directly by the parsing tool.

5.2.Explain the Scenarios where PTC (WCA) Reverts to Conventional

Activation
The following are examples where PTC (WCA) reverts to the conventional crossing activation by design.

Failed Initial Communication

Wireless Crossing Activation (WCA) is designed to revert to conventional approach circuits and
activation in the event of a communication failure at initial set-up or during approach to the crossing
prior to activation.

Occupancy
The basic functionality of WCA is to override the conventional approach circuits. It utilizes a wireless
messaging system to communicate with an xWIU allocated to the grade crossing. To override the
conventional circuits, the xWIU “wraps out” or disables the approach circuits while a wireless session is
active. The train won’t activate the crossing even if it shunts the approach circuits until the WCA
determines the activation. As noted in the system safety analysis (previously submitted as part of the
PTCSP), a potential hazard could result if a PTC/WCA equipped train is following an unequipped train
and inadvertently wraps out the circuits for the unequipped train. To prevent this, WCA determines
occupancy by evaluating the signals in its calculated path. If a red signal, a stop target or a restricted
speed target is present between the train and the crossing, the onboard will suppress wireless activation
and proceed reverting to the conventional crossing approach circuit and activation.

Penalty/Unplanned Stop
In the event of a penalty brake application or an unplanned stop on the crossing approach, the WCA
system is designed to default to the conventional approach circuits to ensure safety of the traveling
public at the crossing. If the crossing is being inhibited when the train is penalized or executing an
unplanned stop, the onboard TMC will send a station release message to immediately activate the
crossing. If the onboard is performing an express move when the penalty or unplanned stop occurs, the
onboard will send a disarm message activating the crossing. The system treats a “gate down” condition
as the safest mode of operation.

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Unhealthy Crossing
In the event of multiple missed Crossing Status messages or a Crossing Status message with the health
bit set low, the onboard will report the crossing as unhealthy and notify the Operator via the PTC screen.
The missed crossing messages can be caused by a WiMAX or communication network issue. As part of
the system safety case, the onboard TMC will not establish a wireless session but will allow the train to
proceed through the crossing at a pre-determined speed as configured in the track database (sub-div)
and the crossing will activate via the conventional approach circuits.

Transition to Non-Active State

For proper PTC operation, it is essential that the onboard TMC is cut-in and active. The onboard TMC is
critical for managing and enforcing track speeds, stop targets and track authorities. With wireless
crossing activation, proper onboard operation is necessary to ensuring accurate crossing arrival times
and efficient arming. If an event occurs that causes a transition to a state other than active; e.g.
disengaged, cutout, failure or switching, the onboard TMC is designed to disable the wireless session
and therefore the crossing activation will revert to the conventional approach circuits.

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