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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

Short Notes on Roman Warfare

David G Terrell

September, 2009

The way of Roman Warfare

I assume here that “early” refers to pre-consular Rome (before about 550 BC, or so). I assert that
there was a “Roman Way of War” that developed through this period that continued evolving
through the Republic and Empire. I‟ll organize my rough definition along Strategic, Operational
and Tactical lines.

Strategic. The most important consideration to early Roman military strategy is their cultural
emphasis on adhering to shared, mutual obligations. These obligations bound them to their Gods
(Worship properly and the God will bless us.) and to their familia (I think of them having almost
a Mafia organization.). These obligations caused them to ritually demonstrate the “righteousness‟
of their grievances, before going to war (the demand for restitution, calling the God to witness
the grievance, and the symbolic spear, hurled into the enemy‟s territory.) (Cary pp 49 & 54 is
particularly pertinent here).

Operational. The reorganization of the populace into geographically (at least at first) tribes and
divided into property-based classes by Servius Tullius provided a doctrinal organization that lent
itself to the easy formation of ground units made up of men who probably knew, or knew of,
each other. This provided a unity that supported the tactical organization.

Tactical The demographic reorganization made it easier to adopt the Greek hoplite tactical
model. Men with means were grouped so the wealthy were responsible for the most expensive
weapon system (horse) and less well-to-do were able to provide themselves with hoplite panoply.
The geographic tribalization facilitates the formation and training of phalanxes.

Taken together, the Roman Way of War was one focused on practicality. Making and keeping
obligations with neighbors simplified life and reduced waste and violence while increasing
prosperity. Organizing the military aged males geographically and monetarily ensured the forces
were equipped at least public expense and facilitated training and unit cohesion. Adopting the
hoplite model demonstrated a willingness to adopt good practice, wherever it was created.

I can almost hear Don Corelone saying “It‟s all about business.” (From the Marco Puzo
Godfather novels and movies… which might be a good thing for us to read in understanding the
Italian evolution of Roman ideals.)
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

Romans are practical

I concur with the "very conservative and were slow to adapt" observation about the Greeks.
Remember that the Greeks were fighting a ritualized form of armed contest up until the
Peloponnesian War made them realists.

I think of the WW1 differences between the trench fighters and the fighter pilots. The central
character of the movie "The Blue Max" was a infantryman who became a pilot, bringing his
"Roman" attitude into a "Grecian" mode of war.

Greek Influence?

With cavalry's weakness against determined, prepared infantry-in-defense, they'd learn pretty
quick to us horse in a flank attack against engaged infantry. Taking them between two fires could
turn the battle. The use of Dragoons (horse-mobile infantry) hearkens me back to examining the
use of chariots as battle-taxis.

Early Roman Military: Adaptation

The checkerboard formation that characterized the deployment order was an interesting
development. On one hand, it lengthened the battle front, making it easier to envelop a smaller,
massed foe. I can also see how it would allow friendly horse to infiltrate the lines when needed,
while hindering enemy horse. It also made it more difficult for a equal foe, unused to discipline,
to flank the Romans and the small "mini-phalanxes" made sure no one would be easily defeated
in detail. An all-round good response to the threats.

Early Rome

I see where some comments are going... unconsidered assimilation can have unintended
consequences. The unwillingness to admit one was wrong and to return to an older, but more
effective, course of action can fly in the face of "progress". We could have a whole course on the
"idea that was Rome". I'm game.
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

I have the DVDs of the BBC TV series "I, Claudius" based on Suetonius. The depiction of
Augustus' characterizations of Greeks is quite humorous.

Heroic Warfare

I think the former... "no plan survives first contact with the enemy". I think that as an action
proceeded, the nice little manipular groups would suffer attrition and loss of cohesion. Before
long, there might easily be opportunity for a lone legionnaire to stand fast next to his standard
and send some barbarian warriors to their doom.

But we can engage in well-reasoned speculation... and test some of our ideas in reenactment at
the individual level and in war games at the operational and tactical level.

When we reach a point that our theories fit the available information (historical and
archeological) and stand up to critical evaluation, it's a worthy accomplishment.

I'm with Novick (That Noble Dream) in that we should find patterns in history, not make them.
Separating the wheat from the chaff is the labor to which we are called.

The Battle of the Allia

The Battle of the Allia (387 B.C.) was a kick in the pants to the Romans, coming as it did soon
after the taking of Veii after a decade-long siege. The invading Gauls (from the Po region,
according to Mackay & Frank) came through Etruria an defeated the Romans near
Crustumerium, who then abandoned the city, except for holdouts on the Capitoline Hill. The
Gauls sacked the city (no surprise) and then left. Frank says the Gauls were “recalled by the
urgent necessity of defending their own homes before they had succeeded in capturing the
Roman citadel” and settled for a significant ransom before departing “well laden with booty”.
This close call had lasting psychological effects, making the Gauls into the “number one enemy”
for a long time—and led to the building of a city wall (likely a substantial expense).

Of tactical interest is Cary's assertion that the Romans were "out-reached by the Gallic
longswords." might this be the origin of the shift to the maniple?

The defeat had fallout. The city was weakened in resources and prestige. Within the next few
years, the Volsci and Aequi started again to conduct raids on Latium.
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

Roman army

The consular tribunes had secured no position for their camp, had constructed no entrenchments
behind which to retire, and had shown as much disregard of the gods as of the enemy, for they
formed their order of battle without having obtained favorable auspices. They extended their line
on either wing to prevent their being outflanked, but even so they could not make their front
equal to the enemy's, whilst by thus thinning their line they weakened the centre so that it could
hardly keep in touch.

The spaced maniples could lengthen the line without thinning any particular part of it.

But I have to wonder if the thinning of the line in this battle (even if it was a fiction described in
Livy's sources) and the defeat that followed defined the problem set that experimentation
eventually addressed with the maniple.

"How does one extend the length of an infantry front without thinning the ranks?"

I appreciate your thoughts. I look at this case a bit differently. The Gauls may have presented a
asymmetric threat--which, by definition, is one for which you are not prepared to defend against.

For Livy to say "they should have foreseen it" is the kind of ex post facto analysis we see today
with regard to every successful asymmetric attack against the USA--with accusations of
"intelligence failures" and "intentionally allowing attacks." But I digress...

When I consider your fortifications observations, I have to wonder if Livy was in a position to
know whether or not "a securely entrenched camp in their rear was part of Roman practice even
before the maniples were employed". It may not have been a practice at the time of the battle.

Perhaps, like my proposal that the defeat due to the weakness of the thinned ranks eventually led
to the spaced squares of the maniples... the failure to have a close-at-hand redoubt at this battle
eventually led to the practice of preparing a daily fortified camp.

The Romans really paid attention to their "lessons learned" sessions.

I'm reading the Penguin Classics version of Livy. Looking at 5:38, I'm interested in a dichotomy
between his description of the suddenness of the Gallic onslaught... "set forward, with terrible
speed, on the path to Rome"; and a seeming criticism of the Romans choosing unprepared
positions and having not prepared fortifications.
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

This seems to be the standard after-the-fact response to considerations of a tactical surprise that
results in defeat--the hunt for intelligence failures.

Government

The political reform of 367… hmmm… the consulship was restored and unreservedly opened to
plebeians (Cary 77) perhaps to provide a “greater unity of command”. The idea of the military
“mustang” comes to mind. Having plebs in high command might mean that subsequent leaders
had a higher probability of being people with more „earthy‟ experience.

I keep reminding myself that "ancient" does not necessarily mean "unsophisticated".

Large-scale international commerce; massive construction programs; and, even (relatively) large
military force administration, funding and management had been going on in the eastern Med for
centuries. It's almost certain, to me, that skilled project managers and merchant administrators
were available to the Roman political leaders--if not employed by them in their private
enterprises.

I've been thinking about your "reform from an Etruscan king to a Senate and two consuls" off
and on. My thinking revolves around a "fact" of military power: unity of command yields
efficiency in the development of operational plans and their execution. By spreading the
authority to select military leaders and then further dividing the authority between two consuls,
Rome consciously imposed an inefficient system in order to prevent placing too much power
within the grasp of a single individual. The system would work only as long as sufficient
warning preceded any particular threat and the threat could be thwarted by the forces placed
under a single consul.

There was a risk of defeat when any threat moved faster than consultative decision-making could
respond. This was compounded by the speed of communications when local commanders,
lacking authority, had to communicate information to Rome and await a response, while local
conditions continued to change.

A second risk existed when overly large threat forces necessitated the uniting of both consular
forces. On one hand, the unification violated the "division of powers" policy that protected Rome
from tyranny. On the other, the purposeful division of command could prevent the Roman army
from following a consistent operational direction.
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

The Hellenic prejudice against those unable to speak Greek was a fundamental block to
including other populations as citizens. Perhaps the multi-lingual environment in which the early
Romans found themselves made them more cosmopolitan that the Greeks. I believe that the
Greek Idea was based on a common language and the mental paradigms growing out of thinking
in Grecian terms. To think like a Greek, one had to think in Greek... much like my experience
with Arabic-speaking peoples today. But upon what was the Roman Idea based? Eventually,
Latin became the language of the empire but what made one Roman?

I will ponder this...

Battle of Asculum - Roman force

At least, by this time, the Romans had started building fortified camps as a redoubt (Cary, 95).
Le Bohec thinks they may have learned the tactic from Pyrrhus‟ forces (Le Bohec, 131).

Once the Roman‟s lost the choice of terrain—and the reason isn‟t answered to my satisfaction—
the Macedonian infantry had the greater reach (sarissa over a pilum, or gladus). Nevertheless, the
Roman‟s gave a good account of themselves, until the elephants showed. It looks, from
Dionysius and Plutarch, like the elephants were the major factor in throwing the Romans into
confusion—or, perhaps, it was the confusion caused by the defeat of the counter-elephant
devices by the light infantry supporting the elephants. It looks like the Romans had not learned
the value of adding an infantry screen to protect animal-borne weapon systems.

Dionysius tells us in XX.2.2 this: "The Romans, when they were pursued by the Greeks, would

wheel their horses about, and checking them with the reins, would fight an infantry battle..."

Why would the Roman cavalry dismount to fight on foot? Doesn't seem very effective.

Dragoons! This seems no different than the “battle taxi” usage of chariots—using horses as a
mean of rapid locomotion about the battlefield. Mounted infantry would not have to be as well
trained as fully qualified cavalry—no charging and wheeling—just learn how to ride the horse.
But, I bet these troops were trained to function as both cavalry and light infantry. They would
also make good choices for scouting and picket duty.

Academically *cough* accomplished.... LOL (thinking AKA "know-it-all")! OK. Got me! But, I
don't mean to be an ass. I just eat this stuff up.
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

Here's my thinking.

The nascent Roman society (using Toynbee's "total network of relations between human beings"
definition) was a Mediterranean society. In general, the Mediterranean societies shared
pantheons of gods that we would term archetypes--each god being responsible for some
characteristic of nature or existence. They also shared seagoing modes of commerce, similar
types of agricultural development, climate... all the stuff Fernand Braudel goes on about in his
History of the Mediterranean.

Even when the languages differed, the cognitive and linguistic frameworks behind them were
similar, having rubbed against each other for several thousands of years. I assert they had many
things, processes and methods in common that made translation and mutual understanding come
easier.

Speaking of Toynbee, he's not always in favor these days as he focused a great deal on a
Christian-centric history of the region, but his placement of Roman Civilization as being the
"belated political unification of the Hellenic world" is very interesting to me.

{and the book is unfortunately not in Google Books' "partial view" for me to link give a to it.
The one volume abridgment is worth having (ISBN 1566199379)}

I assert that the societies to the north came from traditions (linguistic, religious, cultural,
climatic, etc.) so different that real communications were difficult for a spell. These set the stage
for the same kind of cultural misunderstandings as those regarding the gifts of earth and water
that kicked off the Greco-Persian wars.

But one key is to understand that 'foreignness' is in the eye of the beholder. The "Hierarchy of
Exclusion" Orson S. Card developed in his Ender's Game books is useful in understanding what I
mean. When the Romans judged the others to be "barbarians" they set the stage for the violence.

It's very easy, in a lack of communication context, to take offense. Show the sole of your foot to
a middle eastern male... or, hold out your hand to shake his wife's hand... or, pick up his Quran
with your left hand... and get ready to be disliked.

A couple of weeks ago, I was in Belgium to observe a class being taught to NATO soldiers. Most
of my career has been Asia focused and it was my first trip to a francophone country. I worked
hard not to be the “Ugly American” but I could sense the aggravation with the “American who
comes here without learning the language.” I was the barbarian for the week. Not fun. Since I‟ll
be going back, I have another license of Rosetta Stone-for my free time.
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

I know I rambled. For that, I apologize. Nevertheless, I hope I was able to present my thoughts
understandably, if not coherently.

Mercenaries

The Romans gave their soldiers citizenship (Cary, 105) which kinda shot the market for
mercenaries in the foot. Also, the Romans were really into trust and by giving the fighters a
vested interest in victory, had some confidence that such men would not desert in times of
extreme stress.

The siege

Lacking any kind of fast Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability, it is no

mystery to me that fixed cities provided the meeting place for field armies. There was just too
much empty land upon which to maneuver. It may be that Rome's disdain for mercenaries may
be the reason siegecraft had not developed by this time. Had they hired some Macedonians,
perhaps things would have been different. Or, possibly, the temporary nature of early Roman
armies meant not having soldiers with the tenure needed to develop the combat engineering skills
required for engineering a siege. (Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare, 55)

Elephants

I believe the "shock value" of elephants was diminishing by this time. They no longer held the
shock and awe value as they once did; and, tactics were becoming successful against them. Their
value as a "prime mover" to pull wagons out of a hole, erect a tower, or move a tree trunk
probably came to outweigh their combat power. They were probably relegated to reserve service
just in case a situation arose where a thundering herd would make a difference.

Roman camp

Keeping in mind that a legionary camp accommodated 6,000 troops plus auxiliaries... we aren't
talking about 5 or 6 tents around a couple of picnic tables. Tacitus describes a later Roman Camp
in Celtic Germania as a very sophisticated, complex installation.
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Here's an image of a painting drawn from the description.

Think about tearing this down every day, on the move. I'd think they would appreciate standing
garrison duty for a spell.

Varro's plan

The view of the common soldier is often lost in the histories. Only the "great men" are noticed.
When all is considered, men I have known and led fight for their units, the man standing beside
them.

It was not a bad plan, except for Varro continuing to stick with the old trued and true losing
strategy of Trebia and Trasminene... and completely ignoring the Punic cavalry... and deploying
his cavalry, in difficult terrain, without infantry support.

Also, Hannibal's placement of the African heavy infantry at each end of the line demonstrated to
me that he meant to hold the flanks. He also used the terrain better, forcing the Romans to fight
up a slight incline.
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

Alternating days

Instituting joint command in the field was a disaster due to the prospect for unclear directions.
Were these forces deployed so close to Rome, that the Senate feared unitary command? But,
here, it seems to be less of a problem as Aemilius had command of the cavalry and he was
anchoring the Roman right--the position of honor. Was there an agreed division of labor? Varro
over the infantry and Aemilius the cavalry? So, even though the day-to-day command was
awkward, it looks like they were in some agreement for the actual battle.

Bouncing back

With Cannae's monstrous butcher's bill... 70,000 dead in an area Gabriel describes as roughly the
size of Central Park... 20 percent of Rome's population of military aged males were killed,
captured or wounded.

The magnitude of the carnage may have affected Hannibal. When Maharbal (the cavalry general)
pressed him to use this moment to attack Rome, he refused--allowing the Romans to bounce
back.

Hannibal

There might have been a moment when Hannibal could have done Rome in the eye but, it didnt
last long.

However, his success brought its own issues... Capua defected to the Punic side, potentially
bringing 30k infantry and 4k horse to Hannibal's side. The Romans besieged the city and
Hannibal had to defend it or risk losing it and any other cites that might be considering the
switch. This diluted his forces.

Also, the Romans went back to Fabian tactics. Hannibal could have marched on Rome, but the
following siege would have pinned him down so that the multiple Roman armies afield would
know where he was and they would be able to combine against him. He would have lost
movement and flexibility and been suckered into a battle of attrition with a superior force with
shorter supply lines.
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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

Controlling Minor States

Philip failed to control the foreign policy of Rhodes and Pergamum, and their actions brought
Rome into war with Macedon. (Shades of America and Cuba (Spanish-American War)!)

What could Philip have done to prevent these minor powers from stirring the pot?

Philip had a horrible reputation for harsh treatment of weaker poleis. It occurred to me as I was
reading, that Philip could have used a bit more "honey" in his dealings and perhaps not been
dragged into this war. I don't think the Romans would have turned east otherwise.

Maintaining a Military Edge

Did Greece fall to the Romans because it did not keep up an army proficient in the use of the
newest tactics and equipment?

Let me see what I can stir up...

The phalanx grew out of that "rugby with spears" paradigm that settled conflicts by playing
"push-a-war" on a prepared, flat playing field; at a scheduled time; between teams whose
strengths were previously negotiated. It was never meant to be a hastily-deployed, improvised,
rough-field tactic. Even Alexander kept it for specific purposes (critical point pressure,
channelization, blocking, mopping-up, etc.) and used cavalry as his shock corps.

Philip's phalanx was massive and powerful... along a single axis of movement. Rapid maneuver
could counteract that strength. Arrogance and complacence ensured their eventual failure.

America was getting just as stuck as the Macedonians, but with mechanized armor, during the
last days of the Soviet Union. We were considering tank designs so heavy they couldn't cross an
unpaved field without sinking--and so big they couldn't fit through an automobile tunnel. And
then the new maniple appeared... soldiers equipped with cheap Rocket Propelled Grenades who
could get behind, fall on their flank and massacre them.

Were we lucky? In avoiding war with the Warsaw Pact, we never risked falling into our own
Cynoscephalae in the Fulda Gap. Sounds like a decent premise for an alternate history novel.

Keeping an eye on your enemy

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Terrell DG, Short Notes on Roman Warfare

Both sides broke contact at Pherae, exercising some discernment in choosing a better place and
time for battle, but should they have maintained situational awareness of their opponent's
location while on the move?

I'm thinking it would have only taken a couple of hundred horse to put ten troops into the field to
follow the opposing force and maintain a trail of couriers back to the commander. But I could be
wrong...

I've come to think that Philip's biggest mistake was turning out foragers before having scouted
the area. Knowing there was a Roman force within 50 miles should have been enough to set him
on edge.

Movement to Contact

When we compare Flamininus' movement to combat versus Philip's, what lessons can we draw?

Nameless officer

This would have been a military tribune. The political tribune would have no military standing in
the Army, unless I mistake things greatly.

This unnamed officer was doubtless an active and responsible officer, who knew his men--and to
whom his men looked to during battle. I wonder if this was the work of the Praefectus castrorum.
If this "prefect of the camp" position already existed this early, he would have been the longest
serving, most senior tribune (and probably former first pilus) and would have the stature to pull
20 maniples aside when the rest of the legion was still going in the original direction.

The whole incident is a testimony of the professionalism of these "company grade" officers.

I'm equally sure that the grunt legionnaire had little contact with the big brass--and likely
avoided anyone wearing marks of rank, thinking all centurions were dolori posteriori.

If he had been the scion of a famous family, we probably would have. But this makes me think
this was a commoner... or freedman... who made good through the ranks.

Or, that he took his course of action against the direct orders of a less imaginative superior and
was not celebrated because the Roman higher commanders did not want his example to spread
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too widely. It might happen again with less stellar results. The fact that the tribune's actions
saved the day may have kept him from execution for disobedience and insubordination.

More on Elephants

I still think that elephants were mainly used as a prime mover by this time. They could tow a
very heavy mount of cargo... or could help pull a center pole for a large structure... or drag
downed timber to a construction site... or clear a road.

Here, they were placed on the flanks and used against a force unprepared to meet them. I have to
think that if the Macedonians had successfully formed their left, the Roman elephants might not
have been quite so effective. And, might have been held back until a chaotic situation existed,
preventing effective resistance... or making a wavering force break and run... as happened here.

Roman Cavalry Advantage

The more I've thought about this, the more I've come to realize the significance of the "melee"
nature of large cavalry-on-cavalry battles. In the absence of good visibility, all it would take is
broken morale in a small, localized part of the battle to create a rapidly increasing spread of
panic. Just being out of communications with your higher echelon and the noise of those gaining
the local advantage would serve to spread the effect. Seeing the riders beside you turn and flee
would be enough to get most men moving in the same direction.

I was wondering how much low visibility may have had. The raised dust seems to be a possible
factor.

Conditioning and Training

The invading tribes were an entire people on the move. This must have been an enormous
migration... nomads writ large. I figure their conditioning might have been as rigorous as the
Romans, but the presence of the baggage train must have been a serious restraint on any
flexibility of movement and any thought of formal tactical training.
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They had to defend their families. This fact tied them down to a static defensive perimeter. They
had to forage, affecting the numbers of effectives under arms. The Romans could threaten the
families at any time and thus force the Cimbri to battle at any time. The Romans could therefore
establish a local superiority at one point, while the rest of the defensive force was in a defensive
posture. Wolves against a flock of sheep.

The migratory tribe would have no recourse to this kind of tactical accommodation. I'm racking
my brain to think of defensive mechanisms they could have used to protect their column and still
field a flying, independent force capable of taking the offensive to the Romans... I don't see it.
These guys were at a severe disadvantage to the Romans.

But can you imagine the fodder requirements for an enormous cavalry force? It would have
made the physical footprint of the group even larger... Hmmm, lacking a sedentary place of
residence, there would be no agriculture to speak of... everything would be hunting and
gathering. Sad...

Marius' Choice of Terrain

This is something I learned from having 4 older brothers... who were, in their own ways, quite
the barbarians. When one has a smaller force, freedom of movement is critical. You can run
away from... or around behind an opponent. If the terrain had been limiting, it would have, on
one hand channelized your enemy to a limited front, perhaps giving you a local parity. But, woe
to you if the larger force gets behind you, or the terrain limits your movement, and you get
crushed--the hammer upon the anvil, and no place to run.

The camp as the anvil... Did the camp have fortifications of any significance? The camp would
only have been a refuge if it had a defensive perimeter. It was probably an unprotected
encampment. Even if they had erected palisades, the simplest siege equipment could have
penetrated them. I think that the only chance they had ended when the cavalry broke. Sometimes,
I don't like the Romans very much.

Vercingetorix’s Decision

I truly think that Vercingetorix thought that between the expected relief column and the
oncoming winter, the Romans would crack. I scratch my head in wonder that V-man didn't order
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a harassing force to stick around, outside the siege, and make foraging rough on the Romans. He
gave Caesar a too free hand to put his plans into effect.

Don't forget they were used to building legionary camps at the end of every day. I've seen 1.6
miles as the perimeter of the double walled camp, in a Polybian description. Ten legions, given
the materials could build 16 miles of wall in a day. So the basics of the fortifications could well
be in place in 4 or 5 days... sounds like the hundred-acre wood just got smaller.

Total War in Gaul

I still haven't decided if it was Rome, or Caesar, who was intent on dominating Gaul. War was
indisputably a part of Roman politics. Caesar had to be aware that Gaul, in spite of all the killing
and slave-taking, was going to still be ethnically Gallic--and therefore, it was in Rome's interest
to integrate as much as to conquer.

The only thing I can see to counter my tendency to see Caesar as a blunt militarist is that his
early efforts were in response to allied Gallic suffering at Germanic hands. But even that is
tempered... by early 52BCE, he'd overstayed his welcome and the expectation of a permanent
submission to Rome got everybody all riled up.

It just occurs to me... it is possible that Caesar was doing to Europe what Alexander the Great did
going west? I know Caesar compared himself favorably to Alexander. Was Caesar setting up the
conditions for a fusion of the Gallic and Roman peoples as Alexander was for the Greco-
Persians? Perhaps that is why Caesar stuck around Europe so long. And Britain... he might have
been trying to reach the end of the world--like Alexander.

Had there been a single Germano-Gallic Empire to conquer, the peoples of the area might have
been more amenable to being ruled. But NO! He had to have ornery darn Germans to deal with.

Gauls, Germans and Huns... Oh My! Sorry.... it's been a long day. One must take humor where
one finds it.

I am made, once again, to think of the "challenge and response" paradigm asserted by Toynbee
in his "A Study of History". If one does not respond effectively to a challenge... what happens?
The challenge manifests itself again, at a later time. The reactions of the actors, at the time events
happen, decide the issue when the encounter takes place.
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Relief Force Tactics

The relief force apparently did not commit their infantry forces in the initial attack.
(Goldsworthy, Caesar 339-340)

If the map on 337 is correct and the relief force did approach from the SW... I would have tried
to push between forts Kilo and Alfa; put a blocking force to keep Alfa bottled up with cavalry to
fall on them if they ventured out; and, turning the flank of the interior force out along the plain.
The I would have fought a withdrawal out the same way I came in...

Caesar's account

Have you noticed how similar Caesar's narrative can be to Arrian's writings about Alexander,
written about 120 years later?
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I'm wondering if their writing styles (if not their sense of military honor as Arrian achieved the
consulship c 130AD under Hadrian, followed by several governorships) were affected by:

 both Caesar and Arrian enjoying access to the same sources about Alexander.
 both being products of an exposure to Greek literature in general. (Cary 308)

I see a chicken and an egg here and am not sure which came first.

Number of Gauls

If the numbers are accurate, with the 240k representing the total contingent strength... and they
had... say, a 30% combatant-to-tail ratio, it would have fielded about 80,000 fighters... approx 8
US Civil War era infantry divisions... not quite three Corps. The 60,000 would be about 6
divisions and represent a 25% tail ratio.

With a bit of discipline, it could be done. But, given my vision of their quality, in that regard, I
agree with your assessment of "unwieldy".

David G Terrell
Herndon, Virginia

Cary, M, and H H Scullard. A History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine. 3rd Edition.
New York: Palgrave, 1975.

Le Bohec, Yann. The Imperial Roman Army. Translated by Raphael Bate. New York: Routledge,
2001.

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