-Indeed it is a general rule of statutory construction
that courts may take judicial notice of the origin and
1. November 29, 1920
In re Application of MAX SHOOP for admission to
practice law
- Max Shoop for admission to practice law in the
Philippines Islands under paragraph four of the Rules
for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to
the Practice of Law, effective July 1, 1920
-under paragraph 1 of the New York rule there exists
between that jurisdiction and this, with reference to
admission of attorneys without examination, a basis of
comity sufficient to satisfy the requirement in the rule
of this court in that regard.
-Jurisprudence is the groundwork of the written law,
or, as Bouvier defines it, "The science of law. The
particular science of giving a wise interpretation to the
laws and making a just application of them to call
cases as they arise." In an untechnical sense, it
sometimes means Case Law.
-concept of a common law is the concept of a growing
and ever-changing system of legal principles and
theories. and it must be recognized that due to the
modern tendency toward codification (which was the
principle of the Roman and Civil Law), there are no
jurisdictions to-day with a pure English Common Law,
with the exception of England itself.
-English Common Law principles as embodied in
Anglo-American Jurisprudence are used and applied
by the courts to the extent that such Common Law
principles are not in conflict with the local written laws,
customs, and institutions as modified by the change of
sovereignty and subsequent legislation, and there is
no other foreign case law system used to any
substantial extent, then it is proper to say in the sense
of the New York rule that the "jurisprudence" of the
Philippine Islands is based on the English Common
Law.
-Its manifest purpose and object was to replace the
old judicial system, with its incidents and traditions
drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system
modelled in all its essential characteristics upon the
judicial system of the United States.
history of the statutes which they are called upon to
construe and administer, and of the facts which affect
their derivation, validity and operation
-Spanish law became highly codified during the
nineteenth century. All of the laws of Spain were,
however, not made applicable to the Philippine
Islands; only those were effective here which were
extended by royal decree.
Penal Code 1887
Code of Commerce 1888
Ley Provisional, Code of Criminal Procedure, and
Code of Civil Procedure 1888
Civil Code 1889
(Except portion relating to marriage, thus reviving a
portion of Marriage Law of 1870.) Marriage Law
1870
Mortgage Law 1889
Railway Laws 1875 and 1877
Law of Waters 1866
-Spanish jurisprudence does not recognize the
principle of stare decisis; consequently
-When there is no law exactly applicable to the point
in controversy, the customs of the place shall be
observed and in the absence thereof, the general
principles of law
-The Partidas is a code law and cannot in any proper
sense be considered as Common Law. It specifically
provided, however, for recourse to customs when the
written law was silent. He formulates the rule that
courts are governed: first, by written law; second, by
the customs of the place; third, by judicial decision;
and fourth, by general principles of law.
-. Also, all Spanish laws, customs, and rights of
property inconsistent with the Constitution and
American principles and institutions were thereupon
superseded
1
-bulk of present day Statute Law is derivative from
Anglo-American sources; derivative within the sense
of having been copied, and in the sense of having
been enacted by Congress or by virtue of its authority
-atty gen Araneta: Philippine Islands in cases not
controlled by statute will lay down principles in
keeping with the common law, unless the habits,
customs, and thoughts of the people of these Islands
are deemed to be so different from the habits,
customs, and thoughts of the people of England and
the United States that said principles may not be
applied here
- Philippine Common Law supplements and amplifies
our statute law.
Philippine Islands similar to those privileges accorded
by the rule of this court.
Accordingly, the supporting papers filed by the
applicant in this case showing to the satisfaction of
the court his qualifications as an attorney-at-law, his
petition is hereby granted and he is admitted to the
practice of law in the Philippine Islands.
2. G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

-Philippine Common Law), based upon the English vs.

Common Law in its present day form of an Anglo-
American Common Law, which common law is THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
effective in all of the subjects of law in this jurisdiction
in so far as it does not conflict with the express -Title: Anggara v Electoral Commission
language of the written law or with the local customs
and institutions.
Citation: 63 Phil 136

-CONCLUSIONS.
Topic: Separation of Powers

We may summarize our conclusions as follows:

(1) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory

Facts:
of the United States, under a civil government
established by the Congress.
In the elections for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the
(2) In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written
Province of Tayabas on September 17, 1935, Jose A.
laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decision in
Angara the petitioner, and the respondents, Pedro
cases not covered by the letter of the written law, this
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were
court relies upon the theories and precedents of
candidates. On October 7, 1935 petitioner Angara
Anglo- American cases, subject to the limited
was proclaimed as member-elect of the National
exception of those instances where the remnants of
Assembly of the said district having received the most
the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law
number of votes. That on December 3, 1935 the
theories and of the few cases where such precedents
National Assembly in session assembled and passed
are inconsistent with local customs and institutions.
Resolution No. 8 declaring petitioner Angara as the
winner.
(3) The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon
the English Common Law in its present day form of
On December 8, 1935 the respondent Pedro Ynsua
Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive
filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of
extent.
Protest against petitioner Jose A. Angara, praying that
the respondent be declared elected member of the
(4) By virtue of the foregoing, the New York rule, National Assembly or that the election of said position
given a reasonable interpretation, permits conferring be nullified.
privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the

2
On December 20, 2015 petitioner Angara filed a
“Motion to Dismissed the Protest”, alleging that
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its prerogative to
prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented; and that
the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and the
acceptance formula for, the limitation of said period;
and lastly the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period.
Petitioner also prayed that the Resolution No. 8 of the
National Assembly is valid and should be respected
and obeyed, and that the Constitution confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission
solely as regards to the contested elections of the
National Assembly so therefore the Supreme Court
has no jurisdiction to it.
That on December 27, 1935 respondent Ynsua filed
an ”Answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that
there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of protest against the election of a
member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
The case was submitted for decision to the Electoral
Commission on January 23, 1936 and promulgated a
resolution denying herein petitioner’s “Motion to
Dismiss the Protest”
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Electoral Commission
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest in the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of
the National Assembly?
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to the Electoral Commission being the sole
judge as regards to the merits of contested elections
to the National Assembly
Rulings:
1. We hold, therefore, that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein
petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can
Not in any manner toll the time for filing protests
against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest
within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission
Might prescribe.
2. (a) That the government established by the
Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive
and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial
review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that
no one branch or agency of the government
transcends
3. [No. L-6120. June 30, 1953]
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, petitioner, vs. FELICISIMO
OCAMPO, as Judge-at-large presiding over Branch C
of the Court of First Instance of Manila and Eugenion
Angeles, as City Fiscal of Manila, representing the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
-SUBSTANTIVE MATTER, DISTINGUISHED BY
PROCEDURAL.—.A. substantive law creates, defines
or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property,
or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the
administration of public .affairs, whereas rules of
3
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by
which substantive rights may be enforced in courts of
justice.
-This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent
Judge from proceeding with the trial of two criminal
cases which were then pending against petitioner
without the assistance of assessors
-Revised Charter of the City of Manila, approved on
June 18, 1949, and respondents assail the
constitutionality of said section in that it contravenes
the constitutional provision that the rules of court
"shall he uniform for all courts of the same grade
- aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal
action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First
Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the
manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure."
-that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the
rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of
the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in
said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said
statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409.
-Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now
comes to this court imputing abuse of discretion to the
respondent Judge.
The issues now posed by petitioner are:
"I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of
assessors is an absolute substantive right, and the
duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.
-"II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a
substantive right, cannot be impaired by this court in
the exercise of its rule-making power.
"III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
Section 2477 of the Old Charter of Manila, creating
the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are
substantive law and were not repealed by Rules of
Court.
-"V. Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not
invalid class legislation and does not violate the
constitutional provision that the rules of pleading,
practice and procedure 'shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade.' "
-claim would be correct if we were to hold that the
right to trial with the aid of assessors is not sub-
stantive but procedural or adjective in nature. If it were
merely procedural, not having been incorporated in
the Rules of Court, the logical conclusion is that the
rule-making power has deemed wise to eliminate it.
-why the provisions concerning trial by assessors
embodied in the Code f Civil Procedure have not been
incorporated by the Supreme Court in the present
Rules of Court. To have done so, it would have been
a travesty of its rule-making power which, by direct
mandate of the Con¬stitution, is limited to matters
referring to pleading, prac¬tice and procedure
- concerning trial by assessors embodied in the Code
of Civil Procedure are not wholly substantive but
portions thereof are remedial such as those which
refer to the method of summoning assessors,
enforcing their attendance, ex- cusing them from
attendance, their compensation, oath, duties and
effect of dissent from the opinion
-we cannot but hold that the observations made by
respondents to the effect that the reference made to
said provisions in section 49 is a mere surplusage, or
was due to a mere oversight, has no legal basis, as
such innuendo would be tantamount to imputing lack
of foresight, if not brazen negligence, to our legislative
body.
-It is finally contended that section 49 of Republic Act
No. 409 is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional provisions that procedural rules "shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade" and,
therefore, it is a class legislation. This contention
cannot be entertained; firstly, because it is raised for
the first time in this in stance, a procedural defect
which would bar any further discussion on the matter
following well-known precedents1 and, secondly,
because it is not correct that at present only in Manila
trial with the aid of assessors may be invoked if we
will sustain the theory that the promul¬gation of the
Rules of Court did not have the effect of repealing the
provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure.
4. No. L-32166. October 18, 1977.*
4
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN, CFI, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA,
GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES,
NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLITO DEL ROSARIO,
accused-appellees.
-An offense punishable with a fine up to P500.00 falls
under the concurrent jurisdiction of a provincial capital
town court and the Court of First Instance. The order
of the former is directly appealable to the Supreme
Court.—It is obvious that the crime of electro fishing,
which is punishable with a fine up to P50. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize
it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any
legal basis.
-An administrative regulation must be in harmony with
law; it must not amend an act of the legislature. An
administrative agency can have only the
administrative or policing powers expressly or by
necessary implication conferred upon it.
-It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused
in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro
fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta.
Cruz. electrocuting device locally known as ‘senso’
with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or
other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire
attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct
and with the use of these devices or equipments
catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any
aquatic animals within its currect reach, to the
detriment and prejudice of the populace. The lower
court further held that, since the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it unlawful.
-Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who
uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing
with a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor
more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not
less than six months nor more than five years.
-Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G.
1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine
waters. The order is quoted below:
“SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN
ALL WATERS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
-Prohibition.—It shall be unlawful for any person to
engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of
electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters
except for research, educational and scientific
purposes with permit
-The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p.
11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable
under section 83 of the Fisheries Law. assumption is
incorrect because section 3 of the aforequoted
Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fine of not
exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro
fishing,
-are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
-The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize
it
-The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive
official the power to declare what acts should
constitute a criminal offense.
-However, at present, there is no more doubt that
electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law
and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive
regulation because Presidential Decree No. 704
-the rule-making power of executive officials and
administrative agencies and, in particular, of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now
Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries
Law sustains the view that he exceeded his authority
in penalizing electro fishing by means of an
administrative order.
-An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress
5
-Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic
principle that “administrative or executive acts, orders
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.”
-case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule
or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic
law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law
-It has been held that “to declare what shall constitute
a crime and how it shall be punished is a power
vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be
delegated to any other body or agency
-the instant case the regulation penalizing electro
fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries
Law, under which the regulation was issued, because
the law itself does not expressly punish electro
fishing.
-WHEREFORE, the lower court’s decision of June 9,
1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and
the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is
affirmed
-And since the instant case was filed in the municipal
court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the
order of dismissal rendered by that municipal court
was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court
of First Instance of Laguna (
5. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985.*
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO,
and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President,
-Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure
the enforcement of a public duty (e.g. the publication
in the Official Gazette of Presidential Decrees, LOI,
etc.) are real parties in interest in mandamus case.—
-Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date
of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the
Official Gazette
. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia
legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
-; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication of
Presidential decrees and issuances as it uses the
words “shall be published.”—The very first clause of
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There
shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word
“shall” used therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality.
-But administrative and executive orders and those
which affect only a particular class of persons need
not be published.—The publication of all presidential
issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures
or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures,
-Due Process; Publication of Presidential decrees and
issuances of general application is a matter of due
process.—
-Presidential Decrees and issuances of general
application which have not been published shall have
no force and effect
-e; Implementation of Presidential Decrees prior to
their publication in the Official Gazette may have
consequences which cannot be ignored.—Similarly,
the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is “an operative fact.
B. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.*
6
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO,
and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President
- The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2
of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to
the requirement of publication
-this clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous publication.
-For purposes of the prior publication requirement for
effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only to those of
general application, but also to laws of local
application, private laws; administrative rules
enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank
circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act;
but not mere interpretative rules regulating and
providing guidelines for purposes of internal
operations only
-. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people only, and not to
the public as a whole.
-—We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
6. G.R. No. 104037. May 29, 1992.*
REYNALDO V. UMALI, petitioner, vs. HON. JESUS
P. ESTANISLAO, Secretary of Finance, and HON.
JOSE U. ONG, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
-Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30
January 1992 which is after fifteen (15) days following
its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya".—
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took
effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15)
days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in
the "Malaya."
- Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE
BASIC PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL
EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO INDIVIDUALS FOR
INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY
THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH (L), ITEMS
(1) AND (2) (A) OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES."
-The said act was signed and approved by the
President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14
January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general
circulation.
-EFFECTIVITY.—These regulations shall take effect
on compensation income from January 1, 1992."
-On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No.
104069 likewise filed a petition for mandamus and
prohibition on their behalf as well as for those other
individual taxpayers who might be similarly situated,
to compel the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
implement the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting
the personal and additional exemptions allowable to
individuals for income tax purposes in regard to
income earned or received in 1991
- Thus, the implementing regulations collide frontally
with Section 3 of Rep, Act 7167 which states that the
statute "shall take effect upon its approval.
-WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue
Regulations No. 1-92 which provide that the
regulations shall take effect on compensation income
earned or received from 1 January 1992 are hereby
SET ASIDE. They should take effect on compensation
income earned or received from 1 January 1991.
Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992,
the individual taxpayers entitled to the increased
exemptions on compensation income earned during
calendar year 1991 who may have filed their income
tax returns on or before 15 April
7. G.R. No. 132593. June 25, 1999.*
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondent.
7

- The legislative intent is to protect incumbents who
are receiving salaries and/or allowances over and
above those authorized by Republic Act 6758 by
allowing them to continue to receive the same even
after Republic Act 6758 took effec
-the legislature has manifested its intent to gradually
phase out this privilege without upsetting the policy of
non-diminution of pay and consistent with the rule that
laws should only be applied prospectively in the spirit
of fairness and justice.
-There was no intention on the part of the legislature
to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by
incumbents of government positions at the time of the
passage of Republic Act 6758 by virtue of Sections 12
and 17 thereof.—
-PITC officials who availed of the subject car plan
benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July
1, 1989. Thus, it was legal and proper for them to
continue enjoying said benefits within the five year
period from date of purchase of the vehicle allowed by
their Car Loan Agreements with PITC.
-DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM
pursuant to Section 23 of Republic Act 6758 is of no
force and effect due to the absence of publication
thereof in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation.—COA relied on DBM-CCC No. 10
as basis for the disallowance of the subject car plan
benefits
-Due Process; Publication is required as a condition
precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the
public of the contents of the law or rules and
regulations before their rights and interests are
affected by the same.—
-has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10
has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for
publication in the Official Gazette per letter to the
National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999
-The answer is in the negative, precisely, for the
reason that publication is required as a condition
precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the
public of the contents of the law or rules and
regulations before their rights and interests are
affected by the same
-special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered
by a subsequent general law by mere implication.—
Petitioner argues that RA 6758 which is a law of
general application cannot repeal provisions of the
Revised Charter of PITC and its amendatory laws
expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage
being special laws
-Henceforth, PITC should now be considered as
covered by laws prescribing a compensation and
position classification system in the government
including Republic Act 6758, without prejudice to the
non-diminution of pay of incumbents as of July 1,
1989 as provided in Sections 12 and 17 of said law.—
-In the case at bar, the repeal by Section 16 of RA
6758 of “all corporate charters that exempt agencies
from the coverage of the System” was clear and
expressed necessarily to achieve the purposes for
which the law was enacted, that is, the
standardization of salaries of all employees in
government owned and/or controlled corporations to
achieve “equal pay for substantially equal work”
-a period of five (5) years from the date the vehicle
was purchased. The terms and conditions of the car
plan are embodied in a ‘Car Loan Agreement.’3 Per
PITC’s car plan guidelines, the purpose of the plan is
to provide financial assistance to qualified employees
in purchasing their own transportation facilities in the
performance of their work, for representation, and
personal use.4
-Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), entitled “An Act
Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and For
Other Purposes,”
-% of the yearly car registration and insurance
premiums and 50% of the costs of registration of the
chattel mortgage over the car) made after November
1, 1989 was disallowed by the resident COA auditor.
-ehicle being utilized by the officer is actually being
used for corporate purposes because the officer
concerned is no longer entitled to utilize company-
owned vehicles for official business once he/she has
availed of a car plan.
-DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
8
general circulation in the Philippines.(condition
precedent)
the case at bar, the disallowance of the subject car
plan benefits would hamper the officials in the
performance of their functions to promote and develop
trade which requires mobility in the performance of
official business
-WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, the
assailed Decisions of the Commission on Audit are
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. 148579. February 5, 2007.*
GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD, respondent.
-Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB); The Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB) is empowered to
screen, review and examine all motion pictures and
television programs including publicity materials.—
Section 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB
-The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power of
review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7,
such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited
by the Philippine Government and/or departments and
agencies, and (2) newsreels.
-On the other hand, petitioner claims that “Muro Ami:
The Making” was a public affairs program. Even if that
were so, our resolution of this issue would not
change. This Court has already ruled that a public
affairs program—described as a variety of news
treatment; a cross between pure television news and
news-related commentaries, analysis and/or
exchange of opinions—is within the MTRCB’s power
of review
-Right to Information; Administrative issuances which
are not published or filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the
University of the Philippines Law Center are
ineffective and may not be enforced; Memorandum
Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties
for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting
programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been
registered with the ONAR as of 27 January 2000—
petitioner TV company was not bound by said circular
and should not have been meted the sanction
provided there
-GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF
television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7,
2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of
suspension against petitioner for airing “Muro Ami:
The Making” without first securing a permit from it as
provided in Section 7 of PD 1986
-The pivotal issues for our resolution are:
1. (1)whether the MTRCB has the power or
authority to review the show “Muro Ami: The Making”
prior to its broadcast by television and
-First, Section 3 of PD 19865 empowers the MTRCB
to screen, review and examine all motion pictures,
television programs including publicity materials. This
power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and
Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which
reads:
“SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW.
—No motion picture, television program or related
publicity material shall be imported, exported,
produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited
or broadcasted by television without prior permit
issued.
-Court has already ruled that a public affairs program
-- described as a variety of news treatment; a cross
between pure television news and news-related
commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions
—is within the MTRCB’s power of review.8 Clearly,
“Muro Ami: The Making” (which petitioner claims to be
a public affairs program) was well within the purview
of MTRCB’s power of prior review
2. (2)whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17
was enforceable and binding on petitioner.
-Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for
the penalties for the first, second and third offenses
for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit,
has not been registered with the ONAR as of January
9
27, 2000.10 Hence, the same is yet to be effective.11
It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in
the ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound
by said circular and should not have been meted the
sanction provided thereunder
-WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 18, 2001, insofar as it affirmed the public
respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board’s jurisdiction over “Muro Ami: The
Making,” is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the suspension order issued
against petitioner GMA Network, Inc. pursuant to
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is hereby declared
null and void.
9. Garcillano v HoR
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly
containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly
between the President of the Philippines and a high-
ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented
public attention and thrust the country into a
controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present
administration on the line, and resulted in the near-
collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes,
allegedly contained the President’s instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to
become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses
of Congress.1
-Such conversation was recorded and was played
during the house of representative investigation.
Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed
before the court praying that such playing of the
illegally seized communication was in violation of RA
4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition
for injunction prays that the Senate committee be
prevented from further conducting such investigation
for the basic reason that there was no proper
publication of the senate rules, empowering them to
make such investigation of the unlawfully seized
documents.
Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of
the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed
with their investigation?
-The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation
of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."
-Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
-arguing that the rules have never been amended
since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web
page. Incorrect: . R.A. 8792 considers an electronic
data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for
evidentiary purposes
- rules that they will observe was not properly
published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the
land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of
the required publication will put a person’s life, liberty
and property at stake without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is
DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued
enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any
inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello
Garci" tapes.
10. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sereno G.R. No.
237428 May 11, 2018
-JBC agreed to require the applicants for the Chief
Justice position to submit, instead of the usual
10
submission of the SALNs for the last two years of
public service, all previous SALNs up to December
31, 2011 for those I government service.
-, respondent submitted to the ORSN her SALNs for
the year 2009, 2010, and 2011. Respondent also
executed a waiver of confidentiality of her local and
foreign bank accounts.
-respondent was listed as applicant No. 14 with an
opposite annotation that she has “COMPLETE
REQUIREMENTS” and a note stating “Letter 7/23/12
– considering that her government records in the
academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable
to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.”
A month after respondent’s acceptance of her
nomination, or on August 24, 2012, respondent was
appointed by then President Aquino III as Chief
Justice
-As such, Petitioner file a case for quo warranto
against the incumbent Chief Justice as ineligible to
hold the highest post in the Judiciary for failing to
regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth
as a member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as
Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court, in violation of the
Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law, and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
-ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court can assume
jurisdiction and give due recourse to the instant
petition for quo warranto against respondent who is
an impeachable officer and against whom an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with
the House of Re presentatives
-The Court has jurisdiction over the instant Petition for
Quo Warranto.
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part,
provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
-Quo warranto and impeachment can proceed
independently and simultaneously. The term “quo
warranto” is Latin for “by what authority
-be no forum shopping in this case despite the
pendency of the impeachment proceedings before the
House of Representatives. The cause of action in the
two proceedings are unequivocally different.
2) Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the
ground of prescription
-No. Prescription does not lie against the State.
Reference must necessarily be had to Section 3, Rule
66 which makes it compulsory for the Solicitor
General to commence a quo warranto action:
-explains that the remedy of quo warranto is intended
to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority
unlawfully asserted. Indeed, quo warranto serves to
end a continuous usurpation.
-Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of
the novel issues imbued with public interest presented
before the Court than to dismiss the case outright
merely on technicality
3) Whether respondent failed to comply with the
submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if
so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC
voids the nomination and appointment of respondent
as Chief Justice
-Respondents chronically failed to file her SALNs and
thus violated the Constitution, the law and the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
- A member of the Judiciary who commits such
violations cannot be deemed to be a person of proven
integrity. Also, the invalidity of respondent’s
appointment springs from her lack of qualifications
Decision
Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED. Respondent
Maria Lourdes P.A Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED
from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAFULLY
HOLDING and EXERCISING THE OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent is
OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom
11
12