SPOUSES BERNYL BALANGAUAN & KATHERENE BALANGAUAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL NINETEENTH (19TH) DIVISION, CEBU CITY & THE
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LTD., respondents.

G. R. No. 174350 August 13, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Katherene was a Premier Customer Services Representative (PCSR) of respondent bank, HSBC. As a PCSR, she managed
the accounts of HSBC depositors with Premier Status. One such client and/or depositor handled by her was Roger Dwayne York
(York).

Petitioner Katherene being on vacation at the time, York was attended to by another PCSR. While at the bank, York inquired about
the status of his time deposit in the amount of P2,500,000.00. The PCSR representative who attended to him, however, could not find
any record of said placement in the bank’s data base. York insisted that through petitioner Katherene, he made a placement. It was
likewise discovered that the above-mentioned deposits were transacted using petitioner Katherene’s computer and work station using
the code or personal password "CEO8." So as not to ruin its name and goodwill among its clients, respondent HSBC reimbursed
York the P2,500,000.00.

Respondent HSBC, through its personnel, filed a criminal complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Cebu City. Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene submitted their joint counter-affidavit basically denying the allegations
contained in the affidavits of the aforenamed employees of respondent HSBC as well as that made by York.

Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) found no probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the
criminal complaint of estafa and/or qualified estafa, particularly Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the ACP
recommended the dismissal of respondent HSBC’s complaint. Respondent HSBC appealed the above-quoted resolution and
foregoing comment to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review. The Chief State Prosecutor, Jovencito R. Zuño,
for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition, denying respondent HSBC’s recourse. Respondent HSBC’s Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by the DOJ.Respondent HSBC then went to the Court of Appeals by means of a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision granting respondent HSBC’s petition, thereby annulling and setting aside the twin
resolutions of the DOJ. In reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene contend that the
Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals, when it resolved to grant the petition in CA-G.R. CEB. SP No. 00068, did so on two grounds, i.e., 1) that "the
public respondent (DOJ) gravely abused his discretion in finding that there was no reversible error on the part of the Cebu City
Prosecutor dismissing the case against the private respondent without stating the facts and the law upon which this conclusion was
made"; and 2) that "the public respondent (DOJ) made reference to the facts and circumstances of the case leading to his finding that
no probable cause exists, x x x (the) very facts and circumstances (which) show that there exists a probable cause to believe that
indeed the private respondents committed the crimes x x x charged against them."

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJ’s failure to identify and discuss the issues raised by the respondent HSBC in its Petition
for Review filed therewith. And, in support thereof, respondent HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue that "it was not necessary
for the Secretary of Justice to have his resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was based," because courts and quasi-
judicial bodies should faithfully comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by them
should state clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which the decision is based.

It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable
cause. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:

[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

Though some cases describe the public prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is
true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin
to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and other
than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as
judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause
to file an Information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former’s
order or resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no
application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved
respondent HSBC’s motion for reconsideration.

This Court cannot find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, when it reversed and set aside the resolutions of
the DOJ. There is no showing that the appellate court acted in an arbitrary and despotic manner, so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion or unilateral refusal to perform its legally mandated duty. On the contrary, we find the assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals to be more in accordance with the evidence on record and relevant laws and jurisprudence than the resolutions of
the DOJ.

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced and our disquisition above, we hereby dismiss the instant petition for
being the wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court, as well as for petitioner Bernyl and Katherene’s failure to sufficiently
show that the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,

vs.

BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA

GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.

G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969

Facts:

Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial
hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first
witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through
counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing,
on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority. Then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal
in character, he prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.

The lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from
hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee
posting a bond in the amount of P500.00

Issue: Whether or not petitioner-appellee could be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party
proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice.
Ruling:

A decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent
Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and
against himself." Hence this appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the
petitioner-appellee.

1. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only
to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in
character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged.
He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater
deprivation.

To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American Supreme Court opinion highly
persuasive in character. In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it
should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it."
We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice
the medical profession.

2. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused
has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony,
to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more
in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due
weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ...
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."

It could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on
appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand
without his consent.

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner,

vs.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

Facts:

On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which
prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019 be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit.

Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14
March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings.

Sen. Estrada’s request was made "[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)." It was denied by the Ombdusman.
Issue: Whether or not Sen. Estrada's Constitutional Right to Due Process of Law was violated.

Ruling: The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is
not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront
and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited
to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable
guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie
evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and
the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for
a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence
needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only
more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we
borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of
proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are
finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to
substantial evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint
Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted
Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The
Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond
what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary
investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations
without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The
present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations
governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a
decision against the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is
required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to
establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an
actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the
fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and
supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations
invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all
courts throughout the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the
prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released
from prison because their conviction violated constitutional due process.

JOSEFINA CADA, Petitioner, v. TIME SAVER LAUNDRY/LESLIE PEREZ, Respondents.

[G.R. NO. 181480 : January 30, 2009]

Facts:

Petitioner filed before the NLRC a Complaint against respondents for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary, nonpayment of
overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA,
separation pay and attorney's fees. Respondent TSL is a sole proprietorship engaged in the laundry business. Respondent Perez is the
owner/proprietor of TSL.

Petitioner alleged that she was employed by the respondents on 2002 as Presser, receiving a salary of P220.00 per day. She worked
for 12 hours a day, from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., but she was not paid overtime pay. She also did not receive holiday pay, premium
pay for holidays and rest days, 5 days service incentive leave pay (SILP), and 13th month pay. While she was working on 2003, the
management called her attention for quarreling with her co-employee. Without giving her an opportunity to explain and defend her
side, petitioner was sent home and prevented to work further, compelling her to file the Complaint for illegal dismissal against
respondents.

Labor Arbiter ruled finding complainant to have been illegally dismissed, she is entitled to payment of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement as aforestated and backwages. Respondents appealed to the NLRC essentially arguing that they were denied due
process on the ground of improper service of summons and that the monetary award in favor of petitioner was without basis. The
NLRC issued its Resolution sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals held that respondent Perez
was indeed denied due process

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents that right to due process was denied.

In quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC and its arbitration branch, procedural rules governing service of summons are not
strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. The constitutional requirement of due process with respect to service
of summons only exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the
service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered, the traditional notion of fair
play is satisfied, due process is served.

To apply the technical rules on service of summons would be to overturn the bias of the Constitution and the laws in favor of labor.
In labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules maybe relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should not
defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. This Court is ever mindful of the underlying
spirit and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively without resort to technical rules.

In Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, we expounded on the presumption of regularity
in the service of summons and other notices, to wit:

[U]nless the contrary is proven, official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly
conducted. This presumption of the regularity of the quasi-judicial proceedings before DOLE includes the presumption of regularity
of service of summons and other notices. x x x.
Moreover, it is a legal presumption, based on wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly performed; that the
proceedings of a judicial (and quasi-judicial) tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial (quasi-judicial) acts and duties have been
and will be duly and properly performed.4The burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct, if any, is on the part of
respondents who, in this case, clearly failed to discharge the same.

It has not escaped our attention the respondents' denial of receipt of the notices from the Labor Arbiter, yet they were able to receive
a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision and file a timely appeal with the NLRC.

Indeed, respondents were able to seek the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter when they seasonably filed
their appeal before the NLRC. A party who has availed himself of the opportunity to present his position cannot claim to have been
denied due process. Despite such opportunity, respondents failed to convincingly establish that their defense is meritorious.

Undoubtedly, respondents were afforded ample opportunity to be heard. Despite any purported procedural flaw that may have marred
the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, it should be deemed rectified in the subsequent proceedings in the NLRC, to the Court of
Appeals, and before this Court.

G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.

MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M.
DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,
MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 165636 April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO Petitioner,

vs.

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE, JACKIE AQUINO-
GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in
their capacity as members of the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M.
DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR.,
MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the MTRCB Respondents.

Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito]
kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae
yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host
of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating
Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986 , creating the MTRCB, in relation
to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB
Rules of Procedure

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other
members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case.

Issues:
Whether or not the Order of preventive suspension promulgated by respondent [MTRCB] against the television program Ang Dating
Daan is null and void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Petitioner’s contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or
quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or
authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the
inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.

A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to
issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its
power of regulation and supervision.

Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:

Section 3. Powers and Functions.—The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

xxxx

c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production, x x x exhibition and/or
television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in
the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to:

xxxx

vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead;

xxxx

(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition,
and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures,
programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x
produced, copied, reproduced, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;

xxxx

k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this
Act x x x. (Emphasis added.)

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s authority and functions expressly set forth in
PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant,
deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in
accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television."

Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate
and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its
power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.