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rather, self-consciousness as desire), the two ideas need to be situated within their logical
place in the Phenomenology – that is to say, within the sub-chapter 'self-certainty' – and
they need to be described independently of the overarching structure of the book. This will
entail describing the shortcomings of Hegelian desire, and will end up describing how a
another animate self-consciousness, an 'other' that can resist – is necessary for self-
consciousness. That is the goal of this paper: to unpack the definition of self-consciousness
Consciousness' begins with a sub-section called 'self-certainty'. As the former chapter tried
to prove the reality of what our senses tell us as purely observing subjects ('sense-
objects, or rather that those 'external' objects are conditioned and experienced by pure
subjectivity. Though, as the propositions in sense-certainty fell under the weight of internal
truly is' because of contradictions between trying to talk about a singular, particular object,
and having to describe this object with multiple, universal terms (e.g. 'redness' or
'roundness'). These contradictions lead to the conclusion that the subject-object dualism is
to be done away with, or as Hegel puts it, “In the previous modes of certainty what is true
for consciousness is something other than itself. But the Notion of this truth vanishes in the
experience of it” (§166, p. 104). The destruction of such a dualism is the grounding for self-
certainty: in the absence of some externally existing object to ground a Truth, or the
'Absolute', the 'I', or self, becomes the object for inquiry. This association of self as the
Absolute Hegel says is a, “certainty which is identical with its truth” since, “the certainty is to
itself its own object, and consciousness is to itself the truth” (§166, p. 104). This is the first
sense-certainty, that is, that an 'I' is 'what-is', and that this singular 'I' is all there is.
This solipsism doesn't totally negate that there are 'other' things in the world of
experience though, “In this [self-certainty] there is indeed an otherness; that is to say,
consciousness makes a distinction, but one which at the same time is for consciousness
not a distinction” (§166, p. 104). What this seemingly paradoxical statement aims to say is
that other objects are there in some sense – even the greatest of solipsists still eat, and
bath, and make first to keep warm (a contradiction that becomes an issue for Hegel later in
the book, but which is rather irrelevant here) – but that their 'existence isn't something
independent of a self and is instead a very continuation of this 'being'. At this point, only
because there is an 'I' at all are there objects in the world. That's how the object can both be
This movement to the 'I', being the subject of this dialectical process, Hegel can thus
characterize as the “native realm of truth” (§167, p. 104). This is because self-
consciousness is the first fully mediated stage in the journey to the Absolute. Whereas
consciousness was simply the realm of 'common sense', pre-reflective and pre-
this is a movement forward, it is not an end, and thus self-consciousness is fraught with
contradiction. And as has been said beforehand, the contradiction lies in desire.
As said before, self-consciousness has to make a non-distinctive distinction between
itself and objects. This becomes impossible though: if objects are just extensions of one's
being, of an 'I' (as is the claim of self-certainty), then those objects are indistinguishable
from the 'I'. As Hegel puts it, “self-consciousness is the return from otherness” and, “what it
[self-consciousness] distinguishes from itself is only itself as itself … the difference is not
and it is only the motionless tautology of: 'I am I'” (§167, p. 105). This is because two
indistinguishable objects are unable to be torn apart from each other, at least in the sense of
perceiving those objects in any way. For example, take two objects – two apples, let's say: if
all of their properties are the same (color, spatial dimensions, chemical makeup, etc.), then
there is no meaningful way to distinguish the one apple from the other. Similarly, if an object
is just an extension of the being of an 'I', then there's no meaningful way to tell the
difference between that object and the 'I'. This is problematic because the 'I' is then a
'motionless tautology', and as a tautology, the 'I' then becomes meaningless. Thus the
of meaning for the self, the 'I' – an end that is the opposite of the intention of such a
movement.
To make this point a bit clearer, it has to be understood that Hegel posits two
different principles about the world (in the consciousness chapter): one, that an object is
only identical to itself, and two, that an object can only be distinguished in comparison to
another object. In other words, the 'blue' color of the sky is only identical with the notion of
'blue' itself, and only has meaning if it can be contrasted with something else, in this case
'red' (or really any other color, as long as it's something). The problem with the idea of the
'objects' of self-certainty being extensions of the self is that there is no opposing 'thing' that
clarify and define the 'self' at all, “The unity [of the self as Absolute] is divided within itself
because it is an absolutely negative or infinite unity; and because it is what subsists, the
difference, too, has independence only in it” (§170, p. 107). When only the self 'is', then
nothing else can meaningfully be said to be; in a world that was totally comprised of the
color 'red', the characterization of something as red would be meaningless, and the concept
Since the self cannot assume itself to be the Absolute without being able to
distinguish between objects and the self, a relation has to be created that deals with these
objects. This relationship is desire. As Hegel words this distinction, “[T]he simple substance
of Life is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these
existant differences” (§171, p. 108) This means that consciousness has to mentally
separate itself from other objects, essentially realize the contradiction on some level, but
then has to destroy those objects to ensure that the subject is still the master of reality. This
is desire: a need for something 'external' that can give some sort of recognition to a 'self' as
master of reality. If an 'I' can destroy an external object, then it still has command over it; the
'I' can distinguish between itself and the objects it desires – by desiring – and thus has a
Desire harbors a contradiction though: the goal of desire to not just to help get rid of
the contradiction present in distinguishing the 'I' from objects when they're solely extensions
of that 'I', it's also there to reassert the authority of the 'I', the independence of the self. Were
the self truly independent though, fully separated from any need for an external reality, then
it wouldn't need those external objects to confirm it's independence. In a movement to help
preserve independence, the self instead becomes dependent. As Hegel says, “Self-
consciousness which is simply for itself … or is primarily desire, will therefore … learn
through experience that the object is independent” (§168, p. 106). So not only is the self
dependent on external objects, but the objects themselves become independent (at least to
the philosophical audience of the book; the subject of 'self-certainty' is still raging against
At this point, the 'I' has to come into contact with an object that somehow confirms its
independence, but that the 'I' cannot demolish. This movement is twofold: it takes place as
genus is that transcendental thing which a person takes on in order to give meaning to a life
(for example, God, Nation, Liberalism, Communism, etc.). The genus is important because
it “does not exist for itself qua this simple determination,” that is, the 'I' determining it as an
object, giving it meaning, and because it points the 'I' toward “something other than itself”
(§172, p. 109). As a transcendental idea, it cannot be consumed by the 'I', but in giving
meaning to a person's life genus recognizes that person as something independent and
Hegel puts it, “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness” (§175, p. 110). This 'satisfaction' is twofold: one, the recognition of an 'other'
of some sort is the beginning of the movement towards the chapter on Reason, when
society becomes the important point of focus, instead of the individual self-consciousness.
This is why Hegel is able to say that “With this [recognition of another self-consciousness],
we already have before us the Notion of Spirit” (§177, p. 110), where 'Spirit' here simply
dialectically for Hegel. Secondly, though, the 'other' is still an object to the solipsistic 'I', but a
non-threatening one. This is due to the fact that the encountering of the other is one in
which the 'other' is able to recognize the 'I' as independent, not through its destruction, but
simply in saying so, in language. In this way, the other self-consciousness fulfills the goal of
desire.
It may have become apparent at this point though that these 'others' aren't enough to
fully satisfy the goals of desire and self-certainty: they are still 'other' and thus challenge the
solipsistic 'I' in his domination. The point of the book that deals with this contradiction
though is the sub-section titled 'Lordship and Bondage', and is thus a dialectical move
forward beyond self-certainty. Therefore it's beyond the scope of this essay, though the end
should be semi-obvious: the contradictions of desire will continue until a point where the
distinction between the 'I' and the 'other' becomes moot and the examination of society can
Self-consciousness is always desiring some other in order to confirm itself, but this desiring
always contradicts its intended goal by always needing some 'other' for the confirmation.
This is why the goal of desire is a failure: it can never produce it intended result. And
because only this 'other' can confirm its independence, but only in a way that still preserves
its external nature. This is why the self-conscious project is doomed to a sort of failure, but
why out of that failure springs something beautiful: Spirit itself. But, it must be remembered,
that this failure isn't something unnecessary, a mistake that should be quickly forgotten; like
all of the past steps in Hegel's dialectic, self-consciousness is the ash necessary to bring
forth a phoenix.