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CIVIL PROCEDURE DOCTRINES:

1. BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES INC., VS COURT OF APPEALS AND


LOLITA G. TOLEDO
G.R. NO. 173946

DOCTRINES:

1. Well settled is the rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court
denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is
finally decided on the merits. Therefore, "the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal
after a decision has been rendered."

2. a) Aspects of Jurisdiction

The concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases
involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.
The Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the courts concerned over the
subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to
belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.
The "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to
dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional
issues cannot be waived, subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches."
b) Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons.
The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a defense which is personal to the
person claiming it.

3. Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:


SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

 It is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for
the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent, is solidary. In other
words, the collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by
respondent only, even without impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of
Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioner's complaint for sum of money.

4. Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that "neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court
on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately."
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Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined party must have the
capacity to sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued
in a separate case.

Where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by
law, the complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action
against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.

Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same
extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party
defendant in a court action.

2. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL VS. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY


G.R. NO. L-21450
DOCTRINE:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.
 
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
 
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

3. BERNARDO VS. HEIRS OF VILLEGAS


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G.R. NO. 183357


DOCTRINE:

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the
proceeding. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a
claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any
of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.   The
reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.
 
However, estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before
challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision
after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent
or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable
practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

4. JORGE PADERANGA VS BUISSAN


G.R. NO. L-49475
Doctrine: 

In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real
property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
mortgage on, real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an
action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person. Hence, a real action
may at the same time be an action in personam and not necessarily an action in rem.
where the ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition
or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such an action must be deemed
a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any
part thereof lies.

5. CABRERA VS. CLARIN


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G.R. NO. 215640

Doctrine:
Estoppel on jurisdiction 

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. A court's
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal for the same is
conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action. It applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first
time on appeal or even after final judgment.The exception to the basic rule mentioned operates on
the principle of estoppel by laches whereby a party may be barred by laches from invoking the lack
of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active
participation of said party invoking the plea. 
estoppel by laches... laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

6. SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES VS. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY


AND DRY CLEANING
G.R. NO. 169454
Doctrines: 

A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory obligation contained in the penal clause is
actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary estimation.

In an action for damages, the court which has jurisdiction is determined by the total amount of
damages claimed.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal trial courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
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actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts 1of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

7. HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO VS. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO


DORONIO
G.R. NO. 169454
Doctrine:

1. The S.C ruled said that if the issue involve is the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other
related matters involving the settlement of estate, as in this case, the best forum to ventilate and
adjudge this kind of issue is the probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction which
partake of the nature of a special proceeding.
Whereas, the action for reconveyance and damages is a civil action by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or prevention or redress of a wrong.

Thus, the S.C ruled that the RTC is not the proper venue because the issue involve is the
settlement and distribution of estate of the decedent which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the probate court.

2. The SC also said that persons who are not parties in the deed of donation can set up the defense
of illegality of the deed of donation if they are directly affected by the deed of donation.

Hence, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio even if their predecessors is not a party to the deed of
donation have the right to question the validity of such contract since the civil code extended to 3 rd
persons who are directly affected by the contract.

3. The SC said that in resolving the issue of who has the better right over the land, it has disagree
with the petitioners posture that validity of the deed of donation is not the determining factor who
has the better right, but it is precisely the validity and enforceability of the deed of donation that is
the determining factor in resolving the issue of who has the better right.

8. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS VS. REYES


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G.R. NO. 180771


Doctrine:

May the resident mammals in representation by the stewards have locus standi to file a case, or
whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions before
courts of law.

The rules of court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law. It necessitates that the action must be brought in the name of the real party – in
– interest, even if filed by a representatives.

Thus, the SC said that people who have a meaningful relation to that animals or inanimate objects,
including man, who are dependent on it, or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life, must be
able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are threaten with destruction.

Therefore, having shown in the petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning
the habitats of the marine mammals, the petitioners then declared to have the legal standing to file
this petition.

Moreover, may a person’s name be simply impleaded as unwilling co – plaintiff without her
knowledge and consent in a petition.

The SC said that as a rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot
be obtained, he/she may be made party defendant because the unwilling party’s name cannot be
simply included in a petition without her knowledge and consent, for the reason that such would be
a denial of due process.

Hence, impleading arroyo as unwilling co – plaintiff without her knowledge and consent in the
petition is incorrect.

9. IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL


INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS.
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ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND


REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY
UDK - 15143
Doctrine:

In case for a petition for judicial review, there are certain limitations to be observe before the court
may take cognizance of the case:

1. There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
2. The person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuances; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement;
3. The question of constitutionality must be raise at the earliest opportunity; and
4. The issue of constitutionality must be at the very lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the petitioner failed to comply with the first and second requirements, therefore
such failure warrants the outright dismissal of the case, because there is no actual case or
controversy and the petitioner have no standing to question the validity of the act or issuances.

There was dismissal on the ground that there is no actual case or controversy because the
propose bill is not a law, since a court only act on a petition where there is a law being
implemented that is questioned, and that a petitioner sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the
proposed bill is passed into law.

10. UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL INC., VS


COSLAP
G.R. NO. 135945
Doctrines:
 
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Forum shopping; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping exists
when a party “repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, all raising substantially the same issues either in pending in, or already resolved
adcersely by some other court.’ - There is an equally persuasive reason to grant the petition. As an
additional ground for the annulment of the assailed status quo order of COSLAP, UNITED accuses
private respondents of engaging in forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when a party
repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
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circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely by some other court. 
 
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory construction; Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-
94’s use of the word “shall” imports an imperative obligation inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.-- The said Administrative Circulars use of the auxiliary verb shall imports an imperative
obligation xxx inconsistent with the idea of discretion
 
Same; Same; Same; The certification against forum shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or
principal party, and not by his counsel--- the certification is a peculiar personal representation on
the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no
other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.---  A scrutiny
of the pleadings filed before the trial courts and the COSLAP sufficiently establishes private
respondents propensity for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the certification against forum
shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, and not by his counsel.[31] Hence,
one can deduce that the certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the
principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending
cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. In the case at bar, private
respondents litany of omissions range from failing to submit the required certification against forum
shopping to filing a false certification, and then to forum shopping itself. First, the petition filed
before the COSLAP conspicuously lacked a certification against forum shopping. Second, it does
not appear from the record that the ASSOCIATION informed Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City before which Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, that another action, Civil Case
No. 3382-R, was filed before Branch 61 of the same court. Another group of homeless residents of
Dominican Hill, the LAND REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the latter
case. The aforesaid plaintiff, however, does not hesitate to admit that it filed the second case in
representation of private respondent, as one of its affiliates. In the same manner, the certification
against forum shopping accompanying the complaint in Civil Case No. 3382-R does not mention
the pendency of Civil Case No. 3316-R. In fact, the opposite assurance was given, that there was
no action pending before any other tribunal. Another transgression is that both branches of the trial
court do not appear to have been notified of the filing of the subject COSLAP Case No. 98-253.
 
Same; Same; Same; The willful attempt by private respondents to obtain a preliminary injunction in
another court after it failed to acquire the same from the original court constitutes grave abuse of
the judicial process. ---- It is evident from the foregoing facts that private respondents, in filing
multiple petitions, have mocked our attempts to eradicate forum shopping and have thereby upset
the orderly administration of justice. They sought recourse from three (3) different tribunals in order
to obtain the writ of injunction they so desperately desired. The willful attempt by private
respondents to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after it failed to acquire the same
from the original court constitutes grave abuse of the judicial process.
 
 
Same; Same; Same; Forum shopping is evident where the elements of litis pendentia or rejudicata
are present.--- It has been held that forum shopping is evident where the elements of litis pendentia
or res judicata are present. Private respondents subterfuge comes to naught, for the effects of res
judicata or litis pendentia may not be avoided by varying the designation of the parties or changing
the form of the action or adopting a different mode of presenting ones case.
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Same; Same; Same; A party’s willful and deliberate act of forum shopping is punishable by
summary dismissal of the actions filed. ---In view of the foregoing, all that remains to be done is the
imposition of the proper penalty. A partys willful and deliberate act of forum shopping is punishable
by summary dismissal of the actions filed.[36] The summary dismissal of both COSLAP Case No.
98-253 and Civil Case No. 3316-R is therefore warranted under the premises. We shall refrain from
making any pronouncement on Civil Case No. 3382-R, the dismissal of which was elevated on
appeal to the Court of Appeals where it is still pending.

11. HEIRS OF AUSTINO MESINA VS. HEIRS OF DOMINGO


FIAN, SR.
G.R. NO. 201816
Doctrines: 
Remedial Law; Action; Causes of Action; Elements of; A complaint states a cause of action if it
avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action. ---  Failure to state a cause
of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers
the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) The legal right of the
plaintiff; (b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) The act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said right.

Same; Civil Procedure; Parties; Non-Joinder of Indispensable Parties; The non-joinder of


indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action; The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable.  --- Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is
a necessary party or in this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit." 10 An indispensable party,
on the other hand, is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of the
action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. 11 As such, this is properly a non-
joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in the complaint
being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Having
settled that, Our pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil is instructive as
regards the proper course of action on the part of the courts in cases of non-joinder of
indispensable parties, viz: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may
dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Same; Same; Verification; That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase “or
based on authentic records” does not make the verification defective; Also, verification, like in most
cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal requirement, not jurisdictional; Thus, when
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circumstances so warrant, “the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act
on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served.” --- That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on
authentic records" does not make the verification defective. Notably, the provision used the
disjunctive word "or." The word "or" is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. 14 As such,
"personal knowledge" and "authentic records" need not concur in a verification as they are to be
taken separately. Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a
formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters
which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus,
when circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order the correction
of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends
of justice may thereby be served.”

12. ALTRES VS. EMPLEO


G.R. NO. 180986
Doctrines:
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; verification; Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping; Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the
requirements of verification and certification so that the ends of justice may be better served.  ---
Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of
verification and certification so that the ends of justice may be better served. Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not
the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith;
while the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum
shopping.

Same; Same; Same; Same; On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-
settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum shopping; The rule,
however, admits of an exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure
to personally sign the certification . --- On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping,
the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum shopping. The
reason for this is that the persons who have signed the certification cannot be presumed to have
the personal knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing of
any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. The rule, however, admits of an
exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the court that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of justice.

Same; Same; Same; Same;  distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping. ---- 1) A distinction must be
made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and
non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
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shopping. 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily


render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.4) As to certification against forum
shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule
on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons." 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only
one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6)
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he
must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

Same; Civil Procedure; Distinction between a Question of Law and a Question of Fact.  ---The
Court had repeatedly clarified the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A
question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. 36 A
question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances,
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. 37 When
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a
question of law.

13. SAMELCO II VS. ANANIAS D. SELUDO


G.R. NO. 173840
Doctrine:

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under
a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.
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[9]
 In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial
process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties
would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The premature resort to the court is fatal to ones cause of action.
The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to
certain exceptions, to wit: (a) estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) challenged
administrative act is patently illegal; (c) unreasonable delay or official inaction that will prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small; (e) question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) controverted
acts violate due process; (i) issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot; (j) no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved;
and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
 

14. GUERRERO VS. DIRECTOR OF LMB


G.R. NO. 183641

Doctrine of Res judicata applies by way of, either (1) "bar by prior judgment" or (2) "conclusiveness
of judgment."28 For res judicataas a "bar by prior judgment" to apply, four (4) essential requisites
must concur, to wit:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter
and causes of action.
Doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice. Once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification
is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land
The rule is that judgments by a court of competent jurisdiction, which have attained finality, are not
subject to reversal, modification or alteration and are, thus, immutable, the only exceptions are: (1)
the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to
any party, and (3) void judgments.

15. MANCHESTER VS. CA


G.R. NO. 75910
Doctrine:
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The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint and not in the amended complaint.
Henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.

16. HEIRS OF REINOSO VS. CA


G.R. NO. 116121

Doctrine

Manchester Doctrine 
The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory.8 In Manchester v. Court of Appeals,9 it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Exception
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.

17. CARSON VS. RED ROBIN SECURITY


G.R. NO. 225035

Doctrine:
Manotoc Doctrine. Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a)
indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the
efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person
of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
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regular place of business of the defendant. (read the exhaustive discussion in the full case, it is
highlighted)

Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy 24 instructs that:


As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction.

Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court states when a party may be properly declared in default and
the remedy available in such case:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of- If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed
therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in
its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default. - A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but not to take part in the trial. 1âwphi1
(b) Relief from order of default.- A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and
before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that
his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has
a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

18. DANFOSS VS. CONTINENTAL


G.R. NO. 143788
Doctrine:
The principle of anticipatory breach enunciated in Blossom & Company, Inc. v. Manila Gas
Corporation  even if the contract is divisible in its performance and the future periodic deliveries are
not yet due, if the obligor has already manifested his refusal to comply with his future periodic
obligations, "the contract is entire and the breach total," hence, there can only be one action for
damages
A cause of action is defined under Section 2, Rule 2 of the same Rules as:
Sec.2. Cause of action, defined. – A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another.
15

19. LUI ENTERPRISES VS. ZUELLIG


G.R. NO. 193494
Doctrine:
 
A defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons either presents no
defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or was prevented from filing his or her
answer within the required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, in either
case, the court may declare the defendant in default on plaintiff’s motion and notice to defendant.
A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. However, the defendant declared
in default "does not waive all of his or her rights."  He or she still has the right to "receive notice of
subsequent proceedings." Also, the plaintiff must still present evidence supporting his or her
allegations "despite the default of the defendant. Default, therefore, is not meant to punish the
defendant but to enforce the prompt filing of the answer to the complaint. For a defendant without
good defenses, default saves him or her "the embarrassment of openly appearing to defend the
indefensible."
The defendant’s motion to set aside order of default must satisfy three conditions. First is the time
element. The defendant must challenge the default order before judgment. Second, the defendant
must have been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. Third, he must have a meritorious defense.
Excusable negligence is "one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against." The circumstances should be properly alleged and proved.

20. MANUEL VS. ONG


G.R. NO. 205249

DOCTRINE:
Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14, Section 6.
Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A
defendant’s address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is
16

sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of
personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
**Motion to set aside the order of default
Consistent with Rule 9, Section 3(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "the remedy against an
order of default is a motion to set it aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence." However, it is not only the motion to lift order of default which a defendant must file.
The motion to lift order of default must "be appended an affidavit showing the invoked ground, and
another, denominated affidavit of merit, setting forth facts constituting the party's meritorious
defense or defenses."
The need for an affidavit of merit is consistent with Rule 8, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity."

21. MVRS PUBLICATION VS. ISLAMIC


G.R. NO. 135306

DOCTRINE:
In order that a class suit may prosper section 12, rule 3 of the rules of court requires the
concurrence of three essential elements, namely: (a) whether the interest of the named party is
coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made
parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the
ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.

There should be no room for apprehension on future litigations relating to the assailed article in
view of the fact that the instant suit is a class suit. In a class suit, each member of the class for
whose benefit the action is brought is a party plaintiff; the persons represented are quasi parties or
parties by representation. A suit brought in behalf of others in a class gives the court jurisdiction of
the whole subject matter, and all of the parties, such that the judgment will be binding on all
persons belonging to the class represented. In other words, a judgment in a class action concludes
upon all members of the class, whether formally joined as parties or not. The class action has
preclusive effect against one who was not named representative of the class, as long as he was a
member of the class which was a party to the judgment.

22. OGAWA VS. MENIGISHI


G.R. NO. 193089
Rules involved: Rule 8, Section 8. How to contest such documents. 
17

 
DOCTRINE:
 
When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in, or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution
of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically
denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be party to the instrument or when compliance
with an order for an inspection of the original is refused.
 
It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim,
the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant, by the quantum of
evidence required by law, which in this case is preponderance of evidence.
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or
"greater weight of credible evidence."

23. PACANA VS. ROVILA


G.R. NO. 168979
Rules involved: Rule 3 and Rule 9
 
Doctrine:
1. A suit that is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is dismissible on the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
In the present case, the respondent alleged that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest
because:
a. The petitioners should not have filed the case in their own names; and
b. The petitioners should first be declared as heirs.
 
But the S.C says that the present rules of court shows that the fundamentals of the ground for
dismissal based on the failure to state a cause of action has drastically overtime.
 
Hence, Spouses Pacana which are not impleaded as parties-plaintiff in the case at bar are
indispensable parties  as the alleged owners of Rovila Water Supply, without their inclusion as
parties, there can be no final determination of the present case. Since an indispensable and
necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest because they stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit.
 
Doctrine 
18

2. Pursuant to section 1, rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss based on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action may be waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or alleged in
their answer.
 
However, in the case at bar, the respondent did not allege or attached in their answer the
subject grounds they invoked in the present case, both in their motion to dismiss and in their
comment, that it was only during the pretrial stage that they verbally manifested and invited the
attention of the lower court on their grounds for dismissal.

24. TANTUICO VS. RP


G.R. NO. 89114
Rules involved: Rule 3 Sec. 3
Doctrine: Ultimate Facts - Ultimate facts are important & substantial facts w/c either directly form
the basis of the primary right & duty, or w/c directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant.  The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by
w/c these material elements are to be established.  It refers to  principal, determinate, constitutive
facts, upon the existence of w/c, the entire cause of action rests. “Evidentiary facts”  are those facts
w/c are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon w/c
conclusions of ultimate facts are based.
Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three (3) essential elements of a
cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant, & (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint
states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that
ground of failure to state a cause of action. However, where the allegations of the complaint are
vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to
dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars.

25. VIVENCIO VILLAGARCIA VS. FIFTH SHARIA


G.R. NO. 188832
Doctrine: 

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class
to which the proceedings in question belong." This power is conferred by law, which may either be
the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot
choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court
19

hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
judgment rendered, are void.

26. DOMINGO VS. CA


G.R. NO. 169122
Doctrine: 

Liberal application of procedural rules is allowed only when two requisites are present: (1) there is
a plausible explanation for the non-compliance, and (2) the outright dismissal would defeat the
administration of justice.

27. PADILLA VS. GLOBE ASIATIQUE


G.R. NO.
Doctrine: 

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.  It is in
the nature of a cross-complaint; a distinct and independent cause of action which, though alleged
in the answer, is not part of the answer.
If the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause of the counterclaim, then the
counterclaim cannot survive. Conversely, if the counterclaim itself states sufficient cause of action
then it should stand independently of and survive the dismissal of the complaint. Now, having been
directly confronted with the problem of whether the compulsory counterclaim by reason of the
unfounded suit may prosper even if the main complaint had been dismissed.

28. DIO VS. SUBIC BAT MARINE EXPLORATIUM


G.R. NO.
 
DOCTRINE:

The dismissal of the (main) complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim,
and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided that such
20

counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity that may
warrant its outright dismissal. 
Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its
face, including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action.
The court’s authority to proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main
action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question which may
be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
 

29. DACOYCOY VS. IAC


G.R. NO. 74854
DOCTRINE

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue may be waived expressly or


impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided
by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong
venue, which is deemed waived. 
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot
be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue,
though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on
venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to
the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

30. ASIAN UNITED BANK VS. GOODLAND


G.R. NO. 191388
DOCTRINE:

Forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: 
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous
case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); 
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and 
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes
of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
21

The well-entrenched rule is that "a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a
different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

31. NAVOA VS. CA


G.R. NO. 59255
DOCTRINE: 

Cause of Action- is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial
interference in his behalf. The requisites for a cause of action are: (a) a right in favour of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or created, (b) an obligation on the
part of the defendant to respect and not to violate such right; and, (c) an act or omission on the part
of the defendant constituting a violation of the plaintiff’s right or breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff. 

32. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE VS. FAR EAST BANK


G.R. NO. 155173
DOCTRINE: Remedy Against Judgment; Doctrine of Immutability

A petition for annulment of judgment may be availed of only when other remedies are
wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a
court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. The remedy, being exceptional in character, is
not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders,
or resolutions. The remedy disregards, the doctrine of immutability of final judgments. 

The doctrine of immutability serves two-fold purpose:


(a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice;
(b) to put an end to judicial controversies.

The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside
the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his
cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire
proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If
the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice
to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order is set aside on
the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may, on motion, order the trial court to try the case as if a
timely motion for new trial had been granted.
22

33. LAFARGE CEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., VS.


CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 108119
DOCTRINES: 
Counterclaim is compulsary.
Section 6 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: “any claim which a defending party may
have against an opposing party.” 
 Purpose of this is to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to facilitate the disposition of the whole
controversy in a single action, such that the defendant’s demand may be considered by a
counterclaim rather than by an independent suit. 
 LIMITATIONS:
1.   Court should have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim
2.   It could acquire jurisdiction over third parties whose presence is essential for its
consideration.
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM: an independent claim that may be filed separately in another
case.
(i) Does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim.

COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM: does not require for its adjudication (consideration) the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
(i) Arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim
(ii) Should be set up in the same action; otherwise, they would be barred forever.

COMPULSORY OR PERMISSIVE?
(i)  Issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(ii) Would res judicata (judged matter; matter considered by the court and may not be pursued
further)  bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(iii) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s
counterclaim?
(iiii) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
*  YES TO ALL four questions = COMPULSORY
 
Section 6.  Permissive joinder of parties. 
“All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to
all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to
prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with
any proceedings in which he may have no interest.”
 
23

This is for practicality and convenience; meant to discourage duplicity and multiplicity of
suits. 
Section 7 of Rule 3 provides:
“Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.”

34. FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. HON. COURT OF


APPEALS
G.R. NO. 108119
Doctrine: good cause- Section 16 of Rule 24, Rules of Court

Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause that the court
may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by
the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a substantial reason — one that
affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist is for the court to determine, as
there is no hard and fast rule for determining the question as to what is meant by the term "for good
cause shown." We are also in conformity with petitioner's submission that the mere fact that the
court could not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent does not justify the denial of the right
to take deposition. In the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy,
harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to take
deposition. Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression
may be issued if the following requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by
any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that
there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.
The fact that the deposition is to be taken in San Pablo City, whereas the proposed deponent lives
in Manila, is not sufficient to establish private respondent's theory that the requested deposition
was intended to annoy and harass the proposed deponent. Inconvenience to the party whose
deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. No doubt, private
respondent and its representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced — as are all
parties when required to submit to examination — but this is no ground for denial of the deposition-
discovery process. The mere fact that an officer of private respondent would be required to attend
the examination and thereby absent himself from some of his usual business affairs during the
taking of the deposition is utterly insufficient to justify the court in ruling that he is being annoyed,
embarrassed or oppressed, within the meaning of this language. Something far beyond this is
required in this connection to grant a party relief. At any rate, petitioner has signified its willingness
to select a suitable office in Manila for the taking of the deposition in order to accommodate the
proposed deponent.

35. LIANA’S SUPERMARKET VS. NLRC


24

G.R. NO. 111014


Doctrine: Representative suit as distinguished from class suit

According to petitioner, these cases do not fall under the term class suit as defined in Sec. 12, Rule
3, of the Rules of Court because the parties are not so numerous that it would be impracticable to
bring them all before the court. We disagree with petitioner. This is a representative suit as
distinguished from class suit defined in Sec. 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court -Sec. 12. Class
suit.When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case the court shall make sure
that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all interests
concerned are fully protected. Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection of
his individual interest. Sec. 3.Representatives as parties.- A trustee of an express trust, a guardian,
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by statute , may sue or be sued without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended; but the court may, at any stage of the
proceedings, order such beneficiary to be made a party x xx. A representative suit is akin to a class
suit in the limited sense that the phrases found in Sec. 12 of Rule 3, one or more may sue or
defend for the benefit of all, and the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and
representative, are similar to the phrase may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is presented or defended found in Sec. 3 of the same Rule. In other words, both
suits are always filed in behalf of another or others. That is why the two terms are sometimes used
interchangeably.

36. DAVID REYES VS. JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG KENG


G.R. NO. 134241
Doctrine: Application of Equity

The SC ruled that this is a case of silence or insufficiency of the law and the Rules of Court. In this
case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the courts to make a ruling despite the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. This calls for the application of equity which fills the
open spaces in the law. The trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may validly order the
deposit of the P10 million in court to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity
jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal
jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate. Moreover, there is no plausible or
justifiable reason for Reyes to object of the P10 million down payment in court because the
contract to sell can no longer be enforced because Reyes himself subsequently sold the Property
to Line One. Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendentelite, money paid by a buyer if
the seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subsequently sold the same
property to another buyer. By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily offers to return what he has
25

received from the buyer. Such a seller may not take back his offer if the court deems it equitable, to
prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution, to put the money in judicial deposit.

37. BULAWAN VS. AQUENDE


G.R. NO. 182819
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
 
COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES – Parties in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

38. ADA VS. BAYLON


G.R. NO. 182435
DOCTRINE: 

MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION - By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of


causes of action is meant uniting two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil
causes of action, each of would be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint,
declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. This is to avoid multiplicity
of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a
complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between parties involving one
subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. While parties to an
action may assert in one pleading as many causes of action as they may have against the
opposing party, such joinder is subject to a condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include
special civil actions governed by special rules.

39. PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. VS STANDARD


INSURANCE COMPANY
G.R. NO. 140746
DOCTRINE:
 
TEST OF JURISDICTION – Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the following
requirements for a permissive joinder of parties: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the
26

plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the
Rules on jurisdiction and venue.

40. CENTRAL BANK BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS VS. BANCO


FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK
G.R. NO. 173399
Doctrine: Amendment and Supplement of Pleadings
 
Rule 10 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court allows the parties to amend their pleadings 
(a) by adding or striking out an allegation or a party’s name; 
(b) by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or rectifying a mistaken or an inadequate
allegation or description in the pleadings for the purpose of determining the actual merits of the
controversy in the most inexpensive and expeditious manner.
Rule 10 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court allows the parties to supplement their pleadings by
setting forth transactions, occurrences, or events that happened since the date of the pleading
sought to be supplemented.
However, the option of a party-litigant to supplement a pleading is not without limitation.
A supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. Its usual
function is to set up new facts that justify, enlarge, or change the kind of relief sought with respect
to the same subject matter as that of the original complaint.

41. WOOD TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION VS. EQUITABLE


BANKING
G.R. NO. 153867
Doctrine: Distinction between a Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings  
 
A judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading. In a case for judgment on the
pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential question in such a case is
whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. This is the distinction between a
proper case of summary judgment, compared to a proper case for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early
stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the  affirmative defenses
offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary
judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify a
summary judgment? A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not
constitute a genuine issue for trial.
27

42. HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. VS. JUANA


GONZALES
G.R. NO. 185922

Doctrines: 

Pleadings; Defense and objections not pleaded either in motion to dismiss or in answer are
deemed waived; exceptions
 Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time frame indicates that
thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so
inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just
noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint
that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions.

Pleadings; motu proprio dismissal
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the
claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata;
and (d) prescription of action.

43. CHUA VS. TORRES


G.R. NO. 151900
Doctrine:

Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:


Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage
28

of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed
and proceeded with separately.

44. CRUZ VS. CRUZ


G.R. NO. 173292
Doctrine: Reconveyance and Damages

When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure necessarily applies, viz:

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.

The foregoing section is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court:
SEC. 17. Death of party. – After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time
to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed
by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
29

If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased’s counsel to inform the
court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceased’s legal representatives.
The deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action.  As explained in Bonilla:
x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.” From the moment of the death of the decedent, the
heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for
by law.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails
to appear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased.  The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the
intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate.

45. OTERO VS. TAN


G.R. NO. 200134
Doctrine: 1. A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the court in
default.
a. Loss of standing in court, the forfeiture of one’s right as a party litigant, contestant of legal
adversary, is the consequence of an order of default.
b. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and examine the
cross examine witnesses.
c. He has no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor may be object to
or refute evidence or motions filed against him.
 
2. In Lina vs CA, et al., this Court enumerated the remedies available to party who has been
declared in default to wit:
         a.  The defendant in default may at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file
a    motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has  meritorious
defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
          b.  If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default,
but before the same has become final and executor, he may file a motion for new
trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
           c.   If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executor, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 Rule 38; and
           d.   He  may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by
him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)
                3.  Indeed a defending party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the
judgment by default.
30

           a.   However, the grounds that may be raised in such an appeal are restricted to any of the
following:
i.  first, the failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the complainant.
ii.  second, the decision is contrary to law; and
iii.  third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed for
             b.   In these cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the pieces of evidence that
were presented by the plaintiff during the ex parte presentation of his evidence.
               4. A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded formraising any other
ground in his appeal from the judgment by default since,otherwise, he would then be allowed to
adduce evidence in his defense, which right he had lost after he was declared in default
a.  Indeed he is prescribed in the appellate tribunal from adducing any evidence to boister his
defense against the plaintiff’s claim.

46. SAMANIEGO VS. AGUILA


G.R. NO. 125567
DOCTRINE:

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action without that party being impleaded. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one
who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest in the subject
matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of pleadings
require the presence of such party on the record.

47. LU VS. LU YM
G.R. NO. 153690
DOCTRINE:

A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. Hence,
without payment of the correct docket fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action
filed by David, et al.
The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory decisions.

48. DBP VS. CARPIO


G.R. NO. 195450
DOCTRINE:
31

Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; to
approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are
done prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has
already been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case of a petition for
review under Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the petition.

49. DE PEDRO VS. ROMASAN


G.R. NO. 194751
DOCTRINE
How jurisdiction over the parties is acquired.

50. LIMOS VS. ODONES


G.R. NO. 186979

DOCTRINE
Rule 3 
Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action,
and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party
Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action.

51. BOTE VS. SPS VELOSO


G.R. NO. 194270
DOCTRINE 
Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court
32

 Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below he may
include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court
below and which is within the issues framed by the parties

52. THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL VS.


COSLAP
G.R. NO. 135945
1. DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
2. AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS NOT A COURT.
 
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
 
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that
exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are
neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation
of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three
(3) branches — the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary — each department being co-equal
and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by
its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the
expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."

53. GADRINAB VS. SALAMANCA


G.R. NO.194560
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
33

It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is immediately
executory and not appealable unless set aside [by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated  the compromise agreement]
There is res judicata when the following concur:
 
1. Previous final judgment;
2. By a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
3. On the merits of the case;
4. Between identical parties, on the same subject matter, and cause of action
 
There are two rules that embody the principle of res judicata. The first rule refers to "bar by prior
judgment," which means that actions on the same claim or cause of action cannot be
relitigated.57 This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (b) of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity[.]
The second rule refers to "conclusiveness of judgment."
 This means that facts already tried and determined in another action involving a different claim or
cause of action cannot anymore be relitigated. This rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:
....
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (49a)
This case involves "bar by prior judgment." Respondents cannot file another action for partition
after final judgment on compromise had already been rendered in a previous action for partition
involving the same parties and property.

54. CAHAYAG VS. COMM CREDIT CORP.


G.R. NO. 168078
CONCEPT OF REAL RIGHT
 
34

Registration of the mortgage establishes a real right or lien in favor of the mortgagee, as provided
by Articles 1312 and 2126 of the Civil Code.  Corollary to the rule, the lien has been treated as
"inseparable from the property inasmuch as it is a right in rem."  In other words, it binds third
persons to the mortgage.

The purpose of registration is to notify persons other than the parties to the contract that a
transaction concerning the property was entered into.Ultimately, registration, because it provides
constructive notice to the whole world, makes the certificate of title reliable, such that third persons
dealing with registered land need only look at the certificate to determine the status of the property.
 

55. GO VS. LOOYUKO


G.R. NO. 196529
It is apparent from the arguments of William that he is calling for the Court to reevaluate the
evidence presented by the parties. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should
cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable by this Court. The issue to be
resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue
invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. William is, therefore, raising
questions of facts beyond the ambit of the Court’s review.

56. KATON VS. PALANCA


G.R. NO. 151149

“The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal.
This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval
of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue
protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
 
57. MEJIA-ESPINOZA VS. CARINO
G.R. NO. 193397
35

A petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy
that may be availed of only under certain exceptional circumstances. Under the Rules, there
are three requirements that must be satisfied before a Rule 47 petition can prosper. 

First, the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of the petitioner. This means that a Rule 47 petition is a remedy of last
resort-it is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies under Rules 37, 38, 40, 41, 42,
43, and 45. 
 
Second, an action for annulment of judgment may be based only on two grounds:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
 
Third, the action must be filed within the temporal window allowed by the Rules. If
based on extrinsic fraud, it must be filed within four years from the discovery of the
extrinsic fraud; if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by
laches or estoppel.
 
There is also a formal requisite that the petition be verified, and must allege with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the
case may be.
 
A final order or resolution is one which is issued by a court which disposes of the subject matter in
its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court.
 
Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public auction. Neither does it
apply to an action to annul a writ of execution because a writ of execution is not a final order or
resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or
of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party.
 

58. SUMBILLA VS. MATRIX FINANCE CORP.


G.R. NO. 197582
36

DOCTRINE:

Doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has the
power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and
when justice requires it. After all, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice.

59. MAMANTEO VS. DEPUTY SHERIFF MAGUMUN


A.M. NO. P-28-1264
DOCTRINE: 

The Writ of Replevin cannot be enforced by the Sheriff when the latter is informed that the property
to be seized is in custodia legis and is forfeited in favor of the government by order of another
government agency.

60. LORENZA C. ONGCO VS. VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY


G.R. NO. 190810

DOCTRINE: 
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a
right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. This remedy, however, is not a right but
is left to the trial court's sound discretion.

61. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL


COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT) VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. AND
DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO
37

G.R. NO. 90478


DOCTRINE
 
Evidentiary matters may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. It is the
purpose and policy of the law that the parties — before the trial,if not indeed, even before the pre-
trial — should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those
known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries. In other words, the desideratum is
that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible
through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.

62. SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA AND LETICIA


AFULUGENCIA VS. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. NO. 185145
DOCTRINE
 
Where a party unjustifiedly refuses to elicit facts material and relevant to his case by addressing
written interrogatories to the adverse party to elicit those facts, the latter may not thereafter be
compelled to testify thereon in court or give a deposition pending appeal. The justification for this is
that the party in need of said facts having foregone the opportunity to inquire into the same from
the other party through means available to him, he should not thereafter be permitted to unduly
burden the latter with courtroom appearances or other cumbersome processes. The sanction
adopted by the Rules is not one of compulsion in the sense that the party is being directly
compelled to avail of the discovery mechanics, but one of negation by depriving him of evidentiary
sources which would otherwise have been accessible to him.

63. ROMEO TESTON VS. DBP


G.R. NO. 144374
DOCTRINE
 
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the
same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially
on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated
and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of
any of the parties.
38

64. CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS.


PHILBANKING CORPORATION
DOCTRINE:
When the defense in the answer is based on an actionable document, a reply specifically
denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the
document will be deemed admitted.

65. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY VS. COURT


OF APPEALS AND ALFONSO ROXAS CHUA
Doctrine:
If an order leaves something to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. Once determined to be final, the order may be the
subject of an appeal, as in the present case.
“No appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order but only decisions and final orders are
appealable. In this case, the Regional Trial Court’s Orders were final, not merely interlocutory. The
order denying respondent’s Motion to hold in abeyance the delivery of the Certificate of Sale of his
Club Filipino share and to declare the sale void, the trial court did not need to do anything more to
settle the rights of the parties, it is considered a final order which is subject of an appeal.”

66. NEYPES VS. CA


G.R. NO. 141524
To  standardize  the  appeal  periods  provided  in  the  Rules  and  to  afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
 This fresh period rule shall also apply to:

1. Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; 
2. Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; 
3. Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and 
4. Rule 45 govering appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
 
39

The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final
Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because
Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution.
 

67. MADARANG VS. MORALES


G.R. NO. 199283
DOCTRINE: 

A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two
(2) reglementary periods: (a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the
judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) within a fixed period of six (6) months
from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding.
It should be noted that the 60-day period from knowledge of the decision, and the 6-month period
from entry of judgment, are both inextendible and uninterruptible. We have also time and again
held that because relief from a final and executory judgment is really more of an exception than a
rule due to its equitable character and nature, strict compliance with these periods, which are
definitely jurisdictional, must always be observed.

68. DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC. VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. NO. 93262
Doctrine: 

The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an appreciable period of time between the
commencement of the action (takes place upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and the service
of summons to the defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a number of actions which the plaintiff or
the court may validly take, including the application for and grant of the provisional remedy of
preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the court from granting the
remedy prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

69. THOMAS YANG VS. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO R.


VALDEZ
G.R. NO. 73317
40

Doctrine: 

Applicant need not be the owner. It is enough that he has right to its possession. "The provisional
remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks immediate
possession of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if
at the time he applies for a writ of replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the
possession thereof."
Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff"
require the return of the property; in Section 6 of Rule 60, he may do so, "within five (5) days after
the taking of the property by the officer".  Both these periods are mandatory in character

70. TERLYNGRACE RIVERA VS. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS


G.R. NO. 165895
Doctrine: Effect of a writ of replevin that has been improperly served

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional
guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and
seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to a
person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court
processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of
the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin
was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no right to seize and to
detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

71. BP PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY BURMAH CASTROL


PHILIPPINES, INC.) VS. CLARK TRADING CORPORATION
G.R. NO.
Doctrine: Main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction 

The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding.1âwphi1 As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action
for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not
be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
preserve the status quo  until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved
or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
41

The writ of injunction would issue: Upon the satisfaction of  tworequisites, namely: (1) the existence
of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which are violative of said right. In the absence of a clear
legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is
not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual
existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

72. SUSAN LIM-LUA VS. DANILO Y. LUA


G.R. NO. 175279
Doctrine: Support pendente lite
 
Support pendente lite is a provisional remedy which grants a person entitled to support an amount
enough for his “sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation”
(Art. 194, Family Code) while the action is pending in court. It may be availed of by any of the
parties in the action for support or in a proceeding where one of the reliefs sought is support for the
applicant. The capacity of the person who will provide the support and the needs of the one entitled
to be supported are taken into consideration in setting the amount of support to be granted.
 
Support pendente lite can be availed of at the commencement of the action or at any time before
the judgment or final order is rendered in the action or proceeding.
The one claiming for support must establish before the court the relationship between the parties
as to entitle one to receive support from the other.
 
Sec. 1. Application. – At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time
prior to the judgment or final order, a verified application of support pendente lite may be filed by
any party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.

73. GORGONIO PANDES VS. HON. JOSE TEODORO, SR.


G.R. NO. L-6666

DOCTRINES:
42

A receivership operates to protect the receiver against interference, without the consent of the
court appointing him, with his custody and possession  of the property subject to the receivership.
(45 Am. Jr. 132)
It has been held . . . that real estate in the custody of a receiver can be levied upon and sold under
execution, provided only that the actual  possession of the receiver is not interfered with" (45 Am.
Jr. 133-134)
The reason is that "only a receiver's  possession  of property subject to receivership . . . is entitled
to protection . . . against interference." (45 Am. Jur. 134; see, also, 75 C.J.S. 759)

74. P.L. UY REALTY CORPORATION VS. ALS MANAGEMENT


G.R. NO. 166462
DOCTRINES:

The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional
party to the first and second action. Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application
of res judicata. The addition or elimination of some parties does not alter the situation.
There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the
first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.

75. ANDREW TAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND WU SEN


WOEI
G.R. NO. 142401
DOCTRINES:

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as preclusion of issues or
collateral estoppel, issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.

76. FLEXO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS.


COLUMBUS FOODS, INCORPORATED AND PACIFIC MEAT
COMPANY
G.R. NO. 164857
SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL - RULE 39
43

 
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the execution of a judgment should not be had until and unless the
judgment has become final and executor for example the period of appeal has lapsed without an
appeal having been taken, or appeal having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the
records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which event, execution shall issue
as a matter of right. Execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court is the exception.
Execution pending appeal requires the observance of the following requisites: (a) there must be
a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there must be a good reason for issuing the writ of
execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule, the
existence of good reasons is essential. Good reasons has been held to consist of compelling
circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory. Such reasons
must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or
damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. The rules do not specify the
good reasons to justify execution pending appeal, thus, it is the discretion of the court to determine
what may be considered as such.

77. ROSENDO T. UY VS. HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO


G.R. NO. 131237
I. SUBJECT MATTER: Execution Pending Appeal – Rule 39 
 
II. DOCTRINE: Only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts judgment pending appeal
with the Regional Trial Court which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided
in Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure . On the other hand, once the Regional
Trial Court has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70,
Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure , be immediately executory, without prejudice to an
appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court.
 

78. DOUGLAS F. ANAMA VS. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK


G.R. NO. 187021
SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION OF JUDMENT – RULE SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT –
RULE 39
DOCTRINE: “Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved
and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is
entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty.”
39
44

DOCTRINE: “Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved
and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is
entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty.”
SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT – RULE 39
DOCTRINE: “Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved
and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is
entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty.”
SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT – RULE 39
DOCTRINE: “Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved
and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is
entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty.”
SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT – RULE 39

DOCTRINE: “Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are
deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter
of right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial
courts ministerial duty.”

79. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND VS. CARLITO LEE


G.R. NO. 190144
SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT – RULE 39
DOCTRINE: A writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the beginning, instead
of at the termination, of a suit. It places the attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until the
judgment of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff’s claim is established, when the lien becomes effective as of the date of
the levy.
SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT – RULE 39

DOCTRINE: A writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the
beginning, instead of at the termination, of a suit. It places the attached properties in custodia legis,
obtaining pendente lite a lien until the judgment of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff’s claim is
established, when the lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy.

80. RUFA A. RUBIO VS. LOURDES ALABAT


G.R. NO. 203947
SUBJECT MATTER: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT – RULE 39
DOCTRINE: “Procedural rules may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in
order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes
of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the
outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires…”
45

81. AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION


(ARBA), REPRESENTED BY JOSEPHINE B. OMICTIN VS.
LORETO G. NICOLAS AND OLIMPIO CRUZ
G.R. NO. 168394
SUBJECT MATTER: APPEALS
DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an ordinary appeal. It is a
continuation of the case from the CA, Sandiganbayan, RTC, or other courts. The petition must only
raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth and discussed.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action. It seeks to correct errors of
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the court,
officer, or quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. The purpose of the remedy of certiorari is
to annul void proceedings; prevent unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority; and provide
for a fair and orderly administration of justice.

82. REPUBLIC VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS


G.R. NO. 203039
DOCTRINE:
The period within which an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment or final order and file a motion for new trial is within the period to file an appeal, which is
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the judgment or final order. It is explicit from the stated provision
that the fifteen day period to file a motion for new trial will start to run from receipt of judgment or
final order. A judgment, final order or resolution shall be served upon a party either personally or
through registered mail. 
Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the
date, place and manner of service.If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be
filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender
46

83. ISABELO ESPERIDA VS. FRANCO K. JURADO, JR.


G.R. NO. 172538
DOCTRINE:
RULE 71
The procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First, there
must be an order requiring the respondent to show causewhy he should not be cited for
contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge
against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider
respondent's answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.The law
requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed in court, and an opportunity given to the person
charged to be heard by himself or counsel. What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be
granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. This
is due process, which must be observed at all times.

84. CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, HEREIN


REPRESENTED BY CITY MAYOR REINALDO A. BAUTISTA, JR.,
VS. ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG
G.R. NO. 1888913

DOCTRINE:
Rule 71
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Only in cases of clear and
contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised, however, such power, being drastic
and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
justice.The court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-
restraint, with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, not for retaliation or vindication.

85. WACK WACK GOLF VS. LEE E. WON


G.R. NO. L-23851

RULE 62
47

The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure,  is a remedy whereby
a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation,
be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or the
one thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double
vexation in respect of one liability.  The procedure under the Rules of Court  is the same as that
under the Code of Civil Procedure,  except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is
available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter
an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or
relates to the performance of an obligation.

86. ARTURO SARTE FLORES VS. SPOUSES LINDO


G.R. NO. 183984

DOCTRINE:

RULE 2

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against
the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such
election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the
properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged
property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the
mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue
for deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the
mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either
case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages
attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under
his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a
personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action
against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to
justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity ( Osorio v. San
Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in
the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place
where the property lies.
48

87. CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB VS. SANCHEZ


G.R. NO. 182738

RULE 71
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice may be punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim
Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-suited or as in default, the
sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of
discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing
agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection,
copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just.
The enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not
exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others.
 
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the
law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the
action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient
party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters
inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to
allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out
pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.
 
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of
indirect contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to
comment on the charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate
the charge and consider respondent’s answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be
punished accordingly.
 
RULE 41
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon
full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard
and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. 
Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have the duty
to ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It
behooves them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from the main case,
49

unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the contempt proceedings and the main
action.
But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules, as
clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the
proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform
the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process. This formal charge is
done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he or she should
not be cited in contempt of court.
In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to explain their failure to bring the
accused before the RTC for his scheduled arraignment. We held in that case that such Order was
not yet sufficient to initiate the contempt proceedings because it did not yet amount to a show-
cause order directing the petitioners to explain why they should not be cited in contempt. The
formal charge has to be specific enough to inform the person, against whom contempt proceedings
are being conducted, that he or she must explain to the court; otherwise, he or she will be cited in
contempt. The Order must express this in clear and unambiguous language.
Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in indirect
contempt proceedings. It states:
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The judgment or final order of a court in
a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But
execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person
adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned
that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order.
The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged
in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and
post a bond for its suspension pendente lite

88. MANGASTER VS. UGAY


G.R. NO. 204926
Doctrine/Principle: 

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was
able to subject the property to the action of his will.

89. ACBANG VS. LUCZON


G.R. NO. 164246
Doctrine/Principle: 
50

The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the
immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient supersedes bond and the deposit of the
accruing rentals.

90. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CROPORATION VS. ARTURO


LOO PO
G.R. NO. 217694
Doctrine/Principle: 

The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations in the complaint.
Thus, consideration of the annexed documents should only be taken in the context of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint

91. ELSA DEGAYO VS. MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN


G.R. NO. 173148
Doctrine:
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the
purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof.36 
General Rule: courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge
Exceptions: 
• close connection with the matter in the controversy. 
• to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one

92. LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION VS. DISTRIBUTION


MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 155849

The right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and
their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels
51

have long recognized and respected. The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore,
whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety.
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority.
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the
presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive
or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the
court.

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