RAMANUSA, PANTHEIST OR PANENTHEIST ? By RICHARD DESMET In a book entitled Religious Hinduism and published for the first time some 18 years ago, I devoted 6 pages to a very succinct exposition of RamAnuja’s teaching and ended it with a short evaluation apportioning both praise and blame. I expressly said that his doctrine cannot satisfy fully the religious heart which craves for a God altogether transcendent and absolute even in his most intimate immanence to us, Though highly personal, the God of Raminuja is not supposed to be complete without his modes, whether qualities or bodies, and thus falls short of that radical transcendence which is the mark of divine personality, What, therefore, vitiates his doctrine is its definite pantheism, consciously opposed to Saikara’s transcendentalism. The root of this pantheism is found in Ramanuja’s conception of the intellectual act as inevitably relational, and in his concep- tion of reality as exactly corresponding to the relational character of human judgment. My insufficiently explained statement that pantheism vitiates Rama- nuja’s doctrine did not remain unchallenged, The first one to take up the cudgel in favour of Ramanuja was Fr. Antony Manalapuzhavila, 0. C.D. In his careful article of 1966, ‘Is RamAnujas a Pantheist?’ he opines that I have too strict an understanding of the characteristically Ramanujian terms: part, mode, body and attribute. They are, he thinks, simply comparisons which “ should be taken only in a general sense as illustrating ‘one and the same truth, namely, the total dependence of all things on God.” Then, quite recently, my friend Rev. Eric J. Lott published a quite extensive study of Ramanuja’s use of the self-body analogy in which he also finds fault with my labelling of Ramanuja as a pantheist.* And Professor Ninian Smart in his foreword to this book writes : “ It is an analogy which has led relatively ignorant Western writers to think of Ramdnuja as a pantheist. 1. R, Desmet and J. Neuner (Editors ), Religious Hinduism, Allahabad: St. Paul Publications, 3rd edition, 1968, pp. 68-69. 2. Fr. Antony, “Is Raminuja a Pantheist?” Indian Ecclesiastical Studies, 5 14 (Oct. 1966 ), pp. 283-313. 3. Eric J. Lott, God and the Universe in the Vedantic Theology of Raminuja, Madras : Riminuja Research Society, 1976. 71 Annals [D. Jy]562 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume This is nonsense as the present book shows; and it is nonsense because Raménuja is very strong on the dependence of the cosmos on the Lord. It is not that the cosmos and God are identical, as pantheism would imply.” From these last words it is obvious that Prof. Smart uses rather brutally the ‘etymological meaning of the term ‘ pantheism’ and this is an indication that this term is perhaps not sufficiently defined and refined to be used incauti- ously. Let me then begin with an elucidation of pantheism. Pantheism When in 1705 Toland coined the term ‘pantheism’ to describe his own position he meant it to denote a Spinozian conception of the whole of reality as one Substance, God, consisting in infinite attributes two of which, thought and extension, have modes or modifications which comprise all the ways of being of our diversified universe. Here already we notice that the oneness of God and world is not a simple identity but a differenced unity. Once coined, the term was found convenient to describe much older systems as well as newly arising doctrines, especially those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Bradley, to cite only the most important ‘ones. Due to this broad historical application, the term ‘pantheism’ got relatively detached from any clearly definable doctrine such as Spinozism and rather denotes today the implication of diverse views which tend to emphasize the immanence of God in the world and to deemphasize, or even to ignore, his transcendence over the world. In this regard, it is like our term advaitavada which also cannot be reduced to the particularity of one doctrine. But while there exists one kevalddvaita doctrine, we cannot point to a single Western doctrine which could represent pure pantheism in the etymological sense of simple identity of world and God. As E.R, Naughton remarks, “since no one has as yet failed to make some distinc tion between transcendent and immanent aspects of infinite being, there never has been a complete and utter pantheism.”* From the many divergent definitions of pantheism it is difficult to extract a cluster of characteristics which would really represent a common core of all so-called pantheisms. We do not find that all pantheisms deny completely the ontological contingency of mundane beings, or the ultimate distinctness of personality either in God or man, or the necessary distinction between cause and effect, or the moral distinction between good and evil. Most of them have, at root, seen that there is no really divine immanence in 4, E.R. Naughton, “Pantheism", New Catholic Bneyclopaedia, Vol. X, New York + McGraw Hill, 1967, p. 947,DESMET : Réménuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 563 the universe unless God transcends this universe. But, as R. Jolivet remarks, “the difficulty in which pantheists are involved is that they do in fact compromise this divine transcendence which they yet regard as necessary. The pantheistic God, by being self-differenced into infinite attributes, by having or projecting cosmic modes or by dialectically realizing himself through an inner process. of self-reflection and self-expression, includes or reflects in his very essence the diversity and mutability which ought to remain characteristic of imperfect reality. He is no longer simple fullness of perfection, ineffable and indescribable, Leaving this point aside for the present let me now turn my attention to another but kindred term, ‘ panentheism’, to which some contemporary thinkers, prominent among whom is Charles Hartshorne, have given a new lease of philosophical favour. Panentheism Introduced in the early nineteenth century by Karl C. F. Krause (1781-1832) to distinguish his doctrine from contemporary forms of pantheism and emanationism, the term panentheism describes today the views of those who introduce a polarity in the notion of God as both eternal and temporal and as including yet transcending the world. Panentheism views all things as being in God (pan en Thed) without exhausting his infinity. It utilizes a real distinction between the essence of God and his existence, or considers God as having accidents really distinct from his substance. It is a kind of surrelativism holding for a convertible relation of dependence between God and the world, the latter being an actual fulfilment of God’s creative possibility. Panentheism is rooted in a conviction that the world as possible in the mind of God becomes actualized and thereby adds to God's actuality. Thus it opposes the Thomistic view of God as Pure Actuality. Panentheists give special importance to what they call a logic of polarity, which has a close affinity to Hegelian dialectics, as the only means of esca- ping ultimate dilemmas arising from the use of categories. Among the forerunners of modern panentheism can be mentioned John Scotus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Schelling, Hegel and Soloviev. And among its twentieth century representatives, Whitehead, Tillich and Hartshorne. Interestingly, E. R. Naughton in his historical survey mentions also Raminuja, Iqbal and Radhakrishnan.’ E. J. Lott would also qualify Ramaouja as a panentheist.? 5. R. Jolivet, The God of Reason, London : Burns and Oates, 1958, p. 92. 6. Naughton, op. cit. “ Panentheism ”, p. 944. 7. Lott, op. cits p. 85.564 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume Panentheism rests upon a principle of polarity that holds that contra- ries may both be true without one excluding the other. In applying the notion of polarity to causality, panentheists place a real reciprocal relation between cause and effect. This would seem to do away with the meaning of causa- lity as such, It is true that lower orders of causes are somewhat involved with their effects through the principle of reaction, but such involvements exist by reason of the limitations of these causes—causality as such does not demand such reciprocity. To import it into God as the first cause is to affect him with a mode of action proper to secondary causes. A further inadequacy evidenced in panentheism involves the role of intrinsic analogy in thinking about God. Panentheists seem convinced that the only way to escape the limiting univocity of the categories is to introduce apparent contradictions and to explain their copredication in terms of chang- ing meaning of the terms; this results, however, in equivocity. Only through analogy can one predicate perfections of being that are simply different, yet somewhat the same. Both pantheism and panentheism appear to be rooted in forms of epistemology which are inadequate to the task of thinking about God. Such epistemologies remain naive to the extent that they view our ways of thinking as coinciding with the ways of being, Instead of critically realizing that our concepts are only signs and pointers, they still view them as representative rather than presentative, i. e., as really corresponding to, and mirroring even though obscurely, the objects of Knowledge. In a similar way they project upon these objects the structures of our concepts and the network of their interrelationships, When the reality considered is God, who more than any object escapes the grasp if not the reach of our knowledge, theories are produced which bring him down to the univocal level of concepts. They superimpose on the simplicity of his fullness structures of substance and attributes or type and modes, or structures of polarity and inner evolution. Whereas it is possible to understand that if the concepts we feel justified to predicate of God can be no more than analogical pointers they can coincide in his simple essence and be asserted formally without imparting to it their plurality, distinctions and oppositions, such a possibility is lacking in these epistemologies. They can only compromise the divine transcendence and view it through the deforming glass of mundane complexity. It is now time to pass on to Ramanuja and to examine if his teaching has any considerable affinity with either pantheism or panentheism, And, first of all, let us consider his epistemology.DESMET : Ramanuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 565 The Ramanujian epistemology For Raminuja the structure of the judgment (essentially the judgment of perception ) reveals immediately the structure of reality. This axiomatic assumption characterises his epistemological realism which he holds in common with Nyaya-Vaigesika. «Every nascent awareness,” he observes, “is produced by some distinctive aspect ( visesa ) so that it may be expressed in this way, ‘this is such’ ( idam ittham); for it is not possible to apprehend any real entity (padartha) without a particular configuration, such as triangular head, dewlap, etc,” (SBh 1. 1. 1.) The ‘this’ (idam) element is the visesya, the subject to be distinguished, and the ‘such’ (ittham) element is the visesana, the distinguishing or differencing predicate or attribute, Both together denote the actually differenced subject as manifested in its separation ( bheda) from other objects of knowledge. The viSesya-visesana structure is called by the Grammarians sémdnd- dhikaranya, functional coordination or appositional construction. It means “the fact that a plurality of terms whose use is motivated by a plurality of objective grounds denotes one and the same thing... It aims at making one and the same thing known as differenced ( visista) by a plurality of differen- cing terms (visesaya)” (ibid.), Let us notice that for Ramanuja the plurality of the terms is motivated by a plurality of objective grounds. Between the two pluralities there is, in his opinion, an exact or one-one correspondence. This appears clearly when he applies his understanding of sémanadhi- karanya to the interpretation of Tattvamasi. He is aware that for Sankara the plurality of the terms was not motivated by a plurality of objective grounds, namely, a differenced structure of the Brahman-Atman, but by a plurality of subjective grounds, namely, the human knower’s liability to err in diverse directions concerning the Absolute. For Sankara, indeed, each term having a limited direct meaning (mukhydrtha) carried the risk of bringing about a perverse understanding of the Unlimited as something limited. Tat, for instance, denoted primarily reality as external and tvam the inward but particular reality of the knowing subject. But in tattvamasi each one controlled and was controlled by the other so that a secondary meaning, a laksydrtha could arise which, stripping them of their mutual incompatibilities, would elevate their essential meaning, their sv@rtha, to the simplicity of the pure unlimited Sac-cit or nirguya Brahmatman. This recourse to laksané, actually jahadajahallaksana, through anvaya and vyatireki (retention of the compatible and exclusion of the incompatible)566 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume had been explained fully in Saikara’s bhdsya on the definition Satyam ‘janam-anantam brahma (Brahman is reality-knowledge-infinite. ). Now, according to Raminuja, “« whether we take the several terms of this definition in their primary sense, i. e., as denoting qualities ( his position ), or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary to those qualities (Sankara’s position, ) in either case we must needs admit a plurality of causes for the application of those several terms to one thing [i.e., for their sémanadhikaranya. }. There is, however, that difference between the two alternatives that in the former case the terms preserve their primary meaning, while in the latter case their denotative power depends on the so-called Jaksana... This view would moreover be in conflict with the sdmdnddhi- karanya notion, as it would not allow of difference of objective grounds for several terms applied to one thing.” (Ibid. ) This text demonstrates two things: first Ramanuja adheres conserva- tively to the Mimamsé rule that the primary meaning be generally privileged and laksand be permitted only in rare cases when absurdity could not be avoided otherwise; and second, he can do it here only because his under- standing of sémdnadhikaranya is grounded in what I have called an episte- mology of naive realism. Indeed, this understanding is logico-ontological. For “the element that is referred to as such [ by the visesaya] when a thing (vastu) is appre- hended as ‘ this is such’ is a mode (prakdra).” (1.1.13) Prakara and Prakarin (mode and entity-with-modes ) “ What determines statements of co-ordination is only the relation of mode ( prakdra) in which one thing [ denoted by a viéesaya, be it a genus, a quality, or even a substance] stands to another, [ the visesya vastu or prakarin).”” ($Bh 1.1.1.) This relation is a relation of inherence and subservience : “class characteristics and qualities inhere in the substance as in their substrate and their final cause (prayojana ), and they are its modes” (ibid. ). The distinction between prakdra and prakarin is not merely logical and does not, therefore, cover an ontological non-difference. For they are different padarthas between which there is an aprthak-siddhi sambandhana, i. a bond of inseparability.- But this bond is not necessarily reciprocal, espe- cially if the prakarin is God. Now “since a mode depends on its prakdrin, the cognition of the mode depends on and includes the prakarin [for cognition is always of a substance ]. From this it follows that a word denoting a mode includes inDESMET : Ramdnuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 567 its denotation the substance having that mode.” ($Bh 1. 1. 13). This being 80, sémanddhikaranya is justified since its appositional structure is grounded in the unity-in-complexity of the prakdrin with its prakaras. In other terms, the structure of the perceptional judgment is paralleled by the ontological structure of its referent, and the two structures are homomorphic. Such a homomorphy is precisely characteristic of the epistemologies of naive realism which ontologise the ways of our thinking. Sarira and Saririn ( body and the embodied ) ‘The modal structure is first discovered in material things. A material entity (pina) is accepted to be as it is known, namely, as specified by generic configurations, qualities, etc. : this is a brown broken-horned cow. Then itis discovered as binding together body and atman in one differenced reality. « For just like genus and quality, so substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of specifying attributes ( viSesana), insofar namely as they consti= tute the body of something else. Enunciations such as ‘the atman is, according to its works, born either a god, or a man, or a bull’ show that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda functional co-ordination has to be taken ina real primary [ not implied ] sense... As material bodies bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things insofar only as they are modes of the dtman, enunciations of co-ordination such as ‘the atman has been born as aman, or a cunuch, or a woman,’ are in every way appro- priate... The relation of bodies to the 4tman is strictly analogous to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substance in which they inhere; for it is the atman only which is their substrate and their final cause, and they are modes of the atman. .. That they are its modes appears from the fact that they are mere attributes of the atman manifesting itself as god, man, or the like. .. That they thus stand to it in the relation of distinguishing attributes is not perceived visually because the eye has no capacity to perceive the atman. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that essential nature ; it rather is just the possession of that essential nature on which the judgment of co-ordination [ such as ‘ the dtman is a man’] is based. And as words have the power of denoting the relation of something being a mode of the tman, they denote things together with this relation.” ($Bh 1. 1.1) Ramfnuja is aware that this is an unusual and even novel conception for he puts in the mouth ofa fictitious opponent the following objection : “But in ordinary speech the word ‘ body’ is understood to mean the mere body; it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to the atman ! —Not so, we reply. The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode of the atman; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things, the word ‘ body’ is used in a limited sense [ just as we speak of ‘whiteness’ as if it were a separate568 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume thing although it is never found apart from a white thing of which it is a prakara,|” (ibid. ) He, then, unfolds the full theological scope of this theory: “ As the individual atmans with their body-modes constitute a body of the highest Atman, and hence are modes of it, the words denoting them extend in their connotation up to the very highest Atman. And as all intelligent and non- intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman, and have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in samdnadhikaranya with the terms denoting Brahman [ directly. ]” (ibid. ) Ramanuja’s well-known definition of body’ stands as follows : “ Any substance that an intelligent [ entity ] is able completely to control ( niyantum ) and to support (dhdrayitum ) for his own purposes, and the essential nature of which is entirely subservient ( sesatd) to that intelligent [ entity ] is its body ” (yasya cetanasya yad-dravyam sarva émand svarthe niyantum dharayi« tum-ca Sakyam, tat-Sesata-eka-svariipam-ca, tat-tasya Sariram-iti) (SBh 2.1.9). Or, more briefly, “ The body of a being is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence and activity of which depend on the will of that being” (yad-icchd-adhina-svariipa-sthiti-pravrtti-yat-tat-tasya Sariram-iti). (ibid. 2. 1.8). Having adopted this definition, Ramanuja pursues : “In this sense, then, all conscious and non-conscious beings together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him ” (ibid. 2. 1.9). First of all then, these beings depend on the Lord for their nature of which he is the support. This must be considered on two levels: the level of the actual living bodies and the level of their two constituents, the eternal prakrti and the eternal dtmans. Of the living bodies and their universe, the Lord is the total cause, i. e., both their reality-giving upddana and their struc ture-giving nimitta-kdrana. The process of their origination is a parindma, a self-modification, not however of the very essence ( svariipa ) of the Lord but of his co-essential mode and body, prakyti, which is eternally comprised within his larger substance or svabhdva.® Brahma-parindma is not svariipa- parindma (which would imply bhedabheda), and not even Sakti-parindma (as suggested by the Bh. Gité but rejected by Ramanuja because sakti cannot be extrinsic to the divine svariipa) but only Sarira-parinama (VS [VB], p. 226). One perceives here how Ramanuja preserves to a large extent the Lord’s transcendence thanks to his notion of body and his conception of two a 8. On the distinction between scaripa and svathaea, cf. J. B, Carman, The Theology of Raminyja : An Essay in Interreligious Understanding, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1974, pp 88-07,DESMET : Rémdnuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 569 eternal bodies of the Lord, prakrti and the plurality of equally eternal atomic dimans. Further, the assertion that the Lord also controls the subsistence and activity of all living beings and their universe for his own ends (namely, for his merciful /i/a, the sport of his love for them ), also contributes to preserving his trancendence. For he is thus their inner ruler ( antaryamin ) and their absolute principal (sesin) or master (svdmin) while they are totally his subordinates ( sesa) so that even in their free decisions they act only through his permission (anumati). As their sesin, the Lord pervades them but, RamAnuja says, “ he does not contain them like a jug contains water.- How then does God pervade them?—In virtue of his will. Behold his yoga, miraculous and peculiar to him alone : God supports all beings, but no being is of use to him... All beings depend on God because they constitute his body; but God does not depend on them for they serve no purpose in maintaining his being (Gita Bh@sya, 9.4-5). Divine pervasion may be compared to the pervasion of a whole body by its atomic atman. “As the light of the sun abiding in one place is seen to extend to many places, so the Stman dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body by means of knowledge which is its quality * ($Bh. 2. 3. 26). God, however, does not only pervade all beings through his knowledge but through his ruling will. To say, then, that God and subordinate beings stand in the relation of &tman and body seems to be unobjectionable, at least insofar as it expresses the instrumentality of those beings in regard of God’s omnipotence. But we must not forget that these are parinamic products of his prakrti invested by eternal dimans whose karman is to be enjoyed in them. And prakrti and Gtmans are two eternal bodies of God. Besides, the Lord possesses even an eternal body of glory which is uniquely appropriate to him : « Just as his essential nature consists of indefinable knowledge, bliss and purity; just as he has countless auspicious qualities of matchless excel- lence, the first six of which are knowledge, power, untiring strength, sovereignty, immutability and splendor; and just as he causes all other entities, both spiritual and material, to function by an act of his will; so also he has one permanent celestial form which is agreeable and appropriate to him; he has an infinite variety of superlatively auspicious ornaments that suit his form, and immeasurable, infinite, and amazing weapons of various kinds which are appropriate to his might; he has a consort of matchless beauty...; he has an infinite retinue of attendants...; he has an infinitely great realm... which includes all objects and instruments of enjoyment; and he has a celestial abode (divya-sthana), the essential and inherent nature of 72 Annals [D. J.)3570 ABORI : Diamond Jubilee Volume which is beyond the grasp of speech and thought. All this is eternal and flawless.” (Ved. S., para 127) Not only does Ramanuja assert that there is as much scriptural autho- rity for God’s form, abode, and so on, as for the defining attributes of his essential nature and his other auspicious qualities but he is also willing to expand the concept of God’s essential nature (svariipa) to include God’s form and abode : “ Even as such attributes as knowledge have been stated to constitute the svariipa of the supreme Brahman, likewise his bodily form (ripa) belongs to his svaripa, for the Scriptures declare that his essential nature is such” (ibid., para 135). And in $Bh 1, 1. 21 he says; “even his celestial form...is natural to him (svabhdvika)*” and the conclusion of his comment is ; “this form is nothing else than his own attribute (tasya svadharmah ).” As such it is, of course, different from all material bodies : it is aprakrta (ibid. ). The need felt by Ramanuja for providing God with this eternal form and abode may be found, apart from his fidelity to the Vaisnava tradition, in his explanation of the terms satyakdma and satyasamkalpa of Chand. Up., 8.1.5. The term satyakdma, he says, means ‘he who possesses objects of his desire (kama) which are eternally real (satya).’ These permanent (sthira ) objects are instruments of his enjoyment ( bhoga-upakarana), As to satyasamkalpa it means ‘he who possesses objects accomplished by his eternally real will’, These objects comprise not only the permanent instru- ments of his enjoyment but also the impermanent instruments of his cosmic sport (/ild-upakarana) whose nature, subsistence, functioning and differentia- tions depend (dyatta), as we know, on his will (ibid., para 132). The important notion here is that God appears to need for the very reality of his essential bliss permanent instruments of enjoyment or, more generally, a divine body with a celestial abode, retinue, etc. His self-sufficiency needs that complexity. He is not only vis/sra as having a.plurality of defining attributes and auspicious qualities but even as having a body and a perfect abode co-essential to him. As such he may appear utterly superior to the phenomenal universe but this superiority is only fullness in complexity. In the eyes of those who have ascended to the notion that the divine Absolute can only be fullness in simplicity Ram@nuja’s doctrine cannot but appear to compromise the perfection of divine transcendence. It also appears to compromise God’s absolute ineffability. Ramanuja does not fail to remark that the Supreme Person in his celestial form and abode is inconceivable ( acintya) and beyond the grasp of speech or thought, even to the lower gods and to accomplished ascetics. But the whole of his doctrine of modes or bodies and his conception of sdmanadhikaranya importDESMET : Raménuja, Pantheist or Panentheist ? 571 into that apophatism an undeniable element of cataphatism. Indeed, all our words by denoting objects which are all said to be modes or bodies of God denote simultaneously God himself. Their mukhyarthas extend to him, and even to him primarily. Since Ramanuja rejects the theological recourse to laksand, they are not simply apophatic pointers of God’s absolute essence. They are not simply presentative but representative.* Conclusion The very thrust of my exposition has prevented me from doing justice to the highly religious quality and attractiveness of Ramanuja’s teaching which I feel and value deeply. I regret it but I wanted to focus philosophi- cal attention critically on the epistemological postulates of Ram&nuja and on their consequences for his elaboration of the notion of God. As high as it reaches, as religious as are the attitudes it commands in the devotees, it still seems to me to compromise to some extent the perfect transcendence of God. This is why I had found it pantheistic, Labels do not matter much, It is enough to repeat that Ramanuja teaches visistadvaita which does not mean ‘differentiated non-dualism’ but *non-dualism of the differenced Brahman’. But it is important to under- stand what this really means and how closely it measures up to the standard of perfect transcendence. Instead of speaking of an implication of panthe- ism, I am ready to speak, probably with more correctness, of am affinity of Raminuja’s theology with panentheism. At least for Hartshorne’s panen- theism, God “ must be logically independent (and at the same time) cannot in his full actuality be less or other than literally all-inclusive.” Hartshorne’s method, and roughly Raminuja’s method too, is to follow a via eminentiae attributing to God in a “categorically superior” form the qualities and values found in our analysis of human experience." The question is whether this form is “ categorically uppermost. ” ABBREVIATIONS SBh = Sri Bhagya as translated by G. Thibaut. ‘VS [VB] = Vedértha Sarhgraha as translated by Van Buitenen, Ved. 8. = idem as translated by J. B. Carman, op. cit. 9, For these paras concerning the divine Form and Abode, cf. ibid., pp. 167-175, 10. Cf. Lott, op. cit., pp. 226-227.