Kleist's Essay on Rhetoric

Author(s): Kleist and Jill Anne Kowalik

Source: Monatshefte, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Winter, 1989), pp. 434-446
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
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Kleist'sEssay on Rhetoric
JILL ANNE KOWALIK
Princeton University

Although the complex, often mysterious, speech situations in

Kleist's oeuvrehave been pondered and discussed for decades, it is only
relatively recently that scholars have noticed Kleist's essay "Uber die
allmihliche Verfertigungder Gedanken beim Reden"' as an important
quasi-theoreticalstatement on the relationship between language and
thoughtas Kleist saw it, and as a key to understandinghis literaryworks.
The following study seeks to redefinethe terms with which this essay has
thus farbeen interpreted.For while it is generallyagreedthat Kleist wrote
the essay to explain how language functions as a medium of mental
process, there are significanttextual indications that Kleist meant this
essay additionally-and perhaps primarily-as a discourse on the use of
language.In other words, he is interested here not only in the formal
aspects of languageas representation-what might be called the episte-
mological problem-but also in the pragmatic (rhetorical) function of
language.2Including both formal and pragmatic considerations in the
interpretationof this essay not only allows for a better understandingof
the essay itself, but also sheds light on Kleist's general concerns as an
author.
To clarifyhow the pragmatic/rhetoricalaspect of the essay has been
overlooked, it is useful to examine some English translationsof its title.
The following are three examples:
(A)"OntheGradualFashioningof Thoughtin theProcessof Conversing";
(B) "Onthe GradualFormationof ThoughtsduringSpeech";
(C)"Onthe GradualCompletionof ThoughtsWhileSpeaking."3
All of the above translationscould be renderingsof the hypotheticaltitle
"Uber die allmihliche Verfertigungder Gedanken beim Sprechen."But
Kleist used "beim Reden" because he wanted the words "eine Rede hal-
ten" and "Beredsamkeit"to occur to his readeras well. And whereas all
three versions could refer to intimate, private exchanges, in two cases
even to monologues, four of the five speech situations described in the

Monatshefte,Vol. 81, No. 4, 1989 434

0026-9271/89/0004/0434$01.50/0
c 1989 by The Boardof Regentsof The University of Wisconsin System
Kleist'sEssay on Rhetoric 435

essay are located in a public forum where an orator, a "Redner,"holds

forth to a small or large group. Furthermore,examples B and C are
inappropriatelyindebtedto the aestheticsof GermanClassicism.A Rick-
ibersetzungcould produce"Bildungder Gedanken"(B) and "Vollendung
der Gedanken"(C).4Only Ilse Grahamcapturescorrectlya corresponding
Englishterm, "fashioning,"which conveys the artificial,ratherthan clas-
sical-organic,aspect of Verfertigung.She does not, however, appear to
have perceived the significanceof her choice of words, i.e., the fact that
it refersto the transitionaround 1800 from the view of languageas ergon
to languageas energeia.
For poets at the turn of the century, Verfertigunghad become a
pejorativeterm. Lessing had already used it in his HamburgischeDra-
maturgie to describe mechanical poetic composition in distinction to
originalcreative production.5He could do so because the term, since the
Renaissance,had been associated principallywith the (re)productionof
documents and official letters, a process that Lessing implies is at work
in the writing of plays accordingto predeterminedpatterns.In the latter
half of the 18th century,moreover, Verfertigungwas used in a still more
specializedsense: namely, to designatethe composition of school essays,
which, like other formulaic documents, were fashioned according to a
body of rules now commonly referredto as Schulrhetorik.A title and a
few quotations will illustratethis:
Handbuchzu richtigerVerfertigung undBeurtheilungallerArtenvonschrift-
lichen Aufs~itzendes gemeinen Lebens tiberhauptund der Briefe insbeson-
dere.6
Im Lateinischenund in der Anweisung zur Rede-Kunst, haben sie [die
Schuler]so viel gelernet,dab man ihnen erlaubenkonnen [sic], ihre Ab-
schieds-Redendurch eigenen FleiB und Nachsinnen zu verfertigen.
[Man will den Schuilern]nur so viel von den Regeln der deutschenSprache
beibringen,als n6tig ist, einen ertraglichenAufsatz zu verfertigen.
Allein es ist ihm [dem Schiler] unentbehrlicheinen guten Brief zu schrei-
ben, eine deutliche Erzehlungoder Bericht zu verfertigen,und von einer
Materiedie er gelernthat, einen verninftigen Aufsatz zu machen.
... gewisse prosaischeund poetische Aufsatze, welche die Scholarenvon
Zeit zu Zeit verfertigenmissen.
In the popular pedagogical treatises of the decades immediately preceding
Kleist's activity, the word Verfertigungappearsto have been the preem-
inent terminus technicus for the composition of written texts in school
and of speeches delivered from a manuscript.We may infer, therefore,
that Kleist's essay bears at least a semantic relation to these pedagogical
treatises,although it appearsto representalso an intended commentary
436 Kowalik

on them inasmuch as the final scene of the essay describes the exami-
nation of a student.
But there is additional evidence, both internal and external, that
Kleist's essay was meant to be read in the context of popularpedagogical
thinkingof the late 18th century.The internalevidence is in the opening
lines of the essay. In them, Kleist is setting forth to his friend Riihle, to
whom the essay is addressed, the conditions under which one should
speak. Kleist advises him to talk to any acquaintanceat all about those
questions that have aroused his curiosity, but cannot be resolved in sol-
itary meditation. He then adds:
Ichsehedichzwargrol3eAugenmachen,undmirantworten,manhabedir
in friuhern
Jahrenden Rat gegeben,von nichtszu sprechen,als nur von
Dingen,die du bereitsverstehst.(319)
But who is "man?"And on what occasion in the past was this said? The
artistryand exactitudeof Kleist's writing prevent us from finding in this
typically Kleistian theatricaldescription of Riuhlea merely random ob-
servation. One possible and, indeed, obvious answer to such questions
is that "man"is the school or Gymnasiumprofessor,and that "in friuhern
Jahren" refers to the time when the student was asked to prepare a
Schulrede.That is, the student was asked to speak, not spontaneously,
but from a probablymemorizedtext that had been meticulouslyprepared
in advance accordingto the rules by which essays were verfertigt.Kleist
has indicated in his title, however, that the topic of his essay is not the
production of documents but that of ideas, and that the means of pro-
duction is not written, but ratheroral, performance.
Externalevidence linking this essay to pedagogicaltreatises of the
period, in addition to those already cited, is the title of a Preisaufgabe
issued in 1779 in Berlin by F. G. Resewitz, and asking for the "bester
Entwurfeiner Methode den Styl junger Leute zu bilden und sie zu einer
Fertigkeitzu bringen ihre Gedanken schriftlichauszudrticken."One re-
sponse, submitted in 1786 by Peter Villaume (a follower, like Resewitz,
of Basedow'sideas) bears the title "Methodejungen Leuten zu der Fer-
tigkeit zu verhelfen,ihre Gedankenschriftlichauszudriicken."7The sim-
ilarity of Kleist's title to Villaume's is so great as to suggesta parody of
the latter'sessay, or of others like it which may have had similar titles.
We do not know whetherKleist read Resewitz's or Villaume's work, but
we do know that he was critical-like Lessing, whom he admired-of
Basedow'smechanicalpedagogicalnotions that advocated adherenceto,
or copying of, "positive" behavioral models.8
If Kleist's essay is interpreted,then, as a satirical commentary on
late 18th-centurypedagogicalpractices,it acquires a somewhat different
significancefrom that proposed by those who have seen it strictly as a
Kleist'sEssayon Rhetoric 437
reflectionon languageas an "organicmedium" of thought. In their view,
Kleist's argumentis said to run as follows: The purpose of the essay is
to demonstratethat discourse is necessary in order to develop thought.
Speakingis "ein wahrhafteslautes Denken" (322). But in order for this
act of speaking/thinkingto occur, the psyche of the speakermust firstbe
"excited."This can be broughtabout either throughan existential threat
to the speaker,such as that faced by Mirabeauin the Estates General, or
by a sympatheticinterlocutorwho can place the speaker/thinkerin the
proper(i.e., creative) frame of mind for producingideas, as when a stu-
dent faces a practicedand benevolent examiner. Excitation is necessary
in orderto arouse unconscious material,whose formulationin language
constitutes a making-explicitof the unconscious in thought. This is a
more authentic linguistic product than utterancesbased on purely "ra-
tionalistic" pronouncements.
The difficultywith this interpretationis that it does not adequately
account for all of the, sometimes highly parodistic, speech situations
describedin the essay, nor does it show how Kleist relates the five epi-
sodes to each other.For example,it does not explain why Mirabeauwould
perform well (become "excited") in the face of a threat, but why the
student would do poorly in the same situation. Most problematic,how-
ever, is the continual assertion that Kleist is arguingfor the reciprocal
identity of discourse and thought. For the point of the essay is to dem-
onstrateexactly the opposite: languagecan lack substance,and there are
dangerous political consequences following from a naive equation of
thinking and speaking.Interpretationsbased on the "organicmodel" of
language thus produce conclusions that actually run counter to what
Kleist says.
The generalproblem addressedby the essay is the relationshipbe-
tween powerful speech and right action. By raising this issue, Kleist,
wittingly or unwittingly,situates himself historically at the very root of
rhetoricas a discipline. Although the reception of the ancient rhetorical
tradition in the 18th century is an enormously complex problem, and
althoughthe extent of Kleist's knowledge of this tradition is difficult, if
not impossible, to establish, his own historical position can be more
clearlyapprehendedby viewing it against the primarydebate at the gen-
esis of the discipline:that is, Plato's attempt to formulate a philosophic
rhetoricin opposition to what he saw as the sophistic corruptionof lan-
guage.
Plato argues that the Sophists taught their students only how to
speak well, or how to argue successfullyin the courts, but not how to be
good men. The Sophists are not interested,accordingto Plato, in deter-
mining what is right,but only in winning their case. Success lies for them
in clever words,in exploitinglegal technicalitiesfor the sake of rhetorical
438 Kowalik

victory. In the Phaedrus, for example, Plato elaborates the distinction

between merely successful sophistic discourse and good discourse. The
best oration is producedby the speakerwho is striving towardsjustice.
Right speakingfor Plato is only possible from one who is interested in
rightacting.Conversely,the just man will decide on his actions according
to right thinking that has been carefully formulated in logos. The im-
portantpoint for our discussionis the necessaryrelationshipthat he draws
betweenethics and rhetoric.Neither categorycan be subsumedunder the
other:the good man does not "automatically"producegood speech, nor
does good speech alone count as a measure of justice.
There are echoes in all the major rhetoricaltreatisesof antiquity of
Plato's insistence that the quality of a speech is a function of the orator's
character.But his concept of a relationship (not an identity) between
right acting and right speakingoften was reduced to the statement that
the best speaker,meaning the most powerful and impressive, is by def-
inition the best man. This essentially sophistic notion of the orator sur-
faces in the Renaissance-along with other (competing) notions of the
orator, of course-and from there it migratesinto the Enlightenment.
Because ancient rhetoricaltreatises were always conceived as part
of the paideia, we may view their 18th-centurycounterpartas the ped-
agogical treatises generated during the educational reforms of the En-
lightenment. The traditional ideal of the philosophic orator, preserved
but not understood in the documents of Schulrhetorik,undergoesa his-
torical permutation:out of a citizen who uses his verbal gifts and skills
(ingenium and ars) to participatein and influence important decisions
made by the community, the German Enlightenmentcreates a Biurger
who, by virtue of basic competence in reading and writing, can assume
a productive function in the economy and especially in the emerging
bureaucracy.9It is productive, however, in a limited sense. For while
those involved in Geschdftsschreiberey or employed in a Kanzlei were
expected to work somewhat independently, their reading of and com-
mentarieson documents clearlywere expected to remain within bounds
that did not disturbthe system. The educationalpurposeof Schulrhetorik
was, therefore,not to produce creative minds, but instead reliable "pro-
cessors" of paperwork.Essential to this new "rhetorical"training was a
sophistic assumptionof absoluteequivalencebetween good writing skills
and the use of Verstand.A good writeris eo ipso a "good" (i.e., bureau-
craticallyuseful) citizen and therefore"rational."'o
Kleist referspreciselyto this, the connection between education and
bureaucraticservice as a unified institutional strategy,on the very first
page of his essay. Immediatelyafter repeatingwhat Rihle had been told
in school, Kleist turns to his own dilemma while at work on documents:
Kleist'sEssayon Rhetoric 439
Oft sitzeich an meinemGeschiftstischiber den Akten,underforsche,in
einerverwickelten den Gesichtspunkt,
Streitsache, aus welchemsie wohl
zu beurteilensein mochte.(319)
The enterprise,in which his "innerstesWesen"is "begriffen,"Kleist says
with considerableirony, is "sich aufzuklaren."The observation is ironic
becausestate institutionsexpectedabsoluteallegiance("risonniertso viel
ihr wollt, ... aber gehorcht!")while nearlyevery Romantic viewed work
within a bureaucracyas anythingbut a means of self-development.Kleist
is now proposingto search for an answer to his question independently
of solutions provided by another person or by institutional precedent.
He suggeststhat one simply begin talkingabout it even though one does
not know exactlywhat will emerge-advice that no contemporarystudent
would have received. This passage is perhaps more frequently quoted
than any other in the essay, but it is rarelygiven in full:
Aberweilich dochirgendeine dunkleVorstellung habe,die mit dem,was
ich suche,von fernherin einigerVerbindung steht,so prigt,wennich nur
dreistdamitdenAnfangmache,dasGemiit,wahrenddieRedefortschreitet,
in derNotwendigkeit, demAnfangnunauchein Endezu finden,jene ver-
worreneVorstellungzur volligen Deutlichkeit aus, dergestalt,da3 die Er-
kenntnis,zu meinem Erstaunen,mit der Periode fertig ist. Ich mische un-
artikulierte
Toneein,ziehedie Verbindungswrrter in die Lange,gebrauche
auchwohl eine Apposition,wo sie nicht ngtig wire, und bedienemich
anderer,die Redeausdehnender, zurFabrikation
Kunstgriffe, meinerIdee
aufderWerkstittederVernunft,die gehirigeZeitzu gewinnen.(319f.)
Those who view these wordsmerelyas a statementof the organicrelation
betweenthinkingand speakingusuallyend theircitation at "Periodefertig
ist," therebymissingthe obvious parodyof a numberof rhetoricalnotions
(amplification,digression, ornamentation, etc.) and, hence, the signifi-
canceof the passageas a whole. Furthermore,"Periode"is often discussed
as if Kleist had simply written"Satz,"but his contemporarieswould have
understoodit as a rhetoricalterm referringto a complex sentence "fash-
ioned" accordingto carefullyapplied syntactical rules. Kleist ironically
registershis "Erstaunen"that the end of the period coincides with the
finishingof the thought (the development of "Erkenntnis")because En-
lightenment pedagogues had insisted on thoughts being clearly "con-
ceived," i.e., absorbedand recombined,"durchMeditation" (319) from
materiallaid before the student beforea composition was begun. In ad-
dition, the phrases "Werkstitte der Vernunft"and "Fabrikationmeiner
Idee" reiteratethe aspect of artificialityalreadydiscussed, and constitute
Kleist's own humorous referenceto the instrumentalizationof reason in
the 18th century.
The second sentence quoted makes clear that the verbal display is
a power play designed to garnertime for the furiously working mind as
440 Kowalik
it tries to bring forth an idea in language. The perceived threat is an
attempt at interruptinghim, i.e., at trying to tell him what he wants to
know, which would limit his own discourse, or attempt at self-enlight-
enment, and transform him into a passive listener. His spirit (Gemit)
nevertheless rises to the occasion "wie ein groBerGeneral"[!],and the
articulationof the idea is completed. Although speech is "in progress"
during the active development of thought, the more important point is
that verbal displays can lack significantcontent even while serving the
strategicfunction of overpoweringthe listener (in this case, so that an
idea can be worked out by Gemiut).Here, in his opening episode, Kleist
insists on the discrepancybetween the artificial rhetoricalperformance
and articulatedthought. By playingon the word "Periode,"as well as on
other rhetoricalconcepts, he appropriatesterms from the arsenal of En-
lightenmentpedagogyand uses them to attack that tradition in order to
describe his own concept of self-education.Kleist therebyacknowledges
that the use of rhetoricalways involves the exercise to power.
Rhetoricaldisplay is a poor source of knowledge,he goes on to say,
because the greatestoratorshave not even known in advance what they
weregoingto say. With this ironic reversalof the spontaneitytopos,which
holds that greatwords flow automaticallyfrom greatconceptions, Kleist
suggeststhat the mere appearanceof rhetorical"thunderbolts"is no guar-
antee of great thoughts behind them. He recounts the gradual way in
which Mirabeau's"Donnerkeil"(320) was produced (i.e., as if the "Ba-
jonette" [320] with which Mirabeau accomplished the "Vernichtung
seines Gegners"[321] were a haphazardcreation)in orderto presentboth
the positive and negative functions of the stunning verbal performance.
The Mirabeauepisode, the second in the essay, thus has two pur-
poses. First,it points out to one of its implied readers,the Prussianschool
professor,that politicallyeffectiveoral performancecan occur, or is more
likely to occur, if the speaker(the student) has not been forced to deliver
a writtentext memorized in advance. While scholarshave quibbled over
whether Kleist did or did not quote Mirabeauaccurately,and while the
historicalMirabeauwas known to speak from texts writtenboth by him-
self and by others for him, the issue is not whether Kleist's account is
historicallycorrect.The essay is a literarypiece, and Kleist's observation
is meant to make fun of a pedagogicalsystem that paradoxicallyuses
Schulrhetorikfor the suppression of powerful orators who might bring
about social change, in favor of the mass production of passive readers
and writers (copiers).
Second, the episode demonstrateshow effortlessly,as if by mystical
force, passive listeners may be moved to action. In the context of a
digressionon animal magnetism, a topic of great fascination for Kleist,
an electrifiedand electrifyingMirabeauis said to have virtually ignited
Kleist'sEssay on Rhetoric 441

his listeners to action in an oratoricaldisplay compared to an electrical

discharge through which his enthusiasm passes to his listeners." His
"Elektrizitatsgrad" (321) was so high that his very presencebroughtabout
the events attributedto his words:
Vielleicht,da3 es auf diese Art zuletztdas ZuckeneinerOberlippewar,
oderein zweideutigesSpielan derManschette, wasin Frankreich
denUm-
sturz der Ordnungder Dinge bewirkte.(321)
Whereasin the firstepisode Kleist had observedthat intellectuallyempty
speeches can have strategicfunctions, here he asserts that the effective
rhetoricaldisplay need not even contain words:a twitchinglip will suffice
as an exercise of power, to initiate the French Revolution, for example.
Hence the most effective speeches are those in which the audience is
poised to hear what the orator argues. He merely need exploit the pre-
disposition of the audience to bringabout a particularpolitical outcome.
The speakeris able to do this, Kleist suggestsin the next episode, because
a mere pretenseof spontaneousemotion engendersthe listener'strust in
the wisdom of the orator.
While such pretensehas belonged, since the earliest rhetoricaltrea-
tises, to the accepted means of persuasion,Kleist's radical insight in his
third episode is that the listener'sacceptanceof the pretenseis a method
of transferringresponsibilityfor one's own destructive desire onto the
"genius"of the speaker,whose "spontaneousinvention" (Erfindung)cat-
alyzes the violence. The episode describesthe speech held by the fox in
"Les animaux malades de la peste" by Lafontaine. "Man kennt diese
Fabel," Kleist adds with a sarcastic double entendre,meaning not only
the actual fable but also its plot, i.e., the ritualistic destruction of the
weakest or dumbest member of a group, a very old problem indeed.
Surely, in this case, it is hardly appropriateto speak of the "creative
development"of an idea: the speech situation is one in which "derFuchs
dem L6wen eine Apologie zu halten gezwungenist, ohne zu wissen, wo
er den Stoff dazu hernehmen soll ..." (322, my emphasis). Rhetorical
display legitimizes the unconscious desire for destruction by the mob,
which then acts on words singularly devoid of rational sense, the fox
describesthe donkey as "der blutdfirstige!(der alle Kriuter auffriBt)..."
(322).
Preciselyat this point Kleist delivers his now famous "ein solches
Reden ist ein wahrhafteslautes Denken" (322), which is a bitterly sar-
castic referralto how easily speech without substance passes for solid
argumentation.In making violence acceptable,he argues, "die Sprache
ist alsdann keine Fessel" (322) but the reverse. A parallel event is the
"FluB priesterlicherBeredsamkeit"(155) in Kleist's Erdbebenin Chili.
"Hier ist eine Stelle, die begreiflichmacht, daB Kleist wichtig fuiruns ist
442 Kowalik
und warumer es ist. Hiervonsollte nicht abgelenktwerdendurchdie
Redevon Gesellschaftskritik,diedasVerhiltnisvon GewaltundSprache,
das for unsereEpochein all ihrenpolitisch-gesellschaftlichen wie indi-
viduellenErscheinungen bestimmendist, in diesemFallauf das Thema
klerikalerHerrschafteingrenzt."'2
To review:the firstthreespeechsituations(the dialoguewith his
sister,to whomKleistrefersin the beginning;Mirabeau'sperformance;
the fox'sapology)all representironicreversalsof the spontaneitytopos
in whichhe questionsthe intellectualcontentof rhetoricaldisplay.He
alsoplacestheseepisodeson a scaleof violence:the firstcontainsstrategy
but no violence,the second,violencethat may or may not have served
anultimatesocialgood-KleistfelttheRevolutionhadnot-and thethird
describespurelydestructiveviolencebasedon preservationof obvious
(thefox representsa groupwhosecommongoalis "dasUn-
self-interest
gewittervon sich ableiten"[322]).
Thequestion,however,is not whetherKleistviewedrhetoricalper-
formanceperse as a goodor an evil. Instead,we arebeingaskedto revise
our thinkingaboutthe statusof rhetoricalperformance. By structuring
the episodesas he does,Kleistasksus to give up the notionthatthe best
speakeris the best man-becausehe is mistakenlyfelt to be a sourceof
knowledgeor wisdom-and replaceit with the notion that good men can
only develop in an environmentthat allows them to speak.His somewhat
Rousseauistic search for the "good man," for l'homme instead of le ci-
toyen, or Mensch instead of Biirger,led him to articulatein this essay a
notion of discourse that was probably, but not necessarily, oral rather
than writtenbecause documents tend to be more vulnerablethan speech
to institutional organizationand control. Kleist's point (and here he dif-
fers from Rousseau) is not the simple advocacy of spontaneous oral dis-
courseas the best means of"making the unconsciousexplicit,"as is nearly
universally asserted, but the critique of all discourse, written and oral,
that merely reproducesinstitutionally mandated models of speech.'3He
is seekinginstead an ideal form of languagethat would not be subject to
institutionalco-optation,that would not necessarilybe viewed as a source
of "wisdom" (i.e., authority), and that would provide the condition of
possibility for authentic humanism, an attitude that would allow less
perfect (i.e., uncontrolled)utterancesto occur in the community.
Kleist therefore offers in his fourth episode the example of those
whose power over languageis deficient and who as a result have trouble
in socialsituations:"Leute,die sich,weilsie sichderSprachenichtmich-
tigftihlen,... in derRegelzurickgezogenhalten"(323).Suchpeoplecan
be encouraged to speak("aufflammen") in a "Gesellschaft,
wo durchein
lebhaftesGesprich,eine kontinuierliche Befruchtung der Gemiter mit
Ideenim Werkist" (323). Of course,"Gesellschaft" is anotherdouble
Kleist'sEssayon Rhetoric 443
entendreand refersnot just to the lively conversationat "Teetische,"but
also to a society free of state censors. Speakerswho have been officially
or psychologicallyrepressed-Kleist sees a dynamic relationbetween the
two-have something to contribute: "Es ist wahrscheinlich,daB diese
Leute etwas recht Treffendes,und sehr deutlich, gedacht haben" (323).
But theirinexperiencepreventsthem from prevailingin a society in which
discourse is viewed as a form of warfare:
Und iberhauptwirdjeder,der,bei gleicherDeutlichkeit,geschwinderals
sein Gegnerspricht,einenVorteiliber ihn haben,weiler gleichsammehr
Truppenals er ins Feldfuihrt.(323)
Because clever, polished, and easily delivered speech- institutionally
molded speech with Truppenbehind it-is mistaken for knowledge, all
rough,misshapenstatementsthat differfrom it in purelyrhetoricalqual-
ity are suppressed.And becauserhetoricallyunpolishedstatementsmight
lead to potentiallynew, therefore"revolutionary,"ideas which may revise
the existingpowerstructure,the crucialfundamentalincongruityof think-
ing and speakingis officiallyignored or denied in pedagogicalpolicy for
the sake of political exploitation.
The paradigm with which Kleist illustrates the dynamic of open
speech, potential knowledge, and political repression is the university
oral examination. Suppose, Kleist suggests,that a student just happens
to be askeda question such as "Whatis the state?"or "Whatis property?"
(323). Such questions call forthtwo kinds of answers.Eitherthe respond-
ent may provide a quick and clever rhetoricaldisplay in which memo-
rized definitions are rattled off and then forgotten, or he may give a
confused but ultimately more serious answer based on what he has
thoughtabout the question but never been given the chance to express.
Kleist says that "ohne vorhergegangeneEinleitung"the student cannot
answer "wo diese Vorbereitungdes Gemiutsginzlich fehlt" (323). Since
criticsusuallymiss the double significanceof"Gesellschaft"in the fourth
episode, it likewise does not occur to them that Kleist's meaning is not
simply the student's need to "feel comfortable,"but also that (Prussian)
state censorship needs to be abolished.
The repressive examiner will assume that since the student stum-
bles, he has no idea what the proper answer should be. The intelligent
examinerwill realize that knowledgeof these difficultissues is not to be
gaugedby facile responsesbut by the degreeto which a reflectionon this
problem has informed our character."Denn nicht wir wissen, es ist al-
lererstein gewisser Zustand unsrer,welcher weiB" (323). The quotation
appropriatesanother ancient topos, that of "divine possession," as with
the rhapsode who spontaneously gives forth poetic truths while in a
trance. Kleist uses this topos ironically to indicate the importance of
444 Kowalik
knowledgeas a state of mind, as opposed to mere verbal performance.
Only "gemeineGeister"(324), those who have faithfullycopied down in
Aufstitzethe definitions fed to them by the state-employedprofessor,will
be able to appear to know. But knowing as a mental condition means
that a concept must develop over the course of many conversations on
a question, out of which a coherent set of ideas could emerge that is
rooted in our characterand not simply in our words.
The university oral examination is a direct historicaldescendant of
the Roman schools of declamation. But whereas the Roman student,
ideally at least, was being preparedby the use of fictional cases for real
futureconflict outside the school, Kleist shows that not only do the ques-
tions asked in the university examination not prepare the student for
resolvingsocial conflicts-over the constitution of the state, for example-
but they actually preclude his subsequent participation as a citizen in
those conflicts. The scenario goes as follows. First the professor fosters
in his student the belief that rhetoricaldisplay is an indication of knowl-
edge. (Actualrhetoricaldisplay in the 18th-centuryschool, however, was
based on careful written preparationaccording to accepted models in
which spontaneitywas feigned.)Then the professorasks a question about
which no practice has been allowed: namely, "What is the state?" The
student is suddenly and cruelly asked to take the convention of spon-
taneity literally,something that ensures his failure to produce a satisfac-
tory response.Afterthis traumaticexperience,he hesitates to take up the
question again at a later time. The professor,however, who fears for and
protectshis own reputationas an "enlightened"mind by cleverly asking
the question, appearsto have an interest in the development of political
ideas among his students. But he leaves the examination, having suc-
cessfullypersuadedthe studentthat discourseaboutthe concept of"state"
is a fruitlessand painful endeavor-Kleist's word is "widerwirtig"(324).
We see in this confrontation more than the participation of the
school system in repression by the state. Kleist also shows us the self-
serving role played by the state in its equation of knowledge and verbal
performance.Such a conflation,quite paradoxically,resultsin the eternal
irreconcilability of thinking and speaking, because the possibility of
their-to be sure, non-harmonious- relationshipto each other is denied
in an act of mutual identification.When intellectualsubstancecannot be
distinguishedfrom rhetoricaldisplay, speakersand listeners (or writers
and readers)are preventedfrom giving an ethical evaluation of powerful
discourse,which is the discoursesanctionedby the powerful.This in turn
produces the most favorable climate conceivable for any state seeking
unquestioningacceptanceof its Realpolitik.
Interpretationsof the essay that are based on an equivalence of
languageand thought run the risk of replicating,unwittingly, precisely
Kleist'sEssayon Rhetoric 445
the cultural-politicalstrategy described by Kleist. Such an interpretive
position cannot challengethe paradoxicalrole of the state in maintaining
an unresolvable discrepancybetween thinking and speaking even as it
conflates them because this position is ultimately grounded in the con-
viction that Kleist's writingembodies a fundamentalskepticism towards
language,towardsits ability qua medium to express thought adequately.
Kleist saw himself as an "unaussprechlicherMensch" (729f.), so this
position holds, and his essay "Uber die allmihliche Verfertigungder
Gedanken beim Reden" was an attempt at explaining how a Utopian
spontaneous discourse might overcome the dilemma posed by the "in-
adequacies"of language that are everywhere evident in his plays and
narratives.Yet we miss the author'spurposein writingthis essay, perhaps
even his purpose as an author, if we confine our interpretationto a sup-
posed exclusively epistemological problem in his oeuvre.For the essay
reveals how Kleist's reflectionon the relationshipbetween languageand
thoughtis anchoredin his cultural-politicalcriticism.Isolatingthe formal
question of representationfrom the pragmatic/rhetoricalissues of lan-
guagepreventsus from recognizinghis (unfulfilled)desire to captureand
understandthe shocking paradox, still with us, of "diese h6chste Sitten-
losigkeit bei der h6chsten Wissenschaft"(681).

'Heinrich von Kleist, StimtlicheWerkeund Briefe,ed. Helmut Sembdner,7th ed.,

2 vols. (Miinchen,1984) 2: 319-324. All referencesto Kleist's worksare from this volume
of this edition and will appearin parenthesesby page numberin the text and notes.
2 An exceptionto the generalneglectof the essay in terms of the rhetoricaltradition
is GeraldGillespie,"Kleist'sHypothesisof AffectiveExpression:Acting-outin Language,"
Seminar17 (1981):275-282, who views the essay as partof the Romantic"epochalreaction
againstrhetoricas a heritageof fixed devices and memorizedformulae"(280). The article
does not analyze,however, Kleist's use of rhetoricaltopoi, nor does it discuss his funda-
mentallypragmatic/rhetorical/political stance.
The sourcesare: (A) Ilse Graham,Heinrich von Kleist-Word into Flesh:A Poet's
Questfor the Symbol (Berlin/New York, 1977);(B) Maria M. Tatar, Spellbound:Studies
on Mesmerismand Literature(Princeton,1978);(C) John H. Smith, "Dialogic Midwifery
in Kleist'sMarquisevon O and the Hermeneuticsof Tellingthe Untold in Kantand Plato,"
PMLA 100 (1985): 203-219. Gillespie does not translatethe title.
4 The terminologyof classicism is also found in one of the most influentialinter-
pretationsof the essay,the one by Hans Heinz Holz in his Machtund OhnmachtderSprache
(Frankfurt,1962): 26-33, where the words bilden and ausbildenoccur with referenceto
thought.See also Judith Schlanger,"Kleist:'L'Id6evient en Parlant',"Littrature 51 (Oct.
1983):3-14, who speaksof"la formationdes id6es."For an overview of"organic"notions
of languagein GermanClassicismand Romanticism,see Hans Arens,Sprachwissenschaft:
Der Gang ihrerEntwicklungvon derAntikebis zur Gegenwart,2 vols. (Frankfurt,1969) 2:
119-130 and 155-227.
SCf. HamburgischeDramaturgie,36. Stiuck,in G. E. LessingsSimtliche Schriften,
ed. Lachmann-Muncker, 3rded. (1886;reprint:Berlin, 1968)9: 335, and Grimm,Deutsches
Wirterbuch,25: 328-30.
6 This and the following four quotations are taken from Heinrich Bosse, "Dichter

kann man nicht bilden:Zur Veranderungder Schulrhetoriknach 1770,"Jahrbuchfar In-

ternationaleGermanistik9 (1978):80-125. Bosse gives currentlyavailablesourcematerials
446 Kowalik
for (1) through(5) on pp. 88, 83, 93, 103, and 114, respectively.The original titles are
restatedhere to provide context for the reader:(1) a work by Johann FriedrichHeynatz,
publishedin 1773 and again in 1775 in Berlin;(2) from J. F. Hahn, Die Miglichkeit und
Nutzbarkeiteines CurriculiScholastici(Berlin, 1754);(3) from Johann Ignazvon Felbiger,
Methodenbuch fitr Lehrerder deutschenSchulen in den kaiserlich-kaniglichen Erblindern
(Wien, 1775); (4) from Henrich Martin Gottfried Krster, Anweisungdie Sprachen und
Wissenschaftenverninftigzu erlernenund ordentlichzu studieren(Frankfurtund Leipzig,
1763);(5) quoted from the 1782 Bestimmungenof the St. Johannis-Schulein Hamburg.
7Bosse, 105, n. 105.
8 Cf. Kleist's"Allerneuster Erziehungsplan"(329-335) and Lessing'scritiqueof Ba-
sedow in his Briefe,die neuesteLitteraturbetreffend,esp. 104. Stiick,in Simtliche Schriften
8: 233-236.
9 Cf. Bosse, 86-89, esp. n. 22, which quotes Peter Villaume: "Wir verlangenaber
keineunnachahmlicheScribenten,die ohnehinnichtgebildetwerden.Es werdennursimple,
deutliche, verniinftigeSchreiberverlangt,die in ihren Geschaftendie Feder zu brauchen
wissen. Ich sage mit FleiBSchreiberund Geschifte. Denn Autorenmussenwir nicht bilden
wollen. Wir haben deren schon zum UberfluB,befugter und unbefugter.Also nur Ge-
schiftsminner, Gesch.ftsschreiberey." The Instruction far den Unterricht in dem
GroJ3herzoglichen Gymnasiumzu Darmstadtof 1827 shows how successfulthis and similar
argumentswere:"Die Stylibungen sind zunichst den Bedirfnissendes praktischenLebens
gewidmet,indem sie alle Gattungenvon Geschiftsaufsitzen umfassen,zuerstdes niederen
Geschiftstyls, wie Abschiede,Anweisungen,Anzeigen, Circularschreiben, Contracte,For-
mulare, Obligationen,Quittungen, Rechnungen, Reverse, Schenkungsschriften,Schuld-
scheine,Specificationen,Vollmachten,Vorschlige,Wechsel,Zeugnisseu.s.w. Hierauffolgen
einige Gattungendes Canzlei-und Gerichtsstyls,z. B. Attestate,Berichte,Citationen,De-
crete,Gutachten,Protokolle,Relationen,Scheineu.s.w., endlicheinige Gattungendes Hof-
styls, Bittschriften,Gutachten,Vorstellungenu.s.w."Quoted by GeorgJager,Der Deutsch-
unterrichtaufdem Gymnasiumder Goethezeit:eineAnthologie(Hildesheim, 1977) 13. This
now humorousproliferationof "genres"(so many that they must be alphabetizedto be
discussed)indicateshow seriouslysuch documentswere taken.
,oSee the sections beginningwith "Denkschulungals Aufgabedes Unterrichts,"in
Horst Joachim Frank,Dichtung,Sprache,Menschenbildung:Geschichtedes Deutschunter-
richtsvondenAnfangenbis 1945, 2 vols. (Munchen,1976) 1: 156-206. Frankdemonstrates
how Humboldt'sconceptof languageas an organicstructurewas trivializedand popularized
in the grammarbooks of the early 19th century,which were writtenon the premise of an
identity between languageand thought:"Der Mensch spricht,weil er denkt, und mit der
Verrichtungdes Denkens ist zugleich die Verrichtungdes Sprechensgegeben"(Karl Fer-
dinand Becker,Organismusder Sprache[1827] as quoted by Frank, 166). This notion was
pickedup by RaimundJakobWurstin his PraktischeSprachdenklehre of 1836:"Sprechen
ist ein laut gewordenesDenken" (Frank, 174), a statementbrilliantlyanticipatedand sat-
irized by Kleist with his "Redenist ein wahrhafteslautes Denken."
' The fullestdiscussionof animal magnetismwith referenceto the essay is by Tatar,
82-120. For importantnew evidence, see Steven R. Huff, StarresLeben: The Problemof
Passivity in the Worksof Heinrich von Kleist (Diss. PrincetonUniversity, 1987), 37-85.
The image of thunderbolts,which appearsin the writingsof animal magnetism,is a rhe-
torical topos with which Kleist would have been familiar.This is one example of double
entendre,often employed by Kleist as a stylistic device.
12 Helmut Arntzen,"Heinrichvon Kleist: Gewalt und Sprache,"in Die Gegenwir-
tigkeitKleists,(Berlin, 1980), 70f.
13 Rousseaudistinguishesbetween oral and writtendiscourseaccordingto qualities
he views as inherentin languageitself:"L'6criture... substituel'exactitudeg l'expression.
L'on rend ses sentimens quand on parle et ses idres quand on 6crit. En 6crivant on est
forc6 de prendretous les mots dans l'acceptioncommune; mais celui qui parle varie les
acceptionspar les tons, il les determinecomme il lui plait; moins g~n6 pour &treclair, il
donne plus Ala force, et il n'est pas possible qu'une langue qu'on 6crit garde longtems la
vivacit6 de celle qui n'est que parlre,"see his Essai sur l'originedes langues, ed. Charles
Porset (Paris, 1976), 67. Kleist, by contrast,does not polarize oral and written media ac-
cordingto a normativeemotive-intellectiveantithesis.