in Re Judge Abdul JR PDF

EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486. September 3, 2019.]

[Formerly A.M. No. 17-02-45-RTC]
RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION

ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDING JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR.,
BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BUTUAN CITY, AGUSAN DEL
NORTE
DECISION
PER CURIAM : p
Death of the respondent judge during the pendency of his administrative case
shall not terminate the proceedings against him, much less absolve him, or cause the
dismissal of the complaint if the investigation was completed prior to his demise. If
death intervenes before he has been dismissed from service, the appropriate penalty is
forfeiture of all retirement and other benefits, except accrued leaves.
Such is the situation in this administrative matter initiated against Judge
Godofredo B. Abul, Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Butuan
City, Agusan del Norte, in which the complaint charged him with extortion committed
against prison inmates detained for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Antecedents
On April 7, 2015, the O ce of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the letter
sent by Rev. Father Antoni A. Saniel, Director of the Prison Ministry of the Diocese of
Butuan, 1 denouncing the extortionate activities committed by Judge Abul against the
detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan. 2 Allegedly, Judge Abul had demanded
money ranging from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 in exchange for the detainees'
release from jail or the dismissal of the criminal cases. 3 Father Saniel submitted with
his letter the a davits of Hazel D. Reyes (Reyes) 4 and Anna Marie B. Montilla (Montilla)
that attested to the extortion activities of Judge Abul.
In her a davit, Reyes claimed that she was an "asset" of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA); that Judge Abul had extorted money from detainees
accused of and undergoing trial for drug-related charges in exchange for their liberty;
that a certain Naomi Saranggani, the wife of a detainee, had approached and asked her
if she wanted her criminal case to be dismissed; that Saranggani had told her that
Judge Abul summoned her to look for detainees facing drug-related charges who
wanted their cases to be favorably resolved; that Saranggani had told her and Montilla
that they should start raising money totalling P200,000.00 to pay Judge Abul; and that
Montilla had related that when she attended her December 5, 2014 hearing, Judge Abul
asked for her cellphone number so that they could directly communicate with each
another.
On her part, Montilla averred that she had met Saranggani on November 4, 2014
when the latter went to the Agusan del Norte Provincial Jail to await the release of her
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husband, Walid Saranggani; that Saranggani had asked if she (Montilla) had wanted to
be released from prison herself because Judge Abul could arrange her release in
exchange for the sum of P200,000.00; that Saranggani had then used her phone to call
someone whom she kept addressing as "judge;" that Saranggani had then handed the
phone to her to talk to the person, who introduced himself as Judge Abul, and asked if
she could pay P100,000.00 in exchange for her release; that she had later on personally
met Judge Abul during her scheduled hearing on December 5, 2014, and he had told her
that they should help one another because she could be convicted based on the
document that she had signed; that Judge Abul had asked her phone number in case he
would want to see her after her release; that Saranggani had intimated to her that they
paid P250,000.00 to Judge Abul to secure the release of her husband; and that she had
learned through Saranggani that Judge Abul had also been instrumental in the release
of other prisoners after they had paid him.
Investigation and Report
of the Judicial Audit Team
The OCA conducted a fact- nding investigation of the complaint led by Father
Saniel through a team led by Atty. Rullyn S. Garcia. 5
The team interviewed Reyes and Montilla who con rmed their a davits. Reyes
and Montilla also separately con rmed that in February 2015, Judge Abul arrived at the
provincial jail and talked to them; that Judge Abul asked Reyes to execute a disclaimer
that he would prepare and that he would ensure her release from detention; that as to
Montilla, Judge Abul appeared to be annoyed by her a davit, and said to her that he
would just inhibit but would see to it that she would be convicted. 6
The team reviewed the records of Criminal Case No. 15630 charging Walid
Saranggani, Shaira Salic, Mike Saranggani and Ryan Umpa for violating Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 and ra ed to the RTC Branch presided by respondent. The team
concluded that Criminal Case No. 15630 had been decided in haste and without regard
to procedural rules that cast doubt on the regularity of the acquittal of all accused. 7
On February 28, 2017, the Court En Banc issued a resolution placing Judge Abul
under preventive suspension, and required him to comment on the complaint and the
investigation report. 8
Comment/Answer of Judge Abul
In his comment/answer, 9 Judge Abul denied all the accusations, and insisted
that the same were false, baseless and concocted by an evil and malicious mind for the
sole purpose of besmirching his unblemished record of service in the Judiciary. He
maintained that Fr. Saniel had no personal knowledge of the alleged extortion activities;
that the declarations of Reyes and Montilla were not based on their personal
knowledge and were thus inadmissible against him; that he did not go to the provincial
jail to confront Reyes and Montilla, but only to talk to the jail warden to inquire if the
prisoners were being allowed to leave jail; that the a davits of Reyes and Montilla had
been notarized before notary public Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, but the representative of
the latter had stated that said a davits were not notarized by Atty. Poculan; and that it
was improbable for him to demand money from Reyes and Montilla considering that
they had appeared to have no visible income to support themselves.
Pending review of this administrative case, the Court received the letter from the
respondent's wife dated September 13, 2017 informing about Judge Abul's demise. 1 0
Subsequently, the counsel for the late judge led a Notice of Death and Motion to
Dismiss, 1 1 praying for the dismissal of the complaint in view of the respondent's death
and the punitive nature of the administrative liabilities. 1 2
OCA Report and Recommendation
On February 20, 2018, the OCA submitted its report, 1 3 and recommended
therein as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED , we respectfully recommend for the
consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1. The motion to dismiss led by respondent Judge's
counsel, Atty. Teristram B. Zoleta, be DENIED for lack of merit;
and
2. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., Branch 4, Regional
Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, be ADJUDGED
GUILTY of grave misconduct constituting violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and FINED
in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00),
to be deducted from his retirement gratuity.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 1 4
The OCA disagreed with the urging of the respondent's counsel to dismiss the
complaint in view of his intervening demise, observing:
It has been settled that the death of a respondent does not preclude a
nding of administrative liability. However, it may necessitate the dismissal of
the case upon a consideration of the following factors: first, if the respondent's
right to due process was not observed; second, the presence of exceptional
circumstances in the case on the grounds equitable and humanitarian reasons;
and third, the kind of penalty imposed.
In this case, none of the foregoing factors exists. First, respondent
Judge's right to due process was not violated. As borne by the records, he was
duly informed of the accusations against him, having been furnished with a
copy of the letter-complaint of Fr. Saniel and its attached a davits, as well as a
copy of the investigation report of Atty. Garcia. In fact, he led his comment
thereon, which the Court received on 19 April 2017. Second, his death alone is
insu cient to justify the dismissal of the case on the ground of equitable or
humanitarian consideration. A case was ordered dismissed by the Court by
reason of the respondent's death for equitable and humanitarian considerations
as the liability was incurred by reason of respondent's poor health. In this case,
there was no circumstance other than respondent Judge's death that may
warrant the invocation of equitable or humanitarian ground in his favor. Third,
the penalty of ne may still be imposed notwithstanding his death. In fact, in
one case, the respondent who died before the investigating judge was able to
nish and submit his report but was duly noti ed of the proceedings against
him and was directed to le his answer, although he opted not to comply
therewith, was still meted the penalty of forfeiture of his retirement bene ts,
except his accrued leave credits, after having been found guilty of grave
misconduct. 1 5
The OCA found that the allegations against Judge Abul had been con rmed and
validated by Judge Abul himself and by the court records; that the a davits of Reyes
and Montilla had appeared to be credible in light of Judge Abul's inability to impute any
ill-motive, malice or bad faith to the accusers; and that based on the results of the
investigation Judge Abul had violated Canon 2, Canon 3 and Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary in a manner that amounted to grave
misconduct. 1 6
Issue
Did Judge Abul's actuations amount to gross misconduct constituting violations
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary?
Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings of the OCA but modify its recommendation.
Based on the sworn declarations of Reyes and Montilla, as well as the court
records of Criminal Case No. 15630, there appeared to be su cient grounds to hold
Judge Abul administratively liable for extortion as charged against him. Consequently,
the Court concurs with the following observations of the OCA, viz.:
Going into the merits of the case, it may be true that some of the
statements made by Reyes and Montilla in their respective a davits and before
Atty. Garcia were not necessarily based on their own personal knowledge since
they were just mostly conveyed to them by Naomi. Nonetheless, these
statements cannot simply be brushed aside as hearsay and, therefore,
inadmissible in evidence against respondent Judge. It bears stressing that some
of these statements were con rmed and validated by respondent Judge himself
and by the records of Criminal Case No. 15630.
First, Reyes and Montilla claimed that respondent Judge went to the
Agusan del Norte Provincial Jail on 4 or 5 February 2015, and this was admitted
by respondent Judge, although he denied talking with them since his supposed
purpose in going there was merely to ask its O cer-in-Charge, Mr. Antenorio,
whether prisoners are allowed to leave the jail premises without the court's
authority in light of the complaint-a davits of Reyes and Montilla against him
that were executed before Atty. Puculan on 13 January 2015. However, the
positive assertion by Reyes and Montilla that he personally talked with them
inside the Provincial Warden's o ce is more credible than his bare denial.
Notably, Montilla claimed that it was Mr. Antenorio who convinced them to talk
with respondent Judge. If, indeed, he did not purposely talk with Reyes and
Montilla, he could have easily obtained an a davit or statement from Mr.
Antenorio to refute such allegation, but he conveniently failed to do so.
Second, the allegation of Reyes that Naomi told her and Montilla that the
drugs case against her (Naomi's) husband and his co-accused was dismissed
by respondent Judge on 24 November 2014, as well as the allegation of
Montilla that Naomi went to the Provincial Jail sometime in November 2014 to
fetch her husband and relatives after they were acquitted by respondent Judge,
are not without factual basis. As borne by the records of Criminal Case No.
15630, the Decision acquitting the accused in said case was promulgated on 24
November 2014 without the presence of all the accused, even if such presence
is required under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, thereby
making it necessary for Naomi to fetch her husband and his co-accused from
the Provincial Jail. The consistency between the statements of Reyes and
Montilla and the circumstances of said case, as borne by the records, makes the
allegations of Reyes and Montilla credible.
It bears stressing that respondent Judge was furnished with a copy of
the Investigation Report dated 10 February 2017 of Atty. Garcia, where said
statements and circumstances of the subject criminal case were clearly
outlined. It was also stated therein that Reyes claimed that Naomi told her that
her husband and his co-accused obtained a favorable decision after paying
respondent Judge the amount of Php250,000.00. Atty. Garcia characterized the
proceedings in the same criminal case as a "patent irregularity" since
respondent Judge "decided it with undue haste and without due regard to the
procedural rules, resulting in the questionable acquittal of all the accused."
However, despite the gravity of the irregularity imputed to him and despite being
required to comment thereon, respondent Judge offered not a single word to
refute the ndings and observations of Atty. Garcia, thereby giving the
impression that respondent Judge has admitted such ndings and
observations.
The foregoing circumstances render the allegations of Reyes and
Montilla not only admissible in evidence but also convincing, especially so that
respondent Judge failed to offer any plausible imputation of ill motive, malice
or bad faith on their part to make any false accusation against him. Montilla
claims that she negotiated with respondent Judge over the phone regarding the
amount he was asking in exchange for the dismissal of her case in the presence
of Reyes and Naomi. Reyes corroborated Montilla's statement, having overheard
the conversation between respondent Judge and Montilla as the phone was set
on speaker mode. Montilla further claims that during the scheduled hearing of
her case on 5 December 2014, respondent Judge called her to the lawyer's table,
and admonished her for asking that the Php200,000.00 she was supposed to
pay him be reduced even if the a davit she executed showed that she is guilty.
17
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of
every whiff of impropriety not only in regard to his discharge of judicial duties, but also
to his behavior outside his o ce and even as a private individual. 1 8 Indeed, judges
should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel who have matters
pending before them in order to avoid even the mere perception of possible bias or
partiality. They should be scrupulously careful with respect to pending or prospective
litigations before them to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that
their personal, social or sundry relations could in uence their objectivity, for not only
must they possess pro ciency in law but they must also act and behave in such manner
that would assure litigants and their counsel, with great comfort, of the judges'
competence, integrity and independence. 1 9
In view of this, whether or not Judge Abul really demanded money in exchange
for either the liberty of Reyes and Montilla or the dismissal of the criminal case led
against them even became immaterial herein. By simply meeting and talking with them
as the accused whose cases were then pending in his sala, Judge Abul already
transgressed ethical norms and compromised his integrity and impartiality as the trial
judge. His actuations agrantly violated the following norms and canons of The New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, to wit:
CANON 2
Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial o ce but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must rea rm the
people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice musty not merely be done
but must also be seen to be done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 3
Impartiality
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial o ce. It applies
not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision to
made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor,
bias or prejudice.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and
out of court, maintains and enhances the con dence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct
themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them
to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all
the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the acquittal of the accused in Criminal Case No. 15630, the Court
agrees with and adopts the following relevant findings thereon by the OCA, to wit:
While there was no direct evidence that respondent Judge was paid
Php250,000.00 in consideration for the acquittal of all the accused in Criminal
Case No. 15630, the highly questionable circumstances surrounding their
acquittal on reasonable doubt give credence to the allegation of corruption
against him. The decision was premature and grossly unprocedural, the same
being in violation of Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. Notably, he
allowed the accused to manipulate the proceedings when he unduly acted
favorably on their memorandum praying for their acquittal despite the vehement
opposition thereto of the prosecution, correctly pointing out that the same could
not be treated as demurrer to evidence having been led out of time. Worse,
without considering the merits of the prosecution's opposition to the
memorandum despite its legal and logical soundness, he submitted the case for
decision by merely stating in his order that "the defense has led a
memorandum indicating that they (sic) are submitting the case for decision
based on prosecution's evidence and the prosecution has submitted its
comment." With extraordinary and undue speed, he penned the decision on the
same day that the case was submitted for decision, and he promulgated the
decision without the presence of the accused in violation of Section 6, Rule 120
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Plainly enough, Judge Abul's actuations and behavior constituted grave
misconduct. It is settled that grave misconduct exists where the requisites of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or agrant disregard of established rule are
present. As an element of grave misconduct, corruption consists in the act of an o cial
or duciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some bene t for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights
of others. 2 0
Judge Abul's death intervened in the meantime. Nonetheless, and as
recommended by the OCA, his death should not result in the dismissal of the
administrative complaint. In Gonzales v. Escalona , 2 1 we held that the Court is not
ousted of its jurisdiction by the mere fact that the respondent public o cial had
meanwhile ceased to hold o ce. Verily, jurisdiction over the case or subject matter,
once acquired, continues until nal resolution. With more reason is this true herein
because Judge Abul was fully afforded due process during the investigation.
Worth noting is that the Court already sternly warned Judge Abul in Calo v. Judge
Abul, Jr. 2 2 "to be more circumspect in issuing orders which must truly re ect the actual
facts they represent to obviate engendering views of partiality among others." The
warning evidently fell on deaf ears in view of the clear showing that Judge Abul still
committed another serious offense.
It is now time to impose the stiffer penalty on him.
Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, grave misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious offense that results in dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the bene ts, and perpetual disquali cation
from reappointment or appointment to any public o ce, including government-owned
and controlled corporations, except accrued leave credits. 2 3
Had Judge Abul not died, he would have been meted the extreme penalty of
dismissal, with the concomitant forfeiture of all retirement and allied bene ts due to
him, except accrued leaves, as an accessory penalty. Considering that his intervening
death has rendered his dismissal no longer feasible, the accessory penalty of forfeiture
of all such retirement and allied bene ts, except accrued leaves, then becomes the
viable sanction.
WHEREFORE , the Court FINDS and DECLARES the late Presiding Judge
Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte
GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT ; and, accordingly, FORFEITS all bene ts, including
retirement gratuity, exclusive of his accrued leaves, which shall be released to his legal
heirs.
SO ORDERED .
Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, J.C. Reyes, Jr.,
Carandang and Inting, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., I join the dissent. See separate opinion.
Caguioa, A.B. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Lazaro-Javier and Zalameda, JJ., join the
dissent of Justice Hernando.
Hernando, J., I dissent. Please see dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN , J., dissenting :
I join the able dissent of Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando and add the
following thoughts for emphasis. In my view, the death of respondent Judge Godofredo
B. Abul, Jr. prior to the promulgation and nality of a decision moots the administrative
case against him. Proceeding further and imposing any penalty that will be suffered by
his widow violates the principle of due process of law, a fundamental part of our
Constitution.
To recall, a judicial audit was conducted based on a complaint led by Reverend
Father Antoni A. Saniel, the director of the Prison Ministry of the Diocese of Butuan,
alleging that respondent was demanding money ranging from P200,000.00 to
P300,000.00 from detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan in exchange for their
release or the cases' dismissal. 1
The judicial audit team subsequently led their investigation report, in which the
witnesses interviewed con rmed respondent's alleged extortion activities. On February
28, 2017, this Court issued a Resolution placing him on preventive suspension and
requiring him to comment on the complaint and investigation report. 2
In his Comment/Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and
claimed that they were "false, baseless[,] and concocted by an evil and malicious mind
with the sole purpose of besmirching his unblemished record of service in the
judiciary." 3
On August 5, 2017, respondent was killed by an unidenti ed motorcycle-riding
assailant outside his house. 4 This Court was informed of his death in a September 13,
2017 letter sent by his widow. 5
In a February 20, 2018 Report and Recommendation, the O ce of the Court
Administrator found respondent guilty of grave misconduct. While the offense is
punishable by dismissal from service, the O ce of the Court Administrator instead
recommended the penalty of a ne of P500,000.00, to be deducted from respondent's
retirement gratuity in view of his death. 6
The majority adopted the Office of the Court Administrator's findings. However, it
modi ed the recommended penalty to the forfeiture of all bene ts, including retirement
gratuity, on the ground that the death of a respondent in an administrative case does
not oust this Court of its jurisdiction to proceed with the case or to impose accessory
penalties. 7
I disagree.
I
The fundamental right to due process of law is found in Article I, Section 1 of the
Constitution:
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.
Procedural due process is canonically a part of this provision. Due process has
no controlling and precise de nition but is generally premised on the idea of fairness or
"freedom from arbitrariness." 8 It is considered to be "the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play." 9 In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila: 1 0
There is no controlling and precise de nition of due process. It furnishes though
a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What
then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and
as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any government
action for that matter, from the imputation of legal in rmity; su cient to spell
its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, o cial action, to paraphrase
Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reasons and result in sheer oppression.
Due process is thus hostile to any o cial action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identi ed as freedom from arbitrariness. It
is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those
strivings for justice" and judges the act of o cialdom of whatever branch" in
the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that re ect
[democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or
"technical conception with xed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrases. 1 1
Due process encompasses both procedural and substantive due process.
Procedural due process "concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere." 1 2 In his
opinion in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company , 1 3 now-retired
Associate Justice Arturo Brion traced the history of procedural due process:
At its most basic, procedural due process is about fairness in the mode
of procedure to be followed. It is not a novel concept, but one that traces its
roots in the common law principle of natural justice.
Natural justice connotes the requirement that administrative tribunals,
when reaching a decision, must do so with procedural fairness. If they err, the
superior courts will step in to quash the decision by certiorari or prevent the error
by a writ of prohibition. The requirement was initially applied in a purely judicial
context, but was subsequently extended to executive regulatory fact- nding, as
the administrative powers of the English justices of the peace were transferred
to administrative bodies that were required to adopt some of the procedures
reminiscent of those used in a courtroom. Natural justice was comprised of two
main sub-rules: audi alteram partem — that a person must know the case
against him and be given an opportunity to answer it; and nemo judex in sua
cause debe esse — the rule against bias. Still much later, the natural justice
principle gave rise to the duty to be fair to cover governmental decisions which
cannot be characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature.
While the audi alteram partem rule provided for the right to be noti ed of
the case against him, the right to bring evidence, and to make argument —
whether in the traditional judicial or the administrative setting — common law
maintained a distinction between the two settings. "An administrative tribunal
had a duty to act in good faith and to listen fairly to both sides, but not to treat
the question as if it were a trial. There would be no need to examine under oath,
nor even to examine witnesses at all. Any other procedure could be utilized
which would obtain the information required, as long as the parties had an
opportunity to know and to contradict anything which might be prejudicial to
their case." 1 4
I n Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission , 15 procedural due process has been
summarized as:
. . . the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal
which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its
most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have
the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the
question of the right in the matter involved. 1 6
In this jurisdiction, Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 1 7 states the seven
(7) cardinal primary rights in "trials and investigations of an administrative character" 1 8
for due process to be satisfied:
(1) The rst of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan
v. U.S. , . . ., "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. In the language of this
court in Edwards vs. McCoy , . . ., "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented
can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing
to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." This principle emanates
from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional
government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both
a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a nding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." . . . The statute
provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of
a desirable exibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
Only by con ning the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that
the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of
securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. . . .
(6) [The tribunal or o cer], therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. . . .
(7) [The tribunal or o cer] should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 1 9
(Citations omitted)
In Gas Corporation of the Philippines v. Inciong , 2 0 this Court clari ed that while
Ang Tibay remains to be good law, the failure to strictly apply the formalities of an
adversarial proceeding before an administrative tribunal does not necessarily result in a
denial of due process:
The vigor with which counsel for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a
denial of procedural due process is inversely proportional to the merit of this
certiorari and prohibition suit as is quite evident from the Comment of the o ce
of the Solicitor General. It is undoubted that the due process mandate must be
satis ed by an administrative tribunal or agency. So it was announced by
Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations. That is still good law. It follows, therefore, that if procedural due
process were in fact denied, then this petition must prosper. It is equally well-
settled, however, that the standard of due process that must be met in
proceedings before administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as
the element of fairness is not ignored. So the following recent cases have
uniformly held: Maglasang v. Ople, Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili,
Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, Philippine Labor
Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, and Montemayor v. Araneta
University Foundation. From the Comment of the o ce of the Solicitor General,
it is quite clear that no imputation of arbitrariness can be justi ed. The
opportunity to present its side of the case was given both parties to the
controversy. If, for reasons best known to itself, petitioner did not avail of its
right to do so, then it has only itself to blame. No constitutional in rmity could
then be imputed to the proceeding before the labor arbiter. 2 1 (Citations omitted)
Thus, due process in administrative proceedings generally does not require that
the respondent must be heard. It merely requires that the respondent is given the
opportunity to be heard. 2 2 This opportunity to be heard, however, is not lost even after
a judgment is rendered. Due process in administrative proceedings requires that the
respondent still be given the opportunity to question the unfavorable judgment.
In Lumiqued v. Exevea, 2 3 this Court further explains:
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more
practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not
always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have
been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed
satis ed if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. 2 4 (Emphasis supplied)
The opportunity to be heard should be present in all aspects of the procedure
until the nality of the judgment, decision, or resolution. It is not a mere formality but an
intrinsic and substantial part of the constitutional right to due process. This is what
inspires the Revised Penal Code provision that dismisses a case against an accused for
any crime when he or she dies. 2 5
II
This Court's disciplinary powers should always be read alongside the guarantee
of any respondent's fundamental rights. After all, it is this Court that is granted both the
power of judicial review and the competence to promulgate rules for the enhancement
and protection of constitutional rights.
It is settled that this Court's jurisdiction over a disciplinary case against a court
o cial or employee, once acquired, is not lost simply because the respondent has
ceased holding office during the pendency of the case. 2 6
Cessation from public o ce during the pendency of the case may occur in three
(3) different ways: (1) resignation; (2) retirement; or (3) death.
On resignation, this Court stated:
[T]o constitute a complete and operative resignation of public o ce, there must
be an intention to relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of
relinquishment . . . and a resignation implies an expression by the incumbent in
some form, express or implied of the intention to surrender, renounce, or
relinquish, the office, and an acceptance by competent and lawful authority. 2 7
Resignation requires intent. It is a voluntary cessation from public o ce.
Sometimes, however, respondents in disciplinary proceedings opt to resign to avoid
being forcibly dismissed from service. Thus, this Court has stated that resignation
"should be used neither as an escape nor as an easy way out to evade administrative
liability by a court personnel facing administrative sanction." 2 8
Therefore, once this Court assumes jurisdiction — that is, after an administrative
case has been led — resignation from public o ce will not render the case moot. In
Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.: 2 9
Petitioner argues that a government employee who has been separated
from service, whether by voluntary resignation or by operation of law, can no
longer be administratively charged. Such argument is devoid of merit.
In O ce of the Court Administrator v. Juan , this Court categorically ruled
that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an
offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of
a public servant does not preclude the nding of any administrative liability to
which he or she shall still be answerable.
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing
upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite
the petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most severe of
administrative sanctions — that of separation from service — may no longer be
imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on
her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her,
namely, the disquali cation to hold any government o ce and the forfeiture of
benefits.
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a
government employee in effecting his or her separation from service, soon after
an administrative case has been initiated against him or her. An employee's act
of tendering his or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the
anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in criminal cases.
30
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez: 3 1

Cessation from o ce of respondent by resignation or retirement neither
warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint led against him while
he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and
academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the ling of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public o cial had ceased in o ce during the pendency of his case.
Respondent's resignation does not preclude the nding of any administrative
liability to which he shall still be answerable. 3 2
Retirement, meanwhile, may be optional or compulsory. Optional retirement for
government employees may be availed after 20 to 30 years of service, regardless of
age. 3 3 Judges and justices may also opt to retire upon reaching 60 years old as long
as they have rendered 15 years of service in the judiciary. 3 4 Optional retirement, like
resignation, is a voluntary cessation from public o ce. Thus, the same rationale is
applied to those who avail of optional retirement during the pendency of an
administrative case. In Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda: 3 5
A public servant whose career is on the line would normally want the
investigating body to know his or her whereabouts for purposes of notice. The
timing of respondent's application for leave, for optional retirement, and her
sudden unexplained disappearance, taken together, leads us to conclude that
hers is not a mere case of negligence. Respondent's acts reveal a calculated
design to evade or derail the investigation against her. Her silence at the least
serves as a tacit waiver of her opportunity to refute the charges made against
her.
Neither respondent's disappearance nor her retirement precludes the
Court from holding her liable. Her disappearance constitutes a waiver of her
right to present evidence in her behalf. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction
over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public o cial
ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent's case. 3 6
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Ruiz: 3 7
The records show that the respondent wrote the Court a letter on May 27,
2013 (or soon after his Sandiganbayan convictions), requesting that he "be
allowed to optionally retire effective November 30, 2013." He later requested, in
another letter, that the effectivity date of his optional retirement be changed
from November 30, 2013 to December 31, 2013.
The Court has not acted on the respondent's request for optional early
retirement in view of his standing criminal convictions; he stands to suffer
accessory penalties affecting his quali cation to retire from o ce should his
convictions stand. The OCA records also show that he is currently on "on leave
of absence" status. In any case, that a judge has retired or has otherwise been
separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to rule on complaints led while he was still in the service. 3 8
(Citations omitted)

I n Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 4, Dolores,
Eastern Samar: 3 9
Judge Bugtas contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the
instant case because of the approval of his optional retirement effective 31
January 2006. This is unacceptable. In Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v.
Veneracion, the Court held that cessation from o ce because of retirement
does not render the administrative case moot or warrant its dismissal[.] 4 0
Respondents in an administrative case could apply for optional retirement to
evade liability. Thus, optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case,
like resignation, will not render the case moot.
Unlike resignation, however, retirement may also be involuntary. Retirement from
public service is compulsory for government employees who have reached 65 years old
4 1 or for judges and justices who have reached 70 years old. 4 2
In the leading case of Perez v. Abiera, 4 3 this Court was confronted with the issue
of whether an administrative complaint against a judge was rendered moot when he
compulsorily retired while the case was pending. Citing Diamalon v. Quintillan , 4 4
respondent Judge Carlos Abiera argued that he could not be meted the penalty of
dismissal since he was no longer in service.
In Quintillan, this Court dismissed the complaint against Judge Jesus Quintillan
since he had already resigned from service before a judgment could be rendered:
[T]he petition for dismissal must be granted. There is no need to inquire further
into the charge imputed to respondent Judge that his actuation in this particular
case failed to satisfy the due process requirement. As an administrative
proceeding is predicated on the holding of an o ce or position in the
Government and there being no doubt as to the resignation of respondent Judge
having been accepted as of August 31, 1967, there is nothing to stand in the
way of the dismissal prayed for. 4 5
I n Abiera, however, this Court clari ed that Quintillan was not meant to be a
precedent to immediately dismiss complaints against judges who resigned or retired
while the administrative cases were pending:
It was not the intent of the Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a
hard and fast rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge as the
case may be renders (sic) moot and academic the administrative case pending
against him; nor did the Court mean to divest itself of jurisdiction to impose
certain penalties short of dismissal from the government service should there be
a nding of guilt on the basis of the evidence. In other words, the jurisdiction
that was Ours at the time of the ling of the administrative complaint was not
lost by the mere fact that the respondent public o cial had ceased to be in
o ce during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent o cial innocent of the charges or declare him guilty
thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have
against a judge or any other public o cial who resorts to wrongful and illegal
conduct during his last days in o ce? What would prevent some corrupt and
unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts
knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and
immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this
Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary
and other o cials under its supervision and control for acts performed in o ce
which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and
the general public. If innocent, respondent o cial merits vindication of his
name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and
faithfully, if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation. 4 6 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, thus, established that:
In short, the cessation from o ce of a respondent Judge either because
of resignation, retirement or some other similar cause does not per se warrant
the dismissal of an administrative complaint which was led against him while
still in the service. Each case is to be resolved in the context of the
circumstances present thereat. 4 7
As this doctrine developed, this Court has interpreted "some other similar cause"
to include death. Death, however, cannot be placed on the same footing as resignation
or retirement. Resignation and optional retirement are voluntary modes of cessation.
The respondent may avail of them as a way to escape or evade liability. This Court,
therefore, should not be ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the administrative
complaint even if the resignation is accepted or the application for retirement is
approved.
Death, unless self-in icted, is involuntary. Respondents who die during the
pendency of the administrative case against them do not do so with the intent to
escape or evade liability. The rationale for proceeding with administrative cases
despite resignation or optional retirement, therefore, cannot apply.
It is conceded that compulsory retirement is also involuntary. Respondents or
this Court cannot fight against the passage of time.
Abiera, however, had a different rationale for respondents who have reached the
compulsory age of retirement:
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a
judge or any other public o cial who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct
during his last days in o ce? What would prevent some corrupt and
unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts
knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and
immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this
Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary
and other o cials under its supervision and control for acts performed in o ce
which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and
the general public. 4 8 (Emphasis supplied)
In formulating the doctrine, this Court was trying to guard against corrupt and
unscrupulous magistrates who would commit abuses knowing fully well that after
retirement, they could no longer be punished.
It is this certainty of cessation that differentiates compulsory retirement from
death as a mode of cessation from public service. A respondent judge knows when he
or she will compulsorily retire. In contrast, nobody knows when one will die, unless the
cause of death is self-in icted. Even those with terminal illnesses cannot pinpoint the
exact day when they will die.
The essence of due process in administrative cases is simply the opportunity to
be heard. Respondents must be given the opportunity to be informed of and refute the
charges against them in all stages of the proceedings.
Only in resignation and retirement can there be a guarantee that respondents will
be given the opportunity to be heard. Even if they resign or retire during the pendency of
the administrative case, they can still be aware of the proceedings and actively submit
pleadings. Thus, they should not be allowed to evade liability by the simple expediency
of separation from public service.
It would be illogical and impractical to treat dead respondents as equal to
resigned or retired respondents. Dead respondents are neither aware of the
continuation of the proceedings against them, nor are in any position to submit
pleadings. Death forecloses any opportunity to be heard. Continuing with the
administrative proceedings even after the respondent's death, therefore, is a violation
of the right to due process.
III
Indeed, here, had respondent's liability been proven, the penalty of dismissal
should have been meted out to him. However, the entire process had not yet been
completed before he died.
It is settled that "[p]ublic o ce is a public trust. Public o cers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and e ciency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
4 9 Public trust requires mechanisms for public o cers and employees to be
accountable to the people. Any party may le administrative complaints against any
erring public o cer or employee. If, after investigation, the public o cer or employee is
found guilty, he or she is penalized accordingly.
Penalties against erring public o cers or employees will vary according to the
type of infraction or the frequency of its commission. What is certain, however, is that
civil service regulations and jurisprudence reserve the highest penalty for the gravest
infraction: dismissal from service.
Thus, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:
SECTION 46. Classi cation of Offenses. — Administrative offenses
with corresponding penalties are classi ed into grave, less grave or light,
depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the
service:
1. Serious Dishonesty;
2. Gross Neglect of Duty;
3. Grave Misconduct;
4. Being Notoriously Undesirable;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Falsification of official document;
7. Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious
habits;
8. Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the
course of o cial duties or in connection therewith when such fee,
gift or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or
expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that
accorded to other persons, or committing acts punishable under the
anti-graft laws;
9. Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with
whom the office of the employee has business relations;
10. Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,
entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value which in the
course of his/her o cial duties or in connection with any operation
being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of his/her o ce. The propriety or impropriety of the
foregoing shall be determined by its value, kinship, or relationship
between giver and receiver and the motivation. A thing of monetary
value is one which is evidently or manifestly excessive by its very
nature;
11. Nepotism; and
12. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino
people.
When a civil servant commits the most deplorable of crimes against the Republic
and the Filipino people, it is in the public interest to remove him or her from public
service, so that this person can no longer pollute the ranks of civil service and diminish
the public's con dence in its government institutions. In City Mayor of Zamboanga v.
Court of Appeals, 5 0 this Court meted out the penalty of dismissal on a city veterinarian
found guilty of grave misconduct by the Civil Service Commission, instead of
reinstatement with full backwages as previously declared by the Court of Appeals. It
explained:
Indeed, to reinstate private respondent to his former position with full
backwages would make a mockery of the fundamental rule that a public o ce
is a public trust and would render futile the constitutional dictates on the
promotion of morale, e ciency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and
courtesy in the government service. Likewise, reinstatement would place private
respondent in such a position where the persons whom he is supposed to lead
have already lost their respect for him and where his tarnished reputation would
continue to hound him. 5 1
Members of the judiciary are held to an even higher standard. In Astillazo v.
Jamlid: 5 2
The Court has said time and time again that the conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an o ce charged with the administration and
disposition of justice — from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk — should
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free
from any suspicion that may taint the well-guarded image of the judiciary. It has
always been emphasized that the conduct of judges and court personnel must
not only be characterized by propriety and decorum at all times, but must also
be above suspicion. Verily, the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored
in the conduct, o cial or otherwise, of the men and women, from the judge to
the least and lowest of its personnel, hence, it becomes the imperative sacred
duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing
as a true temple of justice. Thus, every employee of the court should be an
exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. 5 3 (Citations omitted)
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC 5 4 provides that justices and judges found guilty of serious
charges, or the worst possible offenses that may be committed, are sanctioned with
the following penalties:
SECTION 11. Sanctions. — A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
bene ts as the Court may determine, and disquali cation from
reinstatement or appointment to any public o ce, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of bene ts shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from o ce without salary and other bene ts
for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A ne of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
For the rst two (2) sanctions to be satis ed, they require the respondent judge
or justice to still be in public service.
For obvious reasons, a person who is no longer in the public service cannot be
removed, either temporarily or permanently, from public service. This was why this
Court formulated the doctrine in Abiera, ruling that its jurisdiction "at the time of the
ling of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case." 5 5
This doctrine was further refined in Gonzales v. Escalona: 5 6
Respondent Escalona had already resigned from the service. His
resignation, however, does not render this case moot, nor does it free him from
liability. In fact, the Court views respondent Escalona's resignation before the
investigation as indication of his guilt, in the same way that ight by an
accused in a criminal case is indicative of guilt. In short, his resignation will not
be a way out of the administrative liability he incurred while in the active service.
While we can no longer dismiss him, we can still impose a penalty su ciently
commensurate with the offense he committed.
We treat respondent Superada no differently. While his death intervened
after the completion of the investigation, it has been settled that the Court is not
ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the
respondent public o cial ceases to hold o ce during the pendency of the
respondent's case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the nal
resolution of the case. In Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, we held that the death of the
respondent in an administrative case does not preclude a nding of
administrative liability[.] 5 7 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In its ponencia, the majority merely reiterates Gonzales as basis for continuing
with the case against respondent, who had died before the judgment was rendered. 5 8
What Gonzales failed to explain, however, was that in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube , 5 9 while this
Court asserted its jurisdiction despite the respondent's death, it also conceded that the
penalty could no longer be served. Thus, this Court was constrained to actually dismiss
the case and consider it closed and terminated:
To be sure, respondent Caube's death has permanently foreclosed the
prosecution of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his
malfeasance in o ce. We are, however, not precluded from imposing the
appropriate administrative sanctions against him. Respondent's misconduct is
so grave as to merit his dismissal from the service, were it not for his untimely
demise during the pendency of these proceedings. However, since the penalty
can no longer be carried out, this case is now declared closed and terminated.
60
Indeed, if the respondent could no longer be removed from the Bench, the full
effect of the penalty can no longer be carried out. Even this Court in Gonzales found
that the respondent's liability must be tempered "with compassion in light of his
untimely demise" 6 1 and limited the imposable penalty to a P10,000.00 fine.
This is not the rst time that this Court addresses the impracticability of
imposing an administrative penalty on a respondent who had already died.
I n Government Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission , 6 2 this
Court upheld the Civil Service Commission's ruling that back salaries could be released
to the deceased employees' heirs. This, despite this Court's prior Resolution that any
payment should await the outcome of the disciplinary cases led by the Government
Service Insurance System against them:
The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service
Commission should be upheld, and not merely upon compassionate grounds,
but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the
circumstances. To be sure, if the deceased employees were still alive, it would at
least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's nal dispositions, that the
issue of payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of
the disciplinary proceedings referred to in the Second Division's Resolution of
July 4, 1988.
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the
initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any
then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the
binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and
purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition
precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible
performance or decree a useless exercise. Even in the case of crimes, the death
of the offender extinguishes criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but
also as to the pecuniary, penalties if it occurs before nal judgment. In this
context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, even if not assailable on
grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the
deceased employees are concerned; they could not possibly be bound by any
substantiation in said proceedings of the original charges: irregularities in the
canvass of supplies and materials. The questioned orders of the Civil Service
Commission merely recognized the impossibility of complying with the
Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post-mortem
investigation of the character contemplated. 6 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Even the doctrine in Gonzales was not without exceptions. There, this Court held
that when the respondent dies while the disciplinary case was pending, the presence of
any of the following circumstances is enough to warrant the dismissal of the case
against him or her: " rst, the observance of respondent's right to due process; second,
the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and
humanitarian reasons; and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed." 6 4
I n Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio Rendon, 6 5 this Court found it
inappropriate to proceed with the investigation of a judge "who could no longer be in
any position to defend himself" as it "would be a denial of his right to be heard, our
most basic understanding of due process." 6 6
The respondent judge's submission of a comment or explanation before death is
likewise not enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. As stated in Lumiqued,
the right to due process "is deemed satis ed if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." 6 7
I n Apiag v. Cantero , 6 8 respondent Judge Esmeraldo Cantero (Judge Cantero),
who had been charged with gross misconduct for committing bigamy and falsi cation
of public documents, was able to submit a comment. The O ce of the Court
Administrator later submitted a Report and Recommendation nding him guilty and
recommending his dismissal from service. However, Judge Cantero died while the case
was pending before this Court. In dismissing the case and allowing the release of his
retirement benefits to his heirs, this Court held:
[W]e . . . cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the
needs of his children of his rst marriage — children whose liation he did not
deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with
this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a
penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision,
dismissal of the case is now in order. 6 9
I n Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tambulig
and the 11th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mahayag-Dumingag-Jose na, both
in Zamboanga del Sur, 7 0 Judge Ricardo Salvanera was able to submit his explanation
but died before this Court could rule on his case. Thus, despite nding him guilty of
gross ine ciency and gross ignorance of the law, this Court was constrained to
dismiss the case and release his retirement benefits to his heirs.
The same procedural antecedents are present here. This Court was informed of
respondent's death in a September 13, 2017 letter 7 1 after he had been killed by an
unidenti ed motorcycle-riding assailant. 7 2 While he was able to submit his
Comment/Answer to the investigation report of the judicial audit team, the O ce of the
Court Administrator only concluded its investigation on the allegations against
respondent on February 20, 2018, when it submitted its Report and Recommendation
to this Court. 7 3
The O ce of the Court Administrator is not precluded from making its own
ndings on the administrative complaint, or even to make contrary or additional
ndings of fact. It is not exclusively bound by the factual ndings of the judicial audit
team. Just the same, this Court has the full discretion not to adopt the O ce of the
Court Administrator's ndings, or to consider other evidence that it may have taken for
granted. Thus, a respondent's knowledge of and comment on the judicial audit team's
initial ndings cannot be su cient to satisfy the requirements of due process. He or
she must also be informed of the eventual ndings of the O ce of the Court
Administrator or this Court.
In this instance, respondent had only been aware of the investigation report at
the time of his death. His Comment/Answer was in response only to the judicial audit
team's ndings. It would have been impossible for him to know, before his sudden
death, that the O ce of the Court Administrator and this Court would merely adopt the
factual findings of the judicial audit team.
Respondent is no longer in a position to defend himself from the O ce of the
Court Administrator's ndings. He can no longer be informed of the conclusions of this
Court. The recommended penalty can no longer be served. He is not in any position to
move for reconsideration, to plead his innocence, or to express his remorse. It would be
inappropriate to impose a penalty without running afoul of the basic tenets of
procedural due process.
Likewise, the forfeiture of respondent's retirement benefits is unusually cruel. The
only people who will be affected by the penalty are his heirs, who had nothing to do with
the administrative charges against him. It will punish respondent's widow, who had
sustained gunshot wounds during the attack on him, and who had explained before this
Court that she was a homemaker without any other source of income. 7 4 This Court
should not make respondent's grieving family bear the burden of his faults.
I disagree with the majority that the dismissal of this case weakens our ability to
retain integrity within the ranks of the judiciary.
In the rst place, respondent did not choose to die. In all indications, he was
assassinated. To believe, then, that death would be a way to escape administrative
liability is beyond the rational. Besides, perhaps death is a penalty supreme to what this
Court could ever impose. Perhaps, even, it is a judgment that the universe has imposed
more definitely and profoundly than this Court.
ACCORDINGLY , I vote to DISMISS the administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City,
Agusan del Norte, in view of his death during the pendency of this case.
HERNANDO , J., dissenting :
I dissent in this case.

The death of an accused even after conviction but during the pendency
of his/her appeal shall result in the dismissal of the criminal case against
said accused. This dismissal is triggered by the presumption of innocence
accorded every accused under the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the death of a respondent public servant during the pendency of a
mere administrative case against him/her shall not result in the dismissal of said case
except in the following instances: a) if respondent's right to due process was not
observed; b) there is presence of exceptional circumstances in the case of equitable
and humanitarian reasons; and c) the kind of penalty imposed. This principle is not
founded on any express Constitutional or statutory provision. Its only basis, per
jurisprudence, is public policy, and that is, that public office is a public trust.
I respectfully submit that the non-dismissal rule in case of death of a
respondent public servant in administrative cases is against the
Constitutional right to presumption of innocence of an accused , as I shall
discuss below.
The case at bench involves the alleged extortion activities of Judge Godofredo B.
Abul, Jr. (Judge Abul) wherein he purportedly asked for amounts ranging from
PhP200,000.00 to PhP300,000.00 from detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan in
exchange for their release from prison or dismissal of their criminal cases. After the
O ce of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a letter from Rev. Father Antoni A.
Saniel alleging Judge Abul's activities, it conducted an investigation on the matter.
Eventually, the OCA found that Judge Abul committed grave misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a serious offense, and thereafter
recommended that he be ned in the amount of PhP500,000.00, to be deducted from
his retirement gratuity.
It is important to note, however, that before the Court could render a judgment on
Judge Abul's administrative case, he met an untimely death 1 when he was targeted and
killed by an unidenti ed motorcycle-riding shooter while he was about to leave his
house. In fact, his spouse likewise sustained gunshot wounds during the ambuscade
but fortunately survived. 2
Because of jurisprudence, Judge Abul's death does not result in the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against him since the Court already acquired jurisdiction
over the case and continues to exercise the same until it is nally resolved. 3 In other
words, "[t]he death or retirement of any judicial o cer from the service does not
preclude the nding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable."
4
T h e ponencia, while adopting the ndings and recommendation of the OCA,

modifies the penalty to be imposed on the late Judge Abul. Due to the latter's guilt as to
the administrative charge of gross misconduct, the ponencia declares and orders the
forfeiture of all of his retirement benefits, excluding accrued leaves.
According to Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is considered as a serious charge. Section
11 of the same issuance provides for the following penalties:
SEC. 11. Sanctions . — A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the bene ts as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public o ce, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of bene ts shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from o ce without salary and other bene ts for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 5
The second sanction can no longer be imposed since Judge Abul already passed
away (although he was preventively suspended), while the third sanction appears to be
too mild a penalty and not commensurate with the offense. Presumably recommending
the rst sanction and considering the gravity of his offense and his intervening death,
the OCA recommended that Judge Abul be ned in the amount of PhP500,000.00 to be
deducted from his retirement gratuity. However, the ponente went further and ordered
the forfeiture of all of Judge Abul's bene ts, excluding accrued leaves, even after his
death.
Although I subscribe to the ponencia in nding that Judge Abul may be adjudged
guilty of gross misconduct which is a serious offense, I am compelled to register my
reservations to its pronouncement that the administrative case against the late jurist
should continue notwithstanding his death and that all of his retirement bene ts,
excluding accrued leaves, should be forfeited.
I berth my reservations on the following grounds: (1) the presumption of
innocence should stand before a decision on the administrative case is rendered; (2)
since death of an accused extinguishes personal criminal liability as well as pecuniary
penalties arising from the felony when the death occurs before nal judgment in
criminal cases, the standard for an administrative case should be similar or less
punitive; and (3) humanitarian reasons call for the grant of death and survivorship
benefits in favor of the spouse and the heirs, if the case will not be dismissed.
On the first ground
Article 3, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."
Indeed, until an accused is adjudged guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is a
presumption of his or her innocence. Even if the case at bench is an administrative
case, We should apply this presumption by analogy since Judge Abul's death preceded
the promulgation of the decision which imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal.
Simply put, he should be presumed innocent until a decision is nally rendered, be it in
his favor or not. Unfortunately, even if Judge Abul was able to le his Comment on the
charges against him, he could no longer submit other evidence which could have helped
his cause if he truly was innocent like he previously claimed. Nonetheless, the Court
declared him guilty of gross misconduct based on the existing evidence and the
investigation conducted by the OCA, and then imposed the ultimate penalty of
forfeiture of all of his benefits despite his death.
On the second ground
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment[.]
Based on the aforementioned provision, the death of the accused extinguishes
the criminal liability. Meanwhile, the pecuniary penalties will only be extinguished if the
accused dies before nal judgment is rendered. If this is the standard for criminal
cases wherein the quantum of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt, then a lower
standard for administrative proceedings such as the case at bar should be followed,
even if the quantum of proof therein is substantial evidence. 6
I am aware, however, that the Court has previously pronounced in Gonzales v.
Escalona 7 that an administrative case, which is not strictly personal in nature, is not
automatically terminated upon the death of respondent. This is because public o ce is
a public trust which needs to be protected at all costs, even beyond the death of the
concerned public o cer. I reiterate that this is against the Constitution. Even then, I
wish to point out that if in criminal cases, death extinguishes criminal and civil liability
(arising from the offense), why should it be so much stricter when it comes to
administrative cases with exceptional or justi able factors which require special
consideration such as in this case? Not surprisingly, the Court, using its sound
discretion, previously imposed nes or less stringent penalties upon respondents in
administrative cases who were found guilty even if they already retired or passed away
while their cases were still pending.
Relevantly, the said Gonzales case cited Sexton v. Casida 8 "where the
respondent, who in the meantime died, was found guilty of act unbecoming a public
o cial and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and ned Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00), deductible from his terminal leave pay."
I n Agarao v. Parentela, Jr. , 9 Judge Parentela was found guilty of immorality, a
serious offense penalized with dismissal from the service and forfeiture of all or part of
the bene ts as the Court may determine. However, since the respondent judge passed
away before a decision on his case was rendered, the Court instead forfeited one half
of all of his retirement benefits excluding his accrued leave credits.
I n Kaw v. Judge Osorio , 1 0 while the Court held that the respondent judge may
not necessarily be held liable for extortion and graft and corruption as it was not
substantially proven, he was instead found accountable for violating Canons 2 and 5 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. As a consequence, a ne in the amount of PhP40,000.00
was ordered to be deducted from his retirement bene ts given that he mandatorily
retired before the penalty of dismissal or suspension could be imposed upon him.
I n San Buenaventura v. Migriño , 1 1 the respondent was found guilty of simple
neglect of duty. The Executive Judge who investigated the case recommended that a
penalty of ne equivalent to two months' salary should be imposed. After receipt of the
said recommendation, the OCA modi ed and reduced the penalty to a ne equivalent to
one-month salary for humanitarian consideration and by reason of the death of the
respondent, then submitted it to the Court for nal determination. Subsequently, the
Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA to just impose a fine.
In Re: Evaluation of Administrative Liability of Judge Lubao, 1 2 Judge Lubao was
only ned given that he has already retired. This is considering that he committed
numerous serious, less serious, and light offenses 1 3 while he was still in the service
which would have merited the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of all his bene ts.
Thence, if Judge Lubao, who admittedly committed more offenses than Judge Abul and
yet previously received his retirement bene ts 1 4 in spite of his infractions, was only
ned, then a similar concession should be extended to Judge Abul, especially since he
was murdered while in service and while his administrative case was still pending.
As one can infer from the aforementioned cases, in spite of the death or
retirement of the respondents while their respective administrative cases were still
pending, only a ne or deduction from their bene ts was eventually imposed upon each
of them. Notably, their retirement or survivorship bene ts were not all automatically
forfeited. In light of this, it is clear that the Court can exercise its sound discretion in the
imposition of penalties depending on the circumstances surrounding the case.
On the third ground
It should be emphasized that according to the ponencia, Judge Abul should be
stripped of his retirement bene ts even if he passed away around two years before the
decision in his administrative case was released. This is in addition to the fact that he
was actually murdered mere days after he turned 68 years old. 1 5 Moreover, he would
have turned 70 years old this year (2019), the compulsory age for retirement for judges,
1 6 if not for his untimely demise. Considering these circumstances, it is my opinion that
all of Judge Abul's death and retirement bene ts should not be forfeited because his
death preceded the release of a judgment concerning his administrative case. More
importantly, I believe that for humanitarian reasons, 1 7 Judge Abul's death and
survivorship benefits should be released.
Even if the general rule is that the death of the respondent does not preclude a
nding of administrative liability, 1 8 there are instances wherein such death
necessitates the dismissal of the administrative case. According to Gonzales v.
Espinosa, 1 9 the recognized exceptions are anchored on the following factors: "first, the
observance of respondent's right to due process; second, the presence of exceptional
circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and
third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed." 2 0 I believe that the second
exception pertaining to humanitarian reasons should be applied in this case. Thus, if the
case will not be dismissed, then at least the death and survivorship bene ts should not
all be forfeited.
Relevantly, in a few cases, the Court mitigated the penalties of the respondents in
view of humanitarian considerations.
I n Geocadin v. Peña , 2 1 Judge Peña was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct.
However, since he was overcome by serious illnesses, he was not able to present his
evidence during the investigation. The Court noted that there is a presumption of
innocence in his favor and that due to his unfortunate condition, he deserved
compassion and humanitarian consideration. Hence, the Court imposed a penalty of
reprimand and forfeiture of three months' salary to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
I n Re: Financial Audit on the Accountabilities of Restituto Tabucon, Jr. , 2 2 the
respondent, Tabucon, failed to remit Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collections for
a time because he purportedly used the funds to feed his family. He eventually
restituted the said amounts after he borrowed money with interest from a friend. The
Court ruled that his failure to remit the cash deposited to him on time constituted gross
dishonesty, if not malversation. Yet, since dismissal from the service is no longer
possible given that Tabucon has compulsorily retired from service, the Court held that
forfeiture of all his retirement and other bene ts may be too harsh under the
circumstances. Since he restituted his shortages, a ne in the amount of PhP10,000.00
was imposed upon Tabucon instead.
According to Liwanag v. Lustre , 2 3 the Court found substantial evidence showing
that the respondent judge sexually molested the complainant which constitutes gross
misconduct. While the OCA recommended that he should be dismissed from service
and that all his retirement bene ts be forfeited, the Court modi ed the penalty by
imposing a ne on his retirement bene ts because he already retired from service. It
further stated that the OCA's recommendation to forfeit all of the judge's retirement
bene ts, "while directed at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his
family, who are dependent on him and his retirement gratuity." 2 4 Hence, the Court
deemed it best to impose a PhP40,000.00 ne taking into account the attendant
circumstances.
In this case, notably, Judge Abul's wife, Bernadita C. Abul, who also sustained
gunshot wounds but survived, wrote the Court a letter dated September 13, 2017. 2 5
She explains that she is a housewife who has no work and other source of income and
that ever since Judge Abul's preventive suspension from o ce, their family faced
nancial crisis. She therefore implores from the Court to release the accrued leave
bene ts of Judge Abul as well as other bene ts or assistance which the Court could
extend to them in order to help their family sustain their daily needs and to fund her
son's education in medical school.
Given the speci c circumstances of Judge Abul's case, it is my view that his
mistakes should not unduly punish his spouse or his heirs, especially if they had no
hand in or knowledge about the alleged extortions. Judge Abul's liability should be
considered personal and extinguished by reason of his death, and should not extend
beyond the said death only to be shouldered by his spouse or his son. Doing so would
indirectly impose a harsh penalty upon innocent individuals who not only have to come
to terms with the unjust death of a loved one but also live without one henceforth.
Without a doubt, forfeiture of all of Judge Abul's death and survivorship bene ts would
add to the grief and hardships that his family is already enduring. Thus, it is my humble
position that assuming that the Court would maintain the non-dismissal rule in
administrative cases in case of death of the respondent, the Court should, instead of
imposing such a strict and unforgiving punishment even when Judge Abul has already
passed away, impose a ne to be deducted from his retirement bene ts. This is what
the OCA had in fact recommended in the first place.
Pertinent to the death of a member of the Judiciary while still in actual service,
Sections 2 to 3-A of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9946 2 6 state that:
SEC. 2. In case a Justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial
court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or
any other court hereafter established, dies while in actual service, regardless of
his/her age and length of service as required in Section 1 hereof, his/her heirs
shall receive a lump sum of ve (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the
highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation,
representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief
allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance received by him/her
as such Justice or Judge: Provided, however, That where the deceased Justice
or Judge has rendered at least fteen (15) years either in the Judiciary or in any
other branch of Government, or both, his/her heirs shall instead be entitled to a
lump sum of ten (10) years gratuity computed on the same basis as indicated in
this provision: Provided, further, That the lump sum of ten (10) years gratuity
shall be received by the heirs of the Justice or the Judge who was killed
because of his/her work as such: Provided, That the Justice or Judge has
served in Government for at least ve (5) years regardless of age at the time of
death. When a Justice or Judge is killed intentionally while in service, the
presumption is that the death is work-related.
SEC. 3. Upon retirement, a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge
of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities,
municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a
circuit court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically
entitled to a lump sum of ve (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the
highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation,
representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief
allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance he/she was
receiving on the date of his/her retirement and thereafter upon survival after the
expiration of ve (5) years, to further annuity payable monthly during the
residue of his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof: Provided, however,
That if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted
during his/her incumbency in o ce and prior to the date of retirement, he/she
shall receive a gratuity equivalent to ten (10) years' salary and the allowances
aforementioned: Provided, further, That should the retirement under Section 1(a)
hereof be with the attendance of any partial permanent disability contracted
during his/her incumbency and prior to the date of retirement, he/she shall
receive an additional gratuity equivalent to two (2) years lump sum that he/she
is entitled to under this Act: Provided, furthermore, That if he/she survives after
ten (10) years or seven (7) years, as the case may be, he/she shall continue to
receive a monthly annuity as computed under this Act during the residue of
his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof: Provided, nally , That those
who have retired with the attendance of any partial permanent disability ve (5)
years prior to the effectivity of this Act shall be entitled to the same bene ts
provided herein.
Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such
Justice or Judge has retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of
death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to receive all the
retirement bene ts that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had
the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive
such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.
SEC. 3-A. All pension bene ts of retired members of the Judiciary
shall be automatically increased whenever there is an increase in the salary of
the same position from which he/she retired.
In line with this, according to A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, in case of permanent
disability due to death while in actual service, a judge is entitled to the following
benefits:
B.1 Where government service is at least 15 years, regardless of age
—
(1) Lump sum gratuity of 10 years, to be received by the heirs
(Section 2);
(2) Full survivorship pension bene ts (Section 1) , to be
received by the surviving legitimate spouse upon survival of the
gratuity period of 10 years (Section 3, first paragraph) ;
(3) Automatic increase of pension benefits (Section 3-A) .
Provided, The same bene ts shall apply in respect to a justice or judge who,
with at least 5 years of government service, was killed due to his/her work as
such.
B.2 Where government service is less than 15 years, regardless of
age —
(1) Lump sum gratuity of 5 years, to be received by the heirs
(Section 2)
(2) Pro-rated pension bene ts (Section 1) , to be received by
the surviving legitimate spouse upon survival of the gratuity
period of 10 years (Section 3, first paragraph) ;
(3) Automatic increase of pension benefits (Section 3-A) . 2 7
E. Survivorship Pension Benefits
The legitimate surviving spouse of a Justice or Judge who
(1) has retired or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of
death, and (2) was receiving or would have been entitled to receive
a monthly pension, shall be entitled to receive the said bene ts
that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the
Justice or Judge not died, Provided , That the justice or judge
who, regardless of age, died or was killed while in actual
service shall be considered as retired due to permanent
disability. Provided, further , That the survivorship bene t
shall be pro-rated if the deceased justice or judge had
rendered government service for less than 15 years . The
surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement bene ts
until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage. 2 8
In light of these, it is my view that Judge Abul's spouse and son (or heirs) should
be given the death bene ts granted under Section 2 of R.A. No. 9946. If Judge Abul
served for at least 15 years, his heirs should receive a lump sum equivalent to ten (10)
years. Alternatively, if he served for less than 15 years, the lump sum should be
equivalent to ve (5) years. Subsequently, after the gratuity period of ten (10) years has
passed, his heirs are entitled to survivorship bene ts, speci cally, full monthly pension
(if Judge Abul rendered at least 15 years of service) or pro-rated monthly pension (if he
served for less than 15 years).
In conclusion, it is my position that: 1) Judge Abul's death extinguished any
administrative penalty that may be imposed upon him and that the administrative
complaint against him should be dismissed in accordance with the Constitutional
principle that every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty by the requisite
quantum of proof; and 2) assuming the administrative complaint survives his demise,
the spouse and son (or heirs) of Judge Abul should be granted the death bene ts and
survivorship pension bene ts due to his death while in actual service, considering that
no ruling was handed down prior to his death and no penalty yet has been imposed
upon him before the said death and due to humanitarian considerations unique to his
case.
Lastly, may I point out to my esteemed Brethren that this Court has been
forgiving in the past when it gave due course to petitions for clemency of dismissed
judges. Unlike those magistrates who were recipients of the Court's benevolent
attitude, Judge Abul will never be able to le a petition for clemency simply because he
has passed on to the Great Beyond. The least that can be extended to his heirs to tide
them over in the aftermath of his death is some concrete form of pecuniary security.
I therefore vote to DISMISS the instant administrative complaint against the late
Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 13-14.

2. Id. at 20-22.
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 15-19.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. at 7-8.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id. at 58-59.
9. Id. at 61-77.
10. Id. at 91.
11. Id. at 95-97.

12. Id. at 96.
13. Id. at 104-119.
14. Id. at 119.

15. Id. at 114-115.
16. Id. at 116-117.

17. Id. at 115-116.
18. Munsayac-De Villa v. Reyes, A.M. Nos. RTJ-05-1925, RTJ-05-1926, RTJ-05-1927, RTJ-05-
1928, RTJ-05-1929, RTJ-05-1930 & P-05-2020, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 404, 426.
19. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601, November 13, 2001, 368 SCRA 503,
508.
20. Office of the Ombudsman v. Asis, G.R. No. 237503 (Notice), June 20, 2018.
21. A.M. No. P-03-1715, September 19, 2008, 566 SCRA 1.
22. A.M. No. RTJ-06-1996 (Resolution), July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 416.
23. Section 11, Rule 14, Rules of Court.

LEONEN, J., dissenting:
1. Ponencia, p. 2.
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 3-4.
4. J. Hernando, Opinion, p. 2.
5. Ponencia, p. 4.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil.
306, 319 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
9. Id. citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 32-33
(1938).
10. 127 Phil. 306 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
11. Id. at 318-319 citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME
COURT 32-33 (1938); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 487 (1960); Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 1230 (1961); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); and Pearson v.
McGraw, 308 U.S. 313 (1939).
12. White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 461 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
13. 602 Phil. 522, 544 (2009) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].

14. Id. at 545-546 citing DAVID PHILLIP JONES AND ANNE DE VILLARS, PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 148-149, 157-160 (1985 ed.), and Ridge v. Baldwin, [1963] 2 All
E.R. 66 (H.L.).
15. 272 Phil. 107 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
16. Id. at 115 citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 590 (4th ed.).
17. 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

18. Id. at 641-642.
19. Id. at 642-644.
20. 182 Phil. 215 (1979) [Per CJ. Fernando, Second Division].
21. Id. at 220-221.

22. Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 905 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
23. 346 Phil. 807 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
24. Id. at 828 citing Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 310 Phil. 549 (1995) [Per J.
Vitug, En Banc]; Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, 268 Phil. 37 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second
Division]; Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) v. Civil Service Commission, 311
Phil. 573 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]; Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 905
(1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc]; and Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 322 Phil. 579 (1996) [Per J. Puno, Second
Division].
25. See REV. PEN. CODE, art. 89, which provides:
ARTICLE 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment[.]
26. Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 575, 580 (1975) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, En Banc].
27. Gonzales v. Hernandez, 112 Phil. 160, 165 (1961) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc] citing 43 Am.
Jur. p. 22; Nome v. Rice, 3 Alaska 602; and 2 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 2407.
28. Cajot v. Cledera, 349 Phil. 907, 912 (1998) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
29. 560 Phil. 96 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazaro, Third Division].
30. Id. at 104-105 citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823 (2004) [Per
Curiam, En Banc]; Baquerfo v. Sanchez, 495 Phil. 10 (2005) [Per Curiam, En Banc];
Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, 497 Phil. 615 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division]; and Re:
(1) Lost Checks Issued to the Late Roderick Roy P. Melliza, Former Clerk II, MCTC,
Zaragga, Iloilo and (2) Dropping from the Rolls of Ms. Esther T. Andres, 537 Phil. 634
(2006) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
31. 495 Phil. 10 (2005) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
32. Id. at 16-17 citing Reyes v. Cristi, 470 Phil. 617 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division];
Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, 482 Phil. 318 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc]; Caja v. Nanquil, 481 Phil. 488 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc]; Tuliao v.
Ramos, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]; Perez v. Abiera, 159-A
Phil. 575 [Per J. Muñoz Palma, En Banc]; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, 167 Phil. 42
(1977) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc]; Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998) [Per J.
Kapunan, Third Division]; Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998) [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division]; and Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez, 480 Phil. 495
(2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
33. See Republic Act No. 1616 (1957), sec. 1.
34. See Re: Requests for survivorship benefits of spouses of justices and judges who died prior
to the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9946, A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, September 19,
2017, 840 SCRA 62, 75 [Per J. Martires, En Banc].
36. Id. at 227-228 citing Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 575 (1975) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, En Banc].

38. Id. at 153-154.
40. Id. at 325 citing Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion, 522 Phil. 247 (2006) [Per
J. Corona, Second Division].
41. See Presidential Decree No. 1146 (1977), sec. 11 (b).

42. See Republic Act No. 9946 (2010), sec. 1.
43. 159-A Phil. 575 (1975) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, En Banc].
44. 139 Phil. 654 (1969) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

45. Id. at 656-657.
46. Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 575, 580-581 (1975) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, En Banc].
47. Id. at 582.

48. Id. at 580-581.
49. CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.
50. 261 Phil. 936 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].

51. Id. at 945.
53. Id. at 232-233.
54. Amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: the Discipline of Justices and Judges
(2001).
55. Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 575, 580 (1975) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, En Banc].
56. 587 Phil. 448 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
57. Id. at 462-463.

58. Ponencia, p. 9.
60. Id. at 47.

61. Gonzalez v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448, 465 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
62. 279 Phil. 866 (1991) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].

63. Id. at 876.
64. Gonzalez v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448, 463 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
65. 427 Phil. 518 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].

66. Id. at 525.
67. Lumiqued v. Exevea, 346 Phil. 807, 828 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
68. 335 Phil. 511 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

69. Id. at 526.
70. 509 Phil. 401 (2005) [Per CJ. Davide, Jr., First Division].
71. Ponencia, p. 4.
73. Ponencia, p. 4.
HERNANDO, J., dissenting:

1. Died on August 5, 2017 by multiple gunshot wounds at 68 years old.
2. Rollo, pp. 95-96.
3. Gonzales v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448, 462-463 (2008).

4. San Buenaventura v. Migriño, 725 Phil. 151, 162 (2014).
5. Section 11, A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, RE: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, September 11, 2001.
6. That amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; Office of the Court Administrator v. Yu, 807 Phil. 277, 293 (2017).
7. Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3 at 465.

8. 508 Phil. 166 (2005), as cited in Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3 at 465.
9. 421 Phil. 677 (2001).
10. 467 Phil. 896 (2004).

11. Supra note 4.
12. 785 Phil. 14 (2016).
13. Judge Lubao was found guilty of the following offenses: gross misconduct; violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars; undue delay in rendering a decision or
order; and undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
14. Except for an amount of PhP100,000.00 withheld by the Court from his benefits which
served as security until a final judgment in his case was rendered.
15. Judge Abul's birthday was on August 1, 1949.
16. Republic Act No. 9946, An Act Granting Additional Retirement, Survivorship, and Other
Benefits to Members of the Judiciary, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 910,
as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes (2009).
17. Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, 443 Phil. 732, 736 (2003).

18. Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3, citing Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, 450 Phil. 38, 47 (2003).
19. Supra note 3.
20. Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3 at 463, citing Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, supra
note 17, which cited Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, supra note 18; Baikong Akang Camsa v.
Rendon, 427 Phil. 518 (2002); Judicial Audit Report, 397 Phil. 476 (2000); Report on the
Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Br. 1, Bangued, Abra, 388 Phil. 60 (2000); Apiag v.
Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); Mañozca v. Domagas, 318 Phil. 744 (1995); and Hermosa
v. Paraiso, 159 Phil. 417 (1975).
21. 195 Phil. 344 (1981).
22. 504 Phil. 512 (2005).

23. 365 Phil. 496 (1999).
24. Id. at 510.
25. Rollo, p. 91.

26. Republic Act No. 9946, An Act Granting Additional Retirement, Survivorship, and Other
Benefits to Members of the Judiciary, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 910,
as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes (2009).
27. See Republic Act No. 9946.
28. Re: Requests for Survivorship Pension Benefits of Spouses of Justices and Judges Who
Died Prior to the Effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, September
19, 2017.

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EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486. September 3, 2019.]

RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION

Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez: 3 1

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I dissent in this case.

T h e ponencia, while adopting the ndings and recommendation of the OCA,

1. Rollo, pp. 13-14.

11. Id. at 95-97.

14. Id. at 119.

16. Id. at 116-117.

23. Section 11, Rule 14, Rules of Court.

13. 602 Phil. 522, 544 (2009) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].

17. 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

21. Id. at 220-221.

37. 780 Phil. 133 (2016) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

41. See Presidential Decree No. 1146 (1977), sec. 11 (b).

44. 139 Phil. 654 (1969) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

47. Id. at 582.

50. 261 Phil. 936 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].

57. Id. at 462-463.

60. Id. at 47.

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65. 427 Phil. 518 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].

68. 335 Phil. 511 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

HERNANDO, J., dissenting:

3. Gonzales v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448, 462-463 (2008).

7. Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3 at 465.

10. 467 Phil. 896 (2004).

17. Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, 443 Phil. 732, 736 (2003).

22. 504 Phil. 512 (2005).

25. Rollo, p. 91.

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