Admistrative code of 1987

(1) "Government of the Republic of the Philippines"

refers to the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in
the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous
regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government.

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 158466             June 15, 2004
PABLO V. OCAMPO, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
AND MARIO B. CRESPO a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified
winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who
obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.1
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo.
He alleged that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), herein public respondent, committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing in HRET Case No. 01-024, Pablo Ocampo vs.
Mario "Mark Jimenez" Crespo, the (a) Resolution2 dated March 27,
2003 holding that "protestant" (herein petitioner) cannot be
proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District of
Manila since being a second placer, he "cannot be proclaimed the
first among the remaining qualified candidates"; and (b)
Resolution3 dated June 2, 2003 denying his motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are uncontroverted:
On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of Canvassers proclaimed
private respondent Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly
elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the
May 14, 2001 elections. He was credited with 32,097 votes or a
margin of 768 votes over petitioner who obtained 31,329 votes.

On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET an electoral

protest4 against private respondent, impugning the election in 807
precincts in the 6th District of Manila on the following grounds: (1)
misreading of votes garnered by petitioner; (2) falsification of
election returns; (3) substitution of election returns; (4) use of
marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of
ballots written by one person or two persons. The case was
docketed as HRET Case No. 01-024. Petitioner prayed that a
revision and appreciation of the ballots in the 807 contested
precincts be conducted; and that, thereafter, he be proclaimed the
duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his answer with
counter-protest5 vehemently denying that he engaged in massive
vote buying. He also opposed petitioner’s allegation that there is a
need for the revision and appreciation of ballots.
After the preliminary conference between the parties on July 12,
2001, the HRET issued a Resolution6 limiting the issues to: first,
whether massive vote-buying was committed by private
respondent; and second, whether petitioner can be proclaimed
the duly elected Representative of the 6th District of Manila.
Meanwhile, on March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases Nos.
01-020, Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio Jalandoni vs. Mario
Crespo, and 01-023, Rosenda Ann M. Ocampo vs. Mario Crespo,
issued Resolutions declaring that private respondent is "ineligible
for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for
lack of residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate his
office."7 Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.8
On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to implement Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646,9 which reads:
"Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof, order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong."
Petitioner averred that since private respondent was declared
disqualified in HRET Cases Nos. 01-020 and 01-023, the votes
cast for him should not be counted. And having garnered the
second highest number of votes, he (petitioner) should be declared
the winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and proclaimed the duly
elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
On March 26, 2003, private respondent filed an opposition to
petitioner’s motion to implement the afore-quoted provision.
On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that
private respondent was guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him
as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Anent the second
issue of whether petitioner can be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman, the HRET held:
"x x x Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a
second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the
remaining qualified candidates. The fact that the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes the right to be declared
the winner of the elective office. x x x
It is of no moment that there is only a margin of 768 votes between
protestant and protestee. Whether the margin is ten or ten
thousand, it still remains that protestant did not receive the
mandate of the majority during the elections. Thus, to proclaim him
as the duly elected representative in the stead of protestee would
be anathema to the most basic precepts of republicanism and
democracy as enshrined within our Constitution. In effect, we
would be advocating a massive disenfranchisement of the majority
of the voters of the sixth district of Manila.
Congressional elections are different from local government
elections. In local government elections, when the winning
candidate for governor or mayor is subsequently disqualified, the
vice-governor or the vice-mayor, as the case may be, succeeds to
the position by virtue of the Local Government Code. It is different
in elections for representative. When a voter chooses his
congressional candidate, he chooses only one. If his choice is
concurred in by the majority of voters, that candidate is declared
the winner. Voters are not afforded the opportunity of electing a
‘substitute congressman’ in the eventuality that their first choice
dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in any other way leaves the post
vacant. There can only be one representative for that particular
legislative district. There are no runners-up or second placers.
Thus, when the person vested with the mandate of the majority is
disqualified from holding the post he was elected to, the only
recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold
another election. x x x
This does not mean that the Sixth Legislative District of Manila will
be without adequate representation in Congress. Article VI, Section
9 of the Constitution, and Republic Act No. 6645 allows Congress
to call a special election to fill up this vacancy. There are at least
13 months until the next congressional elections, which is more
than sufficient time within which to hold a special election to enable
the electorate of the Sixth District of Manila to elect their
representative.
For this reason, the Tribunal holds that protestant cannot be
proclaimed as the duly elected representative of the Sixth
legislative District of Manila.
In view of the conclusion herein reached, it is unnecessary to
rule on the recount and revision of ballots in the protested
and counter-protested precincts.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved to:
xxxxxx
) DENY protestant’s (petitioner) Motion to Implement Section 6,
Republic Act No. 6646 by declaring the votes cast for Mario
Crespo as stray votes."
(2) Petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
(3) Petitioner contends that the HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that "it is unnecessary to rule on the
recount and revision of ballots in the protested and counter-
protested precincts." He maintains that it is the ministerial duty
of the HRET to implement the provisions of Section 6, R.A. No.
6646 specifically providing that "any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted."
(4) In his comment, private respondent counters that what the law
requires is that the disqualification by final judgment takes
place before the election. Here, the HRET Resolutions
disqualifying him as Representative of the 6th District of Manila
were rendered long after the May 14, 2001 elections. He also
claims that the Resolutions are not yet final and executory
because they are the subjects of certiorari proceedings before
this Court. Hence, all his votes shall be counted
(5) and none shall be considered stray.
The HRET, in its comment, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, merely reiterates its ruling.
(6) The petition must be dismissed.
(7) The issues here are: (1) whether the votes cast in favor of
private respondent should not be counted pursuant to Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646; and (2) whether petitioner, a second placer in
the May 14, 2001 congressional elections, can be proclaimed the
duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
(8) The issues raised are not novel. In Codilla, Sr. vs. De
Venecia,10 we expounded on the application of Section 6, R.A.
No. 6646. There, we emphasized that there must be a final
judgment before the election in order that the votes of a
disqualified candidate can be considered "stray", thus:
(9) "Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code require a final judgment before the election for
the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray."
Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes
cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides."
The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting
for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment
during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide,
without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers
of government.11
In the present case, private respondent was declared disqualified
almost twenty-two (22) months after the May 14, 2001 elections.
Obviously, the requirement of "final judgment before election" is
absent. Therefore, petitioner can not invoke Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646.
Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence
that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner.12 This principle has been reiterated in a number our
decisions, such as Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC,13 Abella vs.
COMELEC,14 Benito vs. COMELEC15 and Domino vs.
COMELEC.16 As a matter of fact, even as early as 1912, it was
held that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be
proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is
found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected.17
In Geronimo vs. Ramos,18 if the winning candidate is not qualified
and cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected, a
permanent vacancy is thus created. The second placer is just that,
a second placer – he lost in the elections, he was repudiated by
either the majority or plurality of voters. He could not be proclaimed
winner as he could not be considered the first among the qualified
candidates. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the
democratic electroral process and the sociological and
psychological underpinnings behind voters’ preferences.19
At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The
Twelfth Congress formally adjourned on June 11, 2004. And on
May 17, 2004, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Bienvenido Abante the duly elected Congressman of the Sixth
District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.
In the recent case of Enrile vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal,20 we
ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when there is no
more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits. Worth reiterating is our
pronouncement in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, thus:21
"It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline
jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot
and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is
no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh
Posted on December 4, 2008 by danabatnag
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh
Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during
the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After
the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio
Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and
nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the
Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the
Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the
American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in
which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s
proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending
before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and
proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported
by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless
suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even
during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not
loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it
would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the
phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he
intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts
during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial
proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after
the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been
MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in
violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular
construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or
the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the
makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation
would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what
MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings
are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions
are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their
force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by
being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of
Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once
established continues until changed by some competent legislative power.
IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.”
Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the
Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts
of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction
upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same
courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending
therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until
abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are
repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to
final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
(10) Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and
civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this
cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction
would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case
pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion
(govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the
 majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war;
denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)
(11) Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of
the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of
the State and the integrity of the national territory.
(12) Mon 24 Mar 2003

(13) Digest: Aglipay v. Ruiz (GR 45459, 13 March

1937)
(14)
 
(15) Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
(16) Facts: In May 1936, the Director
of Posts announced in the dailies of
Manila that he would order the issuance
of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio
Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfillment of
what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member
 of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner’s attorney, the Director of
Posts publicly announced having sent to
the United States the designs of the
postage for printing. The said stamps
were actually issued and sold though the
greater part thereof remained unsold.
The further sale of the stamps was
sought to be prevented by the
petitioner.
(17) Issue: Whether the issuance of
the postage stamps was in violation of
the Constitution.
(18) Held: Religious freedom as a
constitutional mandate is not inhibition
of profound reverence for religion and is
not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith
to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills
into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. When the Filipino
people, in the preamble of their
Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their
ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the
 general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and
democracy,” they thereby manifested
their intense religious nature and placed
unfaltering reliance upon Him who
guides the destinies of men and nations.
The elevating influence of religion in
human society is recognized here as
elsewhere.
(19) Act 4052 contemplates no
religious purpose in view. What it gives
the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance
of special postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of
course, the phrase “advantageous to the
Government” does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution; i.e. to
appropriate, use or apply of public
money or property for the use, benefit
or support of a particular sect or church.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the
postage stamps was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favor a particular
church or religious denominations. The
stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church,
nor were money derived from the sale of
the stamps given to that church. The
purpose of the issuing of the stamps
 was to take advantage of an event
considered of international importance
to give publicity to the Philippines and
its people and attract more tourists to
the country. Thus, instead of showing a
Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a
map of the Philippines, the location of
the City of Manila, and an inscription
that reads “Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
(20) The Supreme Court denied the
petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Art II sec 6. The separation of Church and State

shall be inviolable.
Art III sec 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession
and
worship,
without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Art VI sec 29(2). No public money or property shall
be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
Establishment Clause
Justice Laurel
1937
FACTS:
 On May 1936, respondent announced in the
newspapers that he would order of postage
stamps
commemorating
the
33rd
International Eucharistic Congress under
Act No. 4052 (cited below)

Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Phil.
Independent Church (Aglipayan), seeks a writ of prohibition to
prevent respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the said Congress.
o
Petitioner alleges that respondent in
issuing and selling the postage stamps violated the Constitutional
provision on the principle of separation of church and state,
specifically section 13, subsection 3, Art. VI which says: “No public
money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church,
denomination…
or
system of religion…”
ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Constitution in
issuing and selling the postage stamps.
HELD: No constitutional infraction.
History of Separation of Church and State:

“… our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for
occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the
church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective
ends and aims.”

This principle was recognized in the Malolos Constitution, inserted
in the Treaty of Paris, in the instructions of McKinley to the Phil.
Commission… and finally embodied in the Constitution as the
supreme expression of the Filipino people.
 Filipino’s enjoy both civil and religious freedom
 guaranteed in the Consti
o
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not
merely religious toleration.
Religious Freedom:

Religious Freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs.
o
Imploring “the aid of Divine Providence,
in order to establish a gov’t that shall embody their ideals…” in the
preamble of the Constitution.

General Concessions indiscriminately accorded
to religious sects:
o
Tax exemptions properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes
o
Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, etc. is
assigned to the armed
forces,
penal
institution,
orphanage or leprosarium.
o
Optional religious instruction in public schools is allowed by
constitutional mandate, etc.
PRESENT CASE:
 Act No. 4052, from which draws authority to
issue and sell the stamps contemplates no religious purpose, but
gives the Director of the Posts the discretionary power to determine
when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.”

The present case was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor
a particular religious denomination.
o
The stamps were not issued for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given
to the church.
o
Purpose of the stamps was “to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourists to the country” officials took advantage
of
an
internationally important event to give publicity to
the Philippines and its people.

The stamp as actually printed instead of showing a Catholic Church
chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila with the inscription
“Seat
XXXIII
Batch 2008A.
1
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ

International
Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
•
What is emphasized
is not the Congress but Manila, the capital
of
the
Philippines, as the
seat
of
that
congress.
o
The propaganda resulting from the issuance and sale of the staff
might redound to the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church but this
was not the intention and is only incidental to the original purpose.

“We are of the opinion that the Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one
which could legitimately be
undertaken
by
appropriate legislation.”
o
There may have peen poor judgment in issuing and selling the
stamp but a gap still exists between that and the unconstitutionality
of the issuance and sale which was not filled by the petitioner.
FACTS:
1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted
Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San
Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". lt provided for (1) the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the
construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for
the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets
and cash donations "
2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No.
6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern
Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano
mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San
Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for
one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the
next feast day. It was further provided in the resolution that the
image would be made available to the Catholic parish church
during the celebration of the saint's feast day. It was ratified in a
plebiscite.
3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations
of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of
Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and
the
wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by
the barangay council for four hundred pesos
4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of
the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees
could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. A
controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return that image to the
barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the
church because church funds were used for its acquisition.
5. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the
occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmeña allegedly
uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel
 C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That
incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeña in the city
court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.
6. Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints
against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of
Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of
immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public
official and ignorance of the law.
7. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the
Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmeña did not
accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image
and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council
enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring
of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the
recovery of the image
8. The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City
against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the
barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos,
Father Osmeña turned over the image to the council ln his answer
to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the
said resolutions.
9. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of
the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes
and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its
members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First
Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said
resolutions (Their main argument was it prejudiced members of the
Catholic Church because they could see the image in the church
only once a year or during the fiesta. <Labo dud!> )
10. Lower Court dismissed the complaints.
ISSUES
1) WON that the barangay council was not duly constituted because
lsidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay,
was not allowed to participate in its sessions? NO
 Batch 2008A.
2
GARCES vs. ESTENZO

RATIO
In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of
the sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and
26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because he
was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City.
Mañago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did
not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the
said resolutions were passed.
2) WON the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that
"no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and
that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such.
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO
Ratio
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass.
Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the
church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and
having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition
and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the
wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring
the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement
would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could
easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image
in connection with prayers and novenas.
This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt
would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic
and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing
contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the
purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his
church.
There can be no question that the image in question
belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña
claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council,
as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have
custody thereof.
If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to
the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution
because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private
property.
The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of
the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of
public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or
property.
(Lower Court’s decision affirmed)
(1971)
This case was heard concurrently with two others, Early v. DiCenso
(1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved
controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In
Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial support for teacher
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects
to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct
supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary
schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-related
educational institutions."
Question Presented
Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause by making state financial aid
available to "church-related educational institutions"?
Conclusion
Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a
three-part test for laws dealing with religious establishment. To be
constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it
must have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit
religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization
of parochial schools furthered a process of religious inculcation,
and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce
the specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the
state in religious affairs. The Court also noted the presence of an
unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legislation which
appropriates support to religious schools.
FACTS:
Batch 2008A.
3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1648             August 17, 1949
PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and LEOPOLDO SYQUIA,
petitioners,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of
Manila, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge of Court of First
Instance of Manila, GEORGE F. MOORE, ET AL., respondents.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
For the purposes of this decision, the following facts gathered from
and based on the pleadings, may be stated. The plaintiffs named
Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the
undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated in the
City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South
Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments located at 1131 M. H.
del Pilar, 1151 M. H. del Pilar and 1188 A. Mabini Streets,
respectively.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three
lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments, in favor of
the United States of America at a monthly rental of P1,775 for the
North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartment,
and P3,335 for the Michel Apartments. The term or period for the
three leases was to be "for the duration of the war and six months
thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the United States of
America." The apartment buildings were used for billeting and
quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila
area.
In March 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced,
George F. Moore was the Commanding General, United States
Army, Philippine Ryukus Command, Manila, and as Commanding
General of the U. S. Army in the Manila Theatre, was said to control
the occupancy of the said apartment houses and had authority in
the name of the United States Government to assign officers of the
U. S. Army to said apartments or to order said officers to vacate the
same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division, Office
of the District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the
command of defendant Moore was in direct charge and control of
the lease and occupancy of said three apartment buildings.
Defendant Moore and Tillman themselves did not occupy any part
of the premises in question.
Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after
September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime
in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in office of
defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the
apartment buildings to them, but were advised that the U. S. Army
wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11, 1946, said
plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman
to renegotiate said leases, execute lease contract for a period of
three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those
payable under the old contracts. The predecessors in office of
Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to execute new
leases but advised that "it is contemplated that the United States
Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947." Not
being in conformity with the continuance of the old leases because
of the alleged comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder,
plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and
to release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946. Tillman
refused to comply with the request. Because of the alleged
representation and assurance that the U.S. Government would
vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no
further steps to secure possession of the buildings and accepted
the monthly rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore
and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to
cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure to
comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the
three apartment buildings will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947,
plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon
defendants Moore and Tillman and 64 other army officers or
members of the United States Armed Forces who were then
occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a)
cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per
month per apartment effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution
of new leases for the three or any one or two of the said apartment
buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said
apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of
the failure to comply with the foregoing demands. The thirty-day
period having expired without any of the defendants having
complied with plaintiffs' demands, the plaintiffs commenced the
present action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an
action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman
and the 64 persons occupying apartments in the three buildings for
the purpose of having them vacate the apartments, each occupants
to pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January 1,
1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated said
apartment; to permit plaintiffs access to said apartment buildings for
the purpose of appraising the damages sustained as the result of
the occupancy by defendants; that defendants be ordered to pay
plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused on
said property; and that in the event said occupants are unable to
pay said P300 a month and/or the damages sustained by said
property, the defendants Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be
made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per apartment
from January 1, 1947 to March 19, 1947, inclusive, and/or the
damages sustained by said apartments, and that defendants Moore
and Tillman be permanently enjoined against ordering any
additional parties in the future from entering and occupying said
premises.
Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special Assistant
of the Judge Advocate, Philippine Ryukus Command on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the
subject matter of the action, because the real party in interest was
the U.S. Government and not the individual defendants named in
the complaint, and that the complaint did not state a cause of
action, the municipal court of Manila in an order dated April 29,
1947, found that the war between the United States of America and
her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other, had
not yet terminated and, consequently, the period or term of the
three leases had not yet expired; that under the well settled rule of
International Law, a foreign government like the United States
Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without
its consent; that it was clear from the allegations of the complaint
that although the United States of America has not been named
therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real defendant in this
case, as the parties named as defendants are officers of the United
States Army and were occupying the buildings in question as such
and pursuant to orders received from that Government. The
municipal court dismissed the action with costs against the plaintiffs
with the suggestion or opinion that a citizen of the Philippines, who
feels aggrieved by the acts of the Government of a foreign country
has the right to demand that the Philippine Government study his
claim and if found meritorious, take such diplomatic steps as may
be necessary for the vindication of rights of that citizen, and that the
matter included or involved in the action should be a proper subject
matter of representations between the Government of the
Government of the United States of America and the Philippines.
Not being satisfied with the order, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Manila, where the motion to dismiss was renewed.
The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated July 12,
1947, affirmed the order of the municipal court dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint. It conceded that under the doctrine laid down in the case
of U. S. vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196 and affirmed in the case of Tindal
vs. Wesley, 167 U. S., 204 ordinarily, courts have jurisdiction over
cases where private parties sue to recover possession of property
being held by officers or agents acting in the name of the U. S.
Government even though no suit can be brought against the
Government itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present
case are bringing this action against officers and agents of the U. S.
Government not only to recover the possession of the three
apartment houses supposedly being held illegally by them in the
name of their government, but also to collect back rents, not only at
the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts entered into by the
United States of America but in excess of said rate, to say nothing
of the damages claimed, as a result of which, a judgment in these
proceedings may become a charge against the U. S. Treasury,
then under the rule laid down in the case of Land vs. Dollar, 91
Law. ed., 1209, the present suit must be regarded as one against
the United States Government itself, which cannot be sued without
its consent, specially by citizens of another country.
The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case before us on a
petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to order the Municipal
Court of Manila to take jurisdiction over the case. On October 30,
1947, counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and
Tillman filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds. The case was
orally argued on November 26, 1947. On March 4, 1948, petitioners
filed a petition which, among other things, informed this Court that
the North Syquia Apartments, the South Syquia Apartments and
Michel Apartments would be vacated by their occupants on
February 29, March 31, and May 31, 1948, respectively. As a
matter of fact, said apartments were actually vacated on the dates
already mentioned and were received by the plaintiff-owners.
On the basis of this petition and because of the return of the three
apartment houses to the owners, counsel for respondents Almeda
Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a petition to dismiss the
present case on the ground that it is moot. Counsel for the
petitioners answering the motion, claimed that the plaintiffs and
petitioners possession of the three apartment houses, reserving all
of their rights against respondents including the right to collect rents
and damages; that they have not been paid rents since January 1,
1947; that respondents admitted that there is a total of P109,895 in
rentals due and owing to petitioners; that should this case be now
dismissed, the petitioners will be unable to enforce collection; that
the question of law involved in this case may again come up before
the courts when conflicts arise between Filipino civilian property
owners and the U.S. Army authorities concerning contracts entered
into in the Philippines between said Filipinos and the U.S.
Government. Consequently, this Court, according to the petitioners,
far from dismissing the case, should decide it, particularly the
question of jurisdiction.
On June 18, 1949, through a "petition to amend complaint" counsel
for the petitioners informed this court that petitioners had already
received the U. S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific the sum of
P109,895 as rentals for the three apartments, but with the
reservation that said acceptance should not be construed as
jeopardizing the rights of the petitioners in the case now pending in
the courts of the Philippines or their rights against the U. S.
Government with respect to the three apartment houses. In view of
this last petition, counsel for respondents alleging that both
respondent Moore and Tillman had long left the Islands for other
Army assignments, and now that both the possession of the three
apartments in question as well as the rentals for their occupation
have already been received by the petitioners renew their motion
for dismissal on the ground that this case has now become moot.
The main purpose of the original action in the municipal court was
to recover the possession of the three apartment houses in
question. The recovery of rentals as submitted by the very counsel
for the petitioner was merely incidental to the main action. Because
the prime purpose of the action had been achieved, namely, the
recovery of the possession of the premises, apart from the fact that
the rentals amounting to P109,895 had been paid to the petitioners
and accepted by them though under reservations, this Court may
now well dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that the
questions involved therein have become academic and moot.
Counsel for the petitioners however, insists that a decision be
rendered on the merits, particularly on the question of jurisdiction of
the municipal court over the original action, not only for the
satisfaction of the parties involved but also to serve as a guide in
future cases involving cases of similar nature such as contracts of
lease entered into between the Government of the United States of
America on one side and Filipino citizens on the other regarding
properties of the latter. We accept the suggestion of petitioners and
shall proceed to discuss the facts and law involved and rule upon
them.
We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First Instance, that
following the doctrine laid down in the cases of U. S. vs. Lee and U.
S. vs. Tindal, supra, a private citizen claiming title and right of
possession of a certain property may, to recover possession of said
property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government
who are said to be illegally witholding the same from him, though in
doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the
Government, and the court may entertain such a suit altho the
Government itself is not included as a party-defendant. Of course,
the Government is not bound or concluded by the decision. The
philosophy of this ruling is that unless the courts are permitted to
take cognizance and to assume jurisdiction over such a case, a
private citizen would be helpless and without redress and protection
of his rights which may have been invaded by the officers of the
government professing to act in its name. In such a case the
officials or agents asserting rightful possession must prove and
justify their claim before the courts, when it is made to appear in the
suit against them that the title and right of possession is in the
private citizen. However, and this is important, where the judgment
in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession
of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against
or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be
regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently,
it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with
the consent of said Government. (See case of Land vs. Dollar, 91
Law. ed., 1209.)
From a careful study of this case, considering the facts involved
therein as well as those of public knowledge of which we take
judicial cognizance, we are convinced that the real party in interest
as defendant in the original case is the United States of America.
The lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United
States of America and the lease agreement themselves were
executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents. The
considerations or rentals was always paid by the U. S.
Government. The original action in the municipal court was brought
on the basis of these three lease contracts and it is obvious in the
opinion of this court that any back rentals or increased rentals will
have to be paid by the U. S. Government not only because, as
already stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such
Government but also because the premises were used by officers
of her armed forces during the war and immediately after the
terminations of hostilities.
We cannot see how the defendants and respondents Moore and
Tillman could be held individually responsible for the payments of
rentals or damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment
houses in question. Both of these army officials had no intervention
whatsoever in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the
initial occupancy of the premises both of which were effected thru
the intervention of and at the instance of their predecessors in
office. The original request made by the petitioners for the return of
the apartment buildings after the supposed termination of the
leases, was made to, and denied not by Moore and Tillman but by
their predecessors in office. The notice and decision that the U. S.
Army wanted and in fact continued to occupy the premises was
made not by Moore and Tillman but by predecessors in office. The
refusal to renegotiate the leases as requested by the petitioners
was made not by Moore but by his predecessors in office according
to the very complaint filed in the municipal court. The assurance
that the U. S. Army will vacate the premises prior to February 29,
1947, was also made by the predecessors in office of Moore.
As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint he was
Chief, Real State Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S.
Army, and was in direct charge and control of the leases and
occupancy of the apartment buildings, but he was under the
command of defendant Moore, his superior officer. We cannot see
how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to occupy
apartments in the three buildings, in obedience to order or direction
from his superior, defendant Moore, could be held personally liable
for the payment of rentals or increase thereof, or damages said to
have been suffered by the plaintiffs.
With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his
command in Manila, these lease agreement had already been
negotiated and executed and were in actual operation. The three
apartment buildings were occupied by army officers assigned
thereto by his predecessors in office. All that he must have done
was to assign or billet incoming army officers to apartments as they
were vacated by outgoing officers due to changes in station. He
found these apartment buildings occupied by his government and
devoted to the use and occupancy of army officers stationed in
Manila under his command, and he had reasons to believe that he
could continue holding and using the premises theretofore assigned
for that purpose and under contracts previously entered into by his
government, as long as and until orders to the contrary were
received by him. It is even to be presumed that when demand was
made by the plaintiffs for the payment of increased rentals or for
vacating the three apartment buildings, defendant Moore, not a
lawyer by profession but a soldier, must have consulted and sought
the advise of his legal department, and that his action in declining
to pay the increased rentals or to eject all his army officers from the
three buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice and
counsel of his legal division. At least, he was not in a position to
pay increased rentals above those set and stipulated in the lease
agreements, without the approval of his government, unless he
personally assumed financial responsibility therefor. Under these
circumstances, neither do we believe nor find that defendant Moore
can be held personally liable for the payment of back or increased
rentals and alleged damages.
As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments
involved, there is less reason for holding them personally liable for
rentals and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs. It must
be remembered that these army officers when coming to their
station in Manila were not given the choice of their dwellings. They
were merely assigned quarters in the apartment buildings in
question. Said assignments or billets may well be regarded as
orders, and all that those officers did was to obey them, and,
accordingly, occupied the rooms assigned to them. Under such
circumstances, can it be supposed or conceived that such army
officers would first inquire whether the rental being paid by the
government for the rooms or apartments assigned to them by order
of their superior officer was fair and reasonable or not, and whether
the period of lease between their government and the owners of the
premises had expired, and whether their occupancy of their rooms
or apartments was legal or illegal? And if they dismissed these
seemingly idle speculations, assuming that they ever entered their
minds, and continued to live in their apartments unless and until
orders to the contrary were received by them, could they later be
held personally liable for any back rentals which their government
may have failed to pay to the owners of the building, or for any
damages to the premises incident to all leases of property, specially
in the absence of proof that such damages to property had been
caused by them and not by the previous occupants, also army
officers who are not now parties defendant to this suit? Incidentally
it may be stated that both defendants Moore and Tillman have long
left these Islands to assume other commands or assignments and
in all probability none of their 64 co-defendants is still within this
jurisdiction.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief
and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the
Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for
back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by
defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by
the said U. S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of
Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already stated,
the present action must be considered as one against the U. S.
Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including
the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present
case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was
raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U. S.
Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which
is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not
only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government
without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an action against
a foreign government without said government's consent, which
renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his
country. The principles of the law behind this rule are so elementary
and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to
cite authorities in support thereof.
In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila committed
no error in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and that the
Court of First Instance acted correctly in affirming the municipal
court's order of dismissal. Case dismissed, without pronouncement
as to costs.
 Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
 
G.R. No. 70547 January 22, 1993
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and HONORIO CABARDO,
petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC.,
respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Leopoldo Sta. Maria for private respondents.
 
MELO, J.:
The imputation of culpa on the part of herein petitioners as a result of the
collision between its strain, bound for Manila from La Union, with a Baliwag
transit bus at the railroad crossing on the road going to Hagonoy, Bulacan
on August l0, 1974, is the subject of the petition at bar directed against the
judgment of affirmance rendered by respondent court, through the Fourth
Civil Cases Division (Sison, Bidin (P), Veloso, JJ.), vis-a-vis the decretal
portion handed down by the court of origin in:
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay the
 plaintiff the amount of P179,511.52 as actual damages.
2. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiff P436,642.03 as reimbursement for the damages paid
by the plaintiff to death, injury and damage claimants.
3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P50, 000.00 to the
plaintiff.
4. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P5, 000.00.
5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiff interest at the legal rate on the above amounts due
the plaintiff from August 10, 1974 until fully paid.
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the cost of this suit.
7. Ordering the dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim for
lack of factual and legal basis. (p. 101, Record on Appeal; p.
103. Rollo.)
Culled from the text of the assailed disposition are the facts of the case at
bar which are hereunder adopted verbatim:
The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train
of defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming
from San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a
passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way
to Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the
railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at
about 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stalled
and was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to
plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died
and fifty-three (53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff
alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its
locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its
passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars,
semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the
public of approaching train that would pass through the
crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against
defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed the
material allegation of the Complaint and as affirmative
defense alleged that the collision was caused by the
negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus
driver, Romeo Hughes.
At the pre-trial conference held on June 23, 1976, the parties
agreed on a partial stipulation of facts and issues which as
amplified at the continuation of the pre-trial conference, on
July 12, 1976, are as follows:
1 That plaintiff is a duly constituted corporation
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission engaged in the business of
transportation and operating public utility buses for
the public with lines covering Manila, Caloocan City,
Quezon City, Malabon, Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga
and Nueva Ecija, and particularly from Manila to
Hagonoy, Bulacan and return in the month of
August, l974 passing thru the town of Calumpit
Bulacan, temporarily while the bridge at Hagonoy,
Bulacan was under construction;
2 That defendant Philippine National Railways is a
purely government owned and controlled
corporation duly registered and existing virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 741, with capacity to sue
and be sued, and is likewise engaged in transporting
passengers and cargoes by trains and buses and
that, it operates a train line between San Fernando,
La Union and Manila particularly Passenger Express
Train with Body No. 73, passing along the
intersection of Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan,
in going to San Fernando, La Union from Manila and
return;
3. That on August 10, 1974, at about 1:20 o'clock in
the afternoon, a Baliuag Transit Bus with Body No.
1066 and Plate No. XS-929 PUB-Bulacan '74 was
driven by its authorized driver Romeo Hughes and
PNR Train No. 73 was operated by Train Engineer
Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado and at the
railroad intersection at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit,
Bulacan, said passenger train No. 73 hit and
bumped the right mid portion of the plaintiff's
passenger bus No. 1066, while the rear portion of
said bus was at the railroad track and its direction
was towards Hagonoy, Bulacan at about 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon;
4. That at the time of the collision there was a slight
rainfall in the vicinity of the scene of the accident
and that there was at said intersection no bars,
semaphores, and signal lights that would warn the
public of the approaching train that was about to
pass through the intersection and likewise there was
no warning devices to passing trains showing that
they were about to pass an intersection in going to
Manila from San Fernando, La Union and back;
5. That on account of said collision, the Baliuag
Transit Bus with Body No. 1066 driven by Romeo
Hughes was damaged and eighteen (18) of its
passengers died and the rest who were more than
fifty three (53) passengers suffered physical injuries;
6. That after the investigation the Chief of Police of
Calumpit, Bulacan, filed a criminal case of Reckless
Imprudence Causing Multiple Homicide with Multiple
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property against
Romeo Hughes y Parfan, driver of the Baliuag
Transit bus docketed under Crim. Case No. 2392;
while the train Engineer Honorio Cabardo alias
Honorio Cirbado was not included as an accused in
said case, although his train No. 73 was the one that
hit and bumped the right rear portion of the said bus;
7. That immediately after the said accident Major
Manuel A. Macam, Chief of the Municipal Police of
Calumpit, Bulacan, together with some of his
policemen conducted an investigation of the
accident;
8. That at the railroad crossing in Calumpit, Bulacan
where the accident took place there is no railroad
crossing bar, however, during the pre-war days
there was a railroad crossing bar at said
intersection; that, however, there was only one sign
of railroad crossing "Stop, Look and Listen" placed
on a concrete slab and attached to a concrete post
existing at the approach of the railroad track from
the Highway going towards Hagonoy, Bulacan and
that after the said railroad track there was a
designated jeep parking area at the right side in the
direction from the Highway to Hagonoy Bulacan;
9. That the train No. 73 driven by Train Engineer
Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado stopped
 after passing the railroad crossing at a distance of
about 50 meters from the said intersection after the
collision on August, 1974;
10. That the expected time of arrival of said Train
No. 73 in Manila was 2:41 P.M. and its departure
time from San Fernando, La Union was 9:00 A.M.
and its expected arrival at Calumpit, Bulacan was
1:41 P.M. with no stop at Calumpit, Bulacan.
SIMPLIFICATION OF ISSUES
11. That the principal issue in the instant case is
who between the driver Romeo Hughes of Baliuag
Transit, Incorporated and the train engineer Honorio
Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado of the Philippine
National Railways was negligent or whether or not
both are negligent; that likewise which of said
companies was negligent at said railroad
intersection;
12. That another additional issue is whether the
Baliuag Transit Incorporated has exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. (pp.
85-87, Record on Appeal). ( Annex A, Petition; pp.
79-82, Rollo)
In addition, respondent court deemed it necessary to reflect the salient
findings of the case for damages as formulated by the trial court:
Posed for resolution are the following issues: Who between
the driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag Transit Incorporated
and Honorio Cabardo, train Engineer of the Philippine
National Railways was negligent in the operation of their
respective vehicles, or whether or both were negligent?
Could either of the companies Baliuag Transit Incorporated
and the Philippine National Railways be held accountable for
the collision because of negligence?
The defendants presented several statements or affidavits of
alleged witnesses to the collision, specifically Exhibits 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19; the Court is at a loss
as to why the persons who gave the said statements were
not presented as witnesses during the trial of the
case, as aptly said, the statements are hearsay evidence
(Azcueta v. Cabangbang, — 45 O.G. 144); at most they be
taken as proof only of the fact that statements of said persons
were taken and that investigation was conducted of the
incident; the Court cannot consider the averments in said
statements as testimonies or evidence of truth.
Defendants endeavored to show that the proximate and
immediate cause of the collision was the negligence of the
bus driver because the driver did not make a stop before
ascending the railtrack; he did not heed the warning or
shoutings of bystanders and passengers and proceeded in
traversing the railtrack at a fast speed; that the bus driver was
in fact violating Section 42(d) of R.A. 4136, otherwise known
as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code for failure to
"stop, look, and listen" at the intersection, before crossing the
railtrack; that it is incumbent upon him to take the necessary
precautions at the intersection because the railroad track is in
itself a warning; and the bus driver ignored such a warning
and must assume the responsibility for the result of the
motion taken by him (U.S. v. Mananquil, 42 Phil. 90)
Except the testimony of the train engineer Cabardo, there is
no admissible evidence to show that indeed, the bus driver
did not take the necessary precaution in traversing the track.
Note that he first noticed the bus when it was only 15 meters
away from him; he could not have possibly noticed the
position of the bus before negotiating the track.
On the other hand, it was shown by plaintiff that the bus
driver Romeo Hughes took the necessary precautions in
traversing the track.
The bus driver had stopped before traversing the track and in
fact asked the conductor to alight and made a "Look and
Listen" before proceeding; the conductor had done just that
and made a signal to proceed when he did not see any
oncoming train. (TSN, October 2l, 1976, p. 4); plaintiff's bus
drivers and conductors are enjoined to observe such a
precautionary measure in seminars conducted by the
company. (TSN, September 23, 1976. pp. 26-27).
The evidence disclosed that the train was running fast
because by his own testimony, the train engineer had
testified that before reaching the station of Calumpit the
terrain was downgrade and levelled only after passing the
Calumpit bridge (TSN, July 28, 1976, p. 14 ); the tendency of
the train, coming from a high point is to accelerate as the
gravity will necessarily make it so, especially when it is pulling
seven coaches loaded with goods and passengers.
Moreover, upon impact, the bus loaded with passengers was
dragged and thrown into a ditch several meters away; the
train had stopped only after the engine portion was about 190
meters away from the fallen bus; several passengers were
injured and at least 20 died; such facts conclusively indicate
that the train was speeding, because if it were moving at
moderate speed, it would not run some 190 meters after
impact and throw the bus at quite a distance especially so
when it is claimed that the train's emergency brakes were
applied.
Further, the train was an express train; its departure was 9:00
A.M. at San Fernando, La Union and expected in Manila at
2:41 P.M.; the collision occurred at 1:30 P.M. or 4 1/2 hours
after it left La Union; surely, the train could have not
negotiated such a distance in so short a time if it were not
running at fast speed.
It may be argued that a railroad is not subject to the same
restrictions to the speed of its train as a motorists (Mckelvey
v. Delaware L. and W.R. Co. 253 App. D.V. 109, 300 NYS
1263 ); but it does not follow that a train will be permitted to
run fast under all conditions at any rate of speed it may
choose. It must regulate its speed with proper regard for the
safety of human life and property (Johnson v. Southern
Pacific Company (Cal. App. 288 p. 81), considering the
surrounding circumstances particularly the nature of the
locality (Atchinson, T. and SFR Co. v. Nicks (Arts) 165 p. 2d
167).
Cabardo's route included the passage over the said
intersection; he could have noticed that it is a very busy
intersection because the crossroad leads to the Calumpit
Poblacion as well as to the neighboring town of Hagonoy;
there was a parking lot by the side of the track whereat
passengers board jeepneys for the neighboring barrios and
towns; stalls abound in the vicinity and bystanders
congregate nearby. A prudent train operator must, under the
circumstances, slacken his speed almost for the protection of
motorists and pedestrians, not only when a collision is
inevitable but even if no hindrance is apparent on the way;
Moreover, there was an intermittent rain at the time of the
collision (see stipulation of facts and photographs); the
condition of the weather was such that even if for this reason
alone, the train engineer should have foreseen that danger of
collision lurked because of poor visibility of slippery road; he
should have taken extra precaution by considerably
slackening its speed. This he failed to do even if the nature of
his job required him to observe care exercised by a prudent
man.
Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus
driver; it was evident that he had taken the necessary
precautions before passing over the railway track; if the bus
was hit, it was for reasons beyond the control of the bus
driver because he had no place to go; there were vehicles to
his left which prevented him in swerving towards that
direction; his bus stalled in view of the obstructions in his
front where a sand and gravel truck stopped because of a
jeep maneuvering into a garage up front. All the wheels at the
bus have already passed the rail portion of the track and only
the rear portion of the bus' body occupied or covered the
railtrack. This was evident because the part of the bus hit by
the train was the rear since the bus fell on a nearby ditch.
Otherwise, if the bus was really hit in mid-body, the bus could
have been halved into two because of the force of the impact.
The stipulation of facts between the parties show that there
was no crossing bar at the railroad intersection at Calumpit,
Bulacan at the time of collision (par. 8, Stipulation of Facts);
the plaintiff contended and the defendants did not deny, that
there were no signal lights, semaphores, flagman or
switchman thereat; the absence of such devices, the plaintiff
argues constitute negligence on the part of the Philippine
National Railways.
A railroad is not required to have a gate (crossing bar) or a
flagman, or to maintain signals at every intersection; only at
such places reasonably necessary; what is considered
reasonably necessary will depend on the amount of travel
upon the road, the frequency with which trains pass over it
and the view which could be obtained of trains as they
approach the crossing, and other conditions (Pari v. Los
Angeles, Ry. Corporation (Cal A2d) 128 p2d 563; Swdyk v.
Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. 148 F. 2d 795, and others).
As has been amply discussed, the crossroad at the
intersection at Calumpit is one which is a busy thoroughfare;
it leads to the Poblacion at Calumpit and other barrios as well
as the town of Hagonoy; the vicinity is utilized as a parking
and waiting area for passengers of jeepneys that ply between
the barrios, clearly, the flow of vehicular traffic thereat is
huge. It can be said also that, since there is no other railtrack
going North except that one passing at Calumpit, trains pass
over it frequently;
A portion of the intersection is being used as a parking area
with stalls and other obstructions present making it difficult, if
not impossible, to see approaching trains (see photographs).
The failure of the Philippine National Railways to put a cross
bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores is
evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the
public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it,
because public safety demands that said devices or
equipments be installed, in the light of aforesaid
jurisprudence. In the opinion of this Court the X sign or the
presence of "STOP, LOOK, LISTEN" warnings would not be
sufficient protection of the motoring public as well as the
pedestrians, in the said intersection;
The parties likewise have stipulated that during the pre-war
days, there was a railroad crossing bar at the said
 intersection (Par-8, Stipulation of Facts). It appears that it
was a self imposed requirement which has been abandoned.
In a case it was held that where the use of a flagman was self
imposed, the abandonment thereof may constitute
negligence. (Fleming v. Missouri and A. Ry. Co. 198 ARDC
290, 128 S.W. 2d 286 and others; cited in Sec. 1082
SCRWARTZ, Vol. 2). Similarly, the abandonment by the PNR
of the use of the crossing bar at the intersection at Calumpit
constitutes negligence, as its installation has become
imperative, because of the prevailing circumstances in the
place.
A railroad company has been adjudged guilty of negligence
and civilly liable for damages when it failed to install
semaphores, or where it does not see to it that its flagman or
switchman comply with their duties faithfully, to motorist
injured by a crossing train as long as he had crossed without
negligence on his part (Lilius vs. MRR, 39 Phil. 758).
(Decision, pages 94-100, R A.; pp. 83-89, Rollo).
On the aspect of whether the Philippine National Railways enjoys immunity
from suit, respondent court initially noted that an exculpation of this nature
that was raised for the first time on appeal may no longer be entertained in
view of the proscription under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of
Court, apart from the fact that the lawyer of petitioner agreed to stipulate
inter alia that the railroad company had capacity to sue and be sued. This
being so, respondent court continued, PNR was perforce estopped from
disavowing the prejudicial repercussion of an admission in judicio. Even as
the laws governing the creation and rehabilitation of the PNR were entirely
mute on its power to sue and be sued, respondent court nonetheless
opined that such prerogative was implied from the general power to
transact business pertinent or indispensable to the attainment of the goals
of the railroad company under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4156 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6366:
 Sec. 4 General Powers — The Philippine National Railways
shall have the following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such
business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation;
and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation
under the Corporation law.
in conjunction with Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. 741:
(b) To own or operate railroad transways, bus lines,
trucklines, subways, and other kinds of land transportation,
vessels, and pipelines, for the purpose of transporting for
consideration, passengers, mail and property between any
points in the Philippines;
Thus, respondent court utilized the doctrine of implied powers announced
in National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, Sr. and Philippine Airlines,
Inc. (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), to the effect that the power to sue and be sued is
implicit from the faculty to transact private business. At any rate,
respondent court characterized the railroad company as a private entity
created not to discharge a governmental function but, among other things,
to operate a transport service which is essentially a business concern, and
thus barred from invoking immunity from suit.
In brushing aside petitioners' asseveration that the bus driver outraced the
train at the crossing, respondent court observed that the bus was hit by the
train at its rear portion then protruding over the tracks as the bus could not
move because another truck at its front was equally immobile due to a jeep
maneuvering into a nearby parking area. Under these tight conditions,
respondent court blamed the train engineer who admitted to have seen the
maneuvering jeep at a distance (TSN, July 28, 1976, page 18) and had the
last clear chance to apply the brakes, knowing fully well that the vehicles
following the jeep could not move away from the path of the train. Apart
from these considerations, it was perceived below that the train was
running fast during the entire trip since the train stopped 190 meters from
the point of impact and arrived at Calumpit, Bulacan earlier than its
expected time of arrival thereat.
Moreover, respondent court agreed with the conclusion reached by the trial
court that the absence of a crossing bar, signal light, flagman or switchman
to warn the public of an approaching train constitutes negligence per the
pronouncement of this Court in Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company (59 Phil
758 [1934]).
Concerning the exercise of diligence normally expected of an employer in
the selection and supervision of its employees, respondent court
expressed the view that PNR was remiss on this score since it allowed
Honorio Cabardo, who finished only primary education and became an
engineer only through sheer experience, to operate the locomotive, not to
mention the fact that such plea in avoidance was not asserted in the
answer and was thus belatedly raised on appeal.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but respondent court was far from
persuaded. Hence, the petition before Us which, in essence, incorporates
similar disputations anent PNR's immunity from suit and the attempt to toss
the burden of negligence from the train engineer to the bus driver of herein
private respondent.
The bone of contention for exculpation is premised on the familiar maxim in
political law that the State, by virtue of its sovereign nature and as
reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is insulated from suits without its
consent (Article 16, Section 3, 1987 Constitution). However, equally
conceded is the legal proposition that the acquiescence of the State to be
sued can be manifested expressly through a general or special law, or
indicated implicitly, as when the State commences litigation for the purpose
of asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters into a contract (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1991 edition, page 33; Sinco, Philippine Political
Law, Eleventh Edition, 1962, page 34). When the State participates in a
covenant, it is deemed to have descended from its superior position to the
level of an ordinary citizen and thus virtually opens itself to judicial process.
Of course, We realize that this Court qualified this form of consent only to
those contracts concluded in a proprietary capacity and therefore immunity
will attach for those contracts entered into in a governmental capacity,
following the ruling in the 1985 case of United States of America vs. Ruiz
(136 SCRA 487 [1985]; cited by Cruz, supra at pages 36-37). But the
restrictive interpretation laid down therein is of no practical worth nor can it
give rise to herein petitioner PNR's exoneration since the case of Malong
vs. Philippine National Railways (138 SCRA 63, [1985]); 3 Padilla, 1987
Constitution with Comments and Cases, 1991 edition, page 644), decided
three months after Ruiz was promulgated, was categorical enough to
specify that the Philippine National Railways "is not performing any
governmental function" (supra, at page 68).
In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en banc, declared:
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a
common carrier, was not immune from suit under Act No.
1510, its charter.
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741,
provides that the PNR is a government instrumentality under
government ownership during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014.
It is under the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Republic Act No. 6366 provides:
Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. — The Philippine
National Railways, being a factor for socio-economic
development and growth, shall be a part of the
infrastructure program of the government and as
such shall remain in and under government
ownership during its corporate existence. The
 Philippine National Railways must be administered
with the view of serving the interests of the public by
providing them the maximum of service and, while
aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the
economy of operation must be ensured so that
service can be rendered at the minimum passenger
and freight prices possible.
The charter also provides:
Sec. 4. General powers. — The Philippine National
Railways shall have the following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all
such business directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the
purpose of the corporation; and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad
corporation under the Corporation Law. (This refers
to Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on
railroad corporations, not reproduced in the
Corporation Code.)
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the
power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. Section 13(2) of the
Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and
be sued in any court.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends
(Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S.
353, 51 L. 3d 834).
 The public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to
suit at the instance of every citizen and, consequently,
controlled in the use and disposition of the means required
for the proper administration of the Government (The Siren
vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed. 129). (at pp.
65-66).
To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a sovereign capacity
when it organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in transportation,
Malong continued to hold that:
. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no
different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company.
The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove
itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil
Code on common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether
corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity
from suit is determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs.
Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs.
Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104
Phil. 593).
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which
they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental
capacity are not suits against the State (81 C.J.S. 1319).
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters
in which they have assumed to act in a private or
nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against
certain corporations created by the State for public
 purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more
of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character,
are not regarded as suits against the State.
The latter is true, although the State may own the
stock or property of such a corporation, for by
engaging in business operations through a
corporation the State divests itself so far of its
sovereign character, and by implicating consents to
suits against the corporation. (81 C.J.S. 1319).
The foregoing rule was applied to State Dock Commissions
carrying on business relating to pilots, terminals and
transportation (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. U.S., 27
Fed. 2nd 370) and to State Highways Commissions created
to build public roads and given appropriations in advance to
discharge obligations incurred in their behalf (Arkansas State
Highway Commission vs. Dodge, 26 SW 2nd 879 and State
Highway Commission of Missouri vs. Bates, 296 SW 418,
cited in National Airports case).
The point is that when the government enters into a
commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and
is to be treated like any other private corporation (Bank of the
U.S. vs. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L ed. 244, cited in
Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel
Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388). The Manila Hotel case
also relied on the following rulings:
By engaging in a particular business through the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character,
so as to render the corporation subject to the rules
 of law governing private corporations.
When the State acts in its proprietary capacity, it is
amenable to all the rules of law which bind private
individuals.
There is not one law for the sovereign and another
for the subject, but when the sovereign engages in
business and the conduct of business enterprises,
and contracts with individuals, whenever the
contract in any form comes before the courts, the
rights and obligation of the contracting parties must
be adjusted upon the same principles as if both
contracting parties were private persons. Both stand
upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is
merged in the dealer, contractor and suitor (People
vs. Stephens, 71 N.Y. 549).
It should be noted that in Philippine National Railways vs.
Union de Maquinistas, etc., L-31948, July 25, 1978, 84 SCRA
223, it was held that the PNR funds could be garnished at the
instance of a labor union.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged
negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for
damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is
subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private
enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.
Thus, the National Development Company is not immune
from suit. It does not exercise sovereign functions. It is an
agency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary
or business functions (National Development Company vs.
Tobias, 117 Phil. 703, 705 and cases cited therein; National
Development Company vs. NDC Employees and Workers'
 Union, L-32387, August 19, 1975, 66 SCRA 18l, 184).
Other government agencies not enjoying immunity from suit
are the Social Security System (Social Security System vs.
Court of Appeals,
L-41299, February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 707) and the
Philippine National Bank (Republic vs. Philippine National
Bank, 121 Phil. 26). (at pp. 66-68).
We come now to the question of whether respondent court properly agreed
with the trial court in imputing negligence on the part of the train engineer
and his employer.
It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the pre-trial hearings
held for the purpose of stipulating on crucial facts that the bus was hit on
the rear portion thereof after it crossed the railroad tracks. Then, too the
train engineer was frank enough to say that he saw the jeep maneuvering
into a parking area near the crossing which caused the obstruction in the
flow of traffic such that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of
herein private respondent were not able to move forward or to take the
opposite lane due to other vehicles. The unmindful demeanor of the train
engineer in surging forward despite the obstruction before him is definitely
anathema to the conduct of a prudent person placed under the same set of
perceived danger. Indeed:
When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of reasonable
diligence commensurate with the surroundings it should be
apparent, to the company that a person on its track or to get
on its track is unaware of his danger or cannot get out of the
way, it becomes the duty of the company to use such
precautions, by warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as
may be reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him. (65 Am.
Jur., Second Edition. p. 649).
Likewise, it was established that the weather condition was characterized
with intermittent rain which should have prompted the train engineer to
exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead
of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the train was travelling more
than the normal speed of 30 kilometers per hour. If the train were really
running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection,
it would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place of the
accident (page 10, Brief for Petitioners). All of these factors, taken
collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that the
train engineer was negligent who, moreover, despite the last opportunity
within his hands vis-a-vis the weather condition including the presence of
people near the intersection, could have obviated the impending collision
had he slackened his speed and applied the brakes (Picart vs. Smith, 37
Phil. 809 [1918]).Withal, these considerations were addressed to the trial
judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, was in a better position to assign
weight on factual questions. Having resolved the question of negligence
between the train engineer and the bus driver after collating the mass of
evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter thus commands great respect
especially so in this case where respondent court gave its nod of approval
to the findings of the court of origin (Co vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
198; 206 [1991]); Amigo vs. Teves, 50 O.G. 5799; Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Fifth edition, page 353).
What exacerbates against petitioners' contention is the authority in this
jurisdiction to the effect that the failure of a railroad company to install a
semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the
public of the passing train amounts to negligence (Lilius vs. Manila
Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 [1934]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of
respondent court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes
such action necessary
or advisable in the public convenience and interest.”
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of
what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads
and to determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is
an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by
the National Assembly.
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded
on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."
Summary: Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (GR
100150, 5 January 1994)

Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights

[GR 100150, 5 January 1994]
En Banc, Vitug (J): 12 concur

Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos

Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the
City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al.
(being the officers and members of the North Edsa Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were given
a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate
the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition
notice, Fermo, et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July
1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon,
Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo, asking
the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia
along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the
CHR issued an Order, directing Simon, et. al. "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending
resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR.
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al.
on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and
convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al. carried out the
demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,
the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00
in favor of Fermo, et. al. to purchase light housing materials and
food under the Commission's supervision and again directed
Simon, et. al. to "desist from further demolition, with the warning
that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and
arrest." A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned
CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990 hearing, Simon,
et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss
set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved, and likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. In an
Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited Simon, et. al. in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a
fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR
issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991,
Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et.
al. filed the petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order
and preliminary injunction, questioning the extent of the authority
and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be prohibited
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case 90 —1580,
entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

Issue: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the “order to
desist” against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.’s stalls, and to cite
Mayor Simon, et. al. for contempt for proceeding to demolish said
stalls despite the CHR order.
Held: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a
provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights." Recalling
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human
Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations; such areas as the "(1) protection of rights
of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention
of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed
against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been
meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has
set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve,
instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil
that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by
Fermo, at. al. on a land which is planned to be developed into a
"People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of
Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy
national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to
be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right
which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it
may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining
herein, the Court not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of Fermo, et.
al. can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. On
its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to
"adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing
in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should
be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt
could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with
the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who
decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining
order) herein, however, is not investigatorial in character but
prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. As
held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on
Human Rights, "The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
'provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection' may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it
that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said
so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is
never derived by implication. Evidently, the 'preventive measures
and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary
injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on
behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ
of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any
court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the
rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144681. June 21, 2004]

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC),

CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF
MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE
S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R.
POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D.
FULGENCIO II, petitioners, vs. ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN,
VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE
RAMONCITO P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and
GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R.
RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS,
KARANGALAN D. SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER,
MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO,
MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T. MENDOZA,
FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN, ELCIN
C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B.
BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA,
JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S. ACOSTA,
MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P.
ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA,
CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO,
MA. LUISA S. GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C.
HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA,
RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R.
TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO, FEDERICO L.
CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAÑEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY,
BERNARDITA B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK
D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT S.
NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA G.
BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H. CABUHAT, NANCY J.
CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE,
EVELYN C. CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA,
DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING, VIOLETA C.
FELIPE, HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA
M. LACSAMANA, NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B.
LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS,
PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR,
 ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA. ANA and
YOLANDA P. UNICA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision,i[1] dated May 16, 2000, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate
court affirmed the judgmentii[2] dated December 19, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No.
93-66530. The trial court allowed the respondents to take their
physician’s oath and to register as duly licensed physicians. Equally
challenged is the Resolutioniii[3] promulgated on August 25, 2000 of
the Court of Appeals, denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of
Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the
Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by
the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful
examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the
seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two
most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry
(Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were
unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored
100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven
got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
The Board also observed that many of those who passed from
Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got
a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the
candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that
strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima
College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the
history of the Physician Licensure Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19,
withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from
the Fatima College of Medicine.iv[4] The PRC asked the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or
irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure
Examination.
Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr.
Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority
in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University,
to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-
Gyne of the said examination.
On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported
that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the
Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La
Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed
that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He
concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the
clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause “strong
enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect
from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort,
energy, etc.”v[5]
For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of
Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the
conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the
test questions.”vi[6]
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V.
Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel
V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De
Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for mandamus,
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil
Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as
intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21,
1993, charging respondents with “immorality, dishonest conduct,
fraud, and deceit” in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne
examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima
examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No.
1687 by the PRC.
On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-
66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the
respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the
physician’s oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their
names in the rolls of the PRC.
The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.
On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP
No. 31701, with the dispositive portion of the Decision ordaining as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower
court against petitioners is hereby nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED. [7] 1

Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing

Decision to this Court in G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution dated
May 23, 1994, we denied the petition for failure to show reversible
error on the part of the appellate court.

1
Id. at 175. Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and concurred in by Presiding Justice Santiago M.
[7]

Kapunan (later a member of the Supreme Court and now retired) and Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez (now a member of the Second Division of the Supreme Court).
 Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the
instant petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530
was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of
their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This
was without prejudice to cross-examination by the opposing
counsel.
On December 13, 1993, petitioners’ counsel failed to appear at
the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December
15. The trial court then ruled that petitioners waived their right to
cross-examine the witnesses.
On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her non-
appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the
witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied
the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the
Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that
adverse counsel was notified less than three (3) days prior to the
hearing.
Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding
with Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents herein moved for the
issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted in its
Order dated April 4, 1994.
The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to annul the Orders of the trial court
dated November 13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994.
We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP
No. 34506 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer
for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction is
GRANTED and the Orders of December 13, 1993, February
 7, 1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 of the RTC-
Manila, Branch 52, and all further proceedings taken by it in
Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED
NULL and VOID. The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow
petitioners’ counsel to cross-examine the respondents’
witnesses, to allow petitioners to present their evidence in due
course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits
on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Costs against
respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED. [8] 2

The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the
petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion
praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate court’s
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright dismissal of
Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners asked for the suspension
of the proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the
aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset
the proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied
the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review
docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional Regulation
Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to
appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the
respondents herein, the trial court ruled that herein petitioners
waived their right to cross-examine the herein respondents. Trial
was reset to November 28, 1994.
2
Rollo, pp. 199-200. Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin, with Associate Justices Angelina S.
[8]

Gutierrez (now a member of the Supreme Court), and Conchita Carpio Morales (likewise a present member of the
Supreme Court) concurring.
 On November 25, 1994, petitioners’ counsel moved for the
inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On November
28, 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners
failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit
and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for
decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment
in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the
respondents to allow the petitioners and intervenors (except
those with asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this
decision) [sic], [9] to take the physician’s oath and to register
3

them as physicians.
It should be made clear that this decision is without
prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may
be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in
the manner provided by law and consistent with the
requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. [10] 4

As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this

Court a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
118437, entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon.
David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be
consolidated with G.R. No. 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be
nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-

3
Of the intervenors in Civil Case No. 93-66530, Achilles Peralta and Evelyn Ramos were dropped as parties per
[9]

Order of the trial court dated August 24, 1993. The case was dismissed as to Sally Bunagan, Reogelio Ancheta,
Oscar Padua, Evelyn Grajo, Valentino Arboleda, Carlos Bernardo, Jr., Mario Cuaresma, Violeta Felipe, and
Percival Pangilinan as per Order dated November 25, 1994. Corazon Cruz and Samuel Bangoy were deemed by
the trial court no longer entitled to the avails of the suit for seeking extrajudicial relief from the Board of Medicine,
as per its Order dated November 25, 1994. See CA Rollo, pp. 140-141.
4 [10]
CA Rollo, pp. 174-175.
66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to
inhibit himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another
branch.
On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice
of Appeal [11] in Civil Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating the case
5

to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

37283.
In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was
consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is
DISMISSED for being moot. The petition in G.R. No. 118437
is likewise DISMISSED on the ground that there is a pending
appeal before the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor
General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more
circumspect in her dealings with the courts as a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED. [12] 6

While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the

appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in
Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit:
Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T.
Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A.
Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero,
Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes,
Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa,
Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-
5 [11]
Id. at 205.
6
G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437, 9 July 1998, 292 SCRA 155, 167. Penned by Associate Justice Josue N.
[12]

Bellosillo, with Associate Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Jose C. Vitug, Artemio V. Panganiban, and Leonardo A.
Quisumbing concurring.
Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B.
Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth
M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla,
Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-
Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested that they
were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved
for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed
by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano,
Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara,
Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma.
Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan,
Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses,
Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo,
Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C.
Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of Appeals ruled that its
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not apply to them.
On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No.
37283, with the following fallo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS
the instant appeal.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [13] 7

In sustaining the trial court’s decision, the appellate court

ratiocinated that the respondents complied with all the statutory
requirements for admission into the licensure examination for
physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said examination.
Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act No. 2382, [14] they
8

should be allowed to take their oaths as physicians and be

registered in the rolls of the PRC.

7 [13]
Rollo, p. 67.
8 [14]
The Medical Act of 1959.
 Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MANDAMUS AGAINST
PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315
AFFIRMING THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION
DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS
TO THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE
ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT
AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL
EXAMINEES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
COULD PROCEED DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS
PRECISELY LODGED TO DETERMINE THE MORAL
FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS. [15] 9

To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a
reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the trial court
that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this
case. They point out that for a writ of mandamus to issue, the
applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to
the thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to perform
the act required. Thus, mandamus may be availed of only when the
duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and not a discretionary
one. The petitioners argue that the appellate court’s decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-G.R.
SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No.
9 [15]
Rollo, pp. 28-29.
31701 that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of
medicine becomes discretionary on the PRC if there exists some
doubt that the successful examinee has not fully met the
requirements of the law. The petitioners stress that this Court’s
Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there
was no showing “that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment” in CA-G.R.
SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R.
No. 112315 has long become final and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure
examinations for physicians, the petitioners have the obligation to
administer to them the oath as physicians and to issue their
certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section 20 [16] 10

of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

37283, found that respondents complied with all the requirements
of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents were admitted by
the Medical Board to the licensure examinations and had passed
the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the
petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as
physicians and register them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to
some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. [17] Section 3 of 11

10
SEC. 20. Issuance of Certificates of Registration, grounds for refusal of [the] same. – The Commissioner of
[16]

Civil Service (now Professional Regulation Commission) the chairman, the members and the Secretary of the
Board of Medical Examiners (now Medical Board) shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who
have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board. They shall not issue a certificate of registration to
any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral
turpitude, or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board of
Medical Examiners (now Medical Board), or has been declared to be of unsound mind. (As amended by Rep. Act
No. 4224, which took effect June 19, 1965).
11
See United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall (US) 604, 21 L. Ed 721; Laizure v. Baker, 11 P. 2d 560; State ex rel
[17]

Lyons v. McDowell, 57 A. 2d 94; Rader v. Burton, 122 N.E. 2d 856; Board of Managers v. City of Wilmington, 70
S.E. 2d 833.
Rule 65 [18] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two
12

situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is
entitled.
We shall discuss the issues successively.
1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To
Issue Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No.
2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the
officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not
involving discretion. [19] Moreover, there must be statutory authority
13

for the performance of the act, [20] and the performance of the duty
14

has been refused. [21] Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did
15

petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and

register respondents as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the
basis of the records:
It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and
intervenor-appellees have fully complied with all the statutory
12
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
[18]

the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the
act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46.
13
See Potter v. Anderson, 392 P. 2d 650; State ex rel Jester v. Paige, 213 P. 2d 441; State ex rel. Sharp v.
[19]

Cross, 211 P. 2d 760; St. George v. Hanson, et al., 78 S.E. 2d 885; State ex rel Vander v. Board of County
Com’rs. et al., 135 N.E. 2d 701.
14 [20]
See State ex rel Jester v. Paige, supra; Pedroso v. De Walt, et al., 340 S.W. 2d 566.
15
See State Board of Barber Examiners v. Walker, 192 P. 2d 723; State ex rel Sharp v. Cross, supra; State ex rel
[21]

Hacharedi v. Baxter, 74 N.E. 2d 242, 332 US 827, 92 L. Ed 402, 68 S. Ct 209.

 requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for
physicians conducted and administered by the respondent-
appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too,
must be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed
the same examinations. [22] 16

The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in

concluding that petitioners should allow the respondents to take
their oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would
enable respondents to practice the medical profession [23] pursuant 17

to Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959?

The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of
Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding that the petitioners had the
ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to
respondents and register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule
in statutory construction that each part of a statute should be
construed in connection with every other part to produce a
harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one section. 18

[24]
The intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from
the statute taken as a whole, not from an isolated part of the
provision. Accordingly, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, as
amended should be read in conjunction with the other provisions of
the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had the
ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to
respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must be
had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959
discloses that the law uses the word “shall” with respect to the
issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners “shall
sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have
satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board.” In
16 [22]
Rollo, p. 58.
17 [23]
Id. at 59.
18
Sotto v. Sotto, No. 17768, 1 September 1922, 43 Phil. 688, 694. See also Araneta v. Concepcion and Araneta,
[24]

No. L-9667, 31 July 1956, 99 Phil. 709, 712.

statutory construction the term “shall” is a word of command. It is
given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the
requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the Board is
obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a
physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 [25] of 19

the Medical Act of 1959.

However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for
serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the
Board requirements by the respondents. The unusually high
scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal,
according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and
raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests.
These doubts have to be appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested
with the power to conduct administrative investigations and
“disapprove applications for examination or registration,” pursuant
to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 1 [26] 20

thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before
the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents to
ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as
required by Section 9 [27] of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated
21

19
SEC. 22. Administrative investigations. – In addition to the functions provided for in the preceding sections, the
[25]

Board of Medical Examiners (now Medical Board) shall perform the following duties: (1) to administer oath to
physicians who qualified in the examinations (stress supplied); (2) to study the conditions affecting the
practice of medicine in all parts of the Philippines; (3) to exercise the powers conferred upon it by this article with
the view of maintaining the ethical and professional standards of the medical profession; (4) to subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum witnesses for all purposes required in the discharge of its duties; and (5) to promulgate,
with the approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Professional Regulation Commission), such rules and
regulations as it may deem necessary for the performance of its duties in harmony with the provisions of this Act
and necessary for the proper practice of medicine in the Philippines.
Administrative investigations shall be conducted by at least two members of the Medical Board with one legal officer
sitting during the investigation, otherwise the proceedings shall be considered void. The existing rules of evidence
shall be observed during all administrative investigations. The Board may disapprove applications for examination
or registration, reprimand erring physicians, or suspend or revoke registration certificates, if the respondents are
found guilty after due investigation. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4224, effective June 19, 1965.)
20
SEC. 1. Objectives. – This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
[26]

education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control, and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines.
21
SEC. 9. Candidates for board examinations. – Candidates for Board examinations shall have the following
[27]

qualifications:
July 1, 1997, the Board ruled:
WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the
respondents[’] examination papers in the Physician Licensure
Examinations given in February 1993 and further DEBARS
them from taking any licensure examination for a period of
ONE (1) YEAR from the date of the promulgation of this
DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the
scheduled examinations for physicians after the lapse of the
period imposed by the BOARD.
SO ORDERED. [28] 22

Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be

ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to
hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the
issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not
lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the
Board shall not issue a certificate of registration only in the
following instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted
by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving
moral turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty of immoral or
dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3)
has been declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that none of
these circumstances are present in their case.
(1)He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign country who has submitted competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country’s existing laws
permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens
thereof;
(2) He shall be of good moral character;
(3) He shall be of sound mind;
(4) He shall not have been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude;
(5) He shall be a holder of the Degree of Doctor of Medicine or its equivalent conferred by a college of medicine duly
recognized by the Government; and
(6) He must have completed a calendar year of technical training known as internship the nature of which shall be
prescribed by the Board of Medical Education undertaken in hospitals and health centers approved by the Board.
(As amended by Rep. Act No. 5946, approved June 21, 1969).
22 [28]
Rollo, p. 419.
 Petitioners reject respondents’ argument. We are informed that
in Board Resolution No. 26, [29] dated July 21, 1993, the Board
23

resolved to file charges against the examinees from Fatima College

of Medicine for “immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the
Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations.” It likewise
sought to cancel the examination results obtained by the
examinees from the Fatima College.
Section 8 [30] of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that
24

a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must

have “satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination.”
Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered
“to physicians who qualified in the examinations.” The operative
word here is “satisfactorily,” defined as “sufficient to meet a
condition or obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or
ignorance.” [31] Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing
25

authority apparently did not find that the respondents “satisfactorily

passed” the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to
nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As
Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to
enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has
been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and
the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. [32] There 26

must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing

demanded. [33] It is long established rule that a license to practice
27

23 [29]
Id. at 99.
24
SEC. 8. Prerequisite to the practice of medicine. – No person shall engage in the practice of medicine in the
[30]

Philippines unless he is at least twenty-one years of age, has satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board
Examination, and is a holder of a valid Certificate of Registration duly issued to him by the Board of Medical
Examiners (now Medical Board).
25 [31]
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2017 (1993 ed.).
26 [32]
See Fosdick v. Terry, 117 So. 2d 397, 398; Puritan Coal Corp. v. Davis, 42 S.E. 2d 807, 813.
27
Lemi v. Valencia, No. L-20768, 29 November 1968, 26 SCRA 203, 210; Ocampo v. Subido, No. L-28344, 27
[33]

August 1976, 72 SCRA 443, 452-453.

medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. [34] 28

It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right [35] of 29

every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a

fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. [36] But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
30

Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police

power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. [37] Thus, persons 31

who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific

or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as
a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation
takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In a
previous case, it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board
of Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution and certificate
authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of Licentiate in
Medicine and Surgery from the University of Barcelona, Spain, to
practice medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the
examination required by the Philippine Medical Act. [38] In another 32

case worth noting, we upheld the power of the State to upgrade the
selection of applicants into medical schools through admission
tests. [39]
33

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the

exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a
particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such
28 [34]
See Morse v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 122 S.W. 446, 448 (1909).
29 [35]
CONST. Art. XIV, Sec. 5 (3).
30 [36]
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 94961 and 96491, 25 February 1991, 194 SCRA 402, 409-410.
31 [37]
Primicias v. Fugoso, No. L-1800, 27 January 1948, 80 Phil. 71, 75.
32 [38]
Philippine Medical Association v. Board of Medical Examiners, No. L-25135, 21 September 1968, 25 SCRA 29.
33 [39]
Tablarin v. Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez, No. L-78164, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 730, 743.
privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions
may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a
condition to acquiring the license. [40] Under the view that the34

legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or

refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally
strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion
to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful
business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules
and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of
their power. [41] 35

In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided

for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the
requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope
and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the
issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has
been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it
must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and
requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority.
Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is
distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if
denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid
requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the
courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals
34 [40]
See Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Commission, 200 A. 407, 116 ALR 1093.
35
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, 30 L.Ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; City Council of Montgomery v. West, 42 So.
[41]

1000; In Re Porterfield, 168 P. 2d 706, 167 ALR 675; Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719; State v. Harris, 6
S.E. 2d 854.
should have dismissed the petition for mandamus below for being
premature. They argue that the administrative remedies had not
been exhausted. The records show that this is not the first time that
petitioners have sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530.
This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which petition we
referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 34506. On motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No.
34506, the appellate court denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial
court and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 were
inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the petitioners sought to
nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
34506 insofar as it did not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-
66530. In our consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R.
Nos. 117817 & 118437, this Court speaking through Justice
Bellosillo opined that:
Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred
in not ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530
sought to be resolved in the instant petition has been
rendered meaningless by an event taking place prior to the
filing of this petition and denial thereof should follow as a
logical consequence. [42] There is no longer any justiciable
36

controversy so that any declaration thereon would be of no

practical use or value. [43] It should be recalled that in its
37

decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court granted the writ

of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which
decision was received by petitioners on 20 December 1994.
Three (3) days after, or on 23 December 1994, petitioners
filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy available to them
was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which they
in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994. 38

36 [42]
Citing Bautista v. Board of Energy, G.R. No. 75016, 13 January 1989, 169 SCRA 167.
37 [43]
Citing Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 108033 , 14 April 1997, 271 SCRA 204, 208.
38 [44]
Rollo, pp. 340-341.
 [44]

The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse

the aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies in the instant case advance
their cause any.
Section 26 [45] of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the
39

administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can

avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine,
namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b)
should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on
appeal to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still be
unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the case to
court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule,
mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still
available. [46] However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
40

remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure question of

law is raised. [47] On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid
41

at the door of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it

refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera,
Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T.
Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A.
Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero,
Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes,
Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa,
Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-
Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B.

39
SEC. 26. Appeal from judgment. – The decision of the Board of Medical Examiners (now Medical Board) shall
[45]

automatically become final thirty days after the date of its promulgation unless the respondent, during the same
period, has appealed to the Commissioner of the Civil Service (now Professional Regulation Commission) and
later to the Office of the President of the Philippines. If the final decision is not satisfactory, the respondent may
ask for a review of the case, or may file in court a petition for certiorari.
40
Ang Tuan Kai & Co. v. Import Control Commission, No. L-4427, 21 April 1952, 91 Phil. 143, 145; Peralta v.
[46]

Salcedo, etc., No. L-10771, 30 April 1957, 101 Phil. 452, 454.
41 [47]
See Madrigal v. Lecaroz, G.R. No. 46218, 23 October 1990, 191 SCRA 20, 26.
Sanchez, Maria Rosario Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M.
Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla,
Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-
Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the Court
of Appeals during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that
they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and
moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A similar
manifestation and motion were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean
I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A.
Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G.
Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R.
Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D.
Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ.
Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A.
Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita.
Following these manifestations and motions, the appellate court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that its ruling would not apply to
them. Thus, inasmuch as the instant case is a petition for review of
the appellate court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a decision
which is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will
similarly not apply to them.
As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan,
Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo,
Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D.
Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M.
Cruz and Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply
pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
dropping their names from the suit.
Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining
respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro,
Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S.
Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V.
Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta.
Ana, as well as the petitioners.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
(1) the assailed decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment
dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering petitioners to
administer the physician’s oath to herein respondents as well as the
resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate court, denying
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No.
93-66530, and affirSmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.
37283 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., no part.
Austria-Martinez, J., no part - on leave.

JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, EMMANUEL BALANE AND CELSO
PAGAPOLA-AN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In the hope of attaining a better future, many Filipinos succumb
to the lure of opportunities in distant shores. Not all, however, are
able to realize their dreams. A number of them return with neither
money nor glory. For these unlucky souls, they take home with
them twice the misery which they yearned to elude in the first place.
When the dream is gone, there is nothing left but a bitter pill to
swallow.
 Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court of the decision [1] dated June 25, 1999 of the Court of
42

Appeals, which denied the petition for certiorari of the decision

dated January 30, 1996 of the National Labor Relations
Commission filed by herein petitioner JMM Promotions and
Management, Inc.
This petition is an offshoot of an illegal dismissal case filed by
private respondents Emmanuel Balane (Balane) and Celso
Pagapola-an (Pagapola-an) in the POEA seeking justice for the
plight they suffered as overseas entertainers. Private respondents
charged petitioner with causing injury to their rights.
The facts of this case follow.
In March 1993, Sam Jin Entertainment Co. Ltd. (Sam Jin),
through its agency, petitioner JMM Promotions and Management,
Inc., hired private respondents and Theresa Domatican
(Domatican) as entertainers for deployment in Korea. The three
entertainers, as a musical band, assumed the name “Fix Trio.”
Balane played the keyboard while Pagapola-an handled the guitar.
Domatican was the band’s original vocalist.
The employment contract provided that private respondents
were to receive a monthly salary of four hundred thousand won
(W400,000) plus a round trip fare for a one-year contract.
The band was set to leave on March 26, 1993. However, a day
before the band’s departure, on March 25, 1993, petitioner
assigned Bernadette Flores (Flores) instead of Domatican to
perform with the band in Korea.
Private respondents, together with Flores, performed as a group
for about four months in Seoul, South Korea. Their stint, however,
was short-lived because of poor performance. Private respondents
laid the blame on Flores’ lack of singing talent. Sam Jin thereafter

42
advised private respondents to return to the Philippines. Flores
stayed behind.
On July 23, 1993, private respondents were repatriated to the
Philippines. Before their departure from Korea, private respondents
signed a statement dated July 21, 1993, [2] prepared by their
43

employer, which expressed their agreement to go back home due

to some difficulties in their contractual undertaking and another
statement dated July 22, 1993, [3] which contained their promise to
44

refund petitioner the sum of one hundred forty thousand won

(W140,000) representing the balance of their processing fee.
Private respondents, after arrival in the Philippines, filed with the
POEA an illegal dismissal case and money claim for the unfinished
employment contract against petitioner and Sam Jin. They claimed
that petitioner was mainly responsible for their aborted stint as a
band in Seoul, Korea. The last-minute replacement of Domatican
with Flores, a singer of allegedly questionable talent, resulted in the
band’s poor performance. This, in turn, led to the premature
termination of the band’s contract.
Petitioner denied any liability or responsibility for the untimely
termination of private respondents’ employment contract. It mainly
anchored its defense to the statements dated July 21, 1993 and
July 22, 1993, signed by private respondents, arguing that the latter
voluntarily expressed their desire to go back to the Philippines.
The POEA ruled in favor of private respondents, ordering
petitioner and Sam Jin to jointly and severally pay private
respondents the amount of US$1,049.98 each, representing the
compensation for the unfinished portion of the employment
contract, [4] based on the following:
45

43

44

45
 “After a judicious appraisal of the attendant facts and
evaluation of the evidence on record, we find that what
actually transpired in this case was an unsuccessful and a
losing entertainment business venture on account of the
entertainers’ failure to put up a good show or performance
before the customers and clients of the club owners.
Complainants blamed the respondents for this fiasco by
attributing the cause thereof to the inability of the singer to
render her part of the trio as she was not a singer nor had she
undergone testing or audition before her engagement as
such. What was originally contracted for was the real
singer/talent and member of the contracted trio, Theresa
Domatican. These facts have not been contradicted or
explained by the respondents except the allegation that
complainants were having difficulty in their employment,
hence they signed a rescission agreement.
“Respondents’ Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’, the statements
executed by complainants, were however disputed by the
latter, claiming that they were forced under the circumstances
to sign the same. They were put in a situation where they can
not (sic) longer perform effectively because of a singer who
cannot sing. If they do not perform, they will not be paid.
Thus they were sent home by their employer and as a pre
requisite for their repatriation, they were made to sign the
aforementioned statements citing difficulty in their
employment as cause of their discharge. Complainants were
definitely pushed against the wall and had no other recourse
but to comply with their employer’s orders in order to be
repatriated.
“It is also worthy to note that one of the complainants,
Emmanuel Balane, corroborated their stance by executing a
statement in the presence of our Consul at the Philippine
Embassy in Seoul, Korea. This statement is further supported
by the Statement dated July 22, 1993 (Annex ‘B’, Joint
 Affidavit of Complainants) which was signed by Kang Ho
Suck, Cho Jin Young and Shin Bok Hu.” [5]46

The NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA on appeal, holding

that the findings of the POEA were supported by substantial
evidence.
Twice thwarted but still unyielding, petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the NLRC decision.
Petitioner’s hope of vindication in the Court of Appeals failed as
the latter found no reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC. The
Court of Appeals attributed fault to the petitioner for the band’s poor
performance abroad when it replaced the band’s original vocalist
Domatican with Flores at the “eleventh hour.” Thus, it held:
“The effect of petitioner’s fault should not be used as the
excuse to terminate its contract of employment with private
respondents.” [6]
47

Aggrieved by the ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioner now

comes before us with the following –
“GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
a - The law is clear that an aggrieved party, before the
appellate body may consider such as the findings of facts,
been able to substantiate the matter arrived at by
preponderance of evidence.
b - That public respondent cannot shied (sic) away from the
mandated rule in the appreciation of evidence; the
proceedings before the inferior quasi-judicial bodies is one of
mere submission of affidavits whereon no open testimony is

46

47
 taken to cross-examine the witnesses; uprightness of the
findings is, therefore, questionable and subject to review.” [7]
48

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously

sustained the findings of fact of the NLRC. Private respondents
could not have performed with Flores for four months in Korea if
they did not initially do well as a band. Fights within and among
themselves, therefore, caused their misfortunes.
Petitioner disputes the observation of the Court of Appeals that
private respondents were intimidated into signing the quitclaim and
request for repatriation. They were paid their salaries and they
even committed to pay petitioner the amount of W140,000 as
reimbursement for expenses incurred in their deployment to Seoul,
Korea.
Petitioner also avers that the execution of statements critical of
petitioner before the Philippine Consul in Seoul was not reflected in
the records. There being no evidence thereof, private respondents’
stories were bereft of factual basis. Furthermore, the identity of the
Koreans who allegedly signed and backed up private respondents’
statements was neither ascertained nor proved.
Petitioner asserts that the quitclaims executed by private
respondents on July 21, 1993 and July 22, 1993 were valid and
binding. The existence of fraud, mistake or duress in their
execution has not been established. Thus, documents attesting
that a compromise agreement has been reached between the
parties remain valid in the absence of any proof to the contrary.
On the other hand, due to alleged financial difficulties, [8] private
49

respondent Balane filed his comment through a mere attorney-in-

fact and contended that the petition for review is merely a dilatory
tactic employed by petitioner. [9]
50

48

49

50
 Petitioner’s arguments border on despair.
As an overture, clear and unmistakable is the rule that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Just as well entrenched is the
doctrine that pure issues of fact may not be the proper subject of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as
this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. [10] We
51

therefore take this opportunity again to reiterate that only questions

of law, not questions of fact, may be raised before the Supreme
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
petitioners in the lower courts and analyze, assess and weigh them
to ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate court were correct
in their appreciation of the evidence. [11]
52

We note that petitioner’s arguments are based on factual and

evidentiary matters which the Supreme Court does not inquire into
in an appeal on certiorari. [12] The issues propounded by petitioner
53

involve only questions of fact previously raised and satisfactorily

ruled upon by the courts a quo.
The POEA and the NLRC were one with respect to the finding
that private respondents were illegally dismissed. Petitioner’s
obstinacy proved futile as the Court of Appeals was likewise in
agreement with the labor courts. “Findings of fact by administrative
agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction.” [13] Moreover, it is a time-
54

honoured rule that “the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the Supreme Court
– and they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals

51

52

53

54
affirms the factual findings of the trial court.” [14] Any exception to
55

these principles, as set forth in the case of Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola

Bottling Co. [15] must be clearly and convincingly proven. Petitioner,
56

however, failed to prove that this case falls within the exception.
Nonetheless, we find it necessary to discuss the issue of validity
of the quitclaims. In the instant case, private respondents claim
that they were merely compelled to sign the releases in favor of
their employer. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that private
respondents entered into the compromise agreement freely and
voluntarily and should not, at this late stage, be permitted to
renounce their signed commitments.
No reasonable argument, however, can possibly sustain
petitioner’s position. Although quitclaims have long been accepted
in this jurisdiction, when the voluntariness of the execution of the
quitclaim or release is squarely at issue, then the employee’s claim
may still be given due course. [16] The law looks with disfavor on
57

quitclaims and releases by employees who have been inveigled or

pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to
evade their legal responsibilities. [17]
58

We are not ready to deviate from this rule for the reason that the
courts a quo have sufficient factual basis in ruling that private
respondents were merely pressured to sign the
quitclaims/compromise agreements. The fact that private
respondents signed the subject statements releasing petitioner and
Sam Jin from any liability and assenting to a refund of the amount
allegedly representing the expenses incurred by petitioner, without
any objection, does not automatically mean the absence of duress,
considering the pathetic circumstances private respondents were
in. We find it incredible that, after all the expense and the trouble
55

56

57

58
they went through in seeking greener pastures abroad, private
respondents would suddenly and without reason decide to return
home and face, as jobless people, a staggering debt of W140,000.
The private respondents had no choice but to sign. They were
stranded in a foreign land with no work and no income, and with
their employer threatening not to give them their return tickets to
Manila if they refused to sign.
Thus, we have time and again held that quitclaims, waivers
and/or complete releases executed by the employees do not stop
them from pursuing their claims arising from unfair labor practice - if
there is a showing of undue pressure or duress. The basic reason
for this is that such quitclaims, waivers and/or complete releases,
being figuratively exacted through the barrel of a gun, are against
public policy and therefore null and void ab initio. Accordingly,
private respondents’ signatures in the subject waivers or quitclaims
never foreclosed their right to pursue a case for illegal dismissal
and money claim. Employer and employee were not on equal
footing. [18] As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, private
59

respondents’ backs were to the wall. Had they been in a position to

object, private respondents would not have agreed to reimburse
petitioner the amount of W140,000 as no person in his right mind,
specially if he is in dire financial straights, would agree to such an
undertaking. Private respondents went abroad precisely to escape
poverty. Obviously it was out of desperation and helplessness that
private respondents agreed to affix their signatures on the subject
waivers. They are therefore deemed not to have waived any of
their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.” [19]
60

This Court sees no compelling reason to reverse the findings of

the POEA, the NLRC and respondent Court of Appeals for lack of

59

60
any showing of error, mistake or misappreciation of facts. [20] This
61

assailed decisions are in harmony with the law and the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

PLDT vs. NTC [G.R. No. 88404.  October 18, 1990.]

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 6 concurring
Facts: On 22 June 1958, RA 2090, was enacted (An Act
Granting Felix Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a
Franchise to Establish Radio Stations for Domestic and
Transoceanic Telecommunications). Felix Alberto & Co.,
Inc. (FACI) was the original corporate name, which was
changed to ETCI with the amendment of the Articles of
Incorporation in 1964. On 13 May 1987, alleging urgent
public need, ETCI filed an application with NTC (NTC Case
87-89) for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, install,
establish, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile
Telephone System and an Alpha Numeric Paging System in
Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with a
prayer for provisional authority to operate Phase A of its
proposal within Metro Manila.  PLDT filed an Opposition
with a Motion to Dismiss, based primarily on the grounds
that (1) ETCI is not capacitated or qualified under its
legislative franchise to operate a systemwide telephone or
network of telephone service such as the one proposed in
its application; (2) ETCI lacks the facilities needed and
indispensable to the successful operation of the proposed
cellular mobile telephone system; (3) PLDT has itself a
pending application with NTC (Case 86-86) to install and
operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System for domestic
61
and international service not only in Manila but also in the
provinces and that under the “prior operator” or
“protection of investment” doctrine, PLDT has the priority
or preference in the operation of such service; and (4) the
provisional authority, if granted, will result in needless,
uneconomical and harmful duplication, among others. In
an Order, dated 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDT’s
Opposition and declared that RA 2090 should be liberally
construed as to include among the services under said
franchise the operation of a cellular mobile telephone
service. After evaluating the reconsideration sought by
PLDT, the NTC, in October 1988, maintained its ruling that
liberally construed, and that ETCI’s franchise carries with it
the privilege to operate and maintain a cellular mobile
telephone service.
On 12 December 1988, NTC issued an order opining that
“public interest, convenience and necessity further demand
a second cellular mobile telephone service provider and
finds prima facie evidence showing ETCI’s legal, financial
and technical capabilities to provide a cellular mobile
service using the AMPS system,” NTC granted ETCI
provisional authority to install, operate and maintain a
cellular mobile telephone system initially in Metro Manila,
Phase A only, subject to the terms and conditions set forth
in the same Order. One of the conditions prescribed
(Condition 5) was that, within ninety (90) days from date
of the acceptance by ETCI of the terms and conditions of
the provisional authority, ETCI and PLDT “shall enter into
an interconnection agreement for the provision of
adequate interconnection facilities between applicant’s
cellular mobile telephone switch and the public switched
telephone network and shall jointly submit such
interconnection agreement to the Commission for
approval.” In a “Motion to Set Aside the Order” granting
provisional authority, PLDT alleged essentially that the
interconnection ordered was in violation of due process
and that the grant of provisional authority was
jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm. On 8 May 1989,
NTC issued an order denying reconsideration and set the
date for continuation of the hearings on the main
proceedings.  PLDT challenged the NTC orders of 12
December 1988 and 8 May 1989 before the Supreme
Court.
On 15 June 1989, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition for its failure to comply fully with the requirements
of Circular 188. Upon satisfactory showing, however, that
there was such compliance, the Court reconsidered the
order and reinstated the petition. On 27 February 1990,
the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, upon
PLDT’s urgent manifestation, enjoining NTC to “Cease and
Desist from all or any of its on-going proceedings and ETCI
from continuing any and all acts intended or related to or
which will amount to the implementation/execution of its
provisional authority.” PLDT was required by the Court to
post a bond of P5 million. PLDT complied.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit
and lifted the Temporary Restraining Order issued. The
bond issued as a condition for the issuance of said
restraining Order is declared forfeited in favor of Express
Telecommunications Co., Inc.; with cost against PLDT.

1.    Abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction only

issue in a special civil action for Certiorari and
Prohibition
Being a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition,
the Court only need determine if NTC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting provisional
authority to ETCI under the NTC questioned Orders of 12
December 1988 and 8 May 1989.
2.    NTC has jurisdiction
NTC is the regulatory agency of the national government
with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities. It is
legally clothed with authority and given ample discretion to
grant a provisional permit or authority. In fact, NTC may,
on its own initiative, grant such relief even in the absence
of a motion from an applicant.
3.    Section 3 (Provisional Remedy), Rule 15, Rule of
Practice and Procedure before the Board of
Communications (now NTC)
“Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or
at any stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of
the pleaders or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for,
based on the pleading, together with the affidavits and
supporting documents attached thereto, without prejudice
to a final decision after completion of the hearing which
shall be called within 30 days from grant of authority
asked for.”
4.    Provisionary authority properly granted
The provisional authority granted by the NTC has a definite
expiry period of 18 months unless sooner renewed, and
which may be revoked, amended or revised by the NTC;
and covers one of four phases. It is also limited to Metro
Manila only. The installation and operation of an alpha
numeric paging system was not authorized. The main
proceedings are clearly to continue as stated in the NTC
Order of 8 May 1989. Further, the provisional authority
was issued after due hearing, reception of evidence and
evaluation thereof, with the hearings attended by various
oppositors, including PLDT. It was granted only after a
prima facie showing that ETCI had the necessary legal,
financial and technical capabilities and that public interest,
convenience and necessity so demanded.
5.    Provisional authority meaningless if grantee is
not allowed to operate
Provisional authority would be meaningless if the grantee
were not allowed to operate. Its lifetime is limited and may
be revoked by the NTC at any time in accordance with law.
The initial expenditure of P130M more or less, is rendered
necessary even under a provisional authority to enable
ETCI to prove its capability.
6.    Differences exist between a Provisional
Authority and a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity
Basic differences exist between a provisional authority and
a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN).
If what had been granted were a CPCN, it would constitute
a final order or award reviewable only by ordinary appeal
to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 9(3) of BP 129,
and not by Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
7.    The Coverage of ETCI’s Franchise (RA 2090)
RA 2090 grants ETCI (formerly FACI) “the right and
privilege of constructing, installing, establishing and
operating in the entire Philippines radio stations for
reception and transmission of messages on radio stations
in the foreign and domestic public fixed point-to-point and
public base, aeronautical and land mobile stations, . . .
with the corresponding relay stations for the reception and
transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy
and/or radiotelephony . . . . ”
8.    Radiotelephony defined
As defined by the New International Webster Dictionary
the term “radiotelephony” is defined as a telephony carried
on by aid of radiowaves without connecting wires. The
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) defines a
“radiotelephone call” as a “telephone call, originating in or
intended on all or part of its route over the radio
communications channels of the mobile service or of the
mobile satellite service.”
9.    Radiotelephony construed liberally to include
cellular mobile telephone system (CMTS)
In its Order of 12 November 1987, the NTC construed the
technical term “radiotelephony” liberally as to include the
operation of a cellular mobile telephone system. While
under Republic Act 2090 a system-wide telephone or
network of telephone service by means of connecting wires
may not have been contemplated, it can be construed
liberally that the operation of a cellular mobile telephone
service which carries messages, either voice or record,
with the aid of radiowaves or a part of its route carried
over radio communication channels, is one included among
the services under said franchise for which a certificate of
public convenience and necessity may be applied for.
10.    Construction given by administrative agency
given great weight and respect
The construction given by an administrative agency
possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise
and experience and deserves great weight and respect. It
can only be set aside by judicial intervention on proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
11.    Factual issues not subject of a special civil
action for certiorari
Whether or not ETCI (previously FACI), in contravention of
its franchise, started the first of its radio
telecommunication stations within 2 years from the grant
of its franchise and completed the construction within 10
years from said date; and whether or not its franchise had
remained unused from the time of its issuance, are
questions of fact beyond the province of this Court,
besides the well-settled procedural consideration that
factual issues are not subjects of a special civil action for
Certiorari. Moreover, neither Section 4, RA 2090 nor PD 36
should be construed as self-executing in working a
forfeiture. Franchise holders should be given an
opportunity to be heard, particularly so, where ETCI does
not admit any breach, in consonance with the rudiments of
fair play.
12.    Legislative franchise cannot be collaterally
attacked; cannot be revoked without due process of
law
PLDT’s allegation – that the ETCI franchise had lapsed into
non-existence for failure of the franchise holder to begin
and complete construction of the radio system authorized
under the franchise and that PD 36 (2 November 1972)
which legislates the mandatory cancellation or invalidation
of all franchises for the operation of communications
services, which have not been availed of or used by the
party or parties in whose name they were issued –
partakes of a collateral attack on a franchise (RA 2090),
which is not allowed. A franchise is a property right and
cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law.
13.    Forfeiture by non-user proper subject of
prerogative writ of quo warranto; Right to assert
belongs to the State
The determination of the right to the exercise of a
franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has
been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of
the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert
which, as a rule, belongs to the State “upon complaint or
otherwise” the reason being that the abuse of a franchise
is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a
franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for
the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is
granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a
concern of Government.
14.    Section 10 of RA 2090
“The grantee shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct
of, sell or assign this franchise nor the rights and privileges
acquired thereunder to any person, firm, company,
corporation or other commercial or legal entity nor merge
with any other person, company or corporation organized
for the same purpose, without the approval of the
Congress of the Philippines first had. . . . . ” The foregoing
provision is directed to the “grantee” of the franchise,
which is the corporation itself and refers to a sale, lease,
or assignment of that franchise. It does not include the
transfer or sale of shares of stock of a corporation by the
latter’s stockholders.
15.    Section 20 (h) of CA 146, as amended by CA
454; Acts requiring the approval of the Commission
Subject to established limitations and exceptions and
saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for
any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator
thereof, without the approval and authorization of the
Commission previously had  xxx xxx xxx (h) To sell or
register in its books the transfer or sale of shares of its
capital stock, if the result of that sale in itself or in
connection with another previous sale, shall be to vest in
the transferee more than forty per centum of the
subscribed capital of said public service. Any transfer made
in violation of this provision shall be void and of no effect
and shall not be registered in the books of the public
service corporation. Nothing herein contained shall be
construed to prevent the holding of shares lawfully
acquired.
16.    Sales of shares of stock of a public utility
governed by Section 20h of the Public Service Act
(CA 146)
The sale of shares of stock of a public utility is governed by
another law, i.e., Section 20(h) of the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act 146). Pursuant thereto, the Public
Service Commission (now the NTC) is the government
agency vested with the authority to approve the transfer of
more than 40% of the subscribed capital stock of a
telecommunications company to a single transferee.
Transfers of shares of a public utility corporation need only
NTC approval, not Congressional authorization.
17.    Grant of provisional authority deemed approval
of series of transfers of shares in ETCI
The approval of the NTC may be deemed to have been met
when it authorized the issuance of the provisional authority
to ETCI. There was full disclosure before the NTC of the
transfers that transpired starting in 1964 until 1987. In
fact, the NTC Order of 12 November 1987 required ETCI to
submit its “present capital and ownership structure.”
Further, ETCI even filed a Motion before the NTC, dated 8
December 1987, or more than a year prior to the grant of
provisional authority, seeking approval of the increase in
its capital stock from P960,000.00 to P40M, and the stock
transfers made by its stockholders.
18.    Distinction between shares of stock and sale of
franchise itself; Corporation has separate and
distinct personality from its stockholders
A distinction should be made between shares of stock,
which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which
requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which
is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the
sale or transfer of which requires Congressional sanction.
Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may
dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not,
however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation,
like its franchise. In other words, even if the original
stockholders had transferred their shares to another group
of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation
subsists as long as the corporation, as an entity, continues
to exist. The franchise is not thereby invalidated by the
transfer of the shares. A corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has
the right of continuity or perpetual succession.
19.    PLDT cannot justifiably refuse to interconnect,
pursuant to RA 6849
RA 6849, or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989,
approved on 8 February 1990, mandates interconnection
providing as it does that “all domestic telecommunications
carriers or utilities . . . shall be interconnected to the public
switch telephone network.” Such regulation of the use and
ownership of telecommunications systems is in the
exercise of the plenary police power of the State for the
promotion of the general welfare.
20.    Constitutional mandate as to the use of
property (Section 6, Article XII)
Section 6, Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution provides
that “the use of property bears a social function, and all
economic agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations,
cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall
have the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common
good so demands.”
21.    NTC merely exercised delegated authority
when it decreed interconnection
The interconnection which has been required of PLDT is a
form of “intervention” with property rights dictated by “the
objective of government to promote the rapid expansion of
telecommunications services in all areas of the
Philippines, . . . to maximize the use of
telecommunications facilities available, . . . in recognition
of the vital role of communications in nation building . . .
and to ensure that all users of the public
telecommunications service have access to all other users
of the service wherever they may be within the Philippines
at an acceptable standard of service and at reasonable
cost” (DOTC Circular 90-248). Undoubtedly, the
encompassing objective is the common good. The NTC, as
the regulatory agency of the State, merely exercised its
delegated authority to regulate the use of
telecommunications networks when it decreed
interconnection.
22.    Interconnection; Sections 1 and 5 of Ministry
Circular 82-81 (6 December 1982)
Section 1 of  Ministry Circular 82-81 provides “that the
government encourages the provision and operation of
public mobile telephone service within local sub-base
stations, particularly, in the highly commercialized areas.”
Section 5 on the other hand provides “that, in the event
the authority to operate said service be granted to other
applicants, other than the franchise holder, the franchise
operator shall be under obligation to enter into an
agreement with the domestic telephone network, under an
interconnection agreement.”
23.    Interconnection; DOTC Circular 87-188 (1987)
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
Circular No. 87-188, issued in 1987, also decrees that “all
public communications carriers shall interconnect their
facilities pursuant to comparatively efficient
interconnection (CEI) as defined by the NTC in the interest
of economic efficiency.”
24.    DOTC Circular 90-248 (14 June 1990); Policy
on Interconnection and Revenue Sharing by Public
Communications Carriers
The sharing of revenue was an additional feature
considered in DOTC Circular 90-248. The circular provides
that “It is the objective of government to promote the
rapid expansion of telecommunications services in all areas
of the Philippines. There is s need to maximize the use of
telecommunications facilities available and encourage
investment in telecommunications infrastructure by
suitably qualified service providers. In recognition of the
vital role of communications in nation building, there is a
need to ensure that all users of the public
telecommunications service have access to all other users
of the service wherever they may be within the Philippines
at an acceptable standard of service and at reasonable
cost. Thus, all facilities offering public telecommunication
services shall be interconnected into the nationwide
telecommunications network/s; the interconnection of
networks shall be effected in a fair and non-discriminatory
manner and within the shortest timeframe practicable; and
the precise points of interface between service operators
shall be as defined by the NTC; and the apportionment of
costs and division of revenues resulting from
interconnection of telecommunications networks shall be
as approved and/or prescribed by the NTC.”
25.    Other interconnection-related circulars: DOTC
Circular 7-13-90 (12 July 1990)
The NTC, on 12 July 1990, issued Memorandum Circular 7-
13-90 prescribing the “Rules and Regulations Governing
the Interconnection of Local Telephone Exchanges and
Public Calling Offices with the Nationwide
Telecommunications Network/s, the Sharing of Revenue
Derived Therefrom, and for Other Purposes.”
26.    Interconnection allows parties to discuss and
agree terms; Negotiations provides right to be heard
The NTC order to interconnect allows the parties
themselves to discuss and agree upon the specific terms
and conditions of the interconnection agreement instead of
the NTC itself laying down the standards of interconnection
which it can very well impose. Thus it is that PLDT cannot
justifiably claim denial of due process. It has been heard.
It will continue to be heard in the main proceedings. It will
surely be heard in the negotiations concerning the
interconnection agreement.
27.    Purpose of interconnection
What interconnection seeks to accomplish is to enable the
system to reach out to the greatest number of people
possible in line with governmental policies laid down.
Cellular phones can access PLDT units and vice versa in as
wide an area as attainable. With the broader reach, public
interest and convenience will be better served. The
interconnection sought by ETCI is by no means a “parasitic
dependence” on PLDT. The ETCI system can operate on its
own even without interconnection, but it will be limited to
its own subscribers. To be sure, ETCI could provide no
mean competition, and eat into PLDT’s own toll revenue,
but all for the eventual benefit of all that the system can
reach.
28.    Ultimate Considerations to which public
utilities must yield
The decisive considerations are public need, public
interest, and the common good. Those were the overriding
factors which motivated NTC in granting provisional
authority to ETCI. Article II, Section 24 of the 1987
Constitution, recognizes the vital role of communication
and information in nation building. It is likewise a State
policy to provide the environment for the emergence of
communications structures suitable to the balanced flow of
information into, out of, and across the country (Article
XVI, Section 10, ibid.). A modern and dependable
communications network rendering efficient and
reasonably priced services is also indispensable for
accelerated economic recovery and development. To these
public and national interests, public utility companies must
bow and yield.
29.    Free competition in industry answer to
improvement in telecommunication industry; No
public utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly
position
Free competition in the industry may also provide the
answer to a much-desired improvement in the quality and
delivery of this type of public utility, to improved
technology, fast and handy mobile service, and reduced
user dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other
public utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly
position in view of the Constitutional proscription that no
franchise certificate or authorization shall be exclusive in
character or shall last longer than 50 years (ibid., Section
11; Article XIV, Section 5, 1973 Constitution; Article XIV,
Section 8, 1935 Constitution). Additionally, the State is
empowered to decide whether public interest demands
that monopolies be regulated or prohibited (1987
Constitution, Article XII, Section 19).
the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial
or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and that the
"petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest
in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought."
Issue: WON the petitioners have legal standing to challenge a contract
entered into by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office with a foreign corporation for the operation of a
nationwide lottery
Ruling:YE S
Rationale:
The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should,
indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may,
in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in
view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases,29 this Court brushed aside
this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-
2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had
declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to
whether or not it should be entertained,"30 or that it "enjoys an
open discretion to entertain the same or not."31
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were
allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this
Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts,
decisions, rulings, or orders of various government
agencies or instrumentalities. Among such cases were those
assailing the constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836
insofar as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick leave to Senators and Representatives
and to elective officials of both Houses of Congress;38 (b)
Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on 25 July 1987, which allowed members of the cabinet,
their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions;39 (c) the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the General
Appropriations Act;40 (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of
desynchronized elections;41 (d) R.A. No. 1869 (the charter
of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the
ground that it is contrary to morals, public policy, and
order;42 and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National
Police.43
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P.,
ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P.,
ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P.,
OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P.,
CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO
L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M.
MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V.
GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE
BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 
FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as
the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of
this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan
Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties
with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines,
and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the
outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in
this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE
OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW
BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF
PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177
IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS
TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR
WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE
TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177
ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE
SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE
PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO
AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
TO THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER
OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET
MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution
dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for the public
respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were
allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there
being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination.
He further contended that the provision under consideration was
enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one
branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a
Reply to the Comment. This, they did, stating, among others, that
as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to
hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until
developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their
respective stands." 3
Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The
Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting
forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII
of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25,
1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and
academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as
basis for the petition's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and
Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 68379-81, September 22, 1986,
We stated that:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the
disappearance of the office in dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondents — both of whom
have gone their separate ways — could be a convenient
justification for dismissing the case. But there are larger
 issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for
all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised.
The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in
effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext
that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal
questions but also the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give
him justice. The two are not always the same. There are
times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue
has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when
although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of
and as a restraint upon the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well
as to avoid great disservice to national interest that We take
cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents'
motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new
Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the plebiscite held on
February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while
Congress has not officially reconvened, We see no cogent reason
for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant
consideration. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et
al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi.
Thus:
 Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the
prevailing view in the United States is stated in the
American Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest
essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule
is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761,
Emphasis supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v.
Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards taxpayers' suits,
this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which
 are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration
reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the
Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis
ions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another
was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However,
to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and
those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in
the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the
enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose
of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e.
transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and
such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another
item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional
body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends
the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same
are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does
not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money
belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even
greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This,
evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the
constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in
Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence,
the conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec.
18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose
[Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item
to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec.
16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall
abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section
44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed
by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the
President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the
enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled
executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary
performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling
party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of
development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5
The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section
44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition
will not lie from one branch of the government against a coordinate
branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere
of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments
of the government, of equal dignity; each is alike supreme
in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly
or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority,
be subjected to the control or supervision of the other,
without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of
power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it.
The Constitution apportions the powers of government,
but it does not make any one of the three departments
subordinate to another, when exercising the trust
committed to it. The courts may declare legislative
enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but
not because the judicial power is superior in degree or
dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what
the law is in the cases which come before them, they must
enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever
a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the
courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but
to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find
that the legislature has failed to keep within its
constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its
action; and in doing so, they only do what every private
citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts
when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments
or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high
authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are
 only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the
legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have
any control over the legislative power, but because the act
is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of
the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that
of their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v.
Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5
Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1
L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting
within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to
interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the
duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and
which power this Court has exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a
provision of law which We have earlier mentioned to be
constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot
therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not acting
within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the
economic destitution brought about by the plundering of the
Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision
which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad
experience cannot remain written in our statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null
and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDER RED.
G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989
MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ASSET PRIVATIZATION
TRUST, MAKATI AGRO-TRADING, INC., and LA FILIPINA UY
GONGCO. CORP., respondents.
Antonio F. Navarrette and Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioner.
J.N. Borrillo, Jr. Law Offices Co-counsel for petitioner.
Alejandro Z. Barin and Balgos & Perez for Makati Agro-Trading,
Inc. and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corp.
Ramon T. Garcia and Fiorello E. Azura for respondent Asset
Privatization Trust.
 
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
In this petition for review, Mantruste Systems, Inc. (or MSI seeks
the annulment of the decision dated September 29, 1988 and the
resolution dated January 4, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in the
consolidated cases of "Makati Agro-Trading, Inc., et al. vs. Judge
Job Madayag, et al." (CA-G.R. SP No. 13929) and "Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al." (CA-G.R. SP No.
14535) which set aside the writ of preliminary injunction that was
issued on December 19, 1987 by Judge Madayag in Civil Case No.
18319 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("Mantruste Systems,
Inc. vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, Asset Privatization
Trust, Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina Uy Gongco
Corporation"). Judge Madayag enjoined the defendants in. that
case from doing the acts stated in its temporary restraining order of
November 13, 1987, namely:
... from approving the winning bid and awarding the
BAYVIEW property, subject matter of this case, in favor of
the winning bidders, the herein defendants, Makati Agro-
Trading, Inc. and La Filipina Uy-Gongco Corporation;
enjoining the Defendants DBP and APT from taking
physical possession of the BAYVIEW property, or ejecting
the plaintiff and its concessionaires, representatives and
agents, from the leased premises;
from terminating the Contract of Lease (Annex N); and
from disturbing and obstructing the plaintiff, through the
defendants' designated security guards, in the pursuit of
its business in the leased premises, until further orders
from this Court. (p. 18, Rollo.)
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
... Herein private respondent Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI)
entered into an 4 "interim lease agreement" dated August
26, 1986 with Page 139 the Development Bank of the
Philippines — owner of the Bayview Plaza Hotel —
wherein the former would operate the hotel for "a minimum
of three months or until such time that the said properties
are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP."
On December 8, 1986 the President issued Proclamation
No. 50 entitled "Launching a Program for the Expeditious
Disposition or Privatization of Certain Government
Corporations and/or the (acquired) Assets thereof, and
creating a Committee on Privatization and the Asset
Privatization Trust." The Bayview Hotel properties were
among the government assets Identified for privatization
and were consequently transferred from DBP to APT for
disposition.
To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP notified
MSI that it was terminating the "interim lease agreement."
In a certificate dated September 18, 1987 signed by
Ernesto S. Salgado, President and Chairman of the Board
of herein private respondent (Annex D; Exh. 2-APT) the
latter agreed to the termination with the following terms:
1. Thirty days from today as of the signing of this
Certification, I will consider the Lease Contract
between MANTRUSTE SYSTEM, INC. and
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
terminated.
2. The Bayview Prince Hotel will be made
available for inspection at all times by other
bidders.
3. The Bayview Prince Hotel will be ready for
delivery to any new owners thirty (30) days from
signing of this Certification.
On October 7, 1987 the APT sent a letter to MSI through
Mr. Salgado granting the latter an extension of thirty days
from October 18 "within which to effect the delivery of the
Bayview Prince Hotel to APT." The extension was given to
"allow (MSI) to wind up (its) affairs and to facilitate a
smooth turn-over of the facilities to its new owners without
necessarily interrupting the hotel's regular operation." The
signature of Mr. Salgado appears on the lower left hand of
the letter under the word "CONFORME."
However, fifteen days later, or on October 22, 1987, MSI
— through its Executive Vice-President Rolando C.
Cipriano — informed APT of the following points:
xxx xxx xxx
MSI is of the opinion . . . since its lease on the
hotel properties has been for more than one year
now, its lease status has taken the character of a
long term one. As such MSI as the lessee has
acquired certain rights and privileges under law
and equity.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . it is the company's firm contention that it has
acquired a priority right to the purchase of
Bayview Hotel properties over and above other
interested parties . . . (Annex F, petition, SP-
14535).
APT's response to this demand was equally firm. It
informed MSI that APT has ". . . not found any stipulation
tending to support your claim that Mantruste System, Inc.,
as lessee, has acquired ... priority right to the purchase of
Bayview Hotel . . ." The Trust also pointed out that the
"Pre-Bidding Conference" for the sale of the hotel has
already been conducted such that for APT to favorably
consider your (MSI's) request would not be in consonance
with law, equity and fair play (Annex G, Idem)
On October 28, Salgado, speaking for MSI, wrote APT
informing the latter of the alleged "legal lien" over the hotel
to the amount of P10,000,000 (should be P12,000,000).
Moreover, he demanded that the Trust consider MSI a
"very preferred" bidder. Nevertheless, on November 4,
 1987 herein private respondent allegedly prepared to
submit its bid to the APT for P95,000,000.00 in cash or
P120,000,000 in installment terms.
On the same occasion, however, MSI asked the Trust for
clarification on the following points: (1) whether APT had a
clean title over the property; (2) whether the Trust knew
the hotel had back taxes; (3) who should pay the tax
arrears; and (4) whether MSI'S advances made in behalf
of DBP would be treated as part of the bid offer.
From there, the versions of the MSI and the Trust differed.
According to herein private respondent, because of the
questions it posed to the Trust, it was "immediately
disqualified from the public bidding." The trust alleged on
the other hand that MSI voluntarily desisted from
participating in the bidding. The property eventually was
awarded to herein petitioners Makati-Agro Trading and La
Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation which submitted a bid for
P83,000,000 (should be P85,000,000).
On November 13, 1981, herein private respondent filed a
complaint with respondent lower court — docketed as Civil
Case No. 18319 — praying among others for: (1) the
issuance of a restraining order enjoining APT from
approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview
property to private petitioners, and from ejecting MSI from
the property or from terminating the contract of lease; (2)
the award of the Bayview property in favor of MSI as the
highest bidder. On December 15, 1937, the lower court, as
already said, granted the writ of preliminary injunction. (pp.
247- 250, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals nullified the lower court's writ of preliminary
injunction for being violative of Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A
dated December 15,1986, which provides:
 No court or administrative agency shall issue any
restraining order or injunction against the Trust in
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of
assets transferred to it . . . Nor shall such order or
injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold
by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking
possession of any assets purchased by him.
The Court of Appeals rejected Judge Madayag's opinion that the
above provision of Proclamation No. 50-A is unconstitutional
because: (1) it ceased to be operative in view of the 1987
Constitution; (2) it constitutes a deprivation of property without due
process of law; and (3) it impinges upon the judicial power as
defined in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court
of Appeals held that:
(1) Proclamation No. 50-A continued to be operative after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, by virtue of Section 3, Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) providing that:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
(2) Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not deprive MSI of its
property  existent, and its belief that DBP had declared it to be the
preferred buyer of the hotel is "illusory." Its only "property right" was
its reimbursable advances allegedly amounting to P12 million (but
denied by DBP in its answer to the complaint) which, it may sue to
collect in a separate action.
(3) In view of Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A, the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction by the lower court against the APT
may not be justified as a valid exercise of power, i.e., the power to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, for does not have a legally
demandable and enforceable right of retention over the hotel. In
any case, judicial power is "not unqualified." It may be regulated
and defined by the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
and by law, and the law in this particular case (Sec. 31, Procl. No.
50-A) provides that judicial power may not be exercised in the form
of an injunction against the acts of the APT in pursuance of its
mandate.
The seven grounds of this petition for certiorari may be compressed
into the following propositions:
(1) that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
substituting its own discretion for that of the trial court on the
propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the
status quo and to protect Mantruste's contractual right to retain
possession of the Bayview Hotel until all its advances are paid; and
(2) that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that Mantruste's
property rights are non-existent except its right to the refund of its
alleged advances; (b) in not declaring unconstitutional Section 31 of
Proclamation 50-A prohibiting the issuance of an injunction against
the APT and (c) in finding that Mantruste is to blame for its failure to
participate in the bidding for the Bayview Hotel
We find no merit in the petition.
While the well-known and basic purpose of a preliminary injunction
is to preserve the status quo of the property subject of the action to
protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting the same during the
pendency of the suit (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445, 452; Lasala vs.
Fernandez, 5 SCRA 79; Rivera vs. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643), and
that generally, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower
court will not be interfered with (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225,
232), the Court of Appeals however correctly found that, under the
lease agreement between the DBP and Mantruste, the latter's claim
to a "patent contractual right to retain possession of the Bayview
Hotel until all its advances are paid" is non-existent. As the right of
retention does not exist, neither does the right to the relief
(injunction) demanded (Sec. 3, Rule 58, Rules of Court).
Furthermore, there is Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A to be
reckoned with which explicitly prohibits courts and administrative
agencies from issuing "any restraining order or injunction against
the Trust APT in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition
of assets transferred to it, nor against any purchaser of assets sold
by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of
any assets purchased by him." While the petitioner decries the
"probable injustice" that it will suffer if it is ousted from the hotel and
possession of the property is delivered to the private respondents
as the winning bidders/purchasers at the public auction sale, the
greater prejudice and injustice to the latter who, after paying P85
million to purchase the hotel have been deprived of its possession
by the illegal issuance of the writ of injunction, may not be glossed
over. On the other hand, as indicated by the Appellate Court, the
petitioner is not without adequate remedy to recover its alleged P12
million advances on behalf of the DBP to make the hotel
operational. It may sue either the DBP, or its successor-in-interest,
the APT for payment of the claim.
Mantruste's right to reimbursement for those advances (the exact
amount of which remains to be determined) may not be denied.
However, its claim to a right of retention over the hotel pending
such reimbursement, is, as was correctly found by the Court of
Appeals, "illusory" and "non-existent." A mere lessee, like
Mantruste, is not a builder in good faith, hence, the right of retention
given to a possessor in good faith under Article 546 of the Civil
Code, pending reimbursement of his advances for necessary
repairs and useful improvements on another's property is not
available to a lessee whose possession is not that of an owner.
 A lessee is not entitled to retain possession of the
premises leased until he is reimbursed for alleged
improvements thereon, for a lessee cannot pretend to act
in good faith in making improvements.
A lessee, in order to be entitled to one half the value of the
improvements introduced by him in the leased premises,
or to remove them should lessor refuse to reimburse the
half value thereof, must show that the same were
introduced in good faith; are useful; suitable to the use for
which the lease is intended without altering the form and
substance of the premises. (Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs.
Simon, 14 SCRA 855.)
Petitioner's contention that he is a builder in good faith for
which reason he may not he evicted unless he is
indemnified for the cost of his improvements on the leased
premises, has no merit. Knowing that his right to occupy
the premises was temporary, he is deemed to have built
his house at his own risk. (Lopez, Inc. vs. Phil. & Eastern
Trading Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348.)
It is a settled rule that lessees are not possessors in good
faith, because they know that their occupancy of the
premises continues only during the life of the lease, hence
they cannot, as a matter of right, recover the value of their
improvements from the lessor, much less retain the
premises until they are reimbursed therefor. (Bacaling vs.
Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA 243.)
Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any
provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power
of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution).
The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the
Freedom Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the
courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction against
the APT and the purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent
courts from interfering in the discharge, by this instrumentality of
the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out
"the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government
corporations and/or the assets thereof' (Proc. No. 50), absent any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the
Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress,
has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution).
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is
that under the system of separation of powers set up in the
Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches and
instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the
determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in
the exercise of their authority and in the performance of Page 145
their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts
may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by
an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation
of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it.
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business
of an administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's
constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts
in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that paragraph 2 of the
Contract of Lease which provides:
2. The term of the lease is a minimum of three (3) months
or until such time that said properties are sold to MSI or
other third parties by DBP (p. 1, Annex N of Annex A
hereof; Exh. I.)
does not give Mantruste preferred standing or "a right of first
refusal" as a prospective buyer of the Bayview Hotel. That provision
of the lease contract gives it only the right, equally with others, to
bid for the property.
In any event, assuming that Mantruste did have that preferred
status (for it was assured by Estela Ladrido, DBP's officer-in-charge
of the Bayview Hotel, that "all things equal (sic) DBP would be more
inclined to sell the Bayview property to MSI Mantruste lost that
preferential right by failing to participate in the bidding for the
property. Its allegation that it would have submitted a higher bid
than the winning bidders, is futile, for the fact is that it did not
submit a bid. Its excuses for failing to do so are unconvincing. The
real reason is difficult to fathom but the following statement in its
petition —
Considering that Mantruste has made capital expenditures
of more than P12 million, then this would mean an
uninterrupted, peaceful and continued possession by
Mantruste of Bayview for more than twenty (20) years in
order to complete the offsetting process. (p. 44, Petition.)
may provide a clue. Mantruste may have banked on its alleged
advance of P12 million to keep it in possession of the hotel for 20
years, without having to buy it at the APT's auction.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 22041           September 11, 1924
JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Araneta & Zaragoza for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and
injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the
Governor-General to represent the Twelfth Senatorial District. The
respondents are Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine
Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier, Alejo Mabanag,
Bernabe de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez, Emiliano T. Tirona,
Antero Soriano, Juan B. Alegre, Vicente de Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo,
Francisco Enage, Tomas Gomez, Sergio Osmeña, Celestino
Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose A. Clarin, Hadji Butu,
Espiridion Guanco, Hermenegildo Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros,
Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago Lucero, all members of the
Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar, Secretary of the Philippine
Senate; Bernabe Bustamante, Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine
Senate, and Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine Senate.
The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate
composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924,
depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of
January, 1924. The resolution reads as follows:
 Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator
for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby declared guilty
of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the
privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted
the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth
District on the occasion of the debate regarding the
credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino;
Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino
be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of his prerogatives,
privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one
year from the first of January, nineteen hundred and
twenty-four;
And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose
Alejandrino, being a Senator appointed by the Governor-
General of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be
furnished said Governor-General for his information.
The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above
quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons.
He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the
respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to
declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3)
as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of
mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to
recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as
Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner
from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order
of suspension, into effect. By special appearance, the Attorney-
General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to the
jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the
same point.
In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently
embarrass us, we desire first of all to say that looking through the
form of the action to the substance, this is, in effect, a suit instituted
by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine
Senate and certain of its official employees. May the Supreme
Court of the Philippines Islands by mandamus and injunction annul
the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine
Senate to reinstate him in his official position? Without, therefore, at
this time discussing any of the other interesting questions which
have been raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the
issue here suggested.
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students
of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our
system of government, each of the three departments is distinct
and not directly subject to the control of another department. The
power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to
abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may,
nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to
enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper
constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The
courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well
as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the
courts restrain the other departments.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to
find the general rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie
from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the
very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus
will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers,
to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their
character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and
over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate
action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has
been held that there where a member has been expelled by the
legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether
the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R. C.
L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190; French vs.
Senate [1905], 146 Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass.,
468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889],
151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto
Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17
Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A.,
582; People ex rel. Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229; People ex
rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex rel. La Chicote
vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil.,
612.)
The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are
numerous and instructive. They are found among the decisions of
our own court, of the United States Supreme Court, and of other
jurisdictions. If some of these cases relate to the chief executive
rather than to the legislature, it is only necessary to explain that the
same rules which govern the relations of the court to the chief
executive likewise govern the relations of the courts to the
legislature.
The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino
vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros
([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This was an original application made in this
court praying for a writ of mandamus to the Governor-General to
compel him to call a special election as provided by law. The
Attorney-General demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and the court, after an elaborate discussion, reached
the conclusion that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the
Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the executive
department, in the performance of any of his official acts." The
demurrer was accordingly sustained and the complaint dismissed.
It is noted that in this decision reliance was placed on the cases of
Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and
Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29 Mich., 320), which we will now
proceed to notice.
State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, supra, concerned a bill praying the United States, Supreme
Court to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General Commanding in the
District of Mississippi and Arkansas from executing certain Acts of
Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the
court said the single point which required consideration was this:
Can the President be restrained by injunction from carrying into
effect an Act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional? He
continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the
Government; the President is the Executive Department.
Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial
Department; though the acts of both, when performed,
are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen
upon consideration of its possible consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for
allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless
to observe that the court is without power to enforce its
process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with
the order of the court and refuses to execute the Acts of
Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur
between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the
Government? May not the House of Representatives
impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case
 could this court interfere in behalf of the President, thus
endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain
by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting
as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle
be offered to the public wonder of an attempt by this court
to arrest proceedings in that court?
These questions answer themselves.
xxx           xxx           xxx
We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a
bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.
It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if
the relief sought cannot be had against Andrew Johnson,
as President, it may be granted against Andrew Johnson,
as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as
against the execution of an Act of Congress by Andrew
Johnson, is relief against its execution by the President. . .
.
Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the legal
fraternity on account of being written by Judge Cooley, related to an
application for mandamus to the Governor to compel him to
perform a duty imposed upon him by statute. Judge Cooley, in part,
said:
. . . Our government is on whose powers have been
carefully apportioned between three distinct departments,
which emanate alike from the people, have their powers
alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal
dignity, and within their respective spheres of action
equally independent.
xxx           xxx           xxx
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all
respects independently of the others, and that what are
called the checks and balances of government constitute
each a restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each of these
cases the action of the department which controls,
modifies, or in any manner influences that of another, is
had strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives
no occasion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The
Legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting
within its proper province in making laws, while the courts,
in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like
manner acting within their proper province, because they
are only applying that which is law to the controversies in
which they are called upon to give judgment. It is mainly
by means of these checks and balances that the officers
of the several departments are kept within their
jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and
power is usurped or abused, the remedy is by
impeachment, and not by another department of the
government attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a
superior authority over that which by the constitution is its
equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the
Legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their
judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments
after they have been rendered. If it could, constitutional
liberty would cease to exist; and if the Legislature could in
like manner override executive action also, the
government would become only a despotism under
popular forms. On the other hand it would be readily
cancelled that no court can compel the Legislature to
make or to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn
at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though
the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the
 constitution or the laws. In these cases the exemption of
the one department from the control of the other is not
only implied in the framework of government, but is
indispensably necessary if any useful apportionment of
power is to exist.
xxx           xxx           xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the
relators that any other course than that which leaves the
head of the executive department to act independently in
the discharge of his duties might possibly lead to
unseemly conflicts, if not to something worse, should the
courts undertake to enforce their mandates and the
executive refuse to obey. . . . And while we should
concede, if jurisdiction was plainly vested in us, the
inability to enforce our judgment would be no sufficient
reason for failing to pronounce it, especially against an
officer who would be presumed ready and anxious in all
cases to render obedience to the law, yet in a case where
jurisdiction is involved in doubt it is not consistent with the
dignity of the court to pronounce judgments which may be
disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the executive to
place him in position where, in a matter within his own
province, he must act contrary to his judgment, or strand
convicted of a disregard of the laws.
We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns
specifically the right of the judiciary to control by mandamus the
action of the legislature. French vs. Senate of the State of
California, supra, was an original proceeding in mandamus brought
by the petitioners who were duly elected senators of the state to
compel the Senate of California to admit them as members thereof.
It was alleged that the petitioners had been expelled without
hearing or opportunity for defense. The writ was denied, Mr. Justice
Shaw delivering the opinion of the court, saying:
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force
in favor of the pleader, they do not make a case justifying
the interposition of this court. Under our form of
government the judicial department has no power to
revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of their house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that
department by the constitution. . . .
There can be noted as specific corroborative authority, State vs.
Bolte, supra, Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and Commonwealth of
Massachusetts vs. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury ([1923], 262
U. S., 447), the latest expression of opinion by the United States
Supreme Court. The record discloses that it was the firm opinion of
the late Chief Justice that the court should not assume jurisdiction
of the proceedings.
So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state
that the principles laid down in some of the preceding authorities
have been the subject of adverse criticism. It is said that the fallacy
of the argument lies in the statement that the three departments of
the government are independent of each other. "They are
independent in so far as they proceed within their legitimate
province and perform the duties that the law requires; yet it has
never been held that the executive was the sole judge of what
duties the law imposes upon him, or the manner in which duties
shall be exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the
judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may
be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . .
It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is
directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the
propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey on
Mandamus, pp. 926-927.) But these were arguments which should
have been presented years ago in this court, and which when
recently presented by counsel in his argument for the petitioner in
the case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 20867, 1 met with no
favorable response from the court. It is now too late to go back and
revise previous decisions and overturn them; in fact this would be
not only impracticable but impossible since at least two decision of
the United States Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling.
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold
that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the
Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. If a
court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of
either of the other departments, it will be the end of popular
government as we know it in democracies.
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with
reference to the right of the Supreme Court to issue mandamus
directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in
having our mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or
against the President of the Philippine Senate and his fellow
Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the
disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs the question. If we
have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no
authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting
under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms,
and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate
who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the
Court do as requested, we might have the spectable presented of
the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the
disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the
Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. The writ of
mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the
person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.
(Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314; Abueva vs. Wood,
supra.)
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty.
On the one hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should
induce this court to exercise a power that does not belong to it. On
the other hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should
induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to
exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this
court where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should
not be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should
not be awarded where mischievous consequences are likely to
follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly
lead to unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with
impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for any
possible collision between it as the highest court in the Philippines
and the Philippine Senate as a branch of a coordinate department,
or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief
Executive and the Legislature.
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic
Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to
appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the
non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators
and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-
General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by
the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House
of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either
House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly
behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any
reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in
the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the
Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a
power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it
would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The
Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the
Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend
an appointive member of the Legislature.
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all
its long history suspended a member. And the reason is obvious.
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged
dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of
representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the
honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an
opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any
means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat
remains filed but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year
is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the
Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than
that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform
to the Organic Law. This was, in effect, our holding in the
comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs. Paredes ([1921], 42
Phil., 599), when we had under particular consideration a legislative
attempt to deprive the Chief Executive of his constitutional power of
appointment. What was there announced is equally applicable to
the instant proceedings.
While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct
decision, it is inserted so that the vital question argued with so
much ability may not pass entirely unnoticed, and so that there may
be at least an indication of the attitude of the court as a restraining
force, with respect to the checks and balances of government. The
Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate
branch of the government, takes no affirmative action. But the
perfection of the entire system suggests the thought that no action
should be taken elsewhere which would constitute, or even seem to
constitute, disregard for the Constitution.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend
on appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for
the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for
cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court
does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine
Senate take any particular action. If it be said that this conclusion
leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the
judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would
hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a
credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who
passes down the halls of legislation and of administration giving
heed to those who have grievances against the Legislature and the
Chief Executive.
We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof
can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers
by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to
consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. As it is
unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of
action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of
the court. So ordered.
Street, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-6749             July 30, 1955
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor
General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Jaime De Los Angeles
for appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Roman B. Antonio for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in
habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the continued detention
and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in
pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952,
is illegal, for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines
committed a clear abuse of discretion in considering his answer
naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the
sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by
the Senate committee to him, and on the further ground that said
Jean L. Arnault, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and
is consequently entitled to be released and discharged.
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the
negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was
effected on October 21, 1949 and the price paid for both estates
was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the
Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special
Committee to determine "whether the said purchase was honest,
valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair
and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the
Committee may deem proper in the premises." In the investigation
conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution,
petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of the purchase
price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-appellee refused to
answer this question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May
15, 1950, to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant
at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid
Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or
to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the
P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto. In G.R. No. L-
3820, petitioner-appellee herein questioned the validity of the
confinement so ordered, by a petition for certiorari filed in this
Court. He contended that the Senate of the Philippines has no
power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he delivered P440,000., that the Legislature
lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond the term of the
legislative session, and that the question of the Senate which he
refused to answer is an incriminating question which the appellee is
not bound to answer. All the abovementioned contentions were
adversely passed upon by the decision of this Court, so his petition
for release was denied.
In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid,
petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit, Exhibit A, wherein he
gives in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding
acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by Gen.
Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the
name of Jess D. Santos. Upon the presentation of the said affidavit
to the said Senate Special Committee, the latter subjected
petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of Jess D. Santos,
and after said investigation and questioning the Committee adopted
Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. This Resolution reads as
follows:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L.
ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND
DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT
MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL
HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
WHEREAS, on the 15th May 1950 the Senate of the
Philippines, transcending divisions of party and faction in the
national interest, adopted a Resolution ordering the detention
and confinement of Jean L. Arnault at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he should have purged himself of
contempt of the Senate by revealing the person to whom he
gave the sum of P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estates deal, and by answering other
pertinent questions in connection therewith;
WHEREAS, after considering the lengthy testimony offered by
the said Jean L. Arnault, and the report thereon rendered by
the Senate Special Committee on the said deal, the Senate
holds and finds that, despite numerous and generous
opportunities offered to him at his own instance and
solicitation, the said Jean L. Arnault has failed and refused,
and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom
he gave the said amount of P440,000, and to answer other
pertinent questions in connection with the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal;
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the
said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was
committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since
become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to
hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and
confinement, said power and authority having been held to be
coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said
Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he
had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements
made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above
referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and
an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were
they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of
the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and
ineffectual because they could be defied by any person of
sufficient stubbornness and malice;
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the identity of the
person to whom the said Jean L. Arnault gave the amount of
P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates deal, and the further information which the Senate
requires and which the said Jean L. Arnault arrogantly and
contumaciously withholds, is required for the discharge of its
legislative functions, particularly so that adequate measures
can be taken to prevent the repetition of similar frauds upon
the Government and the People of the Philippines and to
recover said amount; and
WHEREAS, while not insensible to the appeal of
understanding and mercy, the Senate holds and finds that the
said Jean L. Arnault, by his insolent and contumacious
defiance of the legitimate authority of the Senate, is trifling with
its proceedings, renders himself unworthy of mercy, and, in the
language of the Supreme Court, is his own jailer, because he
could open the doors of his prison at any time by revealing the
truth; now therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, That the Senate
hold and find, as it hereby holds and finds, that Juan L. Arnault
has not purged himself of contempt of the Senate, and has in
no way altered his situation since he has committed to coercive
not punitive, imprisonment for such contempt on the 15th day
of May, 1950; and that Senate order, as it hereby orders, the
 Director of Prisons to hold the said Jean L. Arnault, in his
custody, and in confinement and detention at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, in coercive imprisonment, until he
should have purged himself of the aforesaid contempt to the
satisfaction, and until order to that effect, of the Senate of the
Philippines or of its Special Committee to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.
Adopted, November 8, 1952 . (Exhibit 0)
In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance, petitioner-appellee alleges: (1) That the acquisition by the
Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates was not illegal nor irregular
nor scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact beneficial to the
Government; (2) that the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3820
declared that the Senate did not imprison Arnault "beyond proper
limitations", i.e., beyond the period longer than arresto mayor, as
this is the maximum penalty that can be imposed under the
provisions of Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) that
petitioner-appellee purged himself of the contempt charges when
he disclosed the fact that the one to whom he gave the P440,000
was Jess D. Santos, and submitted evidence in corroboration
thereof; (4) that the Senate is not justified in finding that the
petitioner-appellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D.
Santos as the person to whom he gave the P440,000, specially on
the basis of the evidence submitted to it; (5) that the legislative
purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the confinement
may be considered as having been accomplished, and, therefore,
there is no reason for petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.
The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates is beneficial to the government and is neither illegal nor
irregular is beside the point. To our minds, two questions are
decisive of this case. The first is: Did the Senate Special Committee
believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to
whom he gave the P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos
and if it did not, may the court review said finding? And the second
is: If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the continued
confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in
Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid?
On the first question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has
failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the
person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000" and that the
situation of petitioner "has not materially charged since he was
committed to prison." In the first resolution of the Senate Special
Committee of May 15, 1950, it found that petitioner "refused to
reveal the name of the persons to whom he gave the P440,000, as
well as to answer other pertinent questions related to said amount."
It is clear and evident that the Senate Committee did not believe
petitioner's statement that the person to whom he delivered the
abovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos.
The court a quo, however, arrogating unto itself the power to review
such finding, held that the "petitioner has satisfactorily shown that
the person of Jess D. Santos actually and physically existed in the
human flesh," that the opinion or conclusion of the Senate
Committee is not borne to out by the evidence produced at the
investigation, that the Senate abused its discretion in making its
conclusion and that under these circumstances the only thing that
could in justice be done to petitioner is to order his release and
have his case endorsed to the prosecution branch of the judicial
department for investigation and prosecution as the circumstances
warrant.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that
the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to
review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their
discretion in what is known as the legislative process.
 The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its
exercise of departmental discretion in the means used to
accomplish legitimate legislative ends. Since the legislature is
given a large discretion in reference to the means it may
employ to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge
what means are necessary and appropriate to accomplish an
end which the Constitution makes legitimate, the courts cannot
undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the
legislature are the only means or even the best means
possible to attain the end sought, for such course would best
the exercise of the police power of the state in the judicial
department. It has been said that the methods, regulations,
and restrictions to be imposed to attain results consistent with
the public welfare are purely of legislative cognizance, and the
determination of the legislature is final, except when so
arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the
citizen. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear violation of a
constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that
legislative discretion has been properly exercised. (11 Am.
Jur., pp. 901-902).
These the judicial department of the government has no right or
power or authority to do, much in the same manner that the
legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of
the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that
would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of
separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are
when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or
when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion.
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially
 independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the
judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives
its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance
of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. (People of the Philippine Islands, et al. vs. Vera,
et al 65 Phil., 56; See also Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil., 139)
All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken
against petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to determine if the
constitutional guarantee of due process has been accorded him
before his incarceration by legislative order, and this because of the
mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be
deprived life, liberty or property without due process of law. In the
case at bar such right has fully been extended the petitioner, he
having been given the opportunity to be heard personally and by
counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval of the
Resolution ordering his continued confinement.
The second question involves in turn the following propositions:
Does the Philippine Senate have the power and authority to pass
its resolution ordering the continued confinement of the petitioner?
In the supposition that such power and authority exist, was such
power legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the name
Jess D. Santos? A study of the text of the resolution readily shows
that the Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did not disclose,
by the mere giving of the name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the
person to whom the sum of P440, 000 was delivered, and, in
addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and
contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and
dignity. Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the
confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the
petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the
continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly unitive.
This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that
petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant and contumacious and
constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a
way, therefore, the petitioner's assumption that the imprisonment is
punitive is justified by the language of the resolution, wherefore the
issue now before Us in whether the Senate has the power to punish
the contempt committed against it under the circumstances of the
case. This question is thus squarely presented before Us for
determination.
In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court,
G. R. No. L-38201, Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al. (46 Off. Gaz., No. 7,
3100), it was admitted and we had ruled that the Senate has the
authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question
pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the
information, i.e., by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive
power. It is now contended by petitioner that if he committed an
offense of contempt or perjury against the legislative body, because
he refused to reveal the identity of the person in accordance with
the demands of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not
punish him, for the punishment for his refusal should be sought
through the ordinary processes of the law, i. e., by the institution of
a criminal action in a court of justice.
American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have
the power to punish for contempt if the contempt has had the effect
of obstructing the exercise by the legislature of, or deterring or
preventing it from exercising, its legitimate functions (Annotation to
Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed. 814). While the power of the
United States Senate to punish for contempt was not clearly
recognized in its earlier decision (See Marshal vs. Gordon, 61 L.
ed. 881), the Supreme Court of the United States two decades ago
held that such power and authority exist. In the case of Jurney vs.
MacCraken (294 U. S. 123, 79 L. ed. 802), the question before it
was whether or not the Senate could order the confinement of a
private citizen because of the destruction and removal by him of
certain papers required to be produced. The court said:
First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called
power to punish for contempt may never be exerted, in the
case of a private citizen, solely qua punishment. The argument
is that the power may be used by the legislative body merely
as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the
performance of its duties; that the power to punish ceases as
soon as the obstruction has been removed, or its removal has
become impossible; and hence that there is no power to
punish a witness who, having been requested to produce
papers, destroys them after service of the subpoena. The
contention rests upon a misconception of the limitations upon
the power of the Houses of Congress to punish for contempt. It
is true that the scope of the power is narrow. No act is so
punishable unless it is of a nature to obstruct the performance
of the duties of the legislature. This may be lack of power,
because, as in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L.
ed. 377, there was no legislative duty to be performed; or
because, as in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed.
881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371,
the act complained of is deemed not to be of a character to
obstruct the legislative process. But, where the offending act
was of a nature to obstruct the legislative process, the fact that
the obstruction has since been removed, or that its removal
has become impossible is without legal significance.
The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed
act was exerted by Congress as early as 1795; and since then
it has been exercised on several occasions. It was asserted,
before the Revolution, by the colonial assemblies, in intimation
of the British House of Commons; and afterwards by the
Continental Congress and by state legislative bodies. In
Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat, 204, 5 L. ed. 242, decided in
1821, it was held that the House had power to punish a private
citizen for an attempt to bribe a member. No case has been
found in which an exertion of the power to punish for contempt
has been successfully challenged on the ground that, before
punishment, the offending act had been consummated or that
the obstruction suffered was irremediable. The statement in the
opinion in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881,
37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F. 279 Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371,
supra, upon which MacCracken relies, must be read in the light
of the particular facts. It was there recognized that the only
jurisdictional test to be applied by the court is the character of
the offense; and that the continuance of the obstruction, or the
likelihood of its repetition, are considerations for the discretion
of the legislators in meting out the punishment.
Here, we are concerned not with an extention of congressional
privilege, but with vindication of the established and essential
privilege of requiring the production of evidence. For this
purpose, the power to punish for a past contempt is an
appropriate means. Compare Ex parte Nugent (C. C.) 1
Brunner, Col. Cas. 296, Fed. Cas No. 10375; Steward vs.
Bleine, 1 MacArth. 453. The apprehensions expressed from
time to time in congressional debates, in opposition to
particular exercise of the contempt power concerned, not the
power to punish, as such, but the broad, undefined privileges
which it was believed might find sanction in that power. The
ground for such fears has since been effectively removed by
the decisions of this Court which hold that assertions of
congressional privilege are subject to judicial review. Melbourn
vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, supra; and that
the power to punish for contempt may not be extended to
slanderous attacks which presents no immediate obstruction to
legislative processes. Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61
L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L.R. A. 1917F, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 731
supra.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to
punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise
of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How
could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel
the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to
punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of
the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers,
making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective
authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be
full and complete, independently of the other's authority and power.
And how could the authority and power become complete if for
every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy
against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department
for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to
punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its
authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious witness
is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its
legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial
process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for
the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon
them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority,
the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a
necessary concommitant of the legislative power or process, while
the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the
criminal law.
We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the
exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of
the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the
defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless
there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere
exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial
interference. (Marshall vs. Gordon, supra).
The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged
himself of contempt, because he says he has already answered the
original question which he had previously been required to answer.
In order that the petitioner may be considered as having purged
himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should have testified
truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the
inquiry. No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another
lie or falsehood; this would be repetition of the offense. It is true that
he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the person to whom
delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee
refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the person
whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate,
therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the original
contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore, the act further interpreted
as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to the
intelligence of the honorable members of the body that conducted
the investigation. The act of defiance and contempt could not have
been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate resolution
declaring the petitioner in contempt may not be claimed as an
exertion of an arbitrary power.
One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the
claim that as the period of imprisonment has lasted for a period
which exceeded that provided by law punishment for contempt, i.
e., 6 months of arresto mayor, the petitioner is now entitled to be
released. This claim is not justified by the record. Petitioner was
originally confined by Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On
December 13, 1951, he executed his affidavit and thereafter he
was called to testify again before the Senate Committee. The latter
passed its Resolution No. 114 on November 6, 1952, and he
presented the petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3,
1953, i. e., five months after the last resolution when the Senate
found that the petitioner committed another contempt. It is not true,
therefore, that the petitioner's punishment is beyond the full period
prescribed in the criminal law.
Besides, the last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a
coersive nature, in the sense that the Senate Committee still
demands and requires the disclosure of the fact which the petitioner
had obstinately refused to divulge. While the Philippine Senate has
not given up hope that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the
record, it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued
confinement is an abuse of the legislative power and thereby
interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed,
and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is
declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be
recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the
petitioner-appellee.
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL
TEXT
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law
Foundation
G.R. No. 173034             October 9, 2007
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T.
DUQUE III, ET AL.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 139401             October 2, 2002
JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EMMANUEL BALANE AND
CELSO PAGAPOLA-AN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In the hope of attaining a better future, many Filipinos
succumb to the lure of opportunities in distant shores. Not
all, however, are able to realize their dreams. A number of
them return with neither money nor glory. For these unlucky
souls, they take home with them twice the misery which they
yearned to elude in the first place. When the dream is gone,
there is nothing left but a bitter pill to swallow.
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court of the decision1 dated June 25, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals, which denied the petition for certiorari of the
decision dated January 30, 1996 of the National Labor
Relations Commission filed by herein petitioner JMM
Promotions and Management, Inc.
This petition is an offshoot of an illegal dismissal case filed
by private respondents Emmanuel Balane (Balane) and
Celso Pagapola-an (Pagapola-an) in the POEA seeking
justice for the plight they suffered as overseas entertainers.
Private respondents charged petitioner with causing injury to
their rights.
The facts of this case follow.
In March 1993, Sam Jin Entertainment Co. Ltd. (Sam Jin),
through its agency, petitioner JMM Promotions and
Management, Inc., hired private respondents and Theresa
Domatican (Domatican) as entertainers for deployment in
Korea. The three entertainers, as a musical band, assumed
the name "Fix Trio." Balane played the keyboard while
Pagapola-an handled the guitar. Domatican was the band’s
original vocalist.
The employment contract provided that private respondents
were to receive a monthly salary of four hundred thousand
won (W400,000) plus a round trip fare for a one-year
contract.
The band was set to leave on March 26, 1993. However, a
day before the band’s departure, on March 25, 1993,
petitioner assigned Bernadette Flores (Flores) instead of
Domatican to perform with the band in Korea.
Private respondents, together with Flores, performed as a
group for about four months in Seoul, South Korea. Their
stint, however, was short-lived because of poor
performance. Private respondents laid the blame on Flores’
lack of singing talent. Sam Jin thereafter advised private
respondents to return to the Philippines. Flores stayed
behind.
On July 23, 1993, private respondents were repatriated to
the Philippines. Before their departure from Korea, private
respondents signed a statement dated July 21, 1993,2
prepared by their employer, which expressed their
agreement to go back home due to some difficulties in their
contractual undertaking and another statement dated July
22, 1993,3 which contained their promise to refund petitioner
the sum of one hundred forty thousand won (W140,000)
representing the balance of their processing fee.
Private respondents, after arrival in the Philippines, filed with
the POEA an illegal dismissal case and money claim for the
unfinished employment contract against petitioner and Sam
Jin. They claimed that petitioner was mainly responsible for
their aborted stint as a band in Seoul, Korea. The last-
minute replacement of Domatican with Flores, a singer of
allegedly questionable talent, resulted in the band’s poor
performance. This, in turn, led to the premature termination
of the band’s contract.
Petitioner denied any liability or responsibility for the
untimely termination of private respondents’ employment
contract. It mainly anchored its defense to the statements
dated July 21, 1993 and July 22, 1993, signed by private
respondents, arguing that the latter voluntarily expressed
their desire to go back to the Philippines.
The POEA ruled in favor of private respondents, ordering
petitioner and Sam Jin to jointly and severally pay private
respondents the amount of US$1,049.98 each, representing
the compensation for the unfinished portion of the
employment contract,4 based on the following:
"After a judicious appraisal of the attendant facts and
evaluation of the evidence on record, we find that what
actually transpired in this case was an unsuccessful and a
losing entertainment business venture on account of the
entertainers’ failure to put up a good show or performance
before the customers and clients of the club owners.
Complainants blamed the respondents for this fiasco by
attributing the cause thereof to the inability of the singer to
render her part of the trio as she was not a singer nor had
she undergone testing or audition before her engagement as
such. What was originally contracted for was the real
singer/talent and member of the contracted trio, Theresa
Domatican. These facts have not been contradicted or
explained by the respondents except the allegation that
complainants were having difficulty in their employment,
hence they signed a rescission agreement.
"Respondents’ Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’, the statements executed
by complainants, were however disputed by the latter,
claiming that they were forced under the circumstances to
sign the same. They were put in a situation where they can
not (sic) longer perform effectively because of a singer who
cannot sing. If they do not perform, they will not be paid.
Thus they were sent home by their employer and as a pre
requisite for their repatriation, they were made to sign the
aforementioned statements citing difficulty in their
employment as cause of their discharge. Complainants were
definitely pushed against the wall and had no other recourse
but to comply with their employer’s orders in order to be
repatriated.
"It is also worthy to note that one of the complainants,
Emmanuel Balane, corroborated their stance by executing a
statement in the presence of our Consul at the Philippine
Embassy in Seoul, Korea. This statement is further
supported by the Statement dated July 22, 1993 (Annex ‘B’,
Joint Affidavit of Complainants) which was signed by Kang
Ho Suck, Cho Jin Young and Shin Bok Hu."5
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA on appeal,
holding that the findings of the POEA were supported by
substantial evidence.
Twice thwarted but still unyielding, petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the NLRC decision.
Petitioner’s hope of vindication in the Court of Appeals failed
as the latter found no reason to disturb the findings of the
NLRC. The Court of Appeals attributed fault to the petitioner
for the band’s poor performance abroad when it replaced the
band’s original vocalist Domatican with Flores at the
"eleventh hour." Thus, it held:
"The effect of petitioner’s fault should not be used as the
excuse to terminate its contract of employment with private
respondents."6
Aggrieved by the ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
now comes before us with the following –
"GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
a - The law is clear that an aggrieved party, before the
appellate body may consider such as the findings of
facts, been able to substantiate the matter arrived at by
preponderance of evidence.
b - That public respondent cannot shied (sic) away from
 the mandated rule in the appreciation of evidence; the
proceedings before the inferior quasi-judicial bodies is
one of mere submission of affidavits whereon no open
testimony is taken to cross-examine the witnesses;
uprightness of the findings is, therefore, questionable
and subject to review."7
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously
sustained the findings of fact of the NLRC. Private
respondents could not have performed with Flores for four
months in Korea if they did not initially do well as a band.
Fights within and among themselves, therefore, caused their
misfortunes.
Petitioner disputes the observation of the Court of Appeals
that private respondents were intimidated into signing the
quitclaim and request for repatriation. They were paid their
salaries and they even committed to pay petitioner the
amount of W140,000 as reimbursement for expenses
incurred in their deployment to Seoul, Korea.
Petitioner also avers that the execution of statements critical
of petitioner before the Philippine Consul in Seoul was not
reflected in the records. There being no evidence thereof,
private respondents’ stories were bereft of factual basis.
Furthermore, the identity of the Koreans who allegedly
signed and backed up private respondents’ statements was
neither ascertained nor proved.
Petitioner asserts that the quitclaims executed by private
respondents on July 21, 1993 and July 22, 1993 were valid
and binding. The existence of fraud, mistake or duress in
their execution has not been established. Thus, documents
attesting that a compromise agreement has been reached
between the parties remain valid in the absence of any proof
to the contrary.
On the other hand, due to alleged financial difficulties,8
private respondent Balane filed his comment through a mere
attorney-in-fact and contended that the petition for review is
merely a dilatory tactic employed by petitioner.9
Petitioner’s arguments border on despair.
As an overture, clear and unmistakable is the rule that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Just as well entrenched
is the doctrine that pure issues of fact may not be the proper
subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is generally confined
to questions of law.10 We therefore take this opportunity
again to reiterate that only questions of law, not questions of
fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court in a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court
cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
petitioners in the lower courts and analyze, assess and
weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate
court were correct in their appreciation of the evidence.11
We note that petitioner’s arguments are based on factual
and evidentiary matters which the Supreme Court does not
inquire into in an appeal on certiorari.12 The issues
propounded by petitioner involve only questions of fact
previously raised and satisfactorily ruled upon by the courts
a quo.
The POEA and the NLRC were one with respect to the
finding that private respondents were illegally dismissed.
Petitioner’s obstinacy proved futile as the Court of Appeals
was likewise in agreement with the labor courts. "Findings of
fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts because of the special
knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction."13 Moreover, it is a time-honoured rule that "the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
parties and not reviewable by the Supreme Court – and they
carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms
the factual findings of the trial court."14 Any exception to
these principles, as set forth in the case of Ramos v. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co.15 must be clearly and convincingly proven.
Petitioner, however, failed to prove that this case falls within
the exception.
Nonetheless, we find it necessary to discuss the issue of
validity of the quitclaims. In the instant case, private
respondents claim that they were merely compelled to sign
the releases in favor of their employer. Petitioner, on the
other hand, asserts that private respondents entered into the
compromise agreement freely and voluntarily and should
not, at this late stage, be permitted to renounce their signed
commitments.
No reasonable argument, however, can possibly sustain
petitioner’s position. Although quitclaims have long been
accepted in this jurisdiction, when the voluntariness of the
execution of the quitclaim or release is squarely at issue,
then the employee’s claim may still be given due course.16
The law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by
employees who have been inveigled or pressured into
signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade
their legal responsibilities.17
We are not ready to deviate from this rule for the reason that
the courts a quo have sufficient factual basis in ruling that
private respondents were merely pressured to sign the
quitclaims/compromise agreements. The fact that private
respondents signed the subject statements releasing
petitioner and Sam Jin from any liability and assenting to a
refund of the amount allegedly representing the expenses
incurred by petitioner, without any objection, does not
automatically mean the absence of duress, considering the
pathetic circumstances private respondents were in. We find
it incredible that, after all the expense and the trouble they
went through in seeking greener pastures abroad, private
respondents would suddenly and without reason decide to
return home and face, as jobless people, a staggering debt
of W140,000. The private respondents had no choice but to
sign. They were stranded in a foreign land with no work and
no income, and with their employer threatening not to give
them their return tickets to Manila if they refused to
sign.1avvphil.net
Thus, we have time and again held that quitclaims, waivers
and/or complete releases executed by the employees do not
stop them from pursuing their claims arising from unfair labor
practice - if there is a showing of undue pressure or duress.
The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims, waivers
and/or complete releases, being figuratively exacted through
the barrel of a gun, are against public policy and therefore
null and void ab initio. Accordingly, private respondents’
signatures in the subject waivers or quitclaims never
foreclosed their right to pursue a case for illegal dismissal
and money claim. Employer and employee were not on
equal footing.18 As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals,
private respondents’ backs were to the wall. Had they been
in a position to object, private respondents would not have
agreed to reimburse petitioner the amount of W140,000 as
no person in his right mind, specially if he is in dire financial
straights, would agree to such an undertaking. Private
respondents went abroad precisely to escape poverty.
Obviously it was out of desperation and helplessness that
private respondents agreed to affix their signatures on the
subject waivers. They are therefore deemed not to have
waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur."19
This Court sees no compelling reason to reverse the findings
of the POEA, the NLRC and respondent Court of Appeals for
lack of any showing of error, mistake or misappreciation of
facts.20 This assailed decisions are in harmony with the law
and the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 111088 June 13, 1997

C & M TIMBER CORPORATION (CMTC), petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, Secretary of the Department
of Environment & Natural Resources, HON. ANTONIO T.
CARPIO, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and HON.
RENATO C. CORONA, Assistant Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs, respondents.
 
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber
Corporation seeks the nullification of the order dated
February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7, 1993 of
the Office of the President, declaring as of no force and
effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to
petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106, with the expiry
date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680 hectares of forest land in
the municipalities of Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the
Province of Aurora and the Municipality of Maddela in
Quirino province. 1
It appears that in a letter dated July 20, 1984 2 to President
Marcos, Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation (FLDC),
through its president and general manager, requested a
timber concession over the same area covered by
petitioner's TLA No. 106, alleging that the same had been
cancelled pursuant to a presidential directive banning all
forms of logging in the area. The request was granted in a
note dated August 14, 1984 by President Marcos who wrote,
as was his wont, on the margin of the letter of FLDC:
"Approved." 3
Accordingly, on September 21, 1984, the Ministry of Natural
Resources, as it was then called, issued TLA No. 360, with
the expiry date September 30, 1994, to FLDC, covering the
area subject of TLA No. 106. In 1985, FLDC began logging
operations.
On June 26, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources
Ernesto M. Maceda suspended TLA No. 360 for FLDC's
"gross violation of the terms and conditions thereof,
especially the reforestation and selective logging activities
and in consonance with the national policy on forest
conservation." 4 On July 26, 1986, Minister Maceda issued
another order cancelling the license of FLDC on the ground
that "in spite of the suspension order dated June 26, 1986,
said concessionaire has continued logging operations in
violation of forestry rules and regulations." 5
Learning of the cancellation of FLDC's TLA, petitioner,
through its officer-in-charge, wrote Minister Maceda a letter
dated October 10, 1986, requesting "revalidation" of its TLA
No. 106. 6 As FLDC sought a reconsideration of the order
cancelling its TLA, petitioner wrote another letter dated
February 13, 1987, 7 alleging that because of the log ban
imposed by the previous administration it had to stop its
logging operations, but that when the ban was lifted on
September 21, 1984, its concession area was awarded to
FLDC "as a result of [FLDC's] covetous maneuvers and
unlawful machinations." (Petitioner was later to say that
those behind FLDC, among them being the former
President's sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, were "very influential
because of their very strong connections with the previous
Marcos regime." 8) Petitioner prayed that it be allowed to
resume logging operations.
In his order dated May 2, 1988, 9 Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran, Jr., of the DENR, declared petitioner's TLA No.
106 as of no more force and effect and consequently denied
the petition for its restoration, even as he denied FLDC's
motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of TLA No.
360. Secretary Factoran, Jr. ruled that petitioner's petition
was barred by reason of laches, because petitioner did not
file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC until
February 13, 1987, after FLDC had been logging under its
license for almost two years. On the other hand, FLDC's
motion for reconsideration was denied, "since the findings
on which the cancellation order had been based, notably
gross violation of the terms and conditions of its license,
such as reforestation and selective logging activities appear
to be firmly grounded."
Both petitioner CMTC and FLDC appealed to the Office of
the President. Petitioner denied that it was guilty of laches. It
alleged that it had sent a letter to the then Minister of Natural
Resources Rodolfo del Rosario dated September 24, 1984
protesting the grant of a TLA to FLDC over the area covered
by its (petitioner's) TLA and, for this reason, requesting
nullification of FLDC's TLA.
In a decision dated March 21, 1991, 10 the Office of the
President, through then Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos,
affirmed the DENR's order of May 2, 1988. Like the DENR it
found petitioner guilty of laches, the alleged filing by
petitioner of a protest on September 24, 1984 not having
been duly proven. The decision of the Office of the President
stated: 11
As disclosed by the records, this Office, in a letter
of June 1, 1989, had requested the DENR to issue
a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of
CMTC's aforesaid Annex "A" to enable it to resolve
this case judiciously and expeditiously. Said letter-
request pertinently reads:
. . . C & M Timber Corporation has
attached to its "Supplemental Petition For
Review," dated June 1, 1988, a xerox
copy of (Annex "A") of its letter to the
Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del
Rosario, dated September 24, 1984,
prepared by its counsel, Atty. Norberto J.
Quisumbing, protesting against the award
of the contested area to Filipinas Loggers
Development Corporation and requesting
that it be annulled and voided.
Considering that the aforementioned
Annex "A" constitutes a vital defense to C
& M Timber Corporation and could be a
pivotal factor in the resolution by this
 Office of the instant appeal, may we
request your good office for a certification
as to the authenticity/veracity of said
document (Annex "A") to enable us to
resolve the case judiciously and
expeditiously.
In reply thereto, the DENR, thru Assistant Secretary
for Legal Affairs Romulo D. San Juan, in a letter of
July 7, 1989, informed this Office, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate
the alleged aforementioned Annex "A", no
such document could be found or is on file
in this Office.
This Office, therefore, regrets that it can
not issue the desired certification as to the
authenticity/veracity of the document.
On September 10, 1990, this Office requested an
updated comment of the DENR on (a) the duplicate
original copy of Annex "A"; (b) a xerox copy of
Page 164, entry No. 2233, of the MNR's logbook
tending to show that the original copy of Annex "A"
was received by the MNR; and (c) a xerox copy of
Page 201 of the logbook of the BFD indicating that
the original copy of Annex "A" was received by BFD
from the MNR.
On October 26, 1990, DENR Assistant Secretary
San Juan endorsed to this Office the updated
comment of Director of Forest Management Bureau
(FMB) in a 2nd endorsement of October 25, 1990,
which pertinently reads as follows:
Please be informed that this Office is not
the addressee and repository of the letter
dated September 24, 1984 of Atty.
Norberto Quisumbing. This Office was just
directed by then Minister Rodolfo del
Rosario to act on the purported letter of
Atty. Quisumbing and as directed, we
prepared a memorandum to the President
which was duly complied with as shown by
the entries in the logbook. Annex "A",
which is the main document of the letter-
appeal of C & M Timber Corporation is
presumed appended to the records when
it was acted upon by the BFD (now FMB)
and forwarded to the Secretary (then
Minister). Therefore this Office is not in a
position to certify as to the authenticity of
Annex "A".
Clearly therefore, CMTC's reliance on its Annex "A"
is misplaced, the authenticity thereof not having
been duly proven or established. Significantly, we
note that in all the pleadings filed by CMTC in the
office a quo, and during the hearing conducted,
nothing is mentioned therein about its letter of
September 24, 1984 (Annex "A"). Jurisprudence
teaches that issues neither averred in the pleadings
nor raised during the trial below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal (City of Manila vs. Ebay,
1 SCRA 1086, 1089); that issues of fact not
adequately brought to the attention of the trial court
 need not be considered by a reviewing court, as
they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
(Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA
592, 595); and that parties, may not, on appeal,
adopt a position inconsistent with what they
sustained below (People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698,
700-701)
The Office of the President also declined to set aside the
DENR's order of July 31, 1986, cancelling FLDC's TLA No.
360, after finding the same to be fully substantiated.
Petitioner and FLDC moved for reconsideration. In its order
dated January 25, 1993, 12 the Office of the President,
through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio,
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It held that
"even assuming that CMTC did file regularly its letter-protest
of September 24, 1984 with MNR on September 25, 1984,
CMTC failed to protect its rights for more than two (2) years
until it opposed reinstatement of FLDC's TLA on February
13, 1987. Within that two (2) year period, FLDC logged the
area without any opposition from CMTC." In the same order,
the Office of the President, however, directed the
reinstatement of FLDC's TLA No. 360, in view of the
favorable report of the Bureau of Forest Development dated
March 23, 1987. Later, the President's office reconsidered
its action after the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources Angel C. Alcala, on February 15, 1993,
expressed concern that reinstatement of FLDC's TLA No.
360 "might negate efforts to enhance the conservation and
protection of our forest resources." In a new order dated
February 26, 1993, 13 the Office of the President reinstated
its March 21, 1991 decision.
Petitioner again moved for a reconsideration of the decision
dated March 21, 1991 and for its license to be
"revived/restored.'' Petitioner's motion was, however, denied
by the Office of the President on June 7, 1993 14 in a
resolution signed by Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Renato C. Corona. The President's office ruled:
The above Order of February 26, 1993 was
predicated, as stated therein, on a new policy
consideration on forest conservation and
protection, unmistakably implied from the
President's handwritten instruction. Accordingly,
this Order shall be taken not only as an affirmation
of the March 21, 1991 decision, but also as a
FINAL disposition of the case and ALL matters
incident thereto, like CMTC's motion for
reconsideration, dated April 16, 1991.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that laches cannot
be imputed to it because it did not incur delay in asserting its
rights and even if there was delay, the delay did not work to
the prejudice of other parties, particularly FLDC, because
the cancellation of the FLDC's TLA was attributable only to
its own actions. Petitioner also denies that its license had
been suspended by reason of mediocre performance in
reforestation by order of then Minister of Natural Resources
Teodoro O. Peña. It says that it did not receive any order to
this effect. Finally, petitioner claims that the denial of its
petition, because of "a new policy consideration on forest
conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the
President's handwritten instruction," as stated in the
resolution of June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President,
would deny it the due process of law. Petitioner points out
that there is no total log ban in the country; that Congress
has yet to make a pronouncement on the issue; that any
notice to this effect "must be stated in good form, not
implied"; and that in any case, any new policy consideration
should be prospective in application and cannot affect
petitioner's vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. As already stated, the DENR order of May 2, 1988,
declaring petitioner's TLA No. 106 as no longer of any force
and effect, was based on its finding that although TLA No.
106's date of expiry was June 30, 1997 it had been
suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTC's "mediocre
performance in reforestation" and petitioner's laches in
failing to protest the subsequent award of the same area to
FLDC. There is considerable dispute whether there was
really an order dated June 3, 1983 suspending petitioner's
TLA because of "mediocre performance" in reforestation,
just as there is a dispute whether there indeed was a letter
written on September 24, 1984 on behalf of petitioner
protesting the award of the concession covered by its TLA
No. 106 to FLDC, so as to show that petitioner did not sleep
on its rights.
The alleged order of June 3, 1983 cannot be produced. The
Office of the Solicitor General was given until May 14, 1997
to secure a copy of the order but on May 7, 1997 the OSG
manifested that the order in question could not be found in
the records of this case in which the order might be. 15
Earlier, petitioner requested a copy of the order but the
DENR, through Regional Executive Director Antonio G.
Principe, said that "based from our records there is no file
copy of said alleged order." 16
On the other hand, the alleged letter of September 24, 1984
written by Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting the
award of the concession in question to FLDC cannot be
found in the records of the DENR either. The Assistant
Secretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR certified that
"Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged [letter],
no such document could be found or is on file in this Office."
17
In a later certification, however, Ofelia Castro Biron of the
DENR, claimed that she was a receiving clerk at the
Records and Documents Section of the Ministry of Natural
Resources and that on September 25, 1984 she received
the letter of Atty. Quisumbing and placed on all copies
thereof the stamp of the MNR. She stated that the copy in
the possession of petitioner was a "faithful copy of the letter"
in question. 18
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of the two
documents is indeed a reflection on the sorry state of record
keeping in an important office of the executive department.
Yet these two documents are vital to the presentation of the
evidence of both parties in this case. Fortunately, there are
extant certain records from which it is possible to determine
whether these documents even existed.
With respect to the alleged order of June 3, 1983
suspending petitioner's TLA No. 106 for "mediocre
performance" in reforestation, the Court will presume that
there is such an order in accordance with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions inasmuch
as such order is cited both in the order dated May 2, 1988 of
the DENR, declaring as of no force and effect TLA No. 106,
and in the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the Office of the
President affirming the order of the DENR. It is improbable
that so responsible officials as the Secretary of the DENR
and the Executive Secretary would cite an order that did not
exist.
On the other hand, with respect to the letter dated
September 24, 1984, there are circumstances indicating that
it existed. In addition to the aforesaid certification of Ofelia
Castro Biron that she was the person who received the letter
for the DENR, the logbook of the Ministry of Natural
Resources contains entries indicating that the letter was
received by the Bureau of Forest Development from the
MNR. 19 DENR Assistant Secretary Romulo San Juan
likewise informed the Office of the President that the Bureau
of Forest Management prepared a memorandum on the
aforesaid letter of September 24, 1984, 20 thereby implying
that there was such a letter.
On the premise that there was an order dated June 3, 1983,
we find that after suspending petitioner's TLA for "mediocre
performance" in reforestation under this order, the DENR
cancelled the TLA, this time because of a Presidential
directive imposing a log ban. The records of G.R. No. 76538,
entitled "Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v. Deputy Executive
Secretary," the decision in which is reported in 190 SCRA
673 (1990), contain a copy of the memorandum of then
Director Edmundo V. Cortes of the Bureau of Forest
Development to the Regional Director of Region 2, in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, informing the latter that pursuant to
the instruction of the President and the memorandum dated
August 18, 1983 of then Minister Teodoro Q. Peña, the log
ban previously declared included the concessions of the
companies enumerated in Cortes' memorandum, in
consequence of which the concessions in question were
deemed cancelled. The memorandum of Director Cortes
stated:
MEMORANDUM ORDER
TO : The Regional Director
Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
FROM : The Director
DATE : 24 August 1983
SUBJECT : Stopping of all logging
operations
in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
REMARKS :
Following Presidential
Instructions and
Memorandum Order of
Minister Teodoro Q.
Peña dated 18 August
1983, and in connection
with my previous radio
message, please be
informed that the
coverage of the logging
ban in Quirino and
Nueva Vizcaya
provinces include the
following concessions
which are deemed
cancelled as of the date
of the previous notice:
— Felipe
Ysmael Co.,
Inc.
— Industries
Dev. Corp.
 — Luzon
Loggers, Inc.
—C&M
Timber
Corporation
— Buzon
Industrial Dev.
Corporation
— Dominion
Forest
Resources
Corp.
— FCA Timber
Development
Corp.
— Kasibu
Logging Corp.
— RCC Timber
Company
— Benjamin
Cuaresma
You are hereby
reminded to insure full
compliance with this
order to stop logging
operations by all
licensees above
mentioned and submit a
report on the pullout of
equipment and
inventory of logs within
five days upon receipt
 hereof.
ACTION
DESIRED : For your immediate
implementation.
E
D
M
U
N
D
O
V.
C
O
R
T
E
S
(Emphasis added)
It thus appears that petitioner's license had been cancelled
way back in 1983, a year before its concession was awarded
to FLDC. It is noteworthy that petitioner admits that at the
time of the award to FLDC in 1984 petitioner was no longer
operating its concession because of a log ban although it
claims that the suspension of operations was only
temporary. As a result of the log ban, the TLA of petitioner,
along with those of other loggers in the region, were
cancelled and petitioner and others were ordered to stop
operations. Petitioner also admits that it received a telegram
sent on August 24, 1983 by Director Cortes of the BFD,
directing it to "stop all logging operations to conserve our
remaining forests." 21 It is then not true, as Atty. Quisumbing
stated in protesting the award of the concession to FLDC,
that "the logging ban did not cancel [petitioner's] timber
license agreement."
Now petitioner did not protest the cancellation of its TLA.
Consequently, even if consideration is given to the fact that
a year later, on September 24, 1984, its counsel protested
the grant of the concession to another party (FLDC), this
failure of petitioner to contest first the suspension of its
license on June 3, 1983 and later its cancellation on August
24, 1983 must be deemed fatal to its present action.
Second. Except for the letter of its counsel to the Minister of
Natural Resources, which it reiterated in its letter to the
President of the Philippines, petitioner took no legal steps to
protect its interest. After receiving no favorable response to
its two letters, petitioner could have brought the necessary
action in court for the restoration of its license. It did not.
Instead it waited until FLDC's concession was cancelled in
1986 by asking for the "revalidation" of its (petitioner's) on
TLA No. 106.
Petitioner's excuse before the DENR is that it did not pursue
its protest because its president, Ricardo C. Silverio, had
been told by President Marcos that the area in question had
been awarded to the President's sister, Mrs.
Fortuna Barba, and petitioner was afraid to go against the
wishes of the former President. 22 This is a poor excuse for
petitioner's inaction. In Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v.
Deputy Executive Secretary, 23 a similar excuse was given
that Ysmael & Co's license had been cancelled and its
concession awarded to entities controlled or owned by
relatives or cronies of then President Marcos. For this
reason, after the EDSA Revolution, Ysmael & Co. sought in
1986 the reinstatement of its timber license agreement and
the revocation of those issued to the alleged presidential
cronies. As its request was denied by the Office of the
President, Ysmael & Co. filed a petition for certiorari with this
Court. On the basis of the facts stated, this Court denied the
petition: (1) because the August 25, 1983 order of the
Bureau of Forest Development, cancelling petitioner's timber
license agreement had become final and executory.
Although petitioner sent a letter dated September 19, 1983
to President Marcos seeking reconsideration of the 1983
order of cancellation of the BFD, the grounds stated there
were different from those later relied upon by petitioner for
seeking its reinstatement; (2) because "the fact that
petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have
the earlier administrative actions [cancelling its license and
granting another one covering the same concession to
respondent] reviewed by the court through a petition for
certiorari is prejudicial to its cause." Such special civil action
of certiorari should have been filed within a "reasonable
time." And since none was filed within such period,
petitioner's action was barred by laches; and (3) because
executive evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent
cancellation in the process of formulating policies with
regard to the utilization of timber lands is a prerogative of the
executive department and in the absence of evidence
showing save abuse of discretion courts will not interfere
with the exercise of that discretion.
This case is governed by the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr.
& Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary.
Third. It is finally contended that any "policy consideration on
forest conservation and protection" justifying the decision of
the executive department not to reinstate petitioner's license
must be formally enunciated and cannot merely be implied
from the President's instruction to his subordinates and that,
at all events, the new policy cannot be applied to existing
licenses such as petitioner's.
The President's order reconsidering the resolution of the
Presidential Legal Adviser (insofar as it reinstated the
license of FLDC) was prompted by concerns expressed by
the then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
that "said reinstatement [of FLDC's license] may negate our
efforts to enhance conservation and protection of our forest
resources." There was really no new policy but, as noted in
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere reiteration of a policy
of conservation and protection. The policy is contained in
Art. II, §16 of the Constitution which commands the State "to
protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." There is therefore no merit in
petitioner's contention that no new policy can be applied to
existing licenses.
As to petitioner's contention that the cancellation of its
license constitutes an impairment of the obligation of its
contract, suffice it for us to quote what we held in Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. & Co. Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: 24
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by
public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR,
which were affirmed by the Office of the President,
will disclose public policy considerations which
effectively forestall judicial interference in the case
at bar.
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders
rests the task of implementing the policy to develop
and conserve the country's natural resources, have
indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all
timber license agreements entered into, and
permits or licenses issued, under the previous
dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment is
apparently in response to the renewed and growing
global concern over the despoliation of forest lands
and the utter disregard of their crucial role in
sustaining a balanced ecological system. The
legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. . . .
Thus, while the administration grapples with the
complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the
judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so where, as in
the present case, the interests of a private logging
company are pitted against that of the public at
large on the pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due
 process of law clause [See Sections 3(33) and 20
of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
 
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity
of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO
DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition
for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is
assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that
it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is
violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of
Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed
in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to
be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in
addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the
states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United
States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In
submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the
Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of
a police power measure. The only question is whether or not
it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It
is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response
to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason
that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact
of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression
has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary
power of the State "to govern its citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive
with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that
men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did
not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of
Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest
of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to
one's will." 11 It is subject to the far more overriding demands
and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not
without its own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the
public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private
interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear
misuse of the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question
that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.
It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to
all members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the
preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force
abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative
working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical
and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning
workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government
action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the
Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In
fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In
the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for
isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with
an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no
argument that the Government should act similarly with
respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not
impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are
superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was
largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers
are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not
upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the
Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable
indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this
Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same
thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no
evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then,
that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is
content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations
are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime,
it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part,
the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy,
or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the
Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its
wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect
for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns,
especially when the legislature itself has specifically given
them enough room on how the law should be effectively
enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact,
and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that
Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers
granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the
fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its
own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a
deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is
germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department
Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female
overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the
midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have
suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own
good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions.
Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those
conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say
that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with
a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a
stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary
malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.
Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers. 19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be
applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it
does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument
for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and
arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the
singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group
of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers
deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would
obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the
Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to
as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It
would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and
freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22
(Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such
distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and
stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it
would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the
women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for
favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for
the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of
discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it
would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal
protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly
accords protection to certain women workers, and not the
contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes
a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered
provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has
hot been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment
of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills
defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized
under these guidelines and are exempted from the
suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the
family of Heads of State and Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister
and the other senior government officials;
and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the
diplomatic corps and duly accredited
 international organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with
whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral
labor agreements or understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND
WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing
domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills
shall be allowed to process with the POEA and
leave for worksite only if they are returning to the
same employer to finish an existing or partially
served employment contract. Those workers
returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall
be covered by the suspension and the provision of
these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding
with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare
and protection of Filipino workers. 24
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to
travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject,
among other things, to the requirements of "public safety,"
"as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a
valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its
basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the
respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority
vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes
that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the
right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department
Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative
power. It is true that police power is the domain of the
legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may
not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor
Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment
with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of
worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-
taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must
submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power
of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. 30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all,
decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country
has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound
to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate
protection, personally and economically, while away from
home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an
evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack
or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it
has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not
indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested
that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to
certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by
the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by
the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like
all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in
this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully
accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the
questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The
concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to
maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence
of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government
regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent
living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the
Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of
discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 94125 March 3, 1993
MAYOR JESUS MIGUEL YULO, REPRESENTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, APOLONIO A.
ELASIGUE, AND TEOFILO G. MAMPLATA, ET AL., *
respondents.
Emilio C. Capulong, Jr. for private respondents.
 
BIDIN, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside Resolution No. 89-939 dated
December 7, 1989 and Resolution No. 90-472 dated May
23, 1990 of respondent Civil Service Commission directing
petitioner Mayor Jesus Miguel Yulo of Calamba, Laguna to
reinstate private respondents Teofilo Mamplata, et al., and to
pay their backwages.
On November 24, 1986, private respondent Apolonio A.
Elasigue, Officer in-Charge of the Municipality of Calamba,
Laguna terminated the services of private respondents
Mamplata and forty-three (43) other employees of said
municipality based on the reorganization and approval of the
new staffing pattern thereof (Annex "A", p. 1; Rollo, p.17).
Private respondents Mamplata and the other separated
employees assailed the action of respondent Elasigue
before the Inter-Agency Review Committee created under
Executive Order No. 17 of the then President Corazon
Aquino. Since the private respondents were not removed
pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 and there is no showing
that the reorganization was undertaken to circumvent the
said statute, the Committee referred the case to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of respondent Civil
Service Commission. Pending disposition of the case by the
MSPB, Elasigue lost in the mayoralty election in 1988 to
petitioner Yulo.
The MSPB, finding that there is no sufficient evidence to
prove the guilt of private respondents, ordered the
reinstatement of Mamplata and twenty eight (28) other
employees and the payment of their backwages by the
municipality (Rollo, p. 18).
Petitioner Yulo, as the elected mayor of Calamba, Laguna,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. On appeal,
respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the MSPB.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed later on by petitioner
was denied by respondent Commission which upheld its
earlier ruling but reduced the number of employees to be
reinstated to twenty one (21) (CSC Resolution No. 90-472,
dated May 23, 1992), namely:
 1. Teofilo Mamplata
2. Isagani Fameronag
3. Teresita Ancheta
4. Lourdes Coro
5. Elvira Arevale
6. Rodolfo Adato
7. Gertrudes Terzol
8. Maxima Palema
9. Lourdes Belolo
10. Arturo Samiano
11. Bayas Bacobe
12. Felipe Lazareto
13. Silvino Canillas
14. Leoncio Edrozo
15. Benigno Alcantara
16. Danilo Salustiano
17. Saturnino Centeno, Sr. **
18. Fernando Ustaris
19. Elpedio Garcia
20. Ricardo Ferrer
21. Rafael Alcantara
the reason being that during the pendency of the case
before the MSPB and respondent Commission, some were
re-employed while two of the dismissed employees,
Cresencia Belarmino and Marcial Manila died. Their
untimely death notwithstanding, respondent Commission
ordered the payment of their backwages up to the time of
their respective demise.
Hence, this petition.
The issue in this case is whether the removal of private
respondents Mamplata, et al. from office due to the
reorganization and approval of a new staffing pattern of the
municipal government of Calamba is valid.
Petitioner maintains that the separation of private
respondents was valid and in consonance with Section 2,
Article III of the Freedom Constitution which provides that:
All elective and appointive officials under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or
upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within the period of one year
from February 25, 1986.
To further support this contention, petitioner cites this
Court's ruling in Dario vs. Mison (176 SCRA 84 [1989])
wherein We held that:
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials
under the Provisional Constitution ended on
February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to
February 2, 1987 . . .
Therefore, petitioner argues, the removal of respondents
Mamplata, et al., on November 24, 1986 was valid because
the same was effected before the expiration of the period
above cited.
The argument is devoid of merit. In his narration of facts,
petitioner himself admitted that private respondents' services
were terminated pursuant to the reorganization and approval
of the new staffing pattern of Calamba on November 3, 1986
(Rollo, pp. 4-5). Petitioner's argument to the effect that
respondents were separated from the service by virtue of the
Freedom Constitution or Executive Order No. 17 is palpably
an afterthought. That is why when the respondents appealed
their dismissal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee
created under Executive Order No. 17, said Committee
refused to take cognizance of said appeal on the ground that
the dismissal was not made pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution or Executive Order No. 17 and instead referred
the case on appeal to the MSPB.
It is thus crystal clear that private respondents were not
separated from the service based on Section 2, Article III of
the Freedom Constitution or Executive Order No. 17
implementing the then basic law. On the contrary, their
services were terminated as a "result of the reorganization
and approval of the new staffing pattern of the municipality
of Calamba on November 3, 1986" stated in the individual
notices of termination served upon them by the then OIC
Mayor.
As aptly explained by the respondent Commission:
The first ground, raised by appellant Yulo is devoid
of merit. He argued that the separation of said
employees was in accordance with the Freedom
Constitution of 1986 and the existing laws and
jurisprudence on reorganization. It may be
reiterated here that the main reason why the then
inter-agency Review Committee refused to take
cognizance of the instant case was because
Mamplata et al. were not removed pursuant to
Executive Order No. 17, Said Executive Order
prescribed the rules and guidelines for the
implementation of Section 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution. This declaration on the part
of the Committee, in essence, meant that said
municipal employees were not separated from the
 service under the Freedom Constitution thereby
negating the very foundation of Mayor Yulo's
argument. Although, admittedly, there was a
reorganization of the Municipal Government of
Calamba, Laguna, reorganization per se does not
serve as a license for the local chief executive to
separate career municipal officials and employees
whimsically and indiscriminately. "Reorganization is
improper or invalid when effected without observing
the prescribed priorities in retention and separation,
and without making a fair, just and correct
evaluation of the personnel concerned taking into
account the relevant factors given" [ABACA,
Sisinio, et al., CSC Resolution dated September
20, 1988] (CSC Resolution No. 89-939, p. 2; Rollo,
p. 18; emphasis supplied).
Petitioner Yulo's argument that private respondents were
separated by virtue of the Freedom Constitution is therefore
erroneous.
Not only that. As records further indicate, the MSPB found
that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of
private respondents. As to what were the charges levelled
against the dismissed employees, petitioner Yulo could
merely insinuate that some of said employees were of
"questionable integrity". In support thereof, petitioner
submitted sworn statements to that effect (Exhs. "F" to "M";
Rollo, pp. 42-56), belatedly dated either January 24 or 30,
1990.
It is glaringly obvious, therefore, that at the time private
respondents were dismissed from the service on November
24, l986, there was no evidence to substantiate the claim of
questionable integrity. Simply stated, respondents were
removed without cause.
As this Court held in Dario v. Mison (supra):
At this point, we must distinguish removals from
separations arising from abolition of office (not by
virtue of the Constitution) as a result of
reorganization carried out by reason of economy or
to remove redundancy of operations. In the latter
case, the Government is obliged to prove good
faith. In case of removal undertaken to comply with
clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the
Government is not hard put to prove anything,
plainly and simply because the Constitution allows
it. (citing Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia, 157
SCRA 1 [1988] and other cases).
Aside from petitioner's unproven allegation of "questionable
integrity", neither has he shown that respondents herein
were removed for cause much less that the supposed
reorganization was undertaken on the ground of economy or
redundancy. While there may be a decrease in the number
of positions, i.e., from 285 to 266 as a result of the
reorganization, the number of regular employees, on the
other hand, increased from 231 to 263 brought about by the
appointment of forty-eight (48) new employees. As found by
the MSPB, the separated employees were holding
permanent appointments at the time of their removal and as
such, they enjoy preference in reappointment to a similar
position in the new staffing pattern (Rollo, p. 21, citing CSC
MC 5, s. 1988).
Be that as it may, it is undeniable that private respondents'
employment with the municipality was unlawfully terminated.
On this score alone, the dismissed employees ought to and
must be reinstated. Illegal removal of career civil service
employees in violation of their constitutional right to security
of tenure will not be condoned under the guise of
reorganization (Pari-an v. Civil Service Commission, 202
SCRA 772 [1991]).
Neither can we sustain petitioner's claim that the overt acts
of Mamplata, et al. in filing their separation clearances and
accepting terminal leave benefits estop them from further
claiming reinstatement.
Incidentally, petitioner presented no evidence before the
respondent Commission to prove that private respondents
have actually received their separation benefits. It is only at
this late instance when it opted to do so (Rollo, pp. 208-225).
In any event, receipt by private respondents of their
separation benefits does not preclude them from assailing
the termination of their services and praying for their
reinstatements (Urgelio v. Osmeña, Jr., 10 SCRA 253
[1964].
Petitioner finally argues that if the separation of Mamplata,
et al. be declared illegal, the consequent damage in the form
of backwages among others, should be the personal liability
of private respondent Elasigue and not the innocent
taxpayers of Calamba, Laguna.
Petitioner's argument cannot be sustained. It is a rule in this
jurisdiction that the government, whether national, provincial
or municipal, shall be liable for the acts of its officers or
agents only when such officers or agents had acted strictly
within the scope of their authority as created, conferred and
defined by law (See Mechem, Public Off. & Officers, Secs.
82, 829, 830, 834). However, a public official may be liable
in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Dumlao v.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 247 [1982]).
It is worth noting that respondent Elasigue terminated the
subject employees as a result of the reorganization and
approval of the new staffing pattern of the municipality by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Calamba. Otherwise stated, Elasigue
in terminating the services of respondent employees acted in
his official capacity in the performance of his official duty. In
the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with
malice or bad faith, he cannot be charged with personal
liability for damages that may thereafter result (Mabutol v.
Pascual, 124 SCRA 867 [1983]). Indeed, municipal officers
are liable for damages if they act maliciously or wantonly,
and if the work which they perform is done to injure an
individual rather than to discharge a public duty (Rama v.
Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 496 [1987]). Such malice or
bad faith on the part of a public officer in the performance of
his duties must be shown persuasively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna is hereby
ordered to REINSTATE the twenty (20) personnel named in
CSC Resolution No. 90-472 and pay their backwages
equivalent to five (5) years (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA
175 [1977]; Ginzon v. Municipality of Murcia, 158 SCRA 1
[1988]) less the amount of terminal pay received, it
appearing from private respondents manifestation dated
January 11, 1993 that they are still jobless from the time of
their removal from the service up to the present.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. L-14639            March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as
remarkable as the one which this application for habeas
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to
be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy,
yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is
kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of
popular government, and if we give expression to the
paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent
power of such a government, were constituted. The primary
question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the
men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the
Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these
proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for
other departments of the government, the facts are these:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of
all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for
a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between
October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police.
Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for
sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with
some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary
for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of
October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the
chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of
Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled
some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them
aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women
were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being
taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that
region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
received on board the steamers by a representative of the
Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers.
The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October
29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers
by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by
Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the
hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no
previous notification that the women were prostitutes who
had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further
happenings to these women and the serious charges
growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but
are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to
say, generally, that some of the women married, others
assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others
went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life
unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found
means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the
Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the
attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
number of the deportees presented an application for
habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the
parties, was made to include all of the women who were
sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions
concerned them all, the application will be considered as
including them. The application set forth the salient facts,
which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women
were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police
of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The
writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal
appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann,
admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and
deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted
because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the
action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance
for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their
custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not
extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila.
According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal,
the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In
open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a
member of the court, that these women had been sent out of
Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in
an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor
of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of
Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to
bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to
be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had
returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of
counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the
clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the
day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the
persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced
in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of
those who had been able to come back to Manila through
their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret
service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared,
repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the
stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition
copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the
provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and
telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor
and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered
certain affidavits showing that the women were contained
with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to
Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was
not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because
the women had never been under his control, because they
were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they
had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent
Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the
women under his control and that therefore it was impossible
for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due
deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second
order, which related that the respondents had not complied
with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor
explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that
those of the women not in Manila be brought before the
court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo
on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written
statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the
right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some
other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was
further stated that the question of whether the respondents
were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of
a number of the women, of certain detectives and
policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was
taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919,
the respondents technically presented before the Court the
women who had returned to the city through their own efforts
and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the
respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns,
once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to
account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus.
In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through
their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing
from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one
women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they
desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee,
renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine
had already returned to Manila by other means, and that
despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be
located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were
permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the
court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose
Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police
force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of
Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in
contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica
al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the
record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons
for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision.
We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one
hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and
then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights,
were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to
regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that
the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the
case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the
police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that
these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak
their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the
question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the
Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these
persons from Manila to another distant locality within the
Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands
in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General
can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing
from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission
and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court
of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No.
899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States,
who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland.
New York and other States have statutes providing for the
commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of
being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the
health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a
quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper
colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can
search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even
hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the
chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine
Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense
lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as
are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law
specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of
domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional
system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not
even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the
United States, who has often been said to exercise more
power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary
prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore,
has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere
of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police
could, at their mere behest or even for the most
praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so
insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one
thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the
same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such
power, then any other official can do the same. And if any
official can exercise the power, then all persons would have
just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent
against her wishes and under no law from one locality to
another within the country, then officialdom can hold the
same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed
that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we
pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man,
we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
(Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at
Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard
individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The
law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196,
220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same
high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this
explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and
makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the
primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official
oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the
aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still
rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but
it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any
such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in
force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by
regulations of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more
than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile,
except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and
twenty-five and not more than three thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by
law or by regulation of a general character in force in
the Philippines who shall compel any person to change
his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of
destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and
twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred
and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the
proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has
violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute
and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they
have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless,
that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty
thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant
proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case
which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous
anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully
confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore
might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried
and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal
procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416,
434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the
parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy,
respondents have raised three specific objections to its
issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there
is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court
should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in
question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It
was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and
the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the
city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women
from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by
counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the
deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city
officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition
for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to
be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The
law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it
the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus
if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a
person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been
asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should
have been made returnable before that court. It is a general
rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense
and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be
presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance.
But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge
thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before
the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown
that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or
that the women had any means by which to advance their
plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that
the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was
shown that the case involved parties situated in different
parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still
be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown
that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be
taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider
the application and then to grant the writ would have
amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more
difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel,
the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no
restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and
the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not
extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable
position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum
is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of
habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila
by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as
if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased.
The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until
the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released
or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a
defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality
in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his
official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the
person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had
no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the
true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party
to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the
custody of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport
these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same
officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the
reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been
presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange
as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails
to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of
respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of
Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of
habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a
person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the
State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has
been and continues to be detained in another State. The
membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was
notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and
Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question
presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with
whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American
judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J.,
held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice
Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception
of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear,
the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the
following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice
Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power
of this court to issue the present writ on the petition
which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the
eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been
expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood
shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations,
until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of
right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will
have no sovereign," and after the extension of its
benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of
rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be
discovered that evasion of that great clause for the
protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul
of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If
it is so, it is important that it be determined without
delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy,
as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being
brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions
are confined to the case of imprisonment within the
state — seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was
never the case in England that the court of king's bench
derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from
the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right,
but to compel the observance of rights which
existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode
of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and
served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It
does not reach the former except through the latter. The
 officer or person who serves it does not unbar the
prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court
relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his
constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the
respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be
resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and
imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording
relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are
only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of
confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if
the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the
power of the court he can be compelled to release his
grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased
by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state,
except as greater distance may affect it. The important
question is, where the power of control exercised? And I
am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson
[1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as
authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57
Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the
subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the
Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother
and her husband directing the defendant to produce the
child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain
date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return
stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been
handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his
custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey
the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the
court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was
issued on January 22. That writ commanded the
defendant to have the body of the child before a judge
in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately
after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of
her being taken and detained. That is a command to
bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed,
unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the
nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by
reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession
of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant
had no longer power to produce the child, that might be
an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he
is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is
in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without
lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in
argument to shift the question of contempt to some
anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was
done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a
contempt. But the question is not as to what was done
before the issue of the writ. The question is whether
there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was
issued by not producing the child in obedience to its
commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B.
D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In
re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B.
D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of
interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to
have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three
colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in
his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased
the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he
believed, they were removed beyond the District of
Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus,
and that they were then beyond his control and out of his
custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had
removed the negroes because he suspected they would
apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return
to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to
produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and
refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to
the custody of the marshall until he should produce the
negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law.
The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon
the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes
had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis
produced the two negroes on the last day of the term.
(United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed.
Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111
U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one
of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent
complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding
the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not,
whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as
purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban,
Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to
present the persons named in the writ before the court on
December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918.
The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one
month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record
discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the
21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of
the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his
chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to
return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being
brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three
optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced
the bodies of the persons according to the command of the
writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or
their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the
bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted;
they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did
not present writings that waived the right to be present by
those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits
purporting to show that the women were contended with
their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the
women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to
Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of
Davao, and that about this number either returned at their
own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made,
would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them
to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The,
authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts
all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ
must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court,
said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of
things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every
effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than
write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in
America, and even if necessary himself go after the child,
and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter;
and that the court would only accept clear proof of an
absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the
return did not show that every possible effort to produce the
women was made by the respondents. That the court
forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did
not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of
a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and
because it desired to give the respondents another chance
to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the
respondents appear to have become more zealous and to
have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided.
While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly
contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there
is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect
may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see
this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now
being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive
investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of
her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a
substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this
connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt
of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose
Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police
force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for
the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless
when one is commanded to produce a certain person and
does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court
must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be
guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or
fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in
obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to
do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex
parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99
N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with
judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that
any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the
first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of
their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this
does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a
powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo
appears to have been drawn into the case through a
misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications.
The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no
more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the
city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to
the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the
memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings
him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all
is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official
who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation,
who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who
conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within
his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to
Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila.
His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable.
His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas
corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly
acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty
for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as
much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands
of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt.
Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It
would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban
did comply substantially with the second order of the court,
he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some
members of the court are inclined to this merciful view.
Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding.
The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate
of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
administration of justice to such an extent that his later
activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct.
A nominal fine will at once command such respect without
being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ
of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to
be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of
the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred
pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to
strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los
Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be
taxed against respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we
not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may
serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government
of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
i [1]
Rollo, pp. 44-67. Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia, with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-
De la Cruz, and Renato C. Dacudao concurring.
ii [2]
CA Rollo, pp. 140-175.
iii [3]
Supra, note 1 at 408. Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia, with Associate Justices B.A.
Adefuin-De la Cruz, and Renato C. Dacudao, concurring.
iv [4]
Id. at 69.
v [5]
Id. at 96.
vi [6]
Id. at 92.