Beast Statcon Digests for Saturday, 9/5/2015

Statutory Construction

A. Definition

Caltex vs. Palomar

Facts:
 In 1960, Caltex conceived a promo called “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” in which customers, without having to
purchase Caltex merchandise, may win prizes by estimating the number of liters a hooded gas pump in a Caltex
station will dispense during a specific period.
 The contest has 3 stages – the “Dealer Contest”, “Regional Contest”, and the “National Contest”. Forseeing the
extensive use of the mail for advertising and communications, Caltex sought clearance with the postal authorities.
 Enrico Palomar, the Postmaster General, denied Caltex use of the mail for advertising because the use of the mail
violates Sec. 1954(a) and 1982 of the Revised Administrative Code. Palomar argues that the promo involves
consideration, or if not, that it is a “gift enterprise” prohibited by the Postal Law.
 The trial Court ruled in favor of Caltex, but the respondent appealed.

Issue:
 1) Does petition state a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?
 2) Does petitioner violate the Postal Law?

Held:
 1) Yes. Declaratory relief is a remedy by which the Court applies statutory construction to interpret laws. Caltex'
promo depends on the construction of the provisions in the Postal Law. Construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the intention and meaning of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact
that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
 2) No. The provisions in the Postal Law are meant to prohibit gambling. Even if Caltex' contest was a “gift
enterprise”, it does not encourage gambling because customers are not asked to purchase anything from Caltex to
join the contest.

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao vs. Land Registration Commission

Facts:
 On Oct. 4, 1954, Mateo Rodis sold a parcel of land to petitioner, a corporation sole with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian, as actual incumbent.
 Respondent Registry of Deeds of Davao denied the issuance of a deed in favor of the petitioner because petitioner
is a corporation sole with only one incorporator, who is a foreigner. Philippine law requires that in order for
corporations to be able to own land, at least 60% of such corporations should be owned and controlled by Filipinos,
as required by Sec. 1 and 5 of Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution.
 Land Registration Commissioner also ordered the Registry of Deeds to deny the issuance of a deed, hence the
case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Is the sale violative of Sec. 1 and 5 of Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution?

Held:
 No. In statutory construction, the judiciary assumes that the framers of the law knew what they were talking
about. In the present case, the framers of the Constitution knew about the existence of corporations sole of a
religious nature, and did not intend to include them under the restrictions of said Sec. 1 and 5 of Art. XIII. The
foreign priest is merely an administrator, and the true owners are the local members of the religion.

B. Purpose of Construction

City of Baguio vs. Judge Pio Marcos of CFI Baguio

Facts:
 Private respondent Belong Lutes claims that he and his ancestors were illiterate Igorots who have been in actual,
open, adverese, peaceful, and continuous possession of the land in question since Spanish times. He petitioned in
the respondent court to reopen cadastral proceedings questioning a 1922 decision taking his land for public use.
 The proceedings were instituted in 1912, the decision was made in 1922, and respondents filed for reopening 1961.
 Private petitioners who are tree farm lessees upon agreements executed with the Bureau of Forestry, and the City
of Baguio filed their opposition to the reopening of the case.
  Respondent decided in favor of the petitioner. Petitioners question before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the
court to reopen the case, and if the cadastral court has power to reopen the case.
 RA 931 is the statute in question. The title says “AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT,
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS TO TITLE OF PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN
DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS
NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT”. Sec. 1 speaks of parcels of land that “have been, or about to
be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act.”

Issue:
 Does the cadastral court have power to reopen the case?

Held:
 Yes. In arriving at the decision, the court applied statutory construction. The purpose of statutory construction is
to determine legislative intent. The true object of construction is to ascertain the meaning and will of the
law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced.
 Where literal meaning of the law would not carry out the legislative intent, the title may be resorted to. The title is an
index or clue to the legislative intent of the law. “No bill may be enacted into law which shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”

MCC Industrial vs. Ssangyong Corp.

Facts:
 Petitioner is engaged in importing steel products, respondent is a Korean company supplying respondent with such
products. The two conducted businees via phone calls and fax transmissions.
 On Apr. 13, 2000, Ssangyong confirmed by fax to Mr. Gregory Chan, MCC's manager, MCC's order of 220 MT of
stainless steel at a preferential rate of $1,860. 4 days later, a pro forma invoice letter was sent, saying that MCC has
to pay via letter of credit (L/C) as is the usual practice.
 MCC confirmed, and Ssangyong ordered its manufacturer Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation to make the products
to be sold. MCC, however, said that it could not get a credit line from the bank due to another transaction, and
asked for an extension.
 Exasperated, Ssangyong sent a demand letter to Chan saying that if MCC doesn't give the L/C by Aug. 26, 2000,
Ssangyong will be constrained to cancel the contract and file for damages against MCC.
 Ssangyong filed for damages on Nov. 16, 200l for breach of contract. The Makati RTC awarded damages in favor of
Ssangyong. The CA affirmed the RTC decision but absolved Mr. Chan of damages.
 Petitioner filed case before SC, saying that the lower court erred in admitting as evidence mere photocopies of pro
forma letters sent by fax, and that actual damages should be reduced, if not deleted.

Issue:
 Did court err in admitting photocopies of pro forma letters sent by fax?

Held:
 Yes. The court used the E-Commerce Act of 2000. Said law offered definitions for “electronic data message” and
“electronic document”. While “electronic data message” does not necessarily give rise to an obligation, unlike the
definition for “electronic document”, the legislature intended for them to have similar meanings in the law.
 Looking into the discussions bet. Senators Defensor-Santiago and Magsaysay, it was clear that the legislature
intended for fax messages not to be included under “electronic documents” and therefore inadmissible as electronic
evidence. A photocopy of a fax is even more inadmissible.
 The IRR implementing the E-Commerce Act erred in including fax under electronic documents because it failed to
realize legislative intent.
 MCC, however, is still liable due to other evidence presented proving the existence of the contract. It is not,
however, liable for actual damages.
 In the construction or interpretation of a legislative rule, the primary rule is to search for and determine the
intent and the spirit of the law. A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a
statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the law was enacted, and that tends to
defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment.

C. When construction is resorted to

Garcia vs. Social Security Commission

Facts:
 Petitioner is one of the directors of Impact Corporation, which is engaged in manufacturing aluminum tube
containers. Said business was in financial trouble in 1978, and labor unrest beseiged it in 1980.
  Impact Corporation asked for suspension of payments in the SEC in Mar. 1983.
 On May 8, 1985, the union filed a Notice of Strike before the Ministry of Labor, noting the inability to pay wages, 13 th
month pay, and SSS remittances.
 On Jul. 3, 1985, the SSS filed to collect remittances from Impact Corporation.
 Petitioner argues that Sec. 28(f) of the SSS Law provides that the Director of a corporation is liable only for the
penalties on such corporation, and not for unpaid SSS contributions of said corporation. Petitioner also argues that
only “managing heads”, “managing directors”, or “managing partners” should be held liable.

Issue:
 Is petitioner liable for unpaid contributions?

Held:
 Yes. Sec. 22(a) clearly states that every employer is required to deduct and remit contributions to SSS, and that if
employer fails to pay, 3% penalty shall be imposed. The law clearly says the employer should pay both the
contributions and the penalty.
 Petitioner relied on an argument that Sec. 28(f) of the SSS Law (its managing head, directors, or partners shall be
liable to the penalties provided in this Act) includes only “managing heads, “managing directors”, or “managing
partners”, and wants the court to use statutory construction (ejusdem generis).
 The Court finds no need to resort to statutory construction. The law clearly says 1) managing heads, 2) directors,
and 3) partners.
 Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to apply them
regardless of personal belief or predilections - when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application
not interpretation thereof is imperative.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining

Facts:
 Petitioners are heirs of miners of respondent corporation who were buried in a cave-in incident in Tuba, Benguet.
They filed for damages in the CFI of Manila for negligence.
 The CFI of Manila in Dec. 16, 1968 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdication, stating that the Workmen's
Compensation Commission has original jurisdiction over the case.
 The petitioners argue that it is a civil case based on Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, or the provisions on quasi-delicts.

Issue:
 Does the court have jurisdiction over the case, and did it err in saying that it is a Workmen's Compensation case
and not a civil case?

Held:
 Yes. The case was remanded to the lower court for it has jurisdiction over the case.
 The dissenting opinion, however, postulates that the Court, in saying that the lower courts may try the case, is
essentially legislating, because Sec. 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act says that the rights and remedies
granted to employees excludes those given by the Civil Code.
 A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making body
must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinary,
commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved usage and without
resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-making
body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. Consequently, the grammatical
reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.

Power to Construe

A. Executive Construction

PAFLU vs. Bureau of Labor Relations

Facts:
 Respondent NAFLU won 429 votes to 414 exclusive rights to represent workers of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. in
collective bargaining. Respondent Director of Labor Relations certifies this.
 Petitioner argues that spoiled ballots should be counted, in accordance to the doctrine in Allied Workers' Association
of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations.
 Respondent, however, argues that the doctrine only applies to the time when the Industrial Peace Act was still in
force.
Issue:
 Did respondent commit grave abuse of discretion in saying that the doctrine is irrelevant?

Held:
 No.
 The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the
government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities
need be cited to support it.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Hypermix

The Court, in ruling that CMO 27-2003 as unconstitutional, in violation of the Civil Code provision on publication, and
the equal protection clause, also ruled that the BIR went beyond the delegation to it of legislative powers. The Court
ruled that it violates Sec. 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, which gives customs officers the power to assess and
determine the classification of imported articles. By giving already a classification beforehand (food grade and feed
grade), the BIR is already denying the customs officers of their mandate. Rules and regulations which are product of
delegated power should be in conformity with statutory laws. This is a limitation on the executive's power to construct
laws.

CIR vs. M. Lhuillier

Administrative rules by executive bureaus such as the BIR can be divided into two: legislative rules and interpretative
rules. The first kind needs to be published, the second kind is merely an interpretation, and therefore needs no
publishing. The law in question in the case putting pawnshops in the same classification as lending investors, and
thus subject to the 5% tax, is a legislative rule, and therefore should be published. The BIR did not simply interpret the
law, but imposed a new tax on pawnshops.

Victorias Milling vs. SSC

Facts:
 Petitioner challenges Circular No. 22 of the SSC, which states that effective Nov. 1, 1958, all employers should take
into consideration all bonuses and overtime pay in computing SSS contributions.
 Petitioner says it needs to be approved by the President and published in the Official Gazette because it is a
legislative rule.
 Respondent says it doesn't have to be approved because it is an interpretative rule.

Issue:
 Is Circular No. 22 a legislative rule, or an interpretative rule?

Held:
 It is an interpretative rule, and therefore needs no presidential approval and publication.
 Sec. 8(f) in RA 1161 explicitly excluded bonuses. In RA 1792, however, they are not mentioned, and therefore the
need arose for the BIR to interpret it, and the interpretation was done in Circular No. 22.

B. Judicial Construction

Basis, Extent, and Limitations

Endencia vs. David

Facts:

 Petitioners are judges who assail Sec. 13 of RA 590, and want the refund of the income tax they paid to the BIR,
under respondent commissioner David.
 Petitioners argue that income tax paid by judges is in violation of Sec. 9 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which says
that the salary of judges shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
 Respondent, however, argues that it is not a diminishing of their salary.

Issue:
 Is Sec. 13 of RA 590 constitutional?

Held:
  No. In creating a law that gets income tax from judges, the legislative is making its own interpretation of Sec. 9 of
Art. VIII of the Constitution, by interpreting income taxes to mean that they do not diminish the salary of judges.
 The power to interpret the laws is lodged in the judiciary. The Constitution, in the said provision, intends to
protect the financial autonomy of the judiciary from being held hostage by the other branches, thus maintaining
judicial independence.
 WEIRD LANG KASI JUDGES GET TO DECIDE LAWS TO BENEFIT THEMSELVES

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

Facts:
 Jose Angara filed in the SC for prohibition against the respondent Electoral Commission to restrain it from taking
further cognizance of the electoral protest filed against him by another respondent, Pedro Ynsua. Jose Angara is a
member of the National Assembly.
 Respondent argues that the Electoral Commission is an independent body formed by the 1935 Constitution with
quasi-judicial powers, and whose decisions are final and not appeallable to the Supreme Court.
 Respondent also argues that the Electoral Commission may still take cognizance of the electoral protest filed
against petitioner.

Issue:
 Does SC have jurisdiction?

Held:
 Yes. The Judiciary has the final say over this matter. Natura vaccuum abhorret – nature abhors a vaccuum. When
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries between the 3 branches, it does not assert superiority
over the other branches, but merely asserts the power given to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the constitution. The judiciary, with the Supreme Court as final arbiter, checks the other
departments if they are violative of the Constitution.
 That said, the Court ruled in favor of the respondent, saying that the Electoral Commission indeed has jurisdiction
over the case.

Marcos vs. Manglapus (Secretary of Foreign Affairs), along with other cabinet secretaries

Facts:
 President Cory Aquino said in a statement that she forbids the remains of Ferdinand Marcos to be brought into the
country until such time as the administration or the succeeding one decides to allow it. This is in consideration of
peace and order matters.
 The Marcos family filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the SC.

Issue:
 Did Aquino exercise her power arbitrarily in preventing a Filipino to be buried in his homeland?

Held:
 No. The court clarified the power of the President in this decision. (Separation of powers)
 The Court said that the 1987 Constitution intended to weaken the President's commander-in-chief powers, not the
general exercise of the President's executive power.
 There is no grant of the specific power of legislation to the President, unlike in Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution.
 The President may order such forbidding, in the interest of the public as the President deems it.

IBP vs. Zamora

The IBP seeks to nullify on constitutional grounds President Erap Estrada's order to call out the Marines to help the police in
keeping the peace in Metro Manila. Respondent executive secretary Zamora argued that the court does not have jurisdiction
to decide on this matter because it is a political question. The discretion of the President to call out the armed forces, or to
declare martial law is a matter of his wisdom, and is therefore a political question. However, grave abuse of discretion may be
committed by the President, when the order goes beyond constitutionally mandated limits. The court is deciding on the
legality or constitutionality of the order, not its wisdom, and therefore, it is not a political question as stated by the respondent.
Nevertheless, the Court decided that the order is constitutional.

Requisites for Judicial Review

Southern Hemisphere Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council

Facts:
  Petitioners Southern Hemisphere, and the Makabayan coalition of partylists (Gabriela, Bayan Muna, etc.) seek the
unconstitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007.

Issue:
 May the court take jurisdiction of the case?

Held:
 No. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: 1) there
must be an actual case or controversy, 2) the petitioner must possess locus standi, 3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and 4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case. In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
 The petitioners lack locus standi because none of them have presented a personal stake, i.e., are charged under
RA 9372. A party must have a direct and personal interest, that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some injury as a result of the enforcement of the law, and that it personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury.
 There is no actual case or controversy. The pleadings must show an antagonistic assertion of a right, on one hand,
and a denial, on the other hand. It must concern a real issue and not a theoretical issue. Obscure allegations of
sporadic survaillance and being tagged as communist fronts in now way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution.

Penafrancia Sugar Mill vs. Sugar Regulatory Administration

Facts:
 Responent SRA on Sep. 14, 1995 released Sugar Order No. 2 s. 1995-1996, which provided that a lien of P2.00 per
LKG-bag shall be imposed on all raw sugar quedan-permits, as well as other sugar products, in order to fund the
Philippine Sugar Research Institute.
 Petitioner assailed the validity of said order, and both the RTC and CA upheld the validity.
 While the case is before the Supreme Court, the SRA released Sugar Order No. 5 s. 2013-2014, which revoked the
assailed Sugar Order.

Issue:
 May the Court take cognizance of the case?

Held:
 No. It is moot and academic. A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief
which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts
generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the
judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of
things, it cannot be enforced.

Mendoza vs. Familara

Facts:
 Petitioner is a barangay captain who questions the constitutionality of Sec. 2 of the Local Government Code, and
the retroactive application of the three-term limit imposed on barangay officials beginning from the 1994 barangay
elections.
 On Oct. 2007, respondent filed to disqualify petitioner on the basis that he has been elected 3 consecutive times in
1994, 1997, and 2002.
 Another electoral rival filed to disqualify Mendoza in 2007, and while he won the elections, he was disqualified.
 While the case is pending, the 2010 barangay elections came and went.

Issue:
 Does the Court still have jurisdiction over his case?

Held:
 No. It is moot and academic. The 2010 elections have already brought a new set of leaders for the barangay, which
would render the decision useless anyway.
 Certainly, the rule is not set in stone and permits exceptions. Thus, we may choose to decide cases
otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved; third, the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, the case
 is capable of repetition yet evasive of review. None of the foregoing exceptions calling for this Court to
exercise jurisdiction obtains in this instance.

Kilosbayan vs. Morato

Facts:
 Petitioners seek reconsideration of an earlier ruling by the Supreme Court.
 In the earlier ruling, the Court found the agreement between the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) to be invalid, and thus the two parties agreed to an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) that
does not have the objectionable features of the previous contract.
 Petitioners say that their 1) their standing and 2) that PCSO may not enter into a collaboration or association in
operating an on-line lottery have been decided upon in the previous case, and thus should apply to this new case.

Issue:
 Does petitioner have standing?

Held:
 No. The stricter rule on real parties in interest, used in civil cases, is used rather than the more liberal rule on
standing in constitutionality cases.
 The petitioner argues that it has standing based on Sec. 5, 12, 13, and 17 of Art. II of the Constitution, but these
provisions are not self-executing, nor does the ruling in Oposa vs. Factoran apply, because in the said case, Sec. 16
does confer the right of the people to a healthful and balanced ecology. The other articles do not confer rights which
may be enforceable in courts and thus, give standing.
 Kilosbayan also asserts that as a people's organization, it deserves standing based on Sec. 16, Art. XIII of the
Constitution, which guarantees effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic
decision-making to such organizations. This is because it does not change the rule that only real parties in interest,
or those with standing, may invoke judicial power. In this case, there is no actual case and controversy which
involves the petitioner.
 Neither does petitioner have standing as taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, or legislators. They have only been
allowed to sue 1) in cases involving constitutional issues and 2) under certain conditions. Taxpayers are only
allowed to sue when there is illegal disbursement of government funds which come from their taxes. Voters are
allowed to question election laws only. Concerned citizens are only allowed to sue when the issue is of
transcendental importance. Legislators are only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which
they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
 In addition to not having standing, the doctrines of “the law of the case” and res judicata do not apply, because the
cause in the first case is different from this case. The contract in question in this case is not the same as the one in
the first case, and it doesn't have the objectionable features found in the first agreement.

David vs. Arroyo

In the case, PP 1021 has already lifted the state of emergency, and thus cancelling the effects of PP 1017 and GO 5.
Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent President, argues that the case has become moot and academic by virtue of the
lifting, thus, there is no more actual case and controversy. However, the Court admit exceptions to lack of an actual case
and controversy, when 1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution, 2) the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public is involved, and 3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and 4) if the case is capable of repetition and yet evading review . In this
case all 4 exceptions are present. With regard to standing, some of the petitioners do not have locus standi, as they do not
fall under valid taxpayer, voter, concerned citizen, or legislator suits. However, the case is entertained by the court,
because the issue falls under the doctrine of transcendental importance.

BPI vs. Shemberg Biotech Corporation

Facts:
 Respondent filed for approval of its rehabilitation plan before the RTC of Cebu City. Petitioner opposed the
rehabilitation plan.
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent on Oct. 12, 2001, saying that Shemberg complied with the requirements for
rehabilitation.
 The CA upheld the RTC ruling, hence the petition.
 The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Coportate Rehabilitation before
the SC for the first time, and not in the lower court.

Issue:
 May constitutionality be raised before the SC if it hasn't been raised in the lower court?
Held:
 No. The four requisites of judicial review are that: 1) there must be an actual case and controversy, 2) locus standi of
the petitioner, 3) constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, and 4) constitutionality is the
very lis mota of the case. In this case, the 3rd requisite is not present, because constitutionality was only raised in the
SC. The Court said that in Umali vs. Guingona, Jr., the Court did not even accept a case where the constitutionality
was raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC ruling.

Carbonilla vs. Board of Airlines Representatives

Facts:
 Petitioner Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 amending CAO 7-92 that increases
the overtime rates of customs personnel in NAIA.
 Usec. Mendoza of the Dept. of Finance, and the Office of the President upheld the validity of CAO 1-2005.
Publication requirement has been satisfied, because there have been meetings with stakeholders prior to the
coming out of the order. Petitioner Carbonilla et al motioned to intervene as parties in interest because they are
customs personnel in NAIA.
 The Court of Appeals ruled in the BAR's favor. In its decision, it passed upon the validity of CAO 7-92 and Sec. 3506
of the TCCP.

Issue:
 Does Carbonilla have standing as an intervenor?
 Did the CA err in passing upon the validity of CAO 7-92 and Sec. 3506 of the TCCP?

Held:
 No. He was after back payments for services rendered, and not for the increase in overtime rates, and therefore he
should have filed a separate case instead.
 No. While the issue was not raised for the first time in the lower court (in the Usec's office), higher courts may still
pass upon the constitutionality of statues and administrative regulations. The Court has ruled that the Court of
Appeals is imbued with sufficient authority and discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as
errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution
of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. Further, while it is
true that the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the first opportunity, this Court, in the exercise of
sound discretion, can take cognizance of the constitutional issues raised by the parties in accordance with
Section 5(2)(a), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

General vs. Urro

Facts:
 Petitioner seeks the unconstitutionality of the appointment of respondent as commissioner of NAPOLCOM. General
is also a commissioner of NAPOLCOM.
 Petitioner was appointed in an acting capacity on 2008 to serve out the remainder of the term of the deceased
commissioner Roces.
 Later, PGMA appointed Urro as General's replacement, with an appointment paper dated Mar. 5, 2010.
 Pres. Noynoy Aquino was elected president, and he issued EO No. 2 revoking midnight appointments made by the
previous administration, which includes respondent. Such midnight appointments include those given before Mar.
11, 2010, but whose offices only become vacant after the date. Roces was supposed to have finished on Sep. 2010,
which is after Mar. 2010.
 Petitioner argues that he is the legally subsisting commissioner until the new president has appointed another
qualified commissioner to replace him. Petitioner also seeks the remedy of quo warranto, for the court to recognize
that he is the rightful commissioner. Quo warranto is a remedy by which a person may assert his entitlement to hold
a public office.

Issue:
 May the court pass upon the constitutionality of Urro's appointment?

Held:
 No. The fourth requisite of judicial review, which is that the constitutionality is the lis mota of the case. In this case,
the lis mota, or the primary issue of the case, is not the constitutionality of Urro's appointment, but petitioner's right
to hold office, because if petitioner establishes his right to hold office, then the constitutionality of Urro's appointment
won't matter anymore.
 General only has a temporary appointment anyway, so he does not have cause of action for a quo warranto.

Effect of Unconstitutionality
Peralta vs. CSC

Facts:
 Petitioner was appointed as Trade Specialist II in the DTI on Sep. 25, 1989.
 On Dec. 8, 1989, he received his first salary (WOW TAGAL, GOVERNMENT TALAGA) covering the period from
Sep. 25 to Oct. 31. Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount
corresponding to his absences on Sep. 29 and Oct. 20, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays succeeding those 2
Fridays. Thus, he got deductions for Sep. 29 and 30, Oct. 1, 20, 21, and 22.
 Petitioner sought clarification from the General Administrative Service, who told him that Chapter 5.49 of the
Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service, that if the employee is absent without leave on the day
immediately preceeding a Saturday, Sunday, or a Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without
pay.
 CSC Chairman Patrica Sto. Tomas that none of the Civil Service Laws provide a provision which supports the
regulation in question.
 On May. 25, 1990, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 90-497, and later, 90-797 upholding the
deduction to petitioner's salary, sayting that such policy on absences on Fridays or Mondays has been in effect
since 1965.
 Memorandum No. 16 issued by CSC Chair Sto. Tomas later in 1991 has effectively made the Resolutions invalid.
While this may have made the case moot and academic, the court decided on whether or not the policy has been in
effect since 1965, because it will affect back payments made to petitioner.
 The Supreme Court ruled the resolutions to be invalid.

Issue:
 What is the effect of invalidation of the assailed resolutions?

Held:
 It should be as if they have not been valid from the beginning.
 The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as
though it had never been passed.
 However, to refund all the lost earnings of all the other employees over such a long period of time may cause
financial constraints. The Court must take this into consideration. Thus, the Court did not order the CSC to give back
all these lost earnings, and instead, calls upon the CSC and Congress the handle this situation with justice and
equity.
 The CSC, however, is ordered to give petitioner his lost earnings.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. San Roque Power

Facts:
 3 consolidated cases involving the CIR, against San Roque Power, Taganito Mining, and Philex Mining.
 The 3 companies filed for refund of taxes. Par. (A) and (C) of Sec. 112 of the Tax Code allows companies with zero-
rated sales to file judicial claims for refund if their administrative claims before the CIR are fully or partially denied, or
if the CIR fails to act on the claims within 120 days. Companies may file for refund within 30 days of receiving the
denial, or after 120 days have passed and the CIR has not acted on their petitions.
 San Roque and Taganito filed prematurely, and Philex filed too late, after 426 days.
 San Roque filed on April 10, 2003.
 The BIR came out with BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on Dec. 10, 2003, which states that the taxpayer need not wait
for the 120 + 30 day period to lapse.
 Taganito filed on Feb. 14, 2007.
 The SC decided on the case of CIR vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia on Oct. 6, 2010, reinstating the mandatory
application of the 120 + 30 day periods.

Issue:
 When did the interpretation of Par. (A) and (C) of Sec. 112 of the Tax Code take effect?

Held:
 Art. 8 of the Civil Code says judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines.
 While the interpretation should have taken effect since the passage of the Tax Code, it should not prejudice
Taganito, which filed after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the Aichi decision. Taganito filed it
in good faith while the erroneous interpretation of the BIR was still in force.
 Thus, San Roque's petition must be denied, but Taganito's petition must be granted. Meanwhile, Philex' petition
must be denied because if the CIR does not act on a petition, it is deemed a denial, and therefore, the 30 day period
begins after the 120 days.
Lopez vs. CA

Facts:
 Petitioner is Chairman of the PCSO.
 A case was filed against respondent Romeo Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department of the PCSO, in the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman suspended him for 6 months and 1 day.
 The CA, however, issued a TRO enjoining the Ombudsman from implementing the suspension order until