[G.R. No. 119347.
March 17, 1999] respondents
EULALIA RUSSELLv. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A.
VESTIL
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari  to set aside the Order
dated January 12, 1995 issued by respondent Judge
Augustine A. Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, dismissing the complaint filed by
petitioners on ground of lack of jurisdiction, as well as his
Order dated February 13, 1995 denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint
against private respondents, denominated
"DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN 2275. The complaint, in
substance, alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that
parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and
containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or
less. The land was previously owned by the spouses
Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of
said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal
heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since
then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners
discovered a public document denominated
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION
OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION,"
executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private
respondents divided the property among themselves to
the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the
said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document
was false and perjurious as the private respondents were
not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the
property whatsoever had been made between the heirs.
The complaint prayed that the document be declared null
and void and an order be issued to partition the land
among all the heirs.1cräläwvirtualibräry
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss2 the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total
assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which
under section 33 (3)3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691,4 falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan,
Compostela.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss6 saying that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is
incapable of pecuniary estimation within the
contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as
amended.7cräläwvirtualibräry
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an
Order granting the Motion to Dismiss.8 A Motion for
Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners on
January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to
law because their action is not one for recovery of title to
or possession of the land but an action to annul a
document or declare it null and void,9 hence, one
incapable of pecuniary estimation failing within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Private
1|Page
did not oppose the motion for
reconsideration.
On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued
another Order denying the motion for
reconsideration.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is
whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to
entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed
before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of a
document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND
DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL
PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the
action is one for re-partition and since the assessed value
of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00,
then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
For better appreciation of the facts, the pertinent portions
of the complaint are reproduced hereunder:
xxx
3. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal
heirs of spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho
who died long time ago;
4. That in life the spouses became the owners in fee
simple of a certain parcel of land, which is more
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land containing 56,977.40 square meters,
more or less, located at Cotcot, Liloan, Cebu.
designated as Lot 6149 per Technical Description and
Certification issued by the Office of the Land Management
copy of which are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and
"A-1" and are made part hereof: total assessed value
is P5,000.00;
5. That the land passed to the children of the spouses.
(who are all deceased except for defendant Marcelo
Tautho), namely: Zacarias, Epifania, Vicenta, Felicisimo,
Maria, Lorencia and Marcelo, and which in turn passed to
the plaintiffs and defendants upon their death they being
their descendants and legal heirs;
6. That the subject parcel of land has for year been
undivided by and among the legal heirs of said previous
owners;
7. That, very recently, plaintiffs discovered a public
document, which is a declaration of heirs and deed of
confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition,
affecting the land executed by and among the defendants
whereby defendants divided the property among
themselves to the exclusion of plaintiffs who are entitled
thereto; attached hereto as Annex "B" and is made part
hereof is xerox copy of said document;
8. That the instrument (Annex "B") is false and perjurious
and is a complete nullity because the defendants are not
the only heirs of Casimero Tautho; plaintiffs are also legal
heirs and descendants of said deceased; moreover, there
has been no oral partition of the property;
9. That pursuant to said document (Annex "B"),
defendants had procured tax declarations of the land for
their supposed "shares" to the great damage and
prejudice of plaintiffs;
10. That the property in controversy should be divided
into seven (7) equal parts since Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria N. Tautho had seven children;
11. That the parties had failed to settle the controversy
amicably at the barangay level; attached hereto as Annex
"C" is Certification to file Action;
12. That by reason of the foregoing unjust and illegal act
of defendants, plaintiffs were forced to bring instant
action and contract the services of the undersigned
counsel with whom they bind themselves to
pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court to declare null and void the document
(Annex "B") of declaration of heirs and confirmation and
to order the partition of the land into seven (7) equal
parts; each part shall respectively go to the seven (7)
children of Casimero Tautho and considering six (6) of
them died already the same shall go to their children or
descendants, and to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs
attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies
just and equitable under the premises.11
We agree with petitioners.
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is
doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and
therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In  Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill,[12 we had the occasion
to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).13
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are
those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of
mortgage or annulment of judgment;14 also actions
questioning the validity of a mortgage,15 annulling a deed
of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid16 and
for rescession, which is a counterpart of specific
performance.17cräläwvirtualibräry
2|Page
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically
mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or
MCTC where the assessed value of the real property
involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila,
or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value
exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it
is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under
Sec. 19(2).18cräläwvirtualibräry
However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case
is annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION
OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is
to declare null and void the document in which private
respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the
late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and
divided his property among themselves to the exclusion
of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled
to the property. While the complaint also prays for the
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the
main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the
document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein.19cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Order dismissing Civil Case No.
MAN-2275, as well as the Order denying the motion for
reconsideration of said Order, is SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 165777               July 25, 2011
CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], substituted by her
HEIRS, represented by LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER,
and RHODORA R. PELOMIDA as their Attorney-in-fact, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated
September 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 60764.
On August 26, 1999, respondents Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor
(Rosario), Nepthalie Castor Itucas, Ferolyn Castor Facurib
(Ferolyn), Rachel De Castor, Lea Castor Dollolosa and Rosalie
Castor Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
General Santos City a Complaint3 for ownership, possession and
damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two
documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's
conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land
against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria, defendants Avelino
Gumban, Dolores Cagaitan, Zacasio Poutan, PO1 Jonas
Montales, Ignacio Olarte and alias Dory. Respondent Rosario is
the surviving wife of the late Fernando Castor, while the rest of
the respondents are their legitimate children. The documents they
sought to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest
including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960 allegedly
executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's
father; and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November
23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to Dismiss4 (Ex-Abundante Ad
Cautelam) on the following grounds: (1) the claim or demand has
been extinguished by virtue of the valid sale of Lot No. 1615 to
Eugenio; (2) the action is barred by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription; (3) the action is barred by laches; and (4) plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action, or filed the case prematurely for
failure to resort to prior barangay conciliation proceedings.
Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to
Dismiss5 raising the following additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs
have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has no jurisdiction
over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full.
Respondents filed their Opposition thereto.
On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order6 denying the
motion to dismiss, to wit:
After the motion to dismiss and its addendum have been received,
it is now ripe for resolution. One of the grounds alleged in the
complaint is for the recovery of conjugal share on Lot No. 1615, of
Pls-209 D with damages.
It is alleged that the late Fernando Castor and Rosario Dideles
Vda. de Castor were married on September 15, 1952, and the
application to the land was dated January 17, 1952 and the patent
was issued by the President on November 19, 1954.
The said land was sold to the defendant on October 3, 1960
(Annex C) and an Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23,
1960 which was made a part thereof as Annex "D." Considering
the marriage of September 15, 1992, the said land became
conjugal as of the date of the marriage and, therefore, ½ thereof
belongs to the wife, Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor.
Thus, considering the above, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.7
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,8 which the
RTC denied in an Order9 dated February 4, 2000.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion10 asking the RTC to resolve
the issues of (1) whether or not the complaint should be
dismissed or expunged from the records pursuant to Supreme
Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings contained
in the Order dated February 4, 2000; and (3) holding in abeyance
the submission of the answer to the complaint.
Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to
Allow11 them to continue prosecuting this case as indigent
litigants.
On March 8, 2000, the RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion in an
Order12 that read in this wise:
On the omnibus motion regarding filing fees, the plaintiffs
asserted in its motion that they are charging defendant actual and
compensatory damages such as are proved during the hearing of
this case. So also are attorney’s fees and moral damages, all to
be proved during the hearing of this case.
Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession (sic)
to determine how much is to be charged.
At any rate, if after hearing the Clerk of Court determine that the
filing fees is still insufficient, considering the total amount of the
claim, the Clerk of Court should determine and, thereafter, if any
amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to
pay the same x x x.
As to the second issue, the same has already been decided in its
order dated February 4, 2000.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the omnibus motion is
DENIED.
The defendant shall file their answer within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this order.13
3|Page
From this Order, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
clarification on whether plaintiffs should be allowed to continue
prosecuting the case as indigent litigants.
On March 30, 2000, the RTC issued a Clarificatory
Order14 reading as follows:
As has been said, the plaintiff asserted in its motion that they are
charging defendants actual and compensatory damages as has
been proved during the hearing of this case. So also are
attorney's fees and moral damages all to be proved during the
hearing of this case.
Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession (sic)
to determine how much is to be charged.
At any rate, after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the
filing fee is still insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien
on the judgment that may be entered.
As to the motion seeking from the Honorable Court allowance to
allow plaintiff to continue prosecuting this case as indigent
litigants, suffice it to say that the same is already provided for in
this order.
WHEREFORE, the defendants shall file their answer within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this Order.15
In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the
nullification of the Order dated November 19, 1999 and the
subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.
In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition.
The CA found that SC Circular No. 7 would not apply where the
amount of damages or value of the property was immaterial; that
the Circular could be applied only in cases where the amount
claimed or the value of the personal property was determinative of
the court's jurisdiction citing the case of Tacay v. RTC of Tagum,
Davao del Norte.16 The CA found that respondents had paid the
corresponding docket fees upon the filing of the complaint, thus,
the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the failure
to state the amount of damages claimed in the body of the
complaint or in the prayer thereof. The CA found that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. It noted
that the RTC's Clarificatory Order dated March 30, 2000, which
stated that "if after hearing the Clerk of Court determines that the
filing fee is still insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien
on the judgment that may be entered" was in accordance with the
rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion.17 The CA
proceeded to state that a judicious examination of the complaint
pointed to a determination of the respective rights and interests of
the parties over the property based on the issues presented
therein which could only be determined in a full-blown trial on the
merits of the case.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied
in a Resolution dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among
others, that the defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches
were likewise unavailing. It found that the subject property is
covered by a Torrens title (OCT No. V-19556); thus, it is axiomatic
that adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim
of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a
Torrens title; that unless there are intervening rights of third
persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a decision
directing the return of the lot to petitioner, the equitable defense of
laches will not apply as against the registered owner.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises
the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE
RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT
DOCKET FEES.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE ACTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS
BARRED BY LACHES AND EXTRAORDINARY
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.18
We find the petition without merit.
Preliminarily, although not raised as an issue in this petition, we
find it necessary to discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of this case. Respondents' complaint was filed in
1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg.
129.19 Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that
the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the
following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x
Section 3 of RA No. 7691 expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the first level courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law (BP Blg. 129) is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
4|Page
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, we would
first determine whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this case based on the above-quoted provisions.
The Complaint filed by respondents in the RTC was for
ownership, possession and damages, and alternative causes of
action either to declare two documents as patent nullities and/or
for recovery of conjugal share on the subject land with damages
or redemption of the subject land. In their Complaint, respondents
claimed that Rosario and Fernando are the registered owners of
the subject land with an assessed value of ₱12,780.00; that the
couple left the cultivation and enjoyment of the usufruct of the
subject land to Fernando's mother and her second family to
augment their means of livelihood; that respondent Rosario and
Fernando thought that when the latter's mother died in 1980, the
subject land was in the enjoyment of the second family of his
mother, but later learned that the subject land was leased by
petitioner Ceferina; that sometime in August 1999, respondents
learned of the existence of the Deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3, 1960,
where Fernando had allegedly transferred his rights and interests
on the subject land in favor of Eugenio, petitioner Ceferina's
father, as well as an Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November
23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner Ceferina; that
Fernando's signature in the Deed of Transfer was not his but a
forgery; and the Affidavit of Relinquishment was also void as it
was a direct result of a simulated Deed of Transfer.
Respondents prayed that they be declared as absolute and lawful
owners of the subject land and to order petitioner and the other
defendants to vacate the premises and restore respondents to its
possession and enjoyment therefore. On their second cause of
action, they prayed that the Deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest Including Improvements Thereon be declared as a
forgery, purely simulated and without any consideration; hence,
inexistent, void ab initio and/or a patent nullity, as well as the
Affidavit of Relinquishment which was the direct result of the Deed
of Transfer. Respondents also prayed in the alternative that if the
Deed be finally upheld as valid, to order petitioner to reconvey to
respondent Rosario the undivided one-half portion of the subject
land as conjugal owner thereof and to account and reimburse her
of its usufruct; and/or to allow them to redeem the subject land.
It would appear that the first cause of action involves the issue of
recovery of possession and interest of the parties over the subject
land which is a real action. Respondents alleged that the
assessed value of the subject land was ₱12,780.00 based on Tax
Declaration No. 15272. Thus, since it is a real action with an
assessed value of less than ₱20,000.00, the case would fall under
the jurisdiction of the MTC as provided under the above-quoted
Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended.
Notably, however, respondents in the same Complaint filed
alternative causes of action assailing the validity of the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest executed by Fernando in favor of
petitioner's father. Respondents also sought for the reconveyance
to respondent Rosario of the undivided one-half portion of the
subject land as conjugal owner thereof in case the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest will be upheld as valid; and/or for
redemption of the subject land. Clearly, this is a case of joinder of
causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of
possession of, or any interest in the real property under
contention, but includes an action to annul contracts and
reconveyance which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
thus, properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.20
In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,21 we held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).22
Thus, respondents correctly filed their Complaint with the RTC.
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in
court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the
requisite docket and filing fees.23 It is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action.24
Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action
or a permissive counter-claim or money claim against an estate
not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-
party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention,
and for all clerical services in the same, if the total-sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in
litigation, is:
xxxx
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated ........ ₱400.00
2. x x x
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if
there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.25
Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract
which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling
within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be
based on the assessed value of the subject land as claimed by
petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based on Section
7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees
Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of
₱400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other
fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents'
proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once
acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated. 26
Notably, petitioner’s claim that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
in this case is premised on her contention that respondents
violated SC Circular No. 7 issued on March 24, 1998 requiring
that all complaints must specify the amount of damages sought
not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer to be
accepted and admitted for filing. Petitioner argues that
respondents alleged in paragraph 13 of their Complaint that:
(T)he reasonable rental for the use of the [subject] land is
₱2,000.00 per hectare, every crop time, once every four months,
or ₱6,000.00 a year per hectare; that defendants in proportion
and length of time of their respective occupancy is and/or are
jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs of the produce thereby in
the following proportions, viz: (a) for defendant Ceferina de Ungria
for a period of time claimed by her as such; (b) for defendants
Dolores Cagautan, a certain alias "Dory," and PO1 Jonas
Montales, of an undetermined area, the latter having entered the
area sometime in 1998 and defendant alias "Dory," only just few
months ago; that defendant Ignacio Olarte and Zacasio Puutan of
occupying about one-half hectare each.27
and in their prayer asked:
5|Page
x x x Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, in proportion
to the length and area of their respective occupancy, to pay
reasonable rentals to the plaintiffs in the proportion and amount
assessed in paragraph 13 of the First Cause of Action.
xxxx
(a) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiffs actual and compensatory damages such as are
proved during the hearing of this case;
(b) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiffs attorneys' fees and moral damages, all to be
proved during the hearing of this case.28
Thus, the RTC should have dismissed the case, since
respondents did not specify the amount of damages in their
prayer.
We are not persuaded.
SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,29where we held
that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount of
damages being asked for shall not be accepted or admitted, or
shall otherwise be expunged from the record; and that the Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee.
However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,30 we laid
down the following guidelines in the payment of docket fees, to
wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in
no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim
by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of
the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Subsequently, in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,31 we said:
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for payment
of damages "in amounts justified by the evidence" does not call
for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC Circular No.
7, dated March 24, 1988 which required that all complaints must
specify the amount of damages sought not only in the body of the
pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be accepted and
admitted for filing. Sun Insurance effectively modified SC Circular
No. 7 by providing that filing fees for damages and awards that
cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally granted
by the trial court.
x x x judgment awards which were left for determination by the
court or as may be proven during trial would still be subject to
additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial
court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fees.32
A reading of the allegations in the complaint would show that the
amount of the rental due can only be determined after a final
judgment, since there is a need to show supporting evidence
when the petitioner and the other defendants started to possess
the subject land. Thus, we find no reversible error committed by
the CA when it ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the RTC in issuing its Order dated March 30, 2000,
where the RTC stated that "since there was no hearing yet,
respondents are not in a position to determine how much is to be
charged and that after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that
the filing fee is still insufficient, the same shall be considered as
lien on the judgment that may be entered."
Petitioner claims that the action is barred by extraordinary
acquisitive prescription and laches. Petitioner contends that she
took possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open,
exclusive, notorious and continuous since 1952 through her
predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio, and by herself up to the
present; that the late Fernando and private respondents had
never taken possession of the land at any single moment; and
that, granting without admitting that the transfer of rights between
Fernando and Eugenio was null and void for any reason
whatsoever, petitioner's possession of the land had already
ripened into ownership after the lapse of 30 years from August
1952 by virtue of the extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
We are not persuaded.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to
registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.33 Prescription is unavailing not only against the
registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.34 In
this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a titled
property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor,
married to Rosario Dideles.
Petitioner claims that respondent had impliedly admitted the fact
of sale by Fernando to Eugenio in August 1952, but only
according to respondents, the sale was null and void because it
violated the provisions of the Public Land Act. Petitioner argues
that the application of Fernando, dated January 17, 1952, was not
the homestead application referred to in Sections 118 and 124 of
the Public Land Act; and that Fernando's application was only as
settler, or for the allocation of the subject land to him vice the
original settler Cadiente.
Such argument does not persuade.
The trial in this case has not yet started as in fact no answer has
yet been filed. We find that these issues are factual which must be
resolved at the trial of this case on the merits wherein both parties
will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims
and defenses.
Anent petitioner's defense of laches, the same is evidentiary in
nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings. Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a
valid ground to dismiss respondents' complaint.35 Notably, the
allegations of respondents in their petition filed before the RTC
which alleged among others:
7. That sometime between the years 1965 to 1970,
defendant Ceferina de Ungria, accompanied by Miss
Angela Jagna-an, appeared in the residence of plaintiff
Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor in Bo.1, Banga, South
Cotabato, and requested her to sign a folded document
with her name only appearing thereon, telling her that it
has something to do with the land above-described, of
which she refused telling her that she better return it to
the person who requested her to do so (referring to her
mother-in-law), more so that her husband was out at that
time;
6|Page
8. That when the matter was brought home to Fernando
Castor, the latter just commented that [his] mother
desires the land above-described to be sold to defendant
Ceferina de Ungria which however he was opposed to
do so even as they occasionally come into heated
arguments everytime this insistence on the same subject
propped up;
9. That even after the death of the mother of the late
Fernando Castor in Bo. Bula, City of General Santos,
sometime in 1980, the latter and his surviving wife
thought all the while that the land above-described was
in the enjoyment of his late mother's family with his 2nd
husband; that it was only after sometime when plaintiff
Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor heard that the land
above-described had even been leased by defendant
Ceferina de Ungria with the Stanfilco and Checkered
farm;
10. That sometime in 1997, defendant Ceferina de
Ungria sent overtures to plaintiffs through Ester Orejana,
who is the half sister-in-law of plaintiff Rosario Dideles
Vda. de Castor that she desires to settle with them
relating to the land above-described; that the overtures
developed into defendant Ceferina de Ungria meeting for
the purpose plaintiff Ferolyn Castor Facurib where the
negotiation continued with Lolita Javier as attorney-in-
fact after defendant Ceferina de Ungria left to reside in
Manila and which resulted later to the attorney-in-fact
offering the plaintiffs ₱100,000.00 to quitclaim on their
rights over the said land, which offer, however, was
refused by plaintiffs as so [insignificant] as compared to
the actual value of the same land; that in that
negotiation, defendant Ceferina de Ungria was
challenged to show any pertinent document to support
her claim on the land in question and where she meekly
answered by saying at the time that she does not have
any of such document;
x x x x36
would not conclusively establish laches.1avvphil Thus, it is
necessary for petitioners to proceed to trial and present
controverting evidence to prove the elements of laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176858               September 15, 2010
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented by CLAUDIO
PADILLA, vs. DOMINADOR MAGDUA, 
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Orders dated 8 September 20062 and 13 February 20073 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34, in Civil
Case No. 2001-10-161.
The Facts
Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a piece
of land located in San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanita’s
death on 23 March 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita,
sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their
eldest brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans for
the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June 1998 written by
Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to find out
that Ricardo had declared the land for himself, prejudicing their
rights as co-heirs. It was then discovered that Juanita had
allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property4 (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making
him the sole owner of the land. The records do not show that the
land was registered under the Torrens system.
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of
Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership, possession,
partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the sale
of the land by Ricardo’s daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia
Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The
sale was made during the lifetime of Ricardo.
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had
the land transferred in his name without the consent and
knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to
1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. However,
when Ricardo and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left for
Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third
parties.
Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the
Affidavit is highly questionable because on 15 May 1978 Juanita
executed a written instrument stating that she would be leaving
behind to her children the land which she had inherited from her
parents.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land was within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte.
In an Order dated 20 February 2006,5 the RTC dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed
value of the land in the amount of ₱590.00 was less than the
amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the
case.6
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued
that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed
of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond
pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription.
In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its
previous stand and took cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9
of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed only
in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was executed in
1966. The RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his
inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs
appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other
heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since
prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under
the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could also be
taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardo’s daughters in
favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion of the order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the Court is
reconsidered in so far as the pronouncement of the Court that it
has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action. The dismissal of
the action, however, is maintained not by reason of lack of
jurisdiction but by reason of prescription.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration which the RTC
denied in an Order dated 13 February 2007 since petitioners
raised no new issue.
Hence, this petition.
7|Page
The Issue
The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by
prescription.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint
on the ground of prescription. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit
executed in 1966 does not conform with the requirement of
sufficient repudiation of co-ownership by Ricardo against his co-
heirs in accordance with Article 494 of the Civil Code. Petitioners
assert that the Affidavit became part of public records only
because it was kept by the Provincial Assessor’s office for real
property tax declaration purposes. However, such cannot be
contemplated by law as a record or registration affecting real
properties. Petitioners insist that the Affidavit is not an act of
appropriation sufficient to be deemed as constructive notice to an
adverse claim of ownership absent a clear showing that
petitioners, as co-heirs, were notified or had knowledge of the
Affidavit issued by their mother in Ricardo’s favor.
Respondent Dominador, on the other hand, maintains that
Juanita, during her lifetime, never renounced her signature on the
Affidavit or interposed objections to Ricardo’s possession of the
land, which was open, absolute and in the concept of an owner.
Dominador contends that the alleged written instrument dated 15
May 1978 executed by Juanita years before she died was only
made known lately and conveys the possibility of being fabricated.
Dominador adds that the alleged ‘highly questionable signature’ of
Juanita on the Affidavit was only made an issue after 35 years
from the date of the transfer in 1966 until the filing of the case in
2001. As a buyer in good faith, Dominador invokes the defense of
acquisitive prescription against petitioners.
At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal except under any of the following
circumstances: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific
evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding
of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings
of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.8
We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on
the ground of prescription based solely on the Affidavit executed
by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the property
from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is speculative.
Thus, a review of the case is necessary.
Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dominador
based on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that
the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the
Affidavit was executed on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the
present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than 30
years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in
favor of Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the action
to question the Affidavit had already prescribed.
After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly
relied on the Affidavit alone in order to dismiss the case without
considering petitioners’ evidence. The facts show that the land
was sold to Dominador by Ricardo’s daughters, namely Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo.
However, the alleged deed of sale was not presented as evidence
and neither was it shown that Ricardo’s daughters had any
authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. No cogent evidence
was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to, acquiesced
in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to Dominador. In its
8 September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily concluded that
Ricardo’s daughters had legal personality to sell the property:
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas had no legal personality or right to
[sell] the subject property is of no moment in this case. It should
be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against [his]
daughters and not the herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia
might have already consented to or ratified the alleged deed of
sale.9
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any
proof to show that Ricardo’s possession of the land had been
open, continuous and exclusive for more than 30 years in order to
establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription.10 Dominador
merely assumed that Ricardo had been in possession of the land
for 30 years based on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The
petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed with the RTC
for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages,
alleged that Ricardo left the land after he separated from his wife
sometime after 1966 and moved to another place. The records do
not mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to go
back to the land or whether Ricardo’s family ever lived there.
Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land
declared in his name for taxation purposes from 1966 after the
Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case was filed.
Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is
evidence of claim to possession of the land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of
the land. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive
prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494
of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order
that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites
must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3)
that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.11
In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After
Juanita’s death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their
mother’s land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about
the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified
petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for
himself. Accordingly, Ricardo’s interest in the land had now
become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their
claim of entitlement to the land. In Generosa v. Prangan-
Valera,12 we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of
one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had
repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised
of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the
prescriptive period begins to run.
However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run
only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of
Ricardo’s repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners
filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition
8|Page
and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere
three years had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the
10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription period required by law
in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land.
Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.
Further, Dominador’s argument that prescription began to
commence in 1966, after the Affidavit was executed, is erroneous.
Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC
that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more than 30
years. Dominador did not submit any other corroborative evidence
to establish Ricardo’s alleged possession since 1966. In Heirs of
Maningding v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that the evidence
relative to the possession, as a fact, upon which the alleged
prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in
order to establish the prescription. Here, Dominador failed to
present any other competent evidence to prove the alleged
extraordinary acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over the land.
Since the property is an unregistered land, Dominador bought the
land at his own risk, being aware as buyer that no title had been
issued over the land. As a consequence, Dominador is not
afforded protection unless he can manifestly prove his legal
entitlement to his claim.
With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold
that the RTC did not err in taking cognizance of the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),14 amending
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; x x x
On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions which
involve title to or possession of real property, or any interest,
outside Metro Manila where the assessed value does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00). The provision states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."
In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of
the land was ₱590.00 according to the Declaration of Property as
of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based on the value alone,
being way below ₱20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the
case. However, petitioners argued that the action was not merely
for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages
but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since annulment of
contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC
has jurisdiction over the case.151avvphi1
Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,16 we held
that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to
recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1)
the due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by
Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole
owner of the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to
be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the
deed of sale executed between Ricardo’s daughters and
Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is something
other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-
entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted.17
In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied
upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of
prescription, insufficiently established Dominador’s rightful claim
of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case
on the merits to determine who among the parties are legally
entitled to the land.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET
ASIDE the Orders dated 8 September 2006 and 13 February
2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 34 in
Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104796 March 6, 1998
SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE
LEON,  vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO MA.
ELAYDA II, FEDERICO ELAYDA and DANILO ELAYDA,  dismiss but required private respondents to pay the amount of
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision is whether in assessing the docket fees
to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of
a contract of sale, the value of the real property, subject matter of
the contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action
should be considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of
P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, §7(b)(1) of the Rules of Court.
9|Page
The trial court held the fees should be based on the value of the
property, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the flat
rate should be charged. Hence this petition for review
on certiorari.
The facts are as follows:
On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of two (2) parcels of land against petitioners,
praying for the following reliefs:
1. Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract
of Conditional Sale (Supplementary Agreement) for
having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private
respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of
the Civil Code and/or violation of the terms and
conditions of the said contract.
2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for
being absolutely simulated; and
3. Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs
(private respondents) attorney's fees in the amount of
P100,000.00.
Other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable in
the premises are also prayed for. 1
Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required private
respondents to pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of
P610.00, broken down as follows:
P450.00 — Docket fee for the Judicial Development
Fund under
Official Receipt No. 1877773
150.00 — Docket fee for the General Fund under Official
Receipt
No. 6834215
10.00 — for the Legal Research Fund under Official
Receipt No.
6834450. 2
On September 26, 1991, petitioners moved for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by reason of private respondents'
nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners
contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the
claim for P100,000.00 for attorney's fees, private respondents
should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based
on the alleged value of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter
of the contract of sale sought to be annulled. 3
On September 30, 1991, private respondents filed opposition to
the motion to dismiss, arguing that outright dismissal of their
complaint was not warranted on the basis of the alleged
nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees, considering
that the amount paid by them was that assessed by the clerk of
court. 4 On October 9, 1991, petitioners filed a reply to which
private respondents filed, on October 17, 1991, a rejoinder.
On October 21, 1991, the trial court 5 denied petitioners' motion to
docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land in
litigation as stated in the complaint.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their
motion was denied by the trial court. They therefore, brought the
matter to the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1992,
rendered a decision 6 annulling the orders of the trial court. The
appellate court held that an action for rescission or annulment of
contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore,
the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real
property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or
rescinded. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion
was denied in a resolution dated March 25, 1992 of the appellate
court. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. — (a) For filing
an action or a permissive counter-claim or money claim
against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc.
complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all
clerical services in the same, if the total-sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property
in litigation, is:
1. Not more than P20,000.00 P120.00
2. More than P20,000.00 but less than P40,000.00
150.00
3. P40,000.00 or more but less than P60,000.00 200.00
4. P60,000.00 or more but less than P80,000.00 250.00
5. P80,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00 400.00
6. P100,000.00 or more but less than P150,000.00
600.00
7. For each P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00 5.00
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the
subject matter
cannot be estimated P400.00
2. Special civil actions except judicial
foreclosure of
mortgage which shall be governed by
paragraph (a)
above 400.00
3. All other actions not involving
property 400.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if
there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees. (emphasis added)
Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of real property is a real action and, therefore, the
amount of the docket fees to be paid by private respondent should
be based either on the assessed value of the property, subject
matter of the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the
complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph of §7(b) of Rule 141, as
amended by the Resolution of the Court dated September 12,
1990. Since private respondents alleged that the land, in which
they claimed an interest as heirs, had been sold for
P4,378,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be considered
the estimated value of the land for the purpose of determining the
docket fees.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so, the docket fees should
be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, §7(b)(1). In support
of their argument, they cite the cases of Lapitan
v. Scandia, Inc. 7 and Bautista v.Lim. 8 In Lapitan this Court, in an
opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held:
10 | P a g e
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that
in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation,
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class
cases, besides the determination of damages, demand
an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to
be more within the competence of courts of first instance,
which were the lowest courts of record at the time that
the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted
allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine
Commission of June 11, 1901).
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been
expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by
courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-
26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's Distributors,
Inc. vs.  Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. And no
cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by
the parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution)
should be differently treated, a "rescission" being
counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance". In
both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake
an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the
other. No award for damages may be had in an action for
rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters
which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the
same manner that courts of first instance would have to
make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of
pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this
Court, arising from issues like those raised in Arroz
v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967 (legality or
illegality of the conveyance sought for and the
determination of the validity of the money deposit
made); De Ursua v.  Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950
(validity of a judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707,
December 23, 1959 (validity of mortgage); Baito
v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of
the parties, the right to support created by the relation,
etc., in actions for support); De Rivera, et al.  v. Halili, L-
15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of
documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of
the same nature may be raised by a party against whom
an action for rescission has been brought, or by the
plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a
prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be
taken as the basis for concluding such action as one
capable of pecuniary estimation — a prayer which must
be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be
compensated for what he may have suffered as a result
of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on
precluded from recovering damages by the rule against
splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of
suits.
Conformably with this discussion of actions "where the value of
the case cannot be estimated," the Court in Bautista v.  Lim, held
that an action for rescission of contract is one which cannot be
estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the
flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the former Rule 141, §141,
§5(10). Said this Court:
We hold that Judge Dalisay did not err in considering
Civil Case No. V-144 as basically one for rescission or
 annulment of contract which is not susceptible of
pecuniary estimation (1 Moran's Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1970 Ed, p. 55; Lapitan vs. Scandia, Inc., L-
24668, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 479, 781-483).
Consequently, the fee for docketing it is P200, an
amount already paid by plaintiff, now respondent Matilda
Lim. (She should pay also the two pesos legal research
fund fee, if she has not paid it, as required in Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 3870, the charter of the U.P. Law
Center).
Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land,
it is the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which
is controlling. The Court of Appeals correctly applied these cases
to the present one. As it said:
We would like to add the observations that since the
action of petitioners [private respondents] against private
respondents [petitioners] is solely for annulment or
rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation, the action should not be confused and
equated with the "value of the property" subject of the
transaction; that by the very nature of the case, the
allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint, sans
any prayer for recovery of money and/or value of the
transaction, or for actual or compensatory damages, the
assessment and collection of the legal fees should not
be intertwined with the merits of the case and/or what
may be its end result; and that to sustain private
respondents' [petitioners'] position on what the
respondent court may decide after all, then the
assessment should be deferred and finally assessed
only after the court had finally decided the case, which
cannot be done because the rules require that filing fees
should be based on what is alleged and prayed for in the
face of the complaint and paid upon the filing of the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 149243           October 28, 2002
LOLITA B. COPIOSO, petitioner, 
vs.
LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all
surnamed COPIOSO, and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 62090 which dismissed petitioner's
petition for certiorari as well as its Resolution denying
reconsideration thereof.
On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael, Esteban and
Corazon, all surnamed Copioso, filed a complaint2 for
reconveyance of two (2) parcels of coconut land situated in
Banilad, Nagcarlan, Laguna, against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses
Bernabe and Imelda Doria, and the estate of deceased Antonio
Copioso, as well as vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca,
Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased
brother Antonio Copioso were co-owners of the subject property
having inherited the same from their parents, and that through
fraud and machination Antonio had the property transferred to his
name and that of spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria who
subsequently sold the same to third parties. They thus prayed for
the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their being co-
owners thereof.
11 | P a g e
When respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion for bill
of particulars that the assessed value of the subject property
was P3,770.00, petitioner Lolita Copioso and spouses Bernabe
and Imelda Doria separately moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and not the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over the case
considering that the assessed value of the property was lower
than P20,000.00.
The trial court in its twin orders of 5 and 12 September 2000
denied the motions to dismiss holding that since the subject
matter of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was
properly within its jurisdiction.3 Lolita Copioso's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied,4 hence, she filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the
annulment of the twin orders of the trial court which denied the
motions to dismiss and at the same time maintaining her position
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the
assessed value of the property was below P20,000.00.
The appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for reconveyance.
Motion for reconsideration thereon was similarly denied by the
appellate court, hence this petition.
Petitioner Lolita Copioso anchors her argument on Sec. 33, par.
(3), of B.P. Blg. 129 otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by Sec. 3 of RA 7691
which provides -
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x (3) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value
of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, that in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for reconveyance cannot be
resolved unless the trial court delves upon the issues of "title,
possession and interests" of each of the stakeholders over the
subject parcels of land. She asserts that the allegations and relief
prayed for in the complaint coupled with the assessed value of the
disputed property place the action within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the MTC and not the RTC.
In turn, private respondents anchor their position on Sec. 19, par.
(1), of the same law which provides -
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – The Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: In all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation: x x x
Simply, they claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a
case of joinder of causes of action which include the annulment of
sale and other instruments of false conveyance incapable of
pecuniary estimation thus within the legal competence of the
RTC.
The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither
ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19
par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil
cases capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, Sec.
33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (1), applies to cases
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as
amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil cases involving sum of
money or title to, possession of, or any interest in real property,
jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the amount of the claim
or the assessed value of the real property involved, such that
where the sum of money or the assessed value of the real
property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila, jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and where it exceeds that
amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC.
Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession and
interest of each of the contending parties over the contested
property the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdictional
range of the MTC. Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the
allegations set forth, and the reliefs prayed for, forestall its
cognizance by the MTC.
As can be readily gleaned from the records, the complaint was for
"Reconveyance and/or Recovery of Common Properties Illegally
Disposed, with Annulment of Sales and other Instruments of False
Conveyance, with Damages, and Restraining Order." Private
respondents alleged therein that they were co-owners of the
property along with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso; and
that in or about 1998, with fraud and machination, Antonio
together with the spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria made it
appear in a public document entitled Pagpapatunay ng Kusang
Loob na Pagbabahagi that they were the co-owners of the subject
property and had divided the same equally between themselves
to the exclusion of private respondents. Subsequently, they sold
the subdivided lots to the other defendants namely Dolores
Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and
Federico Casabar.
Private respondents also sought payment of moral damages,
exemplary damages, litigation expenses, attorney's fees plus
appearance fees amounting to more or less P286,500.00. They
likewise applied for a TRO pending the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from further
alienating the common properties. They also prayed of the trial
court to order the cancellation, annulment and/or rescission of the
four (4) deeds of absolute sale made in favor of the buyers, and to
order Lolita B. Copioso and the estate of Antonio Copioso to
return the price that the buyer-defendants had paid to them for the
land sold.
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which
comprehends more than the issue of title to, possession of, or any
interest in the real property under contention but includes an
action to annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance,
and a claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue
involved herein is naked possession or bare ownership, then
petitioner Lolita Copioso would not be amiss in her assertion that
the instant complaint for reconveyance, considering the assessed
value of the disputed property, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of
title, ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with the
issue of annulment of sale and reconveyance hence within the
ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the
parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be
dealt with by the court, when necessary, in the resolution of the
case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 16 May 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62090 as well
as its 30 July 2001 Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158121             December 12, 2007
HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR.
vs.
SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO
DECISION
12 | P a g e
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the decision3 and resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions 5 and order6 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil
Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434 which denied the separate
motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the respondents.
The relevant facts are undisputed.
Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr.,
claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No.
5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No.
5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A
(Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141),
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings
Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda.
de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case
No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of the
subject lots.
The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr.7 and his
children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto,
Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha,
filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with
Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida
Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556
issued in the name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195.
The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended Complaint,
petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original
Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as
null and void ab initio;
2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private
property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141
otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by
RA 1942;
3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the
properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122
hectares in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the
finality of the decision in this case and if they refuse,
ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to
execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and
effect as if executed by the defendant[s] themselves;
4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for
the 21 forest trees illegally cut; P50,000.00 for moral
damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the
proceedings;
5. Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in
the area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog
with a total volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the
plaintiff [they] being cut, collected and taken from the
land possessed, preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;
6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and
remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises.8
On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for
Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners, 9 this time
against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-hectare portion
of Lot No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T.
Lomocso" for a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-
A. The two complaints were also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of
Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434,
respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners prayed that
judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT
(P23527) 4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the
western portion of Lot 4888 as private property of the
plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise known as
Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA No. 1942;
2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of
one (1) hectare forested portion of her property in
question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the
finality of the decision in this case segregating one
hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located at its Western
portion and if she refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk of Court
of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of
reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by
the defenda[n]t herself;
3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22
forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral
damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the
proceedings.10
In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be
rendered:
1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-
23207) 12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889
equivalent to one hectare located as (sic) the western
portion of said lots as private property of the plaintiffs
under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.] 141 otherwise know[n] as
the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of
one (1) hectare forested portion of their properties in
question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the
finality of the decision in this case segregating one
hectare from OCT (P-23207) 12870 and OCT (T-20845)-
4889 all of defendants, located at its Western portion and
if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this
Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance
with like force and effect as if executed by the
defendants themselves[;]
3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 for the six (6)
forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral
damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the
proceedings.11
The three complaints12 commonly alleged: a) that on May 21,
1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea
Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses
Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare
land, including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest land"
located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess 4
hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195, one-hectare
portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos.
6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously,
adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic)
owner since 1931;" d) that they continued possession and
occupation of the 4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea
Concha on December 23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12,
1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest
trees standing in [the subject lots] to the exclusion of the
defendants (respondents) or other persons from 1931" up to
November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for
Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by force,
intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered the premises, illegally
cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil Case No.
5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case
No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that even assuming it
was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired
imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as
13 | P a g e
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents
allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil
Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subject lots in Civil
Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer in
Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents
"surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the lots despite
their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i) that the
geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over the
lots never informed them of the survey to give them an
opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that
respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were
issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and
misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in question have not been
transferred to an innocent purchaser.
On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of
the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a)
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the
complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for reconveyance;
(c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and
estoppel.13 On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to
Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the
subject lots are less than P20,000.00.
Petitioners opposed,14 contending that the instant cases involve
actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary
estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended
by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of
action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees
felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be
considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of
respondents.15 The respondents filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration,16 to no avail.17
Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of
Restraining Order Ex Parte18 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 59499. In its Decision,19 the CA reversed the resolutions
and order of the trial court. It held that even assuming that the
complaints state a cause of action, the same have been barred by
the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for
reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence,
the instant complaints must be dismissed as they involve titles
issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of the
complaints. The CA found it unnecessary to resolve the other
issues.
Hence, this appeal in which petitioners raise the following issues,
viz:
FIRST - WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN
REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO
DENYING THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL,
CONSIDERING THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY
COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND TRIAL ON THE
MERITS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT
EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.
SECOND - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION)
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS'
COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION.
THIRD - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION)
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW
THAT PETITIONERS OWN THE SUBJECT FOREST
PORTION OF THE PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY
 INCLUDED IN THE TITLES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF
HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
THEREIN FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE
65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO SUBMIT
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED
ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RENDERED
THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499) DEFICIENT IN
FORM AND SUBSTANCE CITING THE CASE OF
CATUIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).20
In their memorandum,21 respondents reiterated their arguments in
the courts below that: a) the complaints of the petitioners in the
trial court do not state causes of action for reconveyance; b)
assuming the complaints state causes of action for reconveyance,
the same have already been barred by prescription; c) the RTC
does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant
cases; d) the claims for reconveyance in the complaints are
barred by waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by
laches and estoppel; and e) there is no special reason warranting
a review by this Court.
Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of
the instant case yet the CA skirted the question, we resolved to
require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental
Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.22
In their Supplemental Memorandum,23 petitioners contend that the
nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne
by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or
cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve
more than just the issue of title and possession since the nullity of
the OCTs issued to respondents and the reconveyance of the
subject properties were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has
jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that
the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners
cited: a) Raymundo v. CA24which set the criteria for determining
whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation;
b) Swan v. CA25where it was held that an action for annulment of
title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c) Santos v. CA26 where
it was similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion
and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and
d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v.
CA27 where it was held that "[w]here the action affects title to the
property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is
located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that
the assessed values of the subject properties are within the
original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have
included in their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting
of 49 felled natural grown trees illegally cut by respondents.
Combining the assessed values of the properties as shown by
their respective tax declarations and the estimated value of the
trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC
has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong.28 It is conferred by law and an objection based
on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.29 To determine
whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case,
it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and
of the relief sought.30
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions
for reconveyance.31 An action for reconveyance respects the
decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of
property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those
who claim to have a better right.32 There is no special ground for
an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party
14 | P a g e
has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered
owner33 and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value.34
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an
action for reconveyance. The following are also the common
allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute
causes of action for reconveyance, viz:
(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with
his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly
preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-
hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled
forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest
from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they
acquired this property by occupation or possession;35
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea
P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in
[these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants
Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November
12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for
Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by
force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the
premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of
[twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-
two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees
for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;36
(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private
land or that even assuming it was part of the public
domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title
thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise
known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.]
No. [7691];37
(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
knew when they] surreptitiously filed38 [their respective
patent applications and were issued their respective] free
patents and original certificates of title [that the subject
lots belonged to the petitioners];39
(e) [That respondents' free patents and the
corresponding original certificates of titles were issued]
on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and
misrepresentation;40 and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an
innocent purchaser.41
These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud
on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of
an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title
which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their
alleged title.42
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to
remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which
court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x.
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are
situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are
less than P20,000.00, to wit:
Civil Case No. Lot No. Assessed Value Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."
5188 6195 P1,030.00
5433 6196-A 4,500.00
5434 6196-B 4,340.00
7529-A 1,880.00.43
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for
reconveyance44 of or for cancellation of title45 to or to quiet
title46 over real property are actions that fall under the
classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein."
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its
forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47 as amended, gave the
RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original
jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A.
296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no
substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject
matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under
Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under
Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became
crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 769148 in 1994
which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original
jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title
to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second
level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved
as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the
overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the
speedier administration of justice."49
The cases of Raymundo v. CA50 and Commodities Storage and
ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,51 relied upon by the petitioners, are
inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint
for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment
of title. The bone of contention was whether the case was
incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's
contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only
attorney's fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The
Court defined the criterion for determining whether an action is
one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the
issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master
Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that
is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees
was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount
was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor
can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide
any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in
said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was
for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which
15 | P a g e
was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No.
7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here
the action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the
[RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant &
Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil
Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA52 and Santos v. CA53 cited by
the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the
instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The
complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the action being
one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that
the complaint for cancellation of title, reversion and damages is
also one that involves title to and possession of real property
under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that
the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for
"annulment of title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and
damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P.
129.
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject
properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject
properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective
assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section
19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the
RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the
value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included
in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic
that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the
assessed value of the realty involved that should be
computed.54 In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed
values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations
are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant
cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has no
jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 76431 October 16, 1989
FORTUNE MOTORS, (PHILS.) INC., petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, METROPOLITAN
BANK and TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
Quirante & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Bautista, Cruz & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of:
(a) the July 30, 1986 decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R.
SP No. 09255 entitled "Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Hon.
Herminio C. Mariano, et al."dismissing Civil Case No. 8533218
entitled "Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Co." filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IV for
improper venue and (b) the resolution dated October 30, 1986
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On March 29,1982 up to January 6,1984, private respondent
Metropolitan Bank extended various loans to petitioner Fortune
Motors in the total sum of P32,500,000.00 (according to the
borrower; or P34,150,000.00 according to the Bank) which loan
was secured by a real estate mortgage on the Fortune building
and lot in Makati, Rizal. (Rollo, pp. 60-62)
Due to financial difficulties and the onslaught of economic
recession, the petitioner was not able to pay the loan which
became due. (Rollo, p. 62)
For failure of the petitioner to pay the loans, the respondent bank
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After notices were
served, posted, and published, the mortgaged property was sold
at public auction for the price of P47,899,264.91 to mortgagee
Bank as the highest bidder. (Rollo, p. 11)
The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on October 24,
1984 with the one-year redemption period to expire on October
24,1985. (Rollo, p. 12)
On October 21, 1985, three days before the expiration of the
redemption period, petitioner Fortune Motors filed a complaint for
annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging that the
foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was
not yet due, the publication of the notice of sale was incomplete,
there was no public auction, and the price for which the property
was sold was "shockingly low". (Rollo, pp. 60-68)
Before summons could be served private respondent Bank filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the venue of
the action was improperly laid in Manila for the realty covered by
the real estate mortgage is situated in Makati, therefore the action
to annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. (Rollo, pp. 67-71-A )
The motion was opposed by petitioner Fortune Motors alleging
that its action "is a personal action" and that "the issue is the
validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings" so that it may
have a new one year period to redeem. (Rollo, pp. 72-73)
On January 8, 1986 an order was issued by the lower court
reserving the resolution of the Bank's motion to dismiss until after
the trial on the merits as the grounds relied upon by the defendant
were not clear and indubitable. (Rollo, p. 81)
The Bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated
January 8, 1986 but it was denied by the lower court in its order
dated May 28, 1986. (Rollo, Annex "L" pp. 93-96; Annex "N" p.
99)
On June 11, 1986 the respondent Bank filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. (Rollo, Annex
"O" pp. 100-115)
And on July 30, 1986, a decision was issued by the Court of
Appeals, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is granted. The complaint in the Civil
Case No. 85-33218 is dismissed without
prejudice to its being filed in the proper venue.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 15)
A motion for reconsideration was filed on August 11, 1986 on the
said decision and on October 30, 1986 a resolution was issued
denying such motion for reconsideration. (Rollo, Annex "O" pp.
121-123; Annex "S" p. 129)
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
On June 10, 1987 the Court gave due course to the petition,
required the parties to file their respective memoranda within
16 | P a g e
twenty (20) days from the notice hereof, and pay deposit for costs
in the amount of P80.40.
Both parties have filed their respective memoranda, and the case
was submitted for Court's resolution in the resolution dated
December 14, 1987. (Rollo,Metrobank's Memorandum pp. 45-59;
petitioner's memorandum pp.130-136; Res. p. 138)
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner's action for
annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure
sale of Fortune Building is a personal action or a real action for
venue purposes.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or
as indicated in Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or
for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on real property. (Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran, Vol.
1, p. 122)
Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure
of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the Court of
First Instance of the province where the property or any part
thereof lies. (Enriquez v. Macadaeg, 84 Phil. 674,1949;
Garchitorena v. Register of Deeds, 101 Phil. 1207, 1957)
Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted in the
Court of First Instance where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any
of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Sec. 1, Rule
4, Revised Rules of Court).
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate
to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is to
recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property
is a real action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property.
(Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760,1954)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no
different from an action to annul a private sale of real property.
(Munoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737,1950)
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery
of title or possession of the property in question, his action for
annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which,
under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of
which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is
that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real
property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime
objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real
property. It is a real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did not
err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue (Sec.
2, Rule 4) which was timely raised (Sec. 1, Rule 16). (Punzalan,
Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 336, [1983]).
Thus, as aptly decided by the Court of Appeals in a decision
penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice now
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Carolina C. Griño-Aquino,
the pertinent portion reads: "Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of
real property results in a conveyance of the title of the property
sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the
foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting the title of the
property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or part
thereof lies."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G..R. No. 132424             May 2, 2006
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M.
VALDEZ, Petitioners,  alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA
and FRANCISCA FABELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed
by petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M.
Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997
decision1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8
January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in
toto the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed
by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private
respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material
facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of
residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located
at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo,
Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc.
Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales
Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked
as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens
Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex "B";
3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever
occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in the said
lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful
possession thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein
defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them,
but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they
unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the
Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of
the former to surrender the lot peacefully;
6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein
defendants to settle the case amicably, the Barangay
Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification
to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that
the necessary cause of action be taken before the proper
court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as
Annex "C";
7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and
unfounded refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender
the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were
constrained to engage the professional services of
counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing
acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent
a formal demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "D";
8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the
defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in
question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless
nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x2
17 | P a g e
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint
failed to state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the
property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the
on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested
by an ocular inspection report from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. They also stressed that the
complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91
regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the
property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same
plus attorney’s fees.
Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997,
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision
of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners
failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to
show that they had given the private respondents the right to
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private
respondents’ possession of the same, which is a requirement in
unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in
petitioners’ complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry
which requires an allegation of prior material possession. The
Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:
An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional
allegations that will support an action for ejectment are
conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material
possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and the complaint is
deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there
appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private
respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the
right to occupy the premises, which right has now [been]
extinguished.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the
Municipal Trial Court before which the action for ejectment was
filed had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the
dismissal thereof is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and
GRANTED. The decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the
respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for
lack of jurisdiction.3
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in
a resolution dated 30 January 1998.4
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s
consideration5:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER.
B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF
THE COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be
discussed together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint
make out a case for unlawful detainer having alleged that private
respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the
property in question, which allegation is sufficient to establish a
case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if
another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance or permission
without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by an
implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
The petition is not meritorious.
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of
actions available to recover possession of real property:
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria.6
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,
forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In
forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real
property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied.8 The two are
distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that
the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in
unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess.9
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in
nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial
court.10 Both actions must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from
the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue
in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial
court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12 It
is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title.13 In other words, if at
the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not
one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accionpubliciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an
action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional
trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.14
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present
right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the
start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of
the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s
tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to
vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under
Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand
to vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word
"tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such
tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
18 | P a g e
unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons:  First.
Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress –
in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the
forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to
have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if
a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no
action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long
such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of
tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw
him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially
if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one
year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of
the action.18 (Underlining supplied)
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines
the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal
but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is
unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such
a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature.19 The complaint must show
enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.20
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry
or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy
should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria
in the proper regional trial court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against
respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of
land through intestate succession which was occupied by
respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their
deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not
petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court
ruled23:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the
property registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents;
that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of
their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that
they had served written demand on December, 1994, but that
private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a
deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required
to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present
right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails. The
appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the
conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her
death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was
illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the
complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the
subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission
and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx
Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely,
without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As
explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court
ofAppeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right
from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize
a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry
x x x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v.
Cruz,24 petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer merely
contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal
occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in
finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for
unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or
tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the
possession. x x x
xxxx
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite
any averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of
petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject
property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by
petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises
was by mere tolerance.
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s
theory that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these
arguments advance the view that respondent’s occupation of the
property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the
essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioner’s
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right
from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
recovered.25
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain
any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that
they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that
"respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the
land in question by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been
said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.26 Since
the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a
valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds
that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the
Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547
of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197725               July 31, 2013
MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN (in substitution of the deceased
GABRIEL O. ESTEBAN), Petitioner,  The Parties’ Arguments
vs.
SPOUSES RODRIGO C. MARCELO and CARMEN T.
MARCELO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
19 | P a g e
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision 2 dated
January 17, 2011 and the resolution3 dated July 15, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 112609.
The Facts
The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner
Mark Anthony Esteban,4 had been in possession of a piece of
land located at 702 Tiaga St., Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong City,
since the 1950s.5 In the 1960s, the late Esteban's sister
constructed a foundry shop at the property. In the 1970s, after the
foundry operations had proven unproductive, the respondents-
spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside
therein, for a monthly rental fee of ₱50.00. Since March 2001, the
respondents-spouses have stopped paying the rental fee (which
by that time amounted to ₱160.00). On October 31, 2005, the late
Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the respondents-spouses a
demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to vacate
within five (5) days from receipt thereof.6 For failure to comply with
the demand to pay and to vacate, the late Esteban instituted an
unlawful detainer case against the respondents-spouses on
December 6, 2005.
The MeTC’s and RTC’s Rulings
In its April 23, 2009 decision,7 the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment; with the
jurisdictional demand to vacate complied with, the respondents-
spouses must vacate the property, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and
2, Article 1673 of the New Civil Code,8 on the grounds of
expiration of the lease and nonpayment of monthly rentals. The
MeTC likewise ordered the respondents-spouses to pay back
rentals and rentals, plus legal interest until they shall have
vacated the property, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) fully affirmed the MeTC
ruling.9
The CA Ruling
The respondents-spouses appealed the RTC’s ruling to the CA.
In its January 17, 2011 decision,10 the CA reversed the RTC. The
CA ruled that from the year of dispossession in 2001 when the
respondents-spouses stopped paying rent, until the filing of the
complaint for ejectment in 2005, more than a year had passed;
hence, the case no longer involved an accion
interdictal11 cognizable by the MeTC, but an accion
publiciana12 that should have been filed before the
RTC.13 Therefore, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case so
that its decision was a nullity. Likewise, the Court ruled that the
respondents-spouses cannot be evicted as they are protected by
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1517.14 Finally, the CA
ruled that the respondents-spouses qualifies as beneficiary under
Section 16 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7279.15
In its July 15, 2011 resolution, the CA denied the respondents-
spouses’ partial motion for reconsideration anchored on the
petitioner’s failure to effect a substitution of parties upon the death
of the late Esteban. The CA reasoned out that mere failure to
substitute a deceased party is not a sufficient ground to nullify a
trial court’s decision.16 The CA also reiterated its finding against
the petitioner that since the time of dispossession, more than one
year had passed; hence, the case was an accion publiciana that
should have been commenced before the RTC.17
The petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari to
assail the CA rulings. The petitioner argues that the case has
been properly filed as an accion interdictal cognizable by the
MeTC and was filed on December 6, 2005, or within the one-year
prescriptive period counted from the date of the last demand on
October 31, 2005; hence, the MeTC had proper jurisdiction over
the case.
The petitioner further argues that contrary to the CA’s findings, the
failure to pay did not render the possession unlawful; it was the
failure or refusal to vacate after demand and failure to pay that
rendered the occupancy unlawful.18
The petitioner likewise points out that the respondents-spouses
are not covered by P.D. 1517 as there was no showing that the
subject lot had been declared an area for priority development or
for urban land reform.
Finally, the petitioner avers that it was improper for the CA to rule
that the respondents-spouses are qualified beneficiaries under the
RA 7279 as this point was not in issue and should not have been
covered by the appellate review.
In their comment to the petition,19 the respondents-spouses claim
that the substitution of petitioner was irregular as the other
compulsory heirs of the late Esteban had not been made parties
to the present case.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The one-year prescription period
is counted from the last demand
to pay and vacate
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there should first be a
demand to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease and a
demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises. The Revised
Rules of Court clearly so state.20
Since 1947, case law has consistently upheld this rule. "Mere
failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's
possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to
vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents
on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make
unlawful withholding of possession." In 2000, we reiterated this
rule when we declared: "It is therefore clear that before the lessor
may institute such action, he must make a demand upon the
lessee to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate the premises. It is the owner’s demand for the tenant to
vacate the premises and the tenant’s refusal to do so which
makes unlawful the withholding of possession. Such refusal
violates the owner’s right of possession giving rise to an action for
unlawful detainer."22
Subsequent to P.D. 1517, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1893 on September 11, 1979, declaring
the entire Metropolitan Manila area an Urban Land Reform Zone
for purposes of urban land reform. On May 14, 1980, he issued
Proclamation No. 1967, amending Proclamation No. 1893 and
identifying 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority
Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. The Proclamation
pointedly stated that: "the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and
1642 and of LOI No. 935 shall apply only to the above-mentioned
Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones."
"Thus, a legitimate tenant's right of first refusal to purchase the
leased property under P.D. No. 1517 depends on whether the
disputed property in Metropolitan Manila is situated in an area
specifically declared to be both an Area for Priority Development
and Urban Land Reform Zone."26
Based on the cited issuances, we find it clear that for P.D. 1517 to
apply, the tenants must have been a legitimate tenant for ten (10)
years who have built their homes on the disputed property. These
circumstances do not obtain in the present case as it was not the
respondents-spouses who built their dwelling on the land; it was
the late Esteban’s sister who had the foundry shop built in the
1960s and eventually leased the property to the respondents-
spouses in the 1970s. Even assuming that these two
requirements have been complied with, P.D. 1517 still will not
apply as the issue raised in the present petition is not the right of
first refusal of the respondents-spouses, but their non-payment of
rental fees and refusal to vacate. In fact, it was their non-payment
of rental fees and refusal to vacate which caused the petitioner’s
predecessor to file the action for unlawful detainer.1âwphi1
Finally, even assuming that the aforementioned circumstances
were present, the respondents-spouses still cannot qualify under
P.D. 1517 in the absence of any showing that the subject land
had been declared an area for priority development and urban
land reform zone.
Issues not raised may not be
considered and ruled upon
The rule on the propriety of resolving issues not raised before the
lower courts cannot be raised on appeal: "points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as
these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic
consideration of due process impels this rule."27

Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand
to pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for filing the
unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may
choose to waive his cause of action and let the defaulting lessee
remain in the premises.23
As the petitioner correctly observed, the respondents-spouses
never intimated, directly or indirectly, that they were seeking the
protection of RA 7279. Therefore, the CA did not have any
authority to rule that the respondents-spouses qualified as
beneficiaries under RA 7279.

P.D. 1517 does not apply: in the Any one of the co-owners may
absence of showing that the bring an action for ejectment
subject land has been declared
and classified as an Area for
Priority Development and as a We see no merit in the respondents-spouses’ observation that the
Land Reform Zone present petition is irregular because the other compulsory heirs
(or co-owners) have not been impleaded. The present petition has
been properly filed under the express provision of Article 487 of
It was an error for the CA to rule that the respondents-spouses the Civil Code.28
could not be ousted because they were protected by P.D. 1517.
This decree, in fact, does not apply to them.
In the recent case of Rey Catigador Catedrilla v. Mario and
24
Margie Lauron,29 we explained that while all co-owners are real
In Sps. Frilles v. Sps. Yambao,  the Court traced the purpose, parties in interest in suits to recover properties, anyone of them
development and coverage of P.D. 1517. The Court declared in may bring an action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Only
this case that the purpose of the law is to protect the rights of the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
legitimate tenants who have resided for 10 years or more on property becomes an indispensable party thereto; the other co-
specific parcels of land situated in declared Urban Land Reform owners are neither indispensable nor necessary parties.
Zones or Urban Zones, and who have built their homes thereon.
These legitimate tenants have the right not to be dispossessed
and to have the right of first refusal to purchase the property WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the
under reasonable terms and conditions to be determined by the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated January 1 7,
appropriate government agency.25 2011 and the resolution dated July 15, 20 II of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112609 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision dated January 13, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 211, Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No.
20 | P a g e
20270, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the respondents
spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179011               April 15, 2013
REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA, Petitioner,  THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) as Atty's fees, plus
vs.
MARIO and MARGIE1 LAURON, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the
Decision2 dated February 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals ((A) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00939, as well as its Resolution3dated July 11,
2007 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lambunao, Iloilo a
Complaint4 for ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie
Lauron alleging as follows: that Lorenza Lizada is the owner of a
parcel of land known as Lot 183, located in Mabini Street,
Lambunao, Iloilo, which was declared for taxation purposes in her
name under Tax Declaration No. 0363;5 that on February 13,
1972, Lorenza died and was succeeded to her properties by her
sole heir Jesusa Lizada Losañes, who was married to Hilarion
Castigador (Castigador); that the spouses Jesusa and Hilarion
Castigador had a number of children, which included Lilia
Castigador (Lilia), who was married to Maximo Catedrilla
(Maximo); that after the death of the spouses Castigador, their
heirs agreed among themselves to subdivide Lot 183 and,
pursuant to a consolidation subdivision plan6 dated January 21,
1984, the parcel of lot denominated as Lot No. 5 therein was to be
apportioned to the heirs of Lilia since the latter already died on
April 9, 1976; Lilia was succeeded by her heirs, her husband
Maximo and their children, one of whom is herein petitioner; that
petitioner filed the complaint as a co-owner of Lot No. 5; that
sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron,
through the tolerance of the heirs of Lilia, constructed a residential
building of strong materials on the northwest portion of Lot No. 5
covering an area of one hundred square meters; that the heirs of
Lilia made various demands for respondents to vacate the
premises and even exerted earnest efforts to compromise with
them but the same was unavailing; and that petitioner reiterated
the demand on respondents to vacate the subject lot on January
15, 2003, but respondents continued to unlawfully withhold such
possession.
In their Answer,7 respondents claimed that petitioner had no
cause of action against them, since they are not the owners of the
residential building standing on petitioner's lot, but Mildred
Kascher (Mildred), sister of respondent Margie, as shown by the
tax declaration in Mildred's name;8 that in 1992, Mildred had
already paid ₱10,000.00 as downpayment for the subject lot to
Teresito Castigador;9 that there were several instances that the
heirs of Lilia offered the subject Lot 183 for sale to respondents
and Mildred and demanded payment, however, the latter was only
interested in asking money without any intention of delivering or
registering the subject lot; that in 1998, Maximo, petitioner's
father, and respondent Margie entered into an amicable
settlement10 before the Barangay Lupon of Poblacion Ilawod,
Lambunao, Iloilo wherein Maximo offered the subject lot to the
spouses Alfons and Mildred Kascher in the amount of ₱90,000.00
with the agreement that all documents related to the transfer of
the subject lot to Maximo and his children be prepared by
Maximo, but the latter failed to comply; and that the amicable
settlement should have the force and effect of a final judgment of
a court, hence, the instant suit is barred by prior judgment.
Respondents counterclaimed for damages.
On November 14, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision, 11 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
21 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendants:
1. To vacate the lot in question and restore possession
to the plaintiff;
2. To pay plaintiff in the reduced amount of TWENTY
ONE THOUSAND (₱1,000.00) per Court appearance;
3. To pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for the use
of the lot in question ONE THOUSAND (₱1,000.00)
pesos yearly counted from the date of demand;
4. To pay the cost of litigation.
No award of moral and exemplary damages.
Defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient
evidence.12
The MTC found that from the allegations and evidence presented,
it appeared that petitioner is one of the heirs of Lilia Castigador
Catedrilla, the owner of the subject lot and that respondents are
occupying the subject lot; that petitioner is a party who may bring
the suit in accordance with Article 48713 of the Civil Code; and as
a co-owner, petitioner is allowed to bring this action for ejectment
under Section 1, Rule 7014 of the Rules of Court; that respondents
are also the proper party to be sued as they are the occupants of
the subject lot which they do not own; and that the MTC assumed
that the house standing on the subject lot has been standing
thereon even before 1992 and only upon the acquiescence of the
petitioner and his predecessor-in-interest.
The MTC found that respondents would like to focus their defense
on the ground that Mildred is an indispensable party, because she
is the owner of the residential building on the subject lot and that
there was already a perfected contract to sell between Mildred
and Maximo because of an amicable settlement executed before
the Office of the Punong Barangay.
However, the MTC, without dealing on the validity of the
document and its interpretation, ruled that it was clear that
respondent Margie was representing her parents, Mr. and Mrs.
Bienvenido Loraña, in the dispute presented with the Punong
Barangay. It also found that even Mildred's letter to petitioner's
father Maximo recognized the title of petitioner's father over the
subject lot and that it had not been established by respondents if
Teresito Castigador, the person who signed the receipt
evidencing Mildred's downpayment of ₱10,000.00 for the subject
lot, is also one of the heirs of Lilia. The MTC concluded that
respondents could not be allowed to deflect the consequences of
their continued stay over the property, because it was their very
occupation of the property which is the object of petitioner's
complaint; that in an action for ejectment, the subject matter is
material possession or possession de facto over the real property,
and the side issue of ownership over the subject lot is tackled
here only for the purpose of determining who has the better right
of possession which is to prove the nature of possession; that
possession of Lot 183 should be relinquished by respondents to
petitioner, who is a co-owner, without foreclosing other remedies
that may be availed upon by Mildred in the furtherance of her
supposed rights.
Respondents filed their appeal with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City, raffled off to Branch 26. On March 22, 2005,
the RTC rendered its Order,15 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, circumstances herein-above considered, the
decision of the court dated November 14, 2003 is hereby
AFFIRMED, except for the payment of ₱20,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED.16
The RTC found that petitioner, being one of the co-owners of the
subject lot, is the proper party in interest to prosecute against any
intruder thereon. It found that the amicable settlement signed and
executed by the representatives of the registered owner of the
premises before the Lupon is not binding and unenforceable
between the parties. It further ruled that even if Mildred has her
name in the tax declaration signifying that she is the owner of the
house constructed on the subject lot, tax declarations are not
evidence of ownership but merely issued to the declarant for
purposes of payment of taxes; that she cannot be considered as
an indispensable party in a suit for recovery of possession against
respondents; that Mildred should have intervened and proved that
she is an indispensable party because the records showed that
she was not in actual possession of the subject lot. The RTC
deleted the attorney's fees, since the MTC decision merely
ordered the payment of attorney's fees without any basis.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order17 dated June 8, 2005.
Dissatisfied, respondents filed with the CA a petition for review.
Petitioner filed his Comment thereto.
On February 28, 2007, the CA issued its assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this petition for review is
GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br.
26, Iloilo City, dated March 22, 2005, that affirmed the MTC
Decision dated November 14, 2003, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Consequently, the complaint for ejectment of the respondent is
DISMISSED.18
The CA found that only petitioner filed the case for ejectment
against respondents and ruled that the other heirs should have
been impleaded as plaintiffs citing Section 1,19 Rule 7 and Section
7,20 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court; that the presence of all
indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise
of judicial power; that when an indispensable party is not before
the court, the action should be dismissed as without the presence
of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly
render judgment and grant relief in favor of the respondents.
The CA also ruled that while petitioner asserted that the proper
parties to be sued are the respondents as they are the actual
possessors of the subject lot and not Mildred, petitioner still
cannot disclaim knowledge that it was to Mildred to whom his co-
owners offered the property for sale, thus, he knew all along that
the real owner of the house on the subject lot is Mildred and not
respondents; that Mildred even paid ₱10,000.00 out of the total
consideration for the subject lot and required respondents'
relatives to secure the documents that proved their ownership
over the subject lot; that Maximo and Mildred had previously
settled the matter regarding the sale of the subject lot before the
Barangay as contained in an amicable settlement signed by
Maximo and respondent Margie. Thus, the question in this case
extends to mere possessory rights and non-inclusion of
indispensable parties made the complaint fatally defective. From
the facts obtaining in this case, ejectment being a summary
remedy is not the appropriate action to file against the alleged
deforciant of the property.
Hence, this petition for review wherein petitioner raises the
following issues:
I finding that Mildred Kascher is an indispensable party and that her
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT WAS A NULLITY .
II
22 | P a g e
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER KNEW
ALL ALONG THAT MILDRED KASCHER, AND NOT
RESPONDENTS, WERE THE REAL OWNERS OF THE
RESIDENTIAL BUILDING.21
The CA found that petitioner's co-heirs to the subject lot should
have been impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the ejectment case
against respondents, since without their presence, the trial court
could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of
petitioner.
We do not concur.
Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his
co-owners. In Wee v. De Castro,22 wherein petitioner therein
argued that the respondent cannot maintain an action for
ejectment against him, without joining all his co-owners, we ruled
in this wise:
Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of
possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and
recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by
the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino:
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for
himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,
this Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party
to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded
even in his absence, thus:
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real
parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil
Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring
an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-
owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property,
is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.23
In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for
unlawful detainer, he stated in the complaint that he is one of the
heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the
subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive
ownership of the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the
purpose of recovering its possession which would redound to the
benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized the
existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the
action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs.
Petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error in
non-inclusion as a party defendant in the ejectment case made
the complaint fatally defective, thus, must be dismissed.
We agree with petitioner.
The CA based its findings that Mildred is an indispensable party
because it found that petitioner knew all along that Mildred is the
owner of the house constructed on the subject lot as shown in the
affidavits24 of Maximo and petitioner stating that petitioner's co-
owners had offered for sale the subject lot to Mildred, and that
Maximo, petitioner's father, and Mildred had previously settled
before the Barangay the matter regarding the sale of the subject
lot to the latter as contained in the amicable settlement.
We find that the affidavits of Maximo and petitioner merely stated
that the lot was offered for sale to Mildred, but nowhere did it
admit that Mildred is the owner of the house constructed on the
subject lot.
Also, it appears that the amicable settlement25 before the
Barangay wherein it was stated that Maximo will sell the subject
lot to the spouses Alfons and Mildred Kascher was signed by
Maximo on behalf of his children and respondent Margie on behalf
of Mr. and Mrs. Bienvenido Loraña. Thus, there is no basis for the
CA's conclusion that it was Mildred and Maximo who had
previously settled the sale of the subject lot.
Moreover, it appears however, that while there was a settlement,
Liah C. Catedrilla, one of petitioner's co-heirs, wrote a
letter26 dated October 30, 2002, to the Spouses Loraña and
respondent Margie stating that the latter had made a change on
the purchase price for the subject lot which was different from that
agreed upon in the amicable settlement. Records neither show
that respondent Margie had taken steps to meet with Liah or any
of her co-heirs to settle the matter of the purchase price nor rebut
such allegation in the letter if it was not true. The letter27 dated
July 5, 2003 of respondent Margie's counsel addressed to
petitioner's counsel, stating that his client is amenable in the
amount as proposed in the amicable settlement, would not alter
the fact of respondents' non-compliance with the settlement since
the letter was sent after the ejectment case had already been filed
by petitioner.
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,28 we explained the nature of the
amicable settlement reached after a barangay conciliation, thus:
Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides
that an amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation
proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court
if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the
proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date. It
further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution
by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date,
or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond
the six-month period. This special provision follows the general
precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with
a judicial compromise.1âwphi1
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties
themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of res
judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set
aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, we clarified that the
broad precept enunciated in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of
the same Code, which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise,
the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
We explained, viz.:
Before the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to
rescind compromise agreements. Where a party violated the
terms of a compromise agreement, the only recourse open to the
other party was to enforce the terms thereof.
When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 x x x
created for the first time the right of rescission. That provision
23 | P a g e
gives to the aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand." Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to qualify the
broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 that "a compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved
party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved
in his original demand, as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission.
This is because he may regard the compromise as already
rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.29
While the amicable settlement executed between Maximo and
respondent Margie before the Barangay had the force and effect
of a final judgment of a court, it appears that there was non-
compliance thereto by respondent Margie on behalf of her parents
which may be construed as repudiation. The settlement is
considered rescinded in accordance with the provision of Article
2041 of the Civil Code. Since the settlement was rescinded,
petitioner, as a co-owner, properly instituted the action for
ejectment to recover possession of the subject lot against
respondents who are in possession of the same.
Even the receipt30 signed by a certain Teresito Castigador,
acknowledging having received from Mildred the amount of
₱10,000.00 as downpayment for the purchase of the subject lot,
would not also prove respondents' allegation that there was
already a perfected contract to sell the subject lot to Mildred, since
the authority of Teresito to sell on behalf of the heirs of Lilia
Castigador was not established.
In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled
to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the
party-litigants.31 In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party-
in-interest as party-defendant is the person who is in possession
of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease and
only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner.32 Well settled
is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same
upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against him.33 His status is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.34
Here, records show that the subject lot is owned by petitioner's
mother, and petitioner, being an heir and a co-owner, is entitled to
the possession of the subject lot. On the other hand, respondent
spouses are the occupants of the subject lot which they do not
own. Respondents' possession of the subject lot was without any
contract of lease as they failed to present any, thus lending
credence to petitioner's claim that their stay in the subject lot is by
mere tolerance of petitioner and his predecessors.1âwphi1 It is
indeed respondents spouses who are the real parties-in-interest
who were correctly impleaded as defendants in the unlawful
detainer case filed by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated February 28, 2007 and the
Resolution dated July 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated March 22, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No.
04-27978, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180269               February 20, 2013
JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR., substituted by his heirs, namely:
FELICIDAD CUD lAMA T VDA. DE CASILANG, JOSE C.
CASILANG, JR., RICARDO C. CASILANG, MARIA LOURDES
C. CASILANG, CHRISTOPHER C. CASILANG, BEN C.
CASILANG, DANTE C. CASILANG, GREGORIO C. CASILANG,
HERALD C. CASILANG; and FELICIDAD Z. CASILANG,
MARCELINA Z. CASILANG, JACINTA Z. CASILANG,
BONIFACIO Z. CASILANG, LEONORA Z. CASILANG, and
FLORA Z. CASILANG, Petitioners,  denied on June 23, 1998.
vs.
ROSARIO Z. CASILANG-DIZON, MARIO A. CASILANG,
ANGELO A. CASILANG, RODOLFO A. CASILANG, and ATTY.
ALICIA B. FABIA, in her capacity as Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Pangasinan and/or her duly authorized
representative, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated July 19,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619,
which reversed and set aside the Decision2 dated April 21, 2003
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41, in
Civil Case No. 98-02371-D.
Antecedent Facts
The late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca
Zacarias (Francisca) had eight (8) children, namely: Felicidad
Casilang (Felicidad), Ireneo Casilang (Ireneo), Marcelina Casilang
(Marcelina), Jacinta Casilang (Jacinta), Bonifacio Casilang
(Bonifacio), Leonora Casilang (Leonora), Jose Casilang (Jose)
and Flora Casilang (Flora). Liborio died intestate on October 11,
1982 at the age of 83, followed not long after by his wife
Francisca on December 25, 1982. Their son Bonifacio also died in
1986, survived by his child Bernabe Casilang (Bernabe), while
son Ireneo died on June 11, 1992, survived by his four (4)
children, namely: Mario Casilang (Mario), Angelo Casilang
(Angelo), Rosario Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo Casilang
(Rodolfo), herein respondents.
The estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of three (3)
parcels of land located in Barangay Talibaew, Calasiao,
Pangasinan, namely: (1) Lot No. 4676, with an area of 4,164
square meters; (2) Lot No. 4704, containing 1,164 sq m; and (3)
Lot No. 4618, with 897 sq m.
On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan a complaint for
unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 847, to evict her
uncle, petitioner Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot
No. 4618 was owned by her father Ireneo, as evidenced by Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 555 issued in 1994 under her father’s name.
On April 3, 1997, the respondents executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with  Quitclaim3 whereby they adjudicated
Lot No. 4618 to themselves. In the same instrument, respondents
Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo renounced their respective shares in
Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario.
In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the "lawful,
absolute, exclusive owner and in actual possession" of the said
lot, and that he acquired the same "through intestate succession
from his late father."4 For some reason, however, he and his
lawyer, who was from the Public Attorney’s Office, failed to
appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference, and Jose was
declared in default; thus, the adverse judgment against him.5
On February 18, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment finding
Rosario to be the owner of Lot No. 4618, and ordering Jose to
remove his house, vacate Lot No. 4618, and pay Rosario ₱500.00
in monthly rentals from the filing of the complaint until she was
placed in possession, plus attorney’s fees of ₱5,000.00, litigation
expenses and costs. On March 23, 1998, the MTC issued a writ of
execution; and on August 28, 1998, a Writ of Demolition 6 was
issued.
On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of
Liborio and Francisca,7 filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a
Complaint,8 docketed as Civil Case No. 98-02371-D for
"Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession
with Damages" against the respondents. On June 10, 1998, the
petitioners moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
24 | P a g e
injunction or temporary restraining order, which the RTC however
Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition executed by Ireneo’s children over Lot
No. 4618, as well as TD No. 555, and by necessary implication its
derivatives, TD No. 15177 (for the lot) and TD No. 15176 (for the
house), both of which were issued in 1998 in the name of Rosario
Casilang-Dizon.9
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that all eight (8) children
of Liborio entered into a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to
which Jose was allotted Lot No. 4618 as his share; that Ireneo
never claimed ownership of Lot No. 4618, nor took possession of
it, because his share was the southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No.
4676, containing an area of 1,308 sq m,10 of which he took
exclusive possession during his lifetime; that Jose has always
resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he built his
family’s semi-concrete house just a few steps away from his
parents’ old bamboo hut; that he took in and cared for his aged
parents in his house until their deaths in 1982; that one of his
children has also built a house on the lot.11 Jose, said to be the
most educated of the Casilang siblings, worked as an insurance
agent.12 The complete disposition of the intestate estate of Liborio
per the parties’ verbal partition appears as follows:
1. Lot No. 4676, with 4,164 sq m, declared under TD No.
534 in Liborio’s name,13 was verbally partitioned among
Marcelina (236 sq m), Leonora (1,965 sq m), Flora (655
sq m), and Ireneo, represented by his children, the
herein respondents-defendants (1,308 sq m), as shown
in a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated
January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all the
Casilang siblings and their representatives.
2. Lot No. 4704, with 1,164 sq m, declared under TD No.
276 in Liborio’s name,14 was divided among Jacinta and
Bonifacio, who died in 1986 and is now represented by
his son Bernabe; and
3. Lot No. 4618, containing 897 sq m, declared since
1994 under TD No. 555 in Ireneo’s name,15 is now the
subject of the controversy below. Jose insists that he
succeeded to it per verbal partition, and that he and his
family have always occupied the same peacefully,
adversely and exclusively even while their parents were
alive.16
For her part, Rosario alleged in her answer with
counterclaim,17 which she filed on September 15, 1998, that:
a) She is the actual and lawful owner of Lot No. 4618
with an area of 897 square meters, having acquired the
same by way of a Deed of Extra judicial Partition with
Quitclaim dated 3 April 1997 which was duly executed
among herein Appellant ROSARIO and her brothers,
namely, MARIO, ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed
CASILANG;
b) Her ownership over subject property could be traced
back to her late father IR[E]NEO which the latter
inherited by way of intestate succession from his
deceased father LIBORIO sometime in 1992; that the
residential house described in herein Appellee JOSE’s
complaint is an illegal structure built by him in 1997
without her (ROSARIO’s) knowledge and consent; that in
fact, an ejectment suit was filed against Appellee JOSE
with the Municipal Trial Court in Calasiao, Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 847;
c) The subject lot is never a portion of Appellee JOSE’s
share from the intestate of his deceased father,
LIBORIO; that on the contrary, the lot is his deceased
brother IR[E]NEO’s share from the late LIBORIO’s
intestate estate; that in fact, the property has long been
declared in the name of the late IRENEO as shown by
Tax Declaration No. 555 long before his children
 ROSARIO DIZON, MARIO, ANGELO and RODOLFO, all
surnamed CASILANG, executed the Deed of Partition
dated 18 February 1998; that Appellee JOSE had
actually consumed his shares which he inherited from his
late father, and after a series of sales and dispositions of
the same made by him, he now wants to take Appellants’
property;
d) Appellee JOSE is never the rightful owner of the lot in
question and has not shown any convincing proof of his
supposed ownership; that the improvements introduced
by him, specifically the structures he cited are the subject
of a Writ of Demolition dated 28 August 1998 pursuant to
the Order dated 17 August 1998 of the MTC of Calasiao,
Pangasinan;
e) No protestation or objection was ever made by
Appellee JOSE in Civil Case No. 847 (Unlawful
Detainer case) where he was the defendant; that the
truth was that his possession of the subject property was
upon the tolerance and benevolence of his late brother
IRENEO during the latter’s lifetime and that Appellant
ROSARIO;
f) The RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial
Sheriff would just be doing her job if she and her
deputies would implement the writ of
execution/demolition issued by the MTC of Calasiao,
Pangasinan since it is its ministerial duty to do so;
g) The Appellees have no cause of action; not having
shown in their complaint the basis, the reason and the
very core of their claim as to why the questioned
document should be nullified.18 (Citation omitted)
In their reply19 to Rosario’s aforesaid answer, the petitioners
asserted that the MTC committed a grave error in failing to
consider a material fact-that Jose had long been in prior
possession under a claim of title which he obtained by partition.
At the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the
parties entered into the following stipulations:
1. That the late LIBORIO is the father of FELICIDAD,
MARCELINA, JUANITA, LEONORA, FLORA and
IRENEO, all surnamed CASILANG;
2. That the late LIBORIO died in 1982; That the late
LIBORIO and his family resided on Lot [No.] 4618 up to
his death in 1982; That the house of the late LIBORIO is
located on Lot [No.] 4618;
3. That Plaintiff JOSE used to reside on the lot in
question because there was a case for ejectment filed
against him;
4. That the house which was demolished is the family
house of the late LIBORIO and FRANCISCA ZACARIAS
with the qualification that it was given to the defendants;
5. That the action involves members of the same family;
and
6. That no earnest efforts were made prior to the
institution of the case in court.20
Ruling of the RTC
After a full trial on the merits, the RTC in its Decision21 dated April
21, 2003 decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as
follows:
25 | P a g e
1. Declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with
Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 null and void;
2. Declaring plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. as the lawful
owner and possessor of the subject Lot No. 4618 and as
such, entitled to the peaceful possession of the same;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff Jose Z.
Casilang Sr. attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00
and litigation expenses in the amount of ₱5,000.00, and
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC affirmed Jose’s ownership and possession of Lot No.
4618 by virtue of the oral partition of the estate of Liborio by all the
siblings. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with
Quitclaim23 dated January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all
the eight (8) Casilang siblings and their legal
representatives―with Ireneo represented by his four (4) children,
and Bonifacio by his son Bernabe―petitioners Jose, Felicidad,
Jacinta and Bernabe, acknowledged that they had “already
received their respective shares of inheritance in advance,"24 and
therefore, renounced their claims over Lot No. 4676 in favor of
co-heirs Marcelina, Leonora, Flora and Ireneo, as follows:
We hereby RENOUNCED, WAIVED AND QUITCLAIM, all our
rights, interests and participations over the WHOLE parcel of land
[Lot No. 4676], left by the late, LIBORIO CASILANG, in favor of
our coheirs, namely: MARCELINA Z. CASILANG-PARAYNO,
LEONORA Z. CASILANG-SARMIENTO, FLORA Z. CASILANG,
MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG, ROSARIO A.
CASILANGDIZON AND RODOLFO A. CASILANG.25
Thus, Jose expressly renounced his share in Lot No. 4676, which
has an area of 4,164 sq m, because he had already received in
advance his share in his father’s estate, Lot No. 4618 with 897 sq
m:
To the mind of the court, Jose Casilang could have not [sic]
renounced and waived his rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676
if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his, while the other lot, Lot
[No.] 470[4], was divided between sister Jacinta Casilang and
brother Bonifacio Casilang[,] Sr., who was represented by his son.
In the same [way] as testified to by plaintiffs Felicidad Casilang
and Jacinta Casilang, they signed the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Quitclaim wherein they waived and renounced their
rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676 because they have
already received their share, which is Lot [No.] 470[4].26
The RTC found baseless the claim of Rosario that Lot No. 4618
was an inheritance of her father Ireneo considering that a tax
declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership. The RTC even
noted that the tax declaration of Ireneo started only in 1994,
although he had been dead since 1992. "Such being the case, the
heirs of Ir[e]neo Casilang has [sic] no basis in adjudicating unto
themselves Lot No. 4618 and partitioning the same by executing
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim."27
Appeal to the CA
Undeterred, Rosario appealed to the CA averring that: (1) the
lower court erred in declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 as null and void; and (2) the
lower court erred in declaring Jose as the lawful owner and
possessor of the subject Lot No. 4618.28
In the now assailed decision, the CA reversed the RTC by relying
mainly on the factual findings and conclusions of the MTC in Civil
Case No. 847, viz:
Per the records, the above described property was subject of Civil
Case No. 847 decided by the MTC of Calasiao, First Judicial
Region, Province of Pangasinan which rendered a
judgment, supra, in favor of Appellant ROSARIO ordering herein
Appellee JOSE and all persons claiming rights under him to
vacate the land of Appellant ROSARIO. It was found by the MTC
that the latter is the owner of the subject parcel of land located at
Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan; that the former owner of the land
is the late IRENEO (who died on 11 June 1992), father of
Appellant ROSARIO; that Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim
was executed by and among the heirs of the late IRENEO; that
MAURO [sic], ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG
waived and quitclaimed their respective shares over the subject
property in favor of Appellant ROSARIO; that Appellee JOSE was
allowed by the late IRENEO during his lifetime to occupy a portion
of the land without a contract of lease and no rentals being paid
by the former; that Appellant ROSARIO allowed Appellee JOSE to
continue occupying the land after the Extra Judicial Partition with
Quitclaim was executed.29
Moreover, noting that the decision in Civil Case No. 847 in favor
of Rosario was issued on February 18, 1998 while the petitioners’
complaint in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D was filed on June 2,
1998, the CA concluded that the latter case was a mere
afterthought:
If the latter has really a strong and valid reason to question the
validity of the Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with
Quitclaim, supra, he could have done it soon after the said Deed
was executed on 3 April 1997. However, curiously enough, it was
only when the MTC ordered his eviction from the subject property
that he decided to file the instant case against the Appellants.30
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
Now in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners maintain
that:
IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY [OF] THE DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND QUITCLAIM DATED APRIL
3, 1997, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY
VIOLATED THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF JOSE Z. CASILANG,
SR. AS DIRECT COMPULSORY HEIR.31
Our Ruling and Discussions
There is merit in the petition.
Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of
ownership raised by the defendant in an ejectment suit, but
only to resolve the issue of possession; its determination is
not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a
summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land. What really
distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory
action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action
(accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question
of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal)
together with forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that
may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from
the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana  or the plenary
action to recover the right of possession and accion
reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also
includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of
actions to judicially recover possession.32
Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Summary
Procedure governs the two forms of ejectment suit, the purpose
being to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right to possession of the property. They are not
processes to determine the actual title to an estate. If at all,
inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of
ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve
the issue of possession and its determination on the ownership
issue is not conclusive.33 As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule
70:
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.―When the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question
26 | P a g e
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
It is apropos, then, to note that in contrast to Civil Case No. 847,
which is an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is for
"Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession;"
it is an accion reinvindicatoria, or action to recover ownership,
which necessarily includes recovery of possession34 as an
incident thereof. Jose asserts his ownership over Lot No. 4618
under a partition agreement with his co-heirs, and seeks to
invalidate Ireneo’s "claim" over Lot No. 4618 and to declare TD
No. 555 void, and consequently, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Quitclaim executed by Ireneo’s heirs.
It is imperative to review the CA’s factual conclusions since
they are entirely contrary to those of the RTC, they have no
citation of specific supporting evidence, and are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence, particularly on the
parties’ verbal partition, but are directly contradicted by the
evidence on record.
It must be noted that the factual findings of the MTC, which the
CA adopted without question, were obtained through Summary
Procedure and were based solely on the complaint and affidavits
of Rosario, after Jose had been declared in default. But since a
full trial was had in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the CA should
have pointed out the specific errors and weaknesses in the RTC’s
factual conclusions before it could rule that Jose was unable to
present "any evidentiary support" to establish his title, and that his
continued possession of Lot No. 4618 was by mere tolerance of
Rosario. At most, however, the CA only opined that it was
conjectural for the RTC to conclude, that Jose had already
received his inheritance when he renounced his share in Lot No.
4676. It then ruled that the RTC erred in not considering the
findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847-that Jose’s possession
over subject property was by mere tolerance. Said the appellate
court:
Given the claim of the Appellee that Lot [No.] 4618
was orally given/assigned to him by his deceased father
LIBORIO, or that his claim was corroborated by his sisters (his co-
plaintiffs-Appellees), or that their claim is indubitably tied up with
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim over Lot No.
4676, still We cannot fully agree with the pronouncement of the
court a quo  that Appellee JOSE could not have renounced and
waived his rights and interest over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes
that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his. Wanting any evidentiary support,
We find this stance as conjectural being unsubstantiated by law or
convincing evidence. At the most and taking the factual or legal
circumstances as shown by the records, We hold that the court a
quo  erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case
No. 847 ruling that herein Appellee JOSE’s possession over
subject property was by mere tolerance. Based as it is on mere
tolerance, Appellee JOSE’s possession therefore could not, in any
way, ripen into ownership.35 (Citations omitted)
By relying solely on the MTC’s findings, the CA completely
ignored the testimonial, documentary and circumstantial evidence
of the petitioners, obtained by the RTC after a full trial on the
merits. More importantly, the CA did not point to any evidence of
Rosario that Ireneo had inherited Lot No. 4618 from Liborio. All it
did was adopt the findings of the MTC.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and unless the case falls
under any of the well-defined exceptions, the Supreme Court will
not delve once more into the findings of facts. In Sps. Sta. Maria
v. CA,36 this Court stated:
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact
of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,
or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.37 (Citation omitted)
In the instant case, the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are
starkly contrasting. Moreover, we find that the CA decision falls
under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) above, which warrants another
review of its factual findings.
The evidence supporting Rosario’s claim of sole ownership of Lot
No. 4618 is the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim,
which she executed with her brothers Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo.
There is no question that by itself, the said document would have
fully conveyed to Rosario whatever rights her brothers might have
in Lot No. 4618. But what needs to be established first is whether
or not Ireneo did in fact own Lot No. 4618 through succession, as
Rosario claims. And here now lies the very crux of the
controversy.
A review of the parties’ evidence shows that they entered
into an oral partition, giving Lot No. 4618 to Jose as his
share, whereas Rosario presented no proof whatsoever that
her father inherited Lot No. 4618 from his father Liborio.
Rosario’s only proof of Ireneo’s ownership is TD No. 555, issued
in his name, but she did not bother to explain why it was dated
1994, although Ireneo died on June 11, 1992. Liborio’s ownership
of Lot No. 4618 is admitted by all the parties, but it must be asked
whether in his lifetime Liborio did in fact transmit it to Ireneo, and if
not, whether it was conveyed to him by Liborio’s heirs. It is
imperative for Rosario to have presented proof of this transfer to
Ireneo, in such a form as would have vested ownership in him.
We find, instead, a preponderance of contrary evidence.
1. In his testimony, Jose claimed that his parents’
bamboo house in Lot No. 4618 disintegrated from wear
and tear; so he took them in to his semi-concrete house
in the same lot, which was just a few steps away, and he
cared for them until they died; shortly before Liborio’s
death, and in the presence of all his siblings, his father
Liborio assigned Lot No. 4618 to him as his inheritance;
his house was demolished in 1998 as a result of the
ejectment case filed against him; but his family continued
to live thereat after reconstructing the house; Ireneo and
his family did not live in Lot No. 4618; although Jose’s
job as an insurance agent took him around Pangasinan,
he always came home to his family in his house in Lot
No. 4618, which he used as his permanent address; only
Lot No. 4676 was included in the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition dated January 8, 1998 because Lot No. 4618
had already been distributed to Jose, and Lot No. 4704
had already been assigned to Jacinta and Bonifacio as
their share in their father’s estate.38
2. Jose’s testimony was corroborated by petitioners
Felicidad,39 Jacinta,40 Leonora,41 and Flora,42 who all
confirmed that their brother Jose has always resided in
Lot No. 4618 from his childhood up to the present, that
he took their aged parents into his house after their
bamboo house was destroyed, and he attended to their
needs until they died in 1982. The sisters were also one
in saying that their father Liborio verbally willed Lot No.
4618 to Jose as his share in his estate, and that their
actual partition affirmed their father’s dispositions.
Jacinta claimed that she and Bonifacio have since taken
possession of Lot No. 4704 pursuant to their partition,
and have also declared their respective portions for tax
purposes.43 Flora corroborated Jacinta on their taking
possession of Lot No. 4704, as well as that Jose built his
house on Lot No. 4618 next to his parents and they
came to live with him in their old age. Flora affirmed that
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Exhibit "F" correctly reflects their verbal partition of Lot
No. 4676, and that she was fully in accord with it. She
added that Felicidad and Marcelina had since
constructed their own houses on the portions of Lot No.
4676 assigned to them.44Felicidad mentioned that in their
partition, Ireneo was given a portion of Lot No. 4676,
while Lot No. 4704 was divided between Jacinta and
Bonifacio, and Jose alone got Lot No. 4618. Leonora
confirmed that they were all present when their father
made his above dispositions of his estate.
3. Benjamin Lorenzo, a long-time neighbor of the
Casilangs testified that Jose’s house stands on Lot No.
4618 and Ireneo did not live with his family on the said
lot but was a tenant in another farm some distance
away.45
4. For her part, Rosario merely asserted that her father
Ireneo succeeded to Lot No. 4618 from Liborio, as
shown in TD No. 555 (Exhibit "1"); that she and her
brothers extra-judicially settled Ireneo’s estate, and that
they each waived their shares in her favor; and, that she
has been paying taxes on Lot No. 4618. Rosario
admitted, however, that Jose has lived in the lot since he
was a child, and he has reconstructed his house thereon
after its court-ordered demolition.46 But Rosario on cross-
examination backtracked by claiming that it was her
father Ireneo and grandfather Liborio who built the old
house in Lot No. 4618, where Ireneo resided until his
death; he even planted various fruit trees. Yet, there is
no mention whatsoever to this effect by any of the
witnesses. Rosario also contradicted herself when she
denied that Jose lived there because his job as
insurance agent took him away often and yet admitted
that Jose’s house stands there, which he reconstructed
after it was ordered demolished by the MTC.
Inexplicably, Rosario disclaimed knowledge of Ireneo’s
share in Lot No. 4676, although she was a signatory,
along with her brothers and all the petitioners, in the
deed of partition of the said lot, whereby she got 1,308
sq m. Rosario also admitted that taxes were paid on the
lot only beginning in 1997, not before.47
5. Benjamin Dizon, husband of Rosario, testified that
Rosario was losing appetite and sleep because of the
case filed by Jose; that Ireneo died in another farm; that
Ireneo had a house in Lot No. 4618 but Jose took over
the house after he died in 1992.48 Respondent Angelo,
brother of Rosario, claimed that when he was 13 or 14
years old, he heard his grandfather tell his father Ireneo
that he would inherit Lot No. 4618. On cross-
examination, Angelo insisted that his father had always
lived with his family in his grandfather’s house in Lot No.
4618, that Jose did not live there but was given another
lot, although he could not say which lot it was; he
admitted that his grandmother lived with Jose when she
died, and Ireneo’s share was in Lot No. 4676.49
6. On rebuttal, Jose recounted that after his four children
were married, Ireneo lived as a tenant in another farm;
that during a period of illness he lived in Manila for some
time, and later resided in Cagayan with his two married
sons; and lastly on his return, worked as a tenant of the
Maningding family for about 10 years in Calasiao,
staying in a hut one kilometer away. Jose also claimed
that Ireneo had asked Liborio for a portion of Lot No.
4676, a lot which is bigger than Lot No. 4618 by several
hundreds of square meters.50
7. On sur-rebuttal, Rosario claimed that her
grandparents, father and mother lived in Lot No. 4618
when she was a child until she married and left in 1976;
that her uncle Jose asked permission from Liborio to be
allowed to stay there with his family. She admitted that
Jose built his house in 1985, three years after Liborio
died, but as if to correct herself, she also claimed that
Jose built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not  in Lot No.
4618. (Contrarily, her aunt Leonora testified that Jose
built his house in Lot No. 4618 while their parents were
 alive.)51 Moreover, if such was the case, Rosario did not
explain why she filed Civil Case No. 847, if she thought
her uncle built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in Lot
No. 4618.52 Rosario also claimed that Ireneo always
came home in the evenings to his father Liborio’s house
from the Maningding farm, which he tenanted for 10
years, but obviously, by then Liborio’s house had long
been gone. Again, confusedly, Rosario denied that she
knew of her father’s share in Lot No. 4676.
equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to
by the parties.58
Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is
well borne out by the records. It is also consistent with the claimed
verbal partition with his siblings, and fully corroborated by his
sisters Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified
that they each had taken possession of their own shares and built
their houses thereon.

From the testimonies of the parties, we are convinced that the
conclusion of the RTC is well-supported that there was indeed a
verbal partition among the heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each
of his eight children received his or her share of his estate, and
that Jose’s share was Lot No. 4618.
The parties’ verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by
their taking possession of their respective shares.
The validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction.
In Vda. de Espina v. Abaya,53 this Court declared that an oral
partition is valid:
Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said
partition. "An agreement of partition may be made orally or in
writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the property owned
in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute
of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition
is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and
designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-
owners."54
In Maestrado v. CA,55 the Supreme Court upheld the partition after
it found that it conformed to the alleged oral partition of the heirs,
and that the oral partition was confirmed by the notarized
quitclaims executed by the heirs subsequently.56 In Maglucot-Aw
v. Maglucot,57 the Supreme Court elaborated on the validity of
parol partition:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of
frauds, courts of equity have enforce [sic] oral partition when it
has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition
is valid and enforceable at law, equity will [in] proper cases, where
the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking
of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the
parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases
involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such
partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title
thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better
right.59 Moreover, under Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who
possesses in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal
presumption that he possesses with a just title, and he cannot be
obliged to show or prove it. Similarly, Article 433 of the Civil Code
provides that actual possession under a claim of ownership raises
a disputable presumption of ownership. Thus, actual possession
and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in
accordance with an alleged partition are considered strong proof
of an oral partition60 which the Court will not hesitate to uphold.
Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.
It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. They are merely indicia of a
claim of ownership,61 but when coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, they can be the basis of claim of
ownership through prescription.62 In the absence of actual, public
and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.63 We have seen that there is
no proof that Liborio, or the Casilang siblings conveyed Lot No.
4618 to Ireneo. There is also no proof that Ireneo himself declared
Lot No. 4618 for tax purposes, and even if he or his heirs did, this
is not enough basis to claim ownership over the subject property.
The Court notes that TO No. 555 was issued only in 1994, two
years after Ireneo's death. Rosario even admitted that she began
paying taxes only in 1997.64 More impmiantly, Ireneo never
claimed Lot No. 4618 nor took possession of it in the concept of
owner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 21, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41 in Civil Case No.
98-02371-D is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition

may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to
assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided
by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken
and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of
equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the

parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part

performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary,
to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of
frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact
between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of

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