Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881

www.elsevier.com/locate/ress

Reprioritization of failures in a system failure mode and effects analysis

by decision making trial and evaluation laboratory technique
S.M. Seyed-Hosseini *, N. Safaei, M.J. Asgharpour
Industrial Engineering Department, Iran University of Science and Technology, Narmak, Tehran, 16844, Iran
Received 10 January 2005; received in revised form 16 August 2005
Available online 10 November 2005

Abstract

In this paper an effective methodology related to decision making field has been developed for reprioritization of failure modes in a system
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for corrective actions. The proposed methodology can cover some of inherently shortcomings of
conventional Risk Priority Number (RPN) method and like. The current prioritization methods have two main deficiencies as: they have not
considered indirect relations between components and are deficient for systems with many subsystems or components. The proposed method
called Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) is an effective approach for analyzing relation between components of a
system in respect to its type (direct/indirect) and severity. The main advantages of DEMATEL are involving indirect relations in analyze,
allocating as possible as unique ranks to alternatives and clustering alternatives in large systems. The demonstrated results have shown that
DEMATEL method can be an efficient, complementary and confident approach for reprioritization of failure modes in a FMEA. For verification of
proposed methodology, two illustrative practical examples are solved and obtained outcomes are reported.
q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Failure mode and effects analysis; Decision making trial and evaluation laboratory

1. Introduction design phases when the relationships between components

FMEA was first developed as a formal design methodology
in the 1960s by the aerospace industry with their obvious
reliability and safety requirements. It represents a powerful and
documented method for engineers to present in a structural and
formalized manner with their subjective thinking and experi-
ence in terms of three main questions [4]: what might go
wrong? What might cause it to wrong? And what effect would
it have? A lot of research has been carried out to enhance the
performance of FMEA until now.
Bell et al. [1] developed a method of causal reasoning in
FMEA. This method can be used only in cases where the inputs
and outputs of a component are known. Wang et al. [2]
proposed an approach combining FMEA and the Boolean
Representation Method (BRM). It might be difficult to
construct the Boolean representation tables for some com-
ponents of a system especially during early conception and
* Corresponding author. Tel.: C98 21 7451500 5; fax: C98 21 7893177.
E-mail addresses: seyedhoseini@yahoo.com (S.M. Seyed-Hosseini),
nimasafaei@iust.ac.ir (N. Safaei), asgharpour@iust.ac.ir (M.J. Asgharpour).
0951-8320/$ - see front matter q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ress.2005.09.005
are far more being clear or hard to be precisely represented.
Xu et al. [3] proposed a fuzzy logic base method for FMEA
to addressed the interdependencies among various failure
modes with uncertain and imprecise information. Sankar and
Prabhu [4] proposed a modified approach for prioritization of
failure modes in FMEA that called risk priority ranks (RPRs).
The failures having a higher rank are given higher priority. The
characterization of this method is based on expert knowledge in
the form of ‘If-Then’ rules where rules formulated in terms of
numerical.
Traditionally, the prioritization of failures for corrective
actions is performed by developing a risk priority number
(RPN) (Ford Motor Company, 1988). The RPN technique uses
linguistic terms to rank the severity of its failure effect (S), the
probability of the failure-mode occurrence (O) and the
probability of the failure being detected (D) on a numeric
scale from 1 to 10. The RPN is a mathematical product of the
three above factors as S!O!D2[1,1000]. Failures modes
having higher RPN are assumed to be more important and
should be given a higher priority.
The DEMATEL method is an effective procedure for
analyzing structure and relationships between components of a
system or a number of available alternatives. DEMATEL can
be priorities the alternatives based on the type of relationships
 S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881 873

Table 1 Table 4
Suggested evaluation criteria and ranking system for the severity of effects for a PN scale statistical data
design FMEA
Incorrect assumption Actual statistical data
Linguistic terms for severity of effect a failure mode Rank
The average of all RPN values is The average RPN values is 166
Hazardous (occurs without warning) 10 roughly 500
Serious (Noncompliance with standards) 9 Roughly 50 percent of RPN values The median is near 105
Extreme (system is inoperable) 8 are above 500. (The median is
Major (system may not operable) 7 near 500)
Significant (functions may not operable) 6 There are 1000 possible RPN values There are 120 unique RPN values
Moderate (The product requires repair) 5
Low (The product dos not require repair) 4
Minor 3 mathematical product of the three factors severity of effect,
Very minor 2
None effect 1
probability of occurrence and probability of detection a failure
mode that scale from 1 to 10 according to a number of
linguistic terms. For example, Tables 1–3 show a Suggested
evaluation criteria and ranking system for the severity,
occurrence and detection of effects for a failure mode.
Table 2
The first shortcoming is that the RPN elements are not
Suggested evaluation criteria and ranking system for the occurrence of failure
in a design FMEA equally weighted with respect to one another in terms of risk.
As a result, some (S, O, D) scenarios product RPNs that are
Linguistic terms for probability of Rate Rank
lower than other combinations, but potentially dangerous. For
occurrence
example, the scenario (very high severity, low rate of
Extremely high (Failure almost inevitable) O1 in 2 10
occurrence, Very high detection) with RPN 9!3!2Z54 is
Very high 1 in 3 9
Repeated failures 1 in 8 8 lower than the scenario (Moderate severity, Moderate rate of
High 1 in 20 7 occurrence, low detection) with RPN 4!5!6Z120 even
Moderately high 1 in 80 6 though it should have a higher priority for corrective action.
Moderate 1 in 400 5
The second shortcoming is that the RPN scale itself has
Relatively low 1 in 2,000 4
Low 1 in 15,000 3 some non-intuitive statistical properties. The initial and correct
Remote 1 in 150,000 2 assumption observation that the scale starts at 1 and ends at
Nearly impossible 1 in 1,500,000 1 1000, often leads to incorrect assumptions about the middle of
the scale. Table 4 contains some common faulty assumptions.
The Fig. 1 shown the 1000 RPN numbers generated from all
and severity of influences of them on another. Alternatives possible combinations. Notice that nearly every RPN value is
having more effect to another are assumed to have higher non-unique, some being recycled as many as 24 times.
priority and called dispatcher and those receiving more
influence from another are assumed to have lower priority
and called Receiver [5].

2. RPN shortcomings

The RPN shortcomings have been analyzed extensively in

Ref. [4]. However, we descript them briefly. As discussed in
previous section, The RPN related to a failure mode is a

Table 3
Suggested evaluation criteria and ranking system for the detection of failure in a
design FMEA

Linguistic term for severity of effect a failure mode Rank Fig. 1. Histogram of RPN numbers generated from all possible combinations.
Absolute uncertainly 10
Very remote 9 B
4 A B C D E
Remote 8 A 2
Very low 7 A 0 0 0 0 0
Low 6 C B 4 0 2 4 0
1 4 C 0 0 0 3 0
Moderate 5 M =
2 D 0 0 2 0 2
Moderately high 4 E
2 3
High 3 E 1 0 0 0 0
D
Very high 2
Almost certain 1
Fig. 2. Typical digraph and corresponding DSRM.
874 S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881
Fig. 3. Relationship between alternatives with respect to relative severity of influence.
3. DEMATEL methodology
A base example is utilized throughout the section to
illustrate DEMATEL method. Generally, let G(V, W, E) be a
uncompleted weighted diagraph where VZ{A1, A2,.,An} is a
set of nodes (available alternatives), EZ{(Ai, Aj)jisj, i,j % n}
is a set of connections (direct relations) between alternatives
and WZ{wijjisj, i,j % n} is a set of weights of corresponding
to connections where kZjEj and wij is the weight of connection
between alternatives Ai and Aj. wij equal to severity of influence
or preference of Ai on Aj. Let Er be a set of paths (indirect
relations) with length of r between each paired alternatives
where r%n-1. An indirect relation is defined as a relation that
can only move in an indirect path between the two alternatives.
For instance, assume that VZ{A, B, C, D, E}, EZ{(B,A), (B,
C), (B,D), (C,D), (D,C) (D,E), (E,A)} and WZ{4,2,4,3,2,2,1}
be weight vector that determined according expert’s knowl-
edge. The corresponding diagraph is shown in Fig. 2.
A DEMATEL procedure is explained as follows:
1. A system designer or decision maker (DM) evaluates the
relationship between sets of paired alternatives. As the
result of this evaluation, a matrix of direct relations (see
the matrix M in Fig. 2) is obtained as the initial data of
the DEMATEL analysis.
2. By according to Eq. (1), the elements of direct relative
severity matrix (DRSM) (matrix M 0 in Fig. 3) are obtained.
The matrix M 0 is a matrix of direct relations between
alternatives. It also is the normalized version of matrix M.
3. By according to Eq. (2), the elements of direct and indirect
relative severity matrix (DIRSM) (matrix M 00 in Fig. 3) are
obtained. The matrix M 00 consists of all the relations,
including direct and indirect relations between alternatives.
Generally, mij00 O 0 means that there is a relationship from
alternative i toward alternative j directly or indirectly with
influence severity of mij00 . Or this means that the alternative i
is prior to alternative j with degree or severity mij00 . For
instance, there is not a direct relationship from alternative
C toward alternative A in matrix M. but there is a indirect
Table 5
Prioritization of alternatives in DEMATEL method
Order R Order C Order RCC Order RKC
B 1.295 D 0.872 D 1.383 B 1.295
D 0.511 C 0.575 B 1.295 C K0.122
C 0.453 A 0.537 C 1.028 E K0.275
E 0.1 E 0.375 A 0.537 D K0.361
A 0 B 0 E 0.175 A K0.537
relationship from alternative C toward alternative A as C/
D/E/A with severity 0.006 that appear in the
matrix M 00 .
4. Using the values of RCC and RKC where C is the sum of
columns and also R is the sum of rows in the matrix of
DIRSM, a level of influence and a level of relationship are
defined. In this case, the alternatives are arranged in
discounting order in terms of values of RCC and RKC
such as Table 5. The value of RKC indicates severity of
influence for each alternative. Alternatives having more
values of RKC have higher influence to another and are
assumed to have higher priority and those having little
values of RKC receiving more influence from another are
assumed to have lower priority. In similar, the value of RC
C indicated degree of relation between each alternative with
others and alternatives having more values of RCC have
more relationship with another and those having little
values of RCC have litter relationship with others.
Practically, the value of RKC is more effective and
applicable than RCC. because RKC is a good criterion for
alternatives prioritization. As a result, the prioritization of
alternatives in terms of RKC is as BOCOEODOA.
Fig. 4 shows the diagram of alternatives prioritization in
terms of RKC (Y-axis) and RCC (X-axis) according to
Table 5. The number and direction of connections is same
Fig. 2. Alternative B with highest value of RKC (i.e. 1.295) is
prior to others and called master dispatcher (a dispatcher
without input). Afterward, alternative C with value of RKC
K0.122 is prior to others and so on. Also, alternative A with
lowest value of RKC (i.e. K0.537) is a master receiver (a
receiver without output). Alternative D with highest value of
RCC (i.e. 1.383) has most relation with others (two input
connections and two output connections) and Alternative E
with lowest value of RCC (i.e. 1.175) has lowest relation with
1.5
B
1
R-C (Influence)
0.5
0
0 E 0.5 1 C 1.5
–0.5 D
A
–1
R+C (Relation)
Fig. 4. Histogram of severity of influence (effect) vs. relationship between
alternatives.
 S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881 875

others. 2
( ) B
Xn 1.5
1 n
mij0 Z mij ; a Z max mij (1) 1
a iZ1

Influence
jZ1
0.5
0 0n
2 n M ðI KM Þ 0
M 00 Z M 0 C M 0 C/C M 0 Z Z M 0 ðI KM 0 ÞK1 E 0.5
n/N ðI KM 0 Þ –0.5
0 1 1.5 D 2
A C
(2) –1
Relation
The above equation is proven by follow lemma.
Fig. 5. Histogram of severity of influence (effect) vs. relationship between
Lemma. If the square matrix MZ[mij] given where 0%mij%1 alternatives.
then the term SZ MC M 2 C/C M n where n/ f can
estimated by Se Z M !ðI KMÞK1 . methods such as RPN, RPRs [4] or fuzzy risk assessment (i.e.
2 n 2 3 expert’s rule bases) [3]. In this research, we assume that the
Proof. SZ M C M C/C M 0 M !SZ M C M C/C
weight vector determined by conventional method RPN in
M nC1
terms of expert’s knowledge as discussed in Section 2.
0SKM !S Z S !ðI KMÞ Z ðM C M 2 C/C M n Þ For illustrating to problem, we consider the example
presented in Ref. [3]. This example correspond the effects of
KðM 2 C M 3 C/C M nC1 Þ Z M KM nC1 Z M !ðI KM n Þ
failure modes related to a centrifugal pump that pumping sea
water to heat exchanger for cooling the hydrocarbon gas.

0S !ðI KMÞ Z M !ðI KM n Þ0 S Z ½M !ðI KM n Þ
=ðI KMÞ Table 7

The FMEA of centrifugal pump

On the other hand, because n/ f then Mn/0, therefore, No. potential Causes Severity Occur Detection RPN
SZ M=ðI KMÞZ M !ðI KMÞK1 Z Se : , failure mode of failure
1 FM 1 CF1 8 4 5 160
2 FM 1 CF4 8 9 5 360
3.1. Sensitivity analysis 3 FM 1 CF5 8 5 4 160
4 FM 1 CF6 8 6 7 336
For verification of the proposed method, we implemented a 5 FM 1 CF8 8 3 4 96
6 FM 1 CF18 8 5 3 120
sensitivity analysis on digraph depicted in Fig. 2. We assume 7 FM 1 CF19 8 2 7 112
the effect of alternative D on C changed from 2 to 4 (i.e. m43Z4 8 FM 1 CF28 8 6 3 144
in matrix M). Then the new prioritization is BODOEOCOA 9 FM 1 CF29 8 8 3 192
as that shown in Table 6. Unlike the old prioritization (i.e. BO 10 FM 1 CF30 8 6 2 96
COEODOA, according to Table 5), the sub-prioritization 11 FM 2 CF1 6 4 5 120
12 FM 2 CF2 6 3 5 90
COEOD inversed as DOEO C in terms of RKC criterion. 13 FM 2 CF3 6 5 3 126
Also, in terms of RCC (relation), alternatives B and C 14 FM 2 CF5 6 7 4 120
swapped. The histogram influence versus relation related to 15 FM 2 CF7 6 6 3 108
Table 6 is shown in Fig. 5. 16 FM 2 CF10 6 7 7 294
17 FM 2 CF11 6 2 3 36
18 FM 2 CF28 6 6 3 108
3.2. An illustrative example 19 FM 3 CF9 5 3 6 90
20 FM 3 CF10 5 7 7 245
The failure information in FMEA can be described as a 21 FM 3 CF13 5 5 3 75
weighted diagraph such as Fig. 2. Where nodes indicate the 22 FM 3 CF14 5 7 5 175
23 FM 3 CF15 5 5 2 50
failure modes or causes of failures and directed connections 24 FM 3 CF16 5 6 8 240
(edges) indicate the effects failure modes on together. Also, the 25 FM 3 CF20 5 2 2 20
weights indicate the degree or severity of effects. The weights 26 FM 3 CF24 5 8 9 360
can be determined according to the expert’s thought by various 27 FM 3 CF25 5 5 5 125
28 FM 4 CF14 7 7 5 245
Table 6 29 FM 4 CF16 7 6 8 336
Prioritization of alternatives in DEMATEL method 30 FM 4 CF17 7 8 5 280
31 FM 4 CF26 7 6 5 210
Order R Order C Order RCC Order RKC
32 FM 4 CF27 7 7 8 392
B 1.446 D 1 D 1.840 B 1.446 33 FM 5 CF12 5 5 8 200
D 0.840 C 1 C 1.552 D K0.159 34 FM 5 CF21 5 2 9 90
C 0.552 A 0.54 B 1.446 E K0.3 35 FM 5 CF22 5 2 3 30
E 0.1 E 0.4 A 0.54 C K0.447 36 FM 5 CF23 5 4 9 180
A 0 B 0 E 0.5 A K0.54 37 FM 5 CF24 5 8 9 360
876 S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881
Cause of failure
(dispatchers) 1 2 3 4
126
RPN 90
(weights) 160 120
Failure mode 1 2
(receivers)
Fig. 6. Corresponding FMEA diagraph.
The general FMEA of this pump is shown in Table 7 (for more
detail see Ref. [3]). As shown in Table 6, this pump has five
potential failure modes (FM) and thirty causes of failure (CF).
Therefore, the corresponding diagraph consists of 35 nodes and
37 connections as shown in Fig. 6. Also, the corresponding
DRSM is shown in Fig. 7. As Fig. 7 depicted, there are a
unilateral flow only from CFs to FMs and rest entries are equal
to zero (three zero blocks). In the other words, FMs have not
any influence on CFs. However, in example presented in
Section 4, we will be seen a mutual flow in DSRM. The
outcome resulted from DEMATEL run is shown in Table 8 and
Fig. 8. The reprioritization obtained from DEMATEL in terms
of RKC criterion is as: CF24OCF10ODC14OCF27O.O
CF20, that is different from RPN prioritization, i.e. CF27O
CF4ODC24OCF6O.OCF20. As DEMATEL point of
view, CF24 has a more severity of influence than CF27 on
system and it is more dangerous. In the other words, according
to rows 26 and 37 in Table 7, CF24 has a severity of influence
360 on MF3 and a severity of influence 360 on MF5 too.
However, according to row 32, CF27 has only a severity of
influence 392 on MF4. It is notable that values 360 and 392 are
relative large value in RPN implementation in Table 7.
Likewise, according to rows 16 and 20 in Table 7, CF10 has
a severity of influence 294 on MF2 and a severity of influence
245 on MF3 too. However, according to row 2, CF4 has only a
severity of influence 360 on MF1 (Fig. 8). On the other hand, as
shown in Fig. 9, the DEMATEL could prioritize the FMs with
respect to ability of vulnerable. On the other words, it can say
that, FMs having more values of RCC (relation) are more
vulnerable. Therefore, the reprioritization obtained from
DEMATEL with respect to ability of vulnerable is as FM1O
FM4OFM3OFM2OFM5. The other advantage of DEMA-
TEL method is its ability for allocation of a rank (i.e. RKC
value) as possible as unique with high accuracy to each item.
According to Table 8, in DEMATEL implementation there are
three instances with same rank (i.e. CFs 10, 14, 27, CFs 3, 25
and CFs 18, 19, 7). However, in RPN implementation there are
six instances with same rank (i.e. CFs 24, 4 (RPNZ360), CFs
10, 14 (RPNZ245), CFs 16, 6 (RPNZ336), CFs 5, 1 (RPNZ
160), CFs 30, 8 (RPNZ96) and CFs 21, 9, 2 (RPNZ90)).
Obviously, in large system this matter is more tangible because
increasing the probability of existence failure modes with same
RPN.
In above presented example, the corresponding digraph
consists of a bipartite graph. In other words, each node (MF or
CF) was dispatcher or receiver. There are many cases in which
5 ... ... ... 30
96
3 4 5
a node can be both dispatcher and receiver simultaneously,
such as nodes C, D and E in Figs. 4 and 5. It occurs in systems
that components or subsystems have indirect reciprocal effect
on together. In such cases, the indirect relationships must be
considered too. By assuming a large number of components or
subsystems, the conventional methods cannot be effective for
prioritization. This matter is shown by a case study in
subsequent section.
4. A practical example
This section presents a real world illustrative example for
implementation of DEMATEL in FMEA. In the late 1970s,
turbochargers were being applied to passenger cars in large
numbers in response to the energy crisis and the resulting fuel
economy legislation [4]. The diesel engine’s gas turbocharger
utilizes the engine’s exhaust gas pressure and heat energy to
cause the turbine wheel to rotate, which in turn causes the
compressor wheel compresses the air-fuel mixture and delivers
it under pressure to the combustion chamber of the engine.
Consequently, the denser charge in the combustion chamber
can develop more horsepower during the combustion cycle.
However, its operational conditions are very severe due to the
high temperature (up to 700 8C) of exhaust gas and the high-
speed rotation (up to 50,000 revolutions/min). Therefore, it is
necessary to conduct the design FMEA of turbocharger to
enhance its reliability and durability. The basic turbocharger
construction, as well as air and oil flow information, is shown
in Fig. 10. Via expert’s knowledge, the failure modes for
turbocharger and its subsystems and components are shown in
Tables 9–11. The failure modes related to turbocharger as a
system are coded as Fij0 where index iZ1 denotes the
turbocharger itself and j represents the number of a failure
mode. The failure modes related to subsystems are coded as
FFij where index i denotes the number of a subsystem and j
represents the number of a failure mode. The failure modes
Fig. 7. Corresponding DSRM.
 S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881 877

Table 8
Reprioritization of failure modes in centrifugal pump by DEMATEL technique (Software output)

No. Order R Order C Order RCC Order RKC RPN

1 CF24 1 MF1 2.466667 MF1 2.466667 CF24 1 360
2 CF16 0.8 MF4 2.031945 MF4 2.031945 CF16 0.8 336
3 CF10 0.748611 MF3 1.916667 MF3 1.916667 CF10 0.748611 245
4 CF14 0.583333 MF2 1.391667 MF2 1.391667 CF14 0.583333 245
5 CF27 0.544444 MF5 1.194445 MF5 1.194445 CF27 0.544444 392
6 CF4 0.5 CF30 0 CF24 1 CF4 0.5 360
7 CF6 0.466667 CF29 0 CF16 0.8 CF6 0.466667 336
8 CF17 0.388889 CF28 0 CF10 0.748611 CF17 0.388889 280
9 CF5 0.388889 CF27 0 CF14 0.583333 CF5 0.388889 160
10 CF1 0.388889 CF26 0 CF27 0.544444 CF1 0.388889 160
11 CF28 0.35 CF25 0 CF4 0.5 CF28 0.35 144
12 CF26 0.291667 CF24 0 CF6 0.466667 CF26 0.291667 210
13 CF12 0.277778 CF23 0 CF17 0.388889 CF12 0.277778 200
14 CF29 0.266667 CF22 0 CF5 0.388889 CF29 0.266667 192
15 CF23 0.25 CF21 0 CF1 0.388889 CF23 0.25 180
16 CF3 0.175 CF20 0 CF28 0.35 CF3 0.175 126
17 CF25 0.173611 CF19 0 CF26 0.291667 CF25 0.173611 125
18 CF18 0.166667 CF18 0 CF12 0.277778 CF18 0.166667 120
19 CF19 0.155556 CF17 0 CF29 0.266667 CF19 0.155556 112
20 CF7 0.15 CF16 0 CF23 0.25 CF7 0.15 108
21 CF30 0.133333 CF15 0 CF3 0.175 CF30 0.133333 96
22 CF8 0.133333 CF14 0 CF25 0.173611 CF8 0.133333 96
23 CF21 0.125 CF13 0 CF18 0.166667 CF21 0.125 90
24 CF9 0.125 CF12 0 CF19 0.155556 CF9 0.125 90
25 CF2 0.125 CF11 0 CF7 0.15 CF2 0.125 90
26 CF13 0.104167 CF10 0 CF30 0.133333 CF13 0.104167 75
27 CF15 0.069444 CF9 0 CF8 0.133333 CF15 0.069444 50
28 CF11 0.05 CF8 0 CF21 0.125 CF11 0.05 36
29 CF22 0.041667 CF7 0 CF9 0.125 CF22 0.041667 30
30 CF20 0.027778 CF6 0 CF2 0.125 CF20 0.027778 20
31 MF5 0 CF5 0 CF13 0.104167 MF5 K1.19444 0
32 MF4 0 CF4 0 CF15 0.069444 MF2 K1.39167 0
33 MF3 0 CF3 0 CF11 0.05 MF3 K1.91667 0
34 MF2 0 CF2 0 CF22 0.041667 MF4 K2.03194 0
35 MF1 0 CF1 0 CF20 0.027778 MF1 K2.46667 0

related to components are coded as Fij where index i denotes
the number of a component and j represents the number of a
failure mode. Also, an initial analysis of above system in
respect to the severity of failure modes effect on together by
RPN method is implemented that shown in Table 13. For
instance, the severity of effect failure mode F43 (Bearing
seizure) on F11 (Blade heavy rubbing) and F12 (Broken blade)
is equal to 3!3!1Z9. The values ’1’ (i.e. 1!1!1) represent
a tiny effect. Also the failure mode F121 has most effect on
0 0 0 0
others and the failure modes F11 , F12 , F13 and F14 have any
effect on others. As shown in Fig. 9, there are some of indirect
relationships between failure modes in Table 13. For example,
the failure mode 9 (F12) can be cause failure mode 13 (F23)
indirectly, i.e. 9/17/18/13. It is notable that this analysis
is implemented before improving by DEMATEL technique.
The outcome of DEMATEL implementation for above
example in respect to direct and indirect relationships is shown
in Table 12 and Fig. 11. The DEMATEL ability of clustering is
shown explicitly in Fig. 11. A cluster includes failure modes
with nearly equal effect and relation. In this case cluster A

1.5 Dispatchers CF24

1 CF16
0.5
1
R-C (Influence)

0 13 9
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
-1 14 5
-1.5 FM5
FM2
-2 FM3
FM4 18 17
-2.5 1
Receivers FM1
-3
R+C (Relation)

Fig. 8. Histogram of severity of influence and relationship between alternatives. Fig. 9. A schema of indirect relationship between failure modes in Table 13.
878 S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881

Fig. 10. The construction of turbocharger: (1) turbine wheel, (2) spindle, (3) compressor, (4) thrust ring, (5) thrust bearing, (6) Lock nut, (7) bearing house, (8) oil
deflector, (9) heat shroud, (10) compressor sealing ring, (11) turbine sealing ring.

(includes failure mode F121) is a master dispatcher and cluster DEMATEL presented only four instances with same rank
D (includes modes F12, F34, F41, F42, and F43) is a master (see bold cells in Table 11). It is notable that in presented
receiver and the final reprioritization is as AZ{32}OBZ example, we considered a pessimistic case in which there are
{22O23}OCZ{1, ., 8, 10, .,16, 21, 24, 25, ., 31}ODZ many failure modes with same RPN and each failure mode
{9O19O18O20O17}. However, the prioritization by RPN is
as: 32O22O23O28O30O24O{1, 10}O18O20O7O
{9, 19}O25O{rest failure modesZ1}. Also, failure mode Table 11
18 (i.e. F41 or worn bearing) is most vulnerable failure mode in The failure modes of components of turbocharger
turbocharger system. Whereas, there are many failure modes Components Failure modes
with same RPN (e.g. failure modes with RPNZ1), the
1. Turbine wheel F11ZBlade heavy rubbing, F12ZBroken blade, F13Z
Deposited carbon on the blade
Table 9
The failure modes of turbocharger as a system 2. Shaft F21ZWorn, F22ZExcessive deformation, F23ZBroken
3. Compressor F31ZBlade heavy rubbing, F32ZNicked blade, F33Z
System Failure modes wheel Deposited dirt on the blade, F34Zblade damaged.
0 0 4. Full floating F41ZWorn bearing, F42ZBroken bearing, F43ZBear-
Turbo- F11 Z Damaged, F12 Z Oil leakage,
0 journal bearings ing seizure
charger F13 Z Loss of power output and excessive smoke,
0
5. Thrust bearing F51ZDamaged
F14 Z Noise and rings
6. Locknut F61ZFracture
7. Bearing housing F71ZBlocked oil inlet passage, F72ZBlocked oil exit
Table 10 funnel, F73ZHousing crack
The failure modes of turbocharger subsystem’s 8. Oil deflector F81ZDamaged
9. Heat shroud F91ZDamaged
Subsystems Failure modes 10. Compressor F101ZFracture, F102ZLeakage
1. Oil supply FF11ZExcessive high oil pressure, FF12ZExcessive sealing ring
high oil pressure, FF13ZOil filter damage, FF14ZOil 11. Turbine seal- F111ZFracture, F112ZLeakage
supply pipe damaged, FF15ZOil return pipe damaged ing ring
2. Air filter FF21ZRestriction of air filter, FF22ZDamaged 12. Operator F121ZStart and stop operation error
 S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881 879

Table 12
Reprioritization of failure modes in turbocharger system by DEMATEL technique in respect to direct and indirect relationships (Software output)

Order R Order C Order RCC Order RKC RPN

32 1.033308 18 0.492716 32 1.033308 32 1.033308 168
22 0.387119 20 0.462228 18 0.580787 22 0.387119 128
23 0.32621 17 0.452709 20 0.489425 23 0.32621 70
30 0.113318 19 0.3664 17 0.454329 24 0.111419 24
24 0.111419 9 0.244134 22 0.387119 1 0.052301 16
18 0.088071 34 0.090368 19 0.382744 30 0.046755 36
28 0.083333 30 0.066563 23 0.32621 10 0.024418 16
1 0.052301 28 0.066563 9 0.274887 28 0.016771 56
9 0.030753 8 0.050682 30 0.179881 7 0.011924 8
20 0.027198 25 0.038691 28 0.149896 4 0.00466 1
10 0.025907 16 0.011905 24 0.111419 5 0.004643 1
19 0.016344 33 0.004637 34 0.090368 27 0.003152 1
7 0.011924 36 0.002976 1 0.052301 2 0.003148 1
4 0.00466 35 0.002976 8 0.050682 3 0.003132 1
5 0.004643 10 0.001488 25 0.043155 21 0.003024 1
25 0.004464 32 0 10 0.027395 13 0.003024 1
27 0.003152 26 0 16 0.013524 31 0.002976 1
2 0.003148 23 0 7 0.011924 14 0.002976 1
3 0.003132 22 0 4 0.00466 15 0.001619 1
21 0.003024 21 0 5 0.004643 11 0.001619 1
13 0.003024 15 0 33 0.004637 6 0.001612 1
31 0.002976 14 0 27 0.003152 12 0.001529 1
14 0.002976 13 0 2 0.003148 29 0.001527 1
17 0.001619 12 0 3 0.003132 26 0.001488 1
16 0.001619 11 0 21 0.003024 35 K0.00298 1
15 0.001619 7 0 13 0.003024 36 K0.00298 1
11 0.001619 6 0 14 0.002976 33 K0.00464 1
6 0.001612 5 0 36 0.002976 16 K0.01029 1
12 0.001529 4 0 31 0.002976 25 K0.03423 3
29 0.001527 3 0 35 0.002976 8 K0.05068 1
26 0.001488 2 0 15 0.001619 34 K0.09037 1
36 0 1 0 11 0.001619 9 K0.21338 5
35 0 27 0 6 0.001612 19 K0.35006 5
34 0 29 0 12 0.001529 18 K0.40465 14
33 0 31 0 29 0.001527 20 K0.43503 9
8 0 24 0 26 0.001488 17 K0.45109 1

effect on corresponding failure modes with same value (see
Table 13).
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a novel technique for reprioritiza-
tion of failure modes in FMEA. The proposed technique that
called DEMATEL prioritizes alternatives based on severity of
effect or influence and direct/indirect relationships of between
them. An indirect relationship means that a failure mode (that
is under effect of a cause of failure) can be cause of other failure
mode(s). The main advantages of DEMATEL are (1)
can be as an input data for DEMATEL method. We show that
the DEMATEL is a useful method for reprioritization of failure
modes in systems with many subsystems and components
whereas in such systems the RPN may not be a useful approach
practically. Nowadays, with promotion of computational tools,
there is not any limitation for implementation of DEMATEL in
very large and complex systems such as car, aircraft or shuttle.
Obviously, the performance of proposed method is depends on
1.2
A 32
1
0.8 B
R-C (Influence)

0.6
considering indirect relationships in relation analyze (2) 0.4 C 23 22
capability of clustering alternatives in large systems with 0.2 24
many failure modes (3) allocating as possible as a unique rank 0
-0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
number to each alternative (4) Also, the DEMATEL can 9
-0.4 19
determine the severity of relation (i.e. RCC value) between an 17 20 18 D
-0.6
alternative with others. It is useful for identification and
R+C (Relation)
prioritization of vulnerable components where a high RCC
value means that corresponding failure mode is more under Fig. 11. Reprioritization and clustering of failure modes in respect to direct and
effect of cause of failures. Finally, RPN or similar approaches indirect relationships.
 880
Table 13
Corresponding DSRM

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
F11 F12 F13 F21 F22 F23 F31 F32 F33 F34 F41 F42 F43 F51 F61 F71 F72 F73 F81 F91 F101 F102 F111 F112 F121 F 0 11 F 0 12 F 0 13 F 0 14
1 FF11 16 16
2 FF12 1 1

S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881
3 FF13 1 1
4 FF14 1 1 1
5 FF15 1 1 1
6 FF21 1
7 FF22 8
8 F11
9 F12 5 5 5 5
10 F13 16
11 F21 1
12 F22 1
13 F23 1 1
14 F31 1 1
15 F32 1
16 F33 1
17 F34 1
18 F41 14 14 14 14
19 F42 5 5
20 F43 9 9
21 F51 1 1
22 F61 128 128
23 F71 70 70 70
24 F72 24 24 24
25 F73 3
26 F81 1
27 F91 1 1
28 F101 56
29 F102 1
30 F111 36 36
31 F112 1 1
32 F121 168 168 168 168
33 0
F11
0
34 F12
35 0
F13
36 0
F14
 S.M. Seyed-Hosseini et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006) 872–881
input data, i.e. weights matrix. Therefore, other methods such
as RPR can be considered for this method. Also DEMATEL
can be considered in Fuzzy or probability environments that
suggested for further researches.
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