SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2

CASE 1
Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The
petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature,
contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
YES. the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any
favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international
importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and
State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 2
GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]
Facts:
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This
provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed.
Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until
the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the
celebration of the saint’s feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image
was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass,
Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the
church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the
priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said
resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8
Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image
was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically,
the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family
desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that
were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their
right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since
private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds
and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 3
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-governmental organization internationally accredited to issue halal
certifications in the Philippines. To carry out its functions, it formulated internal rules and procedures
based on the Qur’an and Sunnah for food analysis and inspection, and began to issue certifications to
qualified products and food manufacturers for a fee.
Later, respondent Office issued Executive Order 46 which created the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme. Such order vested exclusive authority on the Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to
issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. OMA then warned Muslim
consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said certification
had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork. It also began to send
letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they
violate the order. As a result, the IDCP lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing
certifications from it.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition to nullify EO 46, contending that it is unconstitutional for the
government to formulate policies & guidelines on the halal certification scheme because it is a
function that only religious organizations can lawfully & validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 46 is unconstitutional for violating the non-establishment and free exercise
clauses guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes.
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are
drawn from the Qur’an & Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products
as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption; by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur’an & Sunnah on halal food.
Only the prevention of an immediate & grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness & immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even
on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos
right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies
charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption,
properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of
Muslims.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 4
Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop
de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church.
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that
their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of
law.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best
left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not
for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and
official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just
church regulations. “Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization
except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a
civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or
possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 5
VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
59 SCRA 54 G.R. No. L-25246 , September 12, 1974
Ponente: J. Zaldivar
FACTS:
Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such employee, he was a member
of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed shop agreement with the Company that
membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all its permanent
employees.
Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to require as a
condition of employment membership in a labor organization, if such organization is the
representative of the employees. However, the provision was later amended by the enactment of
Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: … “but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the Company
to dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member. This prompted Victoriano to file an action to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing him. The Union assails the constitutionality of RA No. 3350, contending that it infringes on
the fundamental right to form lawful associations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental freedom to form
associations.
RULING:
No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:
“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that
they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far
from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It
does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to
said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the
labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up,
they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining;
and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore,
does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.”
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 6
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu
GR 95770, 29 December 1995
PONENTE: Kapunan
FACTS:
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for
Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits
and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the explulsions.
Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is
devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The children of
Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid
right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom
of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-
compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by
competent authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and
worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only
limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals,
health and interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing
their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention
during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the
solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their
expulsion.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 7
German v Barangan; G.R. No. 68828; 27 Mar 1985; 135 SCRA 514
FACTS:
Petitioners, wearing yellow shirts, marched with raised clenched fist and shouts of anti-government
sentiments on their way to a chapel which adjoins Malacanang Palace. They were stopped from
getting the church and were told that any similar attempt to enter the church will likewise be
prevented.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the prohibition on petitioners from worshiping and praying at the chapel violates their
freedom to worship.
HELD:
NO. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious
freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good
faith. Even assuming that petitioners’ claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, there
is still the necessity of securing the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government
officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacañang as well as to maintain
the smooth functioning of the executive branch of the government.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 8
FORTUNATO R. PAMIL v. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON
G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978
FACTS :
Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of
Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by
petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code
provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers
in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge
sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory
ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this
Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full
force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.

ISSUE” WON the disqualification of the respondent based on Administrative Code provision
Constitutional

HELD: The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible
ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here being an
ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is
thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an
express constitutional mandate.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 9
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
PUNO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed]
and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of
petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the
respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by
the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has
jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board
did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three
series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another
religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
WON respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program?
III. RULING:
YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s
religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” either
religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-
called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.
The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence.
Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs,
hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly
suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate
court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes
constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type
of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by
the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 10
Estrada vs. Escritor,
492 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Facts:
Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested an
investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a child with the
latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act
which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged gross
immoral conduct for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and
Watch Tower Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her
religious beliefs. She further alleged that they executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in
accordance with her religion which allows members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration makes the union moral
and binding within the congregation throughout the world except in countries where divorce is
allowed.
Issue:
WON Escritor guilty of gross immorality for having an illicit relationship?
WON her religious belief justify such act?
Ruling:
Yes the act was grossly immoral. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government
employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she
may be held administratively liable. In these cases, there was not one dissent to the majority's ruling
that their conduct was immoral. The respondents themselves did not foist the defense that their
conduct was not immoral, but instead sought to prove that they did not commit the alleged act or have
abated from committing the act.
No, Escritor is not guilty of gross immorality and she cannot be penalized for her freedom of
religion justifies her conjugal arraignment. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm
of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education is instructive
on the matter, viz:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds.
One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom, including
religious freedom, may be enjoyed.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 11
Soriano vs. La Guardia
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired
on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but
almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the
above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his
duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for
three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside
from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of
a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that
indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.

CASE 12---- PLEASE….REFER TO CONSTI DIGEST IN

GOOGLE DRIVE (CAN’T FIND ANYTHING REMOTELY
CLOSE…SORRY)
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 13
VILLAVICENCIO v. LUKBAN
39 PHIL 778
FACTS:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women closed. One hundred and
seventy women were deported to Davao without their knowledge and consent. The women were
received as laborers in a banana plantation. Some of the women were able to escape and return to
Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
WON respondent mayor violated the right to liberty and abode of the women when they were
deported without their knowledge and consent (Sec. 6 Art. 3)
HELD:
YES. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller,
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our
system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the
more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes
upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."
The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not
thus be easily evaded.
When more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer and
transported to Davao, considering that the existence of the said houses of prostitution has been
tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner
shown, acted without authority of any legal provision which constitutes an exception to the laws
guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city of Manila.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 14
Manotoc v CA; G.R. No. L-62100; 30 May 1986; 142 SCRA 149
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged for estafa in connection with a suspected fake Torrens title submitted to and
accepted by his stock brokerage house. He has been admitted to bail. He filed before each court a
motion seeking permission to leave the country to attend to matters “relative to his business
transactions and opportunities” in the United States. The motions were denied.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the denial of his petition violates petitioner’s right to travel.
HELD:
NO. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as
a valid restriction on his right to travel. If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. The constitutional right to travel
being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on
bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by Art. IV, Sec. 5 of the 1973 Constitution.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 15
Yap vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he
filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in
the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of
the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and
private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the
SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right
to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty,
claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Issues:
Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel?
HELD:
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely
required to inform the court in case he does so.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 16
Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a
special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The
standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be
informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide
actual interest to secure the information sought.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.
Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is
to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public
disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of
examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional
guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access
to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny,
such as those affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public
interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness
while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even
as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on
the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner
is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the
civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 17
RICARDO VALMONTE, et al. vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.. G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
Such request was on the premise that Art. IV, Sec. 6 of the Constitution. The Deputy General
Counsel of the GSIS replied to such letter, however, not having yet received the reply of the Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
receive a reply, “(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the
premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right to information?
HELD:
YES.Before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of “public interest”
or “public concern,” and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
[Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms “public interest” and “public concern”.
As observed in Legazpi:
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator
of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public
character.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court,
are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the
people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled
corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people’s right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 18
Aquino-Sarmiento v Morato; G.R. No. 92541; 13 Nov 1991; 203 SCRA 515
FACTS:
Petitioner, a member of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), was
denied access to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the
movies and television productions. Consequently, the Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 declaring
as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of
the members.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the decisions of the Board are private and personal.
HELD:
NO. The decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor
private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is
guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the
exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency
charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition
of the citizen’s right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the
members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.

Petition is GRANTED. Assailed resolutions are declared NULL and VOID.

SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 19
Chavez vs PCGG
G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998

Facts: Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state
to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s
economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the
people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the
government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos
heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no showing that he
has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG
may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the
Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Issues: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against respondents’ argument
that the “should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements are not yet effective
and binding
Held: Yes.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following recognized restrictions: (1) national
security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal
matters, and (4) other confidential information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreements dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND
VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all
government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or indirectly involved in the
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to
disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in
this Decision.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 20
CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was
passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed
lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila
Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or
to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the
Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is
outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” The Court must perform
its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void
ab initio.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 21
AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO
Facts:
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.The JPEPA, which will be the
first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the
event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in
goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation,
competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the
business environment, and general and final provisions.
Issues:
Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.
HELD:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. ‘Public concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public
concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered
by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the
policy of full public disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only
whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed
executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then
the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital,
not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate
in social, political, and economic decision-making.
Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 22 G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS
FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS
personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG”
or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.
The manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union
members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In
reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among
others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order
thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004,
of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the petition and
enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising
from the same facts and events.
CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available to
workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees
are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly
initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the
service-disruptive effect of such mass action.
ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid
HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel
to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in “peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”. It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid
provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held, citing
MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation
of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance with
law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain
sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government
workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government
service shall be observed. In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October
2004, the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during
their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events
evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and
protests, and even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-
delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government
personnel.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 23 Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620)
Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease
agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth
almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation
proceedings for the land in question.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just
compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .
The requisites for taking are: 1. The expropriator must enter a private property; 2. The entry must be for more
than a momentary period; 3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities; 4. The property must be devoted
for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and 5. The utilization of the property
for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes
of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof.
Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to possession
or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not indefinite or permanent.
The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP,
constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the lant was
transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the land.
By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the
intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of
permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease
contract.
The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its
utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown
by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the
Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been
paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on
June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the
“taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 24
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone
Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San
Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later
found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was
objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and
hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.

Held: YES.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives.
It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should
be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed
compensation.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 25 Sumulong v Hon. Guerrero and the NHA (GR L-48685; 1987) Cortes, J.
Facts On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels
of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners
Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square
meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per
square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential
decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the
amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject
twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the
expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation." Respondent
Judge issued a writ of possession
Petitioners challenge  the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No.
1224, as amended, the order was issued without notice and without hearing, it is unconstitutional for being
violative of the due process clause, specifically; to allow the taking of property regardless of size and no matter
how small the area to be expropriated; Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding, as
defined in said Decree, is not really for a public purpose; The Decree violates procedural due process as it
allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in
court; The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations
arbitrarily fixed by government assessors; The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to
determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and every raise of expropriation.
Issue : Does PD 1224 allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations
arbitrarily fixed by government assessors, depriving the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what
would be "just compensation"? YES. Unconstitutional.
HELD:
Just compensation
 PD 1224 unconstitutional as it allows the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair
valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors
 Already ruled upon by this Court in the case of Ignacio vs. Guerrero which, incidentally, arose from the
same expropriation complaint that led to this instant petition
 The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and 1313 are the
same provisions found in Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533 which were declared
unconstitutional in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs. Dulay
o Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and
full equivalent for the loss sustained. ALL the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered
o Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 26
Manotok v. NHA and RP
G.R. No. L-55166, May 21, 1987
Facts:
Pursuant to LOI No. 555 instituting nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program (SIR) and
LOI No. 557 adopting slum improvement as a national housing policy, the City of Manila and NHA declared the
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list for a Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) which
they described as blighted areas. With this, the President issued the challenged Presidential Decrees Nos.
1669 and 1670 which respectively declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area expropriated.
The decrees gave the City Assessor the authority to determine the market value of the lands involved and
stated that "no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by resident
families which should considerably depress the expropriation cost".
Petitioners maintain that the Presidential Decrees providing for the direct expropriation of the properties
in question violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection of the law because by the mere
passage of the said decrees their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately
deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such
expropriation or to contest the just compensation to which they are entitled. The petitioners argue that the
government must first have filed a complaint with the proper court under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
in order to fulfill the requirements of due process.
Issue: whether or not the petitioners were denied to their right to just compensation?
HELD :
The fixing of the maximum amounts of compensation and the bases thereof which are the assessed values of
the properties in 1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a higher value because, the actual or
symbolic taking of such properties occurred only in 1980 when the questioned decrees were promulgated. ---
The decision of the government to acquire a property through eminent domain should be made known to the
property owner through a formal notice wherein a hearing or a judicial proceeding is contemplated as provided
for in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. This shall be the time of reckoning the value of the property for the
purpose of just compensation.
For the compensation to be just, it must approximate the value of the property at the time of its taking and the
government can be said to have decided to acquire or take the property only after it has, at the least,
commenced a proceeding, judicial or otherwise, for this purpose.
The so-called "conditions" of the properties should not be determined through a decree but must be shown in
an appropriate proceeding in order to arrive at a just valuation of the property.
The market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot substitute for the court's judgment in expropriation
proceedings. It is violative of the due process and the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution to deny to
a property owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or prejudiced.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 27
Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan Airport G.R. No. 156273. October 15, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioners owned (2) parcels of land. In 1949 MCIAA wanted to lots of petitioners for the proposed expansion
of Lahug Airport. To entice the landowners to cede their properties, the government assured them that they
could repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport. On
December 1961 the RTC promulgated its Decision condemning lots of petitioner and other lots for public use
upon payment of just compensation. Petitioners were paid. At the end of 1991 Lahug Airport ceased
operations. Lots of petitioners which had been expropriated for the extension of Lahug Airport were not utilized.
In fact, no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA. On March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint
for reconveyance and damages with RTC against respondent MCIAA to compel the repurchase of their lots.

ISSUE: Must just compensation include interest? How much?

RULING:
NO, only if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction
over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between
the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. The amount of the
interest is 6% per annum as stated in the Rules of Court.

MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey the lots to petitioners who shall hold the same
subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of DPWH. In return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-
beneficiaries of a constructive trust must restore to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of the lots with consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947.
Petitioners must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining the properties
and the monetary value of its services in managing them to the extent that petitioners will be benefited thereby.
The government however may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land, in
the same way that petitioners need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime. As a matter of justice and convenience, the law considers
the fruits and interests as the equivalent of each other.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 28
Manosca v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 106440, January 29, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area
of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. Manosca v. Court of Appeals. The parcel has been the
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of the Iglesia Ni Cristo. Because of that, the Naitional Historical
Institute (NHI) passed a resolution declaring the land to be a national historical landmark which was then
approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Regional Trial Court: The Republic, through the
OSG instituted a complaint for expropriation alleging that the land is a public purpose. RTC then ordered the
Republic to take over the property after fixing the provisional market and assessed value of the property.
Manosca v. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals: The petition for certiorari and prohibition was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted
expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical
Institute ("NHI") as a national historical landmark. Manosca v. Court of Appeals
HELD: Yes.
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like
police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear
to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant,
the exercise of the power. Manosca v. Court of Appeals
Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and the most exact idea of property remaining in the
government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State.
It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public
exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable
from sovereignty.
The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect
as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 29
De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro
Manila. The Respondent City of Pasig, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a portion of her property
to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This
was pursuant to Ordinance enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. Again respondent wrote another
letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly “in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.” petitioner sent a reply
to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving
poor sectors of our community.” respondent reiterated in a letter that the purpose of the expropriation of
petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents.” Subsequently,
respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation and prayed that the trial court, after due notice
and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint. The trial court dismissed the motion on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
the property. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the trial court which prompted
petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari who dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
Issue: Where the expropriation of private property for the benefit of a small community notwithstanding that
there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, is considered to be for public use?
Held: No. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and
the taking must be limited to such necessity. the court held that the very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. That
“necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an
absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public
with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with
such benefit.” That respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property.
SEC 5-10 CONSTI 2
CASE 30
Rutter v. Esteban (G.R. No. L-3708. May 18, 1953)
FACTS:

Rutter sold to Placido a parcel of land through full payment of the half and two installments of the other half of
the agreed amount. The first half was paid then war came through Japanese occupation. Rutter filed an action
to claim to recover the balance due to the CFI. Esteban set up the defense of moratorium clause embodied in
Republic Act No. 342. The CFI dismissed the case upholding the moratorium of 8 years had not yet lapsed. In
Rutter’s motion, he raised the constitutionality issue for the first time, but said motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 342 is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding
the impairment of the obligation of contracts (Article III, Section 1, 1935 Constitution).

HELD:

Yes. R.A. No. 342 was declared unconstitutional.

RATIO:

Consistent with what [the Supreme Court] believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, [the Supreme Court] feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to
declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 x x x is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null
and void and without effect.

CASE 31 (CAN’T FIND ANYTHING RELATED TO SEC-5-10)

CASE 32
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