PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
1. PRACTICE OF LAW
CONCEPT OF PRACTICE OF LAW
Definition: The practice of law is any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. It is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill [Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No.
100113 (1991)].
In American Law Review (ALR), the practice of law is defined
as “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience,” as
cited in the case of Cayetano.
In the case of Phil. Lawyers vs. Agrava, it “embraces the
preparation of the pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients… and in addition, conveying.”
According to Justice Padilla, in his dissent in Cayetano vs.
Monsod, the following factors are considered in determining
whether there is practice of law:
1. Habituality –implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer.
2. Application of law, legal principles, practice or
procedure –calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience.
3. Compensation–implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service for
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
4. Attorney-client relationship – Where a lawyer
undertakes an activity which requires the knowledge of
law but involves no such relationship, such as teaching
law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said
to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer.
Note: The test is the activity, NOT who/what he or she is.
Rule: Even without authority, a person is practicing law, if
he/she represents another.
Exception: Unless he represents himself.
Atty. GCC’s input: For the purposes of the Bar, use the
definition of the ALR as cited in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod.
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A PRIVILEGE
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character
with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity,
legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust
since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate who is
morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations [Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. 1036 (2003)].
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A PROFESSION,
NOT A BUSINESS
Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. The
gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration [Burbe v. Magulta, A. C. 99-634 (2002)].
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Instances where there is Practice of Law:
1. Giving out legal information (Ulep vs Legal Clinic, 23
SCRA 378);
2. Offering of free paralegal advice and making parties
execute Special Power of Attorney that would make him
an agent of the litigants and allow him to file suits,
pleadings and motions with himself as one of the
plaintiffs [Ciocon-Reer vs Lubao, AM OCA IPI No. 09-
3210-RTJ (2012)];
3. Preparation of an extrajudicial settlement of estate
[Adrienda vs Monilla,AM No. P-11-2980(2013)];
4. Motions filed before an administrative body (BSP OSI)
and regular court (Extension and notice of change of
address); said lawyer furnished with orders issued by
legal officer of BSP OSI [Villatuya vs Tbalingcos, AC
No. 6622 (2014);]
5. A trained mind is what clients were relying upon
execution of Special Power of Attorney in favour of
suspended lawyer [Bonifacio vs Era, AC No. 11754
(2017)]; and
6. Appearance before the Election Canvassers and filed
various pleadings; called himself “counsel” [Aguirre vs
Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036, (2003)].
PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW
PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW:
ISOLATED APPEARANCE
Practice (private practice) is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind; appearance as counsel is not conclusive
(People vs Villanueva).
Question: How can we say that there is an isolated appearance?
a. In People vs. Villanueva, 121 Phil 894 (one isolated
appearance): Appearance on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice. Essentially,
the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
b. In Borja Sr. vs. Sulyap, GR No. 150718 (one isolated
appearance): The isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to
the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not
constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public
official.
c. In Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs Ladaga,
AM No. P-99-1287 (ten isolated appearances): The Court
held that the appearances of counsel (approximately 10 times) as
pro bono counsel of his cousin in a criminal case does not
constitute the private practice of law profession contemplated by
law.
PRACTICE OR APPEARANCE: WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Lawyers without authority
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court, corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
Page 1 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Non-lawyers without authority
A non-lawyer who practices law is guilty of illegal practice of law
(Zeta vs. Malinao, Adm. Case No. P-220, 1978). In addition, he
may be liable for indirect contempt for assuming to be an
attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority (Rule 71, Section 3[4 ROC). He can also be criminally
prosecuted for such false representation (Saladaga vs. Astorga).
Sanctions for unauthorized practice of law:
1. Petition for Injunction: Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic,
B.M. No. 553, 1993; for both lawyers and non-lawyers)
2. Declaratory Relief: Que v. Revilla Jr., AC. No 7054,
2009; for lawyers
3. Contempt of Court: Rule 71, Section 3(e), ROC; for
both lawyers and non-lawyers
4. Disqualification and complaints for disbarment:
Rule 138, Section 27, ROC; for lawyers
5. Criminal complaint for estafa against the person
who falsely represented himself as a lawyer to the
damage of another: Saladaga vs. Astorga, A. C. No.
4697, 2014; for both lawyers and non-lawyers
6. Administrative complaint against the erring lawyer
or government official (for lawyers)
Revised Civil Service Rules (Memorandum Circular No.
17)
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute
in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal
of the Government: Provided, further , that if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of
the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That
no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by
an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public
duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of
directors".
Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in
private practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a
duly approved leave of absence for that matter are indispensable
[Yumol v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 6585, 2005; See Rule XVIII, Section
12, Revised Civil Service Rules, cf. Memorandum Circular No.
17, s. 1986 and Special Rules governing members of the judiciary.
See Rule 138, Sec. 35, ROC vis- a-vis RA 6713, Sec. 7 (b) (2)].
Requisites for officer or employee of the EXECUTIVE
departments to engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession:
1. One’s duties and responsibilities do not require him/her
to render his entire time to the government;
2. A written permission was issued by the head of the
Department; and
3. Such private practice is done outside the department’s
office hours.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
WHEN NON-LAWYERS
MAY PRACTICE LAW
General Rule: Only members of the bar are entitled to practice
law.
Exceptions:
1. Law students (Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court);
2. By an agent/friend;
3. By the litigant himself; and
4. Non-Lawyers in Administrative Tribunals.
Law Student Practice
(Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court)
Eligibility:
 Completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum.
 Enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court
Coverage and Conditions:
 May appear without compensation in any civil, criminal
or administrative case before any trial court to
represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of
the law school.
 Shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the IBP duly accredited by the law school.
 Any pleadings and papers to be filed must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.
 Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision
of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary
action.
 Sec. 34, Rule 138, allows appearance before the
inferior courts by a non-lawyer, irrespective of whether
or not he is a law student. Thus, a law student may
appear under the circumstances of Sec. 38, as an agent
or a friend of a party litigant, without complying with
the requirements of Rule 138-A, e.g., supervision of a
lawyer [Cruz vs. Mina, G.R. 154207 (2007)].
By Agent/Friend
 Cases before the MTC: A party to the litigation, may
conduct his own case or litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC).
 Before any other court: A party may conduct his
litigation personally. But if he gets someone to aid him,
that someone must be authorized member of the Bar.
 Criminal case before the MTC in a locality where
a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available:
The judge may appoint a nonlawyer who is a:
a. Resident of the province; and
b. Of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused
in his defense (Sec. 7, Rule 116 RRC).
By the Litigant Himself
 In civil cases: An individual litigant has the right to
conduct his litigation personally.
Page 2 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
 In criminal cases: In grave and less grave offenses, an
accused who is a layman must always appear by
counsel; he cannot conduct his own defense without
violating his right to due process of law.
Exception: Upon motion, the accused may be allowed
to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears
to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel. (Rule 115 (c) ROC)
 A non-lawyer conducting his own litigation is bound by
the same rules in conducting the trial case. He cannot
after judgment, claim that he was not properly
represented.
 An attorney who is otherwise disqualified to practice
law, or has been disbarred or suspended from practice,
can validly prosecute or defend his own litigation, he
having as much right as that of a layman [Danforth vs.
Egan, 119 N.W. 1021 (1909)].
Non-Lawyers in Administrative Tribunals
 Art. 222, Labor Code in rel. to Sec. 6 Rule III of the
NLRC Rules before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter
under the following conditions:
a. Represents as party to the case
b. Represents Legitimate Labor Org (LLO).
c. Represents LLOs member/s
d. Duly-accredited member of any legal aid office
recognized by the DOJ or IBP, or
e. Is the President or owner of the corp./establishment
party to the case
Note: He is not, however, entitled to attorney’s fees
under Article 222 of the Labor Code for not being a
lawyer. (Five J. Taxi vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 111474,
August 22, 1994)
 Sec. 9, Act 2259 (Cadastral Act): A claimant may
appear by himself, or by some person in his behalf,
before a cadastral court.
 Sec. 50, RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law), as amended by RA 9700: Responsible farmer
leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their
fellow farmers, or their organizations in any
proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That
when there are two or more representatives for any
individual or group, the representatives should choose
only one among themselves to represent such party or
group before any DAR proceedings.
Limitations of Practice by Non-Lawyers:
a. Confine his work to non-adversary contentions.
b. Should not undertake purely legal work (i.e.,
examination of witness, presentation of evidence);
c. Should not be habitually rendered.
d. Should not charge or collect attorney’s fees.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROHIBITED FROM PRACTICE
OF LAW
General Prohibition
RA 6713
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official or employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
Xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period
of one (1) year after resignation, retirement , or
separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-
year prohibition shall likewise apply.
To simplify Sec 7 (b)(2) of RA 6713:
Rule: Public officials are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of their profession.
Exception: If allowed by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice is not in conflict with official
functions.
Absolute Prohibition
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
Sec. 35. Certain Attorneys not to practice. No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor general, shall engage in PRIVATE PRACTICE
as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Who are absolutely prohibited?
1. Judges and other officials or employees of superior
courts [Sec. 35, Rule 148, ROC];
RA 910 also provides that ,“No retiring Justice during the time
that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before
any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or
in any criminal case wherein and officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office, or collect any fee for his appearance in any
administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to
the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to any of
its legally constituted officers.”;
Question: Can an incumbent judge act as a notary public?
Answer: Yes. For as long as there is no other notary public
within the area and the document to be notarized is not in
relation the judge’s function, the incumbent judge may act as
one.
2. Officials and employees of the Office of the Solicitor
General [Sec. 35, Rule 148, ROC];
3. Government prosecutors [Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio, A.C.
6705 (2006)];
4. President, vice-president, cabinet members, their
deputies and assistants [Sec. 15, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution];
5. Chairmen and members of constitutional commissions
[Sec. 2, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution];
6. Ombudsman and his deputies [par. 2, Sec. 8 (2), Art. X,
1987 Constitution];
7. All governors, city and municipal mayors [Sec. 90(a), RA
7160];
Page 3 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
8. Civil service officers or employees whose duties require
them to devote their entire time at the disposal of the
government [Catu vs. Rellosa, A.C. 5738 (2008)];
9. All those who are prohibited by special law.
Relative Prohibition
Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
No senator or member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies
1. Senator or member of the House of Representatives
Note: The word “appearance” includes not only arguing a case
before any such body, but also filing a pleading on behalf of a
client [Ramos vs. Manalac, G.R. L-2610 (1951)].
Sec. 90(b), RA 7160
Sanggunian members may practice law except during session
hours and provided they shall not:
a. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein
a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
b. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office;
c. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is
an official; and
d. Use property and personnel of the government except when
the Sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of
the government.
2. Sanggunian member
General Rule: Government officials are not allowed to practice
law.
Exception: Unless it is allowed by the Constitution, statutes,
and there is no conflict of interest. For example:
a. Officers & employees of Executive Departments are
allowed provided they have the written permission
from their heads. (Memo. No. 17)
b. Members of the Legislative Department (Sec. 14, Art.
VI of the 1987 Constitution)
c. Sangguniang Members are not absolutely prohibited
(Take note: Vice Mayors belong to the Sanggunian).
2. DUTIES OF A LAWYER
DIFFERENT CONCEPTS
Rule 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or delay any man’s cause.
Note: This Rule aimed against the practice of ambulance
chasing, barratry and stirring up litigation.
AMBULANCE CHASING
It is an unethical practice of inducing personal injury victims to
bring suits. The practice of lawyers in frequenting hospitals and
homes of the injured to convince them to go to Court (Lex Pareto,
2014).
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
It is an accident-site solicitation of any kind of legal business by
laymen employed by an attorney for the purpose or by the
attorney himself. [‘’[[
It supports perjury, the defrauding of innocent persons by
judgments, upon manufactured causes of actions and the
defrauding of injured persons having proper causes of action but
ignorant of legal rights and court procedure.
A lawyer’s conduct of vindictiveness is a decidedly undesirable
trait especially when one resorts to using the court not to secure
justice but merely to exact revenge warrants his dismissal from
the judiciary (Saburnido vs. Madrono, A.C. No. No. 4497, 2001).
Application: It does not refer only to prospective cases, but also,
continuance or commencement of the action. It is prevalent in
Metro Manila, patients who were hospitalized with their
engagements as seafarers (Linsangan vs. Tolentino). The
client is to execute SPA in favor of the lawyer. Outside Metro
Manila, this applies through expropriation case.
Moreover, it has spawned a number of recognized evils such as
(FSMD):
1. Fomenting of litigation with resulting burdens on the courts
and the public;
2. Subordination of perjury;
3. Mulcting of innocent persons by judgments, upon
manufactured causes of action; and
4. Defrauding of injured persons having proper causes of action
but ignorant of legal rights and court procedures by means of
contracts which retain exorbitant percentages of recovery and
illegal charges for court costs and expenses and by settlement
made for quick returns of fees and against just rights of the
injured persons (Hightower vs. Detroit Edison Co. 247 NW 97,
1993).
Note: Other prohibited acts include:
 Volunteer advice to bring lawsuit comes within the
prohibition, except where ties of blood, relationship and
trust make it a duty to do so.
 Hunting up defects in titles or other causes of action in
order to be employed to bring suit or breed litigation
(Agpalo, 2004).
BARRATRY or “MAINTENANCE”
It is an offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and
suits, either at law or otherwise (Bouvier); lawyer’s act of
fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal services
to one of them.
Note: Barratry is not a crime under the Philippine laws.
However, it is proscribed by the Rules of Legal Ethics. (CPR
Annotated, PhilJA)
Question: What is a crime of maintenance?
Answer: A lawyer owes to society and to the court the duty not
to stir up litigation.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “AMBULANCE CHASING”
AND “BARRATRY”
Ambulance Chasing Barratry
It refers to personal injury. It refers to any action
Page 4 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
EH 401 | 2019-2020 (Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊

It refers to cases brought It refers to cases brought 1. Attorney-client relationship;

before judicial bodies. before judicial and non- 2. Lawful possession by the lawyer of the client’s funds,
judicial bodies. documents and papers in his professional capacity; and
3. Unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees or disbursements.

CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT B. ATTORNEY’S CHARGING LIEN

It is one where the lawyer stipulates with his client in the
prosecution of the case that he will bear all the expenses for the
recovery of things or property being claimed by the client, and
the latter agrees to pay the former a portion of the thing or
property recovered as compensation. There is no stipulation as
to reimbursement. It is void for being against public policy (1999,
2000, 2006 Bar Questions),
Note: A champertous contract is considered void due to public
policy because it would make him acquire a stake in the outcome
of the litigation which might lead him to place his own interest
above that of the client (Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, Feb.
12, 1990).
As compared to CONTINGENT CONTRACT, a contingent
contract is an agreement in which the lawyer’s fee, usually a
fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made
to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend the
client’s right. The lawyer does not undertake to shoulder the
expenses of litigation.
Champertous Contract Contingent
Contract
It is payable in kind only. It is payable in cash.
The lawyers undertake to pay The lawyers do not
all expenses of litigation. undertake to pay all expenses
of litigation.
It is void for being against It is a valid agreement.
public policy.
Note: Both the champertous and contingent contracts are
“Contingent Fee Arrangements/Contracts.”
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close
scrutiny of the Court in order that clients may be protected from
unjust charges. A much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get
nothing if the suit fails (Masmud vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 183385,
2009).
ATTORNEY’S LIEN
The attorney’s liens can either be a retaining lien or a
charging lien.
Note: A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his
client’s money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client
owes him attorney’s fees (Rayos vs. Hernandez, GR No. 169079,
February 12, 2007).
A charging lien is the right of a lawyer to the same extent upon
all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued
in pursuance of such judgments which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon
the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have
the same right and power over such judgments and executions as
his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment
of his fees and disbursements (Sec. 37, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Hence, the lawyer shall also have a lien to the same extent upon
all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued
in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client. This lien exists from and after the time
when he shall have caused:
a. A statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution; and
b. Written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party. From then on, he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his client would
have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees
and disbursements (Sec. 37, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Requisites:
1. Existence of attorney-client relationship;
2. The attorney has rendered services;
3. Favorable money judgment secured by the counsel for
his client;
4. The attorney has a claim for attorney’s fees or advances,
and
5. A statement of his claim has been recorded in the case
with notice served upon the client and adverse party.
Note: A charging lien, to be enforceable as a security for the
payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non
a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of
his client.
Question: How to enforce?
1) File a Motion
2) File collection suit
Question: How to reflect the Notice in your Motion?
1) Furnish your client of the copy of Motion.

A. ATTORNEY’S RETAINING LIEN

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RETAINING LIEN AND
An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and CHARGING LIEN
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession.
Thus: Retaining Lien Charging Lien
Nature
a. He may retain the same until his lawful fees and
A passive lien. It is a general An active lien. It is a special
disbursements have been paid;
lien. It cannot be actively lien. It can be enforced by
b. May apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof (Sec. 37, Rule enforced. execution.
138, Rules of Court). Basis
Lawful possession of funds, Securing of a favorable
Requisites (ALU): papers, documents and judgment for client.

BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER Page 5 of 44

KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
property belonging to the
client.
Coverage
Covers only funds, papers, Covers all judgments for the
documents and property in payment of money and
the lawful possession of the executions issued in
attorney by reason of his pursuance of such judgment
professional employment. (final and executory).
Effectivity
As soon as the lawyer gets As soon as the claim for
possession of the funds, attorney’s fees had been
papers, documents and entered into the records of
property. the case.
Applicability
May be exercised before Generally, it is exercisable
judgment or execution, or only when the attorney had
regardless thereof. already secured a favorable
judgment for his client.
Notice
The client need not be The client and adverse party
notified to make it effective. need to be notified to make it
effective.
CONTINGENT FEE
A contingent fee is one of the manners which attorneys may be
paid as stipulated by the lawyer and the client. It is conditioned
upon the securing of a favorable judgment and recovery of money
or property and the amount of which may be on a percentage
basis.
An arrangement for payment of contingent is made where the
lawyer is paid for his services depending on the success of the
case. This applies usually in civil suits for money or property
where the lawyer’s fee is taken from the award granted by the
court.
Generally, it is valid and binding. The amount would be
determined on a quantum meruit bases.
Note:
 Article 111 of the Labor Code; it involves
extraordinary kind of attorney’s fees in favor of the
client, and a contingency fee basis with a cap up to 10%:
“(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in
any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of
wages, attorney’s fees which exceed ten percent of the
amount of the average wage…”
 The contract does not allow the lawyer to subrogate for
the client.
 Not covered by prohibition in Article 1491 (5) of the
NCC (acquiring); Article 1646 (leasing); Article 1492
(sales in legal redemption, compromises and
renunciation).
 The reason of the prohibition: the law seeks to
protect the client. Since the lawyer can easily
influence the client as he is not inclined with the law as
that of the lawyer.
 Doubts in interpretation: resolve against the
person who causes the obscurity citing Article 1377
of the NCC; adopt a construction favorable to the client
(De Los Santos, Jr. vs. Palanca).
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
B. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(CANONS)
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law of and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's
cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end
or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
VINTRILO, ET. AL. VS. DASIG
A.C. NO. 4984, April 1, 2003
Principle: An act of a lawyer in the government service who
attempts to extort money from persons with applications or
requests pending before his/her office is violative of Rule 1.01 and
runs contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. If his/her misconduct as a government official is
violative of his oath as a lawyer, he/she may be disciplined by the
Court.
FACTS:
The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent. Almost all
complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the
CHED.
Complainants aver that respondent violated her oath as
attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and
unfounded suits which were subsequently dismissed.
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the
commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged
and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the
Coronacions.
Complainants also allege that respondent authored and sent to
then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report,
which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than
eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill-motive of
preventing their re-appointment.
Complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph
b (22), Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful
failure to pay just debts owing to"Borela Tire Supply" and
"Nova's Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored
checks she issued.
As the respondent lawyer failed to file her Answer, as a result,
the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her
Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly
resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record
Report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline.
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that
respondent in violation of her oath as a government official and
Page 6 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or
attempted to extort money from certain people who had
pending applications/requests before her office in exchange
for her promise to act favorably on said applications/requests.
Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to
secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the CHED. For the foregoing reasons, it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent has violated Canon 1 of the
CPR?
2. Whether or not respondent attorney-at-law as Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) of Legal Services in the CHED be disciplined by
this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at
the time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief Education Program
Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs
and Standards, CHED?
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
Respondent's attempts to extort money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office are
violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
acts. Respondent's demands for sums of money to facilitate the
processing of pending applications or requests before her office
violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when
admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule
1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SECOND ISSUE: YES.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this. The
Attorney's Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of
every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorney's Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty
to delay no man for money or malice.
Moreover, said acts of the respondent constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service
from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private
interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value
in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which
may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent's
conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying
a high public office.
For her violation of the Attorney's Oath as well as of Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the CPR,
particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as
OIC, Legal Services, CHED, the Supreme Court ruled that
respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years'
suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice
of law, as recommended by the IBP-Board of Governors, but
outright disbarment.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
LEHNERT VS. DIÑO
A.C. No. 12174, August 28, 2018
Relevant topic: Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Principle: A violation of B.P. 22 is violative of Canon 1 of the
CPR. The Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
FACTS:
Lenhert filed an admin complaint against Atty. Dino before the
IBP. He prayed that respondent Atty. Diño permanently
disbarred for violating the lawyer's oath, as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility, when he committed two (2)
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Diño guilty of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR by issuing in favor of
Lehnert post-dated checks, which were subsequently
dishonored. The Board of Governors adopted the findings of fact
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
imposing on Atty. Diño the penalty of suspension of two (2)
years from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Board of Governors erred in their decision?
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the decision of the IBP-
Board. The SC, citing Lao vs. Medel said that lawyers must at
all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must
promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to continue
as officers of the Court.
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued
a series of worthless checks, unmindful of the deleterious
effects of such act to public interest and public order.
SISON, JR. VS. CAMACHO
A.C. No. 10910, January 10, 2012
Relevant topics: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Principle: A lawyer who enters into a compromise agreement in
behalf of his client but without the latter’s conformity or
authorization is violative of Canon 1 of the CPR.
FACTS:
Atty. Sison, president of MDAHI charged respondent Atty.
Camacho for an alleged violation of Rule 1.01, for dishonestly
interring into a compromise agreement w/o authorization, and
Rule 16.01, for failure to render an accounting of funds w/c were
supposed to be paid as additional docket fees.
Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho, is the counsel of MDAHI
in an insurance claim against Paramount Insurance. The initial
Page 7 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
claim of MDAHI against Paramount Insurance was P14, 863, 777
which was later on increased to P64, 412, 534.18 by taking into
account the interests imposed. Atty. Camacho, however, clarified
with Atty. Dimaano (Corporate Secretary) that the increase in
the claim would require additional docket fees of P1, 288, 260.00.
MDAHI agreed and granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano
as evidenced by a Payment Request/Order Form.
Atty. Dimaano gave the money to Atty. Camacho who promised
to issue a receipt of the said amount but never did. Atty. Sison
later discovered that the RTC already rendered the decision in
favor of MIDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interest for
approximately 65M. On August 11,2011, Atty. Camacho sent a
letter to MDAHI recommending a settlement with Paramount
Insurance in the amount of 15M allegedly to prevent a protracted
appeal with the CA. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and
did not indicate its conformity on the letter.
Surprisingly, even w/o the written conformity of MDAHI,
Atty. Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment, before
the RTC stating that the parties had entered into a
compromise agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Camacho violated the CPR by entering into
a compromise agreement w/o written authority of the client?
RULING: YES.
Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that special powers
of attorney are required in cases of compromise. Lawyers
constantly formulate compromise agreements for the benefit of
their clients. However, Sec. 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
(ROC) further provides that attorneys cannot, w/o special
authority, compromise their client’s litigation, or receive
anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount of
cash.
Furthermore, Rule 1.01 of the CPR states that “a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Members of the Bar must always conduct themselves in a way
that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.
ITCAB, RTC awarded MDAHI approximately 65M. When
Paramount Insurance offered a compromise settlement for 15M,
it was clear as daylight that MDAHI never consented to the said
offer. MDAHI did not sign the conformity regarding the
compromise agreement. Although MDAHI subsequently
received the 15M, it does not erase Atty. Camacho’s
transgression in reaching the compromise agreement w/o prior
consent of his client. RTC already rendered its decision as to the
65M insurance claim. From then on, there was no more need for
additional docket fess. Despite the rendered decision, Atty.
Camacho did not reject the 1.2M or return it to his client.
Instead, he unilaterally withheld the said amount by
capriciously invoking the payment of his attorney’s fees.
Thus, Atty. Camacho violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of
the CPR for failure to account for the money of his client. His
violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting moral unfitness
and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the Bar. He
was ordered by the Court to be disbarred.
CANON 2 - A lawyer shall make his legal services available
in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the
independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons,
the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept
a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
VILLATUYA VS. TABALINGCOS
A.C. NO. 6622, July 10, 2012
Principle: It is a violation of the CPR when a lawyer engages
in indirect solicitation.
FACTS:
This is a letter sent by Tan Venturanza and Valdez Law Offices
to report to the Court that Mr. Tabalingcos, who was previously
disbarred for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct, is
still engaging in the practice of law.
The law firm appended copies of motions he had signed while
acting as counsel for a party to a case. Attached to letter are:
 Motions for Extension signed by Tabalingcos as
counsel for Uniwide Holdings, Inc.;
 Motion for Reconsideration as representative of Asia
Amalgamated Holdings Corporation;
 Copy of the Notice of Change of Address of Tabalingcos
and Associates Law Office.;
 Orders of BSP’s Office of Special Investigation
furnished to Tabalingcos as counsel for Uniwide
Holdings, Inc.; and
 Other instances in which Mr. Tabalingcos made use of
his legal knowledge to circumvent the law for financial
gain. (Unsupported by documentary evidence)
It was also alleged that the respondent allegedly set up two
financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to
advertise his legal services and solicit cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of Mr. Tabalingcos constitutes
practice of law?
RULING: YES.
Mr. Tabalingcos continues to engage in the practice of law
despite having been disbarred and without having been
reinstated to the bar.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
Page 8 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions
(Aguirre v. Rana).
In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that "practice of law"
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
In the case at hand, the motions filed by Mr. Tabalingcos before
an Admin body exercising quasi-judicial function and before a
regular court clearly constituted practice of law. He clearly
represented himself as counsel for Uniwide. This is easily
discerned from the opening sentence of the motion and his
signature, with his PTR and IBP numbers, his roll number, and
MCLE Compliance number.
Despite having been disbarred, through his actions, Mr.
Tabalingcos continued to engage in the practice of law, even if he
has yet to be re-admitted to the Bar. Therefore, Mr. Tabalingcos
acts constitute contempt of court.
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading
or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the
name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the
firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall
withdrawal from the firm and his name shall be dropped from
the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law
currently.
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value
to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business.
KHAN VS. SIMBILLO
A.C. NO. 5299, August 19, 2003
Relevant topics: Rule 2.03- A lawyer shall not do or permit to
be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01- A lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Principle: A lawyer’s use of qualifying words in a paid
advertisement is a violation of Rule 3.01 of the CPR. A lawyer
may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor
may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of
which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was
published which reads: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist
[contact number]”.
Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the published
number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that
her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-
6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property
and custody of children.
Atty. Ismael Khan, as an Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of Public Info. Office, file an administrative complaint was
filed against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and
solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the
CPR and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (ROC).
This case was referred to the IBP for investigation and
recommendation. The IBP found him guilty of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the CPR and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
ROC resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1 year. Note that
although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the
advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but
argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time
to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the
interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Simbillo violated Rule 2.03 & Rule 3.01?
RULING: YES.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which
the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood
is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
Worse, the respondent, in advertising himself as an “annulment
of marriage specialist,” he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as
sacrosanct.
Assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained
in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in
fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their
marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether
proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession.
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the
lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice,
as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same
brief data, are permissible. Note that the law list where the
lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that
purpose. A lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper,
magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his
name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive
or injure the public or the bar.
Hence, Atty. Simbillo is found guilty of violation of Rules 2.03
and 3.01 of the CPR and Rule 138, Section 27 of the ROC. He is
suspended from the practice of law for (1) YEAR.
Page 9 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
LINSANGAN VS. TOLENTINO
A.C. NO. 6672, September 4, 2009
Principle: A lawyer’s calling card which contained the phrase
"with financial assistance" is a violation of Canon 3 of the
CPR. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already
had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans
to finance their legal actions.
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services. Complainant alleged that with the help of
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano (Labiano), respondent convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised
them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their
claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.
Gregorio’s sworn affidavit attested that Labiano tried to prevail
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant
and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan
of 50K. Complainant also attached respondent’s calling card:
Respondent denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the
printing and circulation of the said calling card.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Tolentino violated Canon 3 of the
CPR?
RULING: YES
Canon 3 of the CPR provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified, and
objective information or statement of facts.
To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the
public's estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render
that high character of service to which every member of the bar
is called.
In the case at bar, although respondent initially denied knowing
Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
hearing. Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice
was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano's word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result. Moreover, a lawyer's best advertisement is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason,
lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following
details:
(a)lawyer's name;
(b)name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c)address;
(d)telephone number; and
(e)special branch of law practiced.
Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial
assistance". The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability.
The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent
was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of the
calling cards. Therefore, respondent is suspended from the
practice of law for one year with stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
CANON 5 - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and
assist in disseminating the law and jurisprudence.
CERILLA VS, LEZAMA
A.C. No. 11483, October 3, 2017
Principle: The lawyer was not given the authority to sell. As
such, he/she must act only within the scope of his authority. He
must be fair in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
FACTS:
Cerilla, complainant, filed an administrative complaint for gross
misconduct against Atty. Lezama, respondent, before the IBP.
Respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement on the basis
of the SPA granted to him by the complainant. The SPA
authorized respondent to represent complainant in filing the
ejectment case. Nowhere is it expressly stated in the SPA that
respondent is authorized to compromise on the sale of the
property or to sell the property of complainant.
The records show that respondent admitted that he entered into
the compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful
detainer case and stated that the plaintiff, who is the
complainant herein, was willing to sell the property to the
defendant in the amount of P350,000.00 even if the complainant
did not instruct or authorize him to sell the property, and he
merely acted upon his own belief. As the SPA granted to him by
the complainant did not contain the power to sell the property.
Page 10 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct?
RULING: YES.
The respondent is found guilty of violating Canons 5, 15, and 17
of the CPR.
CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,
participate in continuing legal education programs, support
efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
CANON 15 – _A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 17- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent’s justification does not persuade, because his alleged
honest belief prejudiced his client, since the property she was not
willing to sell was sold at a price decided upon by respondent on
his own, which caused his client and her co-owners to file further
cases to recover their property that was sold due to
respondent's mistake. He overlooked the fact that he was not
authorized by his client to sell the property.
Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the suspension from
the practice of law for a period of 2 years. The Supreme
Court ruled that it is imperative that lawyers be aware with
basic legal principles. Here, nowhere it is expressly stated in the
SPA that respondent is authorized to compromise on the sale of
property. Hence, he clearly acted beyond the scope of his
authority.
CANON 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government services in the discharge of their tasks.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable
of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
BAUTISTA VS. FERRER
A.C. No. 9057, July 3, 2019
Principle: Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in
the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor,
is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
FACTS:
Bautista charged Atty. Ferrer, Assistant Regional Prosecutor
with grave coercion, grave threats, grave oral defamation,
unlawful arrest, violation of RA No. 7438, theft, and attempted
homicide.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
As borne by the records, Bautista suggests that she once owed
Ferrer P200,000.00, but the latter is now claiming that the
amount is already P440,000.00.
That in the morning of March 2011, Ferrer, who was very
furious, came to her house she was renting from the latter and
uttered derogatory remarks such as "punyeta ka! Ang kapal ng
mukha mo!" and threatened her with the words, "kung hindi lang
ako naawa sa anak mo, tutuluyan kita!" Ferrer then brought out
a handgun from a bag being held by her driver, forced her to leave
the house she was renting, illegally searched her bag, and
forcibly took her Nokia cellular phone.
That at around 9 a.m. of the same day, Ferrer forcibly brought
her to the City Hall of San Fernando supposedly to identify those
people who she lent Ferrer's money to. Bautista alleged that at
around 2:30 p.m., Ferrer next detained and delivered her to the
custody of the PNP, San Fernando City, La Union, without any
legal grounds.
Ferrer bragged that the police was under her control and ordered
PO2 Godoy to search her bag who consequently searched her
wallet and got the list of debtors therein. It was only upon the
intercession of a certain Johnny Go that she was released from
the custody of the PNP.
On May 2011, she went to Ferrer's office with Jose Mari Almeida,
a Supervisor from the DepEd, to beg for the release of her
personal belongings as well as a computer belonging to Almeida.
But Ferrer got angry and told her "Putang ina mo Arlene ayusin
mo ako bago mo muna makuha mga gamit mo!" She then picked
a pair of scissors on top of her table and thrust it towards
Bautista but was subdued by Almeida.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ferrer is guilty of the charges against her?
RULING:
The Court finds that Ferrer must be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally
found by the BOG in its prior Resolution. It may be true that
Bautista was, and may still be, indebted to Ferrer and that the
former may not have been completely honest about where exactly
the latter's money went. However, this does not give Ferrer
unbridled authority to act the way that she did. As stated by the
Investigating Commissioner, not only is there something wrong
with the means employed by Ferrer in her efforts to recover what
Bautista may have owed her, said means violated her duties
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It was clearly established, and in fact admitted by Ferrer, that
she uttered the derogatory remarks in the confines of her own
office. This fact, standing alone, already violates Rule 8.01 of
Canon 8 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer from using
language which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper.
These words surely have no place in the mouth of a lawyer in a
high government office such as Ferrer, an Assistant Regional
State Prosecutor no less.
Ferrer's taking of Bautista's cellphone is improper, even if it was
eventually returned later on, and refusal to release the personal
effects of Bautista is tantamount to confiscation, or depriving
Bautista of something that is hers without due process of law.
This is in clear breach of the Bill of Rights, particularly the
principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
Page 11 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Ferrer had every right to demand the return of her investments,
the appropriate course of action should have been to file a
collection case against Bautista. But instead, she chose to put the
law into her own hands by personally questioning Bautista,
bringing her to the police station, and confiscating her personal
belongings.
Hence, Ferrer may have been in the government service for many
years, but such fact may not extinguish her administrative
liability. The possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent, and a continuing requirement, to warrant
admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the bar in good standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a
fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or
associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid
over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons
specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal
business of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees
in a retirement plan even if the plan is based in whole or in
part, on a profit-sharing agreement.
TAPAY VS. BANCOLO
A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013
Principle: A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the Bar in good standing such as allowing a non-
lawyer to affix his/her signature to the pleading.
FACTS:
Rodrigo Tapay and Anthony Rustia, both employees of the Sugar
Regulatory Administration received an Order from the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-
affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification
of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against
them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee.
The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia
accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo denied that
he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet
Divinagracia and declared that the signature in the Complaint
was not his. Thus, Atty.Bancolo signed an affidavit denying the
said signature.
This affidavit was used by Tapay and Rustia in filing a counter-
affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature
of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented
as evidence an affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal
assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office
accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the complaint filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary
per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
The case was then dismissed. Tapay and Rustia then later filed
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a complaint to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The
complainant alleged that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved
in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute
innocent people.
In their Answer, respondents admitted that due to some minor
lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings be signed in
his name by the secretary of the law office. After investigation,
Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her
Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1of the same Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING: YES.
Clearly, Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
CPR. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a
former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in
his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise
categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia
were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in,
the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest
and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained.
Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any
agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
BONIFACIO VS. ERA
A.C. No. 11754, October 3, 2017
Principle: A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law such “allowing & assisting a
suspended lawyer to engage in unauthorized practice of law”.
FACTS:
An illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his
company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation. Complainants
therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and
Associates Law Office through Atty. Era. The Labor Arbiter
found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal
and, consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their
separation pay, full backwages and prorated 13th month pay. A
Writ of Execution was issued to implement the decision.
Page 12 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty.
Era for representing conflicting interests in another case to
which the SC found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and
imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for two years. Later, the scheduled public auction over
Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the business
establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ.
Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public
auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the
highest bidders. On the same day, a certificate of sale was issued,
which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and
employees who were there at that time. She negotiated with
Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award
instead of pulling out the auctioned properties, however, no
settlement was made. As the parties were not able to settle, on
December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to
Bonifacio's business establishment together with their clients
and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out
the auctioned properties. This prompted Bonifacio to file a
criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and
trespassing with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasay City.
The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict
Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion. Meanwhile, Atty.
Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the
NLRC and this Court with regard to the subject labor case.
Atty. Era argued that he did not violate the Court's order of
suspension from the practice of law as he merely acted as his
clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attomey
(SPA). It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SPA, he was not
engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the
implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never signed
any document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his
suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an associate of Era and
Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo
Group as said law firm's clients.
ISSUES:
1. Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law during his
suspension therefrom that would warrant another disciplinary
action against him?
2. Is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Atty.
Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant this
Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against her?
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law". In Cayetano vs.
Monsod, the rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing
in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of
all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the
following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients in
the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid
in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale
and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and
employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that
his clients are now the new owners of the subject properties,
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the
pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's
children in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment
award with interest instead of pulling out the properties.
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating
matters relating to the same may not be exclusively for lawyers,
as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this
case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts
clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind
of the legal effects and consequences of each course of
action in the satisfaction of the judgment award. Atty. Era
was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during
his suspension.
SECOND ISSUE: YES
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty.
Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she allowed
herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice.
Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated Canon 9 of the CPR. Indeed, it is
a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in,
the unauthorized practice of law. As correctly observed by the
Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts
constitutive of law practice could be performed only by a member
of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time.
Hence, she should have not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm, cannot be used to
circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances of
the case clearly show that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace
Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients during
the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty.
Era, who admittedly was the one actively performing all
acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
CANON 13 - A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference
by another branch or agency of the government in the normal
course of judicial proceedings.
FAJARDO VS. ALVAREZ
A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016
Principle: Lawyers shall rely upon the merits of his [or her]
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence,
or gives the appearance of influencing the court. (This case
involves influence peddling.)
FACTS:
Complainant Teresita was the Municipal Treasurer of San
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Alvarez to
defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Page 13 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Teresita alleged that Atty. Alvarez was then working in the
Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health. He
asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, Atty.
Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the Office of the
Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected
with the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with
dismissing her case for a certain fee. Atty. Alvarez said that he
needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and
acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have
the cases against Teresita dismissed.
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez
talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution and
decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against
Teresita, and her dismissal from service, respectively. Teresita
then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the
amount she gave. Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount
to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this promise. Teresita
sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Alvarez violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR?
RULING: YES.
The respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the
very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew people
from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a
favorable decision in complainant's case.
Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain
a favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his
influence among staff in the Office where the case was pending.
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02 prohibit lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be
dismissed because of his personal relationships with officers or
employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and
dishonest. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession."
In relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon
the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing
the court."
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client,
shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter
would involve a conflict with another client or his own
interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective
client.
Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege
communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all
concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling
disputes.
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the
prospects of the case.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able
to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.
Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession
or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make
clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his profession.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have
a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions
he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client's interest are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service
which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Page 14 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information
ROLLON VS. NARAVAL
A.C. No. 6424, March 4, 2005
Principle: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable. Also, a lawyer shall keep his client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information.
FACTS:
A letter-complaint filed by Rollon against Atty. Naraval which
alleged that Rollon seeked Atty. Naraval's assistance in a case
for Collection of Sum of Money with prayer for attachment. Atty.
Naraval agreed to be Rollon's lawyer and required her to pay
8,000 for the filing and partial service fee.
When Rollon’s son made a follow-up, she was informed that Atty.
Naraval failed to act on his case because he was busy. Several
follow-ups were made but no action was done. Rollon decided to
withdraw the case retrieve the amount paid and the documents
pertaining to the case but despite several follow-ups, Atty.
Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents
because they were in his house and cannot return the 8K because
he has no money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Naraval violated Canons 15 and 18?
RULING: YES.
Atty. Rollon did not only violate Canons 15 and 18, but also
Canons 16 and 17.
Canon 15 of the CPR requires that lawyers give their candid
and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of
the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation
thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of
success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part
of lawyers. If they find that their client's cause is defenseless,
then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible.
Respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion on
the merits and the status of the case. Complainant’s case had
been decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had long
become final and executory. But he withheld such vital
information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as
"filing and service fee" and thereby gave her hope that her case
would be acted upon. Moreover, lawyers are deemed to hold in
trust their client's money and property that may come into their
possession (Canon 16).
As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant,
the amount she had given was never applied to the filing fee. His
failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to the
presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby
betrayed the trust she had reposed in him. His failure to do so
constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal
of public confidence in the legal profession.
Moreover, lawyers may decline employment and refuse to accept
representation if they are not in a position to carry it out
effectively or competently. However, once they agree to handle a
case, attorneys are required to undertake the task with zeal,
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
care, and utmost devotion. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty
of fidelity to the client's cause.
Hence, lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can
efficiently handle; otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced.
Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. If they
do any less, then they fail their lawyer's oath.
In the case at hand, after receiving the 8K as filing and partial
service fee, Atty. Naraval failed to render any legal service in
relation to the case of Rollon. Continuous inaction despite
repeated follow-ups reveals his cavalier attituded and appalling
indifference toward his client's cause. He also unjustifiably failed
to return the files of the case entrusted to him and kept the
money she likewise entrusted to him. Therefore, for violating
Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Naraval is suspended from the practice
of law.
SOLIMAN VS. LERIOS-AMBOY
A.C. No. 10568, January 13, 2015
Relevant topic: Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon demand. However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
Principle: A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding
of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.
FACTS:
Soliman filed a complaint against atty. Amboy for violation of
CPR. Soliman had a retainer agreement with Atty. Amboy in
connection with a partition case. Amboy advised Soliman to no
longer institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the
property were amenable to the partition thereof. Amboy
facilitated the issuance of the titles from the co-owners to the
individual owners. However, there was delay in the issuance of
the titles. Atty. Amboy told Soliman that someone from the
Register of Deeds can help expedite the issuance of the titles for
a fee of 80,000 which was later reduced to 50,000, which Soliman
paid. There was further delay and Atty. Amboy asked an
additional 10,000 for the release of the titles. This time Soliman
refused to pay.
Soliman further alleged that Amboy refused to release pertinent
documents she gave to the latter for the processing of titles and
to return the 50,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not atty. Amboy is guilty of violating the CPR?
RULING: YES.
SC affirms penalty and ordered the return of the P50K plus
interests.
In the case at bar, after receiving the P25K as professional fees,
Amboy failed to submit material documents relative to the
issuance of the titles because of her negligence. To make matters
Page 15 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
worse, Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she
asked P50K from Soliman to be paid to her “contract” inside the
RD in order to facilitate the release of the titles. Despite the
payment, Amboy still failed to obtain the issuance of the titles
and even asked Soliman for additional 10k. This is not a simple
case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with
a client.
Hence, Amboy violated Rule 16.03 in not returning the 50,000 to
Soliman after a demand was made following her failure to
procure the issuance of the certificates of title.
CANON 20 - A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees.
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors
in determining his fees:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or
required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the
consent of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in
proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge
and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs,
commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other
compensation whatsoever related to his professional
employment from anyone other than the client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients
concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
CUETO VS. JIMENEZ
A.C. No. 5798, January 20, 2005
Relevant topic: Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies
with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Principle: A lawyer should always uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. He should always remind himself that the legal
profession is imbued with public service.
FACTS:
Engr. Cueto filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Atty.
Jimenez with the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
Cueto alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Jimenez as
notary public since he is the father of the owner of the building
subject of the construction agreement to be notarized. After
notarizing the agreement, Atty. Jimenez demanded 50,000 as
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
notarial fee. He (Cueto) informed him that he only had 30,000 in
cash. Atty. Jimenez persuaded Cueto to pay the 30,000 and to
issue a check for the balance.
Cueto being unfamiliar of the cost of notarial service, paid all his
cash plus check. Atty. Jimenez was told by Cueto not to deposit
the check before the maturity date for insufficiency of funds. He
informed him also that his (Atty.) son had not yet paid his
services as general contractor. But Atty. Jimenez still deposited
the check and it was dishonored. His son also issued a check to
Cueto under the construction agreement but was also dishonored
for closed account.
Atty. Jimenez filed a complaint for B.P. 22 against Cueto. Cueto
also filed his administrative complaint against Atty. Jimenez. He
alleged that the latter violated the CPR and Canons when he
filed the case against him so he could collect the balance of his
notarial will. Atty. Jimenez failed to file his answer and appear
to appear before the IBP Comm. on Bar Discipline (CBD). He was
found guilty of violating Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the CPR and
recommended that he be reprimanded. The same was adopted by
the Board of Governors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Jimenez violated Canon 20 of the CPR?
RULING: YES.
There was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud obtaining in
this case to justify the legal action taken by respondent. As borne
out by the records, complainant Cueto had already paid more
than half of respondent's fee. To resort to a suit to recover the
balance reveals a certain kind of shameful conduct and
inconsiderate behavior which clearly undermines the tenet in the
CPR. That the failure of his own son to pay Cueto, probably
explains why Cueto run short of funds. Atty. Jimenez should
have been more tolerant of the delay incurred by complainant
Cueto.
As to the notarial fees: In real estate and construction projects,
the amount of notarial fee is based on the contract price. The
amount and he was free to accept or reject it or negotiate for a
lower amount. His failure is an implicit acquiescence to the
terms.
CORTEZ VS. CORTEZ
A.C. No. 9119, March 12, 2018
Principle: Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that
stipulated in the retainer Agreement which is conclusive as to
the amount of the lawyer’s compensation. In the absence thereof,
the amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum
meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney’s services.
Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are found to be
excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. In no
case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than
what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes
as his counsel in an illegal dismissal case against Philippine
Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and
Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12%
contingency fee as and by way of attorney's fees. Atty. Cortes
prosecuted his claims for illegal dismissal which was decided in
Page 16 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
favor of complainant. PEC then issued 3 City Bank Checks in the
amount of ₱550,000, ₱275,000, and ₱275,000, respectively, all
payable in the name of complainant.
That after the maturity of the first check, the complainant went
to China Bank with Atty. Cortes and his wife to open an account
to deposit the said check. Atty. Cortes asked complainant to wait
outside the bank while he personally, for and in his behalf,
facilitated the opening of the account. After thirty minutes, he
was asked to go inside and sign a joint savings account with Atty.
Cortes. That when he was about to withdraw the amount of the
initial check deposited, Atty. Cortes arrived with his wife and
ordered the bank teller to hold off the transaction. When
complainant asked why he did that, Atty. Cortes answered that
50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him as attorney's fees.
When complainant questioned him, Atty. Cortes became
hysterical and imposingly maintained that 50% of the total
awarded claims belongs to him. That he was forced to endorse
the second and third checks to Atty. Cortes, after which he was
able to withdraw the proceeds of the first check. That with the
help of the lawyers in the IBP, complainant was able to have the
drawer of the checks cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty.
Cortes before he was able to encash the same.
Atty. Cortes, in his answer, admitted that his services were
engaged by complainant to pursue the labor claims. He, however,
denied that they agreed on a 12% contingency fee by way of
attorney's fees. That complainant is a relative of his, but
considering that the case was to be filed in Pampanga and he
resided in Las Piñas, he would only accept the case on a fifty-fifty
sharing arrangement. That the checks were issued pursuant to
the pre-execution agreement reached by the parties at the office
of Labor Arbiter Suelo. He and complainant agreed that the
amount of the first check be divided fifty-fifty, the whole of the
second check would be the complainant's, and the third check
would be his. That he had to assist complainant in the opening
of an account to deposit the checks.
Atty. Cortes had to convince the bank manager to accept the
checks issued in the name are all in the name of Eugenio E.
Cortez. That anyone in his place would have demanded for the
holding off of the transaction because of the base ingratitude,
patent deception and treachery of complainant. That the check
forms part and parcel of the judgment award to which he had a
lien corresponding to his attorney's fees and complainant should
have at least invited him to witness the "harvest of the fruits."
That the alleged 12% agreement is false, being merely a
concoction of Complainant’s fertile and unstable mind. That the
fifty-fifty sharing arrangement is not unconscionably high
because the complainant was given the option to hire other
lawyers, but still he engaged his services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on
the part of Atty. Cortes, which would subject him to disciplinary
action?
RULING: YES.
1. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is generally recognized as valid and binding, but
must be laid down in, an express contract.
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to
the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases
where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means
with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the
sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent
fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor and
helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have their
rights vindicated.
In this case, the parties did not have an express contract as
regards the payment of fees. Complainant alleges that the
contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake agreement,
while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement was 50%.
The case of Masmud v. NLRC (First Division), et al., discussed
the matter of application of Article 111 of the Labor Code on
attorney's fees: There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the
ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services
rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary
concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as
indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the
prevailing party, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the
extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees. It regulates the amount
recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained
by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as the
standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client
for the legal services he rendered.
It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes
required is in the ordinary sense as it represents reasonable
compensation for legal services he rendered for complainant.
Necessarily, the 10% limitation of the Labor Code would not be
applicable. Beyond the limit fixed by Article 111, such as between
the lawyer and the client, the attorney's fees may exceed 10% on
the basis of quantum meriut. The SC, however, are hard-pressed
to accept the justification of the 50% contingency fee that Atty.
Cortes is insisting on for being exorbitant.
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
"a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." Rule 20.01
of the same canon enumerates the following factors which should
guide a lawyer in determining his fees.
The contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes was, under the
facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and
unconscionable. The issues involved could hardly be said to be
novel and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew that complainant
was already hard up.
However, the recommended suspension of six months is too
harsh and considering that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years
old and that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was able to
get a favorable outcome, a reduction of the suspension is proper.
Respondent Atty. Cortes is found GUILTY of violation of
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months, and is ordered to return to complainant Eugenio E.
Cortez the amount he received in excess of the 12% allowable
attorney's fees.
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated.
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or
secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the
consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
Page 17 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his
employees or associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his
client, use information acquired in the course of employment,
nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a
third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent
of his client, give information from his files to an outside
agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical,
bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar
purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of
the firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by
the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be
required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him,
from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation
about a client's affairs even with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been
consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible
conflict of interest.
SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY
A.C. No. 1890, August 7, 2004
Principle: A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets
of his clients even after termination of the attorney-client
relation.
FACTS:
Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay
against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G. Suntay, alleging that
respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was
privy to all his legal, financial and political affairs from 1956 to
1964. They parted ways due to politics and respondent's
overweening political ambitions in 1964, and respondent had
been filing complaints and cases against complainant, making
use of confidential information gained during their atty-client
relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the confidentiality of lawyer-
client relationship and ethical conduct?
RULING: YES.
The court finds the IBP Recommendation to be well taken. As
found by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay acted as counsel for clients in
cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either
been previously consulted by complainant or which he had
previously helped complainant to administer as the latter's
counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964.
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients
even after termination of the attorney-client relation. IBP
resolution was adopted, and for violating the confidentiality of
lawyer-client relationship and for unethical conduct, respondent
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
CANON 22 - A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for
good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the
following case:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of
conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote
the best interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office;
and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall,
subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers
and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the
matter, including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.
MONTANO VS. IBP
A.M. No. 4215, May 21, 2001
Principle: A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good
cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
FACTS:
Complainant Felicisimo M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca
with misconduct and prays that he be "sternly dealt with
administratively."
On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of
Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty.
Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals
wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.
The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of
P15,000.00, fifty percent (50%) of which was payable upon
acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the
termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid
respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the
attorney's fee.
Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the
appellant's brief and contrary to their agreement that the
remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case,
Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from
complainant. Complainant obliged by paying the amount of
P4,000.00.
Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent counsel
again demanded payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00.
When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer
withdrew his appearance as complainant's counsel without his
prior knowledge and/or conformity.
Page 18 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel
attached a Note stating:
Pepe and Del Montano,
For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your
end of the bargain, here's your reward: Henceforth, you lawyer
for yourselves. Here are your papers.
Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel
exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays
that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively.
Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of
the maximum penalty of disbarment for violating canon 22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Dealca violated Canon 22 of the CPR?
RULING: YES.
There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant's
willingness to pay the attorney's fees. As agreed upon,
complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00
upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance
was not yet due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the
completion and submission of the brief complainant nonetheless
delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the latter
demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his
appearance simply because of complainant's failure to pay the
remaining balance of P3,500.00, which does not appear to be
deliberate. The situation was aggravated by respondent counsel's
note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched
in impolite and insulting language. It was found that Atty.
Dealca's conduct is unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession.
Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances.
Although he may withdraw his services when the client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the
circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was
unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him
the attorney's fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to
fulfill his obligation.
Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a
member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was
only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer
shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed
to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in
accordance with the demands of the Code.
The Court, however, does not agree with complainant's
contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be
imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be
imposed as a penalty. In the present case, reprimand is
deemed sufficient.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
C. OBSERVANCE OF LAW AND COMPLIANCE WITH
COURT’S ORDER OR PROCESS
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Grounds for Disbarment or Suspension:
1. Deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office;
2. Grossly immoral conduct;
3. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
4. Violation of the Oath; and
5. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court.
 Ignoring a directive of a Court constitutes willful
disobedience of lawful orders of the Court and
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
 In the case of Dimaguya v. Rubia, a Court’s
Resolution or Order is not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively.
6. Corruptly or Willfully appearing as an attorney without
authority.
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law of and legal
processes.
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through
the mediation of another:
xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
Elements of Art. 1491:
1. there must be an attorney-client relationship;
2. the property or interest of the client must be in litigation;
3. the attorney takes part as counsel in the case; and
4. the attorney by himself or through another purchases such
property or interest during the pendency of the litigation.
Page 19 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
EH 401 | 2019-2020 (Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊

General Rule: A lawyer may not purchase, even at a public or

judicial auction, in person or through the mediation of another, Similarly, such Supplemental Compromise Agreement was
any property or interest involved in any litigation in which he entered into by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan
may take part by virtue of his profession. This prohibition is concurrently with the pendency of several cases before the CA
entirely independent of fraud and such need not be alleged or and this Court involving the very same property. What is more,
proven. Atty. Linsangan, probably anticipating that he may be charged
of having undue interest over his client's property in litigation,
Exceptions: caused another lawyer to appear but all the while making it
absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's appearance was
1. Property is acquired by the lawyer through a contingent fee
nevertheless under Atty. Linsangan's "direct control and
agreement; and
supervision."
2. One of the elements is missing.
ISSUE:
Note: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating his lawyer's
oath?
 This prohibition only applies if the sale/assignment of
the said property takes place DURING THE
RULING: YES.
PENDENCY of the litigation involving the client’s
The respondent committed acts in violation of his oath as an
property.
attorney thereby warranting the Court's exercise of its
 When there is a matter pending in relation to the
disciplinary power.
property, remember that it is now subject to litigation.
 Art. 1491 extends even to the lawyer’s family members
Plainly, the acts of Atty. Linsangan are in direct
due to the clause, “through the mediation of another”.
contravention of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code which
 Art. 1491 also applies to legal redemption as stated Art.
forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the
1492 and leases in Art. 1646.
property that has been the subject of litigation in which they
have taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of
HEIRS OF CARLOS VS. LINSANGAN
the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he
A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017
lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter
of the litigation which he is conducting," is no longer reproduced
Principles: A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
in the new Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), such
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process.
proscription still applies considering that Canon 1 of the CPR is
Thus, an attorney must exercise utmost good faith and fairness
clear in requiring that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
in all his relationship with his client.
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process " and Rule 13 8, Sec. 3 which requires every lawyer to
FACTS:
take an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
The complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan forced them to
duly constituted authorities therein."
sign pleadings and documents, sold the parcel of land in
Muntinlupa City in cahoots with complainants' estranged
Here, the law transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5)
mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he divided
of the Civil Code, in violation of his lawyer's oath.
his share in the subject property as his supposed attorney's fees
to his wife and children, all in violation of his oath as lawyer.
While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above
proscription, i.e., if the payment of contingent fee is not made
The parcel of land, with an area of 12,331 square meters, was
during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's
previously owned by the Spouses Felix and Felipa Carlos. Their
property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the
son, Teofilo, convinced them to transfer said title to his name
case handled by the lawyer, such is not applicable to the instant
with a promise to distribute the same to his brothers and sisters.
case.
Teofilo delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the title to his
brother, Juan. However, Teofilo sold the entire property to Pedro
The transfer to Atty. Linsangan was made while the subject
Balbanero (Pedro). Pedro, however, failed to pay the agreed
property was still under litigation, or at least concurrently with
installment payments. For purposes of recovering the subject
the pendency of the certiorari proceedings in the CA and the
property from Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed wife, Felicidad),
petitions for review in this Court. Atty. Linsangan, at the guise
and from Pedro, Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan.
of merely waiving portions of the subject property in favor of his
It appears that Atty. Linsangan, for Juan, filed a number of
wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with
cases.
persons who are not licensed to practice law in contravention of
Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR. Another misconduct committed
During the pendency of the above cases, Atty. Linsangan and
by Atty. Linsangan was his act of selling the entire 12,331 square
Juan executed a Contract for Professional Services enumerating
meters property and making it appear that he was specifically
the above cases being handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan. The
authorized to do so by complainants as well as by the other
record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the
persons to whom portions of the property had been previously
cases involving the subject property were still pending resolution
adjudicated. Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney
and final determination, Atty. Linsangan entered into a Contract
authorizes Atty. Linsangan to sell the entire property including
for Professional Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees
complainants' undivided share therein.
shall be that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a
portion thereof, that may be recovered. It is likewise not denied
Measured against this standard, respondent's act clearly fell
by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon himself, and to his
short and had, in fact, placed his personal interest above that of
wife and children, half of the property awarded to complainants
his clients. Considering the foregoing violations of his lawyer's
as heirs of Juan, through a Supplemental Compromise
oath, Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and
Agreement.

BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER Page 20 of 44

KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Canon 16 of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose
upon respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from
the practice of law.
RAMOS VS. NGASEO
A.C. No. 6210, December 9, 2004
Principle: Lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by
purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are
the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of
their profession. However, a mere demand for delivery of the
litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership,
hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of
Article 1491.
FACTS:
Ramos engaged the services of Atty Ngaseo in a case involving a
parcel of land. The decision was adverse to them in the trial
court. However, Atty Ngaseo filed the appeal 3 days after the
lapse of reglementary period.
Thereafter, Ramos received a demand letter from Atty Ngaseo
asking for the delivery of 1000 sq. m piece of land. Ramos alleges
that he did not promise to pay Ngaseo 1000 sq m of land as
appearance fees. Ngaseo also threatened Ramos that he would
file a case if he would not settle his obligation. Ngaseo alleges
that when Ramos went to his office, he was assisted by his
brother because he was deaf and could only speak Tagalog
haltingly.
Moreover, respondent alleged that the complainant offered, in
lieu of the appearance fee the 1000 sq m of land from the subject
matter of the case if they win or from another land if they lose.
He also claimed that after the trial court dismissed the case, he
filed a timely notice of appeal and moved to be discharged as
counsel because he had colon cancer. But Ramos offered to double
the piece of land he promised. The CA rendered decision in favor
of Ramos with regard to the disputed land which became final.
Thereafter, Ramos allegedly failed to contact Ngaseo, which
compelled him to send demand letter. Ramos filed complain
before IBP against Ngaseo for violation of CPR for demanding
the delivery of the piece of land subject of litigation. IBP found
him guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ngaseo violated CPR?
RULING: YES.
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or
rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they
intervene by virtue of their profession. The prohibition on
purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private
individuals but also public or judicial sales.
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy
disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved. However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or
assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the client’s property. Consequently,
where the property is acquired after the termination of the case,
there is no violation.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the
property in litigation since the respondent only made a written
demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not
cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited
transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.
Moreover, the demand letter was made long after the judgment
of civil case. Still, Ngaseo is found guilty of conduct unbecoming
a member of the legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act
will be dealt with more severely.
D. MORAL RIGHTEOUSNESS
Relevant Principles and Canons applied:
To maintain membership in the law profession, "[a] lawyer at
no time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not
only are condition precedent to his entrance to, but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership in,
a great and noble profession."
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, Or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 Rule 1.01 - "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Canon 17- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
BARRIOS VS. ATTY. MARTINEZ
(A.C. No. 4585)
Principle: Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
Misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings, if so
gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privilege, the court may be justified to suspend
or remove him.
FACTS:
Atty. Martinez was convicted by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude for issuing worthless check in violation
of BP 22 (private life). Consequently, a disbarment case was filed
against him. Meanwhile, he also stood charged of another Estafa
case which was also decided against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime for which Atty. Martinez was convicted
is one of moral turpitude?
Page 21 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
RULING: YES.
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." It involves "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and
convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
for issuing a worthless check. In issuing a check without
sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful
dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in law and lawyers. DISBARRED.
General Rule: A lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and
the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline
him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity.
Exception: The misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending
or removing him from the office of attorney."
In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, disbarment was found to
be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude.
NULADA VS. PAULMA
(A.C. No. 8172)
Principle: Canon 1 Rule 1.01 provides that "a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action.
FACTS:
Atty. Paulma (lawyer) was charged in a disbarment case by
Nulada pursuant to his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Lawyer issued a check as payment of debt to Nulada
and accepted the same because of his standing as respected
member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
The check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and failed
to make good the check despite notice and demand, hence a BP
22 case was lodged against the lawyer (MTC) and later found
guilty. The RTC ruled in toto. The same become final and
executory.
Defense: issued it in accommodation for a friend who later died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Paulma be administratively disciplined for
being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude?
RULING: YES.
Court mentioned Section 27, Rule 138 (please refer above). Also,
Canon 1 Rule 1.01 provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
The gravamen of the offense is the mere issuance of a worthless
check. As a lawyer he is aware of the objectives and coverage of
BP 22. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined
him to support the Constitution and obey the laws (Canon 1).
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
It indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence,
and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only
diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the
public's faith in the legal profession as a whole. In this case,
respondent's conduct fell short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a member of the bar. SUSPENDED FOR 2
YEARS.
SORIANO v. DIZON
(A.C. No. 6792)
Principle: Moral Turpitude as “everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
FACTS:
Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving under the influence of liquor
when suddenly Roberto Soriano, a taxi driver, overtook him.
Atty. Dizon was not good about it so he tailed Soriano, pulled it
over and berated him and held him by his shirt. Because of the
aggression, to fend off an impending attack by Atty. Dizon,
Soriano punch him. Atty. Dizon went back to his car and got his
revolver wrapped in a handkerchief. He fired and shot Soriano
and when the latter fell on accused’s thigh, he merely pushed him
out and sped off. The bullet hit his neck and lacerated his carotid
artery. He also sustained spinal cord injury which caused his
body to be paralyzed.
Atty. Dizon was convicted of frustrated homicide (crime involving
moral turpitude). He was allowed probation conditioned on
payment of civil liabilities, but was not fulfilled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide committed by
Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude?
RULING: YES.
The court defined Moral Turpitude as “everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
Moral turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi driver
for no justifiable reason. His act definitely did not constitute self-
defense. It was he who was the aggressor because he first tried
to punch Soriano. The latter was merely defending himself when
he counterpunched Dizon.
Moreover, Dizon’s act was aggravated with treachery when he
shot Soriano when the latter was not in a position to defend
himself. Dizon tried to escape punishment by wrapping the
handle of his gun in handkerchief in order not to leave
fingerprints on the gun used. Dizon’s violent reaction to a simple
traffic incident indicated his skewed morals.
Dizon also violated Canon 1 for he failed to obey the laws
through his illegal possession of unlicensed firearm. Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 CPR which provides that “A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” was also
violated.
Page 22 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Atty. Dizon’s acts clearly showed his unfitness to continue as a
member of the bar. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character,
which is not only a condition precedent to admission, but also a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. DISBARRED.
YAP VS. BURI
(A.C. No. 11156)
Principle: The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he
shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but
its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good
standing in the profession.
FACTS:
Atty. Buri (lawyer) made an offer to but the condo from 1.5M to
1.2M from Michelle Yap. 200k remained unpaid. Lawyer said she
would pay on installment and was allowed to take possession of
the condo. Later on, Yap demanded the balance, lawyer said she
would pay 5k per month but Yap disagreed. Lawyer threatened
yap that she would file Estafa case against her.
In the criminal case, Lawyer alleged she found out that the sale
was without consent of the husband and that Yap cancelled the
sale and promised to return the 1M. Despite demands, Yap
refused to return the amount. Because of the accusation, yap
filed Admin case against the lawyer, the latter filed no answer
nor appear in the conference.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of Atty. Buri are wanting of moral
righteousness?
RULING: YES.
The threats were made to intimidate Yap and prevent her from
collecting the balance.
The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing
in the profession.
Her persistent refusal to pay despite frequent demands reflects
her lack of integrity and moral soundness; taking advantage of
her knowledge of the law, she resorted to threats and
intimidation in order to get away with what she wanted,
constituting a gross violation of professional ethics and a
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Failure to
file answer and position paper aggravated her misconduct.
Lawyer’s Oath, impresses upon lawyers the duty of exhibiting
the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their
relationships with others.
Hence, the Canons violated are:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
integrated bar.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
HDI HOLDINGS, PHIL., INC. VS. CRUZ
(A.C. No. 11724)
Principle: Propensity to lie and deceive his client in order to
obtain money constitute grave violations of the CPR and the
lawyer's oath.
FACTS: HDI retained the services of Atty. Cruz (lawyer) as in-
house counsel and corporate secretary. Pleased by his
performance, he was trusted over confidential matters. But
through his machinations, he misappropriated a total of 41M
(cash bids, personal loans, properties, fictitious sale of property
and unremitted rentals).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Cruz is wanting of moral character?
RULING: YES.
With all the evidences presented, it is beyond dispute that Atty.
Cruz is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct.
He manifested a propensity to lie and deceive his client in order
to obtain money. His misrepresentations constitute grave
violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. Atty. Cruz's failure
to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to
the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by
the client.
Atty. Cruz is guilty of gross misconduct by violating the Canon
of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct, and willful disobedience of lawful orders
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession.
Hence, the Canon violated are:
Canon 1 Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 Rule 16.04- A lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature if the case or by independent advice….xx
Canon 17- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
E. REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING INTEREST
Rule: A lawyer cannot represent clients with conflicting
interests. Hence, as soon as the lawyer perceives the probable
generation of conflicting interests, he must disclose the same
to the prospective client.
There is a conflict of interests when the lawyer has to pursue
an issue positively in behalf of one client but has to pursue it
negatively in behalf of his other client.
Page 23 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
RELATED QUESTIONS
Question: How can the same lawyer validly represent such
conflicting interests?
Answer: Written conformity of everyone concerned must be
obtained.
 In the case of Ocampo-Ingcoco v. Yrreverre, Jr., there is
no violation as written conformity was obtained after
full disclosure of the facts of case; Billones Spouses even
submitted a verified written manifestation of
conformity.
 The following are NOT VALID defenses:
a. Not enough lawyers to serve the exploding population;
b. Good faith or honest intention;
c. The lawyer felt that it was his “duty and responsibility” to file
the case because he felt responsible for the cancellation of the
title and its subsequent transfer in complainant’s name; he “will
be forever bothered by his conscience” if he did not file the case;
d. With the knowledge of one client; and
e. With the knowledge of all clients
Question: What is the effect of termination of relation insofar as
the proscription against representation of conflicting interests is
concerned?
Answer: None, except with written consent of all concerned after
full disclosure of the facts.
Reason: Client’s confidence, once reposed, cannot be divested by
the expiration of professional engagement.
Question: Does the prohibition against representation of
conflicting interests apply even if the lawyer has not acquired
confidential information from a former client? Answer: Yes.
a. A bare attorney-client relationship will suffice;
b. If the prohibition is made to depend on whether the attorney
has acquired confidential information, it will of necessity call for
investigation of that question and will lead only to the revelation
in advance of trial of matters that may further prejudice the
former client. In addition, the inquiry will violate the confidential
relation (Hilado v. David, cited in Agpalo).
Question: Does the rule apply to a law firm?
 Rules: the employment of one member of a law firm is
considered as an employment of the law firm; the
employment of a law firm is equivalent to a retainer of
the members thereof (A.B.A. Opinions, cited in Agpalo).
 The rules apply even if a lawyer who is a member of a
law firm uses an address different from the law firm
(Agpalo).
 The rules still apply even if free practice is given to a
member of a law firm.
Question: When is the rule inapplicable?
1. When there is written consent of all concerned after full
disclosure of the facts;
2. Where no conflict of interests exists:
a. Where the clients represented have similar duties
and asserting no interest adverse to that of the other parties (i.e.,
lawyer representing an administrator of estate of deceased wife
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
and subsequently the administrator of the deceased husband –
(Magno v. Gellada, cited in Agpalo)
b. Where complainant desisted from further
prosecution in a criminal action, counsel for accused may
properly prepare, upon request of complainant, a motion to
dismiss the action and intervene on the latter’s behalf during the
hearing of the motion (Nombrado v. Hernandez, cited in Agpalo).
3. Where there is no attorney-client relationship:
a. Where none of the parties is a former client
b. A public prosecutor may ethically sustain an
information against an accused who is the complainant in
another information filed by the same prosecutor because the
latter represents not the private complainant but the people of
the Philippines as the real offended party (People v. Mediavilla,
cited in Agpalo).
4. When the conflict of interests has ceased (Agpalo).
RULE 15.03 CPR mandates that “a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure.”
QUIAMBAO VS. BAMBA
(A.C. No. 6708 August 25, 2005)
Principle: Representation of opposing clients in two cases,
though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interest, or, at the least,
invites suspicion of double-dealing.
Good faith or honest intention “does not make the
prohibition inoperative”
FACTS:
Lawyer was counsel of a plaintiff in an ejectment case where the
latter was the President of a corporation. After said plaintiff
resigned from the corporation and while said ejectment case is
pending, a replevin case was filed against her (President) by the
same corporation, represented by the same lawyer, for recovery
of a car assigned to her as a service vehicle;
Defenses:
a) made to believe that part of function as counsel for
corporation is to handle personal cases of its officers;
b) ejectment case and replevin cases are unrelated
cases, fraught with different issues, parties and subject
matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Bamba represented conflicting interests?
RULING: YES.
While Atty. Bamba may assert that the complainant expressly
consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case,
the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the
facts to both his clients and he failed to present any
written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR.
a) Good faith or honest intention “does not make the
prohibition inoperative”; lawyers are not obliged to act
either as adviser or advocate for every person and they
have the right to decline such employment subject to
Canon 14 of the CPR.
b) Representation of opposing clients in two cases, though
unrelated, constitutes conflict of interest, or, at the
Page 24 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
least, invites suspicion of double-dealing; it is enough
that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom
would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature
or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with
each of them would affect the performance of the duty
of undivided fidelity to both clients.
There is also conflict of interests when a lawyer who has financial
interest in a security agency, a President at that, engaged in a
business competing with his existing client, one cannot help
entertaining a doubt on his loyalty to his existing client; applies.
(a) with respect to the same general matter however
slight the adverse interest may be, and
(b) even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer’s private
activity or in the performance of function in a
nonprofessional capacity; criterion is probability, not
certainty, of conflict.
SUSPENDED 1 YEAR.
Atty. Glenn’s Note: The second test was applied by SC in both
circumstances of conflict of interests: “whether the acceptance of
a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
of that duty”.
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSN. v. ROMANILLOS
(A.C. No. 5580 June 15, 20052)
Principle: Lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent; as
long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath.
FACTS:
Lawyer represented an association before the HSRC (now
HLURB) against a developer for violation of PD 957 alleging that
a lot designated as school site was sold to third parties without
disclosing it as a school site. While still counsel of association,
lawyer represented third parties in requesting the association’s
conformity to construct a school building. When the said request
was denied, lawyer applied for clearance before HLURB in behalf
of said third parties. Lawyer also acted as counsel for a third
party who substituted for the developer in a civil case filed by the
association against the developer before the RTC. Lawyer was
admonished by SC but he continued to represent the said third
party before CA and SC and even moved for execution of decision.
Defense:
a) association never questioned the propriety of the continued
representation of a third party
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Romanillos represented conflicting
interests?
RULING: a) It is inconsequential that the association never
questioned the propriety of the continued representation; the
lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent; as long as the
lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
clients, he is guilty of violating his oath; Rule 15.03 of the CPR
mandates that ‘’written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts is necessary.’’
DISBARRED.
Atty. Glenn’s Note:
a) There are 2 disbarment cases mentioned in the case
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
b) Good faith as a defense was found in the report of the
Investigating Commissioner in the first disbarment case.
c) The issue in the present case (second disbarment case) is –
notwithstanding the admonition, the lawyer continued to
represent the third party.
PAZ VS. SANCHEZ
(A.C. No. 6125 September 19, 2006)
Principle: Good faith and honest intentions do not excuse the
violation of the prohibition.
FACTS:
Atty. Snachez was engaged by complainant in buying properties
from tenant-farmers.
2 cases are involved, DARAB and RTC:
a) in DARAB case, lawyer filed a case against his former client
(complainant) for annulment of TCT of property, one of
properties purchased by complainant with the lawyer’s
assistance;
b) in RTC case, lawyer filed the case against his former client
(complainant) for annulment of title
Defense:
a) the lawyer felt that it was his “duty and responsibility”
to file the case because he felt responsible for the
cancellation of the title and its subsequent transfer in
complainant’s name; he “will be forever bothered by his
conscience” if he did not file the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Sanzhez represented conflicting interests
when he represented a client in the DARAB case?
RULING: YES.
Guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the CPR. The Court noted that
by Sanchez’s own admission, Paz and Dizon were both his clients
at the time when he filed the DARAB case. That he merely
offered to justify his actuations by stating that he felt it was his
“duty and responsibility” to file the case.
Good faith and honest intentions do not excuse the violation of
the prohibition.
His undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients was placed under
a cloud of doubt. He should have inhibited himself. SUSPENDED
1 YEAR.
Atty. Glenn’s Note: SC noted that respondent did not
specifically deny representing conflicting interests. So, there is a
need to specifically deny an allegation in an administrative case
against a lawyer, otherwise, it could be considered as an
admission against the said lawyer.
LIM, JR. VS. VILAROSA
(A.C. No. 5303 June 15, 2006)
Principle: A lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally
unrelated cases.
FACTS:
Lawyer (Atty. Vilarosa) represented clients in a civil case for
recovery of possession of property involving a hotel owned by a
Page 25 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
corporation (PRC) but eventually withdrew without the approval
or knowledge of said client; in the criminal case, lawyer was
counsel of respondents in a criminal case for BP 22 issued by the
said corporation for the construction of the hotel; in another
criminal case (Estafa), the lawyer positioned himself against the
corporation’s interests; in another collection case against the
corporation, the lawyer appeared as counsel of the contractor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is conflicting interests in the cases
represented by Atty. Vilarosa?
RULING: YES.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether
or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated
cases. Here, the cases directly or indirectly involved the parties’
connection to PRC.
a) even if the corporation is not specifically named as party-
litigant, the prohibition, citing the book of Pineda, stands even if
the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that
the intention and motive of the attorney may have been
honest.
b) Citing the book of Pineda, even respondent’s alleged effort to
settle existing controversy among family members was improper
as a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot
represent any of the parties to it.
As to Atty. Villarosa’s withdrawal, a lawyer shall withdraw
his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in
the circumstances.
A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written
consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.
He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the
adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing,
otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of
paper." SUSPENDED 1 YEAR.
CAPINPIN, JR. VS. CESA, JR.
(A.C. No. 6933, July 05, 2017)
Principle: Knowledge of client will not exonerate unless there
is written consent from any of the parties. (Atty. believes that it
has to be ALL PARTIES)
FACTS:
Complainant executed a Real Estate Mortgage on his lot in favor
of a corporation as security for a loan. Due to complainant’s
default in payment, the corporation initiated foreclosure
proceedings against the lot. Complainant availed of several legal
remedies to stop the said foreclosure proceedings and the
corporation was represented by the respondent, a lawyer, in the
said proceedings. The same lawyer extended help to the
complainant by negotiating with the corporation for the
reduction of the loan payment and cessation of the foreclosure
proceedings. For this, the lawyer received money from the
complainant.
Defense: the negotiation was with the knowledge of client
(corporation)
ISSUE:
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Whether or not Atty. Cesa be administratively disciplines based
on the allegations in the comlaint and evidence on record for
representing conflicting interests?
RULING: YES.
a) there is substantial evidence to hold the lawyer liable; there is
conflict of interests – that of the corporation (to be able to
foreclose and obtain best amount it could get to cover the loan
obligation) and that of complainant (to forestall the foreclosure
and settle the loan obligation for a lesser amount);
b) knowledge of client will not exonerate because there is no
record of any written consent from any of the parties, especially
from the corporation
SUSPENDED 1 YEAR.
Atty. Glenn’s Note: Written consent is required from all
concerned, not “from any of the parties” (with due respect).
F. ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
On the duty of the lawyer to account:
 Note the words of the CPR - account for all money
COLLECTED or RECEIVED FOR or FROM the
client – so this may include rent collected by a lawyer
from a tenant, filing fees for filing of an initiatory
pleading in Court.
 SC calls this Rule 16 of the CPR as the “rule on the
accounting of monies and properties received by
lawyers from clients as well as their return upon
demand” (referring to Canon 16, Rules 16.01, 16.02
and 16.03 of the CPR) [Mariano v. Laki; Yoshimura
v. Panagsagan).
 Note Capinpin vs. Cesa - the fees paid by the
adverse party were considered client’s money and so
the lawyer has the duty to account.
 Note also that receipt by the lawyer of the down-
payment for the property and applied it as his share
in the property violates Canon 16 of the CPR (Heirs
of Carlos vs. Linsangan).
 Note further that money received by a lawyer on
behalf of his client should be accounted for (Huang
vs. Zambrano).
On the duty to serve:
General Rule: Negligence of counsel binds the client.
Exception: Gross Negligence
 In re: Abellana v. Paredes, in sum, the negligence
and mistakes of the counsel are binding on the client,
unless the counsel has committed gross negligence.
For a claim of a counsel's gross negligence to prosper,
nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's
cause must be shown. As well, the gross negligence
should not be accompanied by the client's own
negligence or malice.
 Atty GCC: Note that in that case of Abellana vs.
Paredes, SC declared that gross negligence should
not be accompanied with the client's negligence. So,
the client must be faultless so it will not be bound by
the counsel's negligence.
 Systems and Plan Integrator and Development
Corp. v. Municipal Government of Murcia. It
appears from the records that SPIDC's complaint
was dismissed on account of the law office's
Page 26 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
negligence. Philhouse Development instructs that as
a general rule, the dereliction of duty by the counsel
affects the client. As an exception thereto, the client
may be excused from the counsel's failure only if the
former can prove to have been entirely faultless
RELATED QUESTIONS
Question: When should a lawyer account?
Answer: The word used by SC is “promptly” (HDI Holdings).
Question: Where should a lawyer put the client’s funds?
Answer: The lawyer should put the clients’ funds:
a. Not in personal safe deposit vault (Palencia v. Linsangan)
b. The funds should be deposited in a separate trust account in a
bank or trust company of good repute for safekeeping (Palencia
v. Linsangan).
Question: Does the penalty of an erring lawyer for violation of
Rule 16.01 and 16.03 depend on the amount of money involved?
Atty GCC:
1. SC said penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the CPR may
result to disbarment depending on the amount involved and the
severity of the lawyer’s misconduct. So will note that in that
opinion of the SC, there is an additional requirement aside from
the amount involved, and that is, the severity of the misconduct
(Palencia v. Linsangan).
2. I am not aware of an SC case where the penalty for violation
of Canon 16 of the CPR depends on the amount.
MARIANO VS. LAKI
A.C. NO. 1978, Sept. 25, 2018
Relevant Doctrines/Provisions:
CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all money and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand.
FACTS:
Mariano allegedly engaged Atty. Laki's legal services for the
filing of a petition for annulment of his marriage. Atty. Laki
informed him to prepare the amount of P160,000.00 representing
a package deal for his professional fee, docket fee and expenses
for the preparation and filing of the petition, subject to an
advance payment of P50,000.00. Mariano expressed his surprise
over the huge amount that Atty. Laki was asking, thus, the latter
assured him that he could secure a favorable decision even
without Mariano's personal appearance since he will file the
petition for annulment before the RTC of Tarlac which is
presided by a "friendly judge" and is known to be receptive to
annulment cases.
Relying on Atty. Laki's assurance, Mariano paid the said P160K.
Almost a year after, Mariano discovered that the petition has yet
to be filed as Atty. Laki withdrew the case for the reason that the
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Presiding Judge of RTC - Tarlac has been dismissed by the SC
and he did not expect the new presiding judge to be "friendly".
Mariano tried several times to get hold of a copy of the petition
but nevertheless failed, as it became very difficult to meet nor
reach Atty. Laki through his cell phone.
This prompted Mariano to demand from Atty. Laki, the return of
his money but to no avail. Calls were rejected, and his office was
always closed. Hence the instant petition for disbarment.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Laki failed to comply with his duty in a lawyer-
client relationship?
RULING: YES.
The rule on the accounting of monies and properties received by
lawyers from clients as well as their return upon demand is
explicit.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and
his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a
particular purpose, he should promptly account to the client how
the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
ITC, it is clear that Atty. Laki violated his sworn duties under
the CPR. Not only did he fail to file the petition for annulment of
marriage despite receipt of the acceptance fee, he also failed to
account for the money he received and failed to keep his client
abreast with the developments and status of the case as he
actually never provided Mariano a copy of the petition despite
demand. Worse, after receiving his acceptance fee, Atty. Laki
also made it difficult for his client to contact him, as in fact
Mariano felt that he was being avoided.
Receiving payment for services not rendered, Atty. Laki was
unjustified in keeping Mariano's money. He is obliged to
immediately return it. His refusal to do so despite repeated
demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not
to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with
good fidelity to his clients. It also gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice
of, and in violation of, the trust reposed in him by the client.
Such acts constitute a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the CPR.
But what the Court finds more deplorable was his deceitful
assurances giving the implication that a favorable decision can
be obtained by being in cahoots with a "friendly" judge. It gives a
negative impression that decisions of the courts can be decided
merely on the basis of close ties with the judge and not
necessarily on the merits. Atty. Laki's statements cast doubts on
the integrity of the courts in the eyes of the public. By making
false representation to his client, Atty. Laki not only betrayed his
client's trust but he also undermined the trust and faith of the
public in the legal profession
To summarize, first , Atty. Laki received money from his client
for the purpose of filing a petition but he failed to do so; second ,
after his failure to render legal service despite the receipt of
acceptance fee, he also unjustifiably refused to return the money
he received; third , he grossly disrespected the IBP by ignoring
its directives to file his answer to the complaint and appear at
the mandatory hearings; and lastly, Atty. Laki maligned the
Page 27 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not
on the merits, but through close ties with the judges.
The Court, thus, rules that Atty. Laki be disbarred and ordered
to return to Mariano the P150,000.00 plus 6% interest.
Atty. Glenn’s input:
This case involves a lawyer who failed to file a petition for
annulment of marriage despite receipt of acceptance fee and
failed to perform his duty to account for the money of the client.
He also made deceitful assurances of being able to secure a
favorable decision without the client’s personal appearance
because of a “friendly judge” who is receptive of annulment cases.
Failure to handle client’s money with great degree of fidelity and
lack of good faith constitutes gross misconduct.
The SC calls this duty to account by a lawyer as the “RULE on
the accounting of monies and properties received by lawyers from
clients as well as their return upon demand”
The money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not
used for the purpose should be immediately returned and not just
when asked to do so.
By immediately, there is no rule of thumb. It depends on the
circumstances of the case. But the demand of the client is
relevant for the presumption to arise - that the funds were
appropriated by the lawyer.
Further, notwithstanding the generic nature of cash, that has no
bearing on the liability of the lawyer as what is important is
whether the lawyer has appropriated the funds of the client. You
will note that the lawyer is instructed to deposit the client’s
money in a separate trust account for safekeeping.
PALENCIA VS. LINSANGAN, ET AL.
A.C. NO. 10557, July 10, 2018
Relevant Doctrines/Provisions:
● The practice of law is a profession and not a business. A
lawyer in making known his legal services must do so in a
digni5ed manner. They are prohibited from soliciting cases
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers. Thus, "ambulance chasing," or the
solicitation of almost any kind of business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent, in order to gain
employment, is proscribed.
● Money collected by a lawyer on a judgment rendered in
favor of his client constitutes trust funds and must be
immediately paid over to the client. As he holds such funds
as agent or trustee, his failure to pay or deliver the same to
the client after demand constitutes conversion
FACTS:
Complainant Palencia was an OFW-seafarer who was seriously
injured during work, when he fell into the elevator shaft of the
vessel M/T "PANOS G" flying a Cyprus flag. While being confined
at the Manila Doctors Hospital, to continue his medical
treatment and rehabilitation, paralegals in respondents' law
office, approached the complainant and convinced him to engage
the services of the respondents’ law office; in filing a suit for
indemnity against his employers.
Complainant executed (1) an Attorney-Client Contract; and (2) a
Special Power of Attorney, where he engaged the legal services
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
of the respondents and Gurbani & Co., a law firm based in
Singapore, wherein, the complainant agreed to pay attorney's
fees of 35% of any recovery or settlement obtained for both.
Complainant was able to recover US$80K from his employer
from which the respondents charged complainant attorney's fees
of 35% as agreed.
Further, the respondents (ATTY. PEDRO, ATTY. GERARD AND
ATTY. GLENDA, all surnamed Linsangan) and Gurbani & Co.
also filed a tort case (Singapore case) against the owners of
"Panos G". Negotiations were then made, leading to a settlement
where the complainant was awarded with US$95K. Gurbani &
Co. remitted to the respondents the amount of US$59,608.40. A
net amount of US$ l 8, 132.43 was left for the complainant after
deducting some fees including the 35% attorney’s fees.
Respondents tendered the net amount to the complainant, but
the latter refused.
Complainant filed the letter-complaint before the IBP-CBD,
wherein, he requested that an investigation be conducted and the
corresponding disciplinary action be imposed upon respondents
for committing the following unethical acts:
(1) refusing to remit the amount collected in the Singapore
case worth US$95K, and in offering only the net amount
(2) depositing complainant's money into their own account;
and
(3) engaging in "ambulance chasing" by deploying their
agents to convince the complainant to hire respondents' services
while the former was still bedridden in the hospital.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondents are guilty for violating
the Canons of the CPR?
2. Whether or not the respondents were paid more than
what is due upon them under the “Attorney-Client
Contract” with respect to the 35% attorney’s fees?
RULING:
1. YES.
In fact, the respondents’ acts do not merely constitute a violation
of Canon 16 and its rules, but already amounts to gross
misconduct, to wit:
First, the respondents breached the trust reposed in them when
they betrayed the express language of their Attorney-Client
Contract that they are only entitled to a single 35% attorney's
fees together with the Singapore counsels.
Second, their actions following the complainant's objection
manifests their disregard of their fiduciary duties.
Third, the respondents also mishandled their client's money
when they did not exercise proper safekeeping over it; they failed
to deposit it in a separate trust account in a bank or trust
company of good repute for safekeeping but co-mingled it with
their own funds.
Undoubtedly, the gravity of these acts amounts to gross
misconduct that warrants, at the very least, a suspension.
Page 28 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
2. YES.
ITC, The Attorney-Client Contract between the parties state
that:
"We/I hereby voluntarily agree and bind ourselves, our heirs and
assigns to pay Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan and his collaborating
Singapore counsels, the sum equivalent to thirty-five [35%]
percent of any recovery or settlement obtained."
Clearly, the stipulated rate referred to the combined professional
fees of both respondents and their collaborating Singapore
counsel, Gurbani & Co. Nevertheless, the respondents proceeded
to deduct separate fees on top of the amount already deducted by
Gurbani & Co.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary. It is the lawyer's duty to give a prompt and accurate
account to his client. He is under absolute duty to give his client
a full, detailed, and accurate account of all money and property
which has been received and handled by him, and must justify
all transactions and dealings concerning them.
The fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on
money in his hands collected for his client does not entitle him to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself. Worse,
the respondents allegedly kept the money inside the firm's vault
for 2 years until they were made aware of the disciplinary
complaint against them before the IBP-CBD.
The SC held that it is improper for the lawyer to put his client's
funds in his personal safe deposit vault. Funds belonging to the
client should be deposited in a separate trust account in a bank
or trust company of good repute for safekeeping.
It is apparent from the foregoing that respondents failed to
handle their client's money with great degree of fidelity. They
also showed their lack of good faith when they appropriated for
themselves more than what is allowed under their contract. They
have demonstrated that the payment of their attorney's fees is
more important than their fiduciary and faithful duty of
accounting and returning what is rightfully due to their client.
Moreover, they also failed to observe proper safekeeping of their
client's money. They clearly violated the trust reposed in them,
and demonstrated their lack of integrity and moral soundness.
SPS. VARGAS, ET AL. VS. ORIÑO
A.C. NO. 8907, June 3, 2019
Relevant Doctrines/Provisions:
● Canon 18 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence, while Rule 18.03
thereof explicitly decrees that a lawyer ought not to neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable
● Until the lawyer's withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer
is expected to do his or her best for the interest of the client
FACTS:
Complainants were defendants in a case for Forcible Entry and
Damages before MCTC in Camarines Sur. They were initially
represented by a lawyer from PAO who later withdrew his
appearance, and was substituted by respondent Atty. Ariel
Oriño.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Complainants paid Oriño 20,000 as acceptance fee, and 1,500 as
appearance fee and live chickens and root crops.
Complainants alleged that Oriño entered his appearance at the
time MCTC had already appointed a commissioner to conduct a
relocation survey of the lot in dispute and set the hearing on the
Commissioner’s Report. However, Oriño failed to appear such.
MCTC issued an order directing parties to submit their position
papers but Oriño also failed to do so which resulted in the
judgment against the complainants.
Instead, the Respondent filed a notice of appeal. RTC directed
complainants to file their memorandum but the respondent
again failed to file such.
When asked why he did not submit the aforesaid position paper,
Oriño simply replied, "Hindi ko na sinagot dahil talo na kayo s
forcible entry. Sa lupa na lang kayo maghabol.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a lawyer-client relationship and
respondent violated Canon 18 of CPR?
RULING: YES.
A lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies
his agreement to handle a client's case and accepts money
representing legal fees from the latter." Once a member of the Bar
agrees to provide his legal services to a client, but does not perform
or deliver as promised, then he reneges upon the oath he took as a
lawyer. (Samonte v Jumamil)
Canon 18 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence, while Rule 18.03 thereof
explicitly decrees that a lawyer ought not to neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
In Vda. de Enriquez v. San Jose, the Court said:
[W]hen a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Failure
to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust
reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just
to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society. Until the lawyer's withdrawal is properly done,
the lawyer is expected to do his or her best for the interest
of the client.
ITCAB, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was
created when Orino agreed to accept the complainants’ case and,
in consideration thereof, received from complainants’ payment in
cash and in kind.
It has been held that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform
the obligations due to his client is considered per se a violation of
the lawyer's oath. Lawyers are duty bound to attend to their
client's cause with diligence, care and devotion, whether they
accept it for a fee or for free.
ITCAB, respondent lawyer failed to serve complainants with
industry and diligence. He neglected the legal matter entrusted
to him. He admitted that he failed to formally withdraw as
counsel for complainants allegedly due to his hectic schedule
Page 29 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
during the 2010 elections. He also admitted that he failed to file
the aforesaid position paper with the MCTC. After the MCTC
rendered a decision adverse to complainants, the respondent
lawyer filed a notice of appeal, however, he failed to file the
memorandum of appeal before the RTC for complainants.
Respondent lawyer clearly fell short of the circumspection and
diligence required of those privileged to practice law. He
attributed his shortcomings as a lawyer to his being a politician.
The Court finds such reason unacceptable, if not a display of
insolence and arrogance.
Atty. Glenn’s input:
Duty to serve client with competence and diligence.
a) Lawyer is bound to serve a client with competence and
diligence whether the acceptance is FOR A FEE or FOR FREE
(Sps. Vargas v. Oriño).
However, practice of law does not require extraordinary
diligence. Sps. Vargas v. Oriño provides that "[W]hen a lawyer
takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a
family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by
his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but
also to the legal profession, the courts and society. Until the
lawyer's withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer is expected to
do his or her best for the interest of the client."
So, the diligence required in the law profession is not after all the
same as that of a common carrier!
b) The decision to withdraw from the case due to a view that it is
unmeritorious is not an excuse because no formal withdrawal as
counsel was made (Sps. Vargas vs. Oriño).
G. SELF-REPRESENTATION
CRUZ VS. MIJARES
G.R. NO. 154464, SEPTEMBER 11, 2008
Relevant Doctrines/Provisions:
Section 34 of Rule 138, provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
FACTS:
This case involved petitioner Cruz, a fourth-year law student,
who sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his
behalf, as the plaintiff in a civil case (Abatement of Nuisance)
before the RTC of Pasay City.
He anchored his claim under Section 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court
(ROC), wherein, a non-lawyer may appear before any Court and
conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, respondent Judge Mijares required the
petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for
himself, as a party-litigant. The counsel of the opposing party
filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) to which petitioner Cruz
objected positing that an MTD is not allowed after the Answer
had been filed.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
The respondent Judge then remarked, "Hay naku, masama
`yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the
pending MTD and calendared the next hearing on another date.
Further, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of the respondent
Judge. It asserted that the respondent judge, in uttering an
uncalled-for remark during pre-trial, reflects a negative frame of
mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.
In an Order, the respondent Judge denied the Motion for
Inhibition and the Motion for Reconsideration (MR) filed by
petitioner Cruz was denied with finality. In the same Order, the
Trial Court denied petitioner Cruz's appearance for failure to
submit the promised document and jurisprudence, as well as his
failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-
A, ROC.
In an MR, petitioner Cruz reiterated that the basis of his
appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138.
However, the respondent Judge denied the same basing its
decision under Rule 138-A, ROC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the respondent RTC gravely erred and abused
its discretion when it denied the appearance of petitioner Cruz
by failure to satisfy Rule 138-A, ROC?
RULING: YES.
The Trial Court erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of
petitioner Cruz’s claim is Section 34, Rule 138.
The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may
appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a
non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
A comparative reading of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court is necessary. Rule 138-A, ROC or the “Law
Student Practice Rule” provides that:
“Sec. 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, petitioner Cruz insisted that the basis of his
appearance was Sec. 34, Rule 138, which provides:
“Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.”
Page 30 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Sec. 34, Rule 138 recognizes the right of an individual to
represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules
state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with
the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be
personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The
individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of
proceedings from commencement to the termination of the
litigation.
Hence, Cruz as the plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally
conduct the litigation of the civil case, wherein, he would act not
as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to
represent himself.
The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Trial Court must have
been misled by the fact that petitioner Cruz is a law student and
must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student
Practice Rule.
Moreover, Circular No. 19 never intended to repeal Rule 138
when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice.
It was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-
lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules
of Court through Rule 138- A. Also, by virtue of Sec. 34, Rule 138,
a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before
inferior courts.
ITCAB, petitioner Cruz, is a fourth-year law student, who wished
to represent himself in Court, as the party litigant.
The SC ruled that such must be granted. With this, the RTC of
Pasay City is directed to admit the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner Cruz for the civil case for Abatement of Nuisance.
Atty. Glenn’s input:
On self-representation, Sec. 34 of Rule 138 applies in the RTC.
Besides, said rule provides that in “… any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.” Note the word “or” used under
the rule.
Note, according to SC (Cruz v. Mijares), the said rule applies in
a civil case and not in a criminal case, citing People v. Holgado,
which speaks of the constitutional right of an accused to be heard
by himself and counsel [Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2)] and
during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived (Flores v.
Ruiz). Note the word “and” used in Art. III of the Constitution.
Note also that in the Flores case (this was cited in Cruz), a
contempt charge which partake of of the nature of a criminal
prosecution, the case of People v. Holgado was the basis for
emphasizing the constitutional right of an accused to be heard
where even the most intelligent or educated man, without
counsel, may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.
SC also said in Flores that the practice has always been for the
trial court to provide the accused with a counsel de oficio, if he
has no counsel of his own choice, or cannot afford one.
Representation by a non-lawyer is authorized under Rule 116,
Sec. 7;
In Cruz v. Mijares (an assigned case), citing People v. Holgado,
SC emphasized the right of an accused to be heard BY HIMSELF
AND COUNSEL and that this right cannot be waived.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
PEOPLE VS. TULIN
G.R. NO. 11709, AUGUST 30, 2001
Relevant Doctrines/Provisions:
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that an accused shall be entitled to defend himself in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment
to promulgation of judgment
However, Article 6 of the Civil Code of the Philippines also
provides that the said right of the accused can be waived.
FACTS:
Appellants were charged with qualified piracy in connection with
the seizure of M/T Tabangao in Batangas where with the use of
an aluminum ladder, seven fully armed pirates, including Tulin,
boarded the vessel which is manned by 21 crew and the officers
and crew were forced to sail to Singapore and transfer its loaded
petroleum products to another Vessel Navi Pride off the coast of
Singapore.
Appellants pleaded not guilty with appellant Hiong claiming
that he merely followed the orders of his superiors to buy bunker
fuel.
However, it was disclosed that he connived, through falsification
of documents, to prevent the Singapore ports authority to detect
the sale, the amount of the sale was less than one-half of the
amount of the cargo transferred, that there was no evidence of
the sale, with receipts not issued and the sale was made 66
nautical miles away in the dead of the night.
The officers and crew of M/T Tabangao with whom the appellants
were with for more than a month, positively identified appellants
as the seajackers.
Appellants, except Hiong, were represented by Tomas Posadas
who was later found to be a non-lawyer. They were, however,
assisted by Atty. Abdul Basar who manifested that they were
adopting the evidence adduced by Posadas. Their extrajudicial
statements obtained without assistance of counsel were
introduced as evidence for the prosecution.
The trial court found all appellants except Hiong to have acted
in conspiracy. According to the trial court, Hiong's act was not
indispensable in the attack and seizure of the vessel. He was
found guilty as a mere accomplice. Hence, this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant’s right to sufficient representation
is violated?
RULING: NO.
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present
and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment.
This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the
technicalities of trial.
However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with
right recognized by law."
Page 31 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the
trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if
made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer.
The same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his
rights without the assistance of counsel."
By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by
law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the
rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly
protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas as an
examination of the record will show that he knew the technical
rules of procedure.
Hence, the Court ruled that there was a valid waiver of the right
to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it
was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with
the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty.
Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused
appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of
the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and
intelligently executed the same.
They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked
in open court.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a valid waiver of rights has been made.
However, the right to counsel during custodial investigation may
not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Under the Miranda doctrine, prior to any questioning during
custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
ITCAB, the uncounseled extrajudicial confessions of accused-
appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are
inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom
shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against
them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject
confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-
appellants with moral certainty.
Atty. Glenn’s input:
On representation by non-lawyer:
People v. Tulin:
It was contended by Tulin, et al. that the trial court erred in
allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time
they were represented by Mr. Posadas, a non-lawyer, in a
Manifestation (Exhibit 20), thereby depriving them of their
constitutional right to procedural due process.
SC held:
a) That an accused shall be entitled to defend himself in person
and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of judgment (citing Rule 115 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
b) That under the same Rule 115, upon motion, the accused may
be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently
appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel. In this case, the rights of the
accused were sufficiently protected by the appearance of Mr.
Posadas because he new the technical rules of procedure
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
c) That the said right of the accused can be waived (citing Art. 6
of the Civil Code of the Phils.)
d) In this case, there was a waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial because the Manifestation by
said accused were made with the full assistance of a bona fide
lawyer. The said Manifestation stated the following:
1. That the accused were apprised of the nature and legal
consequences of the subject manifestation;
2. That the accused voluntarily and intelligently executed the
same; and
3. That the accused affirmed the truthfulness of its contents
when asked in open court (per TSN).
VILLAHERMOSA, SR. VS. CARACOL
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
Relevant Doctrines/Provisions:
Rule 138, Section 21 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney
is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney
is required to authorize him to appear in court for his
client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either
party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown,
require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in
a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the
name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make
such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in
court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the
court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
An attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without
being retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave of court.
If an attorney appears on a client's behalf without a retainer or
the requisite authority, neither the litigant whom he purports to
represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his
appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to
deny his assumed authority.
FACTS:
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases derived from OCT
No. 433. Atty. Aquino was the counsel on record for the Plaintiff.
In March 1994, DARAB issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from
OCT no. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian
reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the
DARAB CB and CA.
On Sept. 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Add'l Counsel for Plaintiffs-
Movant," filed a motion for execution with the DARAB praying
for the full implementation of the March 1994 decision.
On Dec. 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of 2nd
Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which he signed as
"Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela".
Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that:
Page 32 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
● Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he
obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of
record.
● Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the
second motion because Efren had already been dead for
more than a year.
● Atty. Caracol's real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre,
who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land.
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to
appear as "additional counsel". He said that he had consulted
Atty. Aquino, and he advised him to go ahead with the filing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Atty. Caracol has authority to appear as counsel
for Plaintiff?
RULING: NO.
Sec. 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an Atty. Is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required
to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable
grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the
authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed
him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires.
An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without
being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished
for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act
as counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear
in court without being employed unless by leave of court.
If an attorney appears on a client's behalf without a retainer or
the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to
represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his
appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to
deny his assumed authority.
Moreover, even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-
client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the
lawyer.
ITC, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he
appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB. However, Atty.
Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he
filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution
and Demolition.
As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have
informed the Court of his client's passing and presented
authority that he was retained by the client's successors-in-
interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.
Atty. Glenn’s input:
While a lawyer is presumed to have authority when he appeared
before DARAB, an attorney-client relationship terminates upon
death of either client or the lawyer.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
H. RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR
A lawyer on his dealings with the opposing litigant
A lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic. It
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession (Beunviaje v. Magdamo).
On the opposing litigant’s counsel
Be guided by the following:
 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness, and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel. (Canon 8)
 Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and
offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract
from the dignity of the legal profession but also
constitute HIGHLY UNPROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT subject to disciplinary action (Roque
v. Balbin).
 Canons 7, 9, 22, 24 25, and 41 of the Code of
Professional Ethic.
CAMACHO VS. PANGULAYAN
A.C. No. 4807, March 22, 2000
FACTS:
Atty. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising
the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys
Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine
V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the
hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer
College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages.
Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected on separate occasions,
without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission
Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil
case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims
they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant,
and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings filed against it.
Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was
unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting
either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Atty. Pangulayan’s defense:
The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do
with the dismissal of Civil Case Q97-30549 and were executed
for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an
administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were
expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal. The students were all members of the
Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be
published some objectionable features or articles in the paper
IBP Board of Governors: Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is
suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being
ISSUE:
Was Atty. Pangulayan remiss in his duty to his colleague?
RULING: YES.
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and
Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by
then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the
civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this
fact. Although aware that the students were represented by
counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to
negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least
Page 33 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant,
who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
The recommended six-month suspension would appear to be
somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the
explanation of respondent.
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3)
MONTHS.
CABALIDA VS. LOBRIDO
A.C. No. 7972, October 3, 2018
FACTS:
Cabalida engaged the services of respondent Atty. Solomon
Lobrido, at the time a partner at Ramos, Lapore, Pettiere and
Lobrido Law Offices, to file an action for Ejectment with damages
before the MTCC. Alpiere and Salisi engaged the services of
respondent Atty Danny L. Pondevilla, at the time a partner at
Basiao, Bolivar and Pondevilla Law and was concurrently City
Legal Officer.
Respondents met for a possible amicable settlement at Atty.
Pondevilla’s office. In their initial meeting, the parties agreed
that the defendants would no longer pursue the case in exchange
for P150,000.00. Three days thereafter, Cabalida, unassisted by
Atty. Lobrido, returned to Atty. Pondevilla's office to finalize the
amicable settlement. Atty. Pondevilla conveyed to Cabalida that
his clients decided to increase the amount to P250,000.00.
The new terms were embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement
that was prepared by Atty. Pondevilla but it only contained the
signatures of Alpiere and Pondevilla-Dequito because Salili
wanted to ponder on its terms for two more weeks. Cabalida on
the other hand signed the Memorandum of Agreement on the
belief that he can sell the property to a prospective buyer who
was willing to purchase the same for P1,300,000.00.
For the time being, however, Cabalida considered mortgaging his
property and thus hired Lydia S. Gela (Gela) and Wilma Palacios
(Palacios), real estate brokers, to assist him in the mortgaging
process.
Atty. Pondevilla presented the Memorandum of Agreement to
the MTCC but moved for the resetting of the Preliminary
Conference, which was granted, because Salili has not yet signed
the Memorandum of Agreement.
On the date of the preliminary conference, however, counsels for
both parties requested for the provisional dismissal of the case
on the belief that the parties are close to arriving at an amicable
settlement.
Cabalida again met with Atty. Pondevilla. This time, he was
accompanied by his brokers, Gela and Palacios, and by Danilo
Flores (Flores), a common friend of Cabalida and Keleher. Atty.
Pondevilla entered into a Trust Agreement with Cabalida and
his companions as evidenced by a document, entitled Trust
Agreement, which was prepared by Atty. Pondevilla on the same
day.
Cabalida, again unassisted by Atty. Lobrido, returned to Atty.
Pondevilla's office to finalize his amicable settlement with Salili
and Alpiere. Atty. Pondevilla prepared a new Memorandum of
Agreement which contained the same terms as its earlier version
but no longer listed Salili as a party or signatory. Nonetheless,
Cabalida signed the revised Memorandum of Agreement, which
provides that Alpiere and Pondevilla-Dequito will no longer
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
claim the property and that Cabalida will pay them P250,000.00
upon execution of the memorandum.
Upon release of the loan, Cabalida claimed the same and paid
P250,000.00 to atty. Pondevilla for which Atty. Pondevilla issued
a receipt cancelling the trust agreement. After receipt of the
money, Atty. Pondevilla submitted the Memorandum of
Agreement to the MTCC. He also submitted his Ex-Part
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw which states that he is
joining the law office of Atty. Lobrido.
MTCC rendered judgment in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the memorandum of agreement. Atty. Lobrido then
filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw as Cabalida’s counsel
stating therein that it was upon Cabalida’s request and his
conformity.
Atty. Adrian Arellano filed his Formal Entry of Appearance for
Cabalida and filed a Motion to Amend Decision praying that the
order be amended to include Salisi who refused to vacate the
property. MTCC said denied this motion.
Cabalida was unable to pay his loan thus the property was
foreclosed and sold in a public auction. Rrespondents convinced
Cabalida that the best course of action for him was to obtain a
loan in order to come up with P250,000.00 as payment to Alpiere.
This was made even after the respondents learned that Cabalida
was in communication with a prospective buyer who was willing
to purchase the property for P1,300,000.00.
Atty. Pondevilla also withheld the possession of the title from
Cabalida and placed it in the custody of his office staff until
Cabalida's property was mortgaged. As for the issuance of the
Trust Agreement, Cabalida claims that he did not receive
P250,000.00 in trust from Atty. Pondevilla.
The complaint also provides that Atty. Lobrido did not assist
Cabalida when he entered into the MOA.
Thus, Cabalida claims that the unethical acts of respondents
clearly violated the Code of Ethics. Respondents took advantage
of their knowledge of the law as against him who was not even a
high school graduate.
The Board of Governors reversed the findings and exonerated
respondents. Cabalida’s subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Board of Governors gravely erred in
exonerating respondents?
RULING: YES.
Yes. The SC adopted the findings of the investigating
commissioner. The failure to represent Cabalida in the
negotiations for the Memorandum of Agreement shows gross
neglect and indifference to his client's cause. Hence, there was
abject failure to observe due diligence. Atty. Lobrido has
therefore violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Canon 18.03.
As to Atty. Pondevilla:
Atty. Pondevilla's participation in the negotiation for the
Memorandum of Agreement ensued when he relayed Alpiere's
terms to Cabalida. The same terms that Pondevilla relayed to
Cabalida were then it faithfully stated in the Memorandum of
Agreement.
Thus, Pondevilla cannot dilute his role in the creation of the
Memorandum of Agreement to that of a spectator. The notary
public's presence also does not remedy the situation especially
Page 34 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
that his obligation is only towards ensuring the authenticity and
due execution of the instrument.
Atty. Pondevilla knew that Atty. Lobrido was Cabalida's counsel
thus he should have, at the very least, given notice to Atty.
Lobrido prior to submission of the Memorandum of Agreement to
court.
Atty. Pondevilla's actions violated Canon 8.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he negotiated with Cabalida
without consulting Atty. Lobrido. Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice
and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
For holding public office as a City Legal Officer and being a
named partner in a law office, Atty. Pondevilla thus engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Section 7 (b) (2)
of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public officials and
Employees, in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 17, series
of 1986, which prohibits government officials or employees from
engaging in the private practice of their profession unless: 1) they
are authorized by their department heads, and 2) that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions. This is in contravention of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
3. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
 It is composed of all persons whose names now appear
or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court (Sec 1, Rule 139).
 A chapter shall be organized in every province and
every city shall be considered as part of the province
except as otherwise provided under Section 4.
 House of Delegates of not more than 120 members who
shall be apportioned among all chapters as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective
members, each chapter shall have at least one Delegate.
TRANSFER OF CHAPTER MEMBERSHIP
IBP BY-LAWS
Section 19. Registration. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his
preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered
a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political
subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof,
his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member
of more than one Chapter.
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all
members registered in its membership roll. Each member shall
maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of
the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he
transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the
Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not
less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter
election.
 A lawyer may not necessarily be a member of the
Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office/residence is located.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
 The only condition required under the transfer to
another Chapter is that the transfer must be made not
less than three months prior to the election of officers
in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
INTEGRATED BAR VS. BAR ASSOCIATIONS
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370:
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated
Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required
to be members.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of every
attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTEGRATED BAR AND
BAR ASSOCIATIONS
Integrated Bar Bar Associations
Compulsory Voluntary
Membership is sine qua non Not a condition sine qua non.
(a condition) for practicing
lawyers.
Violation of the Rules on Not a sufficient cause.
membership is sufficient
cause of disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer from
practice.
TABUZO VS. GOMOS
A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018
FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed by Atty. Tabuzo
(complainant) against Atty. Gomos (respondent) who was then a
Commissioner of the IBP, for allegedly violating the law and
Constitution.
The controversy stemmed from an administrative complaint filed
by Lucille G. Sillo (Sillo) against complainant before the IBP. The
case was assigned to respondent for investigation and report.
The respondent issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending that complainant reprimanded for the
impropriety of talking to Sillo, without her counsel, prior to the
calling of their case for mediation conference, and for the abusive,
offensive or improper language used in the pleadings she filed in
the said case.
The report and recommendation were adopted and approved by
the IBP Board of Governors.
Complainant alleged that respondent violated the law and
Constitution when he failed to act on her pleadings with dispatch
and for issuing his report and recommendation 174 days from the
submission of the last pleading.
Page 35 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
Respondent countered that it was complainant who caused the
delay of the resolution of the case because of the numerous
motions and pleadings she filed. Also, the report and
recommendation was based on facts, law and jurisprudence
which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board. If
complainant felt aggrieved by the report and recommendation,
she could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's
Resolution.
The IBP Commission recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit
The Commission stated that it would be irregular and improper
to review such findings because it would be tantamount to
reopening matters and issues that have been passed upon and
approved by the IBP Board.
The Commission agreed with the respondent that if complainant
felt aggrieved by such findings, her option would have been to file
a motion for reconsideration or some other appropriate remedy,
but not an administrative case against the investigating
commissioner.
The IBP Board adopted the Commission's report and
recommendation dismissing the complaint.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent may be held administratively liable in the
same manner as judges and other government officials; and (NO)
2. Whether respondent may be held administratively liable for
rendering an alleged adverse judgment in his capacity as an
investigating commissioner of the IBP. (NO)
RULING:
IBP is a sui generis public institution deliberately organized, by
both the legislative and judicial branches of government and
recognized by the present and past Constitutions, for the
advancement of the legal profession.
The IBP's officers, especially the IBP Commissioners, are not
considered as public officers under the purview of the law.
IBP as an organization has as its members all lawyers coming
from both the public and private sectors who are authorized to
practice law in the Philippines. However, Section 4 of the IBP's
By-Laws allows only private practitioners to occupy any position
in its organization. This means that only individuals engaged in
the private practice are authorized to be officers or employees
and to perform acts for and in behalf of the IBP.
Hence, the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are
private practitioners performing public functions delegated to
them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to
regulate the practice of law.
IBP Commissioners cannot be held administratively liable for
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in the framework of
administrative law because they cannot strictly be considered as
being "employed" with the government or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and
other IBP officers may be held administratively liable for
violation of the rules promulgated by this Court relative to the
integrated bar and to the practice of law.
Even if they are not "public officers'' in the context of their
employment relationship with the government, they are still
"officers of the court" and "servants of the law" who are expected
to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves
exemplars worthy of emulation by others.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Most importantly, no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution
placed them under the Court's administrative supervision.
Therefore, IBP Commissioners may be held administratively
liable only in relation to their functions as IBP officers not as
government officials.
On the Alleged Delay of the Resolution of the case filed by Sillo
against the complainant. The source of the complainant's main
gripe against the respondent is the supposed delay in the
resolution of the following motions as alleged in the complaint:
(1) Motion for the Issuance of a Subpoena Duces Tecum and
Subpoena Ad Testificandum; (2) Respondent’s interrogatories to
Complainant Lucille Sillo; (3) Motion to Sever; and (4) Motion to
Inhibit.
Based on the above motions, complainant had filed several
pleadings which are not among those that are explicitly
enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
IBP-CBD. The rule uses the term "only" which is patently
indicative that the enumeration is tightly restrictive.
Clearly, the respondent had no positive duty at all to act on these
unsanctioned pleadings, especially in a manner favorable to the
complainant.
The complainant cannot blame respondent for not acting on
prohibited or unsanctioned pleadings. Her insistence in having
the aforementioned motions resolved despite not being
mentioned as among the pleadings allowed by Sec. 1, Rule III of
the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD actually contributed to
the delay of the whole proceedings.
IBP DUES
RULE 139-A RULES OF COURT
Sec. 9, Rule 139-A, ROC. Membership Dues – Every
member of the IBP shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. A fixed sum equivalent to 10% of the collection from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.
Sec. 10, Rule 139-A, ROC. Effect of non-payment of dues --
Subject to the provisions of Sec. 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for 6 months shall warrant suspension
of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for 1
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
 Default for six (6) months: Warrant suspension of
membership.
 Default for one (1) year: Ground for removal from the
Roll of Attorneys.
A membership fee in the IBP is an exaction for regulation, while
the purpose of a tax is revenue.
Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in
the IBP, of which no one is exempt for as long as one’s
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice
of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
Page 36 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
In a case involving a Filipino lawyer staying abroad, the
Supreme Court said that there is nothing in the law or rules,
which allows his exemption from payment of membership dues.
Question: Is a lawyer who is a senior citizen exempt from the
payment of dues?
Answer: No. A senior citizen who is a lawyer is also not exempt
as the law (RA 7432, as amended) only grants tax exemptions,
not exemption from payment of IBP dues.
Question: Is a lawyer who was inactive in the practice of law
exempt from payment of dues?
Answer: No (BM 1370 – Letter of Atty. Arevalo): The Supreme
Court held that a payment of dues is a necessary consequence of
membership and no one is exempt, regardless of lack of practice
of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
4. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
GROUNDS
Grounds for disciplinary proceedings:
(a) Violation of Lawyer’s Oath
(b) Statutory grounds in Sec. 27, Rule 138 of ROC
• Deceit
• Malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office
• Grossly immoral conduct
(c) Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR)
(d) Violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics
(CPE)
Question: Does the Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE) still
apply in the Philippines?
Atty. GCC:
(a) I check the books of Pineda and Agpalo and they did not
expressly say that the CPE was already superseded by the CPR;
(b) There is also no jurisprudence saying that the CPE is repealed
by the CPR;
(c) There are however cases decided by SC that continue to apply
the CPE, even to date, against erring lawyers. Examples of these
cases are Camacho v. Pangulayan and Cabalida vs. Lobrido
involving Canon 9 of the CPE. These cases are among those
under this topic in our syllabus.
 The grounds under Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court are not limitative. Any gross misconduct
of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity which puts his moral character in serious
doubt as a member of the Bar, will render him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.
1. Deceit
It may consist in a misrepresentation, or in the positive assertion
of a falsehood, or in the creation of a false impression by words
or acts, or in any trick or device.
Important: There is no presumption of innocence in favour of
the lawyer as an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage
of the credulity and ignorance of his client.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
2. Malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office
 Malpractice - Refers to any malfeasance or dereliction
of duty committed by a lawyer.
 Gross misconduct - Any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which is
prejudicial to the rights of the parties.
3. Grossly immoral conduct
When it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the community’s sense of decency.
Important: As to whether cohabitation with a woman not the
lawyer’s wife or without marriage is grossly immoral as to merit
disciplinary action depends upon the circumstance of each case.
4. Conviction of a crime of moral turpitude
Everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty or good
morals.
Important: Mere existence of criminal charges against the
lawyer cannot be a ground for his disbarment or suspicion. He is
presumed to be innocent unless otherwise proven guilty with
finality.
5. Violation of oath of office
6. Willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court
7. Corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney to case
without authority to do so
It is prohibited for a lawyer to appear for a person in court
without being hired or employed unless there is leave of court
first obtained. Disbarment or suspension of a Filipino lawyer in
a foreign country
If the Filipino lawyer is disbarred or suspended from the practice
of law by a competent court or disciplinary agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has been admitted as an attorney, and the
ground thereof include any of the acts enumerated in Sec 27,
Rule 138 of the RRC, such disbarment of suspension is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension in the Philippines.
GROUP EXERCISE:
Question: Determine if the following applies in disciplinary
proceedings against a lawyer and explain your answer:
 Malice. It depends on the kind of malice.
a) No, if it is malice applied in criminal law (i.e., malice in
fact or in law in libel) or in civil law (i.e., malice as an
element in award of moral damages for breach of contract
of carriage) as disciplinary proceedings are sui generis.
In Bayonla vs. Reyes, it was held by SC that pending
criminal cases against a lawyer is not an obstacle to an
administrative proceeding. Citing Gatchalian, SC also held
that where a finding of guilt in criminal case will not
necessarily result in finding of liability in administrative
Page 37 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
case and that conversely the acquittal does not necessarily
exculpate him administratively.
Citing Suzuki vs. Tiamson, disciplinary proceedings are
sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers and the only concern in the administrative case is
determination of administrative liability and the Court’s
findings in the said case should not in any way be treated
as having any material bearing on any other judicial actions
which the other party may choose to file against each other.
b) Yes, as the absence of substantial evidence to show that
the lawyer’s acts were tainted with malice that will merit
disciplinary action.
 Payment of civil liability. It depends on the
nature of civil liability.
a) No, if it is a civil liability arising from a crime because as
a rule, the civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal
action, and disciplinary proceedings are sui generis.
b) No also, if the civil liability is purely civil in nature and
not intrinsically linked to professional
engagement. (See Lopez v. Cristobal under Responsible and
Professional Behavior, p. 5, Syllabus)
c) Yes, if the civil liability is intrinsically linked to
professional engagement so restitution may be ordered. (See
Lopez v. Cristobal under Responsible and Professional
Behavior, p. 5, Syllabus)
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
It is judicial in nature and can be exercised only by the courts.
The authority of the Supreme Court is to discipline lawyers is
rooted in its constitutional prerogative to regulate the practice of
law and the
admission of persons to engage therein.
A disbarment proceeding is a class by itself. It is sui generis. It
has the following characteristics:
1. It is neither civil nor criminal proceeding.
2. Double jeopardy cannot be availed of in a disbarment
proceeding against an attorney. Disbarment does not
partake of a criminal proceeding.
3. It can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court
or by the IBP. It can be initiated without a complaint.
4. It can proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainants if the facts proven so warrant.
5. It is imprescriptible.
6. It is conducted confidentiality being confidential
in nature until its final determination.
7. It is itself due process of law.
8. Whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot
be a source of right that may be enforced in another
action.
9. In pari delicto rule is not applicable.
Such power is not arbitrary or despotic one to be exercised at the
pleasure of the court or in the form of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility. The power to disbar attorneys must always be
exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
CAMBALIZA VS. CRISTAL-TENORIO
A.C. No. 6290, July 14, 2004
Supreme Court:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite
the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
AGNO VS. CAGATAN
A.C. No. 4515, July 14, 2008
Supreme Court:
The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to
clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered
injury from the alleged wrongdoing.
Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the
only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charges. The evidence submitted by complainant before the
Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution
and recommended sanctions.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Page 38 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
EH 401 | 2019-2020 (Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊

QUANTUM OF PROOF/BURDEN OF PROOF

Bases: Billanes vs. Latido AC 12066, August 28, 2018 (citing
Substantial evidence v. Preponderance of evidence Reyes vs. Nieva – 2016); Salazar vs. Quiambao AC 12401, March
12, 2019
1. Hierarchy of evidentiary values (Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.):
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt as highest Reasons - according to the Supreme Court:
2. Clear and convincing evidence “… is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and
3. Preponderance of evidence essential considerations attending to these types of cases” as
4. Substantial evidence as the last disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis, neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
2. Different decisions of the Supreme Court: action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers.”
a. Arienda vs. Aguila (2005) – preponderance of evidence
Supreme Court: “… In this regard, we find that complainant GROUP EXERCISE:
failed to meet the required standard. Thus, absent a showing of Question: What is the quantum of proof required in
clear PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE to sustain the charge disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer? Justify your answer
against respondent, the complaint must be dismissed.” by jurisprudence.
(emphasis mine)
Any of the following:
b. Tabang vs. Gacott (2004) – preponderance of evidence (a) substantial evidence
Supreme Court: “In this case, complainants have shown by a (b) preponderance of evidence
preponderance of evidence that respondent committed gross (c) clear and convincing evidence.
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
CPR.” There are decided cases to support any of the said quantum of
proof.
“Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by
complainants and the sheer lack of evidence adduced by a. In Arienda vs. Aguila, it is preponderance.
respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion b. In Concerned citizen vs. Divina, it is substantial
than that respondent committed the acts of which he is accused evidence.
…” c. In Cambaliza vs. Cristal-Tenorio, it is convincing
evidence.
c. Aba vs. De Guzman (2011) – preponderance of evidence d. In Chan vs. Go, it is clear, convincing and
Supreme Court: “The evidence required in suspension or satisfactory evidence.
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.”
Question: In the immediately preceding number, do you agree
d. Concerned citizen vs. Divina (2011) – substantial evidence with the said ruling? Explain your answer.
Supreme Court: “In administrative proceedings, the quantum of
proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or a. Substantial evidence based on Rule 133, Rules
such evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to on Evidence;
support a conclusion.” b. Gravity of disbarment proceedings and higher
quantum of proof must be required (referring to
e. Goopio vs. Maglalang (2018) – substantial evidence clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence);
Supreme Court: “However, in consideration of the gravity of the c. Given the serious consequences of disciplinary
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the proceedings (referring to preponderant
bar, we have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the evidence);
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the d. The lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence
complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his and immense inequality will be created
complaint through substantial evidence.” (referring to preponderance of evidence);
e. Primordial purpose and essential considerations
f. Cambaliza vs. Cristal-Tenorio (2004) – convincing evidence surrounding the case which involves public
Supreme Court: “In disbarment proceedings, the complainant interest; and
has the burden of proving his case by f. Balancing of weight of evidence.
convincing evidence.” (citing Adarne v. Aldaba)

g. Chan vs. Go (2009) – clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence
Supreme Court: “In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.” (citing Aquino v.
Villamar-Mangaoang which talks about convincing evidence or
preponderance of evidence)
Atty. GCC’s input:
At present, the proper evidentiary threshold in disciplinary or
disbarment cases is SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE and not
preponderance of evidence
HOW ARE THEY INSTITUTED?
1. How disciplinary proceedings are instituted (Rule 139-
B, Sec. 1):
• By SC;
• By IBP upon verified complaint of any person;
• By IBP Board of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by
SC or by a Chapter Board of Officers or at the instance of any
person.
2. Upon initiation by IBP (Rule 139-B, Sec. 1):
• Against erring attorneys including those in the government
service;

BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER Page 39 of 44

KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
• All charges against Justices of CA, Sandiganbayan, CTA and
lower courts even if lawyers are jointly charged with
them shall be filed with SC;
• Charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP
including those filed prior to their appointment in the
Judiciary shall immediately be forwarded to SC for disposition
and adjudication;
• Agpalo (8th Ed., p. 569): IBP has no power or jurisdiction over
such Justices or Judges for misconduct in connection with the
discharge of their judicial functions even if such justice or judge
has already retired or been separated from the Judiciary;
• Agpalo (8th Ed., p. 569): complaints for disbarment may not lie
against impeachable officers of the government during their
tenure because they may only be removed from office by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses.
3. Direct filing with SC and its authority:
• SC may summarily dismiss a complaint for utter lack of merit
without referring it to IBP;
• If found prima facie meritorious, SC may refer the complaint
to IBP BOG for appropriate action
• Referral to IBP by SC is not mandatory; SC may refer to
Solicitor General, any officer of the Court or judge of a lower
court.
Related questions:
Question: What does the word “noted” mean? Answer: It
means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the
existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter (Sebastian vs.
Bajar).
Question: Can SC take cognizance of disbarment complaints
against lawyers in the government service? Answer: In the
following cases:
FUJI VS. DELA CRUZ
A.C. No. 11043, March 8, 2017
In holding a special prosecutor of the Bureau of Immigration
liable for negligence (simple neglect), violating Rule 18.03 of the
CPR, SC held:
“Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of her duties as a government official. However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation
of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, then she may be subject to disciplinary action by
this Court.”
Note that the Supreme Court exercised discretion on appropriate
sanction, imposed 3 months suspension, taking into
consideration the Civil Services Rules (1-6 months for simple
neglect of duty) and the penalties imposed in previous cases (3-6
months).
Atty. GCC’s input: With due respect to the Supreme Court:
 In Penilla vs. Alcid, the offense is Gross Misconduct
(for errors committed with respect to the nature of the
remedy adopted in the criminal complaint and the
forum selected in the civil complaint);
 In Baldado vs. Mejica, the offense is Gross
Negligence, Gross Incompetence and Gross Ignorance
(for failing to appeal decision); and
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
 In Vda. De Enriquez vs. San Jose, the offense is
Inexcusable Negligence (for failure to file a pleading
after sending a demand letter).
GROUP EXERCISE:
Question: Is there a need for a complainant in an
administrative case against a lawyer? Explain your answer.
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. How instituted. – Proceedings for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person. xxx xxx xxx.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including
those in the government service; xxx xxx xxx.”
(2) Anonymous complaints are allowed as the SC or the IBP
may initiate disbarment proceedings motu proprio (Rule
139-B)
(3) There is no need if the bases of the complaint are
verifiable public documents. (see Re: Normandie Pizarro
under Judicial Conduct, Syllabus)
GCC Follow-up Question: Should a complaint in a
disciplinary action against a lawyer be verified?
(Rule 139-B) The phrase "upon the verified complaint"
qualifies that of the IBP only but not of the Supreme Court.
So, if it is initiated by SC which can be done motu proprio,
there is no requirement of verification as it is not expressly
provided.
CONFIDENTIALITY RULE;
FORMAL INVESTIGATION
Confidential
Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential,
except that the final order of the court shall be made public as in
other cases coming before the court. (Section 10, Rule 139, Rules
of Court)
ROQUE, JR. VS. CATAPANG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017
The confidentiality rule is intended, to prevent the use of
disbarment proceedings as a tool to damage a lawyer's reputation
in the public sphere. Thus, the general rule is that publicly
disclosing disbarment proceedings may be punished with
contempt.
However, the confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers
is not absolute. It is not to be applied under any circumstance, to
all disclosures of any nature. In disbarment proceedings, a
balance must be struck, due to the demands of the legal
profession.
Page 40 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings
against attorneys" be kept private and confidential. This would
necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment
complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend so far
that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary
actions.
Atty GCC’s input:
 3-fold purpose (Sec. 18, Rule 193-B of ROC):
1. To enable the court and the investigator to make the
investigation free from any extraneous influence or
interference;
2. To protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled,
vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by
prohibiting the publication of such charges pending
their resolution; and
3. To deter the press from publishing the charges or
proceedings based thereon.
 In my view, when confronted in the future of a question
about confidentiality and there is no jurisprudence yet
on the matter that can be applied, please consider its
3-fold purpose:
1. Court and investigator: freedom from any extraneous
influence or interference;
2. Attorney: protection from baseless charges;
3. Press: prevention from publication) in resolving it.
Question to Atty.: What threshold should we apply in
determining the presence of a public interest aspect in
disciplinary proceedings, if any, sir?
Answer: There is no threshold applied by the Supreme Court on
disciplinary proceedings. What we have are cases where such
public interest was applied - Roque, Jr. and Palad vs. Solis.
Note: The Supreme Court did not state the guidelines on how a
matter could be considered as public interest.
GROUP EXERCISE:
Question: Section 18 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
enunciates the confidentiality rule in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers. When does this rule apply?
In Tan vs. IBP CBD, it was found that petitioners cited
most of the amendatory averments in respondent’s Verified
Answer in the administrative case as the core of their
Amended Complaint in the civil case.
The Supreme Court held that there was violation of the
confidential nature of the disbarment proceedings against
respondent lawyer because:
a. “(p)etitioners had in effect announced to the world
the pending disbarment case against respondent
lawyer”;
b. petitioners did not only disclose the ONGOING
proceedings;
c. petitioners DIVULGED most, if not all of the
contents of respondent lawyer’s verified answer.
In Roque, Jr. vs. Catapang, respondents were sued by
petitioner for publicly announcing in a conference at Camp
Aguinaldo that a disbarment complaint had been filed
against petitioner and for distributing a press statement
about the filing of such disbarment complaint.
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
The Supreme Court held that the confidentiality in
disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute and is not to
be applied under any circumstances to all disclosures of any
nature. So, this rule was not applied by the Supreme Court
here as:
• The matter had involved public interest;
• Due to the personalities involved; and
• The announcement that a complaint had been filed does
not violate the confidentiality rule considering that it did
not discuss the disbarment complaint itself. SC also said
that the confidentiality rules does not extend to mere
existence or pendency of disciplinary actions;
• The press statement does not divulge any acts or
character traits on the part of petitioner that would damage
his personal and professional reputation, no particulars
were given about the content of the complaint or the actual
charges filed;
• It is unlikely that respondent’s reputation could be
damaged by the factual report that a complaint had been
filed because even before any case against petitioner had
been filed, media reported that petitioners tweeted publicly
that he looked forward to answering the complaint before
the AFP.
In Roque, Jr., the SC said that where there are yet no
proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep
private and confidential.
Please note: The following cases are cited in Roque, Jr. and
their application to the confidentiality rule:
a. Palad vs. Solis: The disciplinary proceeding against
petitioner became a matter of public concern considering
that it arose from his representation of his client on the
issue of video voyeurism on the internet;
b. Fortun vs. Quinsayas: The dissemination of copies of
the disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of
media constitutes contempt of court;
c. Relativo vs. De Leon: Premature disclosure by
publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment
proceedings is a violation of confidentiality rule.
GROUP EXERCISE:
Question: An administrative complaint against a lawyer
was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The annexes attached to said complaint were all
photocopies. When sought for comment by the IBP, the said
lawyer argued that the complaint lacks merit as the
annexes violate the Best Evidence Rule. Will the said
complaint
prosper? Explain your answer.
In Goopio vs. Maglalang, the Best Evidence Rule (BER)
was applied where the MAIN CHARGE turn on the VERY
ACCURACY, COMPLETENESS, AND AUTHENTICITY of
the documents submitted into evidence.
In addition:
a. Concerned citizen vs. Divina: The SC stated that that
accusation is not synonymous with guilt and mentioned of
the age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it for mere allegation is not evidence.
Note that these are principles under the rules of evidence
applied in a disciplinary proceeding.
Page 41 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
b. Aba vs. De Guzman: The SC reiterated certain
principles under the rules of evidence: Section 3 (a) of Rule
131 (presumption of innocence); Section 1 of Rule 131
(burden of proof); and Rule 133 (weight and sufficiency of
evidence). Note again that these are principles under the
rules of evidence applied in a disciplinary proceeding.
Question: You are one of the Commissioners of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). An administrative case was assigned to
you as Investigating Commissioner which case was referred
by the Supreme Court to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation. The Rollo of the case was forwarded
by the Supreme Court to IBP which Rollo was eventually
turned over to you as Investigating Commissioner. As
Investigating Commissioner, can you base your report and
recommendation on the said Rollo? Explain your answer.
In Villanueva vs. Deloria: The SC said that formal
investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be
dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons and
this ruling is based on Rule 139-B of the ROC. Citing
Baldomar vs. Paras, SC also said that an ex-parte
investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails
to appear despite reasonable notice.
APPROPRIATE SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED
On deciding the appropriate sanction to be imposed,
Supreme Court considers the following (Advincula vs.
Macabata):
a. Considers a number of factors (citing Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, p. 445);
b. Primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings;
c. The Supreme Court has discretion to impose a
particular sanction that it may deem proper against an
erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and
despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice but should be controlled by the
imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and exact from the law strict
compliance with his duties to the court, to the client, to
his brethren in the profession and to the public;
d. The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most
weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct
which seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar;
e. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character
should merit disbarment or suspension while those acts
which neither affect nor erode the moral character of
the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless
they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly
show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice
of law;
f. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must
be clearly demonstrated before suspension of
disbarment is meted out;
g. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should also be
considered; and
h. In Advincula, the charge is gross immorality;
Investigating Commissioner recommended 1 month
suspension while the IBP BOG recommended 3 months
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
suspension; SC found that the acts of respondent in
turning the head of complainant towards him and
kissing her on the lips are distasteful but cannot be
considered as grossly immoral; it is an isolated act of
misconduct of a lesser nature.
In Advincula, based on circumstances of case and considering
that this is respondent’s first offense, SC imposed reprimand.
On Decision of IBP BOG:
Every case heard by an Investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP
Board of Governors xxx. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the reasons on which it is based. xxx. (Rule 139-B,
Sec. 12 [a])
Note here the case of Quiambao vs. Bamba: Reduction from
suspension of 1 year to a stern warning was found by SC to be
without basis as no facts and reasons were clearly and distinctly
stated upon which the reduction is based;
Atty. GCC’s input: If it is an increase of penalty or adoption of
Investigator’s recommendation, the decision of the BOG needs to
state the facts and reasons as required.
Note the following:
 The power of IBP in disciplinary proceedings: power to
recommend so cannot impose penalty.
 IBP BOG can only be held liable for damages if they
acted maliciously or upon illicit consideration; if the
rule were otherwise, a great number of lower court
justices and judges whose acts the appellate courts have
annulled on ground of grave abuse of discretion would
be open targets for damage suits (Cadiz vs. Presiding
Judge of RTC-48).
 MR is not prohibited as Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 is silent
about the filing of an MR and it is in fact encouraged
before resort to SC as a matter of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering
the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may
have committed through a misapprehension of facts or
misappreciation of the evidence (Gerona vs.
Datingaling).
FAILURE TO ANSWER IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
HDI HOLDINGS VS. CRUZ:
A.C. No. 11724, July 31, 2018
Supreme Court: “The natural instinct of man impels him to
resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It
is totally against our human nature to just remain reticent
and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Silence in
such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of
the truth thereof. Consequently, we are left with no choice but to
deduce his implicit admission of the charges levelled against him.
Qui tacet consentive videtur. Silence gives consent.”
GROUP EXERCISE:
Question: Does the failure of a lawyer to answer a
complaint in a disciplinary proceedings merit a sanction
against him or her? Explain your answer.
Page 42 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
EH 401 | 2019-2020
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊
It depends on the peculiar circumstances of a case.
In A-1 Financial Services vs. Valerio, it is the wanton
disregard of IBP’s and Court orders in the course of
proceedings that would merit a sanction. Note that in this
case, the Supreme Court (SC) noted that in Lao vs. Medel
(deliberate failure to pay just debts and issuance of
worthless checks constituting gross misconduct) and
Rangwani vs. Dino (gross misconduct for issuing bad
checks in payment of a piece of property), a lawyer was
sanctioned of 1 year suspension, 2-year suspension was
considered reasonable for issuing worthless checks and
failing to pay debts and for wanton disregard of IBP’s and
Court orders in the course of proceedings
Atty. GCC’s input: I believe also that a mere failure to answer
a complaint does not immediately warrant a sanction from the
SC because in most cases, SC considered other factors. So, in A-
1 Financial Services, note the following factors considered by the
SC:
a. respondent failed to answer the complaint;
b. despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary
hearings set by IBP;
c. she also ignored the proceedings before the court –
failed to answer the complaint against her and appear
during the arraignment despite orders and notices from
the court; and
d. the court considered the justification of the
respondent’s mother as unmeritorious that her
daughter is suffering from a health condition as the
mother failed to prove the contents of the certificate or
present the physician who issued it.
Additional inputs:
a. Aggravating circumstance:
Atty. GCC: In my opinion, I believe that the deliberate failure to
answer a complaint in disciplinary proceedings is an aggravating
circumstance in the imposition of the appropriate sanction
against a lawyer.
Note that in A-1 Financial Services, the SC emphasized that such
conduct of the lawyer runs counter to the precepts of the CPR as
well as the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied
in the CPR and violates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon
every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. I believe also that this is aside from the nature of the
offense itself.
b) Indirect contempt:
Further, please note though that a willful failure or refusal to
obey a lawful order issued by an Investigator of the IBP handling
the disciplinary proceeding constitutes indirect contempt (see
Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 139-B of the ROC) subject to
compliance with the rules provided.
c) Fine as penalty:
Note further, that in Sps. Regulto vs. Teoxon (AC 10301, April 3,
2019), the SC adopted the BOG’s recommendation to impose a
fine of P5,000 for failure to comply with CBD’s directive to file a
comment to the disbarment complaint.
GROUP EXERCISE:
Question: Is a motion for reconsideration a requirement
before the SC can act upon the report of the Integrated Bar
BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER
KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
(Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP BOG)
suspending a lawyer from the practice of law?
No, because in Gerona vs. Datingaling, the Supreme
Court (SC) emphasized that Sec. 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the
ROC does not mention of an MR of the IBP BOG’s
resolution. The SC however said that if an MR is filed after
the records of the case has been forwarded to SC, SC may
decide to treat the motion as a petition for review within the
contemplation of Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b).
DEFENSES
A. Desistance in criminal case: Reliance on Affidavit of
Desistance to secure exoneration is misplaced because:
1. The Affidavit, while filed with the trial court, was not filed in
the administrative case;
2. Court has consistently frowned upon the desistance because of
legal (Rule 139-B, Sec. 5) and jurisprudential injunction
(Rangwani vs. Dino, citing Bolivar vs. Simbol) (Wilkie vs. Limos).
B. Pardon by the legal spouse on the charge of gross
immorality (akin to an affidavit of desistance) cannot abate
disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer (Tiong vs. Florendo).
 Agpalo (8th Ed., p. 581): Executive pardon by President
operates to wipe out the conviction as well as the offense
itself, the grant thereof in favor of a lawyer is a bar to a
proceeding. However, the same does not apply to:
a. Does not automatically entitle the disbarred lawyer
to reinstatement;
b. Disciplinary action that is based not solely on the
lawyer’s commission of the offense but on a transaction
involved or related therein which culminated in his
conviction.
C. Pendency of a criminal case: Pending criminal cases
against a lawyer is not an obstacle to an administrative
proceeding citing Gatchalian where a finding of guilt in criminal
case will not necessarily result in finding of liability in admin
case and that conversely the acquittal does not necessarily
exculpate him administratively (Bayonla vs. Reyes).
D. Prescription:
 Atty. GCC: 2-year prescription under Rule VIII of CBD
Rules in Isenhardt vs. Real is no longer found under
2012 CBD Rules; and
 Bar discipline cases do not prescribe (Heirs of Alilano
vs. Examen).
GROUP EXERCISE:
Question: “A” filed a complaint against her estranged
husband, Atty. “B”, on the ground of immorality and use of
illegal drugs which both happened five years ago. When
sought for comment, Atty. B denied the allegations of the
complaint and set up the defense of prescription citing the
2-year prescriptive period of Rule VIII, Section 1 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (CBD-IBP). After A’s
presentation of her evidence before the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP, she filed an Affidavit of
Desistance and a motion to dismiss the complaint as she
Page 43 of 44
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
EH 401 | 2019-2020 (Based on Atty. J. G. Capanas’ pointers)
Disclaimer: The authors do not guarantee that this is 100% error-free. Use at your own risk. God bless you! 😊

and Atty. B have already reconciled. You are the

investigating Commissioner of the IBP. Would you find Note: Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment
merit in the complaint of A? Explain your answer. less severe such as reprimand, suspension or fine would
accomplish the end desired (Amaya vs. Tecson, A.C. No. 5996,
Under Sec. 5 of Rule 139-B, no investigation shall be Feb. 7, 2005).
interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the Question: What are the aggravating circumstances in
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. disbarment?
1. Prior disciplinary offenses;
So based on the said provision, the affidavit of desistance 2. Dishonest or selfish motives;
and the motion to dismiss can simply be noted and the 3. A pattern of misconduct;
complaint will have to be resolved on the basis of the 4. Multiple offenses;
evidence presented. 5. Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of
Besides, the affidavit of desistance and the motion to the disciplinary agency;
dismiss are based on reconciliation between the 6. Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
complainant and respondent. Since there are two charges deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
against the lawyer, the said affidavit and motion are only 7. Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
relevant to the charge on immorality and not on the second 8. Vulnerability of victim;
charge. 9. Substantial experience in the practice of law; and
10. Indifference to making restitution. (IBP Guidelines
Be that as it may, the resolution of the two cases, as stated, 9.22)
will still be based on the evidences presented.
Question: What are the instances that are neither aggravating
Question: Is the defense of prescription tenable? Explain nor mitigating?
your answer.
1. Forced or compelled restitution;
No, as the said Rule invoked was void for being ultra vires 2. Agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper
and thus null and void as held in Heirs of Alilano vs. behavior or result;
Examen, citing Frias vs. Atty. Bautista Lozada. So, in that 3. Withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
case, the SC said that there is no prescription in bar 4. Resignation prior to completion of disciplinary
discipline cases. proceedings;
5. Complainants recommendation as to sanctions; or
OTHER NOTES AND RELATED QUESTIONS ON 6. Failure of injured client to complain. (IBP Guideline
DEFENSES: 9.4)

Note: The extent of disciplinary action depends on the Question: What are the guidelines to be observed in the matter
attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of
law?
Question: What are the mitigating circumstances in
disbarment? 1. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension,
respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
1. Good faith in the acquisition of a property of the client Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating
subject of litigation (In Re: Ruste, A.M. No. 632, therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of
June 27, 1940); law and has not appeared in any court during
2. Inexperience of the lawyer (Munoz vs. People, G.R. No. the period of his or her suspension;
L- 33672, Sept. 28, 1973); 2. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the
3. Age (Santos vs. Tan, A.C. No. 2697, Apr. 19, 1991); Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of
4. Apology (Munoz vs. People, G.R. No. L- 33672, Sept. the courts where respondent has pending cases handled
28, 1973); by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as
5. Lack of Intention to slight or offend the Court (Rheem counsel; and
of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979, 3. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
Jan. 27, 1967); respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension.
6. Absence of prior disciplinary record;
7. Absence of dishonest or selfish motive;
8. Personal or emotional problems; Nothing follows. 😊
9. Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify
consequences of misconduct;
10. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings;
11. Character or reputation;
12. Physical or mental disability or impairment;
13. Delay in disciplinary proceedings;
14. Interim rehabilitation;
15. Imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
16. Remorse; and
17. Remoteness of prior offenses. (IBP Guidelines 9.32)

BORATA | DADOL | JAILANI | JAVIER Page 44 of 44

KINAZO | MANIT | RICALDE | ZOSA