CALVO, SHAIRA GRACE B.

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1. Lagman et.al v. Pimentel et. al., G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion
mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).In a letter to the
President, through Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana (Secretary Lorenzana), the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, General Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General
Guerrero), recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018
"for compelling reasons based on current security assessment."Acting on said
recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate
and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year,
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of due process
HELD: No. Arguably, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III and House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez
can be said to have an interest in these cases, as representatives of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, respectively. However, considering that one of their main contentions is
that the "supermajority" of the Congress gravely abused their discretion when they allegedly
railroaded the adoption of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, it stands to reason and the
requirements of due process that petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935 and 236061 should have
impleaded the Congress as a whole. Needless to say, the entire body of Congress, and not
merely the respective leaders of its two Houses, will be directly affected should We strike
down the extension of martial law. Thus, the Court hold that in cases impugning the
extension of martial law for lack of sufficient factual basis, the entire body of the Congress,
composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, must be impleaded, being an
indispensable party thereto. It is true that a party's failure to implead an indispensable party is
not per se a ground for the dismissal of the action, as said party may be added, by order of
the court on motion of the party or motu propio, at any stage of the action or at such times as
are just. However, it remains essential - as it is jurisdictional - that an indispensable party be
impleaded before judgment is rendered by the court, as the absence of such indispensable
party renders all subsequent acts of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Joining indispensable parties into an
action is mandatory, being a requirement of due process. In their absence, the judgment
cannot attain real finality.
The Court is, thus, unprepared to trivialize the necessity to implead the entire Congress as
party-respondent in this proceeding, especially considering that the factual scenario and the
concomitant issues raised herein are novel and unprecedented. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the
Congress was impleaded as a respondent in G.R. No. 236145 and the OSG has entered its
appearance and argued for all the respondents named in the four consolidated petitions, the
Court finds that the "essential" and "jurisdictional" requirement of impleading an
indispensable party has been substantially complied with.
2. LTFRB v. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 242860, March 11, 2019
FACTS: On May 26, 2016, DBDOYC registered its business with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and subsequently, in December 2016, launched "Angkas," an
online and on-demand motorcycle-hailing mobile application (Angkas or Angkas app) that
pairs drivers of motorcycles with potential passengers without, however, obtaining the
mandatory certificate of TNC accreditation from the LTFRB. In this regard, DBDOYC
accredited Angkas drivers and allowed them to offer their transport services to the public
despite the absence of CPCs.

LFTRB issued a press release informing the riding public that DBDOYC, which is
considered as a TNC, cannot legally operate. Despite such warning DBDOYC continued to
operate and offer its services to the riding public sans any effort to obtain a certificate of
TNC accreditation. In response, DBDOYC file a petition for Declaration Relief with
Application for TRO/ writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioners before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the DBDOYC’s right to liberty was violated
HELD: No. In this case, the RTC premised its issuance of the assailed injunctive writ on
DBDOYC's purported clear and unmistakable legal right "to conduct its business based on its
constitutional right to liberty." Prescinding therefrom, the RTC concludes that DBDOYC has
"the right to enter into an independent contract with its Angkas bikers as an [application]
provider [without] initially requiring it to secure [a CPC]." As in all fundamental rights, the
State has a legitimate interest in regulating these rights when their exercise clearly affects the
public. To recount, “police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain
the use of liberty and property for public welfare.” Accordingly, the State "may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare
as long as the interference is reasonable and not arbitrary."

Here,it is petitioners' position that DBDOYC is a transportation provider and its accredited
drivers are common carriers engaged in rendering public service which is subject to their
regulation. The regulatory measures against DBDOYC, as mentioned above, pertain to DOs
2015-11 and 2017-11, which have created new classifications of transportation services,
namely TNC and TNVS, in light of modern innovations.
The Court therefore concludes that no clear and unmistakable right exists in DBDOYC's
favor; hence, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed injunctive writ. In
the final analysis, the business of holding one's self out as a transportation service provider,
whether done through online platforms or not, appears to be one which is imbued with public
interest and thus, deserves appropriate regulations. With the safety of the public further in
mind, and given that, at any rate, the above-said administrative issuances are presumed to be
valid until and unless they are set aside, the nullification of the assailed injunctive writ on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion is in order.
3. Falcis v. Civil Registrar General G.R. No. 217910, September 03, 2019
FACTS: Petitioner sought to "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as
unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code."
According to Falcis, a facial challenge on Articles 1 and 2 is permitted as these two (2)
provisions regulate fundamental rights such as "the right to due process and equal protection,
right to decisional and marital privacy, and the right to found a family in accordance with
religious convictions." Because there is allegedly no necessity to limit marriage as only
between a man and a woman, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are supposedly
unconstitutional for depriving Falcis of his right to liberty without substantive due process of
law.
ISSUE: whether Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are violative of the petitioner’s right to
liberty
HELD: No. Here, the Petition cannot be entertained as a facial challenge to Articles 1, 2,
46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code.
A facial challenge is "an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not
only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities." It is distinguished from "as-applied"
challenges, which consider actual facts affecting real litigants. Facial challenges are only
allowed as a narrow exception to the requirement that litigants must only present their own
cases, their extant factual circumstances, to the courts. The Court further ruled that petitioner
has no actual facts that present a real conflict between the parties of this case. The Petition
presents no actual case or controversy.
4. Genuino et.al., v. Hon. De Lima G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
FACTS: On March 19, 1998, then DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ Circular
No. 17, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance of HDOs. The said issuance
was intended to restrain the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which impinge on the people's
right to travel. On April 23, 2007, former DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez issued DOJ
Circular No. 18, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance and implementation
of watchlist orders. In particular, it provides for the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue a
Watchlist Order (WLO) against persons with criminal cases pending preliminary
investigation or petition for review before the DOJ. Further, it states that the DOJ Secretary
may issue an ADO to a person subject of a WLO who intends to leave the country for some
exceptional reasons. Even with the promulgation of DOJ Circular No. 18, however, DOJ
Circular No. 17 remained the governing rule on the issuance of HDOs by the DOJ.
On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ
Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which will govern the issuance
and implementation of HDOs, WLOS, and ADOs. Section 10 of DOJ Circular No. 41
expressly repealed all rules and regulations contained in DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, as
well as all instructions, issuances or orders or parts thereof which are inconsistent with its
provisions.
In view of the foregoing criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422
dated August 9, 2011 against GMA pursuant to her authority under DOJ Circular No. 41. She
also ordered for the inclusion of GMA's name in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watchlist. 10
Thereafter, the Bl issued WLO No. ASM-11-237,11 implementing De Lima's order. In three
separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October 21, 2011, and October 24, 2011, GMA
requested for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 41, so that
she may be able to seek medical attention from medical specialists abroad for her
hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder.
ISSUE: Whether the assailed circular is violative of the fundamental right to travel
HELD: YES. The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law. It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of movement
that the Constitution affords its citizen. It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not
absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to
travel. Section 6 itself provides that the right to travel may be impaired only in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. there is an
identical provision in DOJ Circular No. 41 which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to issue
a HDO or WLO against anyone, motu proprio, in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health. With this all-encompassing provision, there is nothing that can
prevent the Secretary of Justice to prevent anyone from leaving the country under the guise
of national security, public safety or public health. The point is that the DOJ may not justify
its imposition of restriction on the right to travel of the subjects of DOJ Circular No. 41 by
resorting to an analogy. Contrary to its claim, it does not have inherent power to issue HDO,
unlike the courts, or to restrict the right to travel in anyway. It is limited to the powers
expressly granted to it by law and may not extend the same on its own accord or by any
skewed interpretation of its authority.

5. Republic v. Manalo G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

FACTS: On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by
virtue of a judgment of divorce Japanese court. As a result, Manalo moved to admit an
Amended Petition, which the court granted. The OSG did not present any controverting
evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to
file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with
the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, inclusing marriages."
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of
the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE: Whether par. 2 of article 26 of the civil code violates the equal protection clause
HELD: Yes. The Court found that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a
foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. A Filipino who is married to another
Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are
real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has
to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino
against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his/her
Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.
6. IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, SUPREMA T. DUMO, V.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 218269, June 06, 2018
FACTS: Complainant Espinas filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the heirs of Bernarda M.
Trinidad (Trinidad), including the petitioner Dumo. The plaintiffs are the heirs of Marcelino
Espinas (Espinas), who died intestate, leaving a parcel of land (Subject Property) covered by
a Tax Declaration, which particularly described the property The Subject Property was
purchased by Espinas from Carlos Calica through a Deed of Absolute Sale . Espinas
exercised acts of dominion over the Subject Property by appointing a caretaker to oversee
and administer the property. In 1963, Espinas executed an affidavit stating his claim of
ownership over the Subject Property. Espinas had also been paying realty taxes on the
Subject Property. On 6 February 1987, the heirs of Trinidad executed a Deed of Partition
with Absolute Sale over a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 17276. The heirs of
Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the ground that the properties
sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in the accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the
RTC consolidated the land registration case with the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession and Damages. On 2 July 2010, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that
the Subject Property was owned by the heirs of Espinas. The CA, however, modified the
decision of the RTC insofar as it found that the Subject Property belonged to the heirs of
Espinas. The CA found that since the property still belonged to the public domain, and the
heirs of Espinas were not able to establish their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945 or earlier, it was erroneous for the RTC to declare the heirs of Espinas as the owners of
the Subject Property.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in denying the petition for Land Registration and failed to
consider the supporting evidence thereby depriving petitioner of their fundamental right to
due process of law
HELD: No. Dumo cannot validly argue that she was not afforded due process when the CA
considered to review the evidence she herself offered to support her application for land
registration. On the contrary, she was given every opportunity to submit the documents to
establish her right to register the land. She simply failed to do so. When Dumo filed with the
RTC the application for registration of her land, she was asking the RTC to confirm her
incomplete title. The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD No. 1529). Simply put, when Dumo filed her
application for the registration of the lots she claims to have inherited from her mother and
bought from her siblings, the issue of whether she complied with all the requirements was the
very crux of the application. It cannot be argued that because the Republic failed to oppose or
raise the issue in the RTC, the CA may no longer consider this issue. On the contrary, the
classification of the land sought to be registered, and the duration and nature of the
possession and occupation have always been, and will always be the issues in an application
for land registration. It would truly be absurd for Dumo, or any other applicant for land
registration, to expect the courts to grant the application without first determining if the
requisites under the law have been complied with. The CA had every right to look into the
compliance by Dumo with the requirements for the registration of the land, and we find that
the CA correctly found that Dumo has acquired no registerable title to the lots she seeks to
register.

7. People v. Tajeda, G.R. No. 227427, June 06, 2018

FACTS: The accused was charged for selling, delivering, distributing, and possessing
without being authorized by law, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. PO3
Ramos conducted a buy-bust operation after receiving an information that the two accused
were conducting an illegal drug activity. Thereafter, the accused were apprehended. RTC
held that the prosecution sufficiently proved that the plastic sachet marked as "DTC-2"
containing shabu had been recovered from Callejo's possession, and that the latter possessed
the same freely and consciously, without proper authority. The RTC rejected the appellants'
defense of frame-up. In essence, the RTC held that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties stand in the absence of clear and convincing evidence showing
any ill motive on the part of the SAID-SOTG operatives. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE: whether the accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty was violated
HELD: Yes. The presumption of regularity cannot overcome the stronger presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. Trial courts have been directed by
the Court to apply this differentiation. Verily, strict compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165
and the IRR is mandated under the 2010 PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operation and
Investigation (2010 AIDSOTF Manual) which was then applicable
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand due to the glaring disregard by the
SAID-SOTG of the established procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165, its IRR, and the
2010 AIDSOTF Manual. The prosecution's failure to prove the corpus delicti of the offenses
of sale and possession of illegal drugs due to unexplained breaches of procedure committed
by the SAID-SOTG, as well as the material inconsistencies in the apprehending officers'
testimonies on the confidentiality of their informant's identity, taken together, cast reasonable
doubt over appellants' guilt. Verily, the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence ascribed to the appellants.
8. Lagman et.al., v. Hon. Medialdea et.al., G.R. No. 243522, February 19, 2019
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the whole of Mindanao to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group
and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days. Subsequently,
three (3) consolidated petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216 were filed before this Court. In a Decision dated July 4, 2017, the Court in
Representative Edcel C. Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Salvador C. Medialdea, et al.,6 found
sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and declared it
constitutional. On July 18, 2017, the President requested Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, which extended Proclamation No. 216 until December 31,
2017. Thereafter, four (4) consolidated petitions were filed before this Court assailing the
constitutionality of the second extension of Proclamation No. 216. Petitioners contend that
the third extension violates the constitutional proscription against a long duration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They further added that
the extension will lead to further violation of citizens' political, civil, and human rights.
ISSUE: whether the third extension of martial will further violate human rights
HELD: No. All forms of human rights violations and abuses during the implementation of
martial law and suspension of powers should not go unpunished. Nonetheless, consistent
with the previous rulings of the Court in Lagman v. Medialdea and Lagman v. Pimentel III,
the alleged violations and abuses should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Therefore, the
purported human rights abuses mentioned in the petitions, particularly in the Bayan Muna
and Valle Petitions, fail to persuade that these are sufficient to warrant a nullification of the
extension.
A declaration of martial law does not suspend fundamental civil rights of individuals as the
Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution remain effective. Civil courts and legislative
bodies remain open. While it is recognized that, in the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the powers given to officials tasked
with its implementation are susceptible to abuses, these instances have already been taken
into consideration when the pertinent provisions on martial law were drafted. Safeguards
within the 1987 Constitution and existing laws are available to protect the people from these
abuses.
Nevertheless, cognizant of such possibility of abuse, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
endeavored to institute a system of checks and balances to limit the President's exercise of
the martial law and suspension powers, and to establish safeguards to protect civil liberties.
Accordingly, the Bill of Rights remains effective under a state of martial law. Its
implementers must adhere to the principle that civilian authority is supreme over the military
and the armed forces is the protector of the people. They must also abide by the State's policy
to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights.

9. Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

FACTS: Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who, at the time of the filing of
the petition, were earning a living from the tourist activities therein. Zabal claims to build
sandcastles for tourists while Jacosalem drives for tourists and workers in the island. While
not a resident, Bandiola, for his part, claims to occasionally visit Boracay for business and
pleasure. President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island. The petitioners seek to
annul the declaration for it violates their fundamental right to travel and right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether the Declaration violates the petitioners’ right to travel and right to due
process
HELD: No. this case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense
contrary to what petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may
have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of
tourists and non-residents therefrom which were necessary incidents of the island's
rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to
impair the right to travel. Tue questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose of
rehabilitating Boracay and any intention to directly restrict the right cannot, in any manner,
be deduced from its import. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 475 impinges on their
constitutional right to due process since they were deprived of the corollary right to work and
earn a living by reason of the issuance thereof. Concededly, "[a] profession, trade or calling
is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property
rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable
wrong." In any case, petitioners, particularly Zabal and Jacosalem, cannot be said to have
already acquired vested rights to their sources of income in Boracay. As heretofore
mentioned, they are part of the informal sector of the economy where earnings are not
guaranteed.
10. Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019
FACTS: "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003," was enacted. Its purpose is to ensure
equal opportunity to all qualified Filipino citizens abroad to exercise the fundamental right of
suffrage pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution. On January 13, 2016, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10035 entitled "General Instructions for the Special
Board of Election Inspectors and Special Ballot Reception and Custody Group in the
Conduct of Manual Voting and Counting of Votes under Republic Act No. 9189, x x x as
amended by Republic Act No. 10590 for Purposes of the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections." The provision states that it is unlawful for any person to engage in partisan
political activity abroad during the thirty (30)-day overseas voting period.
ISSUE: whether Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as amended by R.A. No. 10590, is
unconstitutional for violating the right to speech, expression, assembly
HELD: Yes. the challenged provision, whether on its face or read with its IRR, constitutes a
restriction on free speech that is greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the
governmental interest it aims to achieve. Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189 should be struck
down for being overbroad as it does not provide for well-defined standards, resulting to the
ambiguity of its application, which produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech
and expression, and ultimately, resulting to the unnecessary invasion of the area of protected
freedoms. the challenged provision, whether on its face or read with its IRR, constitutes a
restriction on free speech that is greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the
governmental interest it aims to achieve. Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189 should be struck
down for being overbroad as it does not provide for well-defined standards, resulting to the
ambiguity of its application, which produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech
and expression, and ultimately, resulting to the unnecessary invasion of the area of protected
freedoms.