Pyrrhonism

Pyrrhonism is a school of philosophical skepticism founded by Pyrrho in the fourth century BCE. It is best
known through the surviving works of Sextus Empiricus, writing in the late second century or early third
century CE.[1]

Contents
Origins
Philosophy
Practice
The ten modes of Aenesidemus
The five modes of Agrippa
Criteria of Action
Skeptic sayings
Similarities with Buddhism
Texts
Symbols
Influence
Scholarchs
List of Pyrrhonist philosophers
See also
References
External links

Origins
Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360 – c. 270 BCE) and his
teacher Anaxarchus, both Democritean
philosophers, traveled to India with Alexander the
Great's army where Pyrrho was said to have studied
with the magi and the gymnosophists,[2] and where
he was influenced by Buddhist teachings, most
particularly the three marks of existence.[3] After
returning to Greece, Pyrrho started a new line of
philosophy now known as "Pyrrhonism." His
Map of Alexander the Great's empire and the route he
teachings were recorded by his student Timon of and Pyrrho took to India
Phlius, most of whose works have been lost.

Pyrrhonism as a school was either revitalized or re-

founded by Aenesidemus in the first century BCE.
Philosophy
As with other Hellenistic philosophies such as Stoicism, Peripateticism and Epicureanism, eudaimonia is the
Pyrrhonist goal of life. According to the Pyrrhonists, it is one's opinions about non-evident matters (i.e.,
dogma) that prevent one from attaining eudaimonia. As with Epicureanism, Pyrrhonism places the
attainment of ataraxia (a state of equanimity) as the way to achieve eudaimonia. To bring the mind to
ataraxia Pyrrhonism uses epoché (suspension of judgment) regarding all non-evident propositions.
Pyrrhonists dispute that the dogmatists - which includes all of Pyrrhonism's rival philosophies - have found
truth regarding non-evident matters. For any non-evident matter, a Pyrrhonist makes arguments for and
against such that the matter cannot be concluded, thus suspending belief and thereby inducing ataraxia.

Pyrrhonism is the earliest Western form of philosophical skepticism. In ancient literature Pyrrhonism was
commonly referred to as "skepticism," and Pyrrhonism was often lumped together with the similar
philosophy of Academic Skepticism. Correspondingly their practitioners were called "skeptics" and
"Academics."

Although Pyrrhonism's objective is eudaimonia, it is best known for its epistemological arguments,
particularly the problem of the criterion, and for being the first Western school of philosophy to identify the
problem of induction and the Münchhausen trilemma.

Pyrrhonists (or Pyrrhonist practice) can be subdivided into those who are ephectic (engaged in suspension of
judgment), zetetic (engaged in seeking), or aporetic (engaged in refutation).[4]

Practice
Pyrrhonist practice is for the purpose of achieving epoché, i.e., suspension of judgment. The core practice is
through setting argument against argument. To aid in this, the Pyrrhonist philosophers Aenesidemus and
Agrippa developed sets of stock arguments known as "modes" or "tropes."

The ten modes of Aenesidemus

Aenesidemus is considered the creator of the Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus, (also known as the Ten Modes of
Aenesidemus); although whether he invented the tropes or just systematized them from prior Pyrrhonist
works is unknown. Sextus Empiricus attributed them simply to the earlier Pyrrhonists. Diogenes Laeritius
attributed them to Aenesidemus. The title of a lost work of Plutarch's - On Pyrrho’s Ten Modes - appears to
attribute the modes to Pyrrho.[5] The tropes represent reasons for epoché (suspension of judgment). These
are as follows:

1. "The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences in
animals."[6]
2. The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences among
human beings.[7]
3. The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences among
the senses.[8]
4. Owing to the "circumstances, conditions or dispositions," the same objects appear different.
The same temperature, as established by instrument, feels very different after an extended
period of cold winter weather (it feels warm) than after mild weather in the autumn (it feels
cold). Time appears slow when young and fast as aging proceeds. Honey tastes sweet to most
but bitter to someone with jaundice. A person with influenza will feel cold and shiver even
though she is hot with a fever.[9]
 5. Based on positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same objects
appear different; for example, the same porch when viewed from one of its corners appears
curtailed, but viewed from the middle symmetrical on all sides; and the same ship seems at a
distance to be small and stationary, but from close at hand large and in motion ; and the same
tower from a distance appears round but from a near point quadrangular.[10]
6. “We deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but along with something else, it
may perhaps be possible to say what the mixture compounded out of the external object and
the thing perceived with it is like, but we would not be able to say what the external object is
like by itself."[11]
7. "Based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, meaning
generally by "constitution" the manner of composition." So, for example, goat horn appears
black when intact and appears white when ground up. Snow appears white when frozen and
translucent as a liquid.[12]
8. "Since all things appear relative, we will suspend judgement about what things exist absolutely
and really existent.[13] Do things which exist "differentially" as opposed to those things that
have a distinct existence of their own, differ from relative things or not? If they do not differ,
then they too are relative; but if they differ, then, since everything which differs is relative to
something..., things which exist absolutely are relative."[14]
9. "Based on constancy or rarity of occurrence." The sun is more amazing than a comet, but
because we see and feel the warmth of the sun daily and the comet rarely, the latter
commands our attention.[15]
10. "There is a Tenth Mode, which is mainly concerned with Ethics, being based on rules of
conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions."[16]

Superordinate to these ten modes stand three other modes:

I: that based on the subject who judges (modes 1, 2, 3 & 4).

II: that based on the object judged (modes 7 & 10).
III: that based on both subject who judges and object judged (modes 5, 6, 8 & 9)

Superordinate to these three modes is the mode of relation.[17]

The five modes of Agrippa

These tropes or "modes" are given by Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. According to Sextus,
they are attributed only "to the more recent skeptics" and it is by Diogenes Laërtius that we attribute them to
Agrippa.[18] The tropes are:

1. Dissent – The uncertainty demonstrated by the differences of opinions among philosophers

and people in general.
2. Progress ad infinitum – All proof rests on matters themselves in need of proof, and so on to
infinity, i.e., the regress argument.
3. Relation – All things are changed as their relations become changed, or, as we look upon
them from different points of view.
4. Assumption – The truth asserted is based on an unsupported assumption.
5. Circularity – The truth asserted involves a circularity of proofs.
 According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension about the
matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this
we are not able to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement.
In the mode deriving from infinite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a source of
conviction for the matter proposed itself needs another such source, which itself needs another,
and so ad infinitum, so that we have no point from which to begin to establish anything, and
suspension of judgement follows. In the mode deriving from relativity, as we said above, the
existing object appears to be such-and-such relative to the subject judging and to the things
observed together with it, but we suspend judgement on what it is like in its nature. We have the
mode from hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infinitum, begin from
something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof in virtue
of a concession. The reciprocal mode occurs when what ought to be confirmatory of the object
under investigation needs to be made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being
unable to take either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.[19]

With reference to these five tropes, that the first and third are a short summary of the earlier Ten Modes of
Aenesidemus.[18] The three additional ones show a progress in the Pyrrhonist system, building upon the
objections derived from the fallibility of sense and opinion to more abstract and metaphysical grounds.

According to Victor Brochard “the five tropes can be regarded as the most radical and most precise
formulation of skepticism that has ever been given. In a sense, they are still irresistible today.”[20]

Criteria of Action

Pyrrhonist decision making is made according to what the Pyrrhonists describe as the criteria of action
holding to the appearances, without beliefs in accord with the ordinary regimen of life based on:

1. the guidance of nature, by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought
2. the compulsion of the pathé by which hunger drives us to food and thirst makes us drink
3. the handing down of customs and laws by which we accept that piety in the conduct of life is
good and impiety bad
4. instruction in arts and crafts[21]

Skeptic sayings

The Pyrrhonists devised several sayings (Greek ΦΩΝΩΝ) to help practitioners bring their minds to
epoche.[22] Among these are:

Not more, nothing more (a saying attributed to Democritus[23])

Non-assertion
Perhaps, it is possible, maybe
I withhold assent
I determine nothing (Montaigne created a variant of this as his own personal motto, "Que sçay-
je?" - "what do I know?")
Everything is indeterminate
Everything is non-apprehensible
I do not apprehend
To every argument an equal argument is opposed
Similarities with Buddhism
The summary of Pyrrho's teaching preserved in the "Aristocles passage" shows signs of Buddhist
philosophical influence. This text is:

Whoever wants eudaimonia (to live well) must consider these three questions: First, how are
pragmata (ethical matters, affairs, topics) by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt
towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?" Pyrrho's
answer is that "As for pragmata they are all adiaphora (undifferentiated by a logical
differentia), astathmēta (unstable, unbalanced, not measurable), and anepikrita (unjudged,
unfixed, undecidable). Therefore, neither our sense-perceptions nor our doxai (views, theories,
beliefs) tell us the truth or lie; so we certainly should not rely on them. Rather, we should be
adoxastous (without views), aklineis (uninclined toward this side or that), and akradantous
(unwavering in our refusal to choose), saying about every single one that it no more is than it is
not or it both is and is not or it neither is nor is not. The outcome for those who actually adopt
this attitude, says Timon, will be first aphasia (speechlessness, non-assertion) and then ataraxia
(freedom from disturbance), and Aenesidemus says pleasure.[24]

Adiaphora, astathmēta, and anepikrita are strikingly similar to the Buddhist three marks of existence,[25]
demonstrating that Pyrrho's teaching is based on what he learned in India, which is what Diogenes Laërtius
reported.[26]

Other similarities between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism include a version of the tetralemma among the
Pyrrhonist maxims[27] and a parallel with the Buddhist Two Truths Doctrine.[28] In Pyrrhonism the Buddhist
concept of "ultimate" (paramārtha) truth corresponds with truth as defined via the criterion of truth, which in
Pyrrhonism is seen as undemonstrated, and therefore nothing can be called "true" with respect of it being an
account of reality. The Buddhist concept of "conventional" or "provisional" (saṁvṛti) truth corresponds in
Pyrrhonism to truth defined via the Pyrrhonist criterion of action, which is used for making decisions about
what to do.

Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy is particularly similar to Pyrrhonism.[29] According to Thomas

McEvilley this is because Nagarjuna was likely influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India.[30]

Texts
Except for the works of Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laërtius, the texts about ancient Pyrrhonism have
been lost, except for a summary of Pyrrhonian Discourses by Aenesidemus, preserved by Photius, and a
summary of Pyrrho's teaching preserved by Eusebius, quoting Aristocles, quoting Pyrrho's student Timon, in
what is known as the "Aristocles passage."

Symbols
The balance scale, in perfect balance, is the traditional symbol of Pyrrhonism. The Pyrrhonist philosopher
Montaigne adopted the image of a balance scale for his motto.[31]

Influence
Pyrrhonism so influenced Arcesilaus, the sixth scholarch of the
Platonic Academy that Arcesilaus reformed the teaching of the
Academy to be nearly identical to Pyrrhonism[32] thus initiating the
Academic Skepticism of the Middle Academy.

The Pyrrhonist school influenced and had substantial overlap with

the Empiric school of medicine. Many of the well-known Pyrrhonist
teachers were also Empirics, including: Sextus Empiricus,
Herodotus of Tarsus, Heraclides, Theodas, and Menodotus.
However, Sextus Empiricus said that Pyrrhonism had more in
common with the Methodic school in that it “follow[s] the
appearances and take[s] from these whatever seems expedient.”[33]
Balance scales in equal balance are
Because of the high degree of similarity between the Buddhist
the symbol of Pyrrhonism
philosopher Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy and Pyrrhonism,
particularly as detailed in the surviving works of Sextus
Empiricus[34], Thomas McEvilley suspects that Nagarjuna was
influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India.[35]

Pyrrhonism regained prominence in the late fifteenth century.[36] The publication of the works of Sextus
Empiricus played a major role in Renaissance and Reformation thought. Philosophers of the time used his
works to source their arguments on how to deal with the religious issues of their day. Major philosophers
such as Michel de Montaigne, Marin Mersenne, and Pierre Gassendi later drew on the model of Pyrrhonism
outlined in Sextus Empiricus’ works for their own arguments. This resurgence of Pyrrhonism has been
called the beginning of modern philosophy.[37]

Pyrrhonism also affected the development of historiography. Historical Pyrrhonism emerged during the
early modern period and played a significant role in shaping modern historiography. Historical Pyrrhonism
questioned the possibility of any absolute knowledge from the past and transformed later historians'
selection of and standard for reliable sources.[38]

A revival of the use of "Pyrrhonism" as a synonym for "skepticism" occurred during the seventeenth
century.[39]

Fallibilism is a modern, fundamental perspective of the scientific method, as put forth by Karl Popper and
Charles Sanders Peirce, that all knowledge is, at best, an approximation, and that any scientist always must
stipulate this in her or his research and findings. It is, in effect, a modernized extension of Pyrrhonism.[40]
Indeed, historic Pyrrhonists sometimes are described by modern authors as fallibilists and modern fallibilists
sometimes are described as Pyrrhonists.[41]

Scholarchs
Diogenes Laërtius recorded the following list of scholarchs of the Pyrrhonist school of philosophy.[42]

326-270 Pyrrho
270-235 Timon of Phlius
???-??? Euphranor of Seleucia
???-??? Eubulus of Alexandria
???-??? Ptolemy of Cyrene
c. 100 Heraclides of Tarentum
c. 50 Aenesidemus
???-??? Zeuxippus
???-??? Zeuxis
???-??? Antiochus of Laodicea on the Lycus
c 100 Menodotus of Nicomedia
c. 120 Herodotus of Tarsus
c. 160 Sextus Empiricus
c. 200 Saturninus

List of Pyrrhonist philosophers

Aenesidemus
Agrippa the Skeptic
Arcesilaus
Robert Fogelin
Hecataeus of Abdera
Heraclides of Tarentum
Herodotus of Tarsus
Benson Mates
Menodotus of Nicomedia
Michel de Montaigne
Nausiphanes
Pyrrho
Sextus Empiricus
Theodas of Laodicea
Timon

See also
Academic Skepticism
Ajñana
Apophasis
Apophatic theology
Cognitive closure (philosophy)
Cratylism
De Docta Ignorantia
Quietism
E-Prime
Nassim Nicholas Taleb
Trivialism
The Hedgehog and the Fox

References
1. 1923-, Popkin, Richard Henry (2003). The history of scepticism : from Savonarola to Bayle.
Popkin, Richard Henry, 1923- (Rev. and expanded ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ISBN 0198026714. OCLC 65192690 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/65192690).
 2. Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers Book XI. (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do
c=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D9%3Achapter%3D11%7CDiogenes)
3. Beckwith, Christopher I. (2015). Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in
Central Asia (http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s10500.pdf) (PDF). Princeton University
Press. p. 28. ISBN 9781400866328.
4. Pulleyn, William (1830). The Etymological Compendium, Or, Portfolio of Origins and
Inventions. T. Tegg. p. 353.
5. Mauro Bonazzi, "Plutarch on the Differences Between the Pyrrhonists and Academics", Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2012
https://www.academia.edu/2362682/Plutarch_on_the_Difference_between_Academics_and_Py
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6. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 27
7. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 47
8. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 55
9. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p.61
10. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book I Section 118 Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p.69-71
11. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p.73
12. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p.77
13. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 79
14. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 81
15. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 83
16. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, p. 85
17. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Trans. R.G. Bury, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1933, pp. 25–27
18. Diogenes Laërtius, ix.
19. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhōneioi hypotypōseis i., from Annas, J., Outlines of Scepticism
Cambridge University Press. (2000).
20. Brochard, V., The Greek Skeptics.
21. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book I Chapter 11 Section 23
22. Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book I Chapter 18
23. Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book II Chapter 30
24. Beckwith, Christopher I. (2015). Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in
Central Asia (http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s10500.pdf) (PDF). Princeton University
Press. pp. 22–23. ISBN 9781400866328.
25. Beckwith, Christopher I. (2015). Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in
Central Asia (http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s10500.pdf) (PDF). Princeton University
Press. p. 28. ISBN 9781400866328.
26. "The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers" (https://web.archive.org/web/20160304083
202/http://classicpersuasion.org/pw/diogenes/dlpyrrho.htm). Peithô's Web. Archived from the
original (http://www.classicpersuasion.org/pw/diogenes/dlpyrrho.htm) on 4 March 2016.
Retrieved 23 March 2016.
27. Sextus Empricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 1, Section 19
28. McEvilley, Thomas (2002). The Shape of Ancient Thought. Allworth Communications. ISBN 1-
58115-203-5., p. 474
29. Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism 2008
30. Thomas McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought 2002 pp499-505
31. Sarah Bakewell, How to Live: Or A Life of Montaigne in One Question and Twenty Attempts at
an Answer 2011 p 127 ISBN 1590514831
32. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book I Chapter 33
33. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.237, trans. Etheridge (Scepticism, Man, and God,
Wesleyan University Press, 1964, p. 98).
34. Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism 2008
35. Thomas McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought 2002 pp499-505
36. Popkin, Richard Henry (2003). The History of Scepticism : from Savonarola to Bayle (Revised
ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198026716. OCLC 65192690 (https://www.w
orldcat.org/oclc/65192690).
37. Popkin, Richard Henry (2003). The History of Scepticism : from Savonarola to Bayle (Revised
ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198026716. OCLC 65192690 (https://www.w
orldcat.org/oclc/65192690).
38. 1985-, Matytsin, Anton M. (6 November 2016). The specter of skepticism in the age of
Enlightenment. Baltimore. ISBN 9781421420530. OCLC 960048885 (https://www.worldcat.org/
oclc/960048885).
39. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, page 7, section 23.
40. Powell, Thomas C. "Fallibilism and Organizational Research: The Third Epistemology" (http://w
ww.thomaspowell.co.uk/article_pdfs/Fallibilism_web_version.pdf), Journal of Management
Research 4, 2001, pp. 201–219.
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42. Diogenes Laërtius, "Lives of the Eminent Philosophers", Book 9, Chapter 12, Section 116

External links
Pyrrhonism discussion group on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/groups/Pyrrhonism/)
Website for the Modern Pyrrhonism Movement (https://www.pyrrhonism.org/)
Pyrrhonian Skepticism (https://philpapers.org/browse/pyrrhonian-skepticism) at PhilPapers
Vogt, Katja. "Ancient Skepticism" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/). In
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Thorsrud, Harold. "Ancient Greek Skepticism" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/skepanci). Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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