T.

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF

JUNE 7, 2009 GENERAL ELECTIONS

By

Tuğba YALÇIN

Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of
Political Science and International Relations
 T.C.

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF

JUNE 7, 2009 GENERAL ELECTIONS

by

Tuğba YALÇIN

Supervisor
Asst. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Deniz TANSİ

Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of
Political Science and International Relations

ISTANBUL, 2010

i
 LEBANESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF
JUNE 7, 2009 GENERAL ELECTIONS

by

Tuğba YALÇIN

Approved by:

Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı CAŞIN .........................................................

Yrd. Doç. Mahmut Deniz TANSİ ........................................................

(Supervisor)

Prof. Dr. Erdal YAVUZ ........................................................

Date of Approval by the Administrative Council of the Institute 05/08/2010

ii
Table of Contents Page

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. vii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................................................................................................... ix
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1
2. HISTORICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF LEBANON............................... 7
2.1. Historical Background of Lebanon ...................................................................................... 7
2.1.1. From Ottoman rule to the World War I ............................................................................. 9
2.1.2. Lebanon under French Mandate ..................................................................................... 16
2.1.3. Independence of Lebanon .............................................................................................. 19
2.1.4. First Arab- Israel War and its impacts on Lebanon........................................................... 21
2.1.5. 1958 political crisis........................................................................................................ 24
2.1.6. 1975-1990 Civil War and the Ta‟if Accord ..................................................................... 30
2.1.6.1. The first phase of the Civil War 1975-1977 .................................................................. 33
2.1.6.2. The second phase of the Civil War 1978-1982 .............................................................. 37
2.1.6.3. The third phase of the Civil War 1982-1989 ................................................................. 38
2.1.6.4. Ta‟if Accord (National Reconciliation) ........................................................................ 43
2.2. Demographic and Geopolitical Structure............................................................................ 45
2.2.1. Geopolitical structure of Lebanon ................................................................................... 47
2.2.2. Sectarian and belief groups and their distribution in Lebanon ........................................... 50
3. POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND MAIN IDEOLOGIES ...................................................... 55
3.1. Lebanese Political System ................................................................................................ 55
3.1.1. Executive branch ........................................................................................................... 56
3.1.2. Legislative branch ......................................................................................................... 57
3.1.3. Judiciary branch ............................................................................................................ 59
3.2. Leading Political Groups in Lebanese Politics .................................................................... 59
3.2.1. March 8 coalition .......................................................................................................... 61
3.2.1.1. AMAL Movement ...................................................................................................... 61
3.2.1.2. Free Patriotic Movement ............................................................................................. 63
3.2.1.3. Syrian Social Nationalist Party .................................................................................... 64
3.2.2. Hezbollah ..................................................................................................................... 65

iii
3.2.2.1. Ideology and aims of the party ..................................................................................... 66
3.2.2.2. Organizational structure and activities .......................................................................... 68
3.2.2.3. Resistance and Hezbollah militia ................................................................................. 72
3.2.2.4. Political wing of Hezbollah ......................................................................................... 77
3.2.2.5. Future of Hezbollah in Lebanon................................................................................... 79
3.2.3. March 14 coalition......................................................................................................... 82
3.2.3.1 Future Movement ........................................................................................................ 82
3.2.3.2. Kataeb (Phalangist) Party ............................................................................................ 83
3.2.3.3. Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) ................................................................................. 85
3.3. Main Ideologies in Lebanon.............................................................................................. 85
3.3.1. Arab nationalism ........................................................................................................... 85
3.3.2. Lebanese nationalism..................................................................................................... 90
4. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS BETWEEN 2005 AND 2009.................................. 95
4.1. Cedar Revolution ............................................................................................................. 95
4.2. 2005 General Elections ..................................................................................................... 98
4.2.1. Distribution of seats and cabinet formation...................................................................... 98
4.3. 2006 Second Lebanon- Israel War................................................................................... 102
4.3.1. Reasons of the war and escalation of the hostilities ........................................................ 102
4.3.2. Israeli attack on Beirut ................................................................................................. 104
4.3.3. Consequences of second Israel- Lebanon War ............................................................... 106
4.4. Domestic Affairs after the War........................................................................................ 109
4.4.1. Palestinian refugee issue and clashes of 2007 ................................................................ 109
4.4.2. 2008 political crisis and May riots in Beirut .................................................................. 116
4.4.3. Doha Agreement and reformation of government .......................................................... 118
5. 2009 GENERAL ELECTION AND NEW PHASE IN FOREIGN POLICY ......................... 120
5.1. 2009 General Election .................................................................................................... 120
5.1.1. Electoral districts and distribution of the seats ............................................................... 121
5.1.2. Formation of the National Unity Government................................................................ 123
5.2. New Phase in Lebanese Foreign Policy............................................................................ 125
5.2.1. The Middle East .......................................................................................................... 125
5.2.1.1. Normalization of Relations: Syrian- Lebanese Relations ............................................. 125
5.2.1.2. Fragile Peace in the Border: Israel- Lebanon Relations................................................ 132
5.2.1.3. Iran in Lebanon: Hezbollah, Iran Connection.............................................................. 138
5.2.1.4. Lebanese- Turkish Relations...................................................................................... 141

iv
5.2.2. Quartet ....................................................................................................................... 143
5.2.2.1. Lebanon- European Union Relations .......................................................................... 143
5.2.2.2. Lebanon- The United States of America Relations ...................................................... 149
5.2.2.3. Lebanon- United Nations Relations............................................................................ 154
5.2.2.4. Lebanon- Russia Relations ........................................................................................ 161
6. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 164
APPENDIX A: SAN REMO COVENANT, 1920 ................................................................... 171
APPENDIX B: COVENANT OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS .................................................... 169
APPENDIX C: TA‟IF ACCORD........................................................................................... 172
APPENDIX D: UNSCR 1701 ............................................................................................... 183
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................... 188
CIRRICULUM VITAE OF THE AUTHOR........................................................................... 214

v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF Arab Deterrent Forces

ALA Arab Liberation Army

CIA Central Investigation Agency

EU European Union

FPM Free Patriotic Movement

IAF Israeli Air Forces

IDF Israel Defense Forces

LAF Lebanese Armed Forces

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PSP Progressive Socialist Party

SSNP Syrian Social Nationalist Party

UK United Kingdom

UNF United National Front

UNIFIL United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon

UNOGIL United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon

USA United States of America

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

vi
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: Distribution of Population According to Sectarian Groups in 1956

TABLE 2: Allocation of Seats in the Parliament in 1992

TABLE 3: Confessional Distribution of Seats in 2005

TABLE 4: Allocation of Seats According to Sects in 2009

TABLE 5: The Parties in Parliament in 2009

vii
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Physical Map of Lebanon.

FIGURE 2: Map of the Shebaa Farms.

FIGURE 3: Contemporary Distribution of Lebanon‟s Main Religious Groups.

FIGURE 4: Map of July, 2006 War.

viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I thank to my mother Belma YIGITBASI for her unyielding support
during my education and also thesis process. I would like to thank to my supervisor of this
thesis, Ass. Prof. Deniz TANSI, for the valuable guidance and advice he gave. He inspired
me greatly to work with this project.

I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Mesut Hakki CASIN, Yeditepe
University; Prof. Eyal Zisser, Tel Aviv University; Prof. Andrei Jablonski, Wroclaw
University and Dr. Jaraslaw Jarzabek, Wroclaw University for their contribution to my
work.

ix
 ABSTRACT

Lebanon lies in the heart of the Middle East that occupies very small proportion of
land, but this doesn‟t make its importance less. Lebanon in last forty years suffered from
internal conflicts and external interventions, but survived to be an independent state.
Instability within Lebanon, has always affected its relations with international actors due to
its uniqueness of governance and diversity of the communities. Historically, both Arabs of
Middle East and Westerners involved in internal power struggle in Lebanon either being
allies, or occupant states in the name of stability, peace and democracy.

June 7, 2009 General Elections in the context of foreign policy progresses of

Lebanon marks a significant year. Lebanon being one of the key elements in the Middle
East region in the context of Middle Eastern peace process and current issues, foundation
of the national unity government under one Lebanese nationality improves position of
Lebanon within and outside its borders. New era in Lebanese politics that is driven by
compromise among the unity government members and cooperation in international
politics finally brings relative peace and stability. On the other hand, lack of willingness to
achieve peaceful relations with “all” of the neighbour states, still threatens Lebanon with
one exception: Lebanon is finally unified against foe and friend.

x
 ÖZET

Ortadoğu‟ nun kalbinde yatan Lübnan, çok küçük bir toprak parçasını kaplamasına
rağmen bu onun bölgedeki önemi daha az yapmamaktadır. Lübnan geçtiğimiz kırk yıl
içinde iç çatışmalar ve dış müdahaleler ile çok acılar çekmiş; ancak bağımsız bir devlet
olarak yaşamayı başarmıştır. Lübnan içindeki istikrarsızlık, onun yönetim ve toplumsal
çeşitliliği bağlamındaki eşsizliği uluslararası aktörlerle ilişkilerini her zaman etkilemiştir.
Tarihsel bağlamda, Ortadoğulu Araplar ve Batılılar; istikrar, barış ve demokrasi adına,
müttefik veya işgalci devletler olarak Lübnan‟ın içsel güç çekişmelerine müdahil
olmuşlardır.

7 Haziran 2009 Genel Seçimleri bağlamında Lübnan‟ın dış politikasındaki

gelişmeler önemli bir yıla işaret etmektedir. Lübnan Ortadoğu barış sürecinde ve
gündemdeki konular hususunda Ortadoğu‟nun önemli bir parçası olarak, Lübnan‟da tek
Lübnan kimliği altında “ulusal birlik” hükümetinin kurulması sınırlar içinde ve dışında
Lübnan‟ın konumunu güçlendirmektedir. Birlik hükümeti içindeki uzlaşma ve uluslarası
politikada işbirliği ile yönlendirilen Lübnan politikasındaki yeni dönemde, sonunda
göreceli bir barış ve istikrar vuku bulmuştur. Diğer taraftan, Lübnan‟ın “tüm” komşuları ile
barışcıl ilişkiler içinde olmayı başarma konusundaki isteksizliği, onu bir istisna dışında
tehdit etmeye devam etmektedir: Lübnan en sonunda dosta ve düşmana karşı tek vücut
olmuştur.

xi
1. INTRODUCTION

Lebanon is a small state that squeezed between Syria and Israel on the coast of
Mediterranean. It is founded on 10,452 square metres and has approximately three million
populations. It is established as an independent and “sovereign” state in 1943, nevertheless
this beautiful state among the historic cedar trees suffered devastating civil wars, and
foreign occupations. The borders of Lebanon, today, are kept by UN peacekeeping troops
while Lebanon struggles to build the nation and spread its “sovereignty” to all of its
territories.

On June 7, 2009, Lebanon held second post- revolution (Cedar Revolution, 2005)
general elections. In comparison with the previous one in 2005 after the Syrian withdrawal,
the composition of the parliament hasn‟t changed at all; pro- Western coalition of Saad
Hariri won the majority of the seats though pro- Syrian coalition was slightly behind. On
the other hand, despite the fact that 2005 “unity government” also had pro- Western and
pro- Syrian ministers as it is in 2009; but Lebanese foreign policy from 2005 to 2009 has
changed significantly with the change of prime minister.

I believe this change in foreign policy is linked with changes in domestic policy. In
democratic states, the governments should apply policies that serve to the best interests of
the nation (Dahl, 1989). The domestic events affect foreign policy choices; though
according to some scholars the interaction between two ways that if foreign policy affects
the domestic events or vice versa is unclear (Levy, 1989). On the other hand, Smith (1996,
p. 134) explains both “domestic politics, and international factors, drive the formation of
foreign policy”. Ostrom and Job (1986) also have concluded that domestic issues are the
most important determinant of foreign policy in any given country.

What is more, in the foreign policy decision making process, governments have to
consider pressure that would come from other states (Smith, 1996). In this regards, states
have to consider if they pose a threat to other states in their foreign policies that would
enable the others to commit aggressive actions.

In Lebanese case, the major problems of domestic politics are identity crisis and
Lebanese nationalism; confessional system and power sharing in a multi-religious and
ethnic society and spreading state sovereignty to all its territories. Each one of these issues

1
intertwined with foreign policy decisions in the context of seeking alliances in the
international arena.

Firstly, in Lebanon one of the most striking factors that affect the foreign policy is
multi religious and ethnic structure of this state. Conflict among these various sectarian
groups that seek to dominate the state politics inevitably engender civil strives and disorder
in the society. Posen (1993) explains ethnic conflict that when the multiethnic states
breakup could place rival ethnic groups in an anarchic setting in order to improve their
positions. However Lebanon maintained its territorial integrity even during the most
storming years of the civil war of 1975, rival group struggle is one of the obstacles for
Lebanon to apply stability in domestic affairs and poses threat to existence of the Lebanese
state.

Lebanon has the most fragmented society with its eighteen officially recognized
sects. Each one of these sects has their own communities, leaders and also laws embedded
Lebanese judicial system. People of Lebanon lived in a common land, has common
language; whereas they define themselves with their ethnic and religious affiliations.
Christians emphasized their historical ties with the Western world believed that Lebanese
derived from Phoenicians. Muslims, in majority Sunnis, attached themselves with Syria
and embraced Arab nationalism. Lebanese search of identity and is a nation struggle drove
the small country into conflict and chaos. Lebanon turned out to be a deeply fragmented
state like “a house of many mansions” (Salibi K. S., 1988). The disagreement on national
identity caused Lebanon to adopt a liberal and neutral foreign policy until 1975: neither
West nor East.

Unwritten National Pact of 1943 was far from creating a common Lebanese identity
that could unite people from various sects and religions under one banner. Even though
National Pact could secure stability in the country, identity search lied in the hearts of the
conflicts. In 1948, when State of Israel declared its independence in Palestine, it was the
search of Lebanese identity that drove Lebanon into the first Arab-Israel War. Arab
identity of Lebanon was mingled with Muslim belief according to Muslim population; on
the other hand it was unacceptable for Maronite Christians who also consider themselves

2
as Arabs with different historical consciousness which goes back to Phoenicians (Hitti P.
K., 1951, p. 40; Salibi K. , 1988; Salibi K. , 1971).

Gellner (1987, p. vii) states that “nineteenth century was the age of nationalism”.
But in the case of Lebanon, the Lebanese nationalism came a little bit too late. Even
though Lewis (1991, p. 532) hints that “in the Arab world as in most regions, a citizen
owes his first loyalty to his country”; in Lebanese case first comes the leader of the
community. Power politics weakens Lebanese institutions and disables policy setting
institution dysfunctional. Weak state and violent power struggle paralyzed Lebanon‟s
foreign policy apparatus from 1975 to 1990. Domestic disunity handed Lebanese foreign
policy to occupant powers, while domestic policy to warlords and militia leaders.

Nation- building and formation of Lebanese nationalism which refers to

“unification of disparate ethnic groups; democratization and economic reconstruction”
(Etzioni, 2004, p. 2) fits all to Lebanon in 2009. Creating of national identity is as
important as formation of the state itself. In post-Cold War politics the most important
reasons of the regional and international instability are rooted in the failure of the state to
capture the loyalties of its citizens (Van Avera, 1994; Posen, 1993). The consciousness of
being an independent nation has always rooted in Christian version of Lebanon, in 2009
finally this approach as independent and sovereign Lebanon spread and confirmed by other
segmentations. No longer have Muslims sought protégé of Syria in expense of national
sovereignty, but both parties Christians and Muslims agree to cooperate with Arab states
economically and militarily.

Secondly, the type of political system that is consociationalism (confessionalism),

which is opposite type of majoritarian democracy, disabled the state efficacy because of
the foreign intervention. James Kellas (1994, p. 111) explains that “Outside interference by
Israel, Syria and Iran destabilized the internal power structure of consociationalism which
had been introduced in 1943, as did the shifting composition of the population from a
Christian to a Muslim majority”.

When we consider Lebanese political conditions that dominated by elites those

members of different sects, Lijphart‟s (1977) emphasis on “elite initiatives as producing
stability” that indicates each segment would need to unite behind one set of leaders; has

3
some flaws in it. In Lebanese case each sects has many politica l leaders that also vary in
ideological and political level. For example both Maronites Samir Geagea, leader of
Lebanese Forces and Michel Aoun, leader of Free Patriotic Movement don‟t have the same
policies. Geagea is in pro-Western March 14 coalition and Aoun in pro-Syrian March 8
coalition.

Consociational democracy is based on existence of clearly defined segments of

society “which are translated into constitution and politics of the state through
governmental institutions, parties and voting behaviour” (Kellas, 1994, p. 115).
Consequently, this system prevents hegemony of one group. As it was stated before
increasing Muslim population while diminishing Christian population brings power
struggle between Christian and Muslim sects to the fore.

Taif Agreement in 1989 called for abolishing confessional system, whereas it still
remains valid system despite its inabilities and flaws in Lebanon. Equality in state
institutions has been provided though major 1943 National Pact principle which divides the
power sharing among three major sects Maronites, Sunnis and Shiites. When we consider
that the Shiites are consisted the majority in Lebanon overreaching the Sunnis, if
majoritarian system would have been established, a Shiite dominated Lebanon is what we
get. In means of foreign policy Iranian and Syrian influence would overpower Western
influence. In this regard, the minority communities like Maronites and Sunnis cannot
afford to change this system; hence sectarian division continues to be an obstacle in front
of unity.

On the other hand, after 2009 General Elections, we witness the same type of
government formation procedure as it was before in 2005; though this one is more stable
and powerful than 2005 in the context of compromising major governmental issues. Shiite
Hezbollah and Amal play important part in the new Lebanese government in harmony with
the rest. Obviously Shiite influence has increased by all means. Hezbollah also is an
exception in Lebanese politics and needs overemphasis.

This Shiite Islamic organization came to life with 1982 Israeli invasion in Lebanon
and flourished militarily between 1982 and 1985. In 1992 Hezbollah attended to general
elections and gained considerable success. Since 1992, He zbollah plays very important

4
role in Lebanese politics. The organization before 2009, acted independently against Israel
without considering consequences of their reckless attacks which eventually resulted large
scale Israeli retaliations. Hence, Lebanese state and Hezbollah pursued their own policies
that Lebanese state denied responsibility and showed its weakness to control radical
military elements; while Hezbollah with its powerful and well organized militia replaced
Lebanese army in the context of protection of the citizens. Despite their respect to only
institution, LAF; citizens relied on Hezbollah for protection.

In 2009, there is compromise between Lebanese government and Hezbollah

regarding both Hezbollah‟s military wing and arms and the Hezbolla h‟s actions against
Israel. Finally, Hariri government legitimized Hezbollah‟s armed struggle as a part of state
policy; Hezbollah, in turn, agreed not to wage irresponsible operations into Israel.
Reflection of domestic compromise to foreign policy is that Lebanon‟s good relations with
both Arab States and Iran as well as Western states. Lebanon, beginning in 2009 forms
balance between east and west once again as it was in 1950s enhancing economic and
diplomatic ties with both sides. Israel remained one enemy also Lebanon agreed how to
resist in future war which will be in concert with Hezbollah.

June 7, 2009, in due respect is a turning point for Lebanese politics as well as
Middle East. Lebanon being one of the key elements in the Middle East region in t he
context of Middle Eastern Peace Process and current issues, foundation of the national
unity government under one Lebanese nationality improves position of Lebanon within
and outside the borders. Hence content of the new government on the basis of political
parties and ministries distributed among Hezbollah led opposition and majority are also
critical for future of Lebanese foreign policy and peace of the region. New era in Lebanese
politics that is driven by compromise among the unity government a nd cooperation in
international politics finally brings relative peace and stability. On the other hand, lack of
willingness to achieve peaceful relations with all of the neighbour states, still threatens
Lebanon.

In Chapter I, introduction, I explained that the policy change in domestic policy that
engenders foreign policy change in nations theoretically.

5
 In chapter two, the historical evolution and geographic importance of Lebanon have
been emphasized along with demographic changes and distribution of various sectarian
groups. Understanding sectarian conflict throughout the history is essential for defining
aspects of today‟s Lebanese politics. Geopolitical importance of the region and sectarian
distribution of the land are tried to be outlined.

In chapter three, political structure and major ideologies which affected Lebanese
politics throughout the history are examined. Although there are many political parties in
Lebanon according to sectarian and ethnic loyalties, two blocs in 2009 elections competes.
Thus in either blocs, leading political parties are studied due to their ideologies and
political ambitions in Lebanese politics.

Chapter four presents an outline of foreign policy of Lebanon between 2005 and
2009. Cedar Revolution and its impacts on internal and foreign policy of the country are
defined. Following the revolution in 2005 general elections and foreign policy of the new
government with Israel and Syria are explained. 2006, Israel- Lebanon War‟s devastating
consequences, Palestinian Refugee issues and conflict with Lebanese Armed Forces and
Palestinian refugees in 2007, Hezbollah‟s political presence in Lebanese decision taking
institutions, 2008 political crisis and conflict between rival forces, and finally Doha
Agreement are represented as main issues to be studied inside of the chapter.

Chapter five is about 2009 General elections results and new cabinet formation. In
the contest of election results, changes and improvements in Lebanese foreign policy has
been examined in this chapter as well. Lebanese foreign policy has been studied under two
sections which are towards Middle Eastern states and the Western states and institutions
such as UN which plays important place in Lebanese internal and external security. In the
context of “war against terrorism” policy of 9/11 increasing role of Hezbollah in relations
with Western states has been illustrated in the chapter.

Chapter six, conclusion summarizes the basic findings of the research.

In this study, I have used secondary data; academic jo urnals and books along with
internet sources and newspaper articles. I aim to apply analytical approach studying the
thesis question.

6
2. HISTORICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF LEBANON

In order understand Lebanon‟s today‟s distinct position and structure in the Middle
Eastern politics, it is important to study her historical background first. The territory where
Lebanon is today, has witnessed many wars, invasions and occupations of great powers of
the time throughout her history. Undeniably, search for a common history for states
constitutes vital point for creation of a nation. Historical background of Lebanon explains
the best the question that why Lebanon has struggles with disunity a nd civil disturbances
until 2009. Even after the elections, small scale conflicts in the society, implies that
Lebanese people still have some doubts on a common history. In this chapter, history of
Lebanon is studied on the basis of major historical events.

2.1. Historical Background of Lebanon

Levant, where Lebanon lies, remained as a battle field of great powers of the time
such as Egyptians, Assyrians, Romans, Byzantines, Persians and Ottomans and later
France and England until 1940s. Province of Lebanon long has been considered as a part of
Syria. Though, it was Phoenicians that who first settled in Lebanon (Hitti, 1951). Cedar
trees, which were fit to built vessels, enabled Phoenicians to trade their products with
Greeks. Greeks called them Canaanites (Hitti, 1951, p. 79) and they were the first maritime
nation. Hitti (1951) explains that “the Mediterranean became a Phoenician lake long before
it became Greek or a Roman lake” (Hitti, 1951, p. 98). Although Phoenicians kept their
individuality until Alexander‟s conquest, “neither the new coming Arameans nor the
Israelites and Philistines made much of an impression on that individuality” (Hitti, 1951, p.
144); they had to submit Egyptian (15 th - 18th Centuries B.C) suzerainty. Though many
Lebanese people are still emphasize their Phoenician ancestry and heritage.

Phoenician independence had ended by the conquest of Persia in the sixth century
B.C. On the other hand, after two centuries later when Persia also was destroyed by
Alexander the Great and after his death, the lands were divided between his generals;
Lebanon became Hellenistic Seleucid kingdom with most of Syria as well. In the first
century B.C., the Roman conquest was also befallen on Lebanon as a Syrian province.
Roman lordship over Syria continued until Arab conquest of the seventh century A.D.
Though after the fourth century, the capital city of the Roman Empire was moved to

7
Constantinople. Until 476 A.D., the Ostrogoth invasion, Old Rome with in the West had
survived (Salibi K. S., 1988). Thus eastern Roman Empire of Byzantium became an
important power in the region since Ottoman conquest of 1453. Yet, by the advent of
Islam, Byzantines ceased from Syria to inner Anatolia in 641. Lebanon along with Syria
also was governed by the caliphs and sultans of Islamic empires, except for the period
between 1098 and 1291, during Crusades. Coastal territories of Syria fell under “Frankish”
domination (Nicolle, 2001, p. 29).

Islam also played pivotal role in the region; that it was already home to Christians
and Jews. After the spread of Islam Syria and Lebanon under Umayyad; “became the
centre of the gravity of the empire” (Kirk, 1949, p. 20). Umayyad Dynasty was
overpowered by Abbasids and the new capital city was transferred to Iraq; this didn‟t
diminish importance of Lebanon as a trading post at the coast of Mediterranean.
Nevertheless influence of Abbasids declined after 695.

Fatimid caliphate, a Shiite sect of the Ismailis, was founded in Tunisian city
Mahdiyya; later extended its borders through Egypt. In 969, the Fatimid conquered Egypt
and established their capital city in Cairo (973 A.C.). Present day Lebanon also became a
Fatimid land. In 1070, Sunni Muslim Turkish Oguz tribes of Transaxonia, Seljuk sultanate
(1058-1157) conquered Syria. In 1171, the last Fatimid caliph was overthrown by Saladin
Ayyubid, the founder of Ayyubid sultanate in Egypt. Ayyubids extended their territories to
Aleppo and Damascus in 1183. When Saladin died, Ayyubid sultanate (1183-1250) was
divided between his sons.

Mamluks, Turkish slaves of Ayyubid sultanate, overpowered their masters

Ayyubids after the death of the Ayyubid sultan in 1250. Meanwhile Mongols invasion
reached to Bagdad in 1258 where they disestablished Abbasid caliphate and put an end to
Ayyubid rule in Syria. In Egypt, Mamluks could resist Mongol invasion and in 1260 they
advanced to Syria and conquered the territory. Battle of “Ain Jalut” sealed the faith of
Syria as a Mamluk state. Mamluk rule over Syria and Lebanon continued until 1516, and it
was ended in 1517 by Ottomans.

8
2.1.1. From Ottoman Rule to the World War I

It was Sultan Selim I who incorporated the Arab world into Ottoman Empire with
the victory of Marj Dabiq in 1517. Neither of the territories captured by Selim I did put up
any resistance to lordship of Ottoman Empire. Feudal lords of Maronites and Druses
immediately delivered their loyalties to their new suzerain (Polk, 1963, p. 10). Under the
millet system of Ottomans Maronites and Druze were subject to their own laws and leaders
(muqaddam). This regulation enabled them to keep their identities and culture untouched
for 400 years under Ottoman rule.

In the millet system, people were classified according to their religious affiliations
rather than race. Thus, each religious group was constituted different millets such as
Armenian, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Druze etc. Hitti (1962, p. 362) explains that “this
led to the recognition of two coexisting nationality: one representing loyalty to one‟s
religious denomination – whether Jewish, Armenian, Greek Orthodox, Maronite or Copt-
and another to the government”. Islam also was one of the millet and it was the most
important and the biggest one in the empire.

Ottomans kept the Mamluk administrative divisions in general with some

exceptions. The niyabah of Mamluks changed to vilayet while na’ib to wali. Syria, after
defeat of treacherous al- Ghazali, was divided to three vilayets and Damascus to ten
sanjaks. Chief among them were Jerusalem, Nabulus, Gaza, Tadmur, Sidon and Beirut.
Sidon was also made vilayet in 1660. Lebanon was divided between Tripoli and Damascus.

Druze and Maronites lived under leadership of their own religious leaders and
chieftains, without offering any military service to the sultan. Lebanese vassals acted
independently in domestic affairs, collected taxes as they pleased, inherited their
possessions to their descendants. Lebanon, unlike Syria became a quasi independent entity
under the local chieftains. Ottoman sultans dealt with their Lebanese vassals either directly
or through wali in Damascus (Hitti P. , 1962).

Fakr- Al Din I al-Ma‟ni (Maan) family along with the other native lords of Lebanon
managed to keep their territories in al- Shuf region. Lebanese lords enjoyed the same
autonomy and privileges that they had during Mamluk rule (Hitti P. , 1962, p. 666) and
Ottomans imposed relatively light tribute. And among the chieftains Fakr al- Din was

9
recognized as the leader of the mountain. 16th century witnessed tribal dissention between
“Qaysits” and “Yemenits” among Druze tribes. The struggle between these two groups had
ended with the superiority of the Qaysits.

Al- Ghazali of Damascus (Hitti P. , 1962, p. 357) along with other Lebanese lords,
declared his loyalty to Ottomans as he had done to his old masters Mamluks. In 1520,
when Ottoman sultan Selim I died, al- Ghazali proclaimed his independence in an
Umayyad Mosque and struck coins on his own name. Nevertheless, he had to face with the
wrath of new Ottoman sultan Suleyman the Magnificent. Sultan Suleiman sent his armies
on al- Ghazali on January 27, 1521 destroying Syrian rebels and killing al- Ghazali at
Qabun, near Damascus. Thus, Maan family became dominant political figure in Lebanon.

The most important thing Maans achieved; that they merged different religious
groups under one community in Lebanon. Janbulats from Aleppo and Maronites from
North Lebanon migrated to South Lebanon (Salibi K. S., 1976). Maan Fakr al- Din II was
raised by a Christian family, favoured Christians. Nevertheless, Fakr‟s works in Lebanon
came to an end by intervention of Ahmad al Hafiz, governor of Damascus. Fakr al-Din II
had to flee to Italy by Flemish ship which was harboured in Sidon in 1613. His son Ali
replaced him emir of Lebanon (Hitti P. , 1962).

Amir Fakr al-Din II had returned to Lebanon after change of governor of Damascus
in 1618. In 1622, he opened the way to Transjordan and Palestine. Thus sultan bestowed
on him sanjaks of Nabulus and Ajlun. Mustapha Pasha of Damascus refused to deliver the
sanjaks. Amir Fakr al- Din II formed an army of 100,000 soldiers against Ottoman Empire;
and in the battle of Anjar, Lebanon forces defeated Mustapha Pasha‟s forces who was
captured in the battle. Sultan Murat IV acknowledged Fakr al-Din II as the lord of Arabia,
from Aleppo to Egypt.

He modernized Lebanon culturally and militarily; though Sultan Murad IV, not
much impressed of Lebanese development, ordered the new governor of Damascus to
attack Lebanon preventing full gain of independence. Even though Fakr al-Din II had
succeeded to create a modern country and expand his territory, in 1635, he was captured by
the Ottomans and executed in Constantinople.

10
 The Shihab family was succeeded Maans in 1697. It is evident that Bashir Shihab II
was the most likely to Fakr al- Din II with his works. In 1799, Bashir had to test his
statesmanship with the conquest of Napoleon. Napoleon besieged Acre, a coastal city in
Palestine, where is forty kilometres far from Lebanese city of Tyre. Both Napoleon and Al-
Jazzar the governor of Acre- asked for assistance from Bashir; whereas he declared himself
neutral in this issue. After long siege of Acre, Napoleon couldn‟t achieve to capture the
city and went back to Egypt.

Shihab Bashir II was the first Maronite Christian governor of Lebanon. The Shihab
family was Sunni Muslim at first, but 1750s onwards they converted to Maronite
Christianity. When Bashir II came to power, he was less wealthy than those feudal lords in
the region. Thus Bashir II reformed taxes and committed to break feudalism in the region.

In this context, Bashir Jumblatt, who was backed by Druses, revolted against Bashir
II. In 1822, governor of Damascus went to war with Acre, and Acre was allied with
Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt. During the war Druze forces attacked to Maronite
Christians in the Lebanon with the anger and discontent of Bashir II. The dispute resulted
with massacre of Druze to Christians. Bashir II had to flee to Egypt. 1821 onwards the
conflict became sectarian in character; thus Christians backed Bashir II while Druses
Junbulats. In 1825, Bashir II finally defeated his opponents in the battle of Simqaniyya and
repressed Druze forces in and around Beirut (Hourani, 1985).

Bashir II allied with France. French influence in the region became intense due to
French protection of Maronite Christians as well as strong economic ties. Muhammad Ali
Pasha, governor of Egypt entered to Lebanon in 1837 after disagreement with Ottoman
Sultanate. Hence Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehmed Ali Pasha, had been sent over Syria to
seize Syrian governorship. It was first offered to Bashir to be governor of Syria, by his dear
friend Mehmed Ali Pasha, but he rejected this offer. Yet, under Ibrahim Pasha‟s lordship
Maronite Christians ruled over Lebanon while Druze communities were isolated from
economical and political life. As a result, 1821-1825 conflict gave way to more bloody
conflicts and civil wars of 1840s and 1860s (Salibi K. S., 1965, pp. 80-105) which carried
Lebanon to Mutasarrafate regime (Nisan, 2003, p. 4).

11
 Ibrahim Pasha supported Maronite superiority and gave new rights to the
Christians. However, in order to maintain his strong and big army, Ibrahim Pasha increased
the taxes. High taxes became a burden for the Lebanese sectarian groups. Furthermore,
Ibrahim Pasha instituted a state monopoly over silk and soap, moreover insisted on
disarmament and military conscription (Akarli, 1993, p. 24). The last measure enraged
Druze and Maronite mountaineers who expected respect to their privileges. Druses,
Muslims and Christians rose against Egyptian regime. The uprising began in Palestine in
1834, spreading throughout the region, reached to Lebanon in 1840. On June 8, 1840,
Maronites, Druses and Muslims held a conference and took oath to stick together whatever
happens and regain their independence. Bashir who supported disarmament of Lebanese as
well, had to deliver himself to British and sent exile to Malta with his family on October 2,
1840. In 1850 he died in Istanbul.

Nevertheless, unity of Muslims, Druses and Maronites didn‟t last long and
Lebanese history witnessed bloody conflict between Druses and Christians three times, in
1841, 1845 and the worst of all in 1860. Ottoman Sultanate promoted Bashir III as of
“prince of the mountain of the Druze” after Bashir II‟s departure from the land. The
Christians, who enjoyed vast privileges during Bashir II‟s regime, also had been given
properties of some Druze families who were sent to exile. When the new Amir took office,
Druze families that lost their lands to Christians reclaimed the lands. These events caused
disorder and anarchy in the country and once again brought Christians and Druses up
against each other. This period indicated the end of Amirs in Lebanon but mutasarrafate
under an Ottoman governor (mutasarrıf).

In 1842, the last Shehabi Amir of Lebanon deposed from his office and a
Hungarian renegade, Omer Pasha in the Ottoman army was appointed to the governorship
of Lebanon by Porte. Whereas, Omer Pasha was not able to cope with the realities of
Lebanon and command loyalties of the Druses or Christians as local amirs did. After long
discussions to settle a solution to the conflict, Austrian Prince Matternich‟s proposal that
required to divide Mount Lebanon as two separate sub governments 1 under wali of Sidon;

1
With this sub governorship both Druze and Maronite co mmunities had equal rights under their own
governments. On the other hand, according to official documents, Christian district had 74,700 Maronites
that majority of them situated in the north while Dru ze district had 25,450 Dru zes, 17,350 Maronites, 5200
Greek Orthodox and 15,590 Greek Orthodox. And in the mountain 200 Jews lived.

12
southern part for Druses and northern part for Christians. Yet, in 1845 Christians made raid
on fourteen Druze villages burning and destroying throughout the way to Jumblatts‟
village. There they met with open fire of Turkish regiment. The conflict soon spread to
Jazzin and Dayr al- Qamar, capital of Druze and other places. Ottoman Porte appointed
Shekib Efendi- foreign minister- to deal with the conflict. Shekib Efendi reinstituted two
governorships. After the new regulations 2 , each government bound to a governor whom
was appointed by Porte, instead of governor of Sidon. Beirut- Zahle road was taken as
boundary between these two administrative districts (Akarli, 1993, p. 28). The sub
governorship (qaymamakam) continued until 1860, the great massacre.

Even after the new regulations in the governorship of two districts, permanent
peace couldn‟t be achieved in the region. Druses and Christians began clashes again in
1860. European powers as of protector of Christians in Lebanon intervened to the ongoing
war between two major sectarian groups and consulted to the governor Hursid Pasha.
Hursid Pasha calling the Druze community to end armed conflict also encouraged the
Christians to stop fighting (El-Sohl, 2004, p. 48). Yet armed conflict escalated between
two sides once again. France, Britain, Russia and Ottomans decided to intervene to the
ongoing massacres in Lebanon and agreed to send joint force of 12.000. France acted alone
and 7.000 French troops landed to Beirut (Longrigg, 1958, p. 22). Ottoman forces under
Fuad Pasha also joined to French forces. Druzes were held liable of the massacre against
Christians. Ottomans and European powers blamed Druzes on the massacre of Christians.
Hence, including Said Janbolat many Druze leaders were executed and punished (Salibi K.
, 1988, p. 85).

The conflict between two different religious groups perceived as a religious based
aggression though the American missionary Calhoun wrote that since Druzes “have
regarded the English as their protectors, and the Maronites in like manner have looked to
French government” (Caesar, 2000, p. 556). Nevertheless, under cloak of religious
rivalries, foreign influence on these different communities turned them against each other
(Khalaf, 2002, p. 1).

2
Each district governor had an advisory council to assist him that consisted of six judges and six advisors
representing six major co mmunities.

13
 Ottoman Empire and also major powers in the region such as Britain and France
along with four other guarantor European Powers decided that the old administration
system didn‟t achieve to secure peace in Mount Lebanon between two rival sectarian
groups. After two years‟ work finally in 1861, seventeen article codes for the new country
of Mount Lebanon was extracted by the hand of major powers of Europe (France, Great
Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Ottoman Empire). In fact, Maronites‟ plan for Mount
Lebanon was to place a Maronite Amir under French protection and to seize power over
the territory and other sectarian groups (Firro, 2003, p. 16). However, Mount Lebanon
became a quasi- independent state under European powers‟ protection with its own
constitution; Mount Lebanon was still Ottoman territory with a governor appointed by
Porte.

Beirut hasn‟t been included to the new country, Mutasarrafiya of Mount Lebanon,
but it was included to Sidon. In 1864 Beirut was incorporated into Vilayet of Damascus
(Akarli, 1993, p. 31). In 1888 vilayet of Beirut came into being as a separate entity from
Damascus. According to the codes, after some minor changes that made on September 6,
1864; mutasarrif (governor) became responsible directly to Porte in Istanbul and his term
of office was extended from three years to five years (Holland, 2009, pp. 212-18). His
main duties were maintaining peace and order, collecting taxes and appointing judges
while an elective administrative council of twelve representatives from different religious
communities assisted him. Moreover, feudal privileges of the local chieftains were
abolished and new constitution bestowed equal rights on all citizens.

Armenian by birth, and Roman Catholic by persuasion, Davud Efendi appointed as

the first governor. Even though, Davud Efendi managed to make the constitution work,
opposition came from local chieftains, mostly Druze, soon after the constitution came into
effect (Zamir, 1985, p. 11). After Davud Efendi, Franco Nasri Kusa from Aleppo
appointed to the office of governorship of Mount Lebanon. His term office passed in
peacefully unlike financial difficulties that Davud Efendi had to face with, Franco Pasha
enjoyed funds from both Damascus and Istanbul. Furthermore, defeat of France in 1870 to
Prussia, diverted France‟s interests to other directions leaving Franco alone without much
intervention. Hence his period emphasized Ottoman sovereignty on Mount Lebanon.
Franco Pasha died in 1873 also leaving his office to Rustem Pasha.

14
 Rustem Pasha‟s term of office French influence increased on Mount Lebanon while
Ottoman power began to diminish due to internal and external disorders in the empire.
Russo-Ottoman war of 1877 damaged Ottoman prestige in international arena. Berlin
Treaty of 1878 caused Ottomans to cease from large tracts of territory. After France‟s
regain of power, Rustem Pasha with his secular policies attained enmity of France and also
Maronite clergy (Spagnolo, 1977, p. 176). In 1883 complaints about Rustem Pasha made
by both Maronites and French ambassador in Beirut pressured Porte and sultanate that
Abdulhamid II had to appoint Vasa Pasha, former governor of Edirne to governorship of
Mount Lebanon for ten years. Vasa also met with opposition of both French consul and
Maronite clergy; yet he managed Mount Lebanon with relatively few problems until his
death in June 1892.

The new governor Naum Pasha came into office with new regulations which limits
the governor‟s term of office to five years; though his duty was extended to ten years when
his term was over in 1897. Until 1902, Naum Pasha governed Mount Lebanon. Naum
Pasha was son in law of Franco Kusa Pasha. His close relations with French and Russian
consuls as well as Maronite clergy disturbed some Lebanese. Petitions about Naum also
prevented him to stay in his office for one more term and Muzaffer Pasha, a member of the
military inspection committee was appointed as a new governor of Mount Lebanon by
Sultan Abdulhamid II following Naum Pasha in 1902. Three months before the end of his
term he died because of an infection on June 28, 1907.

Yusuf Kusa, son of Franco Pasha and foreign minister‟s private secretariat, was
appointed to governor of Mount Lebanon despite the opposition of Abdulhamid II. The
French had demanded Yusuf‟s governorship and Russia, Britain and Italy confirmed
acknowledging the priority of French interests. In 1912, Ohannes Kumcuyan Pasha
replaced Yusuf Pasha; though he resigned in 1915 because of the military regime in
Istanbul. Ali Munif Bey served as governor of Mount Lebanon from September 25, 1915
to May 15, 1915, and then he was replaced by Ismail Hakki Bey. In the last days of the war
Mumtaz Bey was sent to govern Mount Lebanon. Mumtaz Bey was an experienced and
capable governor, but all he could do is to leave his position as soon as the news of
Ottoman defeat and retreat reached to the Mountain (Al-Hakim, 1980).

15
 The Great War of 1914-1918 was about to change everything in the territory
destroying old traditions and administrations of Ottoman Empire including the empire
itself. French interests in Syria and Lebanon could finally be materialized after the war
following the partition of the Middle East between Britain and France. Although French
ambition was considerable in Lebanon and Syria, Arab claims regarding to the full
independence couldn‟t be underestimated. Several secret organizations such as “Al- Ahd”
(Khoury, 1981, p. 442) and “al- Fatat” had been founded in Syria by the nationalist Arab
elites due to gain full independence from Ottoman Empire (Longrigg, 1958, p. 28); yet
they had to wait until 1940s.

2.1.2. Lebanon under French Mandate

Ottoman Empire was dragged into the First Great War on the side of Central
Powers by the bombardment of Russia‟s port of Sevastopol in 1914. I n October, 1915,
autonomous status of Lebanon was abolished and by law the judicial powers and also
heads of millets was deprived from their privileges. In 1914, rights of foreigners and
capitulations had already been revoked. German officers, just after the declaration of the
war, took position in the famous IV Army. The army, at first was consisted of five
divisions; but later the number increased to six divisions (Hitti P. , 1962).

However partition plans of the Middle East were made earlier in May 1916 by M.
Georges Picot of France and Sir Mark Sykes. Whereas this agreement had never come into
effect; France in 1918 still considered it valid. On 8 October, 1918 Beirut was entered by
the British troops along with small landing party from French ships 3 . Allied Forces were
captured Lebanese cities one by one without any serious opposition. Ottoman territories in
the Middle East fell under annexation and occupation of the victorious Allied Forces.
France took control of Syria and Lebanon 4 . Faisal, son of Sheriff Hussein, proclaimed his
kingdom over Syria that promising autonomy to Lebanon and cooperation with France,
trusting promises of independent Arab state under Hashemite dynasty that were given by

3
Also there were Brit ish ships that accompanied to French ships though Brit ish parties didn‟t land on
Lebanon.
4
France supported their traditional “rights” in Syria. Maronites, despite rising Syrian nationalis m, instead of
attaching to Syria wanted to separate from her co mpletely. Three main reasons can be counted explaining this
behaviour: one Maronites, sharing the same language and history with the rest of non - Christian Arabs,
considered themselves part of Europe, second they d idn‟t want to lose power to Muslims, and third their
strong leaning to France played major ro le fo r them to call protection of France and create Greater Lebanon.

16
Britain. Yet his venture for kingship of Syria survived only two years between 1918 and
1920. Meanwhile, Lebanese communities were planning more than Faisal‟s proposal of
quasi- independence. On 22 March 1919, Lebanese notables from different communities
held a meeting in Baabda and declared separation of Lebanon from Syria.

King Faisal was called to London for further consultation about the ongoing
disagreement between him and Allied Forces. Meanwhile Allied Supreme Council was
convened at San Remo 5 on 25 April 1920. Lebanon and Syria was given under French
Mandate, while British got Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan on 28 April 1920. Following
the conference on 30 August 1920, General Grouraud declared “Greater Lebanon” with a
Decree. Hence province of Syria was subdivided into the four new states which were
Greater Lebanon, the Alawi, Syria proper 6 and Jebel Druze (Percy, 1934, p. 214). French
high commissioner of Lebanon and Syria settled in Beirut, yet the state was decided to be
governed by Lebanese officials under supervision of a French advisor (Longrigg, 1958, p.
125).

France defined herself as protector of Maronites in Lebanon and tried to prevent

assimilation of Christians under Muslim Syria (Cleveland, 2004, p. 251). Syrians rejected
and revolted against French mandate fiercely. French troops had suppressed Syrian
rebellion. Unlike Syrian experience, it was a smooth transition to French mandate over
Lebanon. Maronites welcomed French Forces. General Gouraud, high commissioner of
Lebanon and Syria, established “Greater Lebanon” 7 (Qubain, 1961, p. 1), where was
bigger than the old Ottoman Lebanon Mutasarriffa, because fertile Bekaa Valley, Sidon,
Tripoli, and Saida were incorporated into Lebanon. This was „divide and rule‟ policy that
France implemented on Syria; and this new distribution was thought to be advantage of
Maronite Christians while decreasing Christian population to thirty per cent in Lebanon.

5
See Appendix A.
6
Aleppo was also considered as a separete entity from the rest of Syria, though Aleppo was incorporated to
Syria later.
7
New territories that were incorporated to Lebanon also cut Syria fro m the sea. Besides 200.000 Maronites,
were now jo ined 135.000 Christians of various denominations, 30.000 Armenians, 20.000 foreigners,
250.000 Sunnis, 105.000 Shiites, and 44.000 Dru zes.

17
The population in the new territories had Muslim majority. This situation, gave way to
sectarian and religious conflicts in order to attain political power 8 .

Maronite Christians‟ and Muslims‟ expectations from Great Lebanon was almost opposite
of each other. Christians wanted to turn their faces to Europe, their French allies and their
back to Arab world. Mansfield states that “some minorities and also minority of Sunni
Muslims considered French presence as an advantage.” (2003, p. 199). He emphasizes not
all the Muslims opposed to French presence.

However, the educated elite in Lebanon demanded immediate independence.

Nevertheless France had no intention to grant neither Lebanon nor Syria their
independence. Hence, mandate regime of France in Lebanon and Syria was colonial rather
than creating self sufficient independent states. The purpose of France to hold Levant was
actually to protect her colonies in North Africa from any possible effects.

Greater Lebanon, on 22 May, 1926 finally had a constitution that proclaiming the
entity as a republic (Perlmann & Carmichael, 1947, p. 485). 1926 constitution was
conducted by the French government without asking consent of Lebanese. Whereas the
constitution was the constitution of Modern Lebanon was based on religious affiliations;
however this term had been in effect since Ottoman suzerainty. According to the
constitution, president was a Maronite, prime- minister Sunni Muslim and Chamber of
Deputies a Shiite (Mansfield, 2003, p. 202) and the cabinet always had a Greek Orthodox
and Druze member.

The country would have a President with extremely wide authorities such as
assigning Prime Minister and the cabinet and he was elected for six years term. Especially,
in this constitution there was not a word mentioning independence. Moreover, the High
Commissioner had the right to suspend the constitution who executed this right three times
between 1932 and 1934, also in 1939. Even though the constitution was in effect, French
influence in the internal affairs was intense.

8
Instead of nationality, relig ious loyalties became important aspect in the new state of „Greater Lebanon‟.
Confessional system that French administration brought to Lebanon consisted on religious and sectarian
majority; even though Maroni Christians composed of the largest community, still they were less that half of
the whole population. They were followed by Sunni Muslims, Greek Orthodox, and Dru ze as major relig ious
and sectarian groups in order.

18
 In 1930s, the most important problem of Lebanon was to unite Muslims and
Christians under Lebanese state. Both of the groups had different expectations; though they
had to work together in order to become an independent state. Political approaches of two
different politicians shade light on this issue. Multiparty system prevailed in Lebanon since
1920s, though in 1930s and 1940s two blocks became dominant: Constitutional Block of
Beshara Al- Khouri and National Block of Emile Eddah.

Emile Eddah was an attorney who educated in France just like Al- Khouri. Emile
Eddah became prime minister once during Mandate rule and became President from 1936
to 1941 (Fieldhouse, 2006, p. 305). He was in favor of French rule and continuity of
Mandate. He believed that Lebanon was mother land for Maronites; hence he didn‟t bother
at all to satisfy Muslim subjects in Lebanon. On the contrary, Al- Khouri was a strong
defender of full independence for Lebanon; therefore according to him independence could
only be achieved by coordination of Muslims and Christians. Thus, Al- Khouri sought
ways to unite different identities under mutual “Lebanese” nation and interests.

In 1936, French and Lebanese representatives had signed a census similar to that
France had signed with Syria previously. In this census there was an additional term which
was guaranteed representation of all religious groups in the parliament and government. In
1937, with the hope of independence, House of Representatives had a meeting, and Emile
Eddah had been chosen as President. Eddah had assigned Hayreddin Al- Ahdab as Prime
Minister. This assignment had significant importance, because of tradition of Maronite
President, Sunni Prime Minister and Shiite spokesman has taken place first time in
Lebanese history (Longrigg, 1958).

When the Second World War broke out, Lebanon had to face with the fact that
France had rejected independence of Lebanon according to the 1936 agreement and High
Commissioner suspended the constitution. Due to some disagreements between those
religious and sectarian groups, on one thing they reached to consensus that was ultimate
freedom.

2.1.3. Independence of Lebanon

Second World War changed the ongoing status quo once again in Levant countries.
War time policies of France disturbed nationalists of both Syria and Lebanon. On 23 June,

19
1939 in order to draw Turks into Anglo- French angle, France gave Alexandretta to
Turkey. Downfall of French regime in 1940 and installation of Vichy regime instead
increased discontent of the nationalists (Perlmann & Carmichael, 1947, p. 517). Economic
difficulties and occupation in the Middle East gave hard times for the Lebanese people.
This even became worse with the blockade of Mediterranean by the Vichy forces, scarcity
of food had aroused in the country. In 1941, protests for the situation which had started in
Syria spread to coastal cities of Lebanon.

On June 8, following the suppression Britain and Free French Forces invaded
Lebanon and Syria and granted free exit to Vichy French. In July 1941, Vichy forces were
defeated. Britain and De Gaulle of France decided ultimate freedom of Syria and Lebanon
immediately. When the representative General Catroux had arrived in Beirut, Lebanese
people considered this as a sign of independence; on October 23, 1941 independence of
Lebanon was announced by France.

British response to this statement from France was full support in the war of Middle
East against Germans. Britain; moreover had already made her intention to free Lebanon
and Syria from mandate regime (Khadduri, 1944, p. 605). On the other hand, French
approval of self- governments in Lebanon and Syria was rather reluctant (Mansfield, 2003,
p. 220). One of the most important reasons of this situation was France‟s military bases in
the Mediterranean. Moreover, Britain‟s Middle East policy was not trustworthy for France
at all that Britain appointed ministers to both Syria and Lebanon on February 8, 1942.

Nonetheless; in 1943, the first elections in Lebanon took place after independence
and the constitution was restored. Maronite Bechara al-Khouri, who called himself as
“constitutionalist”, has been elected as President and he appointed Sunni Riyad al- Sulh as
of the Prime Minister of Lebanon that he had to clash with France when he decided to
abolish provisions that are “incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of the
country” (Perlmann & Carmichael, 1947, p. 518). French officials in Lebanon began a
campaign to suppress the movement and arrested President, cabinet members and as many
deputies as possible. Nevermore, France couldn‟t find support from Britain and the U.S.A.,
yet that hadn‟t prevented them to seek some privileges from the old mandate territories.

20
France put pressure both Syria and Lebanon to maintain post independence treaties,
thought met with British and Western condemnation.

Khouri and al-Sulh looked for a solution of regional and sectarian disunity; and
they found the solution with “National Pact Agreement” in 1943. According to this
agreement, “Lebanon would be independent within the existing borders but it should
follow an independent Arab foreign policy” (Mühlbacher, 2009, p. 77; Mansfield, 2003, p.
225). Thus, Christians approved Arab identity of the country while Muslims abandoned
their ambitions of uniting with other Arab states. This National Pact served as an
applicable agreement to the conditions of Lebanon until 1975 civil war. Nevertheless
Lebanese state was built on fragile balance, and was doomed to be disturbed by either
internal or external interventions (Rabinovich I. , 1984).

On 17 May 1945, France began to enlarge her garrisons in Levant in order to force
Lebanon and Syria to make some agreements granting privileges to France. However,
Lebanon was strengthened by the previous success that demanded its own military forces.
Yet, in February 1945, Lebanon joined Allied Forces and secured representation in San
Francisco Conference 9 . Clashes occurred between French and Lebanese forces. Finally, in
1946, with the interference of Britain, France had to evacuate all French forces from
Lebanon and Syria. In the context of withdrawal of France from Lebanon, Zahar comments
that power sharing in Lebanon was dependent of “external protectors” and “as long as the
presence of the protector exist peace lasted, yet when they left and new protectors appeared
the country was drawn into turmoil and conflict” (Zahar, 2005, p. 219). When France left
Lebanon, and the Lebanese people were left alone, search for another protector and
disunity among the people in this regard, constituted Lebano n‟s the most striking
weakness.

2.1.4. First Arab- Israel War and Its Impacts on Lebanon

Notion of the The Jewish State first came into being in 1880s with the works of
Theodor Hertlz, a Hungarian Jew, who worked with enthusiasm to create a free Jewish
State. According to Hertlz and other leading Zionists, all the conditions existed in order to

9
San Francisco Conference was held between April 25 and June 29, 1945. In this international meeting
United Nations have been established. The conference was attended by delegations from 46 independent
nations which one of them was also Lebanon.

21
create a state: there was an ethnic group adequate to form a nation, and there was not any
land of their own (Hertlz, 1988, pp. 67-153). When the first Zionist conference met in
Basel in 1897, it was controversial where to establish the Jews State; though the memory
of “promised lands” have always been kept alive in the minds of Zionists after bitter
struggles before and during the Second World War.

On 14 May 1948, State of Israel was founded with the famous speech of David
Ben-Gurion even before departure of British troops from Haifa. On 15 May 1948, Arab
states of Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Transjordan declared war on newly founded state
of Israel. Saudi Arabia sent a small unit and Yemen was only nominally involved (Peretz,
1996, p. 40).

Indeed Lebanese forces were rather symbolic in the war, showing Lebanese support
for Palestinian cause and Arab union with 1,000 soldiers. In addition to this number there
were irregular forces in the Arab Liberation Army operating in Southern Lebanon as well
as small Palestinian forces active within Lebanese Army during 1948 war (Hugges, 2005).
The war also took place in Bint Jubayl region in southern Lebanon between Israeli forces
and Syrian Army.

Lebanon joined Arab League in 1945, yet it preserved its independence. When all
the Arab League states declared war on newly established Israel, Lebanon couldn‟t exclude
itself from its ally Arab states even though Christian President was rather reluctant to take
place among Arab states. According to Hugges (2005, p. 26) Christian attitude towards the
war with Zionists limited the options in front of Lebanon in 1948. Well established
connections between Zionists and Maronites along with some Druze that began in 1920s
caused Lebanon to curtail its involvement into the war with greater number of forces. The
commander of the army was Fouad Chehab, a Maronite Christian who had to reorganize
the military that the French Mandate left to him in 1945.

It is important to consider the overall forces of Lebanese Army in 1948-49. New

Lebanese Army under Chehab consisted of 3,000 men ready to combat. In the war 4 th
battalion was used in the war, while 1st , 2nd and 3rd battalions were stationed along the
frontier. The army was inadequate in the context of weapons, vehicles and armors to
compete with Israeli Army. Furthermore the army had difficulties to increase its capacity

22
with more advanced new weapons due to an arms embargo and a shortage of governmental
funds (Hugges, 2005, pp. 27-29).

Lebanon played defensive role in the war rather than offensive one. General Chehab
pointing out inefficiencies of the puny Lebanese Army preferred to stay along the border,
not crossing into Palestine but to dig in at al-Naqura. Main principle of the Lebanese Army
was not to attack unless Israelis attack. Israeli cross border raids and destruction of
southern Lebanon forced General Chehab to action. Lebanese forces crossed the border
and on 5-6 June 1948 fought in Malikkiya, a border village of Palestine occupied by Israeli
forces. Until midnight on 6 June 1948, 3rd battalion of Lebanese forces had captured
Malikkiya from Israelis and pushed them out of the village. Though Lebanese forces didn‟t
advance, yet it was what they intended was to capture Malikkiya and maintain their
position (Hugges, 2005, p. 32).

However on 8 June 1948, Lebanese forces handed Malikkiya to Arab Liberation

Armies (ALA) and moved back to Lebanese side of the border. They avoided any possible
clashes between Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and remained in defensive position. In fact
Malikkiya was a symbolic battle to prevent any criticisms coming from ally Arab states
that the Lebanese didn‟t do anything for Palestinians. The battle also served good in
Lebanon to impress Muslim population and reduced criticism against the government.

After two weeks, U.N. Security Council called for a four- week cease –fire.
Although both sides had violated the cease- fire terms and strengthened their armies, Israel
was in better position in contrast with the Arabs. Second round of the war witnessed Israeli
advance to Southern Lebanon10 and Sinai peninsula while they couldn‟t achieve to break
through Egyptian blockade of Old City of Jerusalem where Jewis h settlement was placed
(Peretz, 1996). Under these circumstances began the Armistice negotiations in January
1949.

On 23 March 1949, Lebanon and Israel also signed and Armistice at al-Naqurah on
the Lebanese- Israeli border. According to this Armistice, Lebanese and Israeli borders
kept as unchanged as before the war. The armistices also called for peace agreements in the

10
Israelis captured almost all of Galilee and advanced into Lebanon, there at Litani River David Ben Gurion
stopped. Israeli occupation of Lebanon continued until 1949 when the armistice talks began.

23
future, though the first peace agreement had to wait for 30 years to be realized between
Israel and any other Arab state. The war wasn‟t total defeat for Lebanon, though the
consequences of the war were severe for all of the Arab nations.

Disastrous defeat of Arab states raised fundamentalist Islamic parties and

organizations, which are inflamed Palestinian Nationalism in the exile, caused more
agitations and conflicts in the region as well as wars. Fifteen year long Civil War and
political instability proved for Lebanese that the only solution is return of the refugees to
their natural homes.

2.1.5. 1958 Political Crisis

From 1860 to 1958 Lebanon enjoyed rather peaceful, prosperous and liberal
atmosphere without much disturbance (Khalaf, 2002, p. 103); though it couldn‟t achieve to
be a nation state either (Hourani A. , 1988, p. 6). One of the pressing reasons for 1958
political crisis was lack of nationalist feelings, has various internal, external and
international reasons. Winslow (1996, p. 107) states that the turmoil in 1958 was
influenced by three major events: (1) Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, (2) Eisenhower
Doctrines 11 in 1957, (3) establishment of U.A.R in 1958.

Qubain (1961, p. 30) explains internal reasons of the crisis under five points: “(1)
Muslim dissatisfaction, (2) corruption, (3) personalisms, (4) the 1957 elections, and (5) the
attempt to President Chamoun to succeed himself”. In addition to these “search of identity”
could be added to various reasons mentioned above. Relations with Syria and Egypt in
1958 and creation of U.A.R. effected the crisis while struggle between the West and Soviet
Union precipitated the crisis in Lebanon.

Although National Pact has guaranteed a Maronite Christian President with

extensive powers, the president was for six year terms and should not be reelected after his
term of office. Two of the Presidents, Bechara Al- Khouri and Camille Chamoun had tried
to amend the constitution in favor of prolonging their period of presidencies. Al- Khouri‟s
actions due to achieving his goals, such as corruption, bribery and nepotism, worked

11
Pesident Eisenhower promised “military help fo r states in the Middle East threatened by Soviet
communis m.” Winslow, C.; Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society, New York: Routledge,
1996, p. 110.

24
against him (Khalaf, 2002, p. 104). When Al- Khouri had organized the elections in
parliament for his second term presidency; his opponents 12 , including Maronites, went to a
successful strike and he had to resign in 1952 (Cleveland, 2004).

His successor Chamoun achieved better administration in contrast with al-Khouri‟s.

First two years of Chamoun administration in Lebanon increased prosperity in the country.
In 1950s, Lebanon was a capitalist state with an attractive banking system. Laissez fair
economy and free trade attracted foreign investment and life sta ndards of a common man
in Lebanon became more than satisfactory when it was compared with neighbor states s uch
as Syria and Egypt. Moslem demands for reformation has increased in the parliament and
political system; even though they also benefited from better economic conditions as much
as Christians.

Since 1932 census, no other census had been conducted. Moslem population was
aware that now they were not less than Christians in number anymore. As a proof of their
argument they asked for a new census. On the other hand, President Chamoun knew that it
was important for Lebanon to maintain status quo which is in favor of Christians in order
to keep intact fragile balance in Lebanese politics and society (Khalaf, 2002). Although,
Pierre Gemayel, leader of Phalange Party supported equal distribution of governmental
positions with Muslims, he sent an “open letter” to President Chamoun dated August 20,
1954, about general census and application of Law on all immigrants who apply for
citizenship. Following this letter, fourteen Muslim leaders emphasized “abolition of
confessionalism, equitable distribution of governmental positions, conducting a non-
confessional census, and tightening economic ties with Syria” (Qubain, 1961). Some
doubts were raised about “abolition of confessionalism” that this demand aimed to curb
privileges of the President and allocate the power between prime minister and the president
equally. Amendment in the constitution perceived as a threat to future of the state.

12
In the Chamber of Deputies against Al- Khouri‟s second term presidency, an opposition group National
Socialist Front which was allied itself with Jumb latt‟s Progressive Socialist Party, Edde‟s National Bloc, and
al-Bazzi‟s National Call Party and also some influencial independent deputies such as Chamoun, Franjiyah,
Hajj and Ghassan al- Tuwayni. Furthermore, outside the Chamber another three party has composed an
allience with Phalanges, the National Organizat ion, and National Congress and called itself the “Popular
Front”.

25
 Corruption in the government was another issue that raised some disturbance in the
country. When it was compared with a- Khouri administration, Chamoun administration
seemed just. There were some speculations that Chamoun was himself a British
intelligence agent and even some of the politicians believed this. Moreover, many services
such as education favored Christians. Majority of educational institutions were private and
accepted the students from Christian faith (mission schools) and exclude Muslim students.
State institutions were scarce and level of education was very poor in contrast with the
private institutions.

In the context of external reasons, Chamoun‟s foreign policy was based on close
relations with the USA and Western world against Communist threat of the Soviets while
neutral position with any conflict between Arab states; though, Muslims in Lebanon were
attaching to pan- Arabism and Nasserism day by day. In April 1955, Chamoun paid a visit
to Turkey and afterwards Prime Minister Sami al- Solh had visited Turkey as well.
However, the statement was made by both President and the Prime Minister indicated that
the visit aimed good relations between two countries; by some Arab states such as Syria
and Saudi Arabia this visit was interpreted as sympathy to Baghdad Pact and Chamoun‟s
support to Iraq. In June 1955, Turkish President and the Prime Minister also visited
Lebanon. Chamoun found a solution to this dilemma by rejecting participation to Baghdad
Pact and emplacing Lebanon‟s loyalty to Western world. Arab world split in two camps
the ones with Egypt and Syria and the others with Iraq (Winslow, 1996).

Significantly, Egypt and Syria were heading to a union which was expected to
spearhead a bigger union with the participation of other Arab states. When it comes to the
situation in Lebanon, religious and sectarian issues of the state have never been solved
neither by neither 1926 constitution nor 1943 National Pact. Even if National Pact
emphasized “Arab face of Lebanon” as well as not to forego a union with any other Arab
states or to forego any foreign protection, United Arab Republic which was formed by
Egypt and Syria under leadership of charismatic leader Gemal Abdel Nasser inflamed
feelings of Arab nationalism among Moslem minorities of Lebanon. Definitely, Christians
of Lebanon recalled the memories of being “Christians in a sea of Muslims”.

26
 Besides, Egyptian and Lebanese relations deteriorated due to the attitude of
Lebanon following 1956 Suez Canal incident (Winslow, 1996). Egypt and Arab states in
Arab League expected Lebanon to call her ambassador of Britain back and cut relations
with France and Britain, though Lebanon refused to do so. Hence, Chamoun became target
of Egyptian rage and condemnation, gained another enemy to work for his downfall along
with Syria. This incident caused Prime Minister Abdallah al- Yafi to resign, thus bringing
down the cabinet led way to 1957 elections. The electio ns were also darkened by the verbal
attacks of Egypt and Syrian media against Chamoun and his new Prime Minister Sami al-
Sohl (Khalaf, 2002).

Thirdly, as of international reasons of the crisis could be summarized as the

intensity of the Cold War and increased Soviet influence in the Middle East after Suez
crisis. While Egypt and Syria sought support from Soviet Union with the on military,
economic and politic level, Lebanon accepted Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957.
Adoption of the Doctrine divided Lebanon into two camps: the ones- mainly Maronite
Christians- who favor the Doctrine, and those who oppose it claiming that Leba non broke
1943 National Pact siding with the West against Egypt and Syria (Khalaf, 2002, p. 107).

Opposition that composed of both Christian and Muslim parties, Nasserite United
National Front and moderate Third Force began to raise their voice against Chamoun‟s
political actions. Both opposition groups were preparing for the elections rather than
violence against the government. Election campaign began in a peaceful manner, though
when the Front decide to go on strike on May 30, 1957; Minister of Inferior took strict
measures to prevent demonstrations of the opposition. The demonstrations turned to
violent attacks on the streets and resulted by the arrest of some 300 demonstrators along
with heavy casualties in killed and wounded.

Army general, General Fuad Chehab took the initiative and mediated between the
government and the opposition and took control of the police forces. It was decided that
some of the opposition leaders should added to Chamber to observe the elections. The
elections were held on 9 June 1957 on four successive Sundays. Government got sweeping
victory over the opposition. The opposition group could gain only eight seats in Chamber

27
of Deputies of 66 seats. The speculation of fraud in the elections began to circulate. The
opposition accused Chamoun and called for new elections.

Despite the rejections and oppositions to the elections, the days following were
rather calm. Yet open support to U.A.R and Nasserism continued by the opposition United
National Front. Influential leaders of the Front went to Damascus to greet Nasser and
people in Lebanon celebrated the union of these two countries hoping to join them; yet
their enthusiasm met with severe measures taken by the government. 1958 also was the
year that Chamoun‟s term of office end. Amendment in the constitution which enabled
reelection of Chamoun became the main issue occupying both the government and the
opposition. Between supporters of Chamoun and opposition began to clash with each
other. Bombed attacks to houses of opposition and government figures became everyday
incidents such as bombed attacks near Prime Minister Sami al-Solh‟s house on April 1958.

The 1958 Crisis on the other hand began on May, 8 with the assassination of Nasib
al-Matni, a Maronite Christian journalist who was one of those critical to Chamoun
administration (Winslow, 1996, p. 112). On the same day, all of the opposition United
National Front, and Third Force along with other groups such as Free Press, Popular Front,
The Arab Liberation Party and even Grand Mufti of Lebanon declared a general strike
throughout the country while also demanding that the government and Chamoun to resign
(Qubain, 1961). Furthermore the opposition declared that unless their demands were met,
they would continue the strike. Although the demands didn‟t materialize, strike was
relatively a success. Nevertheless, clashes and demonstrations began to devour throughout
the country beginning from May to August of 1958.

Party leaders, who are mainly clan leaders, used their own militias against the
government. On 13 May, 1958, Kemal Jumblatt, leader of Progressive Socialist Party and
also Chouf region Marched to presidential palace with his militias (Khalaf, 2002; Quibain,
1961; Winslow, 1996). This date marked the beginning of the revolt. Despite numerous
attacks to presidential palace, President Chamoun achieved to stay in office, while house
Prime Minister Sami al- Solh was destroyed and burned by the opposition forces. In Beirut,
the army involvement was limited; Tripoli turned to virtual battlefield. Army intervention
in Tripoli was intense that the tanks and soldiers with heavy guns became common scene.

28
There was a fierce war in Chouf region where Jumblatt‟s forces were in control. On June
13, the first time army intervened and General Chehab and Kemal Jumblatt made an
agreement enabling civilians to mobilize securely.

During the conflict General Chehab refrained to fight aga inst opposition forces, but
positioned to be mediator between government loyalists and opposition forces (Khalaf,
2002; Qubain, 1961). There are several reasons why the army hasn‟t intervened to the
ongoing violence and clashes. First of all, the army was the sole institution that opposition
militias have respected along with its general. Secondly, even though they were labeled as
“rebels”, the opposition leaders were coming from very influential and important families,
just like Chehab himself. They were personally friends of the commander. Thirdly,
General Chehab, after hard work he had done to create an effective army, didn‟t want to
waste his efforts forcing the army officers to fight against their “brothers” and clansmen
(Qubain, 1961, p. 83).

As well as the opposition forces, the militia that was loyal to the government was
quite effective during the crisis. One of the most radical one of those groups was Maronite
Phalange, founded by Pierre Gemayel. Phalange as a youth organization then later
developed to a political party (Qubain, 1961, p. 84), with the fascist ideology that Lebanon
was naturally a Maronite land (Khalaf, 2002). Hence, Phalange is strictly opposed to any
kind of union with Arab states; furthermore they considered Arabism and intentions of
Egypt and Syria as threat to “independence” of Lebanon. Naturally Phalange sided with
Maronite Christian Chamoun and government.

Conversely, Dr. Malik, then Minister of Foreign Affairs complained and accused
U.A.R. of the rebellion in the country and smuggling of arms to rebel groups against the
government. On 21 and 22 May, Lebanese Government officially delivered their
complaints both Council of the Arab League and U.N. Security Council. Arab League
states held four sessions in order to solve the problem and issued a resolution; whereas
Lebanese Government rejected it. On June 6, 1958 Security Council took up the Lebanese
question. Security Council proposed that an observation team should be sent to Lebanon in
order to evaluate the Lebanese accusations. On July, 3 the first report of the U.N.
Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was drafted which was unfavorable to the

29
Lebanese claim. Meanwhile, US Marines on July, 15 by the open request of Lebanese
Government landed in Beirut (Stookey, 1979, p. 227) with 2,000 soldiers. Later the first
group of Marines was reinforced with 15,000 men (Khalaf, 2002, p. 116). Shortly after,
Sixth Fleet had joined the rest of US Marines in the Mediterranean.

Presence of American Marines was justified by the US officials that they were there
to protect American Nationals in Lebanon and had no intension to fight a war. On the other
hand, U.N. Security Council claimed that US presence in Lebanon handicapped works of
the Observer Group. American Marines remained in Lebanon despite the protests of Soviet
Union. Meanwhile, on July 31, new Lebanese President was elected: Army General
Chehab. Rashid Karami was appointed as his prime minister. He was agreeable by both the
opposition and government; although then President Chamoun insisted to serve until the
end of his term of office which was dated on September 23, 1958 (Winslow, 1996, p. 127).

Situation in Lebanon began to normalize. After hot debates in U.N. Security

Council regarding withdrawal of American Marines, it was decided that the Observation
Group to be enlarged in Lebanon. On October 25, full withdrawal of American troops had
been completed. By the December of the very same year also the Observation Group had
completed their task and left Lebanon. Hence, Lebanese Civil Strife which turned out to be
an international issue died out as suddenly as it appeared.

2.1.6. 1975-1990 Civil War and the Ta’if Accord

This Civil War which devastated Lebanon for fifteen years had similarities with
1958, in the context of foreign occupation, refugee issues and militia attacks made this
civil war with much broader effects. Between 1958 and 1975, Lebanon enjoyed rapid
economic growth and political stability with several important reforms in agricultural areas
under Chehab administration until 1964. On the other hand, some external and internal
incidents triggered internal instability in Lebanon.

The event that ignited the old hostilities in the hearts of Lebanese was just
symbolic. The first phase of the war that began in 1975 and lasted 1977 was just the
beginning of a deep rooted “identity” conflict. Many scholars (Salibi K. S., 1976; Qubain,
1961; Khalidi W. , 1979) reduced the reasons of this Civil War to “Christian- Muslim
rivalry” following the common generalization that “ethnic and religious hatreds are widely

30
perceived as a cause of civil conflict”; though in Lebanese case it was more than “ethnic or
religious hatreds” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001, p. 6) or “Christian- Muslim rivalry”, but more
diversified, complicated and based on several factors such as economic; educational and
political inequalities; deep ravine between very rich and very poor; state inability to
guarantee security of its citizens; and peoples loyalty to influential feudal landowners
instead of national state (Wenger & Denney, 1990). Fearon and Laitin (2003) also denies
role of the conflict ridden nature of “religious and ethnic diversity” presenting there were
many pluralist and multi cultural states where haven‟t been drawn into civil wars as it
happened in Lebanon that materialized several times in history.

In this context Barakat (1979) such as Odeh (1986, p. 56) associated the Civil Strife
by “class struggle” more than “religious conflict”. Barak (1979, p. 11) explains that the
wealthiest areas were mainly dominated by Christians such as Mount Lebanon, while the
poorest sections of the country consisted of Muslim dominated such as Beqaa, Akkar and
slums of Beirut. Hence the conflict, according to Barak seemed like “Muslim vs.
Christian” dispute. Odeh (1986, p. 52) justifies his claim as giving evidence Jumblatt‟s
stance against confessional system.

In addition to these various explanations of Lebanese conflict, Abul- Husn (1998,

p. 9) identified the roots of the conflict as “struggle for political power and economic
disparities”. He argued that “inequitable distribution of power is the determining factor in
social conflict” (Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 10); following asabiya concept of Ibn Haldun which
highlights “group feeling” and “one‟s unquestionable, sometimes anti ethic attitude against
other communities in order to obey the demands of one‟s own community”. He also
associated asabiya with various communities and militia in Lebanese society. However,
Abul-Husn indicated that sectarianism and asabiya were not the only factors to the civil
war, but also unequal distribution of economic resources consisted of an important factor.

Confessional system for power sharing was represented the major domestic factor
in the Civil Strife (Salibi K. S., 1976; Hourani A. , 1988; Khalidi W. , 1979). Even after
1958, regarding the combination of parliamentary seats remained unchanged in favor of
Christians. Although the constitution emphasized that all the religious communities should
be represented equally, Christian community were entitled to 55 percent of the total seats

31
(Makdisi & Sadaka, 2005). Despite presence of eighteen officially recognized communities
in Lebanon, the parliament was dominated three major religious communities: Maronites,
Sunnis and Shiites. Armenians were considered as a separate community. This political
system weakened the state apparatus and disabled functional reforms to be implemented.

Thus, lack of agricultural reforms and investments to enhance positions of poor

southern regions in Lebanon, several organizations and groups began to flourish along with
Palestinian refugee camps. In the context of economic cleavages, these economic
differences had clear sectarian roots. Musa al-Sadr‟s AMAL Movement founded in 1974
happened to be one of those organizations to bring service and education to “dispossessed”
Shiite community in South Lebanon. Palestinian refugee issue was one of the most
important factors disturbing Shiite community who usually suffer under cross fire between
Israel and Palestinian militias.

After “Black September” incident, PLO headquarters had been transferred to

Lebanon in 1970, multiplying number of refugees in the camps with heavily armed
commandos (Abraham, 1996). In Southern Lebanon where is close to Israeli borders,
Palestinian refugee camps disturbed both local and foreign neighbors. PLO militias and
commandos, who resided in those refugee camps installed raids into Israeli villages. Israeli
response for those attacks not only harm refugees but also Lebanese Shiites. In order to
prevent these attacks, in 1969, PLO leaders and Lebanese government had signed Cairo
Accord (Kalawoun, 2000), which restricted PLO attacks into Israel without permission of
Lebanese government; however PLO militia violated this agreement many times.

The role of the foreign forces that supported contributors financially and militarily
could not be undone. The contributors were divided into two groups as rightist and leftists
that “the camp of rightists Lebanese (mostly Maronite Christians) supported, manipulated,
or encouraged by several Arab reactionary governments, Israel, Iran, and the West; and an
alliance of Palestinian resistance movements and the Leftist Lebanese Nationalist
Movement (LNM) was supported on and off by a few Arab governments and some
socialist groups and countries” (Barakat, 1979, p. 4; Abul-Husn, 1998, p. 4). The rightist
camp was composed of (1) The Phalange, (2) The Free Nationalists, (3) Maronite Order of
Monks, (4) the militia of Suleyman Frangieh and his son who was killed by Phalangists,

32
(5) factions of Lebanese Army and other small organizations. The leftist camp was
represented by (1) Progressive Socialist Party, (2) The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, (3)
the Lebanese Communist Party, (4) the Organization of Communist Action, (5) the
Nasserist Movement, (6) the Arab Baath Socialist Party, (7) the Arab Lebanese Army, (8)
other smaller organizations (Barakat, 1979). The leftists allied themselves with Palestinian
Rejection Group.

The second phase of the Civil War between 1978 and 1982 has witnessed
bloodshed and extremity of violence introduced to already fragmented Lebanese society by
both fellow citizens and foreign powers such as Syria and Israel. Before finalizing the war
in 1989 with Ta‟if Accord, the third phase of the war between 1982 and 1989 brought
more death and sorrow to fighting Lebanese and threatened independence of the “small
democracy” more than ever.

2.1.6.1. The First Phase of the Civil War 1975-1977

On 13, April 1975, during opening of a new church where Phalange leader would
attend, from an unidentified car, was opened fire on to the crowd (Weinberger, 1986, p.
147). Two party men had been killed. Following the incident, revenge seeking Phalangists
ambushed a bus with 30 Palestinian passengers passing by, killing 27 of them (Abul-Husn,
1998, p. 2). Beginning from the very same day, rocket attacks and gun fights between PLO
and Phalangists became everyday noises in Beirut destroying the city for both sides. This
event marked the first phase of the war, between 1975 and 1977.

Although, Anwar al- Sadat of Egypt and Lebanese government interfered issuing a
cease fire between PLO and Phalange, gun fire hadn‟t ceased at all. After twenty days of
the first exchange of gun fire life went back to normal in Beirut without any tangible
solution to the conflict (Abraham, 1996, p. 3). Lebanese army didn‟t intervene to the
clashing sides. Lebanese Army commander and corps were mainly composed of
Christians. It has been feared that the Christian composition of the army could provoke
warring sides instead of deterring them.

In mid- May al-Solh government resigned disabling neither to find a permanent

solution nor to cease the conflict. His latest proposal for the Palestinian issue was to grant
all the Muslim non- Lebanese citizenship, which was rejected immediately by the

33
opposition. However al-Solh resigned, agreed to stay in office until a new one was
appointed by the president. On May 17, President Farangieh appointed army general Nur
al-Din as his prime minister, disturbing both PLO and left wing Lebanese (Vocke, 1978).

Meanwhile the board was set, the pieces were moving. Libya‟s Qaddafi and Syria‟s
Hafez al- Assad informed Arafat that they give their full support to PLO. Kamal Jumblatt,
leader of Progressive Socialist Party calling for a general strike for the Palestinians killed
in the bus attack (Abraham, 1996). Opposition to military government compromised both
Christians and Muslims under the same demand “a civil cabinet” which was realized by the
appointment of Rashid Karami on May 28. Since then Premier Karami sought for a
solution to the conflict now spread among influential leaders and their militia other than
Gemayel and Arafat even dividing the army as Muslim and Christian lines.

Beirut became the battleground of warring sides and divided in two. West Beirut
was controlled by PLO/ Lebanese militia while East Beirut by Christian militia leaded by
Phalange (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2005, p. 67). East Beirut was surrounded by Palestinian
refugee camps where PLO took shelter and found support. Kamal Jumblatt and his militia
played an important role during the conflict, though Jumblatt was pursued his own agenda.

Kamal Jumblatt accused the Phalangists to collaborate with Israel in means of arms
and supplies; meanwhile he negotiated with Israelis proposing a separate, independent
Druze state within Lebanon. Eventually, Jumblatt‟s proposal was rejected by Israel stating
that the proposed lands were crucial for Israel‟s security. When an a greement was finally
decided between PLO, Gemayel, and Karami; Jumblatt asked more power for his
Progressive party in the Parliament and cabinet where his party was excluded because of a
deadlock between Phalange, abating “National Pact of 1943”. His new proposal was
opposed by Christian parties, especially Gemayel that he emphasized this would turn
Lebanon into a Muslim state without any guarantee for Christian safeguarding (Abraham,
1996, p. 15).

On 18 January 1976, rightists had decided to take the initiative and attacked
Quarantine Camp killing 1.000 PLO militia and civilians (Salibi K. S., 1976, pp. 149-54).
In return, PLO and Muslim militia massacred villagers of Damour, a Christian town near
Beirut, killing thousands of civilians (Khalidi W. , 1979). Damour was also home town of

34
Chamoun and his house was demolished during the attacks. Except East Beirut, the whole
country seemed to fell under Palestinians and Lebanese leftist control (Salibi K. S., 1976,
p. 158). Christians‟ rights and lives were at stake. Christians, in order to preserve their
dominant role in the politics, needed a protector. However, Christian power elite would
have preferred a Western protector and supporter, Syria that was willing to interfere
welcomed as well.

Mediation efforts of both Saudis and Americans had failed under Jumblatt‟s secular
government demands. Jumblatt believed that it was not possible for him and his sect Druze
to achieve presidency or premiership while these top positions were allocated to biggest
sets, Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians under guarantee of constitution. His goal was
to reject any proposed peace agreement by either Syrians or Americans. Although Syrian
diplomatic emissary was working on an acceptable accord which was announced and
approved by majority of the leaders including Prime Minister Karami.

The “Damascus Accord” was not something new. It only revised “National Pact”.
Confessionalism remained while appointment of the Prime Minister left to the Parliament,
though this proposal was opposed. Syrian backed Elias Sarkis became President beating
Raymond Eddeh, Muslim backed candidate. In June 1976, Syrian forces intervened to
ongoing Lebanese issue and criticized by Eddeh in the context of Syrian occupation
without any invitation from the authorities (Weinberger, 1986).

Syrian backed Christian militia in Lebanon, who were on the brick of defeat, in
order to avoid partition of Lebanon into two smaller states continued to fight with
Palestinian and Muslim groups. Meanwhile, Libya and Iraq pumped large quantities of
arms to various Palestinian organizations (Cooley, 1979, p. 41). Syrian Army entered to
Lebanon from Beqaa Valley and Zahleh, backed the rightists in order to break Palestinian
defenses in April 1976. Long siege Palestinian refugee camp in East Beirut Tel Al- Zaatar
was occupied with the death of 2,000 refugees.

Meanwhile Egypt proposed to send an Arab Peacekeeping Force into Lebanon

with 1,000 troops composed of half Libyan and half Syrian soldiers of 6,000, which
arrived on June 21 (Cooley, 1979). Soviets supported Palestinians, though Syria was very
important for Soviets to lose as that happened to Egypt. Hence Soviets evaded confront

35
with Syrians on this regard suggesting Palestinians to compromise as soon as possible to
end the war.

On October 16, 1976, Arab countries had arranged Riyadh Summit in Saudi Arabia
(Khalidi W. , 1979, p. 64). According to Riyadh Agreement, between PLO and Lebanese
government 1969 Cairo Agreement reinstituted (Cooley, 1979, p. 47). It has been decided
to send Arab Deterrent Force to Lebanon in order to sustain peace. It has been decided to
send 30,000 troops under President Sarkis‟ command. He could also determine the size of
Syrian troops present in Lebanon. Although, 20,000 Syrian troops have already been in
Lebanon, they only donned by white helmets that they were sent by the ADF (Weinberger,
1986, p. 218). Finally, Syria and PLO also compromised, and PLO began to withdraw its
forces from the south and mountain terrains. Until Cairo Conference, fights in Lebanon
resumed (Cooley, 1979, p. 48); though officially the civil war has ended.

The conflict seemed as religious hostilities between Christians and Muslims, as

Chamoun defined the situation, it was between “PLO left and Lebanese right” (Abraham,
1996, p. 32). It was hoped by the leaders that the conseq uences of the conflict would be
similar to 1958 which provided more rights and privileges for Muslims and they would
compromise. Contrary, it was not possible to keep the “old style” politics, preserving
traditional Lebanese politics based on local landlords and their militia. It was proved that
even Arafat lost control over the battle and disabled to mediate between Jumblatt and
Gemayel. Eventually, Arafat lost credit among non compromised young militia leaders.

PLO objective in this conflict was to control South Lebanon and launch attacks to
Israel without any government restriction. Obviously, achieving this goal was passing
through turning Southern Lebanon into “Fatahland” as Abu Musa (Abraham, 1996, p. 33)
stated in 1976. South Lebanon, being home to Shiite Muslims of Lebanon was disturbed by
the PLO and its militia; grudgingly hated Palestinians more than the Israelis raiding inside
in South Lebanon displacing Shiites and drawing them to suburbs of Beirut. By the Syrian
intervention between Lebanese government and PLO the Cairo Accord of 1969 has been
renewed, thus PLO excluded itself from the Lebanese affairs.

36
2.1.6.2. The Second Phase of the Civil War 1978-1982

On 11 March 1978, eleven Fatah fighters hijacked two buses with their sixty-three
passengers, driving on the route from Haifa to Tel Aviv. The fighters also opened fire to
the vehicles on the route killing 37 Israelis. The Fatah fighters were killed, though this was
too much for Israel (Cooley, 1979, p. 51). Two of the guerillas and eighty two Israelis had
wounded. They were al- Fatah fighters aiming to capture Hilton Hotel with its occupants to
demand urgent liberation of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. Once again Lebanon
became battleground for foreign forces with devastating result for the rest of the country.

On March 14, four days later following the “bus incident” Israel launched an
operation which was called “Operation Litani” into Southern Lebanon. Israel occupied
Southern Lebanon with 15,000 troops, air bombed Palestinian refugee camps and also both
north and south of Litani River. 200,000 Lebanese evacuated their devastated and
destroyed houses and farms fled to northern Lebanon while Palestinian refugee camps
were under heavy air strikes by Israeli air attacks. Saudi Arabia called for imminent
intervention from President Carter, regarding Israeli withdrawal.

U.N. Security Council called immediate withdrawal of Israel and passed Resolution
425. U.N. Security Council decided to send peace forces creating U.N. Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL) with 4,000 troops under French leadership along with Iranian,
Norwegian, Swedish, and later Nepalese and Fiji contingents (Cooley, 1979, p. 53). Syria
declared that she would not enter into open conflict with Israel, though Algeria, Iraq and
Libya announced their support to fighting PLO against Israeli aggression.

Gun shots and attacks unabatedly continued between various fractions. Syrians,
once allied with Phalangists, fought with Christian militia; while Phalange Forces fought
with Chamoun‟s Tigers and Faranjieh‟s militia, also killing Tony Faranjieh with his wife
and child (Abraham, 1996; Winslow, 1996). Rocket fire between Plangists and Syrians
continued on into 1979. Israel shelled Palestinians and UNIFIL as well; Syrians exchanged
fire with South Lebanese Army (SLA), an Israeli creation for security in South Lebanon.

Israel announced that they would withdraw from Lebanon in three phases. The first
phase began on April 4; eventually the area evacuated by Israel was filled by UNIFIL. The
second phase required SLA to fill the gap in Southern Lebanon. Israel installed South

37
Lebanon Army (SLA), a militia of Christian forces under the command of Major Saad
Haddad, on 27 March 1978. SLA was planned to be an armed organization against PLO
contingents remained in Southern Lebanon. However Haddad also assumed that he would
recruit Shiite youngsters in the militia under Christian command, almost the whole militia
composed of Christians. Fierce attacks in the terrain hadn‟t ended between PLO, Israel,
Syria, various militias and now South Lebanese Army (SLA). On the third phase Israel
withdrew completely leaving narrow “security zone” which was a “buffer zone” between
Palestinians and Israelis. When on 4 April 1978, both Lebanese Christian and Muslim
militia leaders agreed to abolish and ban all private militia, but their pleas went unheeded
under Syrian and Israeli artillery (Winslow, 1996, p. 220).

Syrian efforts to make Suleiman Frangieh president had been thwarted by the
attacks of Bashir Gemayel in Zahleh, in central Beirut in April 1981. There were strong
relations with Israel and Gemayel in the matter of presidency issue. Israel wanted to see a
friendly government in Lebanon due to suppress the conflict in South Lebanon (Mackey,
2009). Gemayel was a good candidate for the position. On the other hand, Syria was aware
of the danger and attacked to Phalange in order to prevent them to capture Zahleh.
Gemayel called for aid from Begin and got what he need ed. Israeli fighter jets shot down
two Syrian helicopters.

Syria responded placing surface to air missiles into Zahle. On 17 July 1981, Israel
aircrafts bombed PLO offices in Beirut. This incident caused Israel to be criticized
worldwide and U.N Security Council announced that 300 civilians had been killed and 800
wounded. Temporarily, U.S aircrafts exports had been ceased to Israel.

2.1.6.3. The Third Phase of the Civil War 1982-1989

Israeli- PLO attacks continued in South Lebanon despite Lebanese state‟s pressures
to the PLO. Moreover in the United Kingdom, Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov was
killed by Abu Nidal, Ariel Sharon conducted a plan to put an end to PLO activities and
eliminate Lebanon in the list of hostile states to Israel after Egypt (Norton, 2007, p. 32;
Schiff & Ya'ari, 1984).

On 9 May 1982, Sunday, Israel attacked to PLO as a counter attack of PLO

bombings of an Israeli bus. On the other hand, these activities were violation of cease fire

38
(Winslow, 1996, p. 229). On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon unheeding U.N.
Security Council Resolution 508. Israel planned to weaken PLO in Southern Lebanon, stop
PLO shelling Galilee and also guarantee a permanent peace agreement with Lebanon
(Picard & Philip, 1996, pp. 122-124).

It was not a surprise Israeli invasion (Winslow, 1996, p. 230). IDF had proceeded
beyond its self made limit of twenty five mile and advanced towards Beirut pushing PLO
into West Beirut. Syria striped itself out of the clashes with a cease fire on June 7, though
lost all of its SAM II missiles and several aircrafts. Phalange militia welcomed their Israeli
allies (Picard & Philip, 1996, p. 125). On the Damascus- Beirut Highway, Israel and Syria
once again came to head to head which finalized by another cease fire on 24 June
(Winslow, 1996, p. 232). Syria had to withdraw into Bekaa and remained out of the
ongoing conflict between Israel and PLO.

On 9 June 1982, U.N Security Council passed Resolution 509 renewing demand of
withdrawal of Israel unconditionally behind internationally recognized borders with
Lebanon. The U.S.A. vetoed the resolution giving implicit assent to the Israeli invasion.
Israel moved into Lebanon bombing PLO positions in West Beirut, even though the plan
argued in Knesset was limited with securing Northern borders of Israel and destroying
PLO bases in South Lebanon. Ariel Sharon was Defense Minister and he intended to also
invade Beirut destroying PLO altogether with its leadership.

U.N Security Council worked for a cease fire at once, but they faced with the veto
of the US in favor of Israel. On 12 August 1982, a cease fire had been placed on the table,
a multinational force of U.S Marines; French and Italian forces would secure PLO out of
Lebanon and protect the civilians. On 20 August 1982, the multinational forces landed in
Lebanon to assist departure of PLO. Israel claimed that 2,000 PLO fighters have been
hiding in the refugee camps. PLO evacuated Lebanon with American ships to destinations
in Middle East leaving Palestinian people behind. Since 1958, it was 1982 that the US
Marines landed on Beirut again, but they left on September 10, 1982. Winslow (1996, p.
235) states that departure of US Marines was premature that led the massacres in Sabra and
Shatilla refugee camps.

39
 On 23 August 1982, Bashir Gemayel was elected as the president of Leba non under
siege of Israeli army. Israel has secured a peace treaty with Lebanon finally. Covertly,
Asad warned Gemayel if he would have attempted to sign a peace treaty, he would attack
to Lebanese state; though Gemayel sought for independence from both of these invading
forces (Winslow, 1996, p. 235). Gemayel‟s presidency has been boycotted by Muslims;
nevertheless, he was assassinated on 14 September 1982. His death left Israeli plans for
Lebanon incomplete.

Just after assassination of Gemayel, on 16 September 1982, 200 Phalangist militias

were transferred to refugee camps in Sabra and Shatilla supposed to be under Israeli
protection looking for PLO units which. They killed approximately 2,000 refugees
composed of mostly women, children and elderly (Karx & Cohl, 1983). They left the
camps on 19 September. The massacre of Sabre and Shatilla met with co ndemnation
throughout the world; while bringing back the US Marines in Beirut along with French and
Italian troops to protect Palestinian refugee camps. Lebanon elected its eighth president
Amin Gemayel, older brother of deceased Bashir Gemayel on September 21, 1982.
Gemayel vowed to end the “violence” immediately.

On May 17, 1983, Lebanon, the USA and Israel signed and agreement. This
agreement required Israeli withdrawal along with Syrian troops, though Syria opposed the
agreement and declined negotiations for withdrawal (Winslow, 1996; Khalaf, 2002). The
agreement was proposed to end “state of war” between Lebanon and Israel along with
normalization of the relations. As a result, Israel could continue to hold her grip on South
Lebanon (Picard & Philip, 1996, p. 136).

Israel pulled back from Chouf region where Druze populatio n was in majority
evacuating the buffer zone between Muslims and Christians. Druze took the control of
Chouf once occupied by Israelis leaving vulnerable Gemayel gover nment and Phalange.
Clashes erupted just after Walid Jumblatt‟s declaration of “state of war” with Gemayel
government on September 1. On September 12, the American destroyer John Rodgers was
ordered to attack on Druze positions. This implied that America also took side in sectarian
conflict of Lebanon losing its neutrality with Christians. They became vulnerable as well
(Winslow, 1996, p. 242).

40
 In 1983 brought more conflict and violation to Lebanon. On March 5, Amine
Gemayel had to cancel May 17 Agreement that he couldn‟t resist pressures from Druze and
Muslim units. In Beirut, anti US and Western attacks had begun. Suicide attacks were the
most common events in Beirut. On 23 October 1983, a suicide bomb in Beirut targeted U.S
and French forces killing 241 US and 58 French servicemen. Islamic Jihad was accused for
the very same bombings (Winslow, 1996; Picard & Philip, 1996) as well as Shiite
organization Hezbollah. When the American battleship New Jersey once again shelled
Druze positions, Islamic Jihad issued another warning to the Americans, taking hostages
on December 22, 1983 (Winslow, 1996, p. 244). However American involvement in
Lebanese Civil War had very important consequences in the context of establishment of
new organizations. In South Lebanon, Hezbollah strengthened its positions and filled the
vacuum gap after PLO evacuation.

In February 1984, U.S forces withdrew from Leba non, on 20 September 1984
another US embassy attack took place in East Beirut. The period between 1986 and 1989
was very hard for Lebanese that the sectarian conflict continued to harm Lebanon.
Especially, in 1986, bombings, kidnappings and murder perceived as daily activities.
Western hostage taking reached its zenith in 1985 and 1986 by radical groups working
under Hezbollah umbrella. One of the most significant case occurred on June 14, 1985,
that was hijacking of TWA plane which landed in Beirut finally. Amal leader Nebih Berri
mediated, hence the hostages were handed over in exchange for an “unlinked” release of
300 Arab prisoners in Israel (Winslow, 1996, p. 250).

Continually, leaders of militia and political parties sought for a solution to ongoing
conflict. In 1983, in Geneva notables and leaders of Lebanon organized a conference
without considerable success. Only Arab identity of Lebanon could be agreed on. In 1984,
in Lausanne another conference was held. However in 1985, with support of Syrians,
representatives of the militias met in Damascus and signed “Tripartite Agreement”, an
agreement designed to end Lebanese conflict which regulated relations with Syria and
implemented some political reforms. Though, this agreement was rendered null and void
when Elie Hobeika, head of Lebanese Forces, also one of the signatories, ousted from the
organization (Krayem, 2005).

41
 Prime Minister Rafik Karami failing to construct a peace agreement in 1984 was
assassinated on June 1, 1987. However assassination attempts to those party and militia
leaders continued. Hezbollah head of religion Sheik Fadallah was targeted though the
bomb blasted killed eight bystanders, left Fadlallah untouched (Winslow, 1996, p. 262).
This assault admitted that was a CIA-Saudi operation which was failed. Amine Gemayel,
at the end of his office appointed General Michel Aoun as Prime Minister in September
1988.

This choice caused disputes in the country that the national pact had been violated.
In West Beirut, Selim al- Hoss was elected as prime minister of the civilian government,
while in East Beirut General Aoun formed his own government declaring himself sole
legitimate governor of Lebanon. On November 5, the Chamber of Deputies elected Rene
Muawad as president of the republic, whereas conflict and violence didn‟t come to abrupt
end. On November 22, 1989, Rene Muawad was killed by a car bomb in Beirut. On
November 24, Elias Hrawi was elected under Syrian protection. Emile Lahoud was
appointed to head of Lebanese Army instead of General Aoun.

General Aoun sought for alliance with Lebanese Forces leader Geagea, indeed
Geagea was ready to submit his leadership; only if General Aoun supplied himself with
Iraqi arms shipments. General Aoun on February 24, 1989 announced that he would oust
all foreign occupiers from Lebanese soil as well as closing down all illegal ports (Winslow,
1996, p. 272). All ports of Lebanon being the major entry points for arm shipments and
narcotics disturbed everyone and raised the tension between Aoun and militias controlling
the ports.

Aoun began to “war of liberation”, on March 14, 1989 following the receipt of
shipment from Iraq. Indeed, General Aoun aimed to gain control of the whole country at
once General Shehab achieved in 1958. In this regard, Geagea‟s and Aoun‟s goals
overlapped, even though Geagea pursued another p lan for power control: “federal
Lebanon” (Winslow, 1996; Picard & Philip, 1996, p. 128). This was the main reason that
brought two Maronite leaders head to head in one of the bloodiest conflict of the Civil
War. After series of attacks, Lebanese Forces captured two thirds of the Christian enclave.

42
On May 15, a ceasefire had been issued between Aoun and Geagea, though conflict with
Aoun didn‟t end.

In 1989, Ta‟if Accord was signed due to solving the conflict. General Aoun didn‟t
show consent to this agreement because of the absence of an exact date for withdrawal of
Syrian Army and announced traitors whoever accepted this agreement. Aoun‟s resistance
in presidential palace lasted until August 2, 1990. After heavy Syrian attack, he had to
surrender to Syrian Army leaving his troops to mercy of Syrians. Ten months later, Aoun
deported out of Lebanon and sent to exile to France.

2.1.6.4. Ta’if Accord (National Reconciliation)

Walter states that “…groups fighting civil wars almost always chose to fight to the
finish unless and outside power stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement.” (1997, p. 335).
In Lebanese case, even though the US, Syria, Israel and Arab League “stepped in to
guarantee a peace agreement”, their efforts went astray. “Maybe the Saudis knew how to
deal with Christian Lebanon” (1996, p. 274) as Winslow put it, in 1989, Saudi Arabian
King Fahd called for a summit solving Lebanese conflict.

King Fahd‟s efforts were also assisted by future Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who
was assassinated on February 14, 2005. Hariri was one of the delegates in King Fahd‟s
envoy (Blanford, 2006). Sixty-two deputies, thirty one Christian and thirty one Muslim,
went to Ta‟if regarding the call from Saudi Arabia for a “national reconciliation”. These
were the ones who were elected in 1972 elections out of 99 originally elected. Although
many of the deputies were quite old and some other had passed away already.

After a month of discussion, “national reconciliation” or Ta‟if Accord finally

ratified on November 4, in Qulayat air base. Document of National Reconciliation thus
ended the civil war in Lebanon. Taif Accord, in fact, sought for solution to three major
issues in Lebanon: (1) The identity conflict, (2) sovereignty of the country and presence of
foreign troops, (3) power sharing, and political reform.

However demands were in the direction of secularization of the political system and
abolition of confessionalism; the document restructured 1943 National Pact (Picard &
Philip, 1996, p. 156). Indeed, Taif Accord, Political Reforms section, Article 5 maintained

43
possibility of abolishing confessionalism: “Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an
election law free of sectarian restriction…” (The Taif Agreement, 1989). Number of
deputies increased to 128 and decided to be distributed equally between Christians and
Muslims. Additionally, a Senate consisted of “spiritual families” should be formed and
confined to crucial issues (Taif Agreement, 1989, Section II, Article 7). Distribution of
high rank seats arranged in favor of Muslims that was half and half with Christians (Maila,
1992) while it enabled selection of lower rank officials regardless of confessional
affiliations (Abul- Husn, 1998, p. 104).

Ta‟if Agreement also reduced the privileges of president whom decorated with
great powers by 1943 National Pact, transferred to executive branch. Though Maronite
President, Sunni prime minister and Shiite Speaker rule was cemented in this document as
it was in “1943 National Pact” (Picard & Philip, 1996, p. 158) and yet it was formalized. In
Parliament, Speaker‟s position gained importance because its term of office has been
extended to four years. The Parliament acquired increased powers to draft and administer
laws. In the issues of national security, it must be approved by two thirds of the majority

All the “Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” were disbanded and delivered their
arms to State of Lebanon, whereas Hezbollah kept its arms despite the Ta‟if Accord. The
document also aimed to provide security to individuals in all means of transportation (land,
air, sea). This agreement emphasized unity of Lebanon and indicated that Lebanon was the
homeland for all the Lebanese without discrimination Arab or Maronite; also implied
“independence” of Lebanon.

Ta‟if Accord couldn‟t achieve to create a nation. “Actually, the state is not derived
from national consensus: yet, rather than having a desire to live togethe r, as holds in the
consensus democracies such as Switzerland or the Netherlands, the Lebanese communal
groups have an obligation to live together, an obligation which arises neither from idealism
or ideology” (Salame, 1994, p. 105). Sectarianism remained as basis of the constitution.
Yet the Document clearly stated Arab identity and affiliation of the state, couldn‟t achieve
to create a common “Lebanese identity” apart from Arab identity.

Still the agreement left unsolved the sovereignty problem of Lebanon, because due
to Resolution 425, Israel supposed to withdraw unconditionally and thus Syria would do

44
the same, though Israel refused to discuss the resolution. However, the peace settlement
had limited effect in the context of permanent solution to Lebanese issue. Walter criticizes
that the agreement only implied the military and security aspects leaving “political and
religious differences between the opposing Lebanese factions ” (1997, p. 352).

Ta‟if Accord restored peace and relative stability, was a reform package and
introduced 31 constitutional amendments which were approved by the Lebanese
Parliament. Confessionalism was kept as the political system of Lebanon whereas it was
stated in the Accord abolishing it is a national goal without considerable timetable.
Ostensibly, confessionalism has been considered a temporary arrangement since 1943
(Krayem, 2009). Yet it contributed equal representation of the various sectarian and
religious groups (Makdisi & Sadaka, 2005, p. 61), is still in effect in 2009 despite renewed
demands to abolish it.

Even though Taif Accord couldn‟t achieve to solve “national unity”, Palestinian
refugee issues, confessionalism and sovereignty issues altogether, it compromised warring
sectarian components of the country under an umbrella. The document emphasized
necessity of Syrian troops and endorsed their presence for an unknown period, even though
it implied that Syrian troops would withdraw to Bekaa Valley after two years following
election of a new president. On the other hand, confessionalism remained main obstacle for
the forthcoming governments in the context of forming an acceptable and stable “national
unity cabinet” as well as endangering implementation of full sovereignty over all the
corner of the state. Foreign involvement dominated both domestic and foreign affairs in
post Civil War era.

2.2. Demographic and Geopolitical Structure

Geopolitics, gained importance mainly in 1930s and 40s, is a discourse that argues
relation between geography and foreign policy (O Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2006). In
broader sense, geopolitics could be described “the founding and specification of the state
as a national community” (O Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, p. 3), hence includes making one
national identity, establishing boundary and “converting diverse places into a unitary
internal space”. Coleman (2005) argues that it is vital to focus on historical evolution,
geography, identity state apparatus and power network. Nation building, identity and

45
undeniably boundaries, occupied Middle East‟s agenda where is one of the hottest spot on
world map.

Middle East has been always considered important location due to its strategic
position, valuable resources, commercial role and multicultural structure of the
demography (Spykman, 1944, p. 66). Therefore; period after the World War I and II
played pivotal role in Middle Eastern geopolitics means of determining the boundaries.
However, Mackinder (1904) believes that nation formation was embodied by necessity of
resistance to external forces; the Middle Eastern states were created by dominant powers
such as France and Britain in 19 th century. Though, “the establishment of internally
recognized boundaries was crucial in terms of sovereignty, legitimacy and ultimately,
survival” (Anderson & Fisher, 2000, p. 265) and boundaries constitutes the most important
problem to be studied (Haushofer, 1942). Obviously, location of states on the world map
has great influence and importance in states‟ evolution (Held & McDonald Held, 2000, p.
203).

Within the established boundaries, “raison d’etre” is basic unifying force in a state
among its people. Hartshorne defines raison d’etre as “dominance of unifying factors over
divisive factors in a state” (Hartshorne, 1950; Held & McDonald Held, 2000, p. 205). In
Middle East, with the exception of Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia; borders of theses states
were drawn by colonial powers regardless of a consensus of the people settled on those
lands.

Lack of consensus and consent regarding raison d’etre brought several civil
disturbances in Lebanon respectively along with Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. Huntington
(1993) in his celebrated essay “Clash of Civilizations” labels these countries as “torn
countries”. These countries want to be Western through political elites, yet their
communities emphasize their distinct non- Western identity.

Lebanon, even though was the smallest state in Middle East, occupies very
important place in geopolitical and demographic concept. Lebanon‟s ethnic and religious
diversity, multicultural structure, distinct and complicated geography increase its
significance in the region. Nevertheless, identity and boundary issues as they are subjects
of geopolitical discourse, significantly constitutes major issues of this tiny state as well.

46
2.2.1. Geopolitical Structure of Lebanon

Independent Lebanon was established in the old area of Ottoman province Mt.
Lebanon, though in 1920 General Henri Gauraud announced borders of “Le Grand Liban”
as “from Nahr al- Kabir in the north to Ra‟s al- Naqura in the south, from the
Mediterranean in the West to the Anti- Lebanon in the east” (Zisser, 2001b, p. 1).
Difference of these new borders from the Ottoman Mt. Lebanon was that Beirut, costal
cities Sidon and Tyre, Tripoli, Bekaa Valley and Jabel Akkar and Jabel Amil were
included into “Greater Lebanon”.

Figure 1: Physical Map of Lebanon

Source: http://mapsof.net/uploads/static- maps/lebanon_topography.png

Mountains. Lebanon has a linear mountain range that causes communication issues
with the other side of the mountains (Held & McDonald Held, 2000). Indeed, labyrinth like
mountains of Lebanon, especially Mount Lebanon, provided isolation and security to
several groups such as Maronites and Druses. The highest mountain is Qurnat al-Sawda

47
reaching 3,088m in Tripoli. Anti Lebanon Mountains stands at the border with Syria, are
very similar to Mount Lebanon in the context of its ragged structure. Eastern highlands
reaches 2,000m and the summit of Mount Hermon, a southerly extension of the eastern
highlands reaches 2,813m, though this region remained uninhabited.

Rivers. Lebanon is a water rich country when compared with neighbour Arab states
and Israel. Litani River which is located in Southern Lebanon has vital importance for
Lebanese. The river rises from southern Bekaa Valley and runs southward finally reaches
to Mediterranean Sea. The river produces electric power; utilize two major irrigation
projects in Bekaa Project and Qasimiyah Project.

On the other hand, Israel, being a water scarce country also seeks ways to increase
its water resources and Litani River, was mentioned among “interests” of Israel by David
Ben Gurion (Kliot, 1994; Amery, 1993) though Israel gave up her interests on Litani River.
Lebanon has already accused Israel for stealing water from the river via diverting the river
during 1978-2000 occupation of Southern Lebanon (UPI, 2009), indicates a future dispute
between two states (Amery, 1993; Held & McDonald Held, 2000). However, Kliot,
referring Naff‟s testimony in 1990 regarding Litani River states that Israeli usage of the
water was insignificant and carried by trucks (Kliot, 1994, p. 198).

Boundaries. Lebanon, is a country on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea,

has borders with Syria in the north and east, and Israel in the south. Borders with Syria
have been set by France during colonial times in 1920 without serious opposition; though
the borders have never fully decided on minor areas such as Shebaa Farms and Ghajar
Region. On the other hand, borders with Israel have been decided in 1923 with an A nglo-
French Agreement.

Border settlement with British controlled Palestine- now lays Israel- and French
controlled Lebanon dates back to 1916 Sykes- Picot Agreement. Due to French interests,
the borders were decided from Litani River, cutting Palestine from water resources which
are vital for progress of the territories. In 1918, Britain conquered Palestine and Syria
feeling free to undermine French interests. Furthermore increasing Zionist demands for
water resources were most welcomed by British negotiators. The British demanded to

48
stretch the northern border line up to Litani River and Banias Springs on the slopes of
Mount Hermon (Eshel, 2001).

In 1919 Paris Peace Conference it was proposed that control of the water resources
should be decided with bilateral agreements, though this proposal rendered null and void
(Kaufman, 2009). In 1919, the final decision over the border de marcation was left to
Britain and France; yet it was in December 1920 that an acceptable solution was extracted.
It was decided that Nas al- Naqurah should be the border between Palestine and Lebanon.

Indeed the borders meant nothing to inhabitants living border towns continuing their
daily business crossing the border. In the border area Jews, Christians and Shiites lived
side by side together, whereas these territories became a haven for smugglers and armed
bands because of lack of governmental control. It was in 1938 when first barbed wires
were built in order to seal the border, preventing terrorist acts infiltrated into Palestine.

Although, internationally recognized boundaries between Lebanon and Israel were

remained unchanged after 1948 First Israel- Arab War. Israeli withdrawal in May 2000
inflamed border disputes between Lebanon and Israel again. UN Resolution 425 (1978)
called on Israel to pull back to “internationally recognized boundaries”, no one agreed on
the borders. The UN therefore decided on a “withdrawal line” which was named as Blue
Line; though Lebanese government raised many objections despite this line is a temporary
border which should be decided between Lebanon and Israel.

Figure 2: Map of the Shebaa Farms

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/763504.stm

49
 In addition to “Blue Line” arguments, an Alawite village Al Ghajar caused war with
Lebanon and Israel in 2006. Al-Ghajar which is located 4km east of Metulla an Israeli
village was shown within Lebanese borders in British war maps and also Israeli maps. In
1967, after short period of occupation, Israel withdrew its troops from the village.
However; residents of the village rejected that they were Syrians, calling for Israel should
occupy Ghajar (Kaufman, 2009; Eshel, 2001). The village grew to the north extending into
Lebanese territory. Two thirds of Ghajar stayed in Lebanon while one third remained in
Israeli occupied Syria (Kaufman, 2009). Israel can‟t annex Lebanese part of the village that
would be violation of “UN Blue Line”. In 2006, Israel occupied northern part of the village
unheeding 1701 Resolution.

The last controversy between Israel and Lebanon is Shebaa Farms, on the foothills
of Mount Hermon. Shebaa Farms has been drawn into Syrian territory since independence
of the both states. On one hand, inhabitants of Shebaa Farms pronounce themselves as
Lebanese (Kaufman, 2002). Due to solve this controversial situation in 1956 a joint
Lebanese-Syrian committee made analysis for the fate of this territory. The committee
proposed Shebaa Farms should be in Lebanese territories, though between two states there
was no agreement and Shebaa Farms was shown in Syrian boundaries after that. In 1967,
Israel captured Shebaa Farms as part of Golan Heights as well.

Consequently, Lebanon claims that Shebaa Farms belonged to Lebanon under

unwritten agreement between Lebanon and Syria; on the contrary UN clearly states that the
Shebaa Farms are in Syrian territory. Yet, Syria and Lebanon declare that this 22km2 of the
Golan Heights has already been left Lebanon. This piece of land constituted major reason
with clashes in 2006 between Hezbollah and Israel. Even in 2010, Ghajar and Shebaa
Farms are shown as legitimization of Hezbollah‟s “resistance” to Israeli occupation despite
the fact that UN certified “completion of Israeli withdrawal” from Lebanon in 2000
(Kaufman, 2002).

2.2.2. Sectarian and Belief Groups and Their Distribution in Lebanon

Lebanon from the time being became home to different religions and various
sectarian groups. If it should be given a number of the official sectarian groups, eighteen
different groups actively present in today‟s Lebanon. Lebanese sects are: Sunnis, Shiites,

50
Druzes, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Latins, Protestants, Armenian
Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Assyrians, Jews, Alawittes, and others.
Furthermore, majority of Lebanese sects are Arabs, and among non- Arab ethnic groups
Armenians compose the largest group. There are also Kurds, Chaldeans, White Russians,
Assyrians, Syriacs and many European minorities. Besides Ismaili, Coptic, and other some
new ethnic and religious groups were recognized by Lebanese officials.

According to 1932 census, Maronite Christians consisted of 32 percent of the

overall population and enjoyed slightly numerical majority over the next largest religious
group Sunni Muslims. Another census that was held in 1942 despite its dubious results was
recognized as an equivalent (Qubain, 1961). Other relatively large sects were Greek
Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Shia Muslims, and Druze. Despite the fact that some sects are
majorities over the others Lebanon was and remains “a country of minorities” (Zahar,
2005, p. 220).

According to the Economic Research Institute of the American University of Beirut

research partly based on official data estimated the religious distribution in 1956 as follows
(Qubain, 1961, p. 8):

Muslims and Druze Sub-Total Total

Sunnis 286,000
Shi‟as 250,000
Druze 88,000 624,000
Christians
Maronites 424,000
Greek Orthodox 149,000
Greek Catholics (Melkites) 91,000
Armenian Orthodox 64,000
Armenian Catholics 15,000
Protestants 14,000
Syrian Catholics 6,000
Syrian Orthodox 5,000
Latins (Roman Catholics) 4,000
Chaldeans 1,000 773,000

Miscellaneous
Jews 7,000
Others 7,000 14,000
Grand Total 1,411,000

51
Table 1: Distribution of Population According to Sectarian Groups in 1956.

Source: Qubain, F.I., Crisis in Lebanon, p.8

When we come of today, according to the data retrieved from CIA Factbook, the
Muslim population is estimated 59,7 percent, the Christians 39 percent, and other 1,3
percent of the total population (CIA, 2010). In Muslim population Shiites are the largest
single sect in Lebanon which is around 45 percent. Sunnis follows Shiites with 20 percent
of the total population, furthermore forms the most influential group in political sphere.
Druses are consisted 8 percent of the population, also play important role in socio-political
arena of Lebanon.

Maronites are the largest Christian sect which has 19 percent ratio in total
population. Maronites are highly involved in Lebanese politics and social life, as well as
created modern Lebanese state in 1920 pressuring France; nevertheless their population
decreased resultant to devastating civil war. Many of the Maronites immigrated to Europe
and the USA. The second largest Christian sect is Greek Orthodox which is about 6
percent, whereas they are spread all over Lebanon and not influential in politics.

Other important groups are that non- Arab Armenians which compose of about 6
percent of the total population; while Kurds considered as second largest minority, are
estimated around 1 percent (Held & McDonald Held, 2000, p. 263). Jewish minority in
Lebanon doesn‟t exceed 100 people in 1990; however it was more than 20,000 at the turn
of century and 7,000 in 1950s. Palestinians on the other hand consists 10 percent of overall
population.

Historically each sectarian community were prone to live specific locations with majority
of their own communities. Often these divided sectors contain other communities within.
Maronites, in majority lived in Mount Lebanon. The Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics
mainly located in central Lebanon. Sunni Muslims concentrated in Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli,
coastal cities and also region of Akkar (Abul- Husn, 1998, p. 6). Sunnis constitute one third
of Beirut. Shiite population dominated South Lebanon and northern Bekaa while Druses
live in southern half of Mount Lebanon and also east and south of Beirut (Qubain, 1961;
Held & McDonald Held, 2000). Chouf region is known as stronghold of Druze
community.

52
 During the notorious civil war, after Israeli invasion in 1982, another division
occurred among same sectarian groups. Christians divided in three geographically: “South
central, Chamouns; central, the Gemayels; and North Farangiyehs” (Winslow, 1996, p.
248). Tripoli, Sidon and partially Beirut became Sunni dominated areas, whereas Shiites
also divided geographically that those in Jebel Amil, those in south and west sectors of
Beirut, and those living in the Baalbek- Hermil districts of Bekaa Valley. Christian
population who live in Mount Lebanon was 55 percent in 1975, whereas it has shrunk to 5
percent in 1980s due to massive mobilization (Khalaf, 1993).

Figure 3: Contemporary Distribution of Lebanon‟s Main Religious Groups

Source: Library of Congress Geography and Map Division Washington, D.C.

Today members of each sectarian group still prefer to live in their historical home.
Composition of the cities hasn‟t been changed at all since they were first settled in these
lands. Mount Lebanon still welcomes its Maronite and Druze residents, as Chouf is known

53
where Druses control. South Lebanon, however PLO in 1982 and SLA and Israel in 2000
left the region, still has Shiites in majority. Beirut “jewel of Arab world”, after so many
disasters and wars is still alive with its cosmopolite structure. In Beirut one can meet
Christians, Sunnites and Shiites at once, even though Shiite population increased in due
time, living in slums of Beirut.

54
3. POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND MAIN IDEOLOGIES

3.1. Lebanese Political System

Lebanon, a “parliamentary democracy” constitutes one of the two democracies in

the Middle East with a unique political system. This system is called “confessionalism”
and in effect since 1926 marks the first elections of Lebanese state under French Mandate.
This system emphasizes distinct confessions in the smallest state of the Middle East, and
continues millet tradition that Ottoman administration implemented (Krayem, 2009).

In a broad description “confessionalism” (ta’ifiyya) is “a set of traditional,

constitutional, and electoral practices which aim at the distribution of parliamentary seats,
government, and civil service positions in accordance with the numerical ratio of the
various sects in the Lebanese population” (Suleiman M. , 1967a, p. 110), thus it
“permeates every governmental agency, and envelopes e very social structure in the
country, including political parties” (Suleiman M. , 1967b, p. 682) In this system “each
confessional community is thought of as a separate, identifiable group” (Peleikis, 2001, p.
404). Hence, political rights are allocated to individuals according to their confessional
affiliations and also personal status laws are given under control of religious communities.

Indeed the heterogeneous and plural character of Lebanese demography could be

presented as the reason of such a system. Muslims and Christians consisting of the biggest
communities are divided into smaller confessions which are very different from each other.
Even these confessions can be compared with different nationalities. Mühlbacher (2009, p.
80) illustrates that the 1943 National Pact and also confessionalism in Lebanon were
mainly dedicated to power share among the main religious groups and solidarity against
French Mandate by the political elites in pre-war era.

There are eighteen officially recognized sects whose rights and representation has
been guaranteed in the constitution. The proportional representation in t he parliament and
also lower degree official positions is the main characteristic of the system. This system
doesn‟t let any political party to come to power alone but to form coalitions with other
parties and share the ministries with also with the opposition party members. Rigid lines of
allocation of the administration tasks among the sects disable efficiency of the state

55
apparatus and make it difficult to implement democratic reforms (Hudson M. , 1976, p.
117).

3.1.1. Executive Branch

In a community where there are eighteen officially recognized sects, frankly power
struggles are quite natural that sometimes turned to bloody civil strife throughout the
history. How to allocate top positions among the sects was solved in 1943 with “National
Pact”: Maronite president, Sunni prime minister and Shiite speaker of parliament with
Greek Orthodox as his deputy (Hourani A. , 1985; Kalawoun, 2000; Khalidi W. , 1979;
Salibi K. S., 1988). This agreement institutionalized confessional system while allocating
public and governmental posts according to six to five ratio among major sects, in favor of
Christians (51 %) which was majority according to 1932 census over Muslims (49 %).
Eventually, Maronite community dominated Lebanese politics as it was planned from the
beginning (Salibi K. S., 1976) while Shiites “could yield little influence over the political
system at the time, as it was impoverished and underdeveloped” (Norton, 1987, pp. 16-23;
Norton, 2007, p. 12).

The Maronite President had extensive powers and is elected for six year terms by
the Parliament with two thirds of majority (DPADM, DESA, & UN, 2004). The president
cannot succeed himself in office according to the Constitution. However both in 1947 and
1958 presidents of Lebanon tried to amend the constitution in order to succeed themselves,
which engendered disturbance and conflict. Emille Lahoud who was elected in 1998, by
the support of Syria, could achieve to extend his term of office three years that his duty
was ended in 2004, despite anger of opposition leaded by Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri
(Krayem, 2009).

By Ta‟if Accord, extensive rights and powers of the president were reduced; though
it perpetuated the president‟s strong and influential position. The president has the
authority to appoint and to dismiss all members of cabinet including prime minister;
negotiate and ratify treaties; and promulgate laws passed by the Parliament. The president
also has legislative initiative that he has veto power for laws that only majority of the total
Chamber can override. The President is also head of the state as well as the army. In this
regard, this system resembles “presidential” (Qubain, 1961).

56
 The cabinet and the Prime Minister are appointed by the President of the Republic.
The cabinet members may or may not be chosen from among the deputies though
confessional representation is the basis of this selection. Two or three ministerial offices
were given to Maronites and Sunni Muslims whereas only one ministerial office was given
to other religious sects such as Shiite Muslims. The cabinet is responsible both to the
President and the Chamber.

3.1.2. Legislative Branch

The legislature is composed of unicameral Chamber of Deputies in which members

are elected direct ballot for five year terms. Deputies are elected for shorter period than the
president, thus it is probable for the president to manipulate the elections to assure the
victory of loyal candidates (Suleiman M. , Elections in a Confessional Democracy, 1967a).

Members of the Chamber elect the president of the Chamber who must be
traditionally a Shiite, though in 1947 this tradition has been broken and Habib Shahla, an
Orthodox Christian was elected (Qubain, 1961). Kamal Salibi implies that Speaker of
Parliament position has been reserved to Shiites after 1947; hence before this date “in the
original pact, their considerable presence in the country had not been properly taken into
account” (Salibi K. S., 1988, p. 186). Number of seats to be represented by each confession
has been predicated by law. Between 1943 and 1960 the number of Chamber changed from
55 to 77 and later 44, 66 and 99; the numbers confirm that the ratio between Christians and
non Christians was 6:5. Ta‟if Accord regulated this ratio half and half and distributed
parliamentary seats equally. Hence, number of deputies in parliament increased to 128
(Shields, 2008, p. 480).

Elections of deputies are based on list system in order to prevent extremists to come
into power. Competition among the same sectarian groups is intense, thus anyone in the list
has to secure votes of other sects as well as his own (Mühlbacher, 2009, p. 87). Related to
the confessional political system it was also first time that the “list” system in the elections
was introduced (Shields, 2008, p. 483). List system, in this regard forced the candidates to
cooperate and avoid sectarian issues (Suleiman M. , 1967a). Most of the electoral districts
were multi seat districts, thus in an electoral district list of candidates could be combined
by any groups; although this system carried “feudality” to be the main elements of the

57
elections. The formation of the lists mainly centred on land owners, strong clan leaders,
and their appointees whose active participation dates back to Mutasarrafte (Mühlbacher,
2009, p. 88). Threats and violence shadowed free will of the voters and new “feudality”
was established (Qubain, 1961, p. 16).

Legislative branch has authority to make laws, amend the constitution with majority
of votes, to choose president of the republic; however the president of republic may request
the Council of Ministers to resolve the Parliament before their term of office expire. If the
Council of Ministers agrees the president issues a decree of resolution. Within three
months new elections should be held following the dissolution (DPADM, DESA, & UN,
2004).

CONFESSION BEFORE TAIF AFTER TAIF

Maronite 30 34
Greek Orthodox 11 14
Greek Catholic 6 8
Armenian Orthodox 4 5
Armenian Catholic 1 1
Protestant 1 1
Other Christians 1 1
Total Christians 54 64
Sunni 20 27
Shiite 19 27
Druze 6 8
Alawite 0 2
Total Muslims 45 64
TOTAL 99 128

Table 2: Allocation of Seats in the Parliament in 1992 Elections.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Lebanon

In August 2005, the committee for reform of the electoral system began to work.
Electoral system change was necessary after 1992, 1996 and 2000 electoral regulations that

58
only enabled pro- Syrians to be elected. Composition of the committee is also important
that it was comprised of civil servants like academics and lawyers. It was proposed that in
small districts the elections should be on the majoritarian basis, while in big districts list
system, proportional representation should be intact (Shields, 2008, p. 486). In late 2006
when the reform process slowed down election change proposals also suspended.

3.1.3. Judiciary Branch

Judiciary branch constitutes Four Courts of Cassation that has three courts for civil
and commercial cases and one court for criminal cases, Constitutional Council rules on
constitutionality of laws, and Supreme Council hears charges against the president and
prime minister. Article 20 of Constitution also guarantees independence of Judiciary
(DPADM, DESA, & UN, 2004). The Constitutional Council was created in 1990 by the
Taif Agreement. The Council judges coherence of governmental acts to the Constitution
and adjudicates election disputes.

In addition to these there are Sharia Courts which deals with personal matters is
divided between Sunni and Shia units. The Ecclesiastic Courts also undertakes matters for
Christians and Jews respective to their communities. The jurisdictions of these courts are
limited to personal status and family law matters. Salibi explains the Judiciary system that
“in Lebanese Republic, civil, commercial and criminal law was the same for all, and its
administration remained in the hands of state courts. On the other hand, matters of personal
status involving marriage, divorce and inheritance were left to the religious courts of the
different sects which were officially recognized as part of the Lebanese judiciary” (Salibi
K. S., 1988, p. 194). Hudson admits that each religious group manages their own issues
(Hudson, 1967, p. 247). In addition, there are Labor Court, Land Court, Customs
Committee, Military Courts, and Juvenile Courts.

3.2. Leading Political Groups in Lebanese Politics

Lebanese politics has always been based on multi party system, though neither of
these political parties has any significant role without coalitions. Heywood defines multi
party system that “is characterized by competition amongst more than two parties,
reducing the chances of single party government and increasing the likelihood of
coalitions” (Heywood, 2007, p. 287).

59
 Coalitions are strong possibility in multi party systems that Heywood argues,
whereas in Lebanon none of the parties could ever achieve to form a single party
government. Actually, the ratio of maximum vo tes casted to a single party is around 12, 5
percent which is insufficient to form a cabinet alone. Furthermore, despite numerous
political parties represent different religious groups and ideologies, “parties never won one
third of the seats in parliament” (Angrist, 2004, p. 245), majority of the parliamentarians
are consisted of by independents.

Currently, in Lebanon there are more than a hundred political parties active in
politics. Besides, Lebanese political parties are “political machine of confessions” and
“organizational personification of a few powerful politicians” (Congress, 2003; Odeh,
1986). It is not wrong to say Lebanese parties have neither ideology nor political programs
as it is in Western politics. Even the most ideological parties such as Progressive Socialist
Party of Kemal Jumblatt preserved support for his party due to its Druze character rather
than “socialist” ideology of the party. Frankly, in order to gain votes in the parliament also
cooperation with other confessional groups are essential, hence coalitions contents parties
that represent different confessions.

In Lebanon party politics doesn‟t exist, and primary aim of the parties indeed
arrange a position for the party leader and his hand picked deputies (Salem P. , 1998, p.
23). Servant-client relation in the politics was the main characteristic of the Lebanese
politics; whereas in post-civil war years the zuama is replaced by warlords and militant
parties such as Hezbollah (el Khazen, 2003).

Party formation and coalitions after 2005 can be shown notable example to the
statement above. 2005 marked a new era for Lebanese politics in the context of formation
of coalitions. On February 14, 2005 former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri has been
assassinated just before the election. His assassination provoked crowds that poured in
streets to protest Syrian military presence in Lebanon. In the demonstrations held on March
14, 2005, son of Rafik al- Hariri, Saad Hariri formed a pro- Western opposition coalition
against Syrian influence and presence in Lebanon under umbrella of Future Movement.

On March 8, 2005, on the other hand, pro- Syrian political parties called for mass
demonstrations praising Syrian “assistance” and presence in Lebanon thanking for Syrian

60
efforts stabilizing and putting an end to Lebanese Civil War. This pro- Syrian group also
formed a coalition against Cedar Revolution and its pro- Western government. The group
also supports armed “resistance” to the Israeli occupation.

Hence, today Lebanon is divided in two competing camps as pro Western and pro
Syrian. Main ideologies in March 14 is pro Western, in contrast it is pro Syrian in March 8
Coalition under leadership of Hezbollah. Although there are various parties in both
coalitions, in this section below only the most influential and dominant ones have been
studied.

3.2.1. March 8 Coalition

March 8 Coalition has its name from the mass demonstrations that held in
downtown Beirut on March 8, 2005 following Cedar Revolution. In this group there are
twelve political parties which are Amal Movement, Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah,
Skaff Bloc, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Baath
Arab Socialist Party, Popular Nasserite Organization, Lebanese Democratic Party,
Solidarity Party, El Marada, and Arab Democratic Party. Composition of the Coalition is
intrasectarian, that contents Armenians, Maronites, Druze, Greek Catholic, Sunni, Shiite
and Alewite political parties.

3.2.1.1. AMAL Movement

Islamic Movement concept wasn‟t a new co ncept in 1970s when it was introduced
itself under leadership of Musa al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric in South Lebanon where Shiite
population was mainly concentrated. In 1960s clerics educated in Najaf scattered through
Lebanese towns and villages teaching Islam and educate youngsters in Islamic lore.
Meantime these clerics began to establish charity organizations (Coughlin, 2009).

Musa al-Sadr was singled out among these selected clerics with his charismatic
character and power of elocution. Sadr completed his education in Qom and later moved to
Najaf. He began his activities in Saida. He promoted his Islamic ideology and ideas among
Shiite communities in Southern Lebanon (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad, 2009).

One of the most important acts of him was establishment of “High Shiite Council”
in 1967, despite some opposition. Sadr planned to convey Shiite affairs under one roof. He

61
also broadened scope of his activities and founded a social and political institution
“Movement of Deprived”. This institution assisted the “deprived” people who were
dislocated from their lands in Bekaa and South Lebanon because of poverty and clashes.
Movement of Deprived aided all in the slums regardless of their sectarian affiliations
(Norton, 2007, pp. 20-22).

Sadr, along with social and charity organizations, formed a resistance militia called
Amal 13 (hope) in 1974. This date also marks the explosion in the Palestinian Camp Aynul
Behiyye where Amal militias were trained by the PLO. Hence the presence of Amal was
exposed to the public (Qassam, 2007). Nevertheless, Musa al- Sadr disappeared in 1978
leaving his works unfinished in Libya where he was invited by Muammar Qaddafi for
national celebration.

Whereas trained by Fatah, the biggest fraction of PLO, Amal estranged to the PLO
because of their unauthorized operations into Israel. When Israel first entered into Lebanon
in 1978, even though Amal didn‟t approved of this invasion, fought with PLO. In 1982
they welcomed Israeli occupation and operations against PLO (Norton, 2007, p. 23).

Hussein Hussaini assumed to power following Sadr‟s disappearance in 1978 and he

stayed in power from April 1979 to April 1980. Nabih Berri, a secular lawyer, was elected
after Hussaini. Under Nabih Berri‟s leadership, national unity and equality among all
citizens became focal points of Amal‟s program. Amal rejects confessionalism and Berri
personally works for implementation for the Ta‟if Accord that abolishes confessionalism.
Berri, an important political figure, also holds Speaker of Parliament position for 18 years.

In 1980s, Amal joined to National Salvation Committee which had been created by
Lebanese President Elias Sarkis to bridge dialogue among Lebanon‟s most powerful
militia leaders (Norton, 1987, p. 105) during Israeli occupation. This gesture of Amal‟s
anticipated by some radicals in the party that Amal left the track of Islamist ideas within.
In 1982, when some clergy has opposed to Berri‟s secular policies and found Hezbollah as
an alternative for Shiites, Amal and Hezbollah begin to struggle for domination of
Southern Lebanon and Beirut. Amal was also critical for arms of Palestinian camps, thus
attacked to Shatilla on May 19, 1985 starting five year long “war of the camps”, in which

13
Amal is abbreviation of Afwaj al- Muqawama al- Lubnaniyya. It is also called Harakat A mal.

62
Hezbollah sided with Palestinians. Two premier Shiite forces clashed for five years until
Syrian army intervened in Beirut to put an end to the hostilities in May 1988 (Usher, 1997,
p. 63).

Hezbollah and Amal competed for parliamentary seats with each other in 1996
elections; in 2005 the two parties allied under March 8 Coalition. Amal Movement, since
its foundation, emphasizes poor conditions of the Shiite community, inadequate social and
infrastructural facilities in Southern Lebanon and southern suburbs of Beirut. In addition,
Amal also believes that confessional system is the source of the evil and civil strives in
Lebanon that should be abolished as it was stated in Ta‟if as soon as possible.

In this direction it shares the same base with Hezbollah (Nasr & James, 1985, p.
13). Amal militia has been created during al-Sard‟s leadership for protection of the locals
in the South from Israeli assaults. Amal gives full support to “resistance” in the south that
Hezbollah militia resumes. On the other hand, Amal is a secular political party that never
sought for Islamic Republic in Lebanon allied itself with Syria rather than Iran as
Hezbollah did. The organization also has several magazines, television and radio stations
under their control.

3.2.1.2. Free Patriotic Movement

Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) is relatively new political party in Lebanese

politics though the focal figure, Michel Aoun is not a name that hasn‟t been heard of. Aoun
who has been exiled to France in 1990, at the end of the Civil War, returned in 2005 just
after Syrians left Lebanon. On September 18, 2005, Aoun has officially declared
foundation of the party. The Movement is a multi- confessional and secular party though
main supporters are Christians (Maronites). The main ideo logy of the party is secularism
and equality among the citizens.

Indeed FPM was among March 14; though before 2005 elections it allied itself with
Hezbollah, March 8. FPM has signed an understanding (Hezbollah & FPM, 2006) between
Hezbollah regarding the Hezbollah‟s arms in 2006 following the 2005 elections. It
emphasizes importance of normalization of relations with Syria and calls for liberation of
political prisoners in Syria as well as Israel. Aoun also was one of the party leaders along
with Amal and Hezbollah to postpone election date due to change electoral law made

63
under Syrian tutelage (Norton, 2007, p. 130). Furthermore, FPM confirms its support to the
Hezbollah “resistance” and “liberation of Shebaa Farms”, suggests formation of an
effective and powerful Lebanese Army. FPM legitimized with this document of Hezbollah
arms and weapons underlining that they were for liberation of land.

First election experience of the party was in 2005 general elections that had very
detailed program aiming political reforms and economic development. FPM achieved
significant success in the 2005 elections capturing 21 seats in the parliament. Also two of
the ministers took place in the government in 2008. The Movement owns a TV channel
and a radio station which began broadcasting on June 1, 2009.

3.2.1.3. Syrian Social Nationalist Party

Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) was founded in 1932 by Antun Saadah, a
Greek Orthodox. The organization was an underground, a secret organization influenced
by German National Socialists (Payne, 1996, pp. 352-354; Wild, 1985, p. 130). It is one of
the most influential multi-sectarian parties in Lebanon that consisted of Maronites, Druze,
Sunni and Greek Orthodox (Salibi K. S., 1988, pp. 54-55).

Among its members there were students from American University of Beirut where
Saadah taught German. Main program of SSNP was to reunite Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and
Syria and create Greater Syria that was opposed to pan- Arabism and Lebanese nationalism
as well (Wild, 1985, p. 132). The party ideology was based on “Social Nationalism” and
secularism (Norton, 2007, p. 14). The party program was based on five elements:
separation of church and state, restriction of clergy interfering politics, abolition of
confessionalism, and formation of a powerful army (Pipes, 1988, p. 304).

The Party grew considerably after independence of Lebanon in strengt h that only
contested in size with Phalange Party that in 1958 it was known that the party had 25,000
members. Concerned by its size and influence in 1948, Lebanese government banned the
party and arrested many of its Leaders. In 1949, the party military o fficers attempted to
coup d‟état which failed dramatically (Pipes, 1988, p. 308). Saadah was arrested and
executed following the incident and also was accused being German agent. In response to
the government‟s actions against SSNP, in 1951 SSNP assassinated Prime Minister Riyad
al Solh.

64
 In 1958, despite the fact that the party was banned continued its activities illegally,
SSNP supported President Chamoun during the civil disturbance. President Chamoun
rewarded the party for their support and let them to reopen legally. In 1961, the SSNP
attempted another failed coup d‟état and the party once again outlawed and 3,000 of its
followers were arrested (Pipes, 1988). In those years, the party ideology has changed from
united Syria to Pan- Arab and Marxist left wing doctrine. In 1960s, the party began to
shatter inside and divided at least four fractions. In 1975, during the Civil War, SSNP
supported PLO and joined left wing parties.

The party legalized in 2005 and reopened again. Today, SSNP takes place in March
8 Coalition side by side with Hezbollah and supports fervently national resistance against
Israel. On the other hand, the party haven‟t lost its pan Arab interests with Syria and is a
pro- Syrian party. Although SSNP lost its identity as an armed militia as it was during the
Civil War years, is still an influential political party in Lebanese politics.

3.2.2. Hezbollah

Hezbollah first came into being as a fraction of Amal Movement flourished in 1982
following Israeli invasion of Lebanon. During the Civil War, Hezbollah also participated in
the intra confessional fights that struggled with Amal for the mastership of the Shiite
dominated territories and succeeded gradually. In 1979 Iran Islamic Republic was
succeeded. This event caused erosion within the organization that some of the clerics
insisted on founding Islamic Republic in Lebanon similar to Iranian model. Israeli invasion
in 1982 intensified resistance activities in occupied territories

After 1982, lack of presence an efficient resistance organization bore the necessity
of a new Islamic organization. Representatives of various groups operating against Israeli
occupation were conveyed to discuss to form a Lebanese Islamic Movement. Finally they
were agreed on a constitution that appoints nine representatives to deliver the constitution
to Imam Khomeini for his approval as sole leader of the Shiite community throughout the
world. Consequently, after Khomeini‟s approval, signatory organizations dissolved
themselves and confirmed foundation of Hezbollah. Hezbollah was founded by fully
influenced Lebanese mullahs and the organization is directly linked with Khomeini, after
his death Khamenei (Harik, 2005, p. 16).

65
3.2.2.1. Ideology and Aims of the Party

It is quite difficult to understand what Hezbollah really stands for when we examine
Hezbollah actions and statements. Is it an anti Western organization exclusively targeting
the US and its satellites that is an agent importing Iran‟s Islamic Revolution? Is it a Syrian
and Iranian proxy to promote their interests in regional context? Or is it a local group that
strives for national sovereignty and Shiite interests who has been neglected by the
“corrupt” government? In the case of Hezbollah, it is all of them at once (Saab, 2008).

First and foremost Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shiite Islamist group whose raison
d’etre is to create an Islamic Republic in Lebanon with the example of Iran either by
persuasion or force (Ajami, 1985, p. 792). In more detailed version of this identification is
that “Hezbollah is a Lebanese military, social movement, political party, and terrorist
organization” by Rabinovich and Reinharz (Rabinovich & Reinharz, 2008, p. 423). This
goal constitutes founding principle of the organization in the organizational constitution.
Harik (2005, p. 28) gives the reasons that caused emergence of Hezbollah, a
fundamentalist as “secularism, corruption, conflict and resentment of Israel”.

Hezbollah in an Open Letter introduced in 1985 gives us clear definition of the

movement as an Islamist movement against oppressors not only in Lebanon but also
throughout the world. In this regard they describe themselves as “sons of Umma”
(Hezbollah, 1988) who follows orders and examples of Khomeini their “leader and faqih”.
Moreover Hezbollah denies its political identity in this letter stating they were not “a tight
political cadre” (Hezbollah, 1988). They claimed that their culture was based on Koran and
faqih. Finally Hezbollah asserts that they are fighting soldiers and their military existence
was entwined with its social context.

Secondly their goals in 1985 contained elements of struggle against colonial

powers, as they described, the USA., France and Israel as well as Phalange Party of
Lebanon referring Sabra and Shatilla massacres and Israel- Phalange alliance. Hezbollah in
this Open Letter gives full objectives of the organization:

“ (a) to expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon,
putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land;

66
 (b) to submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the
crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians;

(c) to permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in
all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick
the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice
and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of
imperialistic infiltration into our country.” (Hezbollah, 1988, p. 3) 14 .

Hezbollah adopts the ideology and aim to establish an Islamic Republic in

Lebanon, whereas the organization retains to use force achieving this goal. Virtues of
Islam and Islamic state are emphasized in the Open Letter however the decision was left to
the all Lebanese whether to adopt Islamic Republic or not.

On the contrary, spiritual leader of Hezbollah Sheik Fadlallah refers to

heterogeneous structure of Lebanese demography, therefore finds Iranian model of Islamic
Republic impractical. After Sadr‟s disappearance Fadlallah was the most influential
religious leader in Shiite community of Lebanon (Norton, 2007). Harik argues that Islamic
State of Lebanon was never the first objective of Hezbollah, but they emphasized Islam as
a legitimate factor of resistance against Israel (Harik, 2005, p. 19). Hezbollah also is well
aware Lebanese conditions, thus they have their own solutions for the matter. Hezbollah
guarantees free practice of religion for Christian Lebanese unless they embrace Islam.
Thus, Hezbollah try to eliminate Islam phobia of Christians. Though in 1990s, Hezbollah
changed its course of ideology and preferred to compromise with Christians and Sunnis as
Sheikh Fadlallah has suggested in his books.

Hezbollah decided to participate in 1992 general election first time in its history.
1992 election has an important place in Lebanese history as well being the first post-civil
war election. 1992 election program of Hezbollah marks turning point for the party
ideology. The program signifies Islam and its virtues, though it compromises with the
existing system in the context of rules and regulations. Hezbollah gives their main

14
The original text has been published in al-Safir (Beirut) on February 16, 1985 and also read by Sheik
Ibrahim al A min, spokesperson of the organization. The document in The Jerusalem Quarterly is a translation
of the original text of “Nass al-Risala al- Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l Mustad‟afin fi Lubnan wa-l-
Alam”.

67
objectives for the elections as (1) liberation of national land from “Zionist occupation” and
(2) abolishment of confessional system in Lebanon (Qassam, 2007, p. 300) as well as some
other educational and social objectives.

Hezbollah spokesman‟s words that if Hezbollah cannot persuade Lebanese to create

an Islamic State, “then it is possible to have a dialogue” and compromise on a regime
acceptable to all parties. Obviously, Islamic State option has been adjourned until an
unknown time. Hezbollah‟s participation into general elections has been justified in this
regard staying in the opposition but not to take part in the cabinet. Hezbollah embraced
Lebanese political system as a whole. This process was praised as “Lebanonization of
Hezbollah” (Usher, 1997). Above all in the new 2009 manifesto, second after “Open
Letter” determined new line that Hezbollah adopts: full integration to Lebanese politics
omitting former calls to Islamic Republic (Berti, 2010, p. 96). Hence Lebanonization
process of Hezbollah has been completed in 2009.

In Open Letter, another focal point is that Hezbollah addressed they are not a closed
organization in Lebanon, but linked to the Muslims of the whole world. On the other hand,
Hezbollah never denies its Lebanese roots and authenticity, though the organization
supports openly any struggle against the oppressors who invade illegally Muslim soil
(Harik, 2005, p. 67). It is understandable Hezbollah‟s support for Sunni Hamas in occupied
Palestine.

Khomeini‟s urges regarding liberation of Jerusalem from Israeli occupation, also

puts Hezbollah into Palestinian scene. This view still maintains its validity today as well as
the organization‟s eternal enemy: Israel. Hezbollah in 2009 is against any possible peace
agreement with Israel. The organization denies Israel‟s right to exist, supports return of
Palestinians to “Islamic Palestine”.

3.2.2.2. Organizational Structure and Activities

Hezbollah officially came into being with confirmation of Khomeini whom was
considered as a sole legitimate authority in decision making according to Shiites. It was
nine chosen clerics that formed first council (Sura) that delivered the founding constitution
to Khomeini in 1982. There was not any secretary general or chairman in the council. This
first council of Hezbollah served for seven years (Qassam, 2007). However this first state

68
of the organization hadn‟t been preserved and it was decided to elect a Secretary General.
The council members themselves were elected by high rank members of the party in local
level; and the council members choose a Secretary General among themselves.

The rest of the members assign themselves to other posts. In 1985, “The Open
Letter” marked a milestone in the party as well as organizational level. It was agreed that a
new post “Party Speaker” was necessary in order to explain the party objectives to the rest
of the world besides Lebanon. This position gained importance while promoting Hezbollah
political objectives and inauguration of the political wing.

The council was elected for a year term though in time number of the council
members and their period of duty have changed in relevance with the responsibilities in the
party. In party constitution some adjustments was made and the number of the council
members reduced to seven. Also their term of office has been extended to two years. First
time in party history the post of Assistant Secretary has been adopted.

In May 1991 the council conveyed and chose Sayyid Abbas Musavi as a Secretary
General; nevertheless he was killed on February 16, 1992. Instead of Musavi the council
has decided on Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah who has been in office during that council‟s term
of office. He has been reelected in May 1993 and he is being elected since then (Qassam,
2007). The constitution has been amended once again that enabled succession of the same
person which was restricted with two terms before and the term of office for council
members were extended to three years.

Organizational schema also has been organized accordance with the party activities.
All the vital commissions were allocated among council members and reduced to five:
Jihad Commission, Political Commission, Executive Commission, Parliament Activities
Commission and Judicial Commission.

Activities. Hezbollah is neither a traditional political party nor armed militia. There
are many social organizations work under Hezbollah umbrella. In fact, those organizations
which provide social services and health could be given as a source of unaltered support
for Hezbollah actions despite their destructive effects. After the 2006, approximately 1,200
citizens died and many of them were displaced. Hezbollah relief organizations were at
work. These organizations which also far “exceed the capacity of the Lebanese state”

69
increased popularity of Hezbollah even more than ever (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad, 2009, p.
123; Harik, 2005).

These sophisticated health, educational and social organizations legally registered

with the Lebanese government as NGOs. This precaution enables “Hezbollah” NGOs to
cooperate and work easily with international and other local organizations (Flanigan &
Abdel-Samad, 2009). The Social Unit contains for divisions: the Jihad Construction
Foundation that is responsible for infrastructure, and construction; the Martyrs‟ Foundation
that supports families of deceased militias killed in combats; Foundation for the Wounded
that aids civilians who have been injured during Israeli attacks and Khomeini Support
Committee.

In 1996, Israel attacked to Southern Lebanon destroying almost all the

infrastructure, buildings and farms around. Hezbollah construction institutions came to the
rescue of South Lebanese who deprived from their houses. After this attack, within two
months, Hezbollah rebuilt 5,000 homes in 82 villages, repaired infrastructure and provided
compensation to 2,300 farmers (Usher, 1997, p. 64). In 2006, Hezbollah again
compensated loses for the victims of the war regardless of their sects whether they are
Sunnis or Christians (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad, 2009).

Jihad al- Binaa is one of those charitable construction companies registered with the
Lebanese government. Besides building and repairing houses, schools and hospitals
damaged in wars, the organizations charitable body builds drinking water fountains and
decent toilets in public schools in dahiyeh (Harik, 2005, p. 84).

Hezbollah‟s Islamic Health Unit has 3 hospitals, 12 health centers, 20 infirmaries,

20 dental clinics, 10 defense departments. Health institutions serve in Southern Lebanon
and Bekaa to low income Shiites and other low income citizens at little or no cost. Health
institutions of Hezbollah cover a huge gap in remote areas where Lebanese state has no
authority at all. Al- Rasul al- Azam Hospital is one of the Hezbollah operated hospitals
built in South and dahiyeh. The hospital is equipped with modern and high technology
medical equipments. Furthermore, doctors and medical personal are well educated
professionals who are funded by directly Hezbollah. It is important to note that there is not

70
a single state hospital in dahiyeh but two more private hospital one was built with
association with Sayyid Fadlallah the other again Hezbollah‟s (Harik, 2005, p. 83).

Hezbollah‟s Education Unit provides scholarship and low wage education for the
Shiite students. Lebanese public school system is extremely low quality that only the
poorest families who cannot afford to send their children to private schools prefer public
schools. On the other hand, Hezbollah schools grants high quality educat ion to Shiites
from far lower prices and also scholarships to very poor students. These schools teach the
national curriculum with additional religious study.

Fifteen year long civil war also effected negatively local administrations. During
the war era militia leaders had to provide services for the locals under their control. These
were responsible garbage collection, road repairs, and electricity and water provisions.
These parties exploited governmental sources such as subsidies. On the contrary,
Hezbollah provides the very same services without resorting governmental funds. This
raises a question that where Hezbollah procure financial sources for these services and
charity organizations?

Iranian clergy could allocate financial support abroad under bunyads, charitable
institutions operate in Iran. Harik also adds more sources that “the financial sources for
eight associations they [Hezbollah] run include contributions from Lebanese individuals,
Hezbollah members, Iran, and donations that are part of Shiite religious obligations to
provide a fifth of one‟s income to help those in need.” (2005, p. 93). Moreover it is known
that Iran funds Hezbollah $100 million per year which the European analysts suspect to be
increased to $200 million recently (Wilson, 2004). Second source of Hezbollah funds as
Raad, Hezbollah MP, states that main income comes from the group‟s own investment
portfolios and wealthy Shiites living abroad.

Hezbollah‟s efforts in the social sphere where the Lebanese government leaves
void, frankly increase their popularity among the poorest and most forgotten members of
the society whether they are Shiites or not (2006). Obviously, those public services that
Hezbollah willingly undertakes are hardly done by the state in deteriorating quality (Salibi
K. S., 1988, pp. 1-2). Even in Palestinian refugee camps it was confirmed that Hezbollah is

71
the most popular organization not only for its struggle against Israel but also the services
provided into the camps including in some cases “security” 15 (El Lakkiss, 2007).

3.2.2.3. Resistance and He zbollah Militia

Hezbollah was founded as an Islamic resistance organization first and foremost.

Therefore an effective militia consisted primary importance among all else. Identification
of “resistance” concept for Hezbollah also is raison d’etre of the military wing. Hezbollah
version of resistance is to liberate whole Lebanon from foreign occupation, in particular
Israeli occupation. In order to achieve this goal Jihad is essential motivation.

Hezbollah adopting Shiite belief explains that their actions and operations are
legitimate as of Jihad concept. According to Shiites, Fiqh scholars divide Jihad in two: (1)
Offensive Jihad, and (2) Defensive Jihad. Offensive Jihad decision could be taken only by
two sources the Prophet himself and Lost Imam. Hence offensive Jihad option is
impossible. Secondly, defensive Jihad could be practiced with confirmation of the Velayet-
I Faqih who is now Ali Khamanei, in order to liberate Muslim territories under infidel
occupation. An occupation is the first cause of Jihad (Qassam, 2007, p. 44). Scope and
limits of the war are determined by Velayet-I Faqih.

In 1982, Israel occupied great amount of land in Lebanon in order to pressure PLO
to cease their operations in Israel, though this meant overall invas ion of Lebanon. After
departure of PLO militia, however Israel ceased its troops into self established “Security
Zone”, remained in Lebanon. Hezbollah‟s objective in this regard to force Israeli troops
out of Lebanon. Under these circumstances in 1982, Hezbollah‟s military wing was
created.

Qassam explains development of the militia that “in parallel to this movement
Islamic Republic of Iran also began close relations with Syria and Lebanon. Sheik
Khomeini ordered Iran Revolutionary Guards to support Lebano n against Israel. In
accordance with this order Iranian Guards coming to Lebanon, trained the Mujahedeen
while providing necessary infrastructure. Due to coordinate the movement, high rank
officers of the Iranian Guards arrived to Syria. Syrian government authorized free passage

15
Palestinian refugee camps are exempt fro m both jurisdiction and protection of the Lebanese government.
Security in the camps is provided by Palestinian militia.

72
of Iranian Guards through Syrian territories (Rabil R. , 2007, pp. 43-44). Iran subsided
Hezbollah with weaponry and technical assistance while Syria supplied assistance with
logistics. In Bekaa training camps were established for the volunteered fighters” (Qassam,
2007, p. 23). Bekaa Valley under Syrian control was off limits to Israel (Harik, 2005, p.
38). Young volunteers were in majority in the camps.

Recruitment of the militia is significantly important for the organization. Many

volunteers that want to join Hezbollah ranks experience strict selection process. In this
framework, each Hezbollah militiamen before the ir approval of participation is examined
carefully if the person is suitable for the criteria that are commitment to Hezbollah‟s line,
ability to improve him culturally and militaristically. It is also important that the
militiamen have a clean record (Qassam, 2007, p. 78; Harik, 2005, p. 73).

Hezbollah‟s popularity has increased after Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Many

Lebanese volunteers from different confessions applied Hezbollah military wing in order
to participate armed operations against Israel, though according to the party regulations it
was forbidden for other confessions to take place in the military wing. Thus, Nasrallah
ordered formation of sub-organization “National Brigade” not to exclude other confessions
from the national struggle under Hezbollah supervision (Qassam, 2007).

Hezbollah recruits come from various sources. Young Shiites who were uprooted
from their lands and homes in South Lebanon are the most importa nt viable group in the
militia. Furthermore children that educated in Hezbollah sponsored institutions represent
another source for Hezbollah militia. Shiite families that are aided by Hezbollah encourage
youngsters to join Hezbollah ranks (Harik, 2005).

Hezbollah, in the party organization doesn‟t have difficulties to find resistance

fighters. On the other hand, these volunteers of resistance not always fight in open conflict
with Israel. Hezbollah has many partisans among university students such as engineers,
doctors, and technicians. These people have less dangerous but much effective tasks such
as improvement of weapons. Accuracy of the missiles launched during 2006 war is a proof
of ability of Hezbollah engineers, mathematicians and geographers. Israeli loss of high
technology Merkava tanks in great quantities is also product of Hezbollah scientists‟
efforts (Qassam, 2007).

73
 In the operations waged by the militia, secrecy is the most important weapon
against the enemy according to Hezbollah. It is believed that secrecy of the Hezbollah
operations along with guerilla tactics causes great losses for the enemy which is main
objective of the operations. Unable to gather information about the opera tions of
Hezbollah, Israel becomes vulnerable against Hezbollah attacks without a chance to
prevent losses. It is nearly impossible to predict where and when the resistance would
attack enemy targets (Qassam, 2007).

Military tactics of the organization represents very organized and disciplined

structure. Hezbollah fighters are not an army that could be targeted easily even though the
fighters wear uniforms in demonstrations, in the operations they are nearly impossible to
be identified with their mundane appearance. After Hezbollah operations the fighters easily
could go among people; and their appearance even makes it harder for Israelis to
distinguish them. Hezbollah‟s main military tactic is based on “hit and run” (Matthews,
2008, p. 7). After the attack, the fighters withdraw immediately into the villages nearby
and mingle with the people. This explains why Hezbollah gives scant of losses after the
operations.

This unpredictable atmosphere engenders enemy forces to stand on guards always

and decrease their motivation. On February 8, 2000 Israeli forces destroyed electric
stations in Baalbak. Israeli objective of the attacks was to provoke Hezbollah to wage
counter attack. Hence Israel could broaden the operation into Lebanon giving Hezbollah‟s
reaction as a pretext. When Hezbollah hadn‟t acted as it was expected, Israel had to give up
entire operation.

Hezbollah defines weak point of Israel as “security concerns”. For that reason,
Hezbollah attacks military targets in order to illustrate that there is no safe place for Israelis
in Lebanon. Strategically, Hezbollah also wages counter attacks in civilian targets into
Israel when Israel hits civilians in Lebanon.

Hezbollah has improved since 1982 in the context of quality and quantity of arms
used against Israel. In 1982, they had primitive weapons and thus these had little effect.
Hezbollah used guerilla tactics and terrorist acts like suicide bombings in order to increase
death toll for its enemy. On November 11, 1982, a Hezbollah mujahedeen drove his truck

74
laden with explosives into Israeli barrack killing 141 soldiers. In 1985 Israel withdrew into
“Security Zone” leaving majority of Lebanon (Norton, 2007).

In July 1993, Israel launched “Operation Accountability” in order to curtail

Hezbollah activities in the South. Despite stopping Hezbollah firing Katyushas, Israel
found itself in a difficult position in international arena. The operation couldn‟t fulfill its
objectives set and an unwritten understanding between Israel and Hezbollah was approved
under Syrian and American mediation. This understating stated that the operations would
be conducted only but only within Security Zone and only against military targets. This
understanding legitimized Hezbollah operations within Security Zone waged against SLA
and Israel.

Though in April 1996, Israeli roadside attack killed a teenager outside the combat
area. This event provoked Hezbollah to fire rockets in Northern Israel, onto civilian areas.
Israel, against Hezbollah attacks waged “Operation Wrath of Grapes” hitting Lebanese
infrastructure and power stations. This time cease fire could be ensured by Syrian,
American, and French intervention. In “April Understanding”, the signatory countries,
Syria, the USA, France, Israel, Lebanese government and Hezbollah, was reaffirmation of
the previous one that Hezbollah was free to combat within Security Zone (Harik, 2005, pp.
118-123).

Hezbollah operations after “April Understanding” haven‟t lost their intensity.

Israel‟s military losses increased day by day as long as they remained in Security Zone.
Despite PM Ehud Barak‟s own threats of a new mass retaliation in Lebanon, it was Barak
himself ordered the withdrawal in 2000 behind Blue Line (Harik, 2005; Qassam, 2007).
Israel declared that they obeyed U.N. Resolutions 425 and 426, this hasn‟t refrained
Hezbollah to claim victory over its “invincible” enemy.

In 2006 Hezbollah and Israel once again fought with each other without any gains
for Israel. In 34 days long war, Hezbollah resisted mass retaliation of Israel sending
hundreds of Katyushas into Northern Israel. Israeli operation in 2006 couldn‟ t achieve to
curb Hezbollah activities and also provoke Lebanese against Hezbollah. National support
for “resistance” and Hezbollah reached to governmental level instead of yielding it.
Resolution 1701 however demands Hezbollah to abolish its military wing and become

75
mainstream political party; Hassan Nasrallah keeps stocking Hezbollah warehouses with
advanced weapons.

In due time, they improved quality of weapons. During the war it is known that at
least one Hezbollah fighter had a night vision goggle, thus they were informed of the
operations IDF conducted at night. Moreover, it is known that Hezbollah has advanced
communication network and great quantity of ammunitions that “Hezbollah is a militia
trained like an army and equipped like a state” (Erlanger & Oppel, 2006, p. 2).

Katyusha missiles are one of the arsenals that Hezbollah has in great amount. Some
sources state that Hezbollah has approximately 40,000 short and medium range missiles
(Stahl, 2008). Katyushas are easy to use and require one minute launching. These missiles
usually cannot be detected by Israel easily. In 2006 war, Hezbollah sent one hundred and
fifty rockets per day, but on the last day it was two hundred and fifty. Despite its limited
capacity Hezbollah hit Haifa, third largest city of Israel where 270,000 civilians live as
counter attack of Israeli air bombings of Lebanon (Cordesman, 2006a).

Hezbollah also has long range missiles such as Iranian made Zelzal-2 which can
reach 210 km. However during the war of 2006, Israel claimed that IAF has destroyed
many of them. In addition, Russian made anti- tank weapons which paralyzed high
technology Merkava tanks, C-802 land- to- sea missile which was almost sink an Israeli
destroyer in 2006, less advanced Saggers, medium range Farj 3 and Farj 5 missiles that can
travel 40-43 km and the latter 73km. Syria provides Hezbollah with 220 millimeter and
302 millimeter missiles both equipped with large, anti personal warheads (Erlanger &
Oppel, 2006, p. 3). Russian made RPG-29, antitank missiles, and Metis, modern longer
range and higher speed missile could be included. Israelis claim that Hezbollah also has
Russian made Kornet, though this weapon was not used in 2006 and its prese nce hasn‟t
been confirmed by Hezbollah.

Even it is believed that Hezbollah has Mirsad one unmanned aerial vehicle spy on
Northern Israel (Cordesman, 2006a, p. 8; Devenny, 2006, p. 34). Because these UAVs are
small scaled and slow to be detected, Hezbollah carries on surveillance on Northern Israel.
Furthermore, according to Israel Syria transported Scud missiles to Hezbollah, though
neither Hezbollah nor Lebanese government confirmed having Scud missiles, Syria denied

76
any such transfer of arms (Lyon, 2010). However, it is claimed that even Lebanese
government helps Hezbollah to acquire Scud missiles by some officials (Galey & Kawas,
2010). Thanks to secrecy policy of the organization it is still remains blank exact quality
and quantity of Hezbollah‟s weapons.

Road side bombs are the most popular tactic against Israeli military vehicles,
though Israel also can detect and defuse these cable and wire style bombs. Hezbollah is
currently working on pressure detonators. Secondly, Hezbollah draws Israel into well
prepared battlefields into Lebanon rather than open battle (Erlanger & Oppel, 2006).

Israeli withdrawal in 2000 is considered as the most significant victory over Israel
and even strengthened Hezbollah‟s hand. Israel had ceased to self made „security line‟ in
1985 with its Lebanese ally SLA, though the assaults continued despite massive Israeli
presence in 10 percent of Lebanon. In 1999 high rank Israeli officer has been killed in a car
bomb by Hezbollah showing that none of the Israelis are safe in Lebanon (Matthews, 2008,
p. 5).

3.2.2.4. Political Wing of Hezbollah

Hezbollah inaugurated politics in 1992 with the first general elections after the
Civil War. It was a new experience for the organization began with resistance militaristic
identity. In fact, Hezbollah‟s record was clean when it was compared with the other
militia- political parties that Hezbollah strictly restrained with conflict with the Lebanese
people, although Hezbollah skirmishes with Amal militia in South Lebanon and dahiyeh
was everyday events during the Civil War until Amal‟s failure became imminent.

In order to win seats in the elections, Hezbollah had to compete with Amal as a
Shiite political party in the parliament. Besides it was vital for Hezbollah candidates to
stand side by side on the lists with Christian candidates as well. Thus, precisely Hezbollah
has to collaborate with Christians (Qassam, 2007).

In 1992, Hezbollah high rank officials arranged meetings with Patriarch Nasrallah
Butros Sfeir and other influential Christian leaders. These series of meetings are called as
“infitah” (opening). In fact there were several reasons for this policy. First of all Hezbollah
needed Christians‟ support for the elections. In confessional system if Hezbollah wants to

77
get seats in their election list there must be representatives of other confessions. For
example, in Hezbollah list for Bekaa, along with Shiite candidates it must contain
Orthodox Christian candidates. Despite Islamic identity of the party, in principle
apparently only red line that Hezbollah emphasizes in their connection with other Lebanese
groups is their relationship with Israel (Harik, 2005, p. 77).

Secondly, Christian community in Lebanon always had doubts about Muslims in

their country. From the beginning Christians sought ways to dominate politics in Lebanon
not to fall under Muslim control. The main logic of the National Pact cente red on this
principle. When Hezbollah has founded as a fundamentalist Islamic party, naturally it
frightened Christian community. Hence, Christians constituted weak link against national
resistance that should be win. If Hezbollah gains support of Christia ns for resistance, it
would be easier for them to conduct their operations and legitimize themselves. 1993 and
1996 retaliations of Israel were also aimed to provoke Lebanese ranks against Hezbollah
and drown the movement which couldn‟t succeed thanks to Hezbollah policies.

Finally, in 1992 elections Hezbollah won 12 seats of the 128 seats in the parliament
and became the largest single party bloc in the legislative chamber (Harik, 2005; Usher,
1997). In 1996 elections although it reduced to nine seats, still preserved to be the largest
single party bloc. It should be noted that competition in Bekaa and the south had been
restricted between Amal and Hezbollah in order to maintain resistance unity and prevent
partisan clashes. Hence in the areas mentioned there was single list for both (Usher, 1997,
p. 61). Beirut, Baabda and Jbeil districts where five of the overall seats were available was
open to competition (Harik, 2005, p. 95). In 2000 elections Hezbollah once again reached
to 12 seats in parliament that probably Israeli withdrawal contributed Hezbollah agenda
and popularity.

After 2005, withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon and assassination of Rafiq a-Hariri,
Hezbollah partisans gathered in Beirut to support Syria on March 8, 2005. Leaders of some
other political parties also participated in the demonstrations in favor of Syrian presence.
Hezbollah praised Syrian stabilizing efforts in Lebanon during and after the Civil War.
Under Hezbollah leadership, participants of the demonstrations are called as “March 8
Coalition” and in 2009 general elections lists, candidacies were allocated among the

78
Coalition member parties. Free Patriotic Movement, founded by Maronite Christian and
former exiled army general Michel Aoun in 2005 after his return, is one of the Coalition.

Consequently, Hezbollah‟s success in politics as well as “resistance” is apparent in

the past elections. Hezbollah‟s lists in elections previously and in March 8 Coalition shows
that Hezbollah‟s infitah policy works well in the context of collaboration with other
Lebanese parties. The heterogeneity of the coalition and lists proves that neither ideology
nor religion is overwhelmingly important in politics that in municipal elections Communist
party candidates took place in Hezbollah lists. Hezbollah‟s cooperation with various
Christian parties and even Phalange Party in some cases indicates that in Lebanese political
game Hezbollah is a Lebanese political party where these kinds of alliances considered
normal. As long as they support “resistance” it is sufficient for Hezbollah (Qassam, 2007,
p. 205).

3.2.2.5. Future of Hezbollah in Lebanon

However, Saab (2008, p. 95) asserts that there was not any proof that Hezbollah
would built an Islamic government. He explains that Hezbollah constituted an Islamic
order where they are strong politically though they knew that an Islamic Republic was
impractical while still confessional political system intact. In this regard Hezbollah is
trying to promote its Islamic identity while retaining any confrontation with Sunni and
Christians respecting Confessional structure. Moreover confessional system constitutes
deterrence for Hezbollah in order to realize its aim of creating an Islamic Republic.

On the other hand Saab (2008, p. 104) argues that if majoritarian (one man one
vote) system was adopted instead of confessionalism, Shiites being ma jority in Lebanon
would realize Islamic State project of Hezbollah in the future. Amal leader Nabih Berri‟s
statements abolishing confessionalism after 2009 elections and also Hezbollah‟s
commitments regarding this issue would be strong evidence for Saab‟s hypothesis;
however, Amal leader Nabih Berri is known of his secular sentiments in the organization.

Hezbollah is going to continue expand its social and public works, as long as the
government remains incapable to fulfill its basic responsibilities. Frankly, Hezbollah will
keep its popularity among the needy residents of South and dahiyeh. In the polls and also

79
support for resistance the party obviously collects the rewards of their endeavors (Langohr,
2001, p. 598; Usher, 1997, p. 64).

When it comes to the Hezbollah‟s arm, it seems like they already have had
Lebanese support both from the government and the plain people. Ex- premier Rafik Hariri
approached skeptical to Hezbollah‟s policies during Israeli retaliations both in 1993 and
1996. Hence it is known that he drew Hezbollah‟s anger.

In National Dialogue Process in 2006 and other sessions of National Dialogue,

Hezbollah arms issue remained unsolved in which Shiites opposed any proposal requires
Hezbollah‟s arms. Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006) demands all the militias to
deliver their weapons to the state authorities, actually meaning Hezbollah‟s extensive arms
collection. UN‟s Special Envoy in Lebanon, Tarje Roed Larsen presents another solution
to Hezbollah issue by urging the organization to integrate Lebanese army (Shields, 2008, p.
479). Following May 2008 clashes, he commented that “what we are seeing today
illustrates the necessities of integrating the Lebanese militias into the army.” (Al Jazeera,
2008). In response, in 2009 manifesto, Hezbollah states clearly its cooperation with LAF,
but prefer to stay as a separate and autonomous entity and retain its weapons and resistance
rather than to be integrated into the army (Berti, 2010, p. 98).

Hezbollah, in August 2008 achieved another political victory. The Lebanese cabinet
approved Hezbollah arms and granted the organization to attack Israel freely (Stahl, 2008).
In the National Dialogue in 2006, Hezbollah opposed to abolish its armed wing and in
early May 2008 in Beirut, unexpectedly the organization‟s arms turned to Lebanese state.
Furthermore in Doha, Hezbollah gained veto power in the new unity cabinet which put the
state policy into Hezbollah track. The new government policy counters Resolution 1701
asks the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah.

On September 16, 2008, in “national dialogue” session, President Suleiman

discussed a national defense strategy for Lebanon. One of the most important issues on the
agenda was Hezbollah‟s role in the defense of the country. On August 28, 2008, a
Hezbollah militia fired on an LAF helicopter killing the pilot. Hassan Nasrallah found the
incident as “regrettable” and stated that the militia thought he was firing on an Israeli

80
helicopter. Yet, this incident marks that “if an operational arrangement is formalized for
national defense that includes a role for Hezbollah…” (Addis, 2009b, p. 13).

Hezbollah‟s military wing despite UN Resolution 1701 is still intact and maintains
its weapons after 2006. What is more, on 12 February 2008, one of the most important
figures in Hezbollah armed wing, Imad Mughniyyah has been assassinated in Damascus in
a car bomb. Mughniyyah‟s death raised tension between Israel and Hezbollah that the latter
blames Israel for the assassination while Israel denies. Since 2008, Hassan Nasrallah
vowed revenge from Israel in an unexpected way and he renews his threats that Hezbollah
would hit unexpectedly to Israeli high rank officials all around the world. In response
Israel states that they will act immediately if Hezbollah attacks or kills any of Israeli
citizens in Israel or abroad. Hence another Hezbollah- Israel war is not far away if
Nasrallah keeps his promise to Hezbollah militias who began to be impatient and lose their
faith in Nasrallah concerning Mughniyyeh‟s revenge (Sullivan, 2008, p. 125).

The new Saad Hariri cabinet elected in 2009 seems to avoid confrontation with
Hezbollah on the basis of the organization‟s arms buildup. The organization‟s presence as
an influential and powerful political party and maintenance of its armed wing has been
confirmed in the future. On December 1, 2009, new Lebanese cabinet with a joint
statement adopted Hezbollah‟s “resistance” (Berti, 2010, p. 93). Information Minister
Tareq Mitri announced that “the right of Lebanon, its people, its army, and its resistance to
liberate the occupied Lebanese territory in Shebaa and Kfar Shouba hills” (Al Arabiya,
2009); thus Hezbollah‟s policy towards Israel turned out to be state policy. Lebanese
government of 2009 considers Hezbollah as a necessity for national security and refrains to
disarm the organization (The Associated Press, 2010).

It is an important question that what will happen to Hezbollah‟s arms when

disputed areas have been liberated. Yet this is what Hezbollah officials strictly avoid to
answer. On the other hand from the commitment of Hezbollah to liberate Jerusalem and
Palestine, obviously Hezbollah will continue armed struggle with Israel (Zisser, 2000, p.
36).

81
3.2.3. March 14 Coalition

March 14 Coalition gets its name from the demonstrations that took place in Beirut
following assassination of Rafiq Hariri on March, 14, 2005. The Coalition is led by Saad
Hariri, youngest son Rafiq Hariri. The participant political parties in the Coalition are:
Future Movement, Lebanese Forces, Phalange Party, Free Lebanese Armenian Movement,
National Liberal Party, Democratic Left Movement, Social Democratic Hunchakian Party,
Armenian Democratic Liberal Party, Independence and Progressive Socialist Party.
Whereas Progressive Socialist Party participated to the 2009 elections in March 14
Coalition, has left the alliance after the elections. In this study, because it was part of the
alliance during the elections, PPS has been studied under March 14 Coalition.

3.2.3.1 Future Movement

Future Movement is a Sunni Lebanese political movement which is currently

leaded by Saad Hariri, son of Rafiq Hariri, former prime minister. The party was officially
founded in August 2007 and declared on 5 April 2009 in Beirut. Future Movement is the
largest party in March 14 Coalition (Future Movement , 2007).

As a political party, Future Movement takes freedom, independence and

sovereignty of Lebanon as a major objective. On the other hand, Future Movement
founding document emphasizes Arab identity of Lebanon, as well as its commitment to
Arab and international charters. Arab identity is considered as cooperation with Arab
world in a democratic way; above all Lebanese identity comes before all.

However, the party is mainly Sunni based it doesn‟t discriminate members due to
their religious affiliations. Moreover, Future Movement aims to abolish sectarianism.
Future Movement places itself in pro- Western March 14 Coalition and supports resistance
against Israeli aggression. Future Movement supports Palestinian cause and their right to
return (Future Movement , 2007).

The Future Movement has a television station which broadcasts internationally,

Future News, Radio Orient, and Al Mustaqbal daily newpaper. The Radio Orient and
Future News have been founded in 1995.

82
3.2.3.2. Kataeb (Phalangist) Party

Phalange Party was founded by Pierre Gemayel in 1936. Pierre Gemayel, after his
visit to Germany returned to Lebanon impressed by German National Socialist Party
structure (Wild, 1985, pp. 130, 133). The party headquarters was positioned in Beirut, and
Mount Lebanon, where Christians live in majority (Odeh, 1986). After 1949, Gemayel
planned to change the concept of this organization from a paramilitary one to mainstream
political party. Ideology of the party in these years has shifted from Christian confessional
to nationalist. Even the name of the party has been c hanged to Social Democratic Party,
though these efforts proved to be unsuccessful (Salibi K. S., 1988, p. 188). Even though
the party has been affected from Nazis has never been a fascist organization.

Nationalism sentiments were so high that the Phalange Party opposed to pan-
Arabism as well as French domination in Lebanon. Phalange has worked for independence
of Lebanon free from foreign influence and the party struggled against French Mandate
until 1943 (Johnson, 2002, p. 148). In 1958 Pierre Gemayel and Phalange supported
President Chamoun. Gemayel was appointed to the cabinet in 1958, and two years later
elected to National Assembly. In 1968, Phalange Party joined an alliance wit h National
Liberty Party of Chamoun and National Bloc of Raymond Edde in the parliamentary
elections and became the largest groupings in Lebanon winning 9 of 99 seats (Odeh, 1986).

In 1970s the Phalange formed its militia against rising Palestinian guerillas.
However, Gemayel supported Palestinian cause before has changed his stance against
Palestinian groups when they supported leftists in Lebanon. The bus massacre, caused
killings of Palestinians in the bus by the Phalangists who were kept responsible for church
attack where Gemayel himself attended in April 1975. Phalange militia allied itself with
Tiger militia, and other Christian militias reached to 8,000 in strong, clashed with
Palestinians and Lebanese National Movement (Fisk, 1990).

Later many Christian militias have been founded mainly belonged to Maronite sect.
Phalange militias were the most powerful one among them. Bashir Gemayel replaced his
father in those years and founded Lebanese Forces in 1977 collecting many of the
Christian militias under one banner. Christian Kataeb Party, Lebanese Renewal Party, and
National Liberal Party joined under the roof of Lebanese Front. And their fighting militia

83
also gathered under Lebanese Forces. Their leader was Bashir Gemayel, son of Pierre
Gemayel. Bashir Gemayel managed to tie all the militia and parties to his command with a
series of suppression policy. Lebanese Forces played very important role in the Civil War
(Salibi K. S., 1988).

In September 1982, Bashir Gemayel was elected president, but he couldn‟t stay in
office for long. On 14 September 1982, Gemayel has been assassinated by Syrian
intelligence and was in turn Amin Gemayel, his brother has been elected president. Bachir
Gemayel in his policies has been more radical than Amin Gemayel. He was trying to sign a
peace treaty with Israel while expel all the Palestinian refugees from Lebanon (Ajami,
1985).

Elie Hobeika, under control of Israeli army, led the massacre in Sabra and Shatilla
refugee camps. After Pierre Gemayel‟s death in 1984, his successors Elie Karame and
Amin Gemayel struggle to maintain influence over Lebanese Forces, which became
independent. The Phalange party began to decline and lost its influence in Lebanese
politics. The party broke into several rival factions.

Georges Saadeh took control of the party in 1986 until 1998. He adopted moderate
position toward Syrian presence. Mounir Hajj became the president of the party in 1999
and Karim Pakrodouni in 2002. Amin Gemayel, who left Lebanon in 1988, has returned in
2000 in order to support his son Pierre Gemayel‟s election campaign and opposed to
Syrian control over Lebanon.

In 2005 Cedar Revolution, Phalange took side with anti-Syrian March 14 coalition.
Pakdourani, a Syrian backed party leader had hard times during the Cedar Revolution that
Pierre Amine Gemayel, son of Amine Gemayel, took the leadership of the party leaving
Pakdourani in office as president and Gemayel became Supreme president. Pierre Gemayel
participated to Siniora government as Minister of Industry. Nevertheless, Pierre Gemayel
has been assassinated in 2006 and this affected the party negatively. In 2009 elections
Phalange joined the elections with March 14 coalitions.

84
3.2.3.3. Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)

PSP has been founded by Kamal Jumblatt, an influential Druze warlord in 1949.
Progressive Socialist Party is important that it was one of the most influential non-
Maronite political parties founded in 1940s. The party at first attracted some Christians and
Sunnis though remained mainly as a Druze party. The party‟s main ideology is to form a
secular, national state. However, PSP‟s main insistence is political secularization (Odeh,
1986).

Under Kemal Jumblatt, the party became major element of Lebanese National
Movement which supported Lebanon‟s Arab identity and supported Palestinian. PSP has
founded its own militia which was the most powerful one during the civil war. Its main
adversaries were Lebanese Forces and Phalange militia. In 1977 Kemal Jumblatt was
assassinated by Syrian intelligence and the party experienced a setback. Walid Jumblatt
succeeded his father (Abul-Husn, 1998).

During Israeli invasion in 1982, PSP militia fought with Christian militia and
captured Mount Lebanon. The territories under PSP administration enjoyed high standard
of public and social services. In 1989 when the peace restored after Taif Agreement, PSP
supported Syria and also Walid Jumblatt had personal ties with Syrian intelligence
generals, especially Ghazi Kenaan and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam
(SRPC, 2002). PSP took part several governments but after Hariri‟s international campaign
in 2004, PSP has changed side. In 2005 Cedar Revolution, PSP joined to March 14 and ran
the elections in 2009 with the same group; however PSP left March 14 after the elections.

3.3. Main Ideologies in Lebanon

3.3.1. Arab Nationalism

Arab Nationalism is product of nineteenth century as Geller stated that began in the
West and spread throughout rest of the world. Nationalism among the Arab Nation first
appeared in Syrian and Lebanon. Khoury emphasized that even Baathist radical
nationalism was emerged from Syrian nationalism (Khoury, 1981, p. 441). Furthermore,
Arab nationalism first appeared during the Ottoman rule and found expression in secret

85
societies such as “al- Ahd” and “al- Fatat” which were established in Egypt that they took
advantage of loose regime under British control.

Yet, three factors played important role in the context of emergence of Arab
nationalism which is emphasized by Lewis that the first one of them European influence
and examples of German and Italian Unification (Lewis, 2005, pp. 196-7). The second was
the European interests in the region which can be explained that some European countries
like Britain, France and Russia encouraged nationalism in these Arabic-speaking areas.
The third factor was the “Western romanticism which rediscovered the Arabs and revived
and interest in their remote and glorious past” (Lewis, 2005, p. 196).

On the other hand, Khalidi criticizes that some scholars were unaware of the
relation between Turkish and Arab nationalisms, thus they overemphasized direct
European influence (Khalidi R. , 1991, p. 1363). In the context of “romanticism” as Lewis
stated as an important factor in the Arab nationalism, works of Christian Western educated
intelligentsia such as Nasif Yaziji, Ibrahim Yaziji and Butrus al- Bustani and also their
some Muslim compatriots like Mohammad Arslan who phrased glories of Arab literature
and Arab achievements in golden ages (Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 52) could be showed as
good examples.

Actually, the first phase of Arab nationalism, referring to pre World War I period,
was more likely Pan- Islamism. In the late 19th century, some comments on the corruptness
of Ottoman Caliph began to be heard. According to Arab Islamist degenerated Ottoma n
Caliph should be replaced by an Arab Caliphate. In 1908, Young Turks in the Ottoman
Empire seized power and began their Turkification policies that met with the disapproval
among Arabs.

Abd al- Rahman al- Kawakibi, the ideological pioneer of pan-Arabism, was the first
writer who openly considered Arabs as a political entity in opposition to Turks. Kawakibi
defended the idea of Arab Caliph as a religious leader not political. The Caliph, according
to Kawakibi would serve as a symbol of Islamic unity. In this sense Kawakibi indicated
secular nationalism. Yet Lewis argues that these movements were no more than “distinct
idea of patriotism” (Lewis, 2005, p. 198) and loyalty to the governing state rather than to
an abstract entity.

86
 First Arab congress was held in Paris with the participation of twenty five delegates
in 1913. Syrian and Lebanese Arabs were in majority in the congress. However the
delegates couldn‟t come to a tangible conclusion, yet the main demands could be
summarised as autonomy for Arab provinces, higher degree of Arab participation in the
central government in Istanbul and Arabic as official language of the empire. Arab
delegates divided ideologically on the basis of separation from the central government.
Lebanese Christians supported decentralization and separation from Ottoman Empire.

The idea of secession from Ottoman Empire can be seen in the works of Nejib
Azoury, a Lebanese Christian who have been condemned to death and fled to Paris. His
main idea with the secession was to form an Arab Kingdom indeed he excluded Egypt that
Egyptians were not Arab by race. In this context he defended Pan- Arab sentiments rather
than Arab Nationalism by suggesting foundation of an Arab Kindgdom 16 . Azoury also
believed that the Caliph should only be the religious symbol as Kawakibi had defended. In
this Arab Kingdom, as a member of a religious minority, he hoped to achieve religious
freedom and civic equality.

After the World War I, in the newly established Arab states, “the attachment to
religion endured, and it has provided the basis for a sustained challenge to nationalism in
the Arab world in recent years (Khalidi R. , 1991, p. 1365)”. Yet Arab Nationalism entered
its second phase which refers to endeavour to gain full independence from the Western
elements in their lands and to create nation states within the existing frontiers. Despite the
promises of World War I that were given to Arabs by the Britain and France,
implementation of Mandate regimes on Arab territories became trigger of Arab
nationalism in mandated areas.

Mandatory regimes that were established in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine,

Transjordan and Egypt met disapproval of Arabs in the Middle East. Hashemites, by the
support of their ally Britain in World War I, seized control of Transjordan, Mecca, Nejd,

16
Rashid Khalidi describes Pan-Arabism that establishment of one great Arab State in where all Arabs could
live together. And he discusses on the applicability of this idea that all Arab states founded after the Great
War I prefered to pursue their own interests. He gives an example regard ing this Pan Arab idea tha t in 1944
in the Arab League none of the Arab states favored the Pan Arab idea at all. Yet he excludes Syria and Egypt
in this examp le. See Khalid i, R., Arab Nationalis m: Historical Problems in the Literature‟, A merican
Historical Review, Vol.96, No. 5, A merican Historical Association Press, December 1991, p. 1365-7.

87
and Hejaz. Faisal, son of Sheriff Hussain of King of Mecca and Hejaz, first attempted to
set his kingdom over Syria, yet he had to face with the rage of French. Syrian Arabs on the
other hand, counted on him and they supported his kingdom over united Syria, the
territories where also covered Lebanon. Faisal, hence can be considered also one of the
most important figures in Arab nationalism (Mansfield, 2003, p. 228).

When Faisal was ousted from Syria and its domains, his approval of British
proposal for a kingdom Iraq, disappointed Syrian nationalists and they gave up on
Hashemite suzerainty in Syria and structured their nationalist ideologies on full
independence in the territories drawn for them by the French.

During Mandate regimes, Syrian and Palestinian nationalists had to struggle some
difficulties with the authorities of Mandate. They had to flee to exile that their destinations
were usually Amman and Cairo where they could enjoy loose governance of British. Cairo
became a new centre for Arab Nationalism. It was the most comfortable Arab state to steer
a political movement. The establishment of Executive Committee of the Syrian-
Palestinian Congress in 1921 was perceived as a progress by Arab- Syrian people and
nationalists for the cause.

The committee‟s main concern was Syrian and Lebanese issues, hence Syrian and
Lebanese components in the leadership was strong. In 1922, first schism occurred and
dissatisfied Palestinian representatives left the congress and committee. Yet, the same
disagreements among Arab nationalists and their ideological stance made Great Revolt in
Syria possible and which materialized their claims of right of establishment for political
parties (Hitti P. K., 1951).

Under these circumstances, The People‟s Party had been founded that the main goal
of the party was independence of Syria. Yet the party was far from launching full scale
rebellion against the French administration. Only after the rebellion which began in Druze
territories and Druze military success with the struggle of France, People‟s Party decided
to act. By early September, 1925, Syrian nationalist and Druze leaders established
Provisional National Government in Jebel Druze under Druze president and Syrian vice-
president. Their main goals were announced as evacuation of French forces from Syria,

88
free and fair elections, foundation of national army and a national government. The revolt
that began in Jebel Druze acquired national character and spread throughout the country.

On the contrary, Miller states that the revolt had no national character and he
describes the nature of the revolt as “power struggle within the divisive groups in artificial
state who could agree on one thing: French must go ” (Miller, 1977, p. 547). He also
emphasizes the common purpose of Syrians and Druze which was to oust French forces
out of their territories. On the other hand after the rebellion, it is obvious that the leaders
who wanted keep their positions actually lost their privileges and offices. Miller explains
that “because of its local, rather than national, objectives, its lack of strong leadership and
ideology, and its failure to develop internal coherence, the Syrian revolt cannot be called
nationalist” (Miller, 1977, p. 549). Syrian Arab Nationalism lost its momentum when Syria
finally gained independence of France Mandate in 1946. However, there were some elites
both in Syria and Lebanon that Lebanon would unite with Syria which that this proposal
was rejected by Maronites of Lebanon.

Another figure revived Arab Nationalism and “Arab solidarity” by his words,
Gemal Abdul Naser of Egypt. To him it was the main aim of the revolutionary movement
he began in Egypt to collect all the Arabs under one state. Though reaching this aim it was
required to take “several stages”. Arab solidarity was one of those stages that without Arab
political unity, Arab Nationalism would be without meaning. Al Husri, celebrated
propagator of Arab Nationalism believed that all Arabic-speaking people should unite as a
nation, the language was their binder and they constituted one nation that supports Nasser‟s
unity approach from the heart (Dawisha, 2003, p. 2).

Nevertheless, Egypt through the history hasn‟t defined herself as Arab country.
Egyptians have always emphasized their distinct history and culture which goes to
Pharaohs of ancient times. Negib Azoury, a Syrian Christian Arab nationalist of nineteenth
century advocates that Egyptians did not belong to Arab race, but belonged to African
Berber family. Their language that was spoken in pre-Islamic era had no relevance with
Arabic (Azoury, 1976, p. 81). Redefinition of Egyptian identity could be sought in
socioeconomic factors argued Coury (1982) that because of those economic reasons
cooperation between Arab states and Arab identity of Egypt became important.

89
Furthermore, Palestinian issue and Jews settlements that beginning in 1930s increased
movement in Arab Nationalism concept among Egyptians and other Arab states.
Especially, 1936-1939 Palestinian Revolt became focal point in spreading Arab
Nationalism among the Arabic- Speaking people.

Nasser spearheaded Arab nationalism among Arab states, but especially Syria
during stormy years of 1950s and 1960s. If all the Arabs share one common language and
history, there was no need to maintain the borders that have been drawn by the imperial
powers. The culprit of Arab weakness believed that lied into their divided state. The
introductory article of Baath Party in 1947 declared that “the Arabs form one nation. This
nation has the natural right to live in a single state.” (Haim, 1963, p. 233). Nasser believed
that Egypt comes first and wanted to save Egypt from corruption and bad management
after the defeat in 1948 defeat (Stephens, 1971, pp. 85-87). However, Nasser‟s endeavors
met with criticism by some nationalists that they called this movement as Nasserism.

In 1956 when the British, French and Israelis occupied Suez Channel, it was
considered that the imperial states were coming back to Middle East and created
opportunities for Egypt draw Arab states closer. Egypt, being the largest and most
powerful state, confirmed as the leader by the other states as well. Arab Nationalism has
been carried to higher level by United Arab Republic in 1958 when Syria and Egypt have
united by the request of Syria under Nasser‟s leadership. Nevertheless, this union was a
short lived one and U.A.R. was dissolved in 1961. The setback of Arab Nationalism has
come to surface by 1967 defeat of Arab states against Israel. 1973 war was a relative
success for Nasser and his allies, though after Nasser‟s death and Sadat‟s succession Arab
Nationalism died out.

3.3.2. Lebanese Nationalis m

In order to build a state, obviously one of the most important factor is a shared past,
history that all of the citizens compromise. As it is in many of the Middle Eastern
countries, Lebanon is not exempt from this tradition which intensified in 1920 (Kaufman,
2001, p. 174). Lebanese Christians who wanted to distant themselves from Arab Muslims
adopted the idea that Lebanese people are actually descendants of Phoenicians that actually
lived on the shores of Mediterranean Sea. Muslims stick to the idea that they were Arabs

90
from the beginning as also Salibi supports this idea today (Salibi K. S., 1988).
Lebanonism, indeed appeared, thus the Lebanese could prove that they are not merely
Arabs associated with Syria; but a rooted old community deserves self-determination.

Maronite community of Lebanon had strong feelings for their land. During the
centuries that they first settled into Mount Lebanon, claimed these territories as their
homeland and composed majority as Christians against those Sunni, Shiite and Druze
communities that scattered among villages. Christians of Lebanon, throughout the time
being ruled their territories under feudal landlords. Even though the settlement in these
areas dates back to Canaan which has been discovered by archaeologists; Lebanese identity
emerged in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under the reign of Fakr al Din II (Zamir,
1985, p. 5).

Maan family dominated Mount Lebanon and controlled the local chieftains. During
that period (1520- 1842) Lebanon enjoyed autonomy as a separate entity. These factors
gave rise to Lebanese claims for a state of their own. Reign of Bashir II opened new era for
Lebanese nationalism and this Christian governor made Mount Lebanon homeland for
Christians in particular for Maronites. Hence the balance of power has changed in favour
of Maronites as a result of economic, political, cultural and social alternation.
Improvements in Mount Lebanon enabled many Christians to migrate from various places
to Druze dominated territories as well. Generally Maronites settled to coastal cities and
Beirut.

Event though Sunnis of Lebanon didn‟t want to be separated from Syria whe n
Lebanon was first established; they have enjoyed advantages of having their own identity
and interests (Craig, 2007, p. 3). Maronites didn‟t accept that Lebanon was an Arab
country and denied Arab identity of Lebanon for a long time.

As stated in the recent chapters of this research Lebanon is located in a territory

where is hard to penetrate for the conquerors and invaders. People settled in Mount
Lebanon and periphery could find refuge and also protect their distinct ide ntities
(Kaufman, 2001, p. 174). Lebanism, however always remained as Maronite and Christian
ideology rather than commonly agreed one. Eventually, it is because it was the Christian

91
community was structured and the church played pivotal role for it and asked for an
independent entity in Mount Lebanon.

According to Isik, Maronite efforts to emphasize their distinct identity from other
ethnic groups and surrounding Arab states was strongly related to legitimize their argument
on independent Christian state in Mount Lebanon. Also he adds to his comments on
Maronite perception of Lebanese identity was necessary for them to prove that they were a
part of the land throughout the history; thus they believed that they were descendants of
Phoenicians (Isik, 2005, p. 414). Charles Corm, a strong Lebanese nationalist and poet, in
his book „La Montagne Inspirée‟ stated that Lebanon was a historical, national and
territorial entity separate from its contemporary environment. He omitted Arabism and
Islam while describing Lebanese identity. Corm believed that Islamic religion was not
related to Lebanese identity at all.

For the Muslim Arab population of the country, it was considered completely
different than the Christian perception of Lebanese identity. Muslims have been disturbed
by the partition from Syria (Mansfield, 2003, p. 202) and they put unification with Syria to
the core of Arab nationalism in Lebanon. Muslims emphasized their Arab identity and
culture, though they were part of Syria for hundreds of years. Muslim Arabs of Lebanon
believed that this time France entered their country by force to exploit it as a colony of
France (Longrigg, 1958, p. 113). Raised voice of Arab nationalists for “unity” which
France ignored; though ignoring “unity” claims meant more than just mere ignorance but
also by this attitude they denied Arab character of the whole population as well.
Consequently, the French rule in Lebanon kept the religious conflict alive w hich one of
them took place in C houf region between Christians and Muslims in 1923 and was
required vigorous governmental intervention afterward.

Despite the sectarian cleavages in the Lebanon, Mansfield believes that even under
the French mandate years Lebanese national identity within the borders of le Grand Liban
was exist. The main obstacles in the context of disunity of Lebanon lied in power relations
and sectarian loyalties. Maronites had never been willing to share power equally with
Muslims. Even though the wealthy middle class Muslims and Christians realized that they
have to cooperate with each other and unify, sectarian loyalties were above national ones.

92
 Maronites having high social dominance desired group inequality and keep existing
status quo until 1943, when was the first time Muslims and Christians compromised to
unite under unwritten commitment “National Pact”. This was a significant act that
according to this commitment the country would always one Maronite president with
Sunni prime minister. Though Maronite president had exceeding powers in the country,
thus Maronites kept their dominant position. On the other hand, Maronites kept their faith
in pro- Western governance.

When in 1946, Lebanon gained its independence from French mandate, the
sectarian groups in Lebanon consolidated in order to keep their distinct identities and
privileged positions. Identity crisis gave its fruits in 1958 when the president Chamoun
acted according to Western demands undermining National Pact that also stated the Arab
identity of Lebanon along with Phoenician heritage. Only American Marines could stop
another bloody conflict this time between Christians and Muslims. However after 1958
crisis another unwritten agreement appeared in Lebanese power politics that was equal
share of administrative positions between Christians and other sects “in order to ensure
national unity of the Lebanese people” (Salibi K. , 1971, p. 83).

Furthermore, Arab nationalism concept has Islamic sentiments in it and this is

unacceptable for the Christians of Lebanon. This is why Corm usually excluded Islam from
Lebanese Nationalism and he rejected to write his poems in Arabic but French, although
Said Agl preferred to use Arabic in his writings in which he supported the idea of
Phoenician past of Lebanese people.

However it was the very reason when in 1975 the Civil War erupted. Even though
Palestinian refugees and consequently Palestinian militia under Arab states‟ supervision
was another obstacle to Lebanon and Lebanese identity, Sunni support for Palestinians in
the context of Arab identity could be pointed another explanation to fifteen year long Civil
War in Lebanon. This war deepened the cleavages between various sectarian groups.
Beirut was divided in two between Christians and Muslims as East Beirut and West Beirut
with barricades and armed militia belonging to each religious groups (Salibi, 1988). On the
other hand, this conflict devastated Lebanon, sparkled one national Lebanese identity with

93
Ta‟if Accord- National Reconciliation bringing together hostile warring sectarian groups
around one table to negotiate for the future of the new Lebanese state.

In 1992, Rafiq Hariri, Lebanese billionaire who made his fortune in Saudi Arabia
elected as prime minister, was also a nationalist. Hariri‟s motto for Lebanon was to
“national unity” putting aside the “pre -modern” religious loyalties but to the country
(Makdisi U. , 1996). Hariri worked for sovereignty of Lebanon within its borders. He was
a Sunni, even though he first praised Syrian occupation that 40,000 Syrian troops were
deployed in strategic areas of Lebanon in order to “protect Lebanese people‟s dignity”
during the civil war, he had change in heart. In 2005 Hariri sought for international support
to oust Syrian influence in Lebanese politics and foreign affairs. Syrian retribution was
swift and harsh that Hariri had to resign. However, he achieved to pass U.N. Resolution
1559 that called Syria to evacuate Lebanon. Syrian army rejected to withdraw from
Lebanon until 2005, when was the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, ex-Premier, the most
popular public figure and billionaire with other 20 people, his bodyguards and escorts
along with some bystanders.

Following the assassination of the ex-premier thousands and thousands of people

poured into squires and unified for one purpose: expelling Syrian Army; putting an end to
Syrian influence, and punishing the culprits who killed Hariri. Hariri‟s death “triggered a
popular movement against Syria‟s long- term hegemony over Lebanese politics” (Knio,
Lebanon: Cedar Revolution or Neo- Sectarian Partition?, 2005, p. 225). Peaceful
demonstrations and protests lasted for weeks (Safa, 2006). This event later named as
“Cedar Revolution” for the first time after independence of Lebanon unified various
sectarian groups under one national demand.

94
4. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS BETWEEN 2005 AND 2009

4.1. Cedar Revolution

The Cedar Revolution actually dates back to 2004 when Hariri 17 stepped down
from the Prime Minister‟s post following President Lahoud‟s term of office has been
extended. Hariri‟s unexpectedly brief visit to Damascus on August 26, 2004 and voted on
September 3 in favour of extension of Lahoud‟s mandate (Safa, 2006, p. 29). On October
20, Hariri resigned as prime minister as sign of protest. Syrian backed Omar Karami has
been appointed as prime minister.

Lahoud‟s situation also met with opposition from the other Maronite and Druze
elements in the politics. Maronites gathered their own opposition bloc against Lahoud and
Karami alliance called Qornet Shahwan Gathering while Walid Jumblatt had taken his own
bloc under PSP criticizing Syria. Syria was finally face to face with Sunni- Maronite-
Druze united front against its mandate.

On October 1, 2004 first of the series of car bomb attacks eventuated nearly killing
Druze legislator who is also close to Jumblatt, Marwan Hamade (Salti, 2005, p. 24; Harris,
2005) and these attacks has continued in 2005 targeting opposition ministers. In these
attacks it is believed that Syrian involvement was palpable. This couldn‟t stop the elections
to be set for May 2005. Despite Syrian efforts to curb opposition blocs and asperse Hariri
in particular with bribery claims, it was predicted that Har iri would sweep the
parliamentary seats. Furthermore, Hariri achieved to put Syria under international pressure
concerning Syrian military presence in Lebanon.

On February 14, 2005, Rafik Hariri and his convoy were assassinated by another
car bomb attack (Harris, 2005). Christians, Druses and Sunnis, regardless of their
confessional affiliations poured into the streets and Rafik Hariri‟s pride “Martyr‟s Square”
in downtown Beirut, armed with nothing than flags and banners calling “Syrians out”.
Hariri‟s death “triggered a popular movement against Syria‟s long- term hegemony over
Lebanese politics” (Knio, 2005, p. 225). Lebanon has awakened after a long sleep.

17
Rafiq Hariri is a self made billionaire who is known for his close relations with Saudi Royal family. In
1992 he was elected as Prime M inister and stayed in that post on and off until h is ass assination. Hariri‟s main
objective was to boost Lebanese economy and construct demolished Beirut after the Civil Strife. Oger
Solidare, the construction company which operates still in Lebanon is belonged to Hariri family.

95
 Son of Rafik Hariri, Saad Hariri formed an opposition bloc called Future
Movement gathering Sunni, Druze, some Shiite and Maronite leaders together. Both the
people and political leaders called Syrians to evacuate Lebanon unconditionally and obey
UN Security Resolutions and Ta‟if Accord. Punishment for culprit murdered 19 people
along with Hariri also was on the top of the agenda (Harris, 2005). Nevertheless
investigations concerning Hariri assassination left unsolved. Hence by the opposit ion
leaders UN Security Council is called for Hariri assassination investigation. Furthermore, it
was announced that in May 2005 there would be elections as it has been planned and this
one would be free and fair away from Syrian interference.

Street demonstrations continued until March, blocking daily life with non-stop
gatherings and protests. Among the protesters there were youth organizations, students,
women organizations, journalists, writers, artists and workers, students, and industry
groups. Main targets of the protestors were forcing the government to resign, finding the
responsible of the assassination. Journalists and media who had been suppressed by Syrian
censure found open ground to broadcast demonstrations everyday (Salti, 2005, p. 25). One
of the most meaningful event among all these were the one that families of the missing and
kidnapped carried pictures of their beloved reaching 17,000 souls during Syrian reign of
terror era.

Prime minister, Omer Karami had resigned on February 28 watched by tens of

thousands people from the giant screen set in Martyrs‟ Square (Knio, 2008, p. 446; Sakr,
2005, p. 98). President Lahoud, being aware that he was one of the targets of the
opposition that was also suspected his involvement in the assassination, held talks with the
parliament and called Karami to form a new government. The opposition responded to
block Karami‟s return with sit ins and strikes. Meanwhile, Amal and Hezbollah kept their
silence, although feeling kind of isolated by the anti Syrian demonstrations. Particularly,
Hezbollah was disturbed by the fervent atmosphere against Syria and pro Syrians that
finally the demands of opposition could come to disarmament of its militia under
Resolution 1559.

On March 8, Hezbollah called its backers to gather in Beirut with Lebanese flags
rather than the yellow party flags. Hezbollah leader Nasrallah thanked Syria for assistance

96
following the Civil War and reminded that it was premature to accuse Syria for the
assassination. Nasrallah; furthermore urged the political leaders to support Hezbollah‟s
weapons against Israeli threat and strengthen ties with Syria instead (Knio, 2008, p. 447).

It was one of the biggest gatherings in the history of Lebanon since that time.
Approximately 500,000 people (Harris, 2005) waved their flags under Hezbollah
organization to pay tribute to Syria, to denounce the Security Council Resolution, and to
take part in the new government. Even though Hezbollah announced that every week in
another city there would be demonstrations like that one, it soon gave up on it realizing
many of its supporters were agreed on opposition objectives.

The opposition, on March 14 organized even larger one than the Hezbollah‟s.
Indeed there were 1.2 million people that were also the biggest event the Middle East has
ever seen. They renewed their demands about immediate withdrawal of Syria, uncovering
the truth under Hariri assassination, the removal from office of senior state- security
officials, and holding of free and fair elections (Knio, 2008, p. 447). All the demonstrations
were far from violent riots and skirmishes with the Army which also overwhelmed of the
kindness of the protesters meeting them with flowers (Salti, 2005, p. 22).

Unsuccessful to put an end the demonstrations, Syria found itself in a very difficult
position. Lebanese consent for Syrian withdrawal strengthened Washington‟s hand and
donned with UN Resolution 1559, also taking France by its side, the US began to pressure
on Syria (Knio, 2008; Harris, 2005). Egypt and Saudi Arabia backed the Western decision
against Syrian presence in Lebanon as well. On 29 April 2005, last Syrian soldier left
Lebanon through Bekaa where they had been stationed.

Following the Syrian pullout, until the elections the opposition has compromised
with the choice of Prime Minister Najib Mikati, (Harris, 2005) a business man under
conditions of sacking heads of security agencies, guarantee free and fair elections
supervised and monitored by international team of observers, and resign his parliamentary
position. The opposition got what they had wanted and the legislative elections were set for
May 29.

The Cedar Revolution, also called independence intifada (Salti, 2005), even though
achieved to liberate Lebanon under political and military pressure of Syria, and enabled

97
free and fair elections, still remains unfinished. In the means of acceptable electoral law for
the all citizens, as it was stated in Ta‟if abolition of confessionalism; and review of the
agreements imposed by Syria during the occupation years had to be done. One more issue
that should be finalized is Hariri Tribunal which will uncover the truth lays under the
assassination of one of the most influential figure in Lebanese history.

4.2. 2005 General Elections

4.2.1. Distribution of Seats and Cabinet Formation

After Syrian withdrawal, 2005 elections were praised as the first free elections
since the tumultuous Civil War. The elections were considered as a “milestone” in
Lebanese politics whether to adopt democracy free of Syrian claw. The elections were held
in the country‟s four main regions over successive Sundays (Pan, 2005). The election
process in 2005 has been stated one of the freest and the best monitored election in
Lebanese history (Safa, 2006, p. 22).

It is essential to note that the legislative elections also raised one of the most
important issues: electoral law. It had been prepared in 2000 by the Syrian backed
government in order to ensure the pro-Syrians to be elected while undermining Hariri and
his Christian allies (Shields, 2008, pp. 478-79). Now they had to decide whether to
postpone the elections to a further date and amend a more democratic new electoral law or
to go forward with this imperfect law. The opposition leaders that couldn‟t take the risk a
delay, picked the latter, thus as it was decided before the elections were held on May 29.

The country divided into six electoral districts that were (1) Mount Lebanon, (2)
North Lebanon, (3) Beirut, (4) Bekaa, (5) South Lebanon and (6) Nabatiyeh. Each districts
also divided smaller polling districts. The elections were held on the basis of list system.

98
Electoral Districts Confessions

Mount Lebanon

Aley 2 Druses, 2 Maronites, 1 Greek Orthodox

Baabda 1 Druze, 3 Maronites, 2 Shiites
Chouf 2 Druses, 3 Maronites, 1 Catholic, 2 Sunnis
Jbeil 2 Maronites, 1 Shiite
Kesrwan 5 Maronites
North Metn 2 Greek Orthodox, 4 Maronites, 1 Catholic, 1
Armenian Orthodox.

North Lebanon

Akkar 2 Greek Orthodox, 3 Sunnis, 1 Maronite, 1

Alawite
Batroun 2 Maronites
Bsharreh 2 Maronites
Dennieh 2 Sunnis
Koura 3 Greek Orthodox
Minieh 1 Sunni
Tripoli 5 Sunnis, 1 Greek Orthodox, 1 Maronite, 1
Alawite
Zghorta 3 Maronites.

Beirut

Beirut 1 (Achrafieh, Mazraa, Saifi) 2 Sunnis, 1 Maronite, 1 Catholic, 1 Greek

Beirut 2 ( Msaitbeh, Bashoura, Rmeil)
Beirut 3 (Ain Mreisi, Ras Beirut, Zukak Blat,
Medawar, Marfa‟, Mina al- Hosn)
Orthodox, 1 Evangelical
2 Sunnis, 1 Shiite, 1 Greek Orthodox, 1
Armenian Orthodox, 1 Maronite
2 Sunnis, 1 Shiite, 1 Druze, 2 Armenian
Orthodox, 1 Armenian Catholic.

Bekaa

Bekaa- Hermel 6 Shiites, 2 Sunnis, 1 Catholic, 1 Maronite

West Bekaa- Rashaya 1 Shiite, 2 Sunnis, 1 Druze, 1 Greek Orthodox
Zahleh 1 Sunni, 1 Shiite, 1 Greek Orthodox, 2
Catholics, 1 Maronite, 1 Armenian Orthodox

South Lebanon and Nabatieh

Bint Jbeil 3 Shiites

Jezzine 2 Maronites, 1 Catholic
Marjeyoun- Hasbaya 1 Druze, 1 Greek Orthodox, 2 Shiites, 1 Sunni
Nabatieh 3 Shiites
Saida 2 Sunnis
Tyre 4 Shiites
Zahrani 1 Catholic, 2 Shiites.
Table 3: Confessional Distribution of Seats in 2005. (MENA, 2007)

99
 The election results have been announced on 19 June 2005 by Interior Minister.
Saad Hariri and his allies won 72 seats out of 128. The Future Movement won 36 seats
(Safa, 2006; Paraipan, 2005; Norton, 2007, p. 130) of 72 while Walid Jumblatt and his
Progressive Socialist Party got 15 seats while Samir Geagea‟s Lebanese Forces Party won
6 seats (Paraipan, 2005).

Hezbollah won 14 seats and Amal got 15 under the Resistance, Liberation and
Development bloc. Since its first introduction to Lebanese politics, 2005 election is
considered the most successful one for Hezbollah. Former General Michael Aoun allied
with Suleiman Frangieh and their opposition bloc Free Patriotic Movement had 21 seats in
the parliament.

Winning alliance of Hariri and Jumblatt proposed Fuad Siniora, a Sunni Muslim
and an experienced politician worked as Minister of Finance for years, for the Prime
Minister post and confirmed by Lahoud. Justice, Social, Information, Public Works,
Education, Finance, Energy, and Industry ministries went to Future Movement; Economy,
and Youth and Sports ministries to Qornet Shahwan; Tourism ministry to Lebanese Forces;
Labour, and Agriculture ministry to Hezbollah; Defence and Health ministry to Amal;
Interior, Culture, Displaced ministries to Progressive Socialist Party; Foreign, Reform
ministries to independents, Environment ministry to Armenian; and Telecommunication
ministry to minorities. Nabih Berri kept his post in the parliament as Speaker fourth term in
row (Yalibnan, 2005). However, President Emile Lahoud could extend his term of office
until 2007 by Syrian support despite corruption claims against him.

Hariri and his allies got 72 seats though they were still needed 86 votes to pass
constitutional amendments. Even though there were new faces in the parliament and also in
the government after 29 years of Syrian intervention to Lebanese domestic politics Nebih
Berri, a long time Syrian ally remained in office.

Main agenda of the new parliament is Hezbollah‟s arms, struggle against

corruption, Palestinians in Lebanon and establishment of full sovereignty over the country
including disputed areas under Israeli occupation, reform in the electoral system.
Nevertheless reform process began to slow down in 2006.

100
Speaker of Parliament called for a „national dialogue‟ between opposition and anti
government parties due to break this institutional impasse. The meetings were held for four
months from March to June 2006, crumpled by Israeli- Lebanon War. The forum tackled
seven issues primarily: the border demarcation in particular Shebaa Farms, Hezbollah‟s
weapons, Hariri investigation, the position of the president, the new electoral law,
Palestinian refugee issue, and finally economic policy and development.

There were only two compromises among these various issues which were the
Palestinian issue and economic development. Urban areas were long neglected by previous
state institutions that poor conditions of these areas has been mentioned in the previous
chapter. For the Palestinian issue, non- naturalization of Palestinians and their right to
return has been emphasized. Hezbollah fiercely opposed demilitarization of the party and
deployment of Lebanese army in South Lebanon (Knio, 2008, p. 448). Remaining five
issues left unsolved under the pressure of 2006 War.

When the war ended, political contention resumed between the two rival camps.
Hezbollah and its allies demanded for more seats in the cabinet while March 14 pressed for
unconditional acceptance of international tribunal protocol that was ready to be signed. Six
ministers in whom five of them were Shiites in Siniora cabinet resigned in protest on
November 11, 2006. Obviously Hezbollah wanted to attain veto power and restricting
Siniora government (Shields, 2008, p. 486). President Lahoud and Speaker of Parliament
haven‟t eased the situation for March 14, remnants of Syrian influence in Lebanese politics
has resurfaced even after withdrawal.

Consequently, even though the election process passed in a peaceful atmosphere,

the old electoral law of 2000 was in effect made under Syrian shadow. After the elections
prescribed reforms regarding more democratic electoral law could be materialized even in
2009 elections. National Dialogue Process aimed to decrease sectarian tension a nd create a
national unity government has failed when it came to Hezbollah issues such as
disarmament of the organization and deployment Lebanese army in South Lebanon.

Political assassinations continued killing influential opposition ministers reducing

their numbers in the parliament (Knio, 2008; Feldman, 2006, p. 5). Above all another
devastation war in 2006 loomed darkly over Lebanese democracy also harassing the new

101
cabinet drawing Lebanon at the edge of another sectarian conflict. The long path to 2009
elections has been taken under these circumstances.

4.3. 2006 Second Lebanon- Israel War

4.3.1. Reasons of the War and Escalation of the Hostilities

The war which was lasted thirty four days, turned Be irut and Lebanon once again
into rubble began on 12 July 2006 by the kidnapping of two and killing of eight Israeli
soldiers by Hezbollah militants in the disputed area of Shebaa Farms where was occupied
by Israel (Matthews, 2008). Hezbollah and Lebanese state claims this peace of land as
Lebanese. From time to time, Hezbollah sends small scale groups to tease Israelis in the
region.

What lied under this assault to Israeli post was various. Not only was the border
dispute motivated Hezbollah to take such an action to kidnap two Israeli soldiers; but also
swap between Lebanese prisoners and Israeli soldiers (Mackey, 2009; Salem P. , 2006, p.
13; International Crisis Group, 2006). Above all it was not first Hezbollah operation to
kidnapping Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah attempted the same operation in 2005 but failed
(Matthews, 2008).

Hezbollah had planned to get back its militias that imprisoned in Tel Aviv as
exchange of the two Israeli soldiers kidnapped. Although Olmert, new Prime Minister in
2005 said Israel wouldn‟t negotiate with terrorists referring to Hamas‟ abduction case,
Hezbollah knew that in the past Israel negotiated indirectly with Hezbollah (CRS Report
for Congress, 2006, p. 7).

In 1996 after a German brokered negotiation Israel released 45 prisoners and bodies
of 123 Lebanese in exchange of bodies of 2 IDF soldiers. In 1998 a similar exchange
occurred this time Israel delivered Hadi Nasrallah‟s body, who was killed in 1997, to his
father Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, yet in 2004 Israel, in exchange of
two bodies and one living retired colonel, released 24 Lebanese and 400 Palestinians
(Norton, 2007, pp. 87-88). However, Hezbollah leaders haven‟t estimated that Israel would
launch a large scale attack on Lebanon (Matthews, 2008) neither Nasrallah‟s aim was to
attack Israel.

102
 Moreover, Hezbollah operation to Shiaba Farms represented support for Intifada
after Israeli incursion into Gaza on 25 June 2006 (Matthews, 2008, p. 22). Hezbollah
abduction operation just came after nineteen days after that very similar to this has been
staged in Gaza (Inbar, 2007, p. 57). Hezbollah‟s abduction operation also planed to serve
deterring Israel concerning Palestinian struggle for Jerusalem (Devenny, 2006, p. 31).

Hezbollah also served Iranian nuclear program agenda by diverting attention of

international community to somewhere else. Though the war earned Iran only a limited
time; that the U.N. Security Council postponed Iranian nuclear issue due to Lebanese case.
U.N. warned Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program until August 31or face the
sanctions (CRS Report for Congress, 2006). However, the operation hadn‟t been known by
Tehran that Qassam emphasizes Hezbollah decides on its own when, where and how to do
the operations (Qassam, 2007).

In the context of Hezbollah‟s domestic goals in Lebanon as one of the reasons of

the war, Hezbollah took military option to achieve its political goals and fasten the pace of
reforms in the country which the present government unable to achieve (Alagha, 2008, p.
2). Regardless of the two Hezbollah ministers in the cabinet on the other hand, Lebanese
cabinet didn‟t take any responsibilities of kidnappings even endorsed it. The war frayed
Lebanese government and flawed its credibility among the fellow citizens (Salem, 2006, p.
14).

The Israeli attacks on infrastructure and strategic areas actually aimed Lebanese
government to take responsibility over Hezbollah actions and finally force them to disarm
the organization. However, the Lebanese government was too weak and incapable of
challenging Hezbollah (International Crisis Group, 2006).

Condemnation to Hezbollah acts that carried Lebanon to massive destruction

erupted inside and outside of Lebanon. Sunni governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Egypt blamed Hezbollah also destabilizing the region (Salem P. , 2006, p. 16).

103
4.3.2. Israeli Attack on Beirut

Map 3: Map of July, 2006 War

Source: http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/350/355/july-war/index.html

On 12 July 2006, at 8.55 am Hezbollah put on track their plan and attacked milepost
105. The Hezbollah militia breaking the fence that separates two states ambushed two
vehicles patrolling. When the chaotic situation was finally settled down, the Israelis
realised two of the soldiers were kidnapped. At 11.00 Israeli a few armoured vehicles
crossed Lebanese border to cut off Hezbollah‟s escaping roots (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008,
pp. 9-11). However, Hezbollah was well prepared of any possible Israeli counter operation
and exploded one of the Merkava tanks killing four inside. When the day reached to the
noon, the second Israel- Lebanon war has began.

Israel launched air, land and sea attacks on 13 July 2006 that almost destroyed
whole Lebanese infrastructure at first hand as a response to Katyusha and mortar attacks of
Hezbollah on 12, July 2006. In the first phase of the war Israeli Air Forces attacked
dahiyeh quarter of Beirut that according to IDF reports located as where Hezbollah
command posts were. Military targets along Beirut- Damascus highway were hit by IAF.

104
Infrastructure, roads, bridges and even some barracks of LAF also had been destroyed that
led fifteen Lebanese soldiers to die. Israel laid the responsibility of the war not only on
Hezbollah, but also to Lebanese cabinet which had two Hezbollah ministers. Lebanese
government declared that they had no knowledge about the “Operation True Promise” of
Hezbollah and denied responsibility of the attacks into Israel.

On 14 July Lebanese government asked for cease fire, yet their demands were
unheard by Israeli Chief of Staff Halutz and the attacks continued despite the warnings of
Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Moshe Kaplinski (Kober, 2008, p. 4). Yet Israel,
deciding that air bombardments were not sufficient to stop Hezbollah to fire hundreds of
Katyushas into Northern Israel mobilized reverse division to the border due to destroy
Hezbollah deployments. Shockingly, Hezbollah hit an Israeli naval vessel with C-802
guided missile which blockaded Beirut by the sea just on time when Nasrallah was
addressing to the Lebanese (Matthews, 2008, p. 38).

Between 15 July and 16 July, massive Hezbollah attacks continued into Lebanon
regardless of Israeli air attacks. On July 16, long ranged Hezbollah rockets managed to
reach Haifa killing eight Israelis. On 17 July, Prime Minister Olmert announced Israeli war
objectives as rescuing abducted soldiers, and removing Hezbollah soldiers throughout
northern border line. His most fervent aim was to abolish Hezbollah as a military power
which was not a realistic one at all.

IAF attacks proved ineffective on Hezbollah militia fighting without interruption

sending rockets into Lebanon. Halutz was reluctant to send land forces into Lebanon
believing success of IAF despite the US reports that IAF achieved to hit only 7 percent of
Hezbollah‟s military resources. Halutz unwillingly compromised with army commanders
that insisted sending ground units into Lebanon (Inbar, 2007, pp. 59-60). On July 17 the
first large scale Israeli ground unit advanced to Maroun al Ras.

In Maroun al Ras, it was the first hot contact with Hezbollah and Israelis. The unit
sent in that region was elite unites who were stunned by the volume of the Hezbollah
response. The first elite united had been surrounded and called for assistance that arrived
on 19 July. Bewildered by the Hezbollah fighters and their effective defence, on July 21
Halutz and Olmert called up Israeli forces.

105
 On 24 July, IDF moved to Bint Jbail, a large town north of Maroun al- Ras. Bint
Jbail was one strongly associate with Hezbollah and also one of the most important towns
in the region as well. It was known as Hezbollah stronghold. Capturing the town,
nevertheless had no strategic significance for Israel, but symbolic one argues Kober (2008,
p. 28). Sheik Nasrallah gave his speech and associated Israel as spider web and weak.
Halutz ordered Bint Jbeil to be conquered with just one battalion. Hezbollah‟s response to
this IDF attack was fierce and bitter for the Israelis. Nine soldiers were dead and twenty
seven were wounded at the end of the clashes. Israelis even at the end of the war haven‟t
entirely secured the town.

On 29, July Israel widened the operation in order to control border terrain and
attacked into Hezbollah targets in Beqaa and Tyre. Nevertheless Hezbollah forces using
guerrilla tactics along with advanced anti tank and anti ship missiles made Israeli efforts
fruitless.

In the mid- August Israel unable to prevent Hezbollah Katyushas into Israel as well
as paralyze the organization‟s decentred command; hence it was still intact. Furthermore,
insufficient information about whereabouts of Katyusha missiles fired forced Israel to sent
ground troops and capture the land where required capture of the entire south of Litani
River. Whereas; it was too late on 12 and 13 August for Israel to increase the size of
ground and armoured units advancing in the area of Litani River before the ceasefire come
into effect (Rom, 2006).

Hezbollah wasn‟t idle during the last hours of the war and fired more than 250
rockets into Israel. On August 13, Hezbollah shot down a Sikorsky CH- 53 helicopter
killing the entire crew. It was the last blow for Halutz who had to admit defeat by the
hands of Hezbollah. At the end of thirty four days war Israel only could advance seven
kilometres into Lebanon. On 14 August 2006 U.N. Resolution 1701 came into effect
enabling a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.

4.3.3. Consequences of Second Israel- Lebanon War

Hezbollah forces have been considered victorious in the war of 2006 by Syrians
and many Arab states (Zisser, 2008) as well as Hassan Nasrallah himself (Feldman, 2006).
The perception of Hezbollah victory in the war was intense in Israel as well; whereas

106
Hezbollah‟ Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah had to admit that they hadn‟t
expected this strong reaction from Israel in the context of scale and magnitude (Feldman,
2006, p. 2). The miscalculation was for both sides: Hezbollah and Israel.

Since 1996 Israeli operation Wrath of Grapes, Israel this time found disciplined
guerrilla army with sophisticated weapons like Farj 5 and Katyusha missiles which were
hidden in the bunkers, basements of the buildings and tunnels (Mackey, 2009, p. 249).
Hezbollah also fired land- to- sea missiles and modern anti tank weapons against Israel that
were provided by Iran and Syria to the organization (Ze‟ev, 2006).

It is known that many of Hezbollah long range missiles has been destro yed by IAF,
it is possible for the organization to resupply them quickly from Iran and Syria
(Cordesman, 2006b, p. 4). Even though UN Secretary General extracted a promise from
Assad to avoid arms transfer to Hezbollah, Nasrallah‟s speeches regarding increased
Hezbollah arsenals in quality and quantity proves the contrary.

After 2006 war, Hezbollah has some political gains such as new government ‟s
commitment to the „resistance‟, legitimization for Hezbollah‟s protector role and arms and
respect from Arab states; whereas mainly Christians and other sects criticized Hezbollah‟s
self made war and destruction it brought to economy, infrastructure and environment (CRS
Report for Congress, 2006, pp. 1-2; International Crisis Group, 2006). Salem (2006, p. 18)
claims in militarily and politically, despite Nasrallah‟s self declared „victory‟, lost the
control of the area south of Litani River to Lebanese army and UNIFIL by the Resolution
1701. Mooney Jr. (2007, p. 28), on the other hand, articulates that Hezbollah‟s victory was
a “strategic victory”. Moreover, Hezbollah tied itself with reconstruction and relief to the
devastated Shiites losing ability to military maneuver (Feldman, 2006).

The war that brought bitter destruction to Lebanon once again after the civil war of
1975-1990, caused a new unity government to be formed. Alagha emphasized that
“Hezbollah and their Christian allies, the Free Patriotic Movement, wield the one third veto
power, thus attempted to dominate national political arena, after wielding power over
Legislative and the Presidency” (Alagha J. , 2008, p. 1). Polarization between March 8
coalition led by Hezbollah and allies, and March 14 coalition plunged Lebanon into
political deadlock which was effective from 1 December 2006.

107
 Nevertheless human cost of the war went beyond the infrastructural and economic
damage: more than one million, 25 percent of the overall population, displaced; in
Lebanese side 1,110 civilian (Pederson, 2007, p. 40), 70 to 600 fighter deaths while in
Israeli side 119 soldiers and 41 civilian deaths (Cordesman, 2006b). Furthermore both
sides have thousands of wounded.

On the Israeli side there were some consequences following the war as always that
the wars are two sided. First and foremost, Israel couldn‟t achieve war objectives set at the
beginning of the war. If Israeli war objectives to be summed up they can be given under
five headlines: (1) Break Iranian ambitions before Iran could go nuclear, (2) Cripple or
destroy Hezbollah‟s military wing, (3) Restore Israel‟s credibility against Hamas in Gaza
and Hezbollah after 2000 withdrawal, (4) Force Lebanese state to act as a responsible state
and put an end to Hezbollah‟s actions, (5) Rescue the two abducted soldiers.

Nevertheless, Israel couldn‟t achieve to realize her war objectives. Iran still
continues her nuclear proliferation, and still supports Hezbollah financially and militarily.
Furthermore, Syria declared to implement sanctions if UNIFIL is deployed on the border
line with Lebanon. Despite Israeli destruction of Beirut- Damascus highway and supply
routes between Syria and Lebanon it is just assume that arms transfer through the border
continues as it was before. It is quite difficult to monitor border traffic for Lebanese army
above all it couldn‟t look inside large trucks and containers (Cordesman, 2006b, p. 6).

Hezbollah‟s military wing today intact and is even stronger by the support of new
unity government. Lebanese state, though it acts accordingly with 1701 and deployed
Lebanese army in the south embraces “resistance” and Hezbollah‟s arms until the country
liberated. Israeli attack raised some protests and voices within Lebanese Sunni and
Christian communities, even Hezbollah would think twice in the future to make any
operations this kind.

And finally the two Israeli soldiers couldn‟t be rescued. Israel‟s position against
Hezbollah shattered Israel‟s invincibility and credibility. Hence neither of Israel‟s
objectives has been realised. Moreover, tactical and operational mistakes pinned Israeli
government and high rank officers against increased criticisms (Inbar, 2007).

108
 Winograd Commission that was formed in order to evaluate the failure Israel had
was held in September. Olmert and Peretz testified in the commission; hence Olmert
claimed that he was planning to launch an attack to Hezbollah posts in March 2006
whereas Peres found the war unnecessary. On the other hand, Israeli Army Chief of Staff
Dan Halutz had to resign as the prize of “failure” which buttressed Hezbollah‟s victory
claims.

4.4. Domestic Affairs after the War

4.4.1. Palestinian Refugee Issue and Clashes of 2007

Doubtless to say, Palestinian presence that began in 1948 has vital consequences
for Lebanese social and political life throughout the years. Even though at first Palestinians
were seemed valuable asset for the economy, soon negative effects have surfaced.
According to the most reliable sources, currently 400,000 Palestinians lives twelve refugee
camps scattered throughout Lebanon surrounding (Suleiman J. , 1999, p. 67; International
Crisis Group, 2009, p. 1).

In original there were fifteen refugee camps established by UNRWA in 1940s and
France in 1936, though three of them permanently destroyed during the Civil War. Four of
them are in Beirut and suburbs established in 1940s and 50s, six of them located in South
Lebanon in which Fatah is generally strong, again founded in 1940s; Ain al- Hilweh is the
most populous one with 46,000 refugees. The camp also nurtures Jihadi factions and
sleeping cells of fundamentalist organizations that PLO left behind. There are two camps
in the North, in which one of them called Narh al-Bared witnessed violent clashes in 2007
between LAF and a radical Islamist group Fatah al-Islam (International Crisis Group,
2009).

It is reasonable that from the beginning of the Palestinian influx, Lebanon never has
embraced Palestinians unlike Jordan did. However, Palestinians at first enjoyed high
standards of life renting apartments in Lebanon hoping their residence in this country is
temporary. Many wealthy Palestinians owned banks and profitable businesses that
Suleiman describes this era as the first phase (Suleiman J. , 1999, p. 67) though life in the
refugee camps were telling a different story.

109
 Despite strict controls in the camps and restricted social and political rights,
Palestinians gradually became more active. In the context of Lebanese sectarian structure,
Palestinians, mainly Sunni Muslims, disturbed the fragile and delicate balance (Safa,
2006). When Muslim leftists, Sunnis and Druses appreciated reckless PLO attacks into
Israel even taking risk of clashing with LAF (International Crisis Group, 2009), both
Christians feeling threatened militarily and Shiites dislocated from their farms the in South
by PLO activities resented and opposed fiercely to Palestinian presence.

If great majority of Lebanese were disturbed by this turn of the tide, Christians
were head of it. Christians thus were accused by the Muslim contingents to separate
Lebanon from Arab world. On the other hand, none other sect but the Shiites suffered more
of PLO‟s presence in Lebanon. The so called “belt of misery” surrounding Beirut, slum
areas where in majority Shiites live can be said as PLO making. Hudson (1976, p. 116)
explains reason of Shiite suffering that “much of the South Lebanon has been depopulated
and devastated by repeated Israeli raids since 1968”.

Palestinian resistance first established itself in South Lebanon and began to launch
attacks into Israel. Palestinian raids drew Israeli retaliations in the south. President Chehab
initiated an aggressive policy towards the Palestinians controlling the camps by Lebanese
forces, which caused conflict in the camps and Palestinians challenged with Lebanese
state. On 3 November 1969 Cairo accords signed between Yasser Arafat and Lebanese
state, which aimed to curb Palestinian activities in the south while recognizing “both the
Palestinians‟ right to wage their struggle against Israel from Lebanese soil and the
refugees‟ political and socio-economic rights” (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 4); yet
all the Palestinian activities through Lebanese soil had to be in coordination with Lebanese
authorities. However, Palestinian activities resumed after a short break unheeding the state
authorities (Picard & Philip, 1996, pp. 79-81).

In 1970-71 the situation has changed by the Jordanian Black September. PLO
guerrillas that ousted out of Jordan resettled in Lebanon challenging with the Lebanese
state (Norton, 2007, p. 14). Until 1982, when the PLO had to relocate itself to Tunis,
Palestinian resistance organized its institutions and strengthened by financial and military
aids pouring from the Arab world. PLO‟s aim was to create “state in state” and weaken the

110
existing state restricting it to implement full sovereignty over its soil. Eventually, PLO
guerrillas could easily conduct attacks into Israel without any strict opposition from the
official channels (Safa, 2006, pp. 26-27).

Civil Strife in 1975 carried Palestinian issue to another level. PLO has challenged
the state destroying that fragile balance between confessions altogether dividing them into
warring militias as leftists and rightists. However, evacuation of PLO left the refugee
camps unprotected and made easy targets for the Christian militias (International Crisis
Group, 2009, p. 5). In 1982, opposition of the Christians that fear for losing control of the
country to Sunni elements, attacked Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps killing thousands of
women, children and old.

The period between 1985 and 1989 marked the era as “War of the Camps” for
Palestinians remained in Lebanon after the evacuation of PLO guerrillas. In mid- 1985
Amal militia launched a war against Palestinian camps in Beirut and Southern Lebanon,
despite the fact that Fatah in Tripoli has been defeated. Amal‟s objective was to defeat all
pro Arafat forces remaining in the country. Amal‟s raids into Palestinian camps also
represents the era when Syria turned against PLO presence in Lebanon. This situation
continued until 16 January 1988 when Amal lifted siege with Syrian pressure. The War of
Camps engendered intra Palestinian conflict between Fatah and loyalists. Later it turned to
struggle of survival for the Palestinian organizations in the camps, when Syria detained
hundreds of the movement‟s sympathizers and restricted direct contact with Palestinians
and Lebanese state (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 6).

When finally the peace restored in Lebanon in 1989 with the Taif Accord, first
official meeting between the PLO and Lebanese state occurred in 1991 in Cairo. In the
meeting a three point agenda has been discussed: “(1) Palestinian military presence in the
camps, (2) the security situation in the camps; and (3) the social and civil rights of
Palestinians in Lebanon” (Suleiman J. , 1999, p. 69). Two sides reached to an agreement
under these terms that Palestinians deliver heavy and medium weaponry and redeploy
military personal into the camps while Lebanese government gives civil and social rights
to the Palestinians but not citizenship and eligibility in governmental positions.

111
 The terms of the agreement has been materialized, though there were some
skirmishes in Sidon. On June 27, 1991 Lebanese army positioned itself in Sidon and the
rest of the south. There was another meeting in the ministerial level with Palestinians and
Ministry of Social Work and Agriculture in 1991 concerning “civil and social rights of
Palestinian” no tangible result came out of it. Moreover, Syrian backed PFLP-GC and
Fatah al-Intifada maintained their arms in and out of the camps. Indeed, Palestinian
weapons issue has been ignored between 1990 and 2004 (International Crisis Group,
2009).

Since the most feverish years of 1970s and 80s Palestinian refugee camps re mained
“security islands” for Lebanon that Lebanese army could not control. The camps have their
own armed security personals and judiciary inside. Gibran Tuwayni, editor of an-Nahar
newspaper following the incident that murder of four Lebanese judges that the killers were
expected Palestinians, in Sidon touched the issue of these “security island” that he wrote
“We don‟t intent to accuse the Palestinians of the massacre in Sidon before the
investigations has ended. But the mere presence of Palestinian camps outside the authority
of the state, with their weaponry and armed elements, naturally leads one to point fingers at
the prime cause behind the security disorder and to the situation of disarray inside the
Palestinian camps.” (Tuwayni, 1999), Hence Tuwayni also calls the state security forces to
enter the camps and neutralize them.

After Hariri assassination in 2005, Palestinian arms in the camps became matter of
honour for the March 14 coalition. Armed Palestinian militias in the camps are considered
as Syrian proxies, thus in order to curtail Syrian influence the Palestinians had be
neutralized. It would also constitute an example for Hezbollah‟s disarmament
(International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 7).

The concerns of the government has materialized on 20 May 2007 in Narh al-Bared
refugee camp, located 16 km of Tripoli. Clashes erupted between Fatah al-Islam and
Lebanese Forces on May 20, 2007 after search of a house being used by Fatah militants
who were suspected to be bank robbers (BBC News, 2007). The militants resisted arrest
and opened fire to Lebanese forces and the clashes spread throughout the camp. Fatah
militias also attacked a military post outside of the camp killing 27 Lebanese soldiers and

112
several civilians. On 21 May, 2007 the Lebanese army besieged the camp with tanks and
artilleries. The army began heavy fire on the camp, though after 48 hours of fighting the
army was repelled. The violence spread to Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp near city of Sidon
between Lebanese army and Jund al- Sham militants on June 3, 2007 (Fattah, 2007).

When the mediations failed to a cease fire, on June 9 the second attack came from
the Lebanese army capturing key positions from Fatah, though casualties increased
speedily that among 29 people killed there were two Red Cross workers who were
evacuating the civilians. On June 16 third wave of Lebanese attack began and until 19 June
all of the strategic positions that Fatah militias kept were taken. On June 21, the army
declared that they had achieved all of their objectives in the camp, whereas the heavy
fighting continued. On June 25, after another skirmishes between the Lebanese army and
Islamist militants, mainstream Fatah forces under Mahmoud Abbas‟ control entered Nahr
el- Bared. Lebanese army decided to capture last strategic position at the centre of the
camp on July 12. Fatah al-Islam militants fired several Katyusha rockets into surrounding
villages on July 25.

Finally on August 24, a truce was made that let the remaining women and children
to leave the camp. Until September 7, skirmishes between two fighting sides resumed and
that day Lebanese army declared victory. On the other hand, there were several bombings
in and around Beirut in Christian and Muslim sectors that the Palestinian group Fatah al-
Islam claimed responsibility. At the end of the conflict both sides suffered casualties, while
all the attention turned to faltering conditions of the camps once again (Khalidi &
Riskedahl, 2007), but also security concerns of the authorities resurfaced with the clashes.

On 7 January 2008, PLO representatives in Lebanon agreed that Palestinian

weapons should be under Lebanese laws and control along with security issues in the
camps. Recently, PLO in Lebanon believed that being a sovereign state Lebanon should be
responsible policing in the camps and provide security for the re fugees instead of militias.
In return PLO asks for more socio-economic rights for the refugees (International Crisis
Group, 2009).

In 2009 weapons of the Palestinians inside and outside the camps once again gained
importance. Leader of Fatah contingents Abu al-Aynayn utters his commitment to

113
Lebanese regulations concerning the camps while Ahmad Jibril, head of Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine- General Command (PFLP-GC) draws attention to poor
conditions of the refugee camps and refuses to any state control within the camps (Daily
Star Staff, 2009). Indeed 2007 clashes have brought Palestinian leaders and government
even closer (Salem P. , 2007, p. 2). This illustrates disagreement among the camps under
leadership of different Palestinian groups on major issues such as arms and state control
that increases a possibility of clashes between the camps or state forces.

Under these circumstances how to solve Palestinian refugees issue in Lebanon

became more and more complicated in due time. There are some proposals for Lebanon
that Israel and some Western countries and the United States are urging Lebanon to grant
citizenship to the Palestinians in the refugee camps for 60 years (Haddad, 2004, p. 470).
On the other hand, Lebanese people and the government completely disagree about
naturalization of Palestinians. There are economic, demographic, and social reasons under
Lebanese opposition.

Firstly, Palestinians‟ integration into Lebanon would disturb balance of confessions

in the country. If Palestinians are naturalised, Sunnis would be the majority over Shiites
and Christians (Paraipan, 2005; Haddad, 2004); whereas even Sunnis are against
Palestinian implantation to Lebanon. Selim al- Hoss and former President Lahoud support
right to return of the Palestinians emphasize this issue. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
also agrees on the Palestinian issue with the rest of the Lebanon (Haddad, 2004, p. 472). El
Khazen underlines consensus among all sects regarding the Palestinian resettlement and
adds “it is probably the only issue on which the views of the Lebanese- across ideological
and confessional lines- agree.” (El- Khazen, 1997)

Secondly, Lebanese economy eroded immensely after the notorious Civil War.
Great majority of the workforce and capital has flown to other co untries. Especially
Christian Lebanese, during the war migrated to Western countries such as France and the
US In post war period, despite former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri‟s efforts, Lebanese
economy suffers under high foreign dept today. Lebanon is a co untry with little sources
and wealth. Consequently, Lebanon in its current situation has 25 percent unemployment
rate. When it is considered that the Palestinians would increase Lebanese population 10

114
percent, so unemployment burden on Lebanese economy would carry the state to another
civil disturbance. Moreover, 60 percent of the young people in Lebanon consider leaving
for work to other countries (Habib, 1999). Yet, Lebanese authorities finally authorised
Palestinians to work in more professions than the previous years in 2010. Probably, this
new regulation for Palestinian refugees could improve primitive conditions of families in
the refugee camps. Moreover, better economic conditions in the camps

The Lebanese government restricts the rights of Palestinians in order to encourage

them to leave for another state. Furthermore the state proclaims that it is the first step to
give rights to the Palestinians to grand those citizenships, thus avoids increasing civil rights
for the refugees (CNN, 2007). However in 1950s and 90s there were mass naturalization
for the Palestinians, great majority still lives under very poor conditions. The Lebanese
government restricts transportation and job options for the Palestinians and treat them as
foreigners that 70 professions are restricted for the Palestinians. (Peteet, 1999). Education
is nearly impossible for the young generations that the public schools are closed to
Palestinians and the private schools are not affordable for Palestinians (Hammarberg,
2000). Education mandate in the camps belong to U.N. Relief and Work Agency
(UNRWA) founded in 1949 to assist the refugees.

Thirdly, Palestinians have distinct identity according to Lebanese. Their adaptation

and assimilation within Lebanese are not possible; while Palestinian nationalism is very
common among this community. Furthermore, it is still a vivid in the hearts and minds of
the Lebanese people the role Palestinians played at the beginning of the Civil War. Many
Lebanese holds Palestinians responsible in the eruption of the war, hence there is a wide
understanding that “Lebanon is for Lebanese”. Former Foreign Minister Fares Boue iz
implies that “Lebanon was never before, nor is now capable of dealing with this large
number of Palestinians- it is not right to resolve the Palestinian problem by creating a
Lebanese one.” (Chahine, 1996, p. 18). Consequently, naturalization and resettlement of
the Palestinians constitute the greatest threat to precarious sectarian balance renewing a
sectarian civil war in Lebanon and danger to national security.

115
4.4.2. 2008 political crisis and May riots in Beirut

Conflict that reminded the Civil War of 1975-90 to the Lebanese had started by the
order of Hasan Nasrallah on May 9, 2008, following series of governmental decisions
taken on May 6. One of the three pretexts that turned Beirut into a battlefield was ca ll for
investigation to Hezbollah‟s private fixed line communications network. Second one was
the decision to relocate Hariri International Airport‟s security chief, a man close to
Hezbollah, Walid Shuquair (Saab, 2008). And the third one was to removal of security
cameras situated in the Airport‟s southern walls. Two weeks long conflict began in Beirut.
Though under these ostensible reasons lied Hezbollah‟s seek of more power in the new
cabinet, thus blocking key decisions concerning Hezbollah weapons, domestic and foreign
policy.

Nasrallah announcing governmental decisions as “declaration of war ” began armed

campaign against the March 14 government carried the conflict to the streets. Hezbollah
forces controlled easily West Beirut and Druze section of Mount Lebanon. Damascus
highway which was closed by the LAF has been reopened by Hezbollah. Moreover,
Hezbollah militia secured new routes to supply their bases in South Beirut from the Bekaa
by capturing strategic Druze villages (Macleod, 2008) fighting pro government forces
while the army kept its neutrality.

Hezbollah‟s weapons turned to Lebanese people and challenged state‟s forces.

Hezbollah supporters attacked Future Movement television station and burned two of the
movement‟s buildings which belonged to main opposition leader Saad Hariri ignited
another type of sectarian conflict which is turned out between Sunnis and Shiites (Worth
& Bakri, 2008). Terje Roed-Larsen, a U.N. special envoy to Middle East, following May
2008 clashes commented that “what we are seeing today illustrates the necessities of
integrating the Lebanese militias into the army.”

In fact government‟s decisions that triggered Hezbollah‟s wrath were not baseless.
First of all the security chief was known as his strong ties with Hezbollah. In this regard he
may direct illegal arms transfer for the organization via air from directly Iran and Syria.
Secondly, officers who work in state institutions are subject to a law that also the officials
are located under sectarian basis. Hence, March 14, changing the security officer planed to

116
create their cadres. Security cameras were needed for Hezbollah that their headquarters in
southern Beirut has been located next to the airport and vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore,
telecommunication network that the government would investigate was needed for
resistance in order to communicate free from Israeli or government tapping (Blanford N. ,
2008).

Clashes have been commented by Israel that the overthrow of Lebanese government
by Hezbollah creating a puppet government (Mitnick, 2008) under Iranian influence. On
the other hand, Hamas officials emphasizing cooperation between two organizations
believed that the clashes worked for Israel destabilizing Lebanon. The USA also
condemned officially Hezbollah regarding the clashes in Beirut supporting Siniora
government. Hezbollah for the first time used its military power in domestic affairs
proving the organization is the most powerful institution in Lebanon, even over Lebanese
army bringing severely divided country to edge of civil conflict (Gerges, 2008).

Hezbollah losing ground for their arms after withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon
struggles to keep its militia intact and maintain its position as the strongest institution in
Lebanon, challenges the state. Hezbollah knew that those measures taken by the
government would lead them overall disarmament of the organization reducing it to a
mainstream Lebanese political party. Though Hezbollah achieved to maintain its status quo
after the conflict that the government withdrew its decisions, main issues such as election
of new president, and power sharing in the cabinet issues has been left to Doha meetings in
Qatar.

May 2008 clashed has some consequences for Hezbollah after all. First and
foremost, Hezbollah‟s credibility has eroded that the weapons used internally denying they
were against Israel. Nasrallah‟s excuse breaking this rule was the government‟s decisions
were targeting resistance and the resistance protected Lebanon. For many Lebanese,
Hezbollah has reduced itself to Shiite militia that brutally defending its parochial interests
(International Crisis Group, 2008, pp. 2-3). Yet Alagha argues popularity of Hezbollah
remains unshaken in the Shiite community (Alagha J. , 2008, p. 10).

117
4.4.3. Doha Agreement and reformation of government

2005 however marked an important year for Lebanese democracy, peaceful

demonstration for more democratic institutions and government were not enough to clear
perpetual sectarian conflict in the country. Momentum of the reforms promised began to
slow down and sensitive issues like upcoming presidential elections have already begun to
raise tension between March 14 and March 8.

In order to put an end to sectarian conflict, Speaker of Parliament called for a

„national dialogue‟ between opposition and anti government parties due to break this
institutional impasse. The meetings were held for four months from March to June 2006,
crumpled by Israeli- Lebanon War. The forum tackled seven issues primarily: the border
demarcation in particular Shebaa Farms, Hezbollah‟s weapons, Hariri investigation, the
position of the president, the new electoral law, Palestinian refugee issue, and finally
economic policy and development.

There were only two compromises among these various issues which were the
Palestinian issue and economic development. Urban areas were long neglected by previous
state institutions that poor conditions of these areas has been mentioned in the previous
chapter. For the Palestinian issue, non- naturalization of Palestinians and their right to
return has been emphasized. Hezbollah fiercely opposed demilitarization of the party and
deployment of Lebanese army in South Lebanon (Knio, 2008, p. 448). Remaining five
issues left unsolved under the pressure of 2006 War.

When the war ended, political contention resumed between the two rival camps.
Hezbollah and its allies demanded for more seats in the cabinet while March 14 pressed for
unconditional acceptance of international tribunal protocol that was ready to be signed. Six
ministers in whom five of them were Shiites in Siniora cabinet resigned in protest on
November 11, 2006. Obviously Hezbollah wanted to attain veto power and restrict Siniora
government (Shields, 2008, p. 486).

Siniora government had two thirds of the cabinet and comprised still majority in the
parliament. On the other hand, donned with the constitution Hezbollah and its allies
pronounced the cabinet unconstitutional while one of the major sects in the cabinet
wouldn‟t be represented. Speaker of Parliament also refused to hold parliamentary sessions

118
against the wishes of the majority of MPs. Prime Minister Siniora asked UN to hold the
tribunal outside of Lebanon in line with article 7 of its charter. UN accepted this proposal;
hence March 14 won a victory, though this hasn‟t ended the political crisis.

The crisis, from June 2007 to May 2008, changed in content from tribunal to
presidential election which was scheduled on 25 September 2007. Although both parties
were agreed on neutral Michel Suleiman to be elected, this time it was election process
brought the two camps produced interminable crisis. In November 2007, tenure of Lahoud
ended escalating turmoil in the parliament. The government argued that preventing power
vacuum, powers of the presidency shift to Council of Ministers; whereas March 8
maintained its stance that the government was unconstitutional. Despite the efforts of Arab
League, the political crisis resumed until May 2008 riots.

During the clashes, an Arab diplomatic delegation visited Beirut and held meeting
with Lebanese leaders that on May 15 finally led to an agreement between March 14 and
MARCH 8 ended the clashes and forced the government reverse its decisions (Rabil R. ,
2008). The Qatari government invited Lebanese leaders to Doha as of part of the
agreement due to solve the conflict and put an end to 18 months lo ng political crisis. On 21
May 2008, Doha meeting resulted with a compromise on five point plan.

Opposition got veto power in the new unity government reformed following the
meetings; General Suleiman elected to the presidency; thus the major obstacles ha ve been
solved. The agreement also banned use of force in internal conflicts referring May riots in
Beirut and adopted a new electoral law dividing the county into small electoral districts
that substituted 2000 electoral law. However, Katrib argues “the electoral changes agreed
to in Doha are not true reforms. The changes will serve merely to solidify the current
parties‟ dominance.” (Katrib, 2008, p. 1). The upcoming election in 2009 happens to be the
first test for the new electoral law.

The „Doha Agreement‟ granted the opposition veto power in the new national unity
cabinet (Stahl, 2008) and broke the stalemate in election of a president (Knio, 2008, p.
446). Accordingly, former Army General Michel Suleiman has been elected as the new
President of Lebanon on 25 May 2008. Doha Agreement in fact materialized Hezbollah
aims in 2006 blocking opposition to amend any law doesn‟t fit Hezbollah and Syrian

119
interests. Consequently, Doha agreement however comprises very important place in
Lebanese political history, is a solution to a specific crisis rather than truly comprehensive
accord.

5. 2009 GENERAL ELECTION AND NEW PHASE IN FOREIGN POLICY

5.1. 2009 General Election

In post-war Lebanese history 2009 election is the freest one among. Election was
held on 7 June 2009, Sunday, one day election unlike the previous ones. For the first time,
the elections observed by international and domestic organizations. The Lebanese
Association for Democratic Elections, a local NGO mobilized 3,000 observers throughout
Lebanon to monitor the elections. Carter Center, European Union and National Democratic
Institute are among those international organizations sent observers. The E.U. sent 90
observers to Lebanon before the elections (Yacoubian, 2009).

Election campaigns were very contentious between two rival blocks, March 14 and
March 8. Israeli withdrawal in 2000, “victory” of Hezbollah in 2006 and finally “glorious”
Hezbollah militia 2008 clashes between March 14 supporters were emphasized in Hassan
Nasrallah‟s election campaign. In response Hariri and his allies condemned especially May
2008 clashes and called it “an ill fated day” believing the answer to Nasrallah‟s comments
would come from the Lebanese people (Deutsche Presse, 2009).

What is more, Nasrallah one week before the elections, in his speech promised to
strengthen the Lebanese state by acquiring arms from Iran for the LAF (Alagha J. , 2009).
Hezbollah‟s pro-Iranian attitude frightened Christian population, who is vital for the
elections, due to push Lebanon towards Syria and Iran. Aoun‟s comparatively unsuccessful
performance in 2009 could be tied up with Hezbollah‟s bold speeches.

However Hezbollah was willing to cooperate and join to the new unity government
in pre-elections era. Hezbollah ran 11 candidates in 2009 elections that were 14 in 2005
and pressures for extension of Doha Agreement term “blocking third” position in the new
cabinet as well. The organization would give up its demand for blocking third if the
government guarantees Hezbollah to keep its arms (IRI, 2009).

120
 During the election campaigns and elections, external actors like Saudi Arabia and
Iran supported March 14 and March 8 financially. According to a report the Saudis gave
massive financial support to victorious coalition of Saad Hariri (Dickey, 2009). Iranians,
besides, financed Hezbollah campaign. Yet, all the parties accepted election results that
March 14 got the majority of the seats.

The election mainly considered by the Lebanese a contest between Western backed
March 14 and Syria and Iran backed March 8. The US also declares it supports democracy
under any circumstances though it is clear that the US backs March 14 coalition along with
Saudi Arabia, and the E.U (Addis & Katzman, 2009). Consequently, people‟s choice
determines Lebanon‟s foreign policy decisions.

5.1.1. Electoral districts and distribution of the seats

March 14 alliance obtained 71 seats of 128 while March 8 won 57. This result is similar to
2005 election results that mean neither side actually won the majority to form a single
government. Hence, formation of a unity government is a must. Voting turnout realized 55
percent, which is commented as a high turnout for Lebanon (IRI, 2009). The reason for
low turnout is that the voters have to vote for where they are registered but not where they
live, thus distance is the main obstacle.

2009 elections are held according to the new electoral law that divides the country
smaller electoral districts. Hence there are in total twenty six districts that the elections
were held (Yacoubian, 2009). In this new system more homogenous elections could be
conducted, because the old electoral law with bigger electoral districts delivered Christian
candidates mainly to Muslim voters for Syria‟s sake. This new electoral law allowed
Christians to vote for their own representatives. In Christian majority districts were the
most contestable, such as Metn where is known as stronghold of Michel Aoun. Yet, the
electoral system provides more homogenous elections, deepens sectarianism (Addis &
Katzman, 2009, p. 2). Allocation of seats between sects is as below:

121
Electoral Districts Confessions

Mount Lebanon (35 Seats)

Aley 2 Druses, 2 Maronites, 1 Greek Orthodox

Baabda 1 Druze, 3 Maronites, 2 Shiites
Chouf 2 Druses, 3 Maronites, 1 Greek Catholic, 2
Jbeil Sunnis
Kesrwan 2 Maronites, 1 Shiite
North Metn 5 Maronites
2 Greek Orthodox, 4 Maronites, 1 Greek
Catholic, 1 Armenian Orthodox.

North Lebanon (28 Seats)

Akkar 2 Greek Orthodox, 3 Sunnis, 1 Maronite, 1

Alawite
Batroun 2 Maronites
Bsharreh 2 Maronites
Dennieh- Minieh 3 Sunnis
Koura 3 Greek Orthodox
Tripoli 5 Sunnis, 1 Greek Orthodox, 1 Maronite, 1
Alawite
Zghorta 3 Maronites.

Beirut (19 Seats)

Beirut 1 1 Maronite, 1 Armenian Orthodox, 1 Greek

Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic,1 Other Christians
Beirut 2 1 Sunnis, 1 Shiite, 2 Armenian Orthodox,
Beirut 3 5 Sunnis, 1 Shiite, 1 Druze, 1 Greek Orthodox,
1 Protestant, 1 Other Christians.

Bekaa (23 Seats)

Baalbek- Hermel 6 Shiites, 2 Sunnis, 1 Greek Catholic, 1

Maronite
West Bekaa- Rashaya 1 Shiite, 2 Sunnis, 1 Maronite, 1 Greek
Orthodox, 1 Druze
Zahleh 1 Sunni, 1 Shiite, 1 Greek Orthodox, 2 Greek
Catholics, 1 Maronite, 1 Armenian Orthodox

122
South Lebanon and Nabatieh (23 Seats)

Bint Jbeil 3 Shiites

Jezzine 2 Maronites, 1Greek Catholic
Marjeyoun- Hasbaya 1 Druze, 1 Greek Orthodox, 2 Shiites, 1 Sunni
Nabatieh 3 Shiites
Saida 2 Sunnis
Tyre 4 Shiites
Zahrani 1 Greek Catholic, 2 Shiites.
Table 4: Allocation of Seats According to Sects in 2009.

MARCH 14 MARCH 8 & REFORM AND CHANGE

Future Movement Amal Movement

24 Deputies 12 Deputies
Lebanese Forces Free Patriotic Movement

5 Deputies 10 Deputies
Kataeb Hezbollah

5 Deputies 10 Deputies
Progressive Socialist Party Tashnags Marada

4 Deputies
2Deputies 1 Deputy
Democratic Left SSNP Islamic Action

1 Deputy 2 Deputies 1 Deputy

Ramgavar Jamaa LDP Baathists

1 Deputy 1 Deputy 1 Deputy 2 Deputies

MARCH 14 Affiliated 30 MARCH 8 Affiliated 16
Deputies Deputies
Independents Independents

Table 5: The Parties in Parliament- 2009 Election Results.

5.1.2. Formation of the National Unity Government

Following the elections, for the Prime Minister position that is reserved for Sunnis,
two names came forward: Saad Hariri of Future Movement and Najib Mikati, former

123
Prime Minister. However, the March 14 compromises on Saad Hariri to be the next prime
minister. For Speaker of Parliament, Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri has been
nominated.

March 14 has slightly won the elections as it is custom of confessional system,

though it took months for Hariri to form a new “unity government”. Hariri insisted
participation of March 8, in particular Hezbollah, in the new cabinet as well as Hezbollah
was willing to participate (Addis & Katzman, 2009, p. 3). Covertly, Michel Aoun was
demanding more representation for March 8 in the cabinet. Finally in the new cabinet of
thirty, ten ministries were granted to the opposition, five independent candidates were
appointed by President and fifteen members comprised of March 14.

As a result Hezbollah obtained three seats in the cabinet: the ministry of agriculture,
the ministry of administrative reforms, and the ministry of youth and sports. Now
Hezbollah has veto power to block amendments which would hurt the organization (Berti,
2010, p. 92) that the March 8 holds one third of the cabinet.

When it is compared Hezbollah could increase only one seat, while pro- Western
March 14 coalition won 71 seats compared to 72 in 2005. Hazran claims that even though
it seems Hezbollah has failed in 2009 elections, in fact it is failure of Aoun, Christian
leader of FPM (Hazran, 2009, p. 1). Despite the fact that, Hezbollah has already gained
power with Doha Agreement and controlled major policies and decision making in the
cabinet, with the new unity cabinet under Saad Hariri, Hezbollah‟s role continues seeking
better representation for Shiite community that the Shiites are Lebanon‟s largest
confessional group while demanding elimination of the confessional system.

After five months of the elections, Saad Hariri, the Prime Minister announced the
allocation of portfolios that is based on 15- 10- 5 plan. The current allocation of ministries
according to 15-10-5 formula removed possibility of “blocking third” in expense of
Hezbollah‟s weapons.

According to this fifteen Ministers from parliamentary majority, ten from the
parliamentary opposition, and five Ministers without political affiliation who have been
nominated by President Michel Suleiman (IFES, 2009). Nebih Berri maintained his
position as Speaker of Parliament. March 14 has Ministries of Finance, Justice, Economy,

124
Social Affairs, Information, Culture, Labour, Public Works, Displaced, Education, and
Environment; while March 8 has Foreign Affairs, Telecoms, Energy& Water, Health,
Agriculture, Tourism, Industry, Administrative Reforms, Youth and Sports. Ministry of
Defence has been given to Elias Murr, a non- affiliated Greek Orthodox and Ministry of
Interior again granted to a non- affiliated Maronite Ziyad Baroud (IFES, 2009).

5.2. New Phase in Lebanese Foreign Policy

5.2.1. The Middle East

5.2.1.1. Normalization of Relations: Syrian- Lebanese Relations

On July 1976, Hafez al Assad, former leader of Syria made an historical speech
summarizing everlasting Syrian policy over Lebanon. In this speech he said “[throughout]
history, Syria and Lebanon have been one country and one people” (SWASIA, 1976, p. 1).
Assad‟s point of view on Lebanon dominated Syrian foreign policy towards Lebanon since
both states gained independence in 1946 and continued until 2009. Syria, since
independence, considered Lebanon as part of the Greater Syria and acted accordingly in
the context of international relations (Harris, Bashar al Assad's Lebanon Gambling, 2005).
Not appointing any ambassadors to Lebanon, Syria‟s claims on Lebanese soil and
historical resentment of French decision in 1946 has always shadowed normal relations
between two countries (Sakr, 2005).

Until 1976, Lebanon experienced prosperous life in means of economy and

domestic life adopted a policy not to meddle with regional issues such as Arab- Israeli
conflict directly. Under this policy, Lebanon refrained to join into 1956, 1967 and 1973
Arab- Israeli Wars, even though in 1958 had a conflict that was about to draw the little
state into a bloody civil war. Lebanese foreign policy following the incident has changed
frankly that Lebanon embraced its Arab identity which is the ideology devoured Arab
world, especially Syria and Egypt. Both Syria and Egypt invited Lebanon to join United
Arab Republic in 1958, while Lebanon maintained its position close to Western world
(Harris, 1985, p. 11).

Syria‟s economic, historic and strategic interests led them to stay in Lebanon for
thirty years. Foreign relations between these two states evolved in the framework of Syrian

125
hegemony on Lebanese domestic and international affairs. Apart from intervention of Syria
in Lebanon, Syria from the beginning to today have economic, strategic and security
interests in Lebanon.

Syria since 1964 when the PLO was first established supported the group directly
though in 1975-76 in Lebanon, Syria sided with Maronites against PLO militants waging
series of war in Bekaa, North Beirut and Tyre (Traboulsi, 1990, p. 9). In 1982 Israeli
operation and evacuation of PLO robbed Syria one of the most notable pretext to occupy
Lebanon: defending PLO. Though losing PLO card hasn‟t restrained Syria keeping more
than 20,000 troops and plus similar number of intelligence agents stationed every corner of
Lebanon.

Between 1982 and 1984, Syria achieved major gains curtailing Israeli and
American influence in Lebanon, subordinating Palestinian armed elements and co ntrolling
over Lebanon‟s foreign policy (Harris, 1985) preventing the latter to sign separate peace
treaty with Israel. Lebanon was forced to follow Syrian foreign policy in the expense of its
sovereignty. Syria prevented any possible separate Lebanese- Israeli peace treaty
pressuring Lebanon with its mighty army. Indeed Lebanese Civil War and its afterwards
assisted Syria to achieve its security and economic interests. Lebanon- Syria Defence and
Security agreement which has been signed on September 1, 1991, guaranteed Lebanese
cooperation.

On the other hand, Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon gave another meaningful
reason for Syrian presence in Lebanon due to “security interests”. Syria via occupying
Lebanon formed a defensive military front along Lebanese-Syrian border with Israel. In
this regard, proxy wars with Israel were far more profitable for Syria than a full scale war
for Golan Heights (Harik, 2005, p. 125; Safa, Getting to Arab Democracy: Lebanon
Springs Forward, 2006, p. 27; Rabil R. , 2007, p. 44). Securing Syrian interests in
Lebanon, first PLO, and later Hezbollah proved to be quite useful tools (Rabil R. , 2007, p.
43); and Lebanon is considered a buffer between Syria and Israel (Addis, 2009b)
preventing direct confrontation with Israel in inner Syria (Harris, 1985, p. 9).

It is important to note that Shiite and Syrian alliance in Lebanon deserves study.
The Baath regime came into power in 1963 knowing that they had very narrow sectarian

126
base. In 1971 Assad, an Alewite has been elected as the president. Long adhered as
heretics, Alewites presented themselves as branch of Twelver Shiism. In Lebanon,
impoverished and powerless Shiites‟ search of legitimization for their growing community
bore the need of finding “a powerful and reliable external ally” (Agha & Khalidi, 1995, p.
3). This is exemplified by close friendship of Musa al-Sadr and Hafez al- Assad in 1970s.
Ostensibly, Syrian- Amal connection dates back to Sadr‟s time before the Civil War;
though Secular stance of Amal and birth of Iranian backed Hezbollah gained another
important ally to Syria in the context of common interest concerning war against Israel.
Hezbollah‟s Iranian ideology against existence of Israel and Syria‟s struggle for Golan
Heights even further attached Hezbollah and Syria. Hezbollah is an important military
asset for Syria forcing Israel to sit on the table for Golan Heights as it was PLO before.

Economic interests of Syria have relative importance to its security interests in

Lebanon. Even before the Civil War, Damascus- Beirut highway has heavy traffic with
Syrian transporters carrying goods to Beirut shipyard to be transferred to Med iterranean.
This route was cheaper and easier than to send them via Tartus which was under
construction in 1974 due to enlargement, and Latakia ports. Instability in Lebanon as it had
happened in 1975 endangers Syrian foreign trade (Lawson, 1984, p. 460).

Ta‟if Accord implied “special relationship” between Lebanon and Syria which was
referring to further economical interests giving advantage to the “big sister” in the realms
of agriculture, customs tariffs, and natural resources sharing (Safa, 2006, p. 27). On May
20, 1991 treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination has been signed. Syria had
economic gains in Lebanon rather than loosing economical power as occupier (Traboulsi,
1990, p. 9; Usher, 1997, p. 62).

Beginning of the Syrian occupation migrant Syrian workers who was fed up with
declining Syrian economy (Lawson, 1984, p. 469) poured into Lebanon. Indeed, low to
medium skilled labour in Lebanon was crucially needed in order to carry out government‟s
construction works. On the other hand, it should be noted that thousands of Lebanese
employed in Syrian banking sector. Above all “the most important were the capital held by
Lebanese financial institutions, the light manufactures produced by Lebanese companies,

127
and facilities at the port at Beirut” (Lawson, 1984, p. 474) for Syrian economy and trade.
Moreover, Syria supplies Lebanon oil and natural gas while the latter exports water.

Although in 2005, illegal Syrian workers had to leave Lebanon (Salti, 2005, p. 23),
Syria via unjust trade and tariff agreements, damping cheap products to Lebanese markets
exploited Lebanese sources and economy (Sakr, 2005, p. 89). In 1990s Lebanese
agriculture suffered because of the cheap Syrian products; thus in the South “the Revolt of
the Hunger” has emerged under Tufeili‟s leadership (Norton, 2007, p. 106) demanding
crop subsidies, free education, and basic public needs.

Under Syrian supervision money laundering, arms and drugs smugglings became
main source of the profit. Lebanese politicians had no option but to continue economic
cooperation as Hariri did in 2004 that he embraced economic cooperation between two
sisterly countries. Syrian occupation bypassed economic reforms that should be done in
Syria and benefited Assad‟s position (Harris, Bashar al Assad's Lebanon Gambling, 2005,
pp. 33-34).

Kamal Jumblatt, in 1977, wrote to Assad that Lebanon should remain independent
and he has been assassinated by Syrian operatives (Sakr, 2005, p. 87), ostensibly Bashir
Gemayel in 1982, Rene Mouwad in 1989 and Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and many others have
followed Jumblatt. It is still unknown how many people have been abducted or sent to
prisons in Syria between 1976 and 2005. After 2005, liberation of these prisoners became
on of the foreign policy objectives of Lebanon.

To preserve Lebanon‟s independence was basically vital for Syria as well, that the
intervention in 1976 in Lebanon can be explained under this assumption. Syrian Baath
Party regime is based on domination of minority Alewites under Assad leadership, which
long struggles radical Islamic elements like Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. In Lebanon also
Syria doesn‟t approve any radical elements to take over the Lebanese government drawing
the state once again instability and chaos which would bring international intervention this
time and exclude Syrian influence. It is preferable for Syria that Lebanon would be
governed by “friendly” governments or at least pro-Syrian elements which could interfere
to the governmental decisions.

128
 May 2008 riots in Beirut are an example to this hypothesis. Hezbollah has chance
to overthrow the Siniora government and take over the state. This would fit Hezbollah‟s
long term objective creating an Iranian like Islamic state in Lebanon. However as
Nasrallah has stated this revolution has not happened. Doha Agreement in 2008; however
seems like Lebanese domestic affairs, in the context of its consequences enabling pro-
Syrian Hezbollah to gain veto power in the cabinet, placed Syria once again in the heart of
Lebanon without its troops (Fisk, 2009) and any further objection from the international
community as it had happened in 2004.

What is more, this kind of revolutionary regime change would bring Lebanon once
again at the verge of bloody civil war and eventually partition. In this regard maintaining
Lebanese territorial integrity is essential for Syria that “permanent partition of Lebanon
into sectarian statelets, complicating Syrian management of Lebanese politics and
providing a dangerous precedent for Syria.” (Harris, 1985, p. 9).

Hezbollah, on the other hand, since Syrian withdrawal in 2005 has upgraded
gradually. The organization which was under Damascus and Tehran control since its
existence is no longer junior partner of the axis (Rabil R. , 2007, p. 43). Damascus‟
influence on the organization has declined and Hezbollah took the initiative to its own
hands. Along with full support of Syria, Syria also wanted to control the organization,
though abstained to challenge with Iran. Syrian plans on Hezbollah aimed two targets that
served curbing opposition in domestic politics and pressuring Israel concerning “Occupied
territories” which is the main foreign policy objective on Syrian agenda since 1967 (Zisser,
2001a, p. 70).

In 2005 many things has changed for Syria and Lebanon relations, or it is just to
say patron client relations between two states. However, Syria has never sought to annex
Lebanon which would be unrealistic objective, but to control Lebanon in means of
economically, politically and militaristically (Zisser, 2001a, p. 131). Hariri assassination
and raising voices to Syrian hegemony from the international community which has
already began by French and American brokered UNSCR 1559 (2004) finalized by
withdrawal of Syrian military power and political influence which was replaced b y the
United States and EU. The power vacuum has been filled by the US and EU so fast in 2005

129
that despite major pro-Syrian president and Speaker of Parliament, the composition of the
parliament was swept by pro-Western March 14 coalition.

Yet the last and the most important connection of Syria in Lebanon remained
Hezbollah‟s political and military existence. Hariri assassination and assumptions of
Syrian involvement; long Syrian occupation of Lebanon and exploitation of her sources;
blocking Lebanese policy making apparatus and imposing “Syrian order” (Zisser, 2001a, p.
129) in Lebanon aggravated relations between Syria and Lebanon. Syria realized that it
was the point of no return when the last Syrian soldier left in April 2005. When firs t free of
Syria elections were held in May 2005 none of the leaders shuttled to Damascus for
approval of the President Assad as it was during Syrian control.

In 2006, during National Dialogue Process it was decided to normalize relations

with Syria. In accordance with this decision it was proposed to exchange embassies
between two countries, however the proposal had been rejected by Syria as Syrian Foreign
Minister stated “the time is not right to establish an embassy in Lebanon” (Hatoum, 2006).
This gesture can be commented that Syria was calculating to return Lebanon refraining
cooperation and dialogue as equals (Shields, 2008, p. 478).

Concerning National dialogue decision concerning warming Syrian- Lebanese

relations and also proving the Lebanese identity of Shebaa Farms (Bakri, N., 2006), former
Prime Minister Fuad Siniora planed to visit Damascus, first time after Cedar Revolution
and ended up Syrian accusations that Siniora has violated “all diplomatic norm”
(Lebanonwire, 2006) not accepting the arranged date by Syrian official but proposed
another date to meet giving an excuse. Lebanon shook the Syrian yoke in 2005; though
Syria expected to play the game with old rules.

On September 23, 2008 Syria deployed 10,000 Special Forces along Lebanon‟s
northern border. Syria stated that deployment of the troops is for mutual interest that to
prevent smuggling into Lebanon. Yet, it raised concerns in Lebanon that the Syrians are
positioning to re-enter Lebanon. On October 14, 2008 Syria and Lebanon governments
established formal diplomatic relations for the first time since two countries gained
independence, abating scenario of Syrian invasion in Lebanon. Establishment of Syrian
ambassador to Lebanon, in 2008, (Addis, 2009b) points to change of heart in Damascus is

130
a naive consideration or a cover to control Hezbollah and Lebanese politics while Hariri
Tribunal demands Syrian cooperation (Addis, 2009b, p. 14).

June 2009 elections, second since Syrian withdrawal opened new doors to Syrian-
Lebanese relations. Once again pro- Syrian government headed by Saad Hariri, son of
assassinated Premier Rafik Hariri‟s son, came into power constituting single bloc in the
parliament. Hariri‟s stance since 2005, when his father was assassinated, against Syria was
cold, even though exchange of ambassadors was a sign of normalization.

Hariri after being elected as Premier paid his first visit to Damascus in December
2009, breaking the ice between two states. Saad Hariri has changed his policy to accuse
Syria about Hariri assassination and left the issue to STL to investigate, but improve ties
between these two countries. Hariri visited Assad second time, in February and signed
bilateral agreements which pursue “both countries‟ interests” (Daily Star, 2010). 2010, July
also marked seventeen bilateral agreements between Syria and Lebanon in t he new era of
Lebanese-Syrian relations.

These visits are expected to put an end to demarcation of the border issue that
become one of the reasons of 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. Syria has supported
Lebanese claims that Ghajar and Shebaa Farms were part of Lebanon though refrains to
clarify the issue in order to keep pretext of Hezbollah alive. However, Assad has control of
radical militias such as Fatah al-Islam in Palestinian refugee camps and influential on
Hezbollah that 2007 Palestinian refugee camps clashes was a presentation how Syria could
disturb stability in Lebanon (Sullivan, 2008, p. 129).

Improved ties between Lebanon and Syria haven‟t reduced Syria‟s economic and
security interest, though forced the latter to pursue common interests instead of one sided
relationship. Hezbollah remained as important and useful tool for Syria to regain its
influence ever Lebanon‟s security policy agenda where Syria had lost leverage after 2005
withdrawal. Furthermore, in order to force Israel to sit negotiations over Golan Heights,
Syria needs cooperation with Lebanon. Therefore, Syria has to keep Lebanon in the same
track with her own foreign policy preventing the latter to make any separate peace
negotiations with Israel as it has happened in 1982. Syria bridges the gaps between sullen
political figures in Lebanon such as Walid Jumblatt, Michael Aoun, and Saad Hariri in

131
order to maintain Israeli issue on the top of the agenda in parallel with Syrian (al Kazhali
& Sabbagh, 2010). Increased Western and American influence on Lebanon is a threat for
Syrian interest concerning Golan Heights.

Syria is trying to maintain its key political actor position in the region to overcome
political isolation. Exchange of embassies can be read as a gesture of normalization of
relations between two states, or “re-engage in Lebanese politics” (SYR, 2008). What is
more Syrian influence over Hezbollah is a bargaining chip for President Assad to help him
achieve his regional goals (Bauer & Ismar, 2008). In this regard, 2009 election represents a
turning point for Syria concerning Hezbollah‟s position in the country. Unlike his
predecessor Siniora, Hariri‟s policy statement to “protect a nd embrace” (Moubayed, 2009)
Hezbollah weapons and legitimize “resistance” and Hezbollah‟s military wing in means of
foreign policy, places Lebanon next to Syria, but against Israel.

5.2.1.2. Fragile Peace in the Borde r: Is rael- Lebanon Relations

Israel and Lebanon became neighbours in 1948 when the Israeli state first came
into being, though since that date the two states don‟t have any diplomatic relations apart
from U.N. Resolutions demanding Israel and Lebanon to cease hostilities. It is essential to
say that excluding 1948 War, in which Lebanese military presence was small and no more
than showpiece for Lebanese support for the Arab world (Hugges, 2005), Israeli invasions
of 1978 and 1982 targeted PLO in Lebanon while Israeli retaliations in 1993, 1996 and
2006 focused on another non state actor Hezbollah not the Lebanese state.

From 1948 to 2009, both states accuse each other to pose security threat to one
another. Israel‟s main concern concerning Lebanon is the state‟s weakness and
vulnerability to non-state actors such as Hezbollah and remaining Palestinian factions.
Realizing her security objectives, stabilize her northern border and force Lebanese
government to a sustainable peace treaty, Israel pursued military measures invading
Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. Concerning these objectives 1982 marks the turning point for
both of the states regarding realization of Israel‟s Lebanon objectives and birth of Israel‟s
biggest trouble maker in the region: Hezbollah. As it was stated by Norton “if Iran was the
mother of Hezbollah, Israel was its stepfather because Israel‟s two decades long
occupation fostered and honed Hezbollah.” (Norton, 2006a, p. 1).

132
 On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to put an end to long lasting Palestinian
attacks into Northern Israel, to curtail Syrian influence in Lebanon and force Lebanon to
make a separate peace treaty with Israel. On 23 August 1982, pro-Israel Bashir Gemayel
elected as the President of Lebanon that Israeli invasion speed up the process. Syrian
troops clashed with Israeli forces in Beirut and had to evacuate the city with PLO.
Christian forces under Israeli military umbrella attacked Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps
massacred Palestinian refugees. Israel and Lebanese Christians committed to this crime
condemned by the international community as well as Israelis (Ma'oz, 1995, p. 171).
Nevertheless; Bashir Gemayel was assassinated on 14 September 1982. Amin Gemayel,
brother of the deceased president took presidential post, though Israeli hopes for peace has
died away with Bashir. On 17 May 1983, indeed Lebanon signed a peace treaty with Israel,
albeit the parliament has never ratified the document (Zisser, 2001a, pp. 134-135). Israel
began to withdraw into self made security zone due to increased guerrilla attacks. Israel
almost realized her Lebanese policies in 1982-83 that never again these two states have
come to even close to a peace treaty.

On the other side of the mirror, Lebanon pursues joint policy with the rest of the
Arab world towards Israel: not to compromise unless the latter cease from Arab Lands
(AFP, 2005). Despite the fact that Lebanon doesn‟t have any major land dispute with
Israel, that Lebanon haven‟t participated in 1967 Arab-Israel war. Lebanon claims
territories under Israeli occupation Ghajar and Shebaa Farms which is being considered as
part of Golan Height. Yet precondition to sign a peace treaty with Israel for Lebanon is
Israel‟s withdrawal from “all Arab lands” including Palestinian territories and return of the
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon that their number reached to 400,000 today. Lebanon
insists that she will be the last Arab state to sign peace treaty with Israel refusing to begin
negotiations despite the fact that Syria, close ally of Hezbollah and Israel has already
began indirect negotiations (Issacharoff, 2009).

Israel‟s main policy towards its neighbour first to eliminate the radical elements
which threatens its security and later implement a lasting “peace treaty” separate from
Syria. It is for that reason, Israel through its various retaliations in Lebanon avoided
confronting Lebanese Forces, and in response neutral Lebanese army let the fight between
non-State actors and Israel in Lebanese soil. However, Israel chose to punish Lebanese

133
government (Matthews, 2008; Harik, 2005) for its ineffectiveness and failure to control
these elements; though this tactic has never really worked. A possible Israeli- Syrian peace
treaty worries Hezbollah which would harm the organization‟s military wing and cost it an
ally in the region (Sullivan, 2008, p. 127). Thus, Hezbollah would be cut off from Iran
from land.

In 1990s between Israel and Hezbollah the board was set and it was time to apply
the “rules of the game” (Norton, 2006a, p. 1). In Lebanon, in fact Israel struggled with
Syria and Iran rather than Lebanon via Hezbollah. Both in 1993 operation
“Accountability” and 1996 operation “Wrath of Grapes”, Israel‟s main target wouldn‟t be
wipe Hezbollah off from Lebanon but to cripple the organization. Israeli attacks
concentrated on South Lebanon and some civilian areas including infrastructure that would
increase criticism among Lebanese people against Hezbollah and also a message to Iran
and Syria that they should control the organization.

It is essential to note that Israeli shelling of U.N. base in Qana in 1996 where
Lebanese refugees sought safe shelter, has turned the international community against
Israel and strengthened Hezbollah‟s hand for the new unde rstanding in which the “rules of
the game” were confirmed (Norton, 2007, p. 85). Conflict has been ended by US brokered
understanding between two sides that gave Hezbollah right to self defence in the “security
zone” where Israelis occupies. In addition neither side conduct any assaults in civilian
areas and hit the civilians. Hezbollah made it clear; if Israel hits civilians in Lebanon,
Hezbollah responds accordingly. IDF tacitly conceded that it was occupying force in
Lebanon.

In fact Israeli presence in Lebanon caused losses for Israel more than they have
presumed. It was obvious that the security zone turned out to “insecurity” zone for Israel,
since the “April understanding” of 1996 legitimized Hezbollah raids into security zone.
When the borders of the battle field have been drawn for Hezbollah, Hezbollah knew how
to fight unlike Palestinians that IDF usually accustomed to deal with. Ehud Barak‟s
decision in 1999 to withdraw Israeli troops permanently is very logical on the basis of
increased criticism in Israel and human loss. On May 24, 2000 Israel ceased to behind the
„Blue Line‟. Since then Hezbollah became a strategic threat for Israel (Zisser, 2006).

134
 Israeli withdrawal in 2000, from a different framework can be explained as a
tangible victory for Hezbollah because since 2000 it was the “sole group in any Arab state
committed to implementing an armed struggle” and furthermore Hezbollah achieved that
no other Arab states able to do that is to “oust Israel from Arab territory without the Arab
side committing to any concession.” (Zisser, 2000, p. 32). Whereas this gesture of good
intension towards Lebanon hasn‟t ceased Hezbollah attacks into Shebaa Farm that in April
2001 an Israeli soldier has been killed and in response Israel for the first time since 1982
Israeli warplanes bombarded Syrian positions in South Lebanon and Bekaa. Hostilities
between Israel and Hezbollah continued eventually until 2006 targeting Shebaa Farms
(AFP, 2005).

Devastating 2006 War deterred both sides to take another action which would
escalate hostilities between both sides. However, May Riots and Doha Agreement which
resolved the deadlock granting Hezbollah and opposition “veto power” increased doubts of
Israel against her national security. Hezbollah influence on the government meant Iran,
arch enemy of Israel; place itself at the border with Israel. Giora Eiland, Israel‟s former
security advisor interprets Hezbollah‟s inactivity against Israel as strengthening their
position in domestic politics to “feel more at ease to act against” Israel (Mitnick, 2008).
Hence insecurity of Israel increases possibility of another war between two forces.

In August 2008, Israeli cabinet voted new strategy against Lebanon that deal with
Lebanese government and Hezbollah as a whole. In 2006 war, Israel considered Lebanese
government and Hezbollah as separate entities, hence refrained to attack on Lebanese
military targets. Since the Lebanese government both in 2008 and 2009 legitimized
“resistance”, Israel claims to consider Lebanese government responsible. The comma nder
of the Israeli Defence Force Northern Command, Gadi Eisenkot states that Israel “will
wield disproportionate power against every village from which shots are fired on Israel,
and cause immense damage and destruction.” (Harel, 2008). In 2006, Lebanese
infrastructure and economy immensely damaged after Israeli retaliation.

Border dispute between Israel and Lebanon is still looming over the two nations.
Hezbollah claims Ghajar and Shebaa Farms as Lebanese territories and positions itself as
liberator of Lebanon. Even though UN geographer Miklos Pinther worked hard to resolve

135
the dispute, couldn‟t put an end to the conflict over the area. Israel has to leave Shebaa and
Ghajar to UN forces due to solve demarcation issue between Lebanon and Syria.

In 2009 Avidor Liberman visited Ghajar and declared resolution plan to Ghajar
issue. Liberman proposed to cease from northern part of the village and built a barrier
between two parts of the village evacuating inhabitants of the northern part (Kaufman, Let
Sleeping Dogs Lie: " on Ghajar and Other Anomalies in the Syria- lebanon- israel Tri-
border Region, 2009). Ghajar village is extended into Lebanon and flourished while two
thirds of the village remains in Israel. Lately UNIFIL forces have been deployed in
Lebanese part of the village. This part of the village is the most vulnerable part to
smuggling into Israel throughout Lebanese- Israeli border that the villagers freely travel
between northern and southern parts of the village. On the Israeli side the entry to the
village is controlled by an Israeli checkpoint.

There are other pressing issues between Israel and Lebanon such as “natural gas”
and “water issues. Water, being the most important natural source for Israel, where water is
a scarce source, allegations that Israel steals water from Wazzani River in Ghajar, Lebanon
increase tension time to time in the region. Spanish troops patrolling through Israel-
Lebanon border in Ghajar, confirms that there are some activities as such. After discovery
of offshore natural gas resources border dispute between two states reached to UN, when
Lebanon complained that Israel extended “a lines of buoys into the sea off the two
countries‟ land border” (Barkat, 2010), claiming security reasons.

Resolution 1701 brought relative peace to the border though both parties continue
to accuse each other violating the Resolution. Threat of another war looms in the air under
cover of silence. During Israeli operation on Gaza Strip, firing of three Katyusha missiles
raised questions whether Hezbollah opens second front in Israel breaking three years long
silence. On the contrary, Hezbollah denied responsibility of firing rockets blaming
Palestinian fractions operating in South Lebanon still. Israel, in response satisfy to fire to
the location where the rockets came (McCarthy & Tran, 2009). Despite harsh war threats,
Hezbollah avoids confrontation with Israel which would cause another devastating war
between two sides.

136
 Since 2006, now also backed up Lebanese government, Hezbollah strengthens its
position both as a military group and mainstream political party. If the border dispute
would be resolved, Hezbollah would lose its legitimacy to maintain its armed forces
(Kaufman, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: " on Ghajar and Other Anomalies in the Syria- lebanon-
israel Tri-border Region, 2009). Violating Resolution 1701, Hezbollah continues to
strengthen its military might, even though Lebanese officials deny such activity. However,
Hezbollah confirms their arsenals have been increased when compared with 2006. Hassan
Nasrallah in his speech during Ashoura admits improvement in their arsenals and states
that “...the Zionists will discover that the July 2006 war was a picnic compared to what we
[Hezbollah] have install for them in any new aggression.” (Nasrallah, 2009). It is also
estimated that the Hezbollah‟s arsenals are between 40,000 and 80,000 (Bazzi, 2009)
which is frankly denied by the Lebanese officials.

While Hezbollah resumes increasing its supplies violating Resolution 1701, Israel
also violates the Resolution violating Lebanese airspace (Bazzi, 2009) planting
surveillance devises on Lebanese territory. Moreover, Israel is accused to beleaguer
Lebanese fisher boats in Lebanese territorial sea. Israel also had conflict with German
UNIFIL navy patrolling in Mediterranean that Israeli jets fired the German ship in
Lebanese territorial waters (Zumach, 2007). What is more Israel accuses UNIFIL not to
intervene Hezbollah‟s arms smuggling that the explosion in Hezbollah‟s weapons depot in
Southern Lebanon revealed Hezbollah arms transfer (Greenberg, 2009).

Under the light of current events, apparently the most significant change of
Lebanese policy towards Israel is that the Lebanese state confirmed Hezbollah‟s right to
resist to Israeli occupation of Lebanese lands. After latest statements that the Lebanese
government embraced Hezbollah weapons and resistance, Lebanon finally shares the
responsibility of any future conflict with Israel. Lebanon, through Hezbolla h adopted a
policy to gain the lands under Israeli control by asymmetric warfare, albeit Lebanon cannot
trust its weak armed forces. Though both sides violate Resolution 1701, fragile peace in the
Lebanese- Israeli border is doomed to be broken.

137
5.2.1.3. Iran in Lebanon: Hezbollah, Iran Connection

Iran geographically lies at the far end of heart of the Middle East as well as Middle
Easter issues. When Israel was established in 1948, strong ally of the United States, Iran
hasn‟t disturbed at all. Hence Iranians in fact had not got any refugee problems or Arab-
Israeli Wars. Shah regime isolated itself from the Middle Eastern issues and preferred not
to interfere into Arab- Israel matters; even distanced itself putting Iranian (Persian) identity
forward. In Cold War politics, on the other hand, Iran was an important actor in the Gulf
region that took side with the Western Bloc.

Ayatollah Khomeini‟s “Islamic Revolution” in 1979 ended authoritarian Shah

Regime as well as changed Iran‟s the Middle East policy sharply. Iran; “emerged on the
international scene as a defiant, fiercely independent, proactively religious and nonaligned
power” (Ehteshami, 2002, p. 283). Islamic Revolution should have been spread to those
who are willing to embrace it. “Exportation of Islamic Revolution” (Ehteshami, 2002;
Coughlin, 2009) in other Middle Eastern states with Shiite population occupied Iranian
agenda such as Lebanon. Iran gave speed to support radical Shiite Islamic groups and
movements (ibid., p. 291); in Lebanon first AMAL Movement and since 1982; later
Hezbollah constituted Iran‟s footholds in Lebanon.

Relations between Iran and Lebanon can be traced back to sixteenth century when
the most definitive links were forged (Chehabi, 2006; Agha & Khalidi, 1995). Shiite
population in Jabel Amil even today has familial and crucially religious ties with Iranian
Shiites. These connections had been broadened to educational areas that many of the
Iranian elite like Shapour Bakhtiar studied in Beirut; the city was open to both East and
West (Chehabi, 2006).

Lebanese contribution to Khomeini‟s Islamic Revolution should be mentioned.

Pivotal figures in the formation of Revolutionary Guards such as Mostafa Chamran,
defence minister of Iran Islamic State, who also played important role formation of Amal
militia in 1974, and Mohsen Rafiqdost, who was involved in 1983 American Marines
bombing, have been trained in Southern Lebanon and Bekaa with the PLO militants
(Coughlin, 2009, p. 159). What is more, Musa al-Sadr enjoyed close friendship with
Ayatollah Khomeini whom befriended in Najaf, also shared familial ties (Ibid. p. 134).

138
Yet, an Iranian foothold in Jebel Amil was planted even before the Islamic Revolution. It
was through these linkages Iran gained further access to Lebanon after 1979 (Chehabi,
2006).

In case of Lebanon‟s importance for Iran “...Lebanon represents one of the key
locations where Iran has an interest to interfere: the fragile political system which
traditionally perpetuated Christian and Sunni supremacy over Shiite provides a fertile soil
for Iranian engagement and the evolution of a radical Shiite movement, such as
Hezbollah.” (Bauer & Ismar, 2008, p. 7). Indeed, creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and
later its politicization can be considered Iran‟s biggest success related to Lebanon.

Secondly, Iran‟s objective in the Middle East is to become dominant power in the
Middle East (CRS Report for Congress, 2006). The importance of Lebanon in this plan lies
in its geopolitical position. Therefore Iran finds the opportunity to “jump over Iraq and
reach a wider constituency within the Arab world” (Ehteshami, 2002, p. 298). The most
considerable rival in this contest is Israel for Iran concerning the latter‟s military power
and expansionist policies towards surrounding states such as Syria, the biggest ally of Iran
in the region. Iran allied with Syria and uses Shiite proxies in Lebanon to challenge Israel
and curb Israel‟s military and the US‟s political domination in the region (Barzegar, 2010)
and also keeps the balance of power against Israeli threat (Barzegar, 2007). What is more,
Iran by funding and training proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas tries to undermine
Arab- Israel peace process (Levitt, 2005). Hence, Lebanon, with its weak central
government, large Shiite community, and its geographic location poses heaven for Iran to
achieve her own goals in the region and a battlefield far from her own territory.

With the assistance of Syria, Iran trains radical Islamist organizations‟ militias in
Lebanon. It is well known fact that Iranian Republican Guards trained and seeded Islamic
ideology to Hezbollah‟s militia wing in Bekaa in 1980s under Syrian protection (Salem,
2006, p. 14). The Iranian made weapons such as Farj 3 and Farj 5 used in 2006 War by
Hezbollah are evident that Iranian Guards still train Hezbollah militias how to use
advanced Iranian arms (Nasr V. , 2006).

In 2006, Lebanon- Israel War, Iran‟s role could not be underestimated. It benefited
Iranian efforts to draw attention some other issue than Iranian nuclear proliferation projects

139
(Salem, 2006). In response Israel not only planned to eliminate missile threat that
Hezbollah imposes its Northern borders, but also weakens Iran‟s influence in Lebanon
supporting American policy of aiding democracy and government in Lebanon.

Iran not only supplies Hezbollah militarily and financially, but also provides
medical equipments for Hezbollah run hospital. Yet the most significant amount of the aids
is for Hezbollah‟s military wing (Norton, 2007, p. 110). Iran uses Syria as route for arms
shipment to Hezbollah, though there are some suspicions that Iran also sends arsenals to
Hezbollah via Turkey under guise of non- military equipment such as “cleaning materials”
(Ravid, 2008). Iranian cargo planes loaded with weapons for Hezbollah are transferred
from Damascus to Bekaa in Lebanon (Levitt, 2005, p. 7). Arms transport from Iran to
Lebanese Hezbollah is an illegal process under Resolution 1701 which worries Israel and
the US

2009 marked important year for both Lebanon and Iran in the context of elections.
Iran and Lebanon strengthened diplomatic relations that in 2008 President Suleiman visited
Tehran. In Iran, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad re-elected and known as his pragmatic policies in
the Middle East. On the other hand, in Lebanon election of pro-Western government didn‟t
stained relations between Lebanon and Iran. President Suleiman congratulated
Ahmedinejad for his re-election and mentioned their mutual interests. In March 2009,
Lebanon and Iran have signed five agreements in order to increase economic ties.
Furthermore, trade between two states increased from $78, 4 million in 2006 to $119, 7
million in 2008. In August 2009, Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon met with Lebanese
President and emphasized Iranian support for the Lebanese government. In return, new
Lebanese government headed by Hariri gives their full support to Iranian peaceful nuclear
energy project in U.N., now Lebanon is president of UNSC (Goodenough, 2009).

Iran and Lebanon, apart from economic relations has one thing in common that is
Hezbollah and Hezbollah‟s own policy in Lebanese foreign relations. However Iran denies
the allegations that they support Hezbollah financially and militarily, Hezbollah‟s arms
supplies speaks for itself. What is more Hezbollah bridges Iran and Lebanon in the context
of more extensive relations and plans throwing the US alliance aside. Hezbollah leader
Nasrallah suggests that “The Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular Ayatollah

140
Khamenei, will not hold back on anything that will help Lebanon be a strong and dignified
state, and without conditions.” (Al Jazeera, 2009); implying Lebanon should buy anti
aircraft weapons from Iran. Walid Jumblatt agrees with Nasrallah‟s proposal to buy
advanced defence system from Iran since the US avoids providing Lebanon not to offend
Israel (Daragahi, 2009).

Iran-Lebanon relations, following the elections in both countries improved in

economic, diplomatic and military spheres. Despite the fact that Lebanon is now governed
by the US backed government, new Lebanese foreign policy which doesn‟t alienate Iran,
even endorse Iran‟s nuclear project. Iran, in turn, is ready to supply Lebanon with
advanced weapons against Israel since the Lebanese government confirmed Hezbollah‟s
right to have weapons instead of disarming the organization. Iranian role and influence in
Lebanon is overreaching the U.S evidently.

5.2.1.4. Lebanese- Turkis h Relations

Turkish- Lebanese relations, however based on mutual understanding and historical

ties that comes from Ottoman heritage, resumed in normal level without any significance.
Economic ties between two states that both have coast to Mediterranean marked the
relations rather than diplomatic. On the other hand, this was because Turkish Middle
Eastern policies, which was mainly pro-Israeli due to excessive military, economic and
politic between Israel and Turkey. What is more, Turkish- Syrian conflict concerning water
issues and terrorism reflected to Lebanon as well.

Turkey, since 2001, accession of AKP government, returned to Middle East politics
strengthening its ties with neighbour Arab states as well as Iran under “zero problems with
the neighbours” policy (Davudoglu, 2009). Turkey reoriented its foreign policy to play an
important role in Middle Eastern politics. Turkey‟s neutral position among the warring
states and proactive policy making increases its credibility. Eventually, Turkish efforts to
mediate between Israel and Syria gave its fruits and the negotiations advanced to another
stage that has not been reached before. Turkey‟s mediation efforts between Israel and Syria
effects Lebanon as well. However the negotiations couldn‟t be carried to next stage (Tansi,
2009), it draws Lebanon closer to Turkey.

141
 Beginning from 2004 that Rafiq Hariri visited Turkey seeking support for his
international campaign targeting Syrian presence in Lebanon. In 2005 with Siniora
government, Lebanese contact with Turkey resumed by diplomatic visits between Turkey
and Lebanon. During Israel- Hezbollah war in 2006, Turkey worked for cease fire
agreement as non-permanent member of UNSC and afterwards aided Lebanese state with
humanitarian supplies which reached to $50 million. Moreover, Turkey assisted Lebanon
in 2008 enabling to solve 18 month long deadlock in Doha (Bauer & Ismar, 2008, p. 8).
Under the scope of Resolution 1701, Turkish troops also deployed, into UNIFIL forces,
with two gunboats patrolling in the Mediterranean and works for construction projects in
Lebanon along with five officers in the headquarters (Davudoglu, 2009).

Hariri government in 2009 even carried further Lebanese- Turkish relations in

economic and diplomatic level. Turkey and Lebanon signed a new visa-free agreement to
increase tourism revenues for both during PM Hariri‟s visit in January 2010 paying one of
the first visits after forming the cabinet (Sanyer, 2009). Turkey and Lebanon signed
agreements related to the areas health, agriculture, military cooperation, transportation and
education (AA, 2010).

Regarding to military cooperation Turkey is going to supply and train Lebanese

Army advanced weaponry which is confirmed by the US. What is more, Hariri‟s visit
revealed Turkish foreign policy downturn against Israel that Hariri accused Israel violating
Lebanese airspace and waters seeking Turkish support against Israeli violations. Turkish
Prime Minister, in response announced that Turkey would support Lebanon in UNSC
concerning Lebanese complaints targeting Israel and “never stay silent ” to these kinds of
actions that “threatens global peace” (AFP, 2010).

Meanwhile Hezbollah appreciates flourished Turkey- Lebanon relations. During

2006 war, Turkey hasn‟t condemned Hezbollah (Tansi, 2009) and their role in the war
caused 1,200 civilian death and destroyed infrastructure. Hezbollah is happy for Turkish
new policy towards Israel and praises Turkish efforts for independent Palestine with East
Jerusalem is the capital (İsra Haber , 2010).

Lebanon and Turkey improve economic ties that the two countries propose to create
“a large joint Islamic market” first include nearby states and later extend the frame of the

142
cooperation. Turkish and Lebanese economic objective for 2010 is to increase trade $3
billion (Egypt News, 2010). Hariri family, in Turkey owns Turkish Telecom and its
affiliated companies including cell phone company Avea. Under economic framework,
Turkey would supply energy in Lebanon that the latter suffers from electricity and natural
shortages. After completion of the Nabucco project, evidently Lebanon, as an economic
partner of Turkey would benefit in due regard.

Turkey recently has proved to be a major actor in Middle Eastern politics. Lebanese
and Turkish relations continue to improve under Turkish Middle East policy framework.
On the other hand, relations between these two states mainly based on economic
cooperation seem to spread to military cooperation despite Israeli discontent. To sum, new
phase of Turkish- Lebanese relations as it is stated by Foreign Minister of Turkey Ahmed
Davudoglu that “Turkey will continue to support Lebanon and stand by its brotherly
people” (Davudoglu, 2009).

5.2.2. Quartet

5.2.2.1. Lebanon- European Union Relations

European Union asserts Lebanon as an important player in the Middle Eastern

peace process and democracy promotion to the region as well as providing security in
Mediterranean region which consist “serious threats to EU‟s own stability and strategic
security” (Vizoso, 2008, p. 1). EU has three main documents regarding its democracy
agenda for the Middle East: The European Security Strategy (December 2003),
Strengthening the EU‟s Partnership with the Arab World (December 2003) and the Interim
Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East ( March
2004) (Makdisi, Göksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009). Lebanon‟s historic and economic ties
with EU states also increase its importance for the EU. Moreover, EU is the largest donor
of Lebanon.

9/11 terrorist attacks in the US not only engendered a sharp policy change in the US
towards Arab states, but also in the EU an understanding has occurred that democratic
development in the Arab world was important for the security of Western states. Hence,
EU approaches this democratic improvement policy in the Middle East as a long term
objective. The European approach that different from the American, “is asserted to be one

143
based on gradual and comprehensive process of reform that link political change to broader
issues of social justice, local participation, and the modernization of governance
structures.” (Wittes & Youngs, 2009, p. 4).

Evidently, financial aid to the Arab states in order to prevent radicalization and
promote democracy and reform is vital tool for European Union countries (Wittes &
Youngs, 2009, p. 9). On the other hand, even in the EU cleavages are exists among
member states that illustrated during 2006 cease fire negotiations. Britain‟s support of
American proposal despite France‟s efforts to issue a cease fire as soon as possible
encapsulates the situation.

EU has increased its influence in the Middle East in past few years trying to fill the
United States‟ shoes. Bush administration‟s unconditional support for Israel and “war on
terror” policy engendered the US to lose its credibility in the regional politics. On the other
hand, under Germany‟s leadership as we had witnessed in mediations between Hezbollah
and Israel due to prisoner swap negotiations in 2004, EU became an important partner in
Middle East politics. Moreover, in the case of Lebanon, its historical ties with France
cannot be undermined.

France‟s priority during and after the civil war years in Lebanon realized as
avoiding instability, hence France acquiesced Syrian military presence in Lebanon until
2004. Former President of France Chirac and Rafik al- Hariri shared personal friendship
that their ties reflected to Lebanese- France relations. It is understandable that French
efforts to implement Resolution 1559 after Hariri‟s urges to oust Syria out of Lebanon
claiming the latter has lost her liability as a promoter of stability, but turned out to be a
hegemonic power (Vizoso, 2008, p. 4).

In this regard, joint work of France, Britain and the US, Resolution 1559 in 2004
which demands Syria to withdraw all its troops from Lebanon unconditionally is a n
important illustration on EU‟s cooperation to support democratic regime in Lebanon.
France picking the leadership, supported post- Syrian government, Lebanon‟s sovereignty;
and improve government performance deepening democratic reforms (Wittes & Youngs,
2009, p. 13). And after election of March 14 forces in 2005, France became the fervent
supporter of the movement.

144
 In 2006 Lebanon- Israel War, France worked as a broker with the US in the context
of a cease fire. In this case European states believed the US is too close to Israel to
interfere Lebanese- Israeli conflict. Rome Conference on July 26, gathering the US,
European governments and some Arab states concerning Lebanese issue unable to reach a
consensus in order to end the conflict. Arab and European governments insisted on
immediate cease fire while the US and Britain wanted “sustainable” cease fire letting Israel
to advance in their operation. France in particular worked for immediate and acceptable
cease fire proposal. Disagreements among European Union states to assist to issue a cease
fire agreement for Lebanon is evident that there is not a unified foreign policy within EU
towards Lebanon.

The EU‟s stance during the 2006 was to call for cease fire of both sides and warn
Israel not to resort “disproportionate action”. On August 2, the European Union announced
that it will provide 10 million Euros to Lebanese due to assist those who suffered in the
war. Moreover France announced to send 2,000 troops in Lebanon as part of UNIFIL II
(Vizoso, 2008). President Sarkozy, became the first Western President that visited Michel
Suleiman after his election as President of Lebanon.

President Sarkozy followed different policy towards Lebanon adopting much

vigorous shuttle diplomacy breaking the ice between March 8 and France. In July 2007,
France invited all the Lebanese leaders who attended to “national dialogue” meeting in
France in order to break impasse occurred during the Lebanese “national dialogue”
sessions including Hezbollah.

Germany, since Angela Merkel came into power has adopted a stabilizing policy
towards Middle East. Germany has historical responsibility for Israel‟s existence and
security. Concerning Lebanon, Germany‟s first objective is to stabilize the Lebanon and as
a broader plan for the Middle East to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement. Since
2006 War, Lebanon became the fourth long-term large scale mission for Germany.
However, Germany doesn‟t want to enter any conflict with Israeli soldier at the Lebanese-
Israeli border; thus Germany keeps number of its troops in UNIFIL limited. Germany takes
part in European Maritime Force whose task is to prevent arms smuggling at the Lebanon‟s
maritime borders. Germany also provides technical assistance and trains Lebanese forces

145
to control Lebanese-Syrian border in order to stop arms smuggling in conjunction with the
United Kingdom, Denmark, and United States with the funds from European Commission
(Vizoso, 2008, p. 5).

Since 1990s Germany plays key role in the indirect talks between Hezbollah and
Israel. Germany has mediated between Israel and Hezbollah regarding to release of two
IDF soldiers‟ bodies that had been kidnapped in 2006. Under Germany‟s mediation,
Hezbollah exchanged two bodies; in return Israel released five Lebanese and 200 Lebanese
and Palestinian fighters. The biggest prisoner swap materialized in 2004 under German
mediation (Harik, 2005; Norton, 2007).

Being a Mediterranean country, Italy has shared interests with France on Lebanon
concerning Euro- Mediterranean Partnership. Italy, eventually, supports stability in
Lebanon that played pivotal role in ending hostilities in 2006, in Lebanon. In UNIFIL,
Italy constitutes the largest contingent with its 2,450 troops. Italy due to economic
concerns in the Middle East, participates building a comprehensive peace process actively.
In July 8, 2008, Italian Foreign Minister Frattini, in his visit to Israel expressed Italy‟s
willingness to mediate indirect peace negotiations with Israel and Lebanon.

2003 Lebanon signed an Association Agreement with the EU that commits both
parties to gradual market opening and tariff dismantling (Galie & Hack, 2005, p. 141) and
reform Lebanese- EU trade regulations. This Agreement with European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) which is developed in 2004 aims to integrate Lebanon into internal market
which paves way to creation of Euro- Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010. ENP
adopts a The Action Plan for Lebanon that besides economic relations includes
democratization, human rights, transparency and good governance, media freedom,
minority rights, reform of the electoral law and reforms against corruption.

French proposal of Union for Mediterranean has been announced on President

Sarkozy‟s Election Day in 2007. This proposal mainly bears French concerns about losing
its importance in the Mediterranean has been met with scepticism by the other non
Mediterranean members that the Union excluded. Opposition came mainly from Germany
and later non-Mediterranean countries were included into the union. Mediterranean Union
is spearheaded by France and Germany that is also considered as “a response to the

146
original American Greater Middle East Initiative proposal” (Wittes & Youngs, 2009, p.
17).

Union for Mediterranean reveals EU‟s willingness to promote democracy to its

Mediterranean neighbours as well as building cooperation on energy and energy security,
environment, civil protection and transport. Union for Mediterranean within Barcelona
Process also has shaped Spanish foreign policy towards Lebanon that gives opportunity to
Spain to be more involved into Middle Eastern affairs and peace process 18 . Spain has 1,100
troops in UNIFIL forces and pursued shuttle diplomacy during 2006 war in order to initiate
a cease fire.

Barcelona Process known as Euro-Med Partnership has been launched in 1995 to

foster cooperation between EU member states and Mediterranean partners. This aimed to
improvement of pluralistic democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law would be
pursued through three pillars that are: (1) Political and security partnership, (2) economic
and financial partnership, and (3) social and cultural partnership (Khatib, 2009, p. 5).
However, these mainly focus on administrative developments rather than political ones that
under this program the EU provided 1,500,000 Euros to reform Lebanese judiciary system,
and also launched 1,000,000 Euros program for strengthening Lebanese civil society,
known as AFKAR. EU also sent an Observation team to monitor Lebanese elections in
2009 in addition to 4 million Euros for supporting elections (Ibid. p. 10).

EU, taking more responsibility in Israel- Arab peace considers Lebanon also as an
important player. In May, 2010 Spanish Foreign Minister visited Lebanon to discuss
Lebanon and Syria‟s roles in the peace process (Sikimic, 2010). French Foreign Minister
Kouchner emphasises continuity of Arab-Israel peace talks while tackling Hezbollah‟s
arms and loyalty of both sides to Resolution 1701 in which French efforts could not be
undermined.

Moreover, Germany enhances its relations with Lebanon through all aspects;
economic, educational and cultural. Foreign Minister Westerwelle paid visit to Beirut in

18
Spanish- Lebanese relations date far back than deployment of UNIFIL. There live small community of
Spanish citizens live in Lebanon and also many of them obtain Lebanese citizenship by marriage. During the
civil war, Spanish Ambassador Pedro Manuel de Aristegui has been murdered in 198 9 like French
Ambassador Louis Delamarre (Irani, 2008).

147
May 2010 emphasizing Germany‟s willingness to strengthen ties with Lebanon (Reuters,
2010). Yet, EU unable to develop a common strategy for Lebanon and the EU assistance
has been limited to financial aid (Vizoso, 2008, p. 2).

Before 2009 elections in Lebanon, EU policy towards Lebanon comprised of mediatory

role in order to stabilize the country and assist building state institutions. This common
approach has been stated by French, Spanish and Italian foreign ministers in coordinated
visits to Lebanon in October and November 2007. EU uses financial aid as a tool in
Lebanon as democracy promotion, state building and stabilizer and provides technical and
humanitarian assistance. The EU despite American urges still reluctant to label Hezbollah
as a terrorist organization. All the EU countries condemn violent actions of the
organization against Israeli targets (Flanigan & Abdel-Samad, 2009).

EU‟s approach to Hezbollah and its arms differs from the US‟s policy towards the
organization. EU is well aware that the organization‟s arms existence and its position as
political and social movement make it more complex to simply label the organization as
“terrorist”. Hence, EU “have preferred to engage the group and make efforts to reduce or
contain the likelihood of Hezbollah using its large military potential- an approach that has
given Europe a fair degree of diplomatic leverage” (Vizoso, 2008, p. 6). The EU states
adopts uncertain attitude against Hezbollah (Cohen, 2008, p. 2). In this regard, Germany‟s
mediatory role in prisoner swap between Hezbollah and Israel and resistance of French,
Italian and Spanish governments not to add Hezbollah in state terrorist blacklist is evident
to this policy.

Yet, European parliament in 2005 branded Hezbollah as a terrorist organization that

Netherlands in 2004 and U.K. in 2008 added the organization to their terrorist lists and
banned the organization. It is essential to note that the U.K. banned only the military wing
of the organization and resumes contacts with Hezbollah‟s political wing.

Evidently, each one of the EU member states has their own policies differs from
overall EU policies towards Lebanon and Hezbollah. The EU states which occupies
majority in UNIFIL and has economic relations under the scope of Union for
Mediterranean refrains to antagonize with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Indeed, France, Italy and
Spain major partners of the UNIFIL has close relations with the Lebanese state.

148
Eventually, as a part of the Lebanese government, EU states tolerate Hezbollah and its
arms and enhance economic, cultural ties.

5.2.2.2. Lebanon- The United States of America Relations

American- Lebanese relations date back to nineteenth century and focus on

religious and educational considerations establishing American colleges and sending
religious missionaries. In the twentieth century, Lebanon has been considered as
democratic and free island in the middle of radical Iran, Soviet expansion, Palestinian
insurgency, and Saudi penetration. Independent Lebanon; hence served to the interests of
the US in the parallel with Lebanese policies.

The period between 1941 and 1945 marked the United States‟ new Middle East
policy which was driven by “military containment of Soviet interests in the Middle East,
preservation of transportation and communication routes, securing a peaceful and stable
atmosphere in the region following the creation of Israel, and the growing dependence o f
the Western world on Arab oil (Korbani, 1991, p. 2). Major US policy in the Middle East
has been driven by securing oil resources and Israel.

American involvement in Lebanese Civil War in 1958 can be considered in this

frame. The first US involvement into Lebanese affairs realized in 1958, landing American
Marines into Beirut in order to establish order and peace in Lebanon after wild clashes
occurred according to a political crisis; and in 1982 following Israeli occupation of
Lebanon, this time assisting PLO to evacuate safely.

During notorious Civil War of Lebanon on 15 June 1976, American ambassador for
Lebanon Francis Melloy, his economic advisor and the driver had been kidnapped and
murdered. In those dark times, this incident harmed Leba nese- American relations and the
United States called back all of her citizens resided in Lebanon (Cooley, 1979, p. 42). CIA
Station Chief William Buckley, who was tortured and killed, was another blow to
Lebanese- American relations. Lebanon became very dangerous place for the US citizens.
In 1984 the US banned Americans to enter into Lebanon using US passports until 1997.

However, the most devastating event in Lebanese- American relations is definitely

1983 bombings of American Marines that killed 220 Marines, 18 sailors, and 3 soldiers

149
(Norton, 2007, p. 71) and US Embassy in Beirut. After the bombings American forces
immediately left Lebanon for good. American government establis hed an investigation
commission headed by retired admiral Robert L. J. Long and found Iran responsible for the
attacks.

In civil war years, the USA refrained to tackle with Lebanese affairs and let the
things being when Syrians occupied Lebanon. Indeed in 1970s Saudis, close American ally
in the region aided Syria and PLO contingents with money and arms. In 1976, Saudis has
legalized Syrian occupation by Arab Deterrence Force while Americans praised Syria‟s
role in Lebanon as constructive (Holden & Johns, 1982, pp. 440-44). In 1990s, American
silence to Lebanese issue was due to Syrian support to Gulf War. During occupation years
„American policy towards Lebanon was bound to Riyadh- Damascus connection‟ (Sakr,
2005, p. 92). Syria‟s control of Lebanon was considered as a price to win over Damascus.

After the Gulf War, American policy towards Lebanon has changed gradually
eliminating „Soviet influence‟, yet adopting another one „Syrian‟ beginning in 1990s. The
US also being close ally of Israel supported Israeli military campaigns in 1993 and 1996
due to pushing Hezbollah out of Lebanese- Israeli border. Under this policy, the US
actually aimed to send message to Syria and Iran and challenge with Iran in particular
(CRS Report for Congress, 2006, p. 2).

September 11, 2001 had dramatic effects in the context of American foreign policy
towards Middle Eastern countries in particular Iraq. 9/11 terrorist attacks onwards, the
United States sticks to its policy to “war on terrorism” and in Lebanese case, the US‟s
concerns focused on “Hezbollah”, and “stable, democratic Lebanon free from Syrian and
any other influence” (Addis, 2009a, p. 1). On the other hand, Syria wasn‟t exempt from
condemnation of the US for its occupation in Lebanon. The Congress adopted in December
2003 Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (Abdelnour, 2002)
which defines Syrian presence in Lebanon as illegitimate and unacceptable. The US also
supported Hariri‟s international campaign to extract UN Resolution 1559, calling Syria to
withdraw. President Bush, on May 11, 2004 imposed sanctions on Syria due to its
sponsoring terrorism, occupying Lebanon, producing and developing “weapons of mass
destruction”, and interfering in American operation in Iraq. The sanctions began with

150
prohibiting arms sales and Syrian aircrafts in the USA and intensified as freezing accounts
and assets of Lebanese and Syrian officials in the US.

In 2005, Hariri assassination and withdrawal of Syrian troops carries Lebanese-

American relations even further. The US supported anti- Syrian demonstrations and in
mid- February recalled its ambassador for consultation. On March 16, Bush received
Maronite Patriarch and promised him to defend Lebanese sovereignty and demand Syria to
withdraw. In 2005, March 14 dominated the government; Bush administration backed the
pro-Western group promoting democracy and stability with economic and security
assistance (Addis, 2009b, p. 4).

2006 Israel- Lebanon War marked new phase of American- Lebanese relations. The
US after 9/11, disturbed by military presence of Hezbollah which has been labelled as a
terrorist organization also by Israeli lobby efforts 19 , found a solution to improve Lebanese
Army. The US places Hezbollah as a terrorist organization which “was responsible for
more American deaths than any other terrorist organization until September 11” (Levitt,
2005, p. 1).

Bush administration blamed Hezbollah for escalating 2006 War and causing death
of hundreds of people. Yet, the US was unwilling to pressure Israel to halt its military
campaign in Lebanon differed from previous US administrations (Abramowitz, 2006). It
was Lebanese state and its inability to control over its territory that gives Hezbollah
opportunity to act freely. In this regard, deployment of more UNIFIL troops in Lebanon
and also LAF in South Lebanon are praised by the US; thus Hezbollah‟s ability to
manoeuvre could be reduced. Resolution 1701 is for extending sovereignty of Lebanese
state and eliminating Hezbollah‟s military wing (The State Department, 2006).

A retired Marine Corps officer Gary Anderson argues that Israel couldn‟t control
Hezbollah which was proved in the years between 1982 and 2000; but it is Lebanese
government to reduce Hezbollah to a mainstream political party. Anderson suggests
military aid to Lebanese Army controlling Hezbollah arms (Anderson G. , 2008). In

19
President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 indicating the measures that should be taken against al-
Qaida and its affiliates. In the order it wasn‟t mentioned neither Hezbollah nor Hamas, though this raised
some arguments by the Israeli lobbies. The admin istration later amended the order and added Hezbollah and
Hamas. The USA has labelled Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 1997.

151
parallel with this statement the Bush administration increased US military assistance to
Lebanon following the war in 2006 and 2007.

The Bush administration granted $48 million to provide technical training and new
equipment to LAF (Addis, 2009a, p. 1) following the war. What is more in 2007 the US
transferred $580 million for security and economic assistance to Lebanon (Addis, 2009b,
p. 4). The US continues to support Lebanon in means of military equipment and financial
in 2008 and 2009, albeit at lower levels. In due respect, United States adopts a strategy to
improve LAF in order to prevent any possible attacks from South Lebanon into Israel.

However, Israel has some concerns that the weapons and equipments provided to
LAF would fall into the hands of Hezbollah, thus Israel disapproved potential US sale of
M60 tanks to Lebanon (Israel National News, 2008). US Department of Defence in
response states that they considers Israel‟s security concerns and emphasize its efforts to
“strengthen army domestically, not regionally” (Wander, 2008). Although, the process
advances slowly, the US has promised to deliver 285 trucks to LAF which the Lebanese
army short of.

Covertly, Mooney Jr. criticizes the US policy to allocate great majority of the funds
to LAF and military equipments instead of humanitarian, economic and social programs.
He articulates that Hezbollah‟s and other sectarian militia‟s popularity is mainly based on
their ability to provide social and humanitarian aid to the people while the government
couldn‟t. Hence, he states that “the proponents for heavy military assistance point to the
need to stabilize the security situation first, but the requirement for jobs and services has
proven to be an equally essential part of the security equitation in post-conflict
interventions.” (Mooney Jr., 2007, p. 36).

Ostensibly, under Bush administration two policies collide in two, on the one side
support to Israeli military actions under the scope of “war on terror”, the other promotion
of democracy (Hirsh, 2006, p. 30). In Lebanon, Israeli military operation on Hezbollah,
“terrorist organization” harmed Lebanese state most. In the context of American policy
Lebanon‟s turn to Syria and Iran against Israeli aggression would be heavy blow to
American democracy promotion program showing Lebanon as a democratic and pluralist
state.

152
 This situation would also put American allies under danger, especially Israeli
borders. Yet the US announced that the Administration is requesting an additional 10
million dollars in military aid to help Lebanese Army, though the US grants military and
humanitarian aids to Lebanon since 2001. In 2007 the amount for aid was proposed $280
million (CRS Report for Congress, 2006, p. 25).

The US adopted backing up Lebanese state and army policy and since 2005 general
elections in Lebanon. Since Syrian withdrawal and election of anti- Syrian government the
US showed its commitment to Lebanese state. In 2007 while clashes continued between
the Lebanese army and Palestinian insurgents, beginning from May 25 the US transferred
ammunition and equipment to Lebanese army unceasingly throughout the conflict. The
USA supported pro- Western Siniora government during May 2008 clashes and
condemned Hezbollah for the organization‟s violent actions. The US accused Hezbollah to
consult to their arms against Lebanese citizens (Saab, 2008, p. 94).

2009 election in Lebanon and also new Obama administration in the US adopted
more moderate approach to their foreign policy objectives. Saad Hariri, yet again a leader
fit for American liking, Obama administration, unlike his predecessor, leaves harsh and
hostile policy towards Arab world. This change of attitude could be explained that the
United States trying to regain its credibility and reliability towards Arab states that was lost
by Bush administration‟s “war on terrorism” campaign.

US President Obama‟s speech on 4 June 2009 in Cairo addressing Muslims and

Middle Eastern states, just three days before Lebanese elections, softened tense atmosphere
that Bush administration created in the Middle East and Lebanon. On the hand, visits of
high profile visitors from the US including General David Patreaus, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton and Vice President Joseph Biden propagated democracy; though under
cover the US announced its displeasure if March 8, especially Hezbollah comes into power
(Reuters, 2009).

American policy towards Lebanon after the 2009 elections has developed. Hariri‟s
victory in the polls satisfied American concerns that Lebanon would fall under Iranian
influence. On the other hand, Hezbollah‟s weapons and Israel‟s security concerns remain
the most important issues for the US to overcome. Lebanese government is unable to

153
disarm Hezbollah since 2006. Despite UNIFIL and LAF, Hezbollah‟s arms stock
increased.

5.2.2.3. Lebanon- United Nations Relations

Lebanon, in 1946 when it gained its independence joined to U.N. along with Syria.
Since 1946, Lebanon became active member of the organization. Throughout the period
from 1946 to 2009, Lebanon has been mentioned in many resolutions; that many of them
related to Israel and Arab issues. Above all, two of those various resolutions singled out
among the others as the most important for the fate of Lebanon: deployment of UNIFIL
and Hariri Tribunal. In the context of their co nsequences for Lebanon, U.N. - Lebanon
relations mainly is occupied by these two cases.

UNIFIL is a peacekeeping mission that deployed after the conflict between Israel
and Lebanon in 1978 by Resolution 425 and 426 to ensure that the fighting does not occur
again and secure a permanent cease- fire (Makdisi, Göksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009). The
first UNIFIL‟s task was to monitor Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territories,
restoring international peace and security, and assisting Lebanese army to deploy in the
south.

Resolutions 425 and 426 have been criticized by Israel as “inadequate and sore ly
lacking” because it didn‟t ban “terrorism”. In response PLO had reservations about the
resolution that it didn‟t condemned Israeli aggression. In fact the core issue causing this
conflict in 1978 and afterwards was the question of Palestine and right to return of
Palestinian refugees to their homes (Makdisi, Göksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009, p. 14).

UNIFIL I has been deployed that consisted of 4,000 strong multinational troops for
six months. Resolution 427 of May 3, 1978 authorized to increase the number of
contingents to 6,000. The troops were responsible to prevent further hostilities and hostile
activities in the south while fulfilling this task UNIFIL forces were not allowed to use
force except in self defence. However, Israel withdrew form South Lebanon leaving 10km
buffer zone for SLA, created, trained, equipped and financed by Israel against PLO in the
south.

154
UNIFIL forces couldn‟t deter hostile parties and the tension in the border increased.
Consequently, Resolution 501 authorized to increase UNIFIL to 7,000; whereas Israel,
with the Likud Party, decided to eliminate Palestinian threat and PLO from its northern
border permanently (Rabinovich I. , 1984, pp. 132-33). In 1982, Israel began massive
invasion in Lebanon reaching to Beirut. PLO forces had been evacuated under supervision
of Multi National Forces comprised of the US, French, and Italian troops.

UNSC drafted Resolution 508 called for an end all military activities and
accordingly Resolution 509 demanded Israel to withdraw all its military forces
unconditionally. In June 1982, by Resolution 511 mandate of UNIFIL has been extended.
The UNIFIL forces this time permitted to halt Israeli advance, but they were equipped
insufficiently, thus their mission couldn‟t extend more than monitoring. UNIFIL remained
behind Israeli occupation line for the following three years. In 1985 because of Hezbollah
pressure Israel had to withdraw to self- made Security Zone (Makdisi, Göksel, Hauck, &
Reigeluth, 2009, p. 16).

Following 1993 and 1996 retaliations (Picard & Philip, 1996, p. 183) Israel
unilaterally withdrew its forces from most of the South Lebanon in 2000; albeit Israel
haven‟t cooperated with UNIFIL and Lebanese government also caught unprepared. Israel
left vacuum of power behind filled immediately by Hezbollah militia before LAF and
UNIFIL. UN officially certified that Israel completed withdrawal with the terms of
Resolution 425 leaving Shebaa Farms and Ghajar still occupied.

When it was first deployed, UNIFIL had to face with uncooperative belligerents,
which were PLO that wanted to control the areas where UNIFIL supposed to control in
southern Lebanon (Murphy, 2002) as well as Israel that didn‟t let UNIFIL to deploy its
forces leaving the “security zone” under control of SLA (Norton, 2006b). Today, the
composition and the quantity of the forces have been changed though its mandate o f
operation much remained the same, south of the Litani River.

UNIFIL in Lebanon has been one of the longest missions of U.N. that completely
involved into Lebanese affairs as well. Hezbollah, being the strongest military force as
well as highly organized political party make the organization an important actor in
Lebanese politics and foreign affairs; that occupy U.N. agenda of Lebanon. U.N. Secretary

155
General Kofi Annan and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah‟s meeting in 2000, following
Israeli withdrawal was a clear expression of Hezbollah‟s international recognition (Zisser,
2000, p. 36). Annan explained this meeting was necessary in the context of the role played
by U.N. in Israeli withdrawal and U.N.‟s future assistance to this process. Hence, U.N.
considers openly Hezbollah as a necessary partner in order to achieve permanent peace
between Lebanon and Israel.

UNIFIL I seemed right on the paper but in reality of Lebanon, it was insufficient to
execute peacekeeping mission. “The government of Lebanon was powerless in the area;
the government of Israel was resentful of the new peacekeeping force and not really
disposed to cooperate with it, while other armed groups in the area, including the PLO, had
their own agendas and ideas” says former Under Secretary General of the UN Brian
Urquhart concerning UNIFIL I‟s “failure” (Urquhart, 1989, p. viii). UNIFIL also has
positive effects for South Lebanon in means of humanitarian aid.

Before the Israeli- Lebanon war in 2006 the UNIFIL forces were reduced to 2,000
forces. The borders between 2000 and 2006 stayed calm and the rockets that were fired
from Lebanon haven‟t been associated by Hezbollah but other Palestinian fraction in
Lebanon (Norton, 2006b, p. 77). On 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah militia kidnapped two
Israeli soldiers there was no mistake this time. Lebanese state called for cease- fire
immediately on 12 July 2006, but it was rejected by Israel. The war ended by Resolution
1701 which aimed “cessation of hostilities” on 14 August 2006.

In the first draft of the resolution it was mentioned to form another “international
force” different from UNIFIL under Chapter VII UN Charter which would be NATO
backed to disarm non-state militia, especially Hezbollah; whereas this idea has been given
up later embedding Chapter VII intensions into the revised text (Makdisi K. , 2006).
Quantity of UNIFIL forces have been increased by the Resolution 1701 to 15,000 troops
from 32 countries, mainly from Europe, and upgraded the force‟s capabilities (Mooney Jr.,
2007, p. 30); however the organization deployed 13,264 troops as of 2009 which is
completed in 31 August 2009 by resolution 1832 (2008). Moreover, the role of the UNIFIL
by Resolution 1701 in 2006 is extended as much as its tasks in Lebanon. UNIFIL II
monitor the cessation of hostilities, assist LAF to be deployed throughout the south,

156
cooperate with Lebanese government to issue a permanent cease fire, aids displaced
persons, secure the border under Lebanese states‟ request to prevent arms smuggling to
non-state agents without government‟s consent.

The UNIFIL II has been headed by France than passed to Italy in 2007 and in 2010
to Spain; that turned UNIFIL largely a European force (Norton, 2006b). Moreover states
like Malaysia, Indonesia and Bangladesh have sent contingents to UNIFIL II. The
significance of these states is that neither of them has had any relations with Israel.

Disarmament of Hezbollah that comprised of UNSCR 1701 (2006) most recently is

still an issue which hasn‟t been fulfilled yet and commented as violation of the Resolution
by Israel which also considered as treat to Israeli security in northern border. UNIFIL
forces despite the fact that they train and assist Lebanese forces to disarm militias in the
country unable to conduct this mission. LAF that 30 percent of it comprised of Shiites, and
has familial ties with Hezbollah militia would be unwilling to touch Hezbollah‟s weapons
(Norton, 2006b). Resolution 1701 also demanded to cease all illegal arms transfers to
militias through Syrian- Lebanese border, this objective hasn‟t been fulfilled according to
U.N. Report (2008).

Presence of UNIFIL in disputed areas such as Ghajar and Shebaa Farms where is
under Israeli occupation prevents UNIFIL to avoid confrontation between Israel and
Hezbollah militia. In Ghajar, Spanish contingent under UNIFIL mandate patrols to prevent
arms smuggling that lack of full authority makes the territory ripe for smuggling (Hoge,
2007). It was claimed by Israel that through Syria, Hezbollah had smuggled Scud missiles,
though UNIFIL denied these claims reducing the tension between two sides (FTP/HGL,
2010). However, UNIFIL troops become open target for militant groups in those areas as
well.

It is also essential to note perception of UNIFIL forces in Lebanon. 2007 armed

conflict between Palestinians and Lebanese army inflicted to UNIFIL forces that on June
24 a UNIFIL vehicle was hit by a car bomb on the border with Israel killing six Spanish
soldiers (Salem P. , 2007, p. 2). Both Hezbollah and Lebanese government condemned the
attacks. On July 16, there was another attack on UNIFIL forces without any casualties. It

157
was suspected that Fatah al- Islam or al-Qaida was responsible of the attacks targeted
UNIFIL which increased their activities in Lebanon recently.

U.N. has brokered between Lebanon and Israel many times as it has been
mentioned, though the most important U.N. act after UNIFIL is Hariri Tribunal that
created earthquake effect for both Syria and its agents in Lebanon when it came to
authorize U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon that try suspects of Hariri assassination. The
Security Council, by Resolution 1595 of April 7, 2005, established International
Independent Investigation Commission in order to assist Lebanese authorities in their
investigation of Hariri assassination to “identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers, and
accomplices” (Mehlis, 2005, p. 1). The Commission began its works as of June 16, 2005
asking for extension of its mandate multiple times (Addis, 2009b, p. 9).

Adoption of the Tribunal in Lebanon almost drew the country into another internal
conflict (Salem P. , 2007, p. 1) that pro Syrian opposition and Syria opposed fervently
which delayed the beginning of the court. Pro- Syrian opposition elements headed by
Hezbollah and former President Lahoud opposed to U.N. Security Council proposal to
establish a court claiming that this was internal affair of Lebanon. Lebanese Parliament
approached the matter from another perspective that they proposed to hold the court
outside of Lebanon under U.N. Charter, Chapter VII and Prime Minister Siniora wrote to
Secretary General adding petitions of 70 Lebanese parliamentarians. On May 30, 2007 by
Resolution 1757 (2007), U.N. Security Council voted 10 to 0 with five abstentions.

However, this has been commented as interference to Lebanon‟s internal affairs by

Syria and pro- Syrian opposition; also Russia, Qatar and China thought the same and
abstained from the vote (Addis, 2009b, p. 9; Shehadi & Wilmshurst, 2007, p. 1). Russian
ambassador to the U.N. commented that “never before has the Security Council ratified
agreements on behalf of a parliament of a foreign country” (Prados, 2007, p. 22)while
China complained that it is interference to domestic affairs.

Netherlands agreed to host the tribunal in December 2007. Daniel Bellemare was
appointed as prosecutor for the tribunal and he will work with Lebanese judges in Hariri
Case. The Tribunal will try under Lebanese Criminal Code related to terrorism, not under
“crime against humanity”. Lebanon is expected to fund 49 percent of the cost while the

158
US contributed $14 million for the tribunal (Ibid., p.10). The tribunal commenced on
March 1, 2009.

The UNIIIC‟s mandate has been extended to include all assassinations and
explosions occurred since 1 October 2004 that also covered assassinations of Samir Kassir,
journalist with An-Nahar; the former head of the Lebanese Communist Party, Georges
Hawi; Elias Murr, the Minister of Defence; May Chidiac, LBC TV presenter; and Gibran
Tueni, MP and Editor in Chief of An-Nahar (Shehadi & Wilmshurst, 2007, p. 6). There
were also several explosions in the country in shopping ma lls and Christian dominated
areas. Furthermore, the assassination of Pierre Gemayel, minister in Siniora government
who was in favour of U.N. Tribunal for Lebanon on 21 November 2006 increased fear
among the pro-tribunal ministers in the cabinet and revealed the ineffectiveness of
Lebanese security forces.

Four Lebanese generals who have been arrested in 2005 due to their involvement to
the Hariri assassination have been released in 2009. Indeed, in the first report of the U.N.
investigation Commission, Syria and especially Syrian intelligence officers has been found
responsible of killing Mr. Hariri. In the statements, regarding extension of Presidential
term of Emile Lahoud, in the meeting of Mr. Hariri and President Assad, the latter‟s threat
to “break Lebanon over Mr. Hariri‟s head and Walid Jumblat‟s” (Mehlis, 2005, p. 5)give
hints what may be the reason of assassination of Hariri.

The assassination is linked to Resolution 1559 which demands Syria to withdraw its
troops and to disarm all Lebanese and non- Lebanese militias. UNSCR 1559, concerning
Lebanon aimed to put an end to Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs, and to strengthen
state sovereignty; furthermore for the West, in particular the US, the resolution would
provide security for Israel and weaken the Iranian/Syrian/Hamas and Hezbollah axis
(International Crisis Group, 2009).

Consequently, in the context of conflict resolution and also prevention, UNIFIL

forces since 1978 has been welcomed by majority of the Lebanese, whereas long history of
conflict in Lebanon turned its presence into controversy. UNIFIL, apart from 1982, 1993
and 1996 Israeli retaliations once again failed to keep the country safe in 2006. Hence
UNIFIL‟s main objective, to prevent further clashes with its neighbour Israel has failed, as

159
we have witnessed Israel obeyed Resolution 425 which demands Israel to withdraw from
the Lebanese territories occupied in 1978 has been fulfilled in 2000. Since it‟s know n that
neither side respects Resolution 1701 which ended the war in 2006, U.N. and extended
UNIFIL forces would not achieve to maintain calm and peace in Lebanon.

12,000 UNIFIL forces, which are not deployed in Syrian- Lebanese border because
of objection of Syria, cannot stop arms smuggling (Greenberg, 2009). Moreover, UNIFIL‟s
presence in Lebanon after German Chancellor Angela Merkel‟s statement that “if
affirming Israel‟s right to exist is part of German policy, then we can‟t just stand idly by
when this right to exist is threatened” (Putz, 2006), bore questions in Lebanese minds that
if UNIFIL is exist to protect Israel. Frankly, this statement makes UNIFIL‟s objectives in
Lebanon debatable.

Secondly, Hariri Tribunal raised both praises and criticism in Lebanon and
international community, some welcomed it in means of finding the “truth” behind this
assassination, others criticized as imposing of American agenda on Lebanon against Syria
and Iran overriding Lebanese constitution (Shehadi & Wilmshurst, 2007). On the other
hand it was obvious that in early 2005, Lebanese judicial system as well as security were
far from being neutral and effective after Civil War and Syrian domination. Especially,
security system in Lebanon in which high rank officials were appointed by Syria, was
interwoven with Syrian security and intelligence services.

Hezbollah‟s involvement to Hariri assassination is under scrutiny by the UN

investigators. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah denies these allegations and calls the
tribunal as “Israeli project” that aims to inciting sectarian strife in Lebanon (Ya Libnan,
2010). Nevertheless, even if the party members were indicted by the court, Lebanese
leaders are unwilling to arrest Hezbollah members. Hezbollah chief Nasrallah rejects the
indictments (Worth R. , 2010). Accusations against Hezbollah‟s involvement in Hariri
assassination raise concerns that Lebanon could fall into chaos and conflict which
destabilizes the country.

On the other hand, Special Tribunal for Lebanon is based on an understanding

agreement between U.N. and Lebanese government and doesn‟t have any obligation for
other sovereign states such as Syria to cooperate with the tribunal. Even if it is unique that

160
the tribunal has been implemented under an U.N. Resolution rather than Lebanese cabinet
approval which was gone into deadlock with the resignation of pro-Syrian ministers,
cannot use force under U.N. Charter VII without further notification in the resolution;
hence it cannot be enforced forcefully to other states (Shehadi & Wilmshurst, 2007, p. 8).
Furthermore, it is another question whether this tribunal serves only to deliver the guilty to
the justice or another international interference in Lebanon.

5.2.2.4. Lebanon- Russia Relations

Middle East, because of its strategic position and rich resources became battlefield
and space of power struggle for great powers; Lebanon was not exempt from this. After the
World War II, and Cold War years newly established Lebanese Republic stretched
between Western Powers and Soviets led Arab states such as Syria and Egypt. In
accordance to new Soviet foreign policy towards Middle East, in 1945, Lebanon welcomed
Soviet legation established in Beirut (Wheeler, 1959, p. 298). The balance of power
politics and the US‟s curtailing Communism policies had severe effects in Lebanon in
1960s and 70s. However, even today Russia has part to play in Lebanon being everlasting
ally of Syria.

Russia, on the basis of promoting Communism in Arab world had strong ties with
Egypt, Syria, Libya and particularly Iran. Two of these actors in the Middle East, Syria and
Iran are singled out among the others when we concern Lebanon and especially Hezbollah
connection. Russian Middle East strategy after the Cold War years developed gradually
from ideology promotion to more comprehensive economic, cultural and political ties with
Arab states seeking partnership with the US “only in equal basis” (Blank, 1996, p. 520) but
also competing with the US over Middle Eastern states.

Russia has always interested Eastern Mediterranean and its Arab states for
geopolitical, economic and cultural reasons (Kreutz, 2007). Through Syria, Jordan and
Lebanon Russia reaches to Mediterranean, hence stability of these states has significant
importance for Moscow. Putin‟s Russia is determined to reach warm seas, thus Moscow‟s
relations with Lebanon develops under this policy. However, unlike Syria, Lebanon has
never fallen under Russian influence that this small country strictly attached to the US and
Western bloc (Ibid).

161
 Russia‟s cold stance against Israel and willingness to sell arms whoever wants to
buy them makes her a very desirable partner for the states such as Syria and Iran
confronting Israel and seek ways to even their military might with American backed Israel
in means of military equipment. Russia‟s weak economic situation prevents her to take part
in nation building process in Lebanon that the Western countries do funding March 14
government (Blank, 1996). Russia‟s assistance to Lebanon cannot go beyond providing
military equipments, technical assistance and training partnership. In Post-Soviet period, it
is just to say that Russia avoids antagonizing with the US and Israel in Lebanon while
Moscow strengthens its ties with Israel since 1990s (Kreutz, 2007).

Russia, having extensive Muslim community in her territories which is

approximately 15-20 percent of the overall population, concerns Middle Eastern security
(Bourtman, 2006). Lebanon in this regard is important for Russia for both its Muslim
“majority” and geographic position. Islamic elements that disturb stability in Lebanon such
as Hezbollah have been supplied by Russian arms through Syria and Iran. In 2006 War
Russian made anti-tank missiles that were sold to Syria used by Hezbollah against Israel
(Freedman, 2007, p. 20). In this regard Lebanon is profitable market for Russian arms. On
the other hand, it is essential to note that Hezbollah is not in Russia‟s terrorist list
(Kroupenev, 2000).

Russia considers Hezbollah as a political party and legitimizes it as a political,

social and organized military organization. During 2006 war Russian leadership warned
Israel not to harm Lebanese infrastructure and avoid using disproportionate power while
calling Hezbollah to return kidnapped Israeli soldiers. Moscow urged Israel to solve her
regional issues via diplomatic channels and highlighted necessity to release Lebanese
prisoners (Ibid.). Therefore, in Russian statement Hezbollah‟s name hasn‟t been mentioned
as promoter of the war at all.

Following the war Russia refused to deploy its troops in UNIFIL forces, but in
“humanitarian character”. In this context Moscow‟s perspective here, the UNIFIL is for
assisting LAF to disarm Hezbollah which is an impossible task (Kroupenev, 2000).
Russian senator M. Margelov describes mission of Russian contingents in Lebanon as
“humanitarian character” and adds that Russian “...forces have not been tasked to disarm

162
Hezbollah or to conduct any sort of military operations that may threaten the lives of
Russian serviceman” (ANN News, 2006). Russian Forces in Lebanon maintain their
relations with Hezbollah, in turn; Hezbollah enhances Russia‟s position in peace process.

Russia emphasizes her significant role in the peace process to curtail Iran‟s and
Syria‟s support to radical Islamist elements such as Hezbollah. Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Posuvaluk conducted several meetings with Hassan Nasrallah in this context.
Furthermore in 2000 and 2001 high rank Russian officials met with Hezbollah leadership
concerning release of Lebanese prisoners.

After Hariri assassination, Russia backed up Syria against sanctions and prevented
to vote in favour of Hariri Tribunal under U.N. mandate. Russian policy towards Lebanon
is basically from Syrian point of view (Katz, 2008). On the other hand, after Hariri
assassination Russia cooperated with the US, the EU and Israel to demand Syria to
withdraw Lebanon surprising Damascus (Bourtman, 2006, p. 9). Therefore, Moscow
prefers not to alienate with the Lebanese government while maintaining good relations
with Hezbollah.

Russia provides advanced military Mi-24 helicopters which can be “equipped with
missiles and advanced combat means” (An Nahar, 2010). Lebanon turns Russia to obtain
advanced weapons against Israel that the US refuses to sell such anti-aircraft weaponry
under the pretext that these may be used against Israel, even though the US supplies
Lebanese army with second and third hand military equipment M-198 155mm artillery
guns worth $400 million since 2006 (UPI, 2009). Russia is an important alternative to the
US, while Russia also aims to curtail US influence in Lebanon.

However, Russia seeks other spheres of cooperation with Lebanon rather than arms
sale openly in order to not to damage her relations with Israel as well. Lebanese President
Suleiman visited Kremlin his counterpart President Medvedev in February 2010. This
meeting was the first time ever a Lebanese head of state visited Russia. Russian focal point
in this meeting to conduct energy, tourism and investments cooperation between two states
while Lebanese state sought for more support from Russia in UNSC (FTP, 2010).

Russian and Lebanese relations following the new government improved more than
only militarily. Russia expands its cooperation with Lebanon to energy sector which is

163
very crucial to Lebanon. What is more, Lebanon is ripe for Russian goods and construction
companies. Strategically, Lebanon is a gate opens to warm seas for Russia. In this regard
stability of Lebanon is vital for Russia to pursue her economic and politic interest in
Lebanon smoothly.

6. CONCLUSIONS

2009 General Election held on 7 June, 2009 has changed almost all the dynamics of
Lebanese foreign policy pursued since its independence. Lebanese state having multi
ethnic population and its “democratic” governance has experienced civil strives, foreign
invasions and most recently devastating war in 2006 following the first free election in
2005 from Syrian influence. Three years after the war, Lebanon springs forward to
strengthen her institutions to function with a unity government which really unites all
elements in Lebanese demography.

Unlike all expectations that when pro- Western March 14 has outnumbered March
8 coalition in the parliament, Hariri would isolate Hezbollah hasn‟t been realized and
Hezbollah led opposition found representation in the cabinet with Hariri‟s personal efforts.
Moreover, the organization‟s long disputed weapons which almost caused another civil
disturbance in 2008 have been legitimized by the Lebanese government. Diplomatic and
international efforts to disarm Hezbollah easily have been thwarted by the organization
grasping more power in Lebanese politics. This last move touched strings of Israel that
considers Hezbollah as the biggest threat for her northern borders.

Israel feels like her national security has never been threatened as it is in 2009.
Therefore, another Israel- Lebanon war does not stands far away and warns Lebanon that
Israel will take Lebanese state and Hezbollah both responsible if any attacks occurs as
Hezbollah claims each year on the anniversary of assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, high
rank Hezbollah officer. Allegations against water theft, ongoing occupation of Israel in
Shebaa Farms and Ghajar, and violations of 1701 by Israeli force increase tension and
possibility of another dispute that will be the most damaging for both sides when it is
considered that Hezbollah will not stand alone this time. Moreover, refusal of Lebanese
state to disarm Hezbollah with the new government statement already makes Resolution
1701 dysfunctional.

164
 Israel in the past retaliated Lebanese infrastructure, roads, and bridges also
sometimes targeted civilian areas in order to punish Lebanese state for their inability to
stop Hezbollah attacks into Israel. Now Hezbollah is part of Lebanese national security
plan, Israel will not hesitate to hit Lebanese army positions as well and use disproportioned
force in order to achieve her security objectives. However, Israel‟s retaliations in the past
expected to raise mass protests against Hezbollah, on the contrary this tactic only increased
hatred against Israel and unified Lebanese state and Hezbollah as well as the whole
population. Furthermore there will be no peace treaty for Israel and Lebanon, before
Syrian- Israeli peace.

Syria is very important and influential Lebanese foreign affairs since finally two
countries established diplomatic relations. Hariri‟s visits to Damascus signals that old
hostilities between Assad and Hariri family has been forgiven, despite the accusation of
Syrian involvement to Hariri assassination, U.N. investigators don‟t have any solid proof
to confirm Syrian role. Syria is playing to be close ally of Lebanon in the region against
Israel that also Syria allied herself with Iran bridging Iran and Lebanon. Hezbollah arms
travels through Syria. Besides, Lebanon and Syria pursue the same foreign policy towards
Israel in means of Arab- Israel peace process.

Lebanon doesn‟t have any major land disputes between Israel other than small
proportion of land called Ghajar and Shebaa Farms. Shebaa Farms stand very strategic
position for Israel that it is the highest point and has water resources. Though, it is not
indispensible for Israel in exchange of a sustainable peace treaty with Lebanon and
normalization of relations. Israeli withdrawal from these territories would rip Hezbollah
from its pretext for resistance and raison d’etre abrogating Lebanese government‟s
legitimization of Hezbollah‟s military wing. This move, on the other hand, would draw
Lebanon into another civil war. Lebanese government whether it is pro-Western or not
cannot determine for a peace treaty without consent of Hezbollah, consequently Iran and
Syria.

Yet, Syrian influence on Lebanon returned without military forces, but March 8
ministers in the new cabinet. From Syrian part, Lebanon and Hezbollah are needed to
pressure Israel to resume peace negotiations “land for peace”, regaining Golan Heights.

165
Furthermore, Syria cannot afford to confrontation with Israel in her own territory.
Hezbollah‟s participation into Lebanese politics confirms Lebanon to pursue parallel
foreign policy towards Israel. Above all Iran and Syria for the leadership of the region will
carry Hezbollah struggle even over borders into Palestine.

Hezbollah‟s entry into long list of Lebanese militia and later political life enabled
Iran to reach Arab- Israeli issue via Lebanon. At first in 1982, if Iran‟s aim is to export its
regime, in 2009 it turned to threaten Israeli “security” concerns along the border and wit hin
Palestine by aiding Hamas materially and financially using Hezbollah institutions.
Hezbollah pursuing Khomeini‟s orders without hesitation is not even close to quit armed
struggle against Israel even if the latter evacuate disputed areas such as Ghajar and Shebaa.
Probably Hezbollah efforts are going to shift from Lebanon to Palestine either in disguise
or open. Iranian aid to change balance of power in the region using Hamas and Hezbollah
carries Hezbollah armed struggle even further. Lebanon, as a state with Arab identity as
Hezbollah emphasizes cannot exclude itself from Palestinian issue and ongoing struggle
between Palestine and Israel. Being an „Islamic entity‟ Hezbollah has already chosen its
side: Palestine but in particular Hamas.

Now, in the Middle Eastern politics, Turkey entered as a strong actor having one of
the most powerful military forces in the Middle Eastern region. Since its establishment in
1948, Turkey has been close ally of Israel in the region though following Gaza operation of
Israel in 2007 against Hamas, Turkey- Israel relations began to deteriorate which continues
in 2009. Arab states in the Middle East found Turkey distrustful because of her relations
with Israel. New Turkish proactive foreign policy requires “zero problems” with
neighbours and hostile stance of the AKP government towards Israel get Syria, Iran and
hence Lebanon closer to Turkey. Each one of these states signed visa-free agreements and
enhanced economic, social and military ties. Lebanon and Turkey also having coast to
Mediterranean cooperates economically under EU auspices.

Historical and religious ties between Lebanon and France, makes her indispensible
element for French politics. Maronites of Lebanon have always turned to France when
protection was needed from the Muslims. France still plays the same role as protector of
Lebanon, but now with its increasing Muslim population. French ambitions in the region

166
are rather economic that seeks to build exceptional ties both with Lebanon and Syria.
Stability of Lebanon in this regard has vital importance for France as well as its
sovereignty under Christian domination. French proposal of Union for Mediterranean and
her presence in UNIFIL II unveil French efforts in Lebanon.

EU states, also unlike the US don‟t add Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Even
Germany mediated between Israel and Hezbollah with prisoner swap and Britain contacts
with Hezbollah political wing. EU states acknowledge that in order to keep Lebanon stable
confrontation with Hezbollah will bring harm than doing good. Moreover, EU states have
the biggest share in UNIFIL II that they don‟t want their contingents to be targeted.

Extended UNIFIL II also proves that their efforts to prevent escalation old
hostilities between two states are not eno ugh to halt violations for both sides. UN fails to
offer and most importantly enforce sustainable solution to Lebanese border dispute and
claimed lands under Israeli occupation that the U.N. declared in 2000 Israel has completed
withdrawal from Lebanon according to UNSCR 425 and 426. What is more, UNIFIL‟s
12,000 troops in Lebanese borderline with Israel couldn‟t prevent Hezbollah‟s weapon
transfers into Lebanon that Syria objects UNIFIL deployment in the borderline with Syria
and Lebanon. Lebanon, in return, as of precaution to future Israeli aggression seeks
International support strengthening her ties with major players in the region such as
Turkey, Russia, the US, and EU.

UNIFIL forces more than patrolling at the borders, has other tasks to train and
assist Lebanese army to increase its capabilities against radical elements. Nevertheless,
UNIFIL‟s lack of communication skills in the area makes it difficult to fulfil this tasks
concerning assistance; whereas humanitarian support that the U.N. forces and
organizations provides to Lebanese people are appreciated but not found insufficient as
much as pressuring Israel to respect U.N. resolutions. UNIFIL has been present in Lebanon
for 31 years but couldn‟t prevent Israeli retaliations in 1982, 1993, 1996 and finally 2006.
Despite the fact that in 1996 Israeli attack to Qana, U.N. base is the best proof of UNIFIL‟s
own vulnerability in Lebanon. It can be given excuse that the quantity of the troops and
quality of the weaponry that the UNIFIL possessed since 2006; under overall Israeli

167
operation in Lebanon UNIFIL still cannot deter Israeli aggression. This makes UNIFIL‟s
presence in Lebanon questionable that neither does it disarm Hezbollah nor deter Israel.

In this regard, as of ally of Israel, the US‟s position in the region is determinant
factor peace for Lebanon. The US after 9/11 adopted a very “war against terrorism” policy.
Israeli retaliation in 2006 to Lebanon has been considered as a part of this policy that the
US slackened the process to draft a cease-fire despite French urges. The US added
Hezbollah in terrorist list and that justified Israeli retaliation in Lebanon. Obama
administration, on the other hand, adopted softer foreign policy towards Arab states to
break the ice; concerning Lebanon just befo re the elections the US threatened Lebanese if
they vote for March 8, US military aids would be cut off, that since 2006 the US supplies
Lebanese army. The US refrains to supply Lebanese army with advanced weapons due to
maintain Israeli military advantage. Eventually, Lebanon looks for other suppliers of
advanced weaponry.

Russia is an important substitute to US arms both in the region and also in Lebanon
though due to close relations with Israel and cooperation policy with the US, Russia
refrains to provide advanced weaponry. Russian made arms however cannot be match to
Israeli advanced systems; Israel considers Lebanese arms as threat to her national security.
Russia takes Lebanon as a profitable market and trade partner in the coast of
Mediterranean. Russia is permanent member of UNSC and influential among other
member states. Lebanon, constructing economic and military ties with Russia, also works
for support in UNSC and protection against increased Israeli threat.

In Conclusion, I found that Lebanese foreign policy has changed and improved
since 2009 General Elections. Lebanon has solved major internal issues and destabilizing
factors inside and achieved “unity” among rival factions March 14 and March 8. Hezbollah
led March 8 and majority March 14 also unified under same foreign policy: good relations
and cooperation with Syria and major international actors in order to counter future Israeli
aggression. Hezbollah led March 8 staying in the opposition robed Israel and the US from
pretexts to stop military and financial aids while enabling Hariri to manoeuvre in
international politics. In 2009, Lebanon plays to be an important actor in the Middle
Eastern politics with her proactive and dynamic new foreign policies.

168
APPENDIX A: COVENANT OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Covenant of League of Nations

Creation of Mandates

(28 June 1919)

Article 22

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to
be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are
inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of
the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such
peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their
experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who
are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories
on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of
the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other
similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of
development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized
subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such
time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal
consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory
must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will
guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public
order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the
liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval
bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence
of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other
Members of the League.

169
 There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific
Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their
remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory
of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the
Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in
the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in
reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory

shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in
each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual

reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the
observance of the mandates.

170
APPENDIX B: SAN REMO COVENANT, 1920

The San Remo Resolution

(April 25, 1920)

It was agreed

(a) To accept the terms of the Mandate Article as given below at reference to
Palestine, on the understanding that there was inserted in the process verbal and
undertaken by the Mandatory Power that this wouldn‟t involve the surrender of the
rights hitherto enjoyed by the non- Jewish communities in Palestine; this
undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious protectorate of France,
which had been settled earlier in the previous afternoon by the undertaking given
by the French Government that they recognized this protectorate as being at an end.
(b) That the terms of the Mandates Article should be as follows:
The High Contracting Parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in
accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 22, Part I ( Covenant of the League
of Nations), be provisionally recognized as independent States, subject to the
rendering of administrative advise and assistance by a mandatory until such time as
they able to stand alone. The boundaries of the said States will be determined, and
the selection of the Mandatories made, by the Principle Allied Powers.

The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provision of

Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be
determined by the Principle Allied Powers, to a Mandatory, to be selected by the
said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the
declaration originally made on November 8, 1917, by the British Government and
adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non- Jewish
communities in Palestine, and the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country.

171
APPENDIX C: TA’IF ACCORD

First, Gene ral Principles and Reforms:

I. General Principles

A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all
its citizens.

B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of

the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding
member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a
member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles
in all areas and spheres, without exception.

C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public

liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality
in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference.

D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovreign and they shall exercise
their sovreignty through the constitutional institutions.

E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and
private ownership.

F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the

state's unity and of the system's stability.

G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal,

economic, and social reform.

H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is
entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The
people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be
no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon].

I. No authority violating the common co-existance charter shall be legitimate

172
 II. Political Reforms

A. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which

exercises full control over government policy and activities.

1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the
chamber's term.

2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the
chamber my vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy speaker
with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition submitted by at least
10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately to
fill the vacant post.

3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is

included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a ses sion, and unless the grace
period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill with the
approval of the cabinet.

4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.

5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free o f secterian restriction, the
parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases:

a. Equally between Christians and Muslims.

b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.
c. Proportionately between the districts.

6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108,

shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of
this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this
document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through appointment
by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.

7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not secterian, basis,
a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate
powers shall be confined to crucial issues.

B. President of Republic: The president of republic is the head of the state and a
symbol of the country's unity. He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to
preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity in accordance with the

173
provisions of the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces which are
subject to the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.

2. Head the Supreme Defense Council.

3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the
cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of depostion of the
resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution,
or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the decree of the
resolution shall be valid and must be published.

4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution
and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After
notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination of the laws within the
grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the
constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace periods,
they shall be valid by law and they must be published.

5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.

6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies

speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the
president shall officially familiarize the speaker on.

7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.

8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.

9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and
decrees relieving them from their duties.

10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state
medals by decree.

11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of
international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The
cabinet shall familiariaze the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the country's
interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties involving
conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may not be
abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of Deputies' approval.

174
 12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.

13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold
special sessions by decree.

14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue
beyond the agenda.

15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session
whenever he deems it necessary.

16. Grant special pardon by decree.

17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates
the constitution or commits high treason.

C. Prime Minister: The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it
and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by
the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet.

2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the president
the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the Chamber of
Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not
exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it is
considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of affairs.

3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.

4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting
cabinet resignation or considering it retired.

5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting
the reexamination of laws.

6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the
republic in advance with the issues included in the age nda and with the urgent issues to be
discussed, and sign the usual session minutes.

7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions; coordinate between
the ministers, and issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress of work.

175
 8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the
minister concerned.

9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman.

D. Cabinet:

The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

The following are among the powers exercised by it:

1. Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees,
and takes the necessary decisions for its implementation.

2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities
of all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, and security
departments and institutions.

3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.

4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with
the law.

5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of
the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session
lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the
chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the
government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which called for
dissolving the chamber in the first instance.

6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet
shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meet ing is
2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible,
then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members present. As for
major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be
considered major issues: The state of emergency and it abolition, war and peace, general
mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general budget,
comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of top- level civil
servants or their equivalent, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the
Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and
the dismissal of cabinet ministers.

176
 E. Minister: The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the
government's general policiy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister
shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of
Deputies withraws its confidence from him individually.

F. Cabinet Resignation, Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:

1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:

a. If its chairman resigns.

b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming it.
c. If its chairman dies.
d. At the beginning of a president's term.
e. At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.
f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an initiative by
the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence.

2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and
the prime minister, with cabinet approval.

3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by
law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. A
vote-of-confidence session shall follow.

G. Abolition of Political Secterianism: Abolishing political secterianism is a

fundamental national objective. To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in
accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies electedon the basis of equal
sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this
objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic
and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies
speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The council's task will be to examine
and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber
of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The
following shall be done in the interim period:

a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in
public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the
independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-
level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims
without allocating any particular job to any sect.

177
 b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.

III. Othe r Reforms

A. Administrative Decentralism:

1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central
authority.

2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded
and all state administartions shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the
highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.

3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national

fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistance and unity of the soil,
people, and institutions.

4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller

administrative units [district and smaller units ] through the election of a council, headed
by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation.

5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces

economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified
municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial
resources.

B. Courts:

[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law
and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and e xecutive authorities on the
one hand, and the givens of common coexistance and the basic rights of the Lebanese as
stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:

1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try
presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this
council shall be promulgated.

2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the

constitutionality of the laws, and to settle d isputes and contests emanating from
presidential and parliamentary elections.

178
 3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in
matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality of the
laws:

a. The president of the republic.

b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker.
c. The prime minister.
d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.

[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the
Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:

1. Personal status affairs.

2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.
3. Freedom of religious education.

[3]. To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the the Higher
Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body.

D. Parliamentary Election Law: Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance

with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common
coexistance between the Lebanese and that ensure the sound and efficient political
representation of all the people's factions and generations. This shall be done after
reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the la nd,
and the institutions.

E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development: A socioeconomic council

shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting
the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.

F. Education:

1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary
stage at least.

2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and
regulations.

3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and
textbooks shall be strengthened.

179
 4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened,
and developed in a manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction needs.
The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to
the university, especially to its technical colleges.

5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national
belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the
subjects of history and national education.

G. Information: All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the
law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies
and the objective of ending the state of war.

Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories:

Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong
state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a
detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon
over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad lines of the
plan shall be as follows:

A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The

militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months,
beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of the republic
shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms shall
be approved constitutionally.

B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:

1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning
the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the
governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training courses.

2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure of
individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea.

C. Strengthening the armed forces:

1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if
necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal
security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.

180
 2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving
security under conditions determined by the cabinet.

3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be
able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.

4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the
armed forces shall return to their barracks.

5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve militar y objectives

exclusively.

D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right
of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted
shall be established. Legistlation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of
reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to
spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented
primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria
to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese
government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more
than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the
president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the
political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments -- the
Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government -- shall decide to
redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-
Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint
Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two
governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the
above- mentioned area and to define these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state
authorities where the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the
two states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement.

Third, liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation:

Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-

recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions
calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.

B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.

181
 C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli
occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese
army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of
the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdawl and to provide the
opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.

Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations:

Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal
relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its
strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is
the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and
which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a
manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the
sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the
bases of security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be
allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed
to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances.
Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any
force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security. Syria,
which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its
citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence,
and sovereignty.

182
APPENDIX D: UNSCR 1701

Resolution

The full text of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978),
426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as
the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of
18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005
(S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006
(S/PRST/2006/35),

“Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in

Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah‟s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has
already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian
infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

“Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing
the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current cris is, including
by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

“Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts
aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

“Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the
Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory,
through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the
consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government
of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a United Nations force that is
supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and
bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces
from southern Lebanon,

“Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

“Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the
Shebaa farms area,

“Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August

2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli
army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces
from UNIFIL as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region
and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed
to enable it to perform its duties,

183
 “Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term
solution to the conflict,

“Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international

peace and security,

“1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate
cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive
military operations;

“2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and
UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deplo y their forces together throughout the South
and calls upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its
forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

“3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government
of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution
1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif
Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the
consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government
of Lebanon;

“4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

“5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its pre vious relevant
resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon
within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli- Lebanese
General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

“6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its
financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through
facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government
of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and
calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction
and development of Lebanon;

“7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken
contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution,
humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian
convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to
comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

“8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term
solution based on the following principles and elements:

-- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

184
 -- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities,
including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an
area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the
Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11,
deployed in this area;

-- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords,

and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the
disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the
Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or
authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;

-- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its

Government;

-- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except

as authorized by its Government;

-- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of land

mines in Lebanon in Israel‟s possession;

“9. Invites the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible

agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to
the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and
expresses its intention to be actively involved;

“10. Requests the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant

international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant
provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including
disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in
those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa
farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

“11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers,

equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength
of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying
out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

(a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;

(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout
the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from
Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;

(c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of
Lebanon and the Government of Israel;

185
 (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations
and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;

(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of
the area as referred to in paragraph 8;

(f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to imp lement paragraph 14;

“12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an

international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes
UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems
within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile
activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its
duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel,
facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of
United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the
responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of
physical violence;

“13. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure

UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, urges Member States
to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to
requests for assistance from the Force, and expresses its strong appreciation to those who
have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

“14. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry
points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and
requests UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its
request;

“15. Decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by
their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft:

“(a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment,
paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating
in their territories; and

“(b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training
or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed
in subparagraph (a) above;

except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or
assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in
paragraph 11;

“16. Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and
expresses its intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate

186
and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-
term solution;

“17. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on
the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

“18. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and
lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its
resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515
(2003) of 18 November 2003;

“19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

187
REFERENCES

AA. (2010, January 12). Turkey, Lebanon Lift Visa Procedures. Retrieved June 4, 2010,
from Turkish Weekly: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/95529/turkey- lebanon-to- lift-
visa-procedures.html.

Abdelnour, K. (2002). The Syria Accountability Act and Lebanon. Middle East
Intelligence Bulletin .

Abraham, A. (1996). The Lebanon War. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Abrahams, E. (2009, June 11). Lebanon's Triumph, Iran's Travesty. Retrieved May 23,
2010, from The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/opinion/12abrams.html

Abramowitz, M. (2006, July 21). In Mideast Strife, Bush Sees a Step to Peace. Retrieved
May 22, 2010, from Washington Post: www.washingtonpost.com

Abul-Husn, L. (1998). The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Addis, C. (2009b). Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington D.C.:

Congressional Research Service.

Addis, C. (2009a). U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon. Washington D.C.: Congressional

Research Service, The Libary of Congress.

Addis, C., & Katzman, K. (2009). Middle East Elections 2009: Lebanon, Iran,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. Washington D.C.: CRS Report for Congress.

AFP. (2005, May 24). Five Years of Israel- Lebanon Relations Since Pullout. Retrieved
September 18, 2009, from Lebanonwire :
http://www.lebanonwire.com/0505/05052402AFP.asp

AFP. (2010, January 11). Turkey, Lebanon Lash Out at Israel. Retrieved June 3, 2010,
fromGulfTimes:http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=3366
78&version=1&template_id=37&parent_id=17

188
Agha, H., & Khalidi, A. (1995). Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation. London: The
Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Ajami, F. (1985). Lebanon and Its Inheritors. Foreign Affairs, pp. 778-799.

Akarli, E. (1993). The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920. Oxford: University of
California Press.

Al Arabiya. (2009, December 1). Hezbollah Has Right to Keep Arm: Government.
Retrieved May 26, 2010, from Al- Arabiya News Channel:
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/12/02/93010.html

Al Jazeera. (2008, May 10). Beirut Hit by Deadly Street Battles. Retrieved May 22, 2010,
fromAlJazeera:http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/05/200861517529556798
.html

Al Jazeera. (2009, May 30). Hezbollah: Iran Supports Lebanon. Retrieved June 1, 2010,
from Al Jazeera News:
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/05/20095308035507613.html.

al Kazhali, H., & Sabbagh, H. (2010, April 22). President al-Assad, Frangieh Discuss
Syrian-Lebanese Relations and Future Prospects. Retrieved May 23, 2010, from SANA:
http://www.sana.sy/eng/21/2010/04/22/284118.htm

Alagha, J. (2009). Hezbollah and the 2009 Elections in Lebanon. European Union Institute
for Security Studies.

Alagha, J. (2008). The Israeli- Hezbollah 34 Day War: Causes and Consequenses. Arab
Studies Quarterly , pp. 1-22.

Al-Hakim, Y. (1980). Beirut wa Lubnan fi'ahd al Uthman . Beirut: Dar al-Nihar.

Amery, H. (1993). The Litani River of Lebanon. Geographical Review, pp. 229-237.

An Nahar. (2010, February 26). Russia Agrees to Provide Lebanon with Mi 24 Helicopters
Instead of MiG Fighters. Retrieved June 2, 2010, from An Nahar:
http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/Lebanon/DDBAE9C2DA970B4CC22
576D60068156B?OpenDocument

189
Anderson, E., & Fisher, W. (2000). The Middle East: Geography and Geopolitics. London:
Routledge.

Anderson, G. (2008, May 26). America Should Help Lebanon; Hezbollah Victory
Empowers Iran. The Washington Times , p. 21.

Angrist, M. (2004). Party Systems and Regime Formation in the Modern Middle East:
Explaining Turkish Exceptionalism. Comparative Politics , pp. 229-249.

ANN News. (2006, September 12). Mikhail Margelov: disarming Hezbollah is not one of
Russia's Objective. Retrieved May 21, 2009, from ANN News:
http://www.annnews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=23745

Bakri, N. (2006, March 16). Siniora to Visit Damascus for Talks on Diplomatic Relations.
Retrieved June 28, 2009, from Daily Star Lebanon:
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=22993

Barakat, H. (1979). The Social Context. In E. Haley, & L. Snider, Lebanon in Crisis:
Participants and Issues (pp. 1-20). Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.

Barkat, A. (2010, July 18). Lebanon-Israel gas dispute reaches UN. Retrieved June 28,
2010, from Globes Israel's Business Arena:
http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000575105&fid=1725

Barzegar, K. (2010). Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy After Saddam. The Washington
Quarterly, pp. 173-189.

Barzegar, K. (2007). Iran's Foreign Policy Towards Iraq and Syria. Retrieved June 3, 2010,
from Turkish Policy Quarterly: http://www.esiweb.org

Bauer, M., & Ismar, J. (2008). Regional Problems- Regional Solutions?: Taking Stock of
the Recent Mediation Efforts in the Middle East. Munich: Center for Applied Policy
Research.

Bazzi, M. (2009, December 4). Israel, Lebanon, and Middle East Conflict . Retrieved
December 5, 2009, from The Christian Science Monitor:
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1204/p09s01-coop.html

190
BBC News. (2007, May 21). Figting Rages in Lebanese Camp. Retrieved May 21, 2010,
from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6676291.stm

Berti, B. (2010). The 'Rebirth' of Hezbollah: Analyzing the 2009 Manifesto. Strategic
Assessment, pp. 90-100.

Blanford, N. (2008, May 7). A Cell Phone Civil War in Lebanon. Retrieved February 10,
2009, from Time Magazine: www.time.com

Blanford, N. (2006). Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its
Impacts on the Middle East. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Blank, S. (1996). How New the New Russia? :Russia's Return to Mideast Diplomacy.
Orbis, pp. 517-535.

Bourtman, I. (2006). Putin and Russia's Middle Eastern Policy. Middle East Review of
International Affairs, pp. 1-15.

Caesar, E. (2000). The Politics of Interventionalism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830- 1861 .

New York: I.B. Tauris.

Chahine, H. (1996). Those Left Behind. The Middle East, pp. 17-19.

Chehabi, H. (2006). Distanct Relations: Iran& Lebanon in the Last 500 Years. London :
I.B. Tauris & Co.

CIA. (2010, March 5). The World Factbook. Retrieved March 21, 2010, from Central
Intelligence Agency: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/le.html#People

Cleveland, W. L. (2004). A History of Modern Middle East. Colarado: Westwiew Press.

CNN. (2007, May 21). Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: Facts and Figures.
Retrieved May 21, 2010, from CNN International:
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/21/lebanon.camps/index.html

Cohen, A. (2008). The U.S. Should Oppose Hezbollah and Its Iranian and Syrian Masters
in Lebanon. Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation .

191
Coleman, M. (2005). US Statecraft and the US- Mexico Border. Political Geography, pp.
185-210.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2001). Greed and Grievances in Civil War. Oxford Economic
Papers, pp. 1-32.

Congress, U. L. (2003). Political Parties- Lebanon. Retrieved April 6, 2010, from Country
Studies US: http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/84.htm

Cooley, J. (1979). The Palestinians. In P. Haley, & L. Snider, Lebanon in Crisis:

Participants and Issues (pp. 21-54). New York: Syracuse University Press.

Cordesman, A. (2006a). Iran's Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Washington D.C.:

Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Cordesman, A. (2006b). Preliminary "Lessons" of the Israeli- Hezbollah War. Washington:

Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Coughlin, C. (2009). Khomeini's Ghost: The Definitive Account of Ayatollah Khomeini's

Islamic Revolution and Its Enduring Legacy . London: Macmillan.

Coury, R. (1982). Who "Invented" Egyptian Arab Nationalism? Part 2. International

Journal of Middle East Studies, pp. 459-479.

Craig, J. (2007). Arab Society: Characteristics and Contradictions 2007. Journal of Asian
Affairs, pp. 1-11.

CRS Report for Congress. (2006). Lebanon: The Israel- Hamas- Hezbollah Conflict.
Washington: The Library of Congress.

Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Daily Star . (2010, May 25). Hariri, Obama Discuss Peace, Hezbollah, Iran. Retrieved May
25, 2010, from The Daily Star: Lebanon: www.dailystar.com.lb

Daily Star. (2010, February 4). Hariri to Visit Syria When Border Deal Read. The Daily
Star , p. 1.

192
Daily Star Staff. (2009, December 16). Palestinians "reject" Lebanon Security Breaches.
The Daily Star .

Daragahi, B. (2009, February 16). Iran, Lebanon, Jordan Upgrade Air Power. Retrieved
February 18, 2009, from Los Angeles Times:
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/02/lebanon-jordan.html

Daragahi, B. (2009, September 13). Lebanon: Druze Leader Jumblatt Says Iran Can
Supply Nation's Weapons. Retrieved December 23, 2009, from Los Angeles Times:
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/09/lebanon-druze- leader-jumblatt-
says-iran-can-sell-army-antitank-weapons.html

Davudoglu, H. (2009, July 31). Article by H.E. Ahmet Davudoglu Published in Daily Star
Newspaper (Lebanon). Retrieved June 2, 2010, from Republic of Turkey Ministry of
Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by- h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu-published- in-
daily-star- newspaper-_lebanon_-on-31-july-2009.en.mfa

Deutsche Presse. (2009, May 17). Hariri Lashes Out at Nasrallah's Speech Re-Lebanon's
Elections. Retrieved May 21, 2009, from Monster Sand Critics:
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1477743.php/Hariri_las
hes_out_at_Nasrallah_s_speech_re-Lebanon_s_elections

Devenny, P. (2006). Hezbollah's Strategic Threat to Israel. Middle East Quarterly, pp. 31-
38.

Dickey, C. (2009, June 8). War, Peace and, a Political Touch. Retrieved May 22, 2010,
from Newsweek: www.newsweek.com

Djerejian, E. (2006). From Conflict Managent to Conflict Resolution. Foreign Affairs, pp.
41-48.

DPADM, DESA, & UN. (2004, October). Republic of Lebanon: Public Administration,
Country Profile. Retrieved April 5, 2010, from
http://www.atfl.org/attachments/176_United%20Nations%20DESA%20Public%20Admini
stration%20Country%20Profile%20on%20Lebanon.pdf

193
Egypt News. (2010, March 25). Turkey, Lebanon Urged to Create Islamic Market .
Retrieved June 2, 2010, from Egypt News:
http://news.egypt.com/en/201003259989/news/world/turkey- lebanon-urged-to-create-
islamic- market.html

Ehteshami, A. (2002). The Foreign Policy of Iran. In A. Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies
of Middle East States (pp. 283-309). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

El- Khazen, F. (1997). Permanent Settlement of Refugees in Lebanon. Journal of Refugee

Studies, pp. 275-293.

El Khazen, F. (2003). Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Seach of Partizans.

Middle East Journal, pp. 605- 624.

El Lakkiss, S. (2007, September 14). Beirut Camp Islamists in a New Era Following the
Bared Camp Battle. Annahar .

El-Sohl, R. (2004). Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation. London:
I.B. Tauris.

Erlanger, S., & Oppel, R. (2006, August 7). A Disciplined Hezbollah Surprises Israel With
Its Training, Tactics and Weapons. The New York Times , pp. 1-9.

Eshel, D. (2001). The Israel- Lebanon Border Enigma. IBRU Boundary and Security
Bulletin, pp. 72-83.

Etzioni, A. (2004). A Self- Restrained Approach to Nation- Building by Foreign Powers.

International Affairs, pp. 1-17.

Fattah, H. (2007, June 4). Fighting in Lebanese Refugee Camp Rages, and Spreads.
Retrieved May 2010, 21 , from The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/world/middleeast/04lebanon.html

Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political
Science Review, pp. 1-41.

Feldman, S. (2006). The Hezbollah-Israel War: A Preliminary Assessment. Middle East

Brief, pp. 1-7.

194
Fieldhouse, D. (2006). Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958. New York:
Oxford University Press.

Firro, K. (2003). Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under Mandate. New York:
I.B. Tauris.

Fisk, R. (1990). Pity the Nation, The Abduction of Lebanon. New York: Nation Books.

Fisk, R. (2009, January 11). Who Killed Mr. Lebanon?: The Hunt for Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri's Assassination. Retrieved June 1, 2010, from The Independent :
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/who-killed- mr- lebanon-the-
hunt- for-prime- minister-rafiq- hariris-assassins-1231542.html

Flanigan, T., & Abdel-Samad, M. (2009). Hezbollah's Social Jihad: Nonprofits As

Resistance Organizations. Middle East Policy, pp. 122-137.

Freedman, R. (2007). The Russian Resurgence in the Middle East . China and Eurasia
Forum Quarterly, pp. 19-23.

FTP. (2010, February 25). Russia Assures Lebanon of Broader Cooperation . Retrieved
June 3, 2010, from Press TV: http://dtansikemalizm.blogspot.com/search?updated-
min=2009-01-01T00%3A00%3A00%2B02%3A00&updated- max=2010-01-
01T00%3A00%3A00%2B02%3A00&max-results=50

FTP/HGL. (2010, May 6). UNIFIL: We Have Not Seen Scuds Missiles. Retrieved June 2,
2010, from Press TV: http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=125592&sectionid=351020203

Future Movement . (2007, August 17). The Future Movement Manifestation. Retrieved
May 23, 2009, from Al Mustaqbal: http://www.almustaqbal.org/admin/PDF/politicsEN.pdf

Galey, P., & Kawas, N. (2010, May 12). Hariri's Office Denies Premier Condoned
Hezbollah's Arms. The Daily Star , pp. 1-2.

Galie, A., & Hack, B. (2005). Lebanon and Syria: Blackouts as a Way of Life. Public
Services Yearbook 2005/6, pp. 137- 147.

Gellner, E. (1987). Culture, Identity and Politics. New Castle: Cambridge University Press.

195
Gerges, F. (2008, June 1). Hezbollah and the Future of Lebanon. Retrieved May 2010, 21,
from Dissent Up Front: http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=100

Goodenough, P. (2009, December 23 ). U.S.-Backed Lebanon Signals More Support for

Iran in U.N. Security Council. Retrieved December 25, 2009, from CNS News:
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/58946

Greenberg, H. (2009, July 14). Explosion in Hezbollah Arms Cache Stirs panic in South
Lebanon. Retrieved June 1, 2010, from YNet: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3746608,00.html

Greenberg, H. (2009, October 31). IDF Releases Footage of Hezbollah Arms Smuggling.
Retrieved May 21, 2010, from YNet News:
http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3789656,00.html

Habib, G. (1999, December 7). The Naturalization Decree Strips Lebanese Identity. Al-
Nahar .

Haddad, S. (2004). The Origins of Popular Opposition to Palestinian Resettlement in

Lebanon. International Migration Review, pp. 470- 492.

Haim, S. (1963). Arab Nationalism: An Anthology. Berkeley: University of California

Press.

Hammarberg, T. (2000). The Palestinian Refugees: After Five Decades of Betrayal- Time
at Last? Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs .

Harel, A. (2008, October 5). IDF Plans to Use Disproportio nate Force in Next War.
Haaretz .

Harel, A., & Issacharoff, A. (2008). 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan .

Harik, J. (2005). Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Harris, W. (2005). Bashar al Assad's Lebanon Gambling. Middle East Quarterly, pp. 33-
44.

196
Harris, W. (1985). Syria in Lebanon. Middle East Report and Information Project, pp. 9-
14.

Hartshorne, R. (1950). The Functional Approach in Political Geography. Association of

American Geographers Annals , 40 (2), pp. 95-130.

Hatoum, L. (2006, June 23). Syria Accuses "Unjust" Lebanese of Preventing

Rapproachment. The Daily Star Lebanon , pp. 1-2.

Haushofer, K. (1942). Why Geopolitik? In A. Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer.

New York: Farrah and Rinehard.

Hazran, Y. (2009). The Shiite Community in Lebanon: Form Marginalization to

Ascendancy. Middle East Brief , pp. 1-8.

Held, C. C., & McDonald Held, M. (2000). Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and
Politics. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hertlz, T. (1988). The Jewish State. New York: Dover Publications.

Heywood, A. (2007). Politics. New York: Palgrave Mcmillan.

Hezbollah. (1988). An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program. The Jarusalem Quarterly .

Hezbollah, & FPM. (2006, February 6). Paper of Common Understanding Between
Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement. Retrieved May 2010, 10, from Tayyar:
http://www.tayyar.org/NR/rdonlyres/FC03642C-AF93-4A07-BF30-
0E871CAAFD09/0/fpm_hezbollah.pdf

Hirsh, M. (2006, July 24). The Legacy on the Line . Newsweek .

Hitti, P. K. (1951). History of Syria: Including Lebanon and Palestine. New York:
McMillan Press.

Hitti, P. (1962). Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present. McMillan
Press: London.

197
Hoge, W. (2007, June 27). Arms Flowing Into Lebanon, U.N. Finds. Retrieved June 4,
2010, from The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/world/middleeast/27nations.html

Holden, D., & Johns, R. (1982). The House of Saud. London: Pan Books.

Holland, T. (2009). The European Concert in the Eastern Question. Oxford: Cornell
University Press.

Hourani, A. (1985). Political Society in Lebanon: A Historical Introduction. London:

Center for Lebanese Studies.

Hourani, A. (1988). Visions of Lebanon. In H. Barakat, Toward a Viable Lebanon (pp. 3-

14). London: Croom Helm.

Hudson, M. (1967). Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics. Comparative

Politics, pp. 109-128.

Hudson, M. (1976). The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy.

Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 109-122.

Hugges, M. (2005). Lebanon's Armed Forces and the Arab- Israeli War, 1948-49. Journal
of Palestine Studies , 34 (2), pp. 24-41.

Huntington, S. (1993). Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, Washington D.C., pp. 22-
49.

Ibrahim, A. (2009, February 13). Contemporary Distribution of Lebanon's Main Religious

Groups.

IFES. (2009, November 9). Lebanon's New Government. Retrieved May 19, 2010, from
International Foundation for Electoral Systems : www.ifes.org

Inbar, E. (2007). How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War. Middle East Quarterly,
pp. 57-65.

International Crisis Group. (2006, July 25). Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing Out of the
Abyss. Retrieved June 23, 2009, from International Crisis Group: www.crisisgroup.org

198
International Crisis Group. (2008). Lebanon: Hezbollah's Weapons Turn Inwards.
Retrieved May 22, 2010, from International Crisis Group: www.crisisgroup.org

International Crisis Group. (2009, February 19). Nurturing Instability: Lebanon's

Palestinian Refugee Camps. Retrieved March 29, 2009 , from International Crisis Group:
www.crisisgroup.org

Irani, G. (2008, May 20). Spain, Lebanon and UNIFIL. Real Instituto Elcano.

IRI. (2009, June 10). Lebanon Post-Election Watch: June 2009 Parliamentary Elections.
Retrieved May 22, 2010, from The International Republican Institute : www.iri.org

Isik, R. (2005). Osmanli‟nin Son Donemlerinde Maruniler‟in Lübnan‟da Bağımsız Bir

Hristiyan Devleti Kurma Girişimlerinin Fikri Temelleri. Firat University Journal of Social
Science .

İsra Haber . (2010, June 06). Nasrallah'tan Türkiye'ye Övgü. Retrieved June 7, 2010, from
Haber Panaroma: http://www.haberpanorama.com/news_detail.php?id=21321

Israel National News. (2008, November 23). Israel Worried Over Proposed U.S. Tank Sale
to Lebanon. Retrieved May 22, 2010, from Israel National News Online:
http://www.israelnationalnews.com

Issacharoff, A. (2009, August 24). Lebanon Will Never Negotiate with Israel Directly or
Indirectly. Retrieved October 12, 2009, from Haaretz : http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/news/lebanon-will- never-negotiate-with- israel-directly-or-indirectly-1.282539

Johnson, M. (2002). All Honorable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon . London :
I.B. Tauris.

Kalawoun, N. M. (2000). The Struggle for Lebanon: A Modern History of Lebanese -

Egyptian Relations. London: I.B Tauris.

Karmon, E. (2003). Fight on All Fronts: Hezballah, The War on Terror, and the War in
Iraq. Washington D.C. : Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Karx, & Cohl. (1983). The Beirut Massacre: The Complete Kahan Commission Report.
New Jersey: Princeton .

199
Katrib, J. (2008). Ending (or Deepening) the political Crisis in Lebanon: The Role of
Electoral Reform. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Katz, M. (2008). Comparing Putin's and Brezhnew's Policies Toward the Middle East.
Society ,pp. 177-180.

Kaufman, A. (2009). Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: " on Ghajar and Other Anomalies in the
Syria- lebanon-Israel Tri-border Region. The Middle East Journal , pp. 539-560.

Kaufman, A. (2001). Phoenicianism: The Formation of an Identity in Lebanon in 1920.

Middle Eastern Studies , pp. 173- 194.

Kaufman, A. (2002). Who Owns the Shebaa Farms? Chronicle of a Territorial Dispute.
The Middle East Journal , pp. 576-595.

Kellas, J. (1994). Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: The Contribution of Political Science to
Political Accomodation. Studies in East European Thought , pp. 105-117.

Khadduri, M. (1944). The Franco- Lebanese Dispute and the Crisis of November, 1943.
The American Journal of International Law , pp. 601-620.

Khalaf, S. (1993). Beirut Reclaimed. Reflections on Urban Design and Restoration of

Civility. Beirut: Dar An-Nahar.

Khalaf, S. (2002). Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon. New York: Colombia Press.

Khalidi, M., & Riskedahl, D. (2007). The Road to Nahr al-Barid: Lebanese Political
Discourse and Palestinian Civil Rights. Middle East Report ,
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer244/khalidi_riskedahl.html.

Khalidi, R. (1991). Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature. American

Historical Review , pp. 1363-1373.

Khalidi, W. (1979). Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East.
Harvard Studies in International Affairs , pp. 67-84.

200
Khatib, K. (2009). How Promotion of Political Reform by the European Union is
Perceived in the Arab World: The Case of Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.
Stockholm : International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance .

Khoury, P. (1981). Factionalism Among Nationalist During the French Mandate.

Internationali Journal of Middle East Studies, pp. 441-469.

Kirk, E. (1949). A Short History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to Modern
Times. Washington DC: Public Affairs Press.

Kliot, N. (1994). Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East. New York: Routledge.

Knio, K. (2008). Is Political Stability Sustainable in Post- "Cedar Revolution" Lebanon?

Mediterranean Politics , pp. 445- 453.

Knio, K. (2005). Lebanon: Cedar Revolution or Neo- Sectarian Partition? Mediterranean

Politics , pp. 225-231.

Kober, A. (2008). The Israel Defence Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor
Performance? The Journal of Strategic Studies ,pp. 3-40.

Korbani, A. (1991). U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982: Presidential

Decisionmaking. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Krayem, H. (2009). Lebanon: Confessionalism and the Crisis of Democracy. In B.

Kosmin, & A. Keysar, Secularims, Women and the State: The Mediterranean World in the
21st Century (pp. 67-76). Hartford: Institute for the Study of Secularism in Society and
Culture.

Krayem, H. (2008). Political Parties and Electoral Systems in Lebanon and Israel:
Interactive Reinforcement. Beirut: American University of Beirut.

Krayem, H. (2005). The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement . Retrieved March
27, 2010, from American University of Beirut: http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-
resolution.html

Kreutz, A. (2007). Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe? New York: Praeger.

201
Kroupenev, A. (2000). Russia's Policy vis-a-vis Iran and Hezbollah. International Institute
for Counter-Terrorism , pp. 1-7.

Langohr, V. (2001). Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship Between
Islamism and Electoral Politics. International Journal of Middle East Studies , pp. 591-610.

Lawson, F. H. (1984). Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. International

Organization , pp. 451-480.

Lebanese-Israeli Armistice. (2002). Retrieved December 18, 2008, from Middle East
Organization Web Site: http://www.mideastweb.org/isrlebarmistice1949.htm

Lebanon Topography. (n.d.). Retrieved April 2, 2010, from Maps of the World:
http://mapsof.net/uploads/static- maps/lebanon_topography.png

Lebanonwire. (2006, June 20). Syrian Remarks on Siniora's Visit 'Violate All Diplomatic
Norms'. Retrieved May 22, 2010, from Lebanonwire:
http://lebanonwire.com/0606MLN/06062016LR.asp

Levitt, M. (2005). Iranian State Sponsorship on Terror: Threatening U.S. Security, Global
Stability, and Regional Peace. Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy.

Levy, J. (1989). The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique. In I. Midlarsky, & M.

Midlarsky (Ed.), Handbook of War Studies (pp. 1-30). Boston: Unwin-Hyman.

Lewis, B. (2005). From Babel to Drogomans: Interpreting the Middle East. Phoenix: Orion
Books.

Lewis, B. (1991). Watan . Journal of Contemporary History , pp. 523-533.

Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New

Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Longrigg, S. (1958). Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate. London: Oxford
University Press.

202
Lyon, A. (2010, April 19). Scud Missiles Would Be Odd Choice for Nimble Hezbollah-
Analysis. The Daily Star , pp. 1-2.

Mackey, S. (2009). Mirror of The Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict. New York: W.W.
Norton&Company Inc.

Mackinder, H. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. Geographical Journal , pp. 421-
437.

Macleod, H. (2008, May 13). Hezbollah Capture of Mountain Village Seen as Threat to
Israel. Retrieved May 22, 2010, from The Guardian News:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/13/lebanon.israelandthepalestinians

Maila, J. (1992). The Document of National Reconciliation: A Commentary. In J. Maila,

Prospects for Lebanon (pp. 18-48). Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies.

Makdisi, K. (2006, August 14). The Flaws in the UN Resolution . Retrieved April 23,
2009, from Counterpunch: http://rmf.net/makdisi08142006.html.

Makdisi, K., Göksel, T., Hauck, H., & Reigeluth, S. (2009). UNIFIL II: Emerging and
Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East. Berlin: German Council
on Foreign Relations.

Makdisi, S., & Sadaka, R. (2005). The Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990. In p. Collier, & N.
Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis Vol. 2 (pp. 59-85).
Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Makdisi, U. (1996). Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in

Lebanon. Middle East Report , pp. 23-30.

Mansfield, P. (2003). A History of the Middle East. London: Penguen Books.

Ma'oz, M. (1995). Syria and Israel: From War to Peace Making. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Matthews, M. (2008). We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah- Israeli War.
Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press.

203
McCarthy, R., & Tran, M. (2009, January 8). Rockets Fired From Lebanon Hit Northern
Israel. Retrieved January 9, 2009, from The Guardian :
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/08/gaza-israelandthepalestinians2

Mehlis, D. (2005). Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission

Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595 (2005). New York: United
Nations.

Miller, L. (1977). The Syrian Revolt of 1925. International Journal of Middle East Studies
, pp. 545-563.

Milton-Edwards, B. (2006). Contemporary Politics in the Middle East. Cambridge: Polity.

Mitnick, J. (2008, May 12). Hezbollah 'Redrawing' Mideast Map: Lebanon Seen as
Islamist Gain. The Washington Times , p. 01.

Mooney Jr., W. (2007). Stabilizing Lebanon: Peacekeeping or Nation-Building. Parameters

, pp. 28-41.

Moubayed, S. (2009, December 23). Hariri's Syria Visit Sets Lebanon on Track. Retrieved
December 24, 2009, from Asia Times Online :
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KL23Ak02.html

Murphy, R. (2002). The Political and Diplomatic Background to the Establishment of

UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNITAF and UNOSOM Missions in Somalia. The Journal of
Conflict Studies, pp. 26-56.

Mühlbacher, T. (2009). Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather: The Case of

Lebanon . Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Nasr, S., & James, D. (1985). Roots of the Shi'i Movement. MERIP Reports, pp. 10-16.

Nasr, V. (2006, August 09). After Lebanon, There's Iran. Retrieved June 5, 2010, from The
Christian Science Monitor: http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0809/ps02-coop.html

Nasrallah, H. (2009, July 1). H.E. Nasrallah's Speech on Ashoura in Full. Retrieved June 5,
2010, from Moqawama: http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=7238&fid=11

204
Nicolle, D. (2001). The Crusades: Essential Histories. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn
Publishers.

Nisan, M. (2003). The Conscience of Lebanon: A Political Biography of Etienne Sakr

(Abu- Arz). London: Frank Cass Press.

Norton, A. (1987). Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin:
University of Texas Press.

Norton, A. (2007). Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton : Princeton University Press.

Norton, A. (2006a, September 13). Lebanon: Securing A Lasting Cease-Fire. Retrieved

May 29, 2009, from Global Security: www.globalsecurity.org

Norton, A. (2006b). The Peacekeeping Challenge in Lebanon. MIT Electronic Journal of

Middle East Studies, pp. 76- 79.

O Tuathail, G., & Dalby, S. (1998). Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics 'Toward a

Critical Geopolitics'. In G. O Tuathail, & S. Dalby, Rethinking Geopolitics (pp. 1-15).
New York: Routledge.

O Tuathail, G., Dalby, S., & Routledge, P. (2006). The Geopolitics Reader. New York:
Routledge.

Odeh, B. (1986). Lübnan'da İç Savaş. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları.

Ostrom, C. J., & Job, B. (1986). The President and the Political Use of Force. American
Political Science Review, pp. 541- 566.

Pan, E. (2005, June 20). Lebanon: Election Results. Retrieved May 5, 2010, from Council
on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/publication/8195/lebanon.html

Paraipan, M. (2005, May 7). Old People in Times: Post Elections Lebanon. Retrieved May
5, 2010, from Global Politicians: http://www.globalpolitician.com/2949- lebanon

Payne, S. (1996). A History of Racism: 1914-1945. New York: Routledge.

Pederson, P. (2007). Conflict in the Middle East: Focus on Lebanon. Social Studies
Review , pp. 40-45.

205
Peleikis, A. (2001). Shifting Identities, Reconstructing Boundaries. The Case of a Multi-
Confessional Locality in Post War Lebanon. Die Welt Des Islams, pp. 400-429.

Percy, A. (1934). A Short History of International Affairs. London: Oxford University

Press.

Peretz, D. (1996). The Arab- Israeli Dispute. New York: Facts on File Inc.

Perlmann, M., & Carmichael, J. (1947). History of the Islamic Peoples: with a Review of
Events, 1939- 1947. New York: G.P.Putnam‟s Sons.

Peteet, J. (1999). Identity Crisis: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon. Retrieved from

Worldwide Refugee Information: www.refugees.org

Picard, E., & Philip, F. (1996). Lebanon, a Shattered Country: Myths and Realites of the
Wars in Lebanon. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Pipes, D. (1988). Radical Politics and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. International
Journal of Middle East Studies, pp. 303-324.

Polk, W. (1963). The Opening of South Lebanon 1788-1840: A Study on the Impact of the
West on the Middle East. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Posen, B. (1993). The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival, pp. 27-47.

Prados, A. (2007). Lebanon. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Putz, U. (2006, October 31). UNIFIL Frustration in Lebanon: All (Too) Quiet on the
Southern Front. Retrieved May 21, 2010, from Spiegel Online International :
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,445788,00.html

Qassam, N. (2007). Hizbullah: Bir Hareketin Anlatılmamış Öyküsü. İstanbul: Karma

Kitaplar.

Qubain, F. (1961). Crisis in Lebanon. Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute.

Rabil, R. (2007). Has Hezbollah's Rise Come at Syria's Expense? Middle East Quarterly ,
pp. 43-51.

206
Rabil, R. (2008, May 21). Hezbollah and Lebanon: the Curse of a State. Retrieved May 22,
2010, from Open Democracy : www.opendemocracy.net

Rabinovich, I. (1985). The War For Lebanon 1970- 1985. Cornell University Press.

Rabinovich, I. (1984). The War for Lebanon, 1970- 1983. London : Cornell University
Press.

Rabinovich, I., & Reinharz, J. (2008). Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings
on Society, Politics and Foreign Relations, Pre 1948 to the Present. New Hampshire:
Brandeis University Press.

Ravid, B. (2008, May 3). Hezbollah: We're Ready for War with Israel, but We Won't Start
It. Retrieved May 2010, 21 , from Haaretz: http://www.haaretz.com/news/hezbollah-we-re-
ready-for-war-with-israel-but-we-won-t-start- it-1.240672

Resolution 1832 , S/Res/1832 (2008) (United Nations August 27, 2008).

Reuters. (2009, April 26). Clinton Says U.S. Will Never Sell Out Lebanon.

Reuters. (2010, May 24). Hariri Heads to Washington After Visits to Egypt, Turkey.
Retrieved May 24, 2010, from The Daily Star: Lebanon: www.dailystar.com.lb

Rom, G. (2006). The Second Lebanon Campaign: Two Strategies that Did Not Meet.
Tzevet, pp. 28-34.

Saab, B. (2008). Rethinking Hezbollah's Disarmament. Middle East Policy, pp. 93-106.

Safa, O. (2006). Getting the Arab Democracy: Lebanon Springs Forward. Journal of
Democracy , pp. 22-37.

Safa, O. (2006). Getting to Arab Democracy: Leba non Springs Forward. journal of
Democracy , pp. 22- 38.

Sakr, E. (2005). The Politics and Liberation of Lebanon. Middle East Report , pp. 86- 105.

Salame, G. (1994). Small Is Pluralistic: Democracy as an Instrument of Civil Peace. In G.

Salame, Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World
(pp. 84-112). London: I.B. Tauris.

207
Salem, P. (1998). Framing Post War Lebanon: Perspectives on the Constitution and the
Structure of Power. Mediterranean Politics, pp. 13-26.

Salem, P. (2007, June 26). Lebanon Resists Security Threats but Must Revive National
Unity Government. Retrieved May 26, 2010, from Carnegie Endowment:
www.carnegieendowment.org

Salem, P. (2006). The Future of Lebanon. Foreign Affairs, pp. 13- 23.

Salibi, K. (1988). A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered.

Berkeley: University of California Press.

Salibi, K. S. (1988). A House of Many Mantions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered.

London: University of California Press.

Salibi, K. S. (1976). Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976. New York: Caravan.

Salibi, K. S. (1965). The Modern History of Lebanon. New York: Preager.

Salibi, K. S. (1976). The Modern History of Lebanon. London: Greenwood Publisher

Group.

Salibi, K. (1971). The Lebanese Identity. Journal of Contemporary History, pp. 76-86.

Salti, R. (2005). Beirut Diary: April 2005. Middle East Report, pp. 22-27.

Sanyer, Ş. (2009, November 24). İstikrarı Sağladık Lübnan'da Yatırım Yapacak Türkler
Hiç Sıkıntı Yaşamaz. Retrieved June 3, 2010, from Radikal:
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=965848&
Date=24.11.2009&CategoryID=101

Schiff, Z., & Ya'ari, E. (1984). Israel's Lebanon War. New York: Simon and Schuster .

Security Council Told of 'Major Strides' in Lebanon Which, Despite Challenges, Could
Lead to Stable Government with Authority, SC/9490 (UNSC October 30, 2008).

Shehadi, N., & Wilmshurst, E. (2007). The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN on
Trial? London: Chatham House .

208
Shields, V. (2008). Political Reform in Lebanon: Has the Cedar Revolution Failed? Journal
of Legislative Studies, pp. 474- 488.

Sikimic, S. (2010, May 12). Spain's FM to Visit Lebanon for Talks on Receiving
Palestinian- Israeli Peace Talks. The Daily Star , pp. 1-2 .

Smith, A. (1996). Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems. International

Studies Quarterly, pp. 133-153.

Spagnolo, J. (1977). France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1914. London : Ithaca Press.

Spykman, N. J. (1944). The Geography of the Peace. New York: Brace.

SRPC. (2002, May 22). Khaddam: Attitudes of Damascus and Jumblatt One Major Station
and Eternal. Retrieved June 3, 2010, from Asharq al- Awsat:
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=104563&issueno=8576

Stahl, J. (2008, August 06). Israel Weights New Threats From Lebanon . Retrieved August
2008 , 07 , from CNS News: http://www.cnsnews.com

Stephens, R. (1971). Nasser: A Political Biography. new York: Simon and Schuster.

Stookey, R. (1979). The United States: The American Interest. In E. Haley, & L. Snider,
Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (pp. 225-248). New York: Syracuse Press.

Suleiman, J. (1999). The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the
Palestinian Refugee Camps. Journal of Palestine Studies, pp. 66-80.

Suleiman, M. (1967a). Elections in a Confessional Democracy. The Journal of Politics ,

pp. 109-128.

Suleiman, M. (1967b). The Role of Political Parties in a Confessional Democracy: The

Lebanese Case. The Western Political Quarterly, pp. 682- 693.

Sullivan, A. (2008). Wars and Rumours of War: The Levantine Tinderbox. Middle East
Policy, pp. 125- 133.

Tansi, D. (2009, December 19). Türk- İsrail İlişkileri: 2009. Retrieved January 1, 2009,
from Kemalizm : http://dtansikemalizm.blogspot.com

209
Tansi, D. (2009, November 02). Türkiye Eksen Mi Değiştiriyor? Retrieved November 03,
2009, from Kemalizm : http://dtansikemalizm.blogspot.com

The Associated Press. (2010, May 5). Lebanon Says It Won't Ask Hezbollah to Disarm .
Retrieved May 5, 2010, from Haaretz: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/lebanon-says- it-won-t-ask-hezbollah-to-disarm-1.289065

The State Department. (2006). President Discusses Foreign Policy During Visit to State
Department. Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary.

The Taif Agreement. (1989). Retrieved March 27, 2010, from Mideast Info:
http://www.mideastinfo.com/documents/taif.htm

Traboulsi, F. (1990). Confessional Lines. Middle East Report, pp. 9-10.

United Nations Organization. (2008, December 18). Retrieved December 18, 2008, from
UNRWA Web Site: http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html

UPI. (2009, November 13). Arab Experts Predict Mideast Water Wars. Retrieved March
31, 2010, from United Press International: http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-
Wars/2009/11/13/Arab-experts-predict-Mideast-water-wars/UPI-56281258138250/

UPI. (2009, November 20). Enigma of Russian MiG 29s For Lebanon. Retrieved
November 21, 2009, from United Press International:
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/11/20/Enigma-of-Russian-
MiG-29s-for-Lebanon/UPI-34701258737148/

Urquhart, B. (1989). Foreword. In B. Skogma, UNIFI: International Peacekeeping in

Lebanon, 1978-1988. Boulder&London: Lynne Rienner.

Usher, G. (1997). Hizballah, Syria and the Lebanese Elections. Journal of Palestine Studies
,pp. 59-67.

Van Avera, S. (1994). Hypothesis on Nationalism and War. International Security, pp. 5-
39.

Vizoso, J. (2008). How Serious is the EU About Supporting Democracy and Human Rights
in Lebanon? London: European Council on Foreign Relations and FRIDE.

210
Vocke, H. (1978). The Lebanese War. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Walter, B. (1997). The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International Organization,
pp. 335-64.

Wander, A. (2008, December 3). U.S. Mindful of Israel When Aiding Lebanese Army.
Retrieved May 21, 2010 , from Daily Star: www.dailystar.lb

Weinberger, N. (1986). Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76 Civil War. New
York: Oxford University Press.

Wenger, M., & Denney, J. (1990). Lebanon's Fifteen- Year War 1975-1990. Middle East
Report (162), pp. 23-25.

Wheeler, G. (1959). Russia and the Middle East. International Affairs, pp. 295-304.

Who Receives the Services? (2006, July 26). Ha'aretz .

Wild, S. (1985). National Socialism in the Arab Near East between 1933 and 1939. Die
Welt des Islams, pp. 126-173.

Wilson, S. (2004, December 20). Lebanese Wary of Rising Hezbollah. The Washington
Post , p. 17.

Winslow, C. (1996). Lebanon: War and Politics in Fragmented Society. New York:
Routledge.

Wittes, T., & Youngs, R. (2009). Europe, The United States, and Middle Eastern
Democracy: Repairing the Breach. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution .

Worth, R. (2009, May 27). Hezbollah Says It Is Talking to European Union and I.M.F.
Retrieved May 21, 2010, from The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/world/middleeast/28lebanon.html?_r=1&fta=y

Worth, R. (2010, July 22). Lebanon: Hezbollah Chief Expects Indictments in Ex-premier‟s
Death. Retrieved July 28, 2010, from The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/world/middleeast/23briefs-Lebanon.html?_r=1

211
Worth, R., & Bakri, N. (2008, May 18). Hezbollah Ignites a Sectarian Fuse in Lebanon.
Retrieved May 2010, 21 , from The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html

Ya Libnan. (2010, July 22). FPM MP: Security in Lebanon will deteriorate if Hezbollah
accused of Hariri‟s murder. Retrieved July 25, 2010, from Ya Libnan:
http://www.yalibnan.com/2010/07/22/fpm- mp-security- in- lebanon-will-deteriorate- if-
hezbollah-accused-of-hariris- murder/

Yacoubian, M. (2009). Lebanon's Parliamentary Elections: Anticipating Opportinities and

Challenges. Washington D.C.: The U.S. Institute of Peace.

Yair, E. (1987). War and Intervention in Lebanon. Routledge.

Yalibnan. (2005, July 09). Lebanese Unity Government...or Disunity? Retrieved May 5,
2010, from MENA Election Guide: http://www.mena-
electionguide.org/details.aspx/2/Iran/8/Election%20Results/article135

Zahar, M. J. (2005). Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and
Democratic Failure. In R. P.G., & D. Rothchild, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy
after Civil Wars. New York: Cornell University Press.

Zamir, M. (1985). The Formation of Modern Lebanon . London : Croom Helm Press.

Zamir, M. (1985). The Formation of Modern Lebanon. London: Croom Helm Press.

Ze‟ev, S. (2006). Israel‟s War with Iran. Foreign Affairs , pp. 23-31.

Zisser, E. (2001a). Assad's Legacy: Syria in Transitition. London: Hurst& Co.

Zisser, E. (2006). Hezbollah and Israel: Strategic Threat on the Northern Border. Israel
Affairs, pp. 86-106.

Zisser, E. (2000). Hizballah: New Course Or Continued Warfare. Middle East Review of
International Affairs, pp. 32-42.

Zisser, E. (2008). It‟s a Long Road to Peace with Syria: From the Second Lebanon War to
Peace Overtures in Ankara. Strategic Assesment, pp.107-122.

212
Zisser, E. (2001b). Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence. London: I.B. Tauris.

Zumach, A. (2007, May 23). A New War Is Possible in Lebanon . Retrieved June 2, 2010,
fromOpenDemocracy:http://www.opendemocracy.net/terrorism/articles/War_Lebanon061
1e

213
CIRRICULUM VITAE OF THE AUTHOR

Tuğba YALÇIN

Personal Information :
Date of Birth : 09.05.1982
Place of Birth : Istanbul
Maritial Status : Single

Education :

High School 1996-2000 Kadikoy High School for Girls

Undergraduate 2001-2005 Istanbul University, Economics.
Graduate 2007-2010 Yeditepe University, Political Science and
International Relations

Employme nt

2010- Nissan Otomotiv A.Ş.

2008-2009 Deloitte
2006-2008 Omsan Logistic A.Ş.

214