Powers and Functions of the Commission on Elections

(As Provided by the Administrative Code of 1987)

 POWER to REGULATE and SUPERVISE ENJOYMENT or UTILIZATION of

FRANCHISE

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or

regulate the enjoyment of utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
CASES:

ERMELINE J. TAMPUS – LLB – 1.5B

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 102653, March 05, 1992

The Commission on Election – Extraordinary Powers

Article IX-C, Section 4 of 1987 Constitution

FACTS:
Three (3) consolidated petitions with common question: the constitutionality of Sec.II of
RA 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Petitioners, representatives of mass media which were prevented from selling or
donating space and time for political advertisements: two (2) candidates for office (one
national, one provincial) in the coming May 1992 election. They are taxpayers and
voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed.
Petitioners argue that:

 sec.II(b) of RA 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees

comprising freedom of expression;
 the prohibition imposed by sec.II(b) amounts to censorship because it
selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal
sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992;
 the prohibition is in derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to
election issue;
 sec.II(b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except
those happening the COMELEC space of the newspaper and on
COMELEC time of radio and television broadcast, would bring about a
substantial reduction in quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and issues in the election, thereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec.II(b) of R.A. 6646 has gone beyond the permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
RULING:
No, the Court considers the sec.II(b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
Sec.II(b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations:

 sec.II (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability, has
defined the period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the
relevant election period.
 sec.II (b) is limited in its scope of application. It applies to the purchase
and sale disguise as a donation of print space and air space for
“campaign or other political purposes”. However, it does not in any way
restrict the reporting by newspaper or radio or television stations of news
or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of the government.
 sec.II (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the
COMELEC of print space or air time, which space and time COMELEC is
then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of
charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices.
 sec.II(b) limits the right or free speech and access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears clear and
reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article
IX(C)(4) and Article II(26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the
unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the
resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make crucial
difference. Here, lies the core problem or equalization of the situations of
the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or
empty pockets that said article of the constitution seeks to address.
Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the
right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisement
commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political
commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the
privacy of the general electorate.
 ERMELINE J. TAMPUS – LLB – 1.5B

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119694 May 22, 1995

The Commission on Election

COMELEC Resolution No. 2772

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper

and magazine publishers.

On March 2, 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:

Sec. 2. COMELEC Space. – The Commission shall procure free print space of
not less than one (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city for use as ‘COMELEC Space’ from March 06, 1995 in the
case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May12, 1995. In
the absence of said newspaper, ‘COMELEC Space’ shall be obtained from any
magazine or periodical of said province or city.

Sec.3. Uses of COMELEC Space. – ‘COMELEC Space’ shall be allocated by

Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the
newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to
make known their qualification, their stand on public issues and their platforms
and programs of government.

In this petition, petitioner sought to declare COMELEC Resolution No. 2772

unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the talking of private
property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the
March 22, 1995, letter directive of COMELEC requiring publishers to give free
“COMELEC Space” and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready,
constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Sec. 18(2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

On April 20, 1995, temporary restraining order enjoining COMELEC from enforcing and
implementing the said resolution. On behalf of the respondent COMELEC, Solicitor
General commented that Reso. No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any
obligation to provide free print space in the newspaper as it does not provide any
criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that resolution. Accordingly,
the questioned resolution merely established guidelines to follow in connection with the
procurement of “COMELEC Space”. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General
further argues that even if the questioned resolution is viewed as mandatory, the same
would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional on the

ground of taking the property without just compensation.

RULING:

Yes, Section 2, COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. It suffers from a

fatal constitutional vice and must be nullified.

Section 2 of Resolution no. 2772 does not simply to solicit or request voluntary
donations of print space from the publishers. A written communication officially directing
print media companies to supply free print space, dispatched by a government agency
and signed by a member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is
bound to have produce a coercive effect upon the company addressed.

To compel print media companies to donate “COMELEC Space”, amounts to “taking” of

private personal property for public use or purpose. The extent of the taking or
deprivation is not insubstantial. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,”
measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether
in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the constitution,
but not without payment of “just compensation”. And apparently, the necessity of paying
compensation for “COMELEC Space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission.

Further, resolution no. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain as argued by the Solicitor General.
 ERMELINE J. TAMPUS – LLB – 1.5B

ADIONG vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992

The Commission on Election

COMELEC Resolution No. 2347

FACTS:

On January 13, 1192, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
power granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos.
6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec.15 Lawful Election Propaganda – The following are lawful election
propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed
letters, or other written printed materials not more than eight and one-
half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length.
Provided, that decals and stickers may be posted only in any
authorized posting areas provided in par.(f) of Section 21 hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec.21 Prohibited forms of election propaganda – It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, print, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary,
except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the
campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or
coalition, or at the candidate’s own residential house or one of his
residential house, if he has more than one: provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two(2) feet by three(3) feet in size.

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
assailed the COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him, such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of
Republic Act No.6646.

In addition, the petitioner believes that, with the ban on radio, television, print political
advertisement, he, being the neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and
irreparable injury with the prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and
other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections.

Finally, the petitioner states that as, of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition), he
has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrar in the entire country as to
the location of supposed “COMELEC Poster Areas.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes.

RULING:

The petition is impressed with merit.

The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places

whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC
itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens’ fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec.4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial
enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. All of the protection
expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we gave accorded to free speech the
status of a preferred freedom.

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving object
does not endanger any substantial government interest. This is no clear public interest
threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen’s right
of speech and expression.

Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify
a clamp over one’s mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. A sticker may be
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it place on his private
vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not
anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so
broad that it encompassed even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is
privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule
prescribed by the constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehemently caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Too many restrictions
will deny to people robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest
essential if our elections will truly be free, clean, and honest.
 ERMELINE J. TAMPUS – LLB – 1.5B

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST

ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998

The Commission on Election

Section 92, B.P. No. 881

FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcast companies. It
was declared to be without legal standing to sue I this case as, among other reasons, it
was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of
the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, has the requisite standing
to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
“COMELEC Time - The Commission shall procure radio and television
time to be known as the “COMELEC Time” which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage
of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television are hereby amended so as to provide
radio and television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Sec. 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure
print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Sec. 92 provides that air time
shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus, it contends that Sec. 92 singles
out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year. Petitioner claims that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioner, in 1992,
it lost Php 22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this
year’s elections, its stands to lost Php 58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s
requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime daily for such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Sec. 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.

RULING:
Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
All broadcasting, whether radio or television stations, is licensed by the government.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to
broadcast and that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given
temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In
granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide
free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation
of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the
case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for
COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property
is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.