G.R. No.

80645 August 3, 1993

MARCELINO GALANG, GUADALUPE GALANG, petitioners, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. BUENAVENTURA, ANGELES BUENAVENTURA, CORAZON
BUENAVENTURA, and MA. LUISA BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

Mariano V. Ampl, Jr. for petitioners.

Ramon R. Buenaventura for private-respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision  of the Court of Appeals affirming in
1

toto the judgment rendered by the then Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. R-82-7186
(107585). The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the

same is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO without any pronouncement as to costs at
this instance.2

From the records, we find the following facts.

On July 16, 1976, Ramon Buenaventura on his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of Angeles,
Corazon, Amparo, and Maria Luisa, all surnamed Buenaventura, sold to Guadalupe Galang
and Marcelino Galang two (2) parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City. The agreement was
embodied in a Deed of Sale which stated the following:

I, RAMON R. BUENAVENTURA, Filipino, of legal age, married, and residing at

2111 M. Adriatico, Malate, Manila, in his own behalf and as attorney in fact of
Angeles, Corazon, Amparo and Maria Luisa, all surnamed Buenaventura as per
the special powers of attorney already registered and annotated at the back of
the certificate of title, for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred
Ninety Two Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Five (P192,795.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, hereby SELL, TRANSFER AND CONVEY UNTO
MARCELINO GALANG and GUADALUPE GALANG, Filipino, of legal age,
spouses and residents of 72 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City those parcels of
land situated at Tagaytay City, inherited by us from our parents and our
exclusive paraphernal property, of which we are the absolute owners, our title
thereto being evidenced by TCT No. T-3603 of Tagaytay City Register of Deeds,
more particularly desccribed as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Under the following terms:

(a) 25% of the purchase price upon signing of this instrument;

 (b) 25% within three months, or upon removal of the "encargado" from the
premises, with the delivery of the owner's duplicate certificate of title;

(c) 50% balance within one (1) year from date hereof upon which the title will
be transferred to the buyers but 12% interest per annum will be charged after
said one year in the event full payment is not made. 3

Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang, herein petitioners ppaid to the sellers the first 25% of the
purchase ppprice as stated in the deed. Thereafter, they allegedly demanded from private
respondents failed to do so despite the willingness of petitioners to pay the second 25% of
the purchase price. Consequently, Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang filed on March 18, 1977 a
complaint for specific performance with damages where they alleged among others, that:

5. The period fixed within the defendants should remove the "encargado' from
the premises and to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title had lapsed
without the defendants complying with their obligations thus preventing the
plaintiffs from taking ppossession of the property sold and from developing
and improving the same.

6. On several occasions, the plaintiffs demanded from the defendants, both

orally and in writing, the removal of the latter's "encargado" from the premises
sold and for them to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title to the
plaintiffs but said defendants failed and refused and still fail and refuse to do
so, the demands notwithstanding. 4

Defendants, herein private respondents, denied the allegations and stated that the contract
did not state the true intention of the parties and that it was not their fault that the
"encargado" refused to leave. Furthermore, they filed on July 21, 1978, a third-party
complaint against the "encargado" for subrogation and reimbursement in case of an adverse
judgment against third-party plaintiff. Upon the "encargado's" motion, the complaint was
dismissed on the ground that it did not state a cause of action for the ejectment of the tenant
— the "encargado."

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which is hereby
quoted, to wit:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby orders the defendants to pay

jointly and severally, the plaintiffs P50,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum
from July 16, 1976; P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages; and P3,000.00 as
attorney fees and the costs. 5

In rendering the decision, the trial court reasoned that:

There is no question that, because the defendants had not complied with their
obligation to remove the "encargado," the plaintiffs, as injured parties, may
choose between the fulfillment of the contract of sale and its rescission, in
accordance and (sic) Article 1191 of the Civil Code. They chose enforcement of
the contract which, however is legally impossible. The lands sold to the
plaintiff are agricultural, planted to coffee, among other plants, not only by the
"encargado" but also by his deceased parents. The law prohibits, under pain of
damages, fine and imprisonment, and landlord from dispossessing his
agricultural tenant without the court's approval and on grounds fixed by the
 law, not one of which is shown to exist in respect defendants' "encargado."
(Section 31 and 36, The Agricultural Land Reform Code, RA 3844 as amended).

Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public policy and

those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them.
(Article 1183, Civil Code). Since the consummation of the sale between the
parties is dependent upon the ouster of an agricultural lessee, which cannot be
done because it is against good custom, public policy and the law, the sale is a
nullity. . . .
6

Agreeing that the "encargado" was an agricultural tenant who could not be ejected without
cause, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Hence, this petition.

In their petition, Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang argued that respondent Court erred in
ordering; the rescission instead of specific performance of the contract of sale on the ground
that the ejectment of the "encargado" -tenant was a legally impossible condition that
prevented the fulfillment of the contract. Contrary to the reason advanced by the Court of
Appeals and the trial court, petitioners averred that the removal of the "encargado" was not a
condition precedent to the fulfillment of the contract as paragraph two (2) thereof provides
for an alternative period within which petitioners would have to pay the second 25% of the
purchase price and concomitantly, private respondents would deliver the owner's duplicate
certificate of title. Thus, whether or not the "encargado" was removed, the amount would still
be due and private respondents would still have to deliver the duplicate title.

We are now confronted with the question: Was the removal of the "encargado" a condition
precedent to the fulfillment of the contract of sale such that finding that it was a legally
impossible condition would entitle the buyers to the rescission of the contract?

We answer in the negative.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals based their decision on Art. 1183 of the Civil Code
which provides, thus:

Art. 1183. Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public

policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends
upon them. . . .

Both courts declared the "encargado" a tenant. This being the case, it follows that he may
not be removed from the subject land without just cause, as provided by Presidential Decree
No. 1038. Since the Galangs, then plaintiffs demanded the removal of the "encargado" which,
being legally impossible, could not be met, the contract of sale was rescinded by the courts.

We disagree with the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court. Reviewing the terms of
the Deed of Sale quoted earlier, it is clear that the parties had reached the stage of perfection
of the contract of sale, there being already "a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is
the object of the contract and upon the price,"  and on the basis of which both parties had the
7

personal right to reciprocally demand from the other the fulfillment of their respective
obligations. But contracts of sale may either be absolute or conditional.  One form of
8

conditional sales, is what is now popularly termed as a "Contract to Sell," where ownership
or title is retained until the fulfillment of a positive condition, normally the payment of the
purchase price in the manner agreed upon. The breach of that condition can prevent the
obligation to convey title from acquiring a binding force.  Where the condition is imposed,
9

instead, upon the perfection of the contract, the failure of such condition would prevent such
perfection.   What we have here is a contract to sell for it is the transfer of ownership, not the
10

perfection of the contract that was subjected to a condition. Ownership was not to vest in the
buyers until full payment of the purchase price and the transfer of the title to the buyers.
Apart from full payment of the purchase price, we find no other condition which would affect
the obligations of the parties, i.e., to pay, on the part of the buyer and to convey ownership,
on the part of the seller.

The alleged condition precedent, the removal of the "encargado," was simply an alternative period
for payment of the second 25% of the purchase price given by the seller to the buyer. Assuming that
the removal of the "encargado" could not be brought about, the buyers, petitioners herein, could
have nonetheless demanded the delivery of the owner's duplicate certificate of title by paying the
second 25% of the sale price within three months. In this case, the filing of the complaint for specific
performance of the seller's obligation was the root of the errors committed first, by the trial court and
later, by the Court of Appeals. Both courts overlooked the obvious fact that only the time for paying
the second 25% of the purchase price was qualified and that the entire paragraph reads: "25% within
three months or upon removal of the "encargado" from the premises . . ." and not simply 25% upon
removal of the "encargado."

The case before us could have been resolved by the lower courts without ruling on whether the
"encargado" was a tenant or not. Granting that it was necessary to rule on the legal status of the
"encargado," we find that the courts had been quite precipitate in holding that the "encargado" was a
tenant. There was no sufficient evidence to support that conclusion apart from the affidavits of the
"encargado" and his neighbor. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals regarding this matter rested
on surmises. It held:

We discern no reversible error in the finding and conclusion of the trial court that the
unnamed "encargado" on the lands in question is actually a tenant or agricultural
lessee. The bases of this ineluctable conclusion are not hard to see. As succinctly
pointed out by the court a quo, the "encargado" is staying in his own existing house
thereon, and subject agricultural land is planted to coffee and other plants not only by
the "encargado" but also his deceased parents. Indeed, if the "encargado's" parents
were not tenants or agricultural lessees, the present "encargado" could not have
continued occupying and working thereon, without facing ejectment proceedings;
considering that one of the landowners, defendants-appellees here, is a lawyer
himself. In fact, as can be gleaned from the decision under scrutiny, defendants-
appellees filed a third-party complaint against the "encargado" but they did not
pursue such a course of action because they did not have a clearance from the then
Ministry, now the Department of Agrarian Reform, to proceed against such
"encargado." Then, too, if the said "encargado" did not have the status of a tenant or
agricultural lessee entitled to protection under the agrarian reform laws, he would not
have been given the attention and importance as to be brought before the court a
quo twice, just for a possible amicable settlement, and he would not have had the
firmness to reject an offer for him to continue working half the area under
controversy.

Equally supportive of the foregoing opinion are the following ratiocinations in Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, L-50350, May 15, 1984, 129 SCRA 222:
 . . . it is also undisputed that respondent lives on a hut erected on the landholding.
This fully supports the appellate court's conclusion, since only tenants are entitled to
a homelot where he can build his house thereon as an incident to this right as a
tenant.

xxx xxx xxx

Also, the Court is aware of the practice of landowners, by way of evading the
provisions of tenancy laws, to have their tenants sign contracts or agreements
intended to camouflage the real import of their relationship.

All things duly considered, let alone the better rule that all doubts vis-a-vis the status
of a tiller of the soil should be resolved in favor of tenancy relationship. We cannot
help but conclude here that the "encargado" on the landholding deeded out in the
deed of sale (Exhibit "A") is a tenant or agricultural lessees within the purview and
under the mantle of protection of the Code of Agrarian Reforms.  11

To summarize, we hold that there was no basis for rescinding the contract because the removal of
the "encargado" was not a condition precedent to the contract of sale. Rather, it was one of the
alternative periods for the payment of the second installment given by the seller himself to the
buyers. Secondly, even granting that it was indeed a condition precedent rendering necessary the
determination of the legal status of the "encargado," the lower courts were rash in holding that the
"encargado" was a tenant of the land in question.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, we are convinced that specific performance by the parties of
their respective obligations is proper. Accordingly, petitioners Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang are
ordered to pay private respondents the second 25% of the purchase price. Considering, however,
the time that has lapsed since the parties entered into the contract, payment of the full balance, that
is, 75% of the purchase price, P192,795.00 is in order. However, the 12% interest per annum that
was stipulated in paragraph 3 of the contract of sale should not be assessed against petitioners. On
the other hand, private respondents Ramon Buenaventura, Angeles Buenaventura, Corazon
Buenaventura, and Maria Luisa Buenaventura are obliged to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate
of title and to transfer the title to the land in question upon payment of the purchase price by
petitioners.

Under the Civil Code, private respondents are liable for damages to the injured party, the petitioners
in this case. However, in lieu of actual payment of damages, and considering the fact that private
respondents were in possession of the land during the entire period that this case was pending,
private respondents are no longer entitled to the interest payments which would have been due from
petitioners. 
12

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang are
hereby ordered to pay the full 75% balance of the purchase price (P144,596.25) within thirty (30)
days from notice, with interest upon default. Private respondents Ramon Buenaventura, Corazon
Buenaventura and Maria Luisa Buenaventura are hereby ordered to transfer the title to petitioners
upon full payment of the purchase price.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

  Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29298          December 15, 1928

REYNALDO LABAYEN, ET AL., plaintiffs. 

REYNALDO LABAYEN, appellant, 
vs.
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., defendant-appellee.

Angel S. Gamboa for appellant.

R. Nolan for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an action for damage in the amount of P28,620 for the alleged breach of a contract to grind
sugar cane in 1920-1921. After a rehearing, the defendant was absolved from the complaint, andthe
plaintiff was condemned, on the cross-complaint, to pay the defendant the sum of P12,114, without
special pronouncement as to costs.

An examination of the record on appeal discloses that the exhibits are missing. Still this is not in this
instance of great importance. The facts as found by the trial judge are not seriously disputed from
the facts which worry the parties.

The plaintiff, along with another, possesses the hacienda known as Dos Hermanos of Talisay,
Occidental Negros. The defendant is a corporation dedicated to the milling of sugar cane. On August
27, 1919, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract similar to contracts entered into by
the defendant and other planters. It is this contract which is the basis of plaintiff's cause of action.
Among the clauses in the contract are the following:

COVENANTS OF 'LA CENTRAL'

x x x           x x x          x x x

Third: That it shall build and after building it shall do or cause to be done all that is necessary
for its preservation in good condition, and shall, during the period of this agreement, without
charge to the Procedure or Procedures, operate a permanent railroad run by steam or motor,
or both, for the use of the plantation or plantations in the transportation of sugar cane, sugar,
fertilizer, and all such articles as the procedure may need for his estate, his use and that of
his family and employees, and shall cause the main line or a branch thereof, as the case
may be, to reach the point of the plantation to be hereafter described not farther than one
mile from ay of the boundaries of said plantation, whenever the contour of the land, the
curves, and elevations permit the same; it shall provide said railroad with locomotives or
motors and wagons in a number sufficient to make the transportation of sugar cane, sugar,
fertilizer, and the above mentioned articles, and shall likewise build a branch of said railroad
 in such a way that from the main line, mill and warehouses, it shall reach the wharf above
mentioned, and it shall also cause the yard of the factory near the sugar mill to be available
for use with switches or otherwise. All the steam locomotives shall be provided with safety
spark devices. The railroad shall consist of a road or path conveniently and duly designated
so that, so far as possible, all the producers may derive equal benefit from said railroad. The
right-of way for the main line of the railroad shall be three and a half (3-½) meters wide
measured from the center of the road to each side, and the branches, switches, or curves
shall have more if necessary.

OBLIGATIONS OF THE PRODUCER

x x x           x x x          x x x

Fifth: That he shall accept the provisions of clauses 7, 8, and 9 of the covenants of "La
Central" and shall deliver the cane as therein provided; hereby binding himself to plant each
year according to the usage and custom of a good agriculturist not less than one-half of his
own lands devoted to sugar cane subject to the approval of the Committee of Producers
leaving the remainder uncultivated. 1awphi1.net

MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS

x x x           x x x          x x x

10. In case of . . . inability to secure, under reasonable conditions such rights-of-way as "La
Central" may require, . . . "La Central" shall notify the Committee of Producers and without
incurring any liability for the non-fulfillment of the terms of this contract, its effects shall be
suspended in part or in whole during such period of incapacity. . . . (Emphasis inserted.)

With particular reference to the third paragraph of the clauses obligating the central, it is admitted
that the central has not continued its railroad through to the Hacienda Dos Hermanos. The railroad
comes to the HaciendaEsmeralda No. 2 and there stops. For the railroad to extend to
the Hacienda Dos Hermanos, a distance of four kilometers would require a gradual elevation of 4.84
per cent to 7 per cent, would make necessary the providing of twenty-six curves, and would cost
about P80,000. The witness H. W. Corp, a civil engeneer employed in the construction work of the
Manila Railroad Company, the Pampanga Sugar Milling Co., and the Binalbagan Central, testified
that it was possible to construct a railroad to the Hacienda Dos Hermanos but that to do so would be
very dangerous.

Recalling that the contract provided for the construction of a railroad "whenever the contour of the
land, the curves, and elevations permit the same," and that such construction is possible but very
dangerous, the question then arises if the defendant can excuse itself on this ground, or if the
plaintiff can recover from the defendant for damages for breach of contract, through inability to mill
cane.

It is elemental that the law requires parties to do what they have agreed to do. If a party charges
himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must abide by it unless performance is
rendered impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. A showing of mere
inconvenience, unexpected impediments, or increased expenses is not enough. Equity cannot
relieve from bad bargains simply because they are such. So one must answer in damages where the
impossibility is only so in fact. (Thornborow vs. Whitacre, 2 Ld. Raym. [1164], 92 E. R., 270; Reid vs.
Alaska Packing Co. [1903], 43 Or., 429; Columbus Ry. & Power Co. vs. Columbus [1919], 249 U. S.,
399.)
The foregoing are familiar principles to be found in the American and English law of contracts. The
civil law on the subject of obligations is not essentially different. Article 1272 of the Civil Code
provides: "Impossible things of services cannot be the subject-matter of contracts." And article 1184
of the same Code provides: "The debtor shall also be relieved from obligations which consist in the
performance of a act if fulfillment of the undertaking becomes legally or physically impossible."

May one obligate himself to do something which, when accomplished, will prove to be dangerous to
life and property? We doubt it. Take the contract in question as an example. It was a general
contract of the form used by the central and various proprietors of sugar-cane fields. It was intended
to be limited in particular application to haciendas where not impeded by physical impossibility. The
contract was qualified by an implied conditi on which, if given practical effect, results in absolving the
central from its promise. Not to sanction an exception to the general rule would run counter to public
policy and the law by forcing the performance of a contract undesirable and harmful. (8
Manresa's Codigo Civil Espanol, p. 355.)

There is another aspect to the case which has to do with the tenth paragraph of the mutual
obligations of the contract and which concerned the securing of the right- of-way for the proposed
railroad. To get from the HaciendaEsmeralda No. 2 to the Hacienda Dos Hermanos, the railroad
would have to pass through the haciendas of Esteban de la Rama. But he would not grant
permission to use his land for this purpose in 1920, and only consented to do so in 1924. Here then
was a clear case of such a condition of affairs as was contemplated by the contract.

The foregoing points being admitted, it logically follows that the defendant can recover on its cross-
complaint. The defense to the cross-complaint is identical with the theory of the complaint. For the
same reasons that the plaintiff cannot recover must be make good for his debt to the defendant.

Accepting, therefore, the facts as found by the trial judge, and nothing no reversible error on any
legal question, the judgment appealed from must be as it is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16797             February 27, 1963

RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, 

vs.
SOCORRO A. RAMOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Gelasio L. Dimaano for plaintiffs-appellees.

Vicente K. Aranda for defendants-appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal on points of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case
No. Q-4232.

The record is to the effect that on 24 November 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano
Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Dizon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date,
eleven (11) parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their
corresponding certificates of title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid
P5,000.00 down, P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the Philippine
National Bank, and agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within ninety (90) days. To secure
the said balance, the vendee Socorro A. Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven
parcels in favor of the vendors. By way of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact
of her children, Enrique, Antonio, Milagros, and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor child
Angelita Ramos, executed another mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate.

Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, this
action for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29
April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had
filed action against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24 February 1959 for the recovery
of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at
the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable; that
plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a defense that could be pleaded in
abatement of the second suit. Upon opposition by the plaintiffs, the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City denied the motion to dismiss; but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special
defense in her answer. After trial, on 16 December 1959, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
rendered judgment against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% interest
from 24 February 1959 until payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of
the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-
payment within ninety (90) days.

Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court, and here insists that the action should be dismissed
on account of the alleged splitting of appellee's cause of action, and that the obligation not having
fixed a period, although one was intended, the court below should have set first a date of maturity
before ordering payment or foreclosure.
We find no merit in the appeal.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 
1äwphï1.ñët

An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila
shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for
P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action was for
non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00
was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was constituted
on lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts.
The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

On the second assignment of error: the stipulation in the mortgage contract that the obligation for
P96,000.00 was to be —

without interest, payable within ninety (90) days from this date, provided that in case of
default it shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum,

clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve per cent in case of default being nothing more
than a penalty, designed to induce the debtor to pay on or before the expiration of the ninety (90)
days. Hence, there was no call upon the court to set another due date.

Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39815             April 28, 1934

EULALIO BELISARIO, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
PAZ NATIVIDAD VIUDA DE ZULUETA, defendant-appellee.

Jose V. Claravall for appellant.

Jose C. Zulueta for appellee.

BUTTE, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in an action for the
recovery of two tracts of land situated in the barrio of San Francisco, municipality of Lupao, in said
province, and described in certificates of transfer Nos. 3357 and 3358 issued by the register of
deeds of the Povince of Pangasinan (in which the lands were formerly situated) in favor of the
defendant.

It appears from Exhibit A that the plaintiff sold the said lands absolutely and without reservation to
the defendant for the consideration of P37,000, which was duly paid, and the agreement on the part
of the grantee to assume an indebtedness secured by a lien for 4, 500, which was likewise duly paid.
The deed recites that the sale is absolute and in perpetuity and the grantor warrants to defend the
title. The deed bears the date of April 29, 1927.

On the same date the defendant executed and delivered in favor of the plaintiff Exhibit B which, after
reciting that the defendant is the plaintiff an option to repurchase the lands on or before the end of
May, 1931, for the sum of P37,000.

These two instruments are very clear in their terms, were duly signed by both parties in the presence
of two witnesses and acknowledge before a notary public and recorded. we see no reason whatever
for varying the terms thereof.

On the 28th of May, 1931, the plaintiff appeared at the house of the defendant and offered to
exercise his option of repurchase under said Exhibit B by tendering to the defendant a check in the
sum of P37,000, drawn by Rosendo Santiago against his account in the Peoples Bank and Trust
Company. the books of the disclosed that at the time said check was tendered to the defendant the
drawer thereof had on deposit in the said bank subject to check the sum of P5.85. Even if the check
had been good, the defendant was not legally bound to accept it because such a check does not
satisfy the requirements of a legal tender.

Finding no merit in this appeal, the judgment of the court below is affirmed with costs against the
appellant.

Abad Santos, Imperial, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9806            January 19, 1916

LEONIDES LOPEZ LISO, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
MANUEL TAMBUNTING, defendant-appellant.

Silvestre Apacible for appellant.

Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco for appellee.

ARAULLO, J.:

These proceedings were brought to recover from the defendant the sum of P2,000, amount of the
fees, which, according to the complaint, are owing for professional medical services rendered by the
plaintiff to a daughter of the defendant from March 10 to July 15, 1913, which fees the defendant
refused to pay, notwithstanding the demands therefor made upon him by the plaintiff.

The defendant denied the allegations of the complaint, and furthermore alleged that the obligation
which the plaintiff endeavored to compel him to fulfill was already extinguished.

The Court of First Instance of Manila, after hearing the evidence introduce by both parties, rendered
judgment on December 17, 1913, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P700,
without express finding as to costs. The defendant, after entering a motion for a new trial, which was
denied, appealed from said judgment and forwarded to this court the proper bill of exceptions.

The first question raised by this appeal relates to the amount or value of the fees which the
defendant was ordered to pay.

In the judgment appealed from, the medical services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant's
daughter are given in detail, in accordance with the statement Exhibit A, presented by the plaintiff.
The latter claimed the sum of P2,000 as the reasonable value of his services. The court after
discussing the matter of the service rendered and after taking into account that the plaintiff, as soon
as he had finished rendering them, asked for compensation in the sum of P700 only, and
furthermore, holding that it was in no wise proven that, because said amount was not paid the
plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant, by means of these proceedings, the sum of
P2,000, held that the reasonable value of said services could only be worth said P700. We agree
with this finding of the trial court.

The second question raised by this appeal involves the question of whether the defendant has really
paid the plaintiff, as he claims to have done, the sum of P700 before mentioned, that is, whether the
obligation alleged in the complaint has already been extinguished.

The receipt signed by the plaintiff, for P700, the amount of his fees he endeavored to collect from the
defendant after he had finished rendering the services in question (which receipt was presented by
the defendant at the trial as Exhibit 1) was in the latter's possession, and this fact was alleged by him
as proof that he had already paid said fees to the plaintiff.
With respect to this point, and as the trial court very correctly said in the judgment appealed from,
the testimony given by both the plaintiff and the defendant, as well as by their respective witnesses,
is entirely contradictory.

The court, after hearing the testimony, reached the conclusion that, notwithstanding that the
defendant was in possession of the receipt, the said P700 had not been paid to the plaintiff.

After a careful examination of the evidence we find no reasons whatever for changing or modifying
this finding of the court below. The trial judge had the plaintiff and the defendant and their witnesses
before him, he heard them make their respective statement and was in a position to know which of
them was telling the truth and to determine on which side the preponderance of the evidence lay.

It is true that number 8 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as a legal presumption
"that an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid." Article 1188 of the Civil Code also
provides that the voluntarily surrender by a creditor to his debtor of a private instrument proving a
credit, implies the renunciation of the right of action against the debtor; and article 1189 prescribes
that whenever the private instrument which evidences the debt is in the possession of the debtor, it
will be presumed that the creditor delivered it of his own free will, unless the contrary is proven.

But the legal presumption established by the foregoing provisions of law cannot stand if sufficient
proof is adduced against it. In the case at bar the trial court correctly held that there was sufficient
evidence to the contrary, in view of the preponderance thereof in favor of the plaintiff and of the
circumstances connected with the defendant's possession of said receipt Exhibit 1. Furthermore, in
order that such a presumption may be taken into account, it is necessary, as stated in the laws cited,
that the evidence of the obligation be delivered up to the debtor and that the delivery of the
instrument proving the credit be made voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor. In the present case, it
cannot be said that these circumstances concurred, inasmuch as when the plaintiff sent the receipt
to the defendant for the purpose of collecting his fee, it was not his intention that that document
should remain in the possession of the defendant if the latter did not forthwith pay the amount
specified therein.

By reason of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment appealed from, with costs of this instance against
the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8107             April 29, 1955

VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, 

vs.
HON. BERNABE DE AQUINO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TARLAC, ET
AL.,respondents.

Jose Perez Cardenas for petitioner.

Lorenzo Sumulong and Antonio C. Maraquel for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is a proceeding by way of certiorari against an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
Honorable Bernabe de Aquino presiding. In civil case No. 397 of said court, entitled Ysidra
Cojuanco, et al. vs. Manuel Ernesto Gonzales, filed in said court in May, 1949, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs P6,000 a year from March 1, 1941 as rentals of a
parcel of land leased by plaintiffs to the defendant. This judgment was affirmed by us on September
15, 1953. On September 12, 1949, while the case was pending trial, plaintiffs prayed for the
appointment of a receiver for the property leased, filing a bond therefor. But as the defendant filed a
counterbond, defendant was allowed to retain the land leased. The terms of the bond by the
defendant are as follows:

NOW THEREFORE, WE MANUEL ERNESTO GONZALES as Principal and the VISAYAN

SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION as Surety, hereby bind ourselves jointly and
severally to the plaintiffs, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns in an amount not
exceeding thirty six thousand (P36,000.00) pesos, Philippine currency, conditioned that the
defendant will pay all damages which the said plaintiffs may suffer by reason of the non-
appointment or the discharge of the receiver in the above-entitled case.

As stated above, by reason of the above counterbond filed by him, defendant continued in
possession of the property. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, where the judgment of
the Court of First Instance already referred to was affirmed. Upon the return of the records of the
case to the Court of First Instance, plaintiffs filed a motion dated December 23, 1953, alleging that
by reason of the filing of the counterbond by the Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation, the
plaintiffs were deprived of the harvest of the land leased, and praying that execution issue against
the said Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation for the amount of its bond. The motion was
amended on February 15, 1954 so as to pray for opportunity to prove the damages that had been
caused plaintiffs by the nonappointment of the receiver. The Visayan Surety and Insurance
Corporation filed an opposition to the amended motion, but this we overruled and the motion granted
in an order dated August 4, 1954, which reads as follows:

Acting on the amended motion dated February 16, 1954, filed by the representation of
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 397, the Court finds said amended motion well taken.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, let this amended motion be set for August 16, 1954 at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning, for the reception of evidence on damages suffered by plaintiffs by reason of
non-appointment of receiver in Civil Case No. 397. Upon the reception of the evidence the
Court will determine the damages suffered, for the payment of which execution will issue
against the Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation of Manila.

So ordered.

It is against the above order of the Court of First Instance that the petition for certiorari has been
filed, petitioner alleging that the damages sought to be claimed are not included in the judgment,
which had become final and that the order is in excess of the court's jurisdiction, as it amounts to an
order for the reopening of the case for the purpose of amending the decision which has already
become final and executory, and adding thereto a liability of the petitioner which was not adjudged in
the original decision. The principal defenses interposed by the respondents are that the petitioner
herein had notice that respondents are claiming damages for the retention of the leased premises by
the defendant Manuel Ernesto Gonzales; that the proceeding adopted by the Judge in its order is a
summary hearing authorized by the provisions of Section 17 of Rule 59 to enforce the liability on the
counterbond that the notice to the surety and proof of damages required in Section 20 of Rule 59
was complied with at the trial of the case because counsel for petitioner herein was counsel for the
defendant in the case; and that the proceeding complained of was within the power of the court as it
was merely executing its judgment, the said order being merely to carry out the execution of the
judgment, which execution falls within his authority from the time the judgment becomes final until
the expiration of five years from the entry of judgment.

The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 9, Rule 61, which provides:

Sec. 9. Judgment to include recovery against sureties. — The amount, if any, to be awarded
to either party upon any bond filed by the other in accordance with the provisions of this rule,
shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted under the same procedure as prescribed in
section 20 of Rule 59.

In accordance therewith, and following the procedure outlined in Section 20 of Rule 59, respondents
in this case should have filed a claim in a supplemental complaint in the court of first instance for the
rentals of the land due up to the time of the judgment up to November 4, 1950) in said court, and an
application in this Court for the rentals due from the date of the judgment appealed from (November
4, 1950) to the date of our judgment (September 15, 1953) for the rentals up to the latter date. The
supplemental complaint in the court of first instance and the application in this Court should have
been made before the judgment in either court was rendered or had become final, so that the
damages awarded could have been included therein. The philosophy of this requirement has been
carefully pointed out in the case of Santos vs. Moir, 36 Phil., 350, thus:

The purpose of these provision is not difficult to ascertain. It does away with the necessity of
calling the same witnesses in a second action to give the same testimony they have in the
first; the presentation of the same evidence a second time; and the litigation of the same
questions which had been litigated before. It is clear that when the cause is finally
adjudicated and the injunction continued or dissolved the right to the injunction is definitely
and finally determined; and with it the right to damages. The liability of the sureties is also
determined in large part by such adjudication. Thereafter, the evidence as to their liability, if
any, is largely formal. This being so, why not settle the whole matter at the time the cause is
decided on the merits?
 It not only saves an extra action in the trial court but it avoids an extra appeal. If there are
two separate actions there may be two appeals; one from the judgment on the merits, the
other from the judgment for damages for wrongful issuance of the injunction. Why have two
appeals when there need be one only?

The provision has been consistently followed in a long line of decisions (Monteverde vs. Nakata, 30
Phil., 608; Yap Unki vs. Chua Jamco, 14 Phil., 602; Nava vs. Hofileña, 53 Phil., 738, etc.), and there
is no reason for deviating from the express language of the provision and the consistent rulings of
the Court.

But it is contended by respondents that the order is in consonance with Section 17 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court. This section is applicable to attachment bonds only and has not been made
applicable in cases of receivership.

It is also contended that the order complained of has been issued under the authority of the court to
execute its judgments. As the judgment is against the defendant personally, not against the surety
on his counterbond, the execution to be issued must be against the property of the defendant only
(Sec. 8, Rule 39, Rules of Court). and it can not issue against the counterbond because there is no
judgment against the petitioner thereon. As a matter of fact, the order complained of was issued to
secure a judgment against the surety on the counterbond of defendant, which shows the absence of
a judgment against the surety to be executed. A judgment against a defendant can not per se be
enforced by execution against the surety on his counterbond; a judgment against the surety must
first be secured, before his counterbond may be proceeded against.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted, the order complaint of is revoked and the preliminary
injunction we have granted made absolute. With costs against respondents.

Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.,concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4872             February 16, 1953

EUGENIO BRAVO, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
CIRIANO BARRERAS, defendant-appellee.

Pandes, Llorin and Priela for appellant.

Esequiel S. Grageda for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in order to enable
him to repurchase from the defendant a parcel of land for the sum of P200. Plaintiff claims that on
June 8, 1946, he sold to defendant a parcel of land for P200 with the right to repurchase it within five
years from the date of sale; that on two occasions, namely September 14 and 15, 1950, he
attempted to exercise his right of repurchase by tendering to the defendant the payment of the sum
of P200 as agreed upon, but said defendant refused to accept the payment without any valid reason;
and that in view of said refusal plaintiff deposited said sum of P200 with the court, and filed the
present action as required by the Civil Code.

In his answer, the defendant admit having bought from the plaintiff a parcel of land giving to the latter
the right to repurchase it, but defendant avers, "the trouble between the parties is the fact that the
plaintiff wants to get from the defendant a parcel of land distinct from what the said plaintiff delivered
to the defendant after the execution of thepacto de retro contract."

After holding a pre-trial at which both parties were heard, the court rendered an order of the following
tenor:

At today's pre-trial the parties have agreed that the land sought to be repurchased is also the
subject-matter of another litigation between the same parties in case which is now before the
Court of Appeals on appeal. The herein defendant does not deny the right of the plaintiff to
repurchase the property but maintain that it is now impossible to execute the deed of
repurchase because the identity of the property is still undecided and will not be decided until
after the Court of Appeals has finally disposed of the case before it.

Inasmuch as it will take about two more years before said appeal could be decided and the
plaintiff, on the other hand, has already made a consignation of the purchase price with the
clerk of court which amply protects his right to repurchase the property, the court hereby
order the dismissal of this case without cost and without prejudice.

So ordered. Naga City, Philippines, February 22, 1951.

 JOSE T. SURTIDA
Judge

Plaintiff now appeals from this order contending among other ground, that the lower court erred in
dismissing the complaint upon the single expedient that the identity of the land sought to be
repurchased is pending determination in another case between the same parties which is now
pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, the court having dismissed the case without prejudice
considering that it may take two more years before the appeal could be decided and the fact that the
plaintiff has already made a consignation of the purchase price with the clerk of court.

We find merit in this contention. The ground on which the court on its own accord dismissed this
case after hearing the parties on a pre-trial has no legal basis nor justification. Such action is only
contrary to the Rules of Court. But it impairs a right which the law grants to the plaintiff in connection
with his right to repurchase the property in litigation. Under section 3, Rule 30, of the Rule, an action
can only be dismissed upon motion of a defendant or upon the initiative of the court, (1) when
plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial, (2) when plaintiff fails to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, and (3) when he fails to comply with any rule or order of the court. In
other cases, the case can only be dismissed upon petition of the plaintiff (section 1, Rule 30). The
grounds given by the court in its order of dismissal is not one of those recognized by the Rules of
Court.

Another reason why the dismissal of this case cannot be ordered at this stage lies in the very nature
and purpose behind the presentation of the present action which is to give effect and validity to the
consignation made by the plaintiff under the Civil Code (article 117, old, and article 1258, new Civil
Code). Said articles postulate that the consignation shall be made by depositing the money at the
disposal of the court "in a proper case," and this consignation shall be ineffectual if the case wherein
the deposit was made is to be dismissed.

The most that the court should have done is to order the suspension of the trial pending final
determination of the case which is now pending before the Court of Appeals, even if it may take
several years, for with the preservation of the case the right of the plaintiff to the deposit in so far as
its legal effect is concerned will not be impaired nor affected by the lapse of time. If the case is
dismissed, the consignation will be rendered ineffectual.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside, this case is ordered remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings with costs against the appellee.

Paras, C.J. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 141393             April 19, 2006

CATHERINE A. YEE, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ESTRELLITA P. BERNABE, ACTING PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF
BENGUET, Respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the
order 1 dated December 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, of La Trinidad,
Benguet as well as its subsequent order dated December 28, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Catherine Yee in Criminal Case No. 99-CR-3603 entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Catherine Yee."

The facts are undisputed.

On October 20, 1999, an information 2 for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 was filed with the RTC
in La Trinidad, Benguet against petitioner, stating as follows:

The undersigned accuses CATHERINE A. YEE for VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6539,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 25th day of March, 1998, in the Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away an
Isuzu Elf chiller van with Plate No. USA 359 belonging to PRICINIA ESGUERRA, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner thereof.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Because the offense charged is classified as a heinous crime, the information was automatically
assigned to RTC, Branch 62 which is specifically designated to hear and decide heinous offenses
and crimes within the region.

On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reduction of bail bond and voluntary surrender with
the RTC. The trial court granted the motion on the same day and required petitioner to deposit cash
in the amount of P100,000 for her provisional liberty. Thereafter, on November 10, 1999, petitioner
filed a motion to conduct preliminary reinvestigation 3 which was treated by the trial court as a motion
for preliminary investigation. Petitioner claimed that she was never informed or notified of the
preliminary investigation and submitted, in support thereof, a certification to the effect that the
subpoena for the proceedings had not been served upon her. Despite admitting the fact that there
was lack of notice upon petitioner, the motion was denied by the RTC in the challenged order dated
December 10, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Acting on the ‘motion to conduct preliminary re-investigation’ which is truly a motion for preliminary
investigation, the Court hereby denies the same.

Set the arraignment of the accused on 16 December 1999 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. Issue
subpoena to the accused to be served through Counsel.

SO ORDERED. 4

The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration 5 in the Order dated
December 28, 1999.

Aggrieved, petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court, arguing principally that the denial of her
motion for preliminary reinvestigation was improper because (1) Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which requires that a motion for preliminary investigation be filed within five (5) days from the
time the accused learns of the filing of the information is not applicable to her case; and, (2)
petitioner’s acts of filing a motion to reduce bail, voluntarily surrendering herself, and posting bail
before her arraignment do not constitute a waiver of her right to preliminary investigation. 6

Thereafter, respondent Estrellita P. Bernabe, the Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet, submitted
her comment 7and contended that petitioner had not been deprived of her right to a preliminary
investigation as one had, in fact, been conducted. In any event, respondent Bernabe averred that
petitioner’s failure to seasonably claim her right to demand a preliminary investigation when she
moved for the reduction of her bail bond and when she subsequently posted bail evinced her intent
to waive such right. Respondent Bernabe likewise pointed out that the petition is fatally flawed
because it did not comply with Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there being no allegation
that the orders of the trial court were tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

In a separate comment, 8 the Hon. Fernando P. Cabato, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 62, of
La Trinidad, Benguet, put in issue the propriety of the remedy taken by petitioner, asserting that the
challenged orders are not the final orders that can be subject of an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. Similarly, Judge Cabato also maintained that the denial of petitioner’s
motion was justified considering that petitioner had already posted bail to secure her provisional
release.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment 9 dated July 23, 2000,
contended that the trial court did not commit any reversible error in denying petitioner’s motion for
preliminary reinvestigation, considering that such denial was authorized by the last paragraph of
Section 7, Rule 112 10 of the Rules of Court. The OSG was likewise of the view that petitioner’s act of
posting bail constituted a waiver of her right to question any irregularity in, or even the absence of, a
preliminary investigation relative to the filing of an information against her.

The threshold issue in this case involves a determination of the propriety of the mode adopted by
petitioner to seek relief against the orders of the RTC. On this score, it must be kept in mind that an
aggrieved party is permitted to apply for relief by way of two distinctly different modes, that is, either
through an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, or through a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65.
The remedy taken by petitioner, that is, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, brings up for review
errors committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing more than errors
of judgment. 11 Specifically, this mode of appeal involves the review of judgments, awards or final
orders on the merits where only questions of law are raised. 12 It must be stressed, however, that
only judgments or final orders that completely dispose of the case or a particular matter can be the
subject of such review. 13 Hence, appeal is not allowed against interlocutory orders which are merely
provisional and decide some point or matter but are not a final decision of the whole
controversy.14 The rationale for this rule was stated in Rudecon Management Corporation v.
Singson, 15 which quoted Sitchon v. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 16 to wit:

The reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and not from
interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must
necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the
appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case should necessarily be
delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses; for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be
raised by him and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.

It is noteworthy that the assailed orders denying petitioner’s motion for preliminary reinvestigation
are merely interlocutory and may be questioned not at this stage of the proceedings but rather as
part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Stated
otherwise, the orders do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it
and there has been no adjudication on the merits nor any definitive pronouncement as to the guilt or
innocence of petitioner with respect to the crime with which she is charged.

Granting, for the sake of argument, that the prosecutor would maintain the finding of probable cause
against petitioner after the reinvestigation of the case, and, thereafter, the RTC would sustain the
finding of probable cause against petitioner and issue a warrant for her arrest, the trial court would
subsequently have to proceed to trial, receive the evidence of the parties and render judgment on
the basis thereof. Petitioner would then have the following options: (a) to proceed to trial, and, if
convicted, file a petition for review under Rule 45; or (b) to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
to nullify the resolutions of the RTC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said resolutions and decision. 17

Neither can the petition be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. As pointed out by respondent Fiscal, the petition does not allege grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is the ground for a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in
grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 18 In this connection, it is only upon
showing that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that
an interlocutory order such as that involved in this case may be impugned. Be that as it may, it must
be emphasized that this practice is applied only under certain exceptional circumstances to prevent
unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and so as not to unduly burden the courts. 19  1avvphil.net

Furthermore, such a petition should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not with this Court,
following the rule on the hierarchy of courts. As a matter of policy, direct resort to this Court will not
be entertained unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest and those of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 20

In Ouano v. PGTT Int’l. Corp., 21 the policy was restated in this wise:

We need to reiterate, for the guidance of petitioner, that this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA), as in the present case, and with the RTCs in proper
cases within their respective regions. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a
party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of
his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. The hierarchy of courts
determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of such
extraordinary writs against the first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the RTC, and those
against the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is the established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon this Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of its docket. x x x

In sum, the petition does not raise any special and important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance that would justify direct recourse to this Court. Consequently, the failure of petitioner to
strictly adhere to the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal
of the present petition. 22

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 80645 August 3, 1993

MARCELINO GALANG, GUADALUPE GALANG, petitioners, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. BUENAVENTURA, ANGELES BUENAVENTURA, CORAZON
BUENAVENTURA, and MA. LUISA BUENAVENTURA, respondents.

Mariano V. Ampl, Jr. for petitioners.

Ramon R. Buenaventura for private-respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision  of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the
1

judgment rendered by the then Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. R-82-7186 (107585). The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the same
is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO without any pronouncement as to costs at this
instance. 2

From the records, we find the following facts.

On July 16, 1976, Ramon Buenaventura on his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of Angeles,
Corazon, Amparo, and Maria Luisa, all surnamed Buenaventura, sold to Guadalupe Galang and
Marcelino Galang two (2) parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City. The agreement was embodied in
a Deed of Sale which stated the following:

I, RAMON R. BUENAVENTURA, Filipino, of legal age, married, and residing at 2111

M. Adriatico, Malate, Manila, in his own behalf and as attorney in fact of Angeles,
Corazon, Amparo and Maria Luisa, all surnamed Buenaventura as per the special
powers of attorney already registered and annotated at the back of the certificate of
title, for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Ninety Two Thousand
 Seven Hundred Ninety Five (P192,795.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, hereby
SELL, TRANSFER AND CONVEY UNTO MARCELINO GALANG and GUADALUPE
GALANG, Filipino, of legal age, spouses and residents of 72 4th St., New Manila,
Quezon City those parcels of land situated at Tagaytay City, inherited by us from our
parents and our exclusive paraphernal property, of which we are the absolute
owners, our title thereto being evidenced by TCT No. T-3603 of Tagaytay City
Register of Deeds, more particularly desccribed as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Under the following terms:

(a) 25% of the purchase price upon signing of this instrument;

(b) 25% within three months, or upon removal of the "encargado" from the premises,
with the delivery of the owner's duplicate certificate of title;

(c) 50% balance within one (1) year from date hereof upon which the title will be
transferred to the buyers but 12% interest per annum will be charged after said one
year in the event full payment is not made. 3

Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang, herein petitioners ppaid to the sellers the first 25% of the
purchase ppprice as stated in the deed. Thereafter, they allegedly demanded from private
respondents failed to do so despite the willingness of petitioners to pay the second 25% of the
purchase price. Consequently, Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang filed on March 18, 1977 a
complaint for specific performance with damages where they alleged among others, that:

5. The period fixed within the defendants should remove the "encargado' from the
premises and to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title had lapsed without
the defendants complying with their obligations thus preventing the plaintiffs from
taking ppossession of the property sold and from developing and improving the
same.

6. On several occasions, the plaintiffs demanded from the defendants, both orally
and in writing, the removal of the latter's "encargado" from the premises sold and for
them to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title to the plaintiffs but said
defendants failed and refused and still fail and refuse to do so, the demands
notwithstanding. 4

Defendants, herein private respondents, denied the allegations and stated that the contract did not
state the true intention of the parties and that it was not their fault that the "encargado" refused to
leave. Furthermore, they filed on July 21, 1978, a third-party complaint against the "encargado" for
subrogation and reimbursement in case of an adverse judgment against third-party plaintiff. Upon
the "encargado's" motion, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that it did not state a cause of
action for the ejectment of the tenant — the "encargado."

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which is hereby quoted, to
wit:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby orders the defendants to pay jointly
and severally, the plaintiffs P50,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from July 16,
 1976; P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages; and P3,000.00 as attorney fees and
the costs.5

In rendering the decision, the trial court reasoned that:

There is no question that, because the defendants had not complied with their
obligation to remove the "encargado," the plaintiffs, as injured parties, may choose
between the fulfillment of the contract of sale and its rescission, in accordance and
(sic) Article 1191 of the Civil Code. They chose enforcement of the contract which,
however is legally impossible. The lands sold to the plaintiff are agricultural, planted
to coffee, among other plants, not only by the "encargado" but also by his deceased
parents. The law prohibits, under pain of damages, fine and imprisonment, and
landlord from dispossessing his agricultural tenant without the court's approval and
on grounds fixed by the law, not one of which is shown to exist in respect defendants'
"encargado." (Section 31 and 36, The Agricultural Land Reform Code, RA 3844 as
amended).

Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public policy and those
prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. (Article 1183,
Civil Code). Since the consummation of the sale between the parties is dependent
upon the ouster of an agricultural lessee, which cannot be done because it is against
good custom, public policy and the law, the sale is a nullity. . . .
6

Agreeing that the "encargado" was an agricultural tenant who could not be ejected without cause,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Hence, this petition.

In their petition, Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang argued that respondent Court erred in ordering;
the rescission instead of specific performance of the contract of sale on the ground that the
ejectment of the "encargado" -tenant was a legally impossible condition that prevented the fulfillment
of the contract. Contrary to the reason advanced by the Court of Appeals and the trial court,
petitioners averred that the removal of the "encargado" was not a condition precedent to the
fulfillment of the contract as paragraph two (2) thereof provides for an alternative period within which
petitioners would have to pay the second 25% of the purchase price and concomitantly, private
respondents would deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title. Thus, whether or not the
"encargado" was removed, the amount would still be due and private respondents would still have to
deliver the duplicate title.

We are now confronted with the question: Was the removal of the "encargado" a condition precedent
to the fulfillment of the contract of sale such that finding that it was a legally impossible condition
would entitle the buyers to the rescission of the contract?

We answer in the negative.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals based their decision on Art. 1183 of the Civil Code which
provides, thus:

Art. 1183. Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public policy and
those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. . . .
Both courts declared the "encargado" a tenant. This being the case, it follows that he may not be
removed from the subject land without just cause, as provided by Presidential Decree No. 1038.
Since the Galangs, then plaintiffs demanded the removal of the "encargado" which, being legally
impossible, could not be met, the contract of sale was rescinded by the courts.

We disagree with the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court. Reviewing the terms of the
Deed of Sale quoted earlier, it is clear that the parties had reached the stage of perfection of the
contract of sale, there being already "a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price,"  and on the basis of which both parties had the personal right to
7

reciprocally demand from the other the fulfillment of their respective obligations. But contracts of sale
may either be absolute or conditional.  One form of conditional sales, is what is now popularly
8

termed as a "Contract to Sell," where ownership or title is retained until the fulfillment of a positive
condition, normally the payment of the purchase price in the manner agreed upon. The breach of
that condition can prevent the obligation to convey title from acquiring a binding force.  Where the
9

condition is imposed, instead, upon the perfection of the contract, the failure of such condition would
prevent such perfection.   What we have here is a contract to sell for it is the transfer of ownership,
10

not the perfection of the contract that was subjected to a condition. Ownership was not to vest in the
buyers until full payment of the purchase price and the transfer of the title to the buyers. Apart from
full payment of the purchase price, we find no other condition which would affect the obligations of
the parties, i.e., to pay, on the part of the buyer and to convey ownership, on the part of the seller.

The alleged condition precedent, the removal of the "encargado," was simply an alternative period
for payment of the second 25% of the purchase price given by the seller to the buyer. Assuming that
the removal of the "encargado" could not be brought about, the buyers, petitioners herein, could
have nonetheless demanded the delivery of the owner's duplicate certificate of title by paying the
second 25% of the sale price within three months. In this case, the filing of the complaint for specific
performance of the seller's obligation was the root of the errors committed first, by the trial court and
later, by the Court of Appeals. Both courts overlooked the obvious fact that only the time for paying
the second 25% of the purchase price was qualified and that the entire paragraph reads: "25% within
three months or upon removal of the "encargado" from the premises . . ." and not simply 25% upon
removal of the "encargado."

The case before us could have been resolved by the lower courts without ruling on whether the
"encargado" was a tenant or not. Granting that it was necessary to rule on the legal status of the
"encargado," we find that the courts had been quite precipitate in holding that the "encargado" was a
tenant. There was no sufficient evidence to support that conclusion apart from the affidavits of the
"encargado" and his neighbor. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals regarding this matter rested
on surmises. It held:

We discern no reversible error in the finding and conclusion of the trial court that the
unnamed "encargado" on the lands in question is actually a tenant or agricultural
lessee. The bases of this ineluctable conclusion are not hard to see. As succinctly
pointed out by the court a quo, the "encargado" is staying in his own existing house
thereon, and subject agricultural land is planted to coffee and other plants not only by
the "encargado" but also his deceased parents. Indeed, if the "encargado's" parents
were not tenants or agricultural lessees, the present "encargado" could not have
continued occupying and working thereon, without facing ejectment proceedings;
considering that one of the landowners, defendants-appellees here, is a lawyer
himself. In fact, as can be gleaned from the decision under scrutiny, defendants-
appellees filed a third-party complaint against the "encargado" but they did not
pursue such a course of action because they did not have a clearance from the then
Ministry, now the Department of Agrarian Reform, to proceed against such
 "encargado." Then, too, if the said "encargado" did not have the status of a tenant or
agricultural lessee entitled to protection under the agrarian reform laws, he would not
have been given the attention and importance as to be brought before the court a
quo twice, just for a possible amicable settlement, and he would not have had the
firmness to reject an offer for him to continue working half the area under
controversy.

Equally supportive of the foregoing opinion are the following ratiocinations in Cruz v.
Court of Appeals, L-50350, May 15, 1984, 129 SCRA 222:

. . . it is also undisputed that respondent lives on a hut erected on the landholding.

This fully supports the appellate court's conclusion, since only tenants are entitled to
a homelot where he can build his house thereon as an incident to this right as a
tenant.

xxx xxx xxx

Also, the Court is aware of the practice of landowners, by way of evading the
provisions of tenancy laws, to have their tenants sign contracts or agreements
intended to camouflage the real import of their relationship.

All things duly considered, let alone the better rule that all doubts vis-a-vis the status
of a tiller of the soil should be resolved in favor of tenancy relationship. We cannot
help but conclude here that the "encargado" on the landholding deeded out in the
deed of sale (Exhibit "A") is a tenant or agricultural lessees within the purview and
under the mantle of protection of the Code of Agrarian Reforms.  11

To summarize, we hold that there was no basis for rescinding the contract because the removal of
the "encargado" was not a condition precedent to the contract of sale. Rather, it was one of the
alternative periods for the payment of the second installment given by the seller himself to the
buyers. Secondly, even granting that it was indeed a condition precedent rendering necessary the
determination of the legal status of the "encargado," the lower courts were rash in holding that the
"encargado" was a tenant of the land in question.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, we are convinced that specific performance by the parties of
their respective obligations is proper. Accordingly, petitioners Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang are
ordered to pay private respondents the second 25% of the purchase price. Considering, however,
the time that has lapsed since the parties entered into the contract, payment of the full balance, that
is, 75% of the purchase price, P192,795.00 is in order. However, the 12% interest per annum that
was stipulated in paragraph 3 of the contract of sale should not be assessed against petitioners. On
the other hand, private respondents Ramon Buenaventura, Angeles Buenaventura, Corazon
Buenaventura, and Maria Luisa Buenaventura are obliged to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate
of title and to transfer the title to the land in question upon payment of the purchase price by
petitioners.

Under the Civil Code, private respondents are liable for damages to the injured party, the petitioners
in this case. However, in lieu of actual payment of damages, and considering the fact that private
respondents were in possession of the land during the entire period that this case was pending,
private respondents are no longer entitled to the interest payments which would have been due from
petitioners. 
12
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Marcelino and Guadalupe Galang are
hereby ordered to pay the full 75% balance of the purchase price (P144,596.25) within thirty (30)
days from notice, with interest upon default. Private respondents Ramon Buenaventura, Corazon
Buenaventura and Maria Luisa Buenaventura are hereby ordered to transfer the title to petitioners
upon full payment of the purchase price.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 CA-GR. CR No. 00093, March 27, 1987, penned by Justice Fidel P. Purisima, and
concurred in by Justices Emerito C. Cui and Nicolas P. Lapena, Jr.

2 Rollo, p. 83.

3 Rollo, p. 21.

4 Ibid, p. 17.

5 Rollo, p. 45.

6 Rollo, pp. 43-45.

7 Art. 1475, Civil Code.

8 Art. 1458, Civil Code.

9 Roque v. Lapuz, 96 SCRA 741.

10 People's Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777.

11 Rollo, pp. 81-82.

12 Art. 1191. xxx xxx xxx

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. . . .
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9126             January 31, 1957

ASIA BED FACTORY, petitioner-appellee, 

vs.
NATIONAL BED AND KAPOK INDUSTRIES WORKERS' UNION, ET AL., respondents-appellants.

Paredes, Gaw, Acevedo & Associates for appellee.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for appellants.

REYES, A. J.:

On June 2, 1953, the petitioner Asia Bed Factory and respondent labor union entered into a
collective bargaining agreement which contained, among other things, the following clause:

XI. PAYMENTS FROM MONTHLY TO DAILY

Employees now paid on a monthly basis shall be paid under this agreement on the daily
basis at rates based on their present compensation plus the additional increase of (P0.30)
THIRTY CENTAVOS a day, with the understanding that these employees shall be provided
with work on Sundays at time and one-half; and that in the event that no work on Sundays is
available through no fault of the employee or employees, they shall be entitled to payment of
the equivalent of their wages as if they had performed referred to that day. The rates of
payment of these employees above referred to shall be computed in the attached document
marked as annex "a" and made an integral part of this agreement.

In the event that an employee shall absent himself for no excusable reasons, the Company
shall be entitled to reduce the corresponding wage or wages.

The petitioner faithfully complied with the terms of the above clause until it was forced to suspend its
business on Sundays in obedience to the provisions of Republic Act No. 946, known as the Blue
Sunday Law, which took effect on September 8, 1953, prohibiting the opening of any commercial,
industrial or agricultural enterprise on Sundays. As some of petitioner's employees claimed that
under the terms of their bargaining agreement they were entitled to their Sunday wages even if they
did not work on those days, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila for a
declaratory judgment that it ceased to be bound by the above-quoted clause of the collective
bargaining agreement when the Blue Sunday Law went into effect.

Without disputing the facts alleged in the petition, the respondent labor union, by way of answer,
filed a motion for a summary judgment declaring that petitioner's employees were entitled to Sunday
wages notwithstanding the passage of the Blue Sunday Law.

On the basis of the pleadings thus filed, the lower court rendered judgment holding that, in view of
the provision of the Blue Sunday Law prohibiting the opening of commercial and industrial
establishments on Sundays, the petitioner was relieved from compliance with its agreement "to
provide its employees with work on Sundays and to pay them for Sundays." Reconsideration of the
judgment having been denied, the respondents appealed directly to this Court on a pure question of
law.

The question for determination is whether the approval of the Blue Sunday Law relieved petitioner
from complying with its agreement to pay its laborers Sunday wages since they can not be given
work on Sundays because of the closure of the petitioner's business on those days as required by
said law. The lower court answers the question in the affirmative on the ground that the clause in
question provided for mutual prestations between the contracting parties — the petitioner to provide
its employees with work on Sundays and pay them for such work and the employees to do the work
given them on those days — and that these prestations became impossible of performance when
the Blue Sunday Law prohibited the opening of commercial and industrial establishments on
Sundays.

To this view we are inclined to agree. The bargaining agreement puts the employees on a daily
basis at rates of compensation therein provided, with the express stipulation that work shall be
provided on Sundays and at higher compensation. As the trial court says, payment for Sundays is in
return for work done. It is true the agreement provides for the payment of wages on Sundays if no
work is made available on those days through no fault of the employees. But the fact is that the
agreement does give the employer the right to provide work on Sundays. And it would seem the
height of injustice to deprive the employer of this right without, at the same time, relieving him of the
obligation to pay the employees.

Section 6 of the Blue Sunday Law which says that "it shall be unlawful for any employer to reduce
the compensation of any of his employees or laborers by reason of the provisions of this Act" does
not militate against this view. There is here no attempt on the part of the employer to reduce the
compensation of his employees. It is the law itself which in effect reduces that compensation by
depriving the employees of work on Sundays, thus preventing them from earning the wages
stipulatedin the bargaining agreement.

There is nothing to the contention that to apply the Blue Sunday Law to present agreement would
infringe the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of the obligations of contract. The Blue
Sunday Law is intended for the health, well-being and happiness of the working class and is a
legitimate exercise of the police power.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9126             January 31, 1957

ASIA BED FACTORY, petitioner-appellee, 

vs.
NATIONAL BED AND KAPOK INDUSTRIES WORKERS' UNION, ET AL., respondents-appellants.

Paredes, Gaw, Acevedo & Associates for appellee.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for appellants.

REYES, A. J.:

On June 2, 1953, the petitioner Asia Bed Factory and respondent labor union entered into a
collective bargaining agreement which contained, among other things, the following clause:

XI. PAYMENTS FROM MONTHLY TO DAILY

Employees now paid on a monthly basis shall be paid under this agreement on the daily
basis at rates based on their present compensation plus the additional increase of (P0.30)
THIRTY CENTAVOS a day, with the understanding that these employees shall be provided
with work on Sundays at time and one-half; and that in the event that no work on Sundays is
available through no fault of the employee or employees, they shall be entitled to payment of
the equivalent of their wages as if they had performed referred to that day. The rates of
payment of these employees above referred to shall be computed in the attached document
marked as annex "a" and made an integral part of this agreement.

In the event that an employee shall absent himself for no excusable reasons, the Company
shall be entitled to reduce the corresponding wage or wages.

The petitioner faithfully complied with the terms of the above clause until it was forced to suspend its
business on Sundays in obedience to the provisions of Republic Act No. 946, known as the Blue
Sunday Law, which took effect on September 8, 1953, prohibiting the opening of any commercial,
industrial or agricultural enterprise on Sundays. As some of petitioner's employees claimed that
under the terms of their bargaining agreement they were entitled to their Sunday wages even if they
did not work on those days, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila for a
declaratory judgment that it ceased to be bound by the above-quoted clause of the collective
bargaining agreement when the Blue Sunday Law went into effect.

Without disputing the facts alleged in the petition, the respondent labor union, by way of answer,
filed a motion for a summary judgment declaring that petitioner's employees were entitled to Sunday
wages notwithstanding the passage of the Blue Sunday Law.

On the basis of the pleadings thus filed, the lower court rendered judgment holding that, in view of
the provision of the Blue Sunday Law prohibiting the opening of commercial and industrial
establishments on Sundays, the petitioner was relieved from compliance with its agreement "to
provide its employees with work on Sundays and to pay them for Sundays." Reconsideration of the
judgment having been denied, the respondents appealed directly to this Court on a pure question of
law.

The question for determination is whether the approval of the Blue Sunday Law relieved petitioner
from complying with its agreement to pay its laborers Sunday wages since they can not be given
work on Sundays because of the closure of the petitioner's business on those days as required by
said law. The lower court answers the question in the affirmative on the ground that the clause in
question provided for mutual prestations between the contracting parties — the petitioner to provide
its employees with work on Sundays and pay them for such work and the employees to do the work
given them on those days — and that these prestations became impossible of performance when
the Blue Sunday Law prohibited the opening of commercial and industrial establishments on
Sundays.

To this view we are inclined to agree. The bargaining agreement puts the employees on a daily
basis at rates of compensation therein provided, with the express stipulation that work shall be
provided on Sundays and at higher compensation. As the trial court says, payment for Sundays is in
return for work done. It is true the agreement provides for the payment of wages on Sundays if no
work is made available on those days through no fault of the employees. But the fact is that the
agreement does give the employer the right to provide work on Sundays. And it would seem the
height of injustice to deprive the employer of this right without, at the same time, relieving him of the
obligation to pay the employees.

Section 6 of the Blue Sunday Law which says that "it shall be unlawful for any employer to reduce
the compensation of any of his employees or laborers by reason of the provisions of this Act" does
not militate against this view. There is here no attempt on the part of the employer to reduce the
compensation of his employees. It is the law itself which in effect reduces that compensation by
depriving the employees of work on Sundays, thus preventing them from earning the wages
stipulatedin the bargaining agreement.

There is nothing to the contention that to apply the Blue Sunday Law to present agreement would
infringe the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of the obligations of contract. The Blue
Sunday Law is intended for the health, well-being and happiness of the working class and is a
legitimate exercise of the police power.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.