UK

Their War, Our Struggle

STORIES OF CHILDREN IN CENTRAL MINDANAO

EDDIE LL. QUITORIANO

WITH THEOFELIZ MARIE P. FRANCISCO

UK
Save the Children UK is a member of the International Save the Children Alliance, the world’s leading independent children’s
rights organisation, with members in 27 countries and operational mes in more than 100.

Save the Children works with children and their communities to provide practical assistance and, by influencing policy and
public opinion to bring about positive change for children.

THEIR WAR, OUR STRUGGLE

Stories of Children in Central Mindanao

Published by:

Save the Children UK

Philippines Programme
3/F FSS Building 1
89 Scout Castor Street,
Quezon City, Philippines

Copyright © 2004
Save the Children UK
Philippines Programme

ISBN 971-92959-2-9

This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee or prior permission for teaching purposes,
and is not for resale. For copying in any other circumstances, prior written permission must be obtained from the publisher,
for a corresponding fee.

Edited by Mayette Bayuga and Rosalie Matilac

Design and layout by Liza Margret Suñega
Cover photo by Jesse Allegre
Photography courtesy of Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms
Drawings courtesy of Oxfam-GB
Printed by LSF Printing Service, Philippines
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Chapter 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Children in the Clutches of War
Central Mindanao - 2000, 2003

Chapter 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Family, Friends and Prayer
(How Children Cope)

Chapter 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
The Future of Children
(In the Aftermath of War)

Chapter 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Into the Children’s World

Chapter 5.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Choices
(When Children Make Decisions)

Chapter 6.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
The Way of the Duty Bearers

Chapter 7.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Conclusions

Annex 1 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Annex 2 Locale of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
ACRONYMS

ACH Accion Contra El Hambre

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
BCPC Barangay Council for the Protection of Children
BHW Barangay Health Worker
CAFGU Citizens’ Armed Force Geographic Unit
CARHRIHL Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law
CDRC Citizens Disaster Resource Centre
CFSI Community and Family Services International
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIDSS Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services
CMR Central Mindanao Region
CNSP Children in Need of Special Protection
COMELEC Commission on Elections
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines
CRP Child Rights Programming
CVO Civilian Volunteer Organisation
DepEd Department of Education
DFID Department for International Development
DILG Department of Interior and Local Government
DND Department of National Defense
DRT Disaster Response Teams
DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development
EC European Commission
ECCD Early Childhood Care and Development
EDF Economic Development Fund
EU European Union
EXAT External Assistance Team
FGD Focus Group Discussion
GDI Gender Development Index
GO Government Organisations
GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines
HDI Human Development Index
ICP Immaculate Conception Parish
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IDP Internally Displaced Person
 v

IEC Information and Education Campaign

IHL International Humanitarian Law
IHRL International Human Rights Laws
IMAN Integrated Mindanaon Association of Natives
IRA Internal Revenue Allotment
KCJP Kutawato Council for Justice and Peace
KFI Kadtuntaya Foundation Incorporated
KFI Kauyahan Foundation Incorporated
LGU Local Government Unit
MDCC Municipal Disaster Co-ordinating Council
MHO Municipal Health Office
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIM Mindanao Independence Movement
MLGO Municipal Local Government Officials
MNAO Municipal Nutrition Action Office
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MPDC Municipal Planning and Development Co-ordinator
MPDO Municipal Planning and Development Office
MRDP Mindanao Rural Development Program
MSU Mindanao State University
MSWDO Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office
NDCC National Disaster Co-ordinating Council
NDU Notre Dame University
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NIC Newly Industrialising Countries
NPA New People’s Army
NSCB National Statistics Co-ordination Board
NSO National Statistics Office
OCD Office of the Civil Defence
ODA Official Development Assistance
PD Presidential Decree
PHDN Philippine Human Development Network
PHDR Philippine Human Development Report
PHO Provincial Health Office
PNP Philippine National Police
PNRC Philippine National Red Cross
PSWDO Provincial Social Welfare and Development Office
RA Republic Act
SC UK Save the Children UK
SOC Sense of Coherence
STARCM Support to Agrarian Reform in Central Mindanao
SZOPAD Special Zone of Peace and Development
vi

TJFP Task Force Justice and Peace

TOSCADAR Technical and Organisation Assistance for Civil Society Action
of the Displaced and At Risk in Mindanao
TRIPOD Tri-People’s Organisation Against Disasters
UCCP United Church of Christ in the Philippines
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNCRC United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMDP United Nations Mindanao Development Programme
UNYPHIL United Youth of the Philippines
VSO Voluntary Service Overseas
WFP World Food Programme
WTO World Trade Organisation
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first word of thanks is for Save the Children UK for the trust and
confidence bestowed on me, and to Noel Puno and Rowena Cordero,
who gave their support as they co-ordinated on behalf of the agency.
I have done several studies on the Mindanao conflict but this is my first
major work on children.

This book would not have been possible without the life histories of the
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Maguindanao and Cotabato
and the non-government and governmental duty bearers working in
the region.

My deepest gratitude goes to the children who shared their life histories
in words and sketches; to their parents, siblings and relatives who,
despite their wariness against the manner by which certain researchers
and other external actors merely extract information from them, have
chosen to engage us as partners.

As ever, I thank my research colleagues, Theofeliz Marie Francisco,

Mirian Ontok and Haydee Balading, for their untiring support, on desk
and on field. Special thanks goes to Fr Bert Layson, for his inspiration
and for letting us use the Immaculate Conception Parish (ICP) facilities.
And to the ICP Staff - Adele Nayal, Reynante Babao, Nimfa Manon-
og, Connie Arce, Butch Gilman, Samira Monib, Toto Gamboa and
Dido Mangindra - for invaluably facilitating the interviews and focus
group discussions.

Beverly Manon-og patiently encoded the interview transcripts from

seemingly unreadable notes on virus-stricken computers in rental
shops.
viii

Meg Suñega, as always, gave time to employ her expertise in layout

and design despite competing demands from upscale clients. Odette
Alday, my loyal executive assistant for two years, industriously kept
and pasted receipts on waste paper so that I could submit my financial
reports to Save the Children UK on time. Jeneen Garcia and Rex
Godinez Ortega harnessed their writing skills to chronicle the stories
of the children. Yasmin Hatta assisted me in preparing the Executive
Summary. Grace Bauzon, operating behind the scenes, employed her
people skills to collect electronic data from government agencies. James
Esguerra, newfound friend from the Ateneo de Manila, unselfishly
shared his rare collection of literature on life history methodology.

My special thanks to Oxfam GB for sharing the children’s sketches

from a previous study on Central Mindanao. I have been a consultant
for Oxfam GB in the Philippines since 1998. Uncommonly has a con-
sultant and its client been agreeably combined for so long in the field
of emergencies and humanitarian assistance especially in a competitive
consulting environment.

Not the least, my gratitude to Balay Inc, Balik Kalipay, Provincial Social
Welfare and Development Office (PSWDO) - Cotabato, Municipal
Social Welfare and Development (MSWD) - Carmen, MSWD and
Municipal Health Office of Pikit, MSWD of Pagalungan and Office
of Civil Defence -Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (OCD-
ARMM), for sharing valuable information on their work.

Finally, I am grateful to my mentor in research and development work,

Francisco J Lara, Jr and to my tolerant supporters, inspirations and
advisors on nuances in psychology, Ednil and Diane.

Ed Quitoriano
Quezon City
May 2004
© Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms
INTRODUCTION

Child Rights

W ho is responsible for protecting the rights of children? Why is there a need

to make a special case for children? These are key questions often asked by
child rights advocates, including Save the Children UK. These questions are still
not being asked in Central Mindanao.

International and national laws invoking and guaranteeing the rights of children are
not scarce. Ratified by the United Nations in 1989, the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is the first international instrument that
adopted a comprehensive and specific approach in recognising, guaranteeing and
protecting child rights. The Philippines is state-party to the convention. Apart
from the rights guaranteed in the 1987 Constitution, the government enacted
Republic Act 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination.

Ahead of the Philippine accession to the UNCRC, the Martial Law regime of
President Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees in the 1970s, namely,
PD603 (1974) and PD1508 (1978). The former mandated the establishment
of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC) and the latter
mandated the creation of the Katarungan Pambarangay (Barangay Justice System).
12

Both laws were strengthened by the promulgation of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which instituted local government autonomy through devolution of
certain functions of the national government and decentralisation of power. In
1997, the government also enacted Republic Act (RA) 8369, which mandated the
creation of family courts nation-wide. These laws indicate government intention
to localise application of child rights protection through the formulation of local
policies, passage of local legislation and creation of local mechanisms for rights
protection.

Notwithstanding the presence of a favourable policy environment, little is known

about implementation, especially at the local level. Advances in policy discourse
and practice highlight issues and concerns about domestic violence, juvenile
delinquency, substance abuse, child trafficking and the phenomenon of child
soldiers. Aside from the issue of child soldiering, little is known about children in
situations of conflict in Central Mindanao. There is a dearth of knowledge on the
effects of the war (aside from the issue of hunger, malnutrition, health and shelter)
and the ways of coping of the children. Moreover, there is scarcity of discourse on
the application of the laws at the local level and in a complex conflict environment
like Central Mindanao. Local government initiatives, with the support of the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), ie, on the creation of the BCPCs, are
cursorily documented and narrated to donor agencies. Little is known, however,
about their conduct and practices. Local initiatives are at a problematic crossroads
with signage, asking the oft-repeated questions: Why make a special case for
children when the chronic conflict has been victimising large populations, not only
children? Who is responsible for protecting the rights of children?

Answers to the preceding questions require identification of anomalous perspectives

that becloud analysis of the problems and issues and formulation of solutions.
Some of the prevailing anomalous perspectives are the following:
• That the case for children is subsumed under the rights claims of families.
Emergency response directed towards families and communities automatically
benefits children;
• That the fight for the rights of children is a product of, and dependent on the
discourse and actions of adults;
• That the status of children as citizens may be deferred because of their youth
and ignorance and, therefore, they simply need protection from adult members
of society and the state;
• That human rights violations are mainly those that are perpetrated by the
state;
• And that children are victims, not actors, in the conflict.
 13

In recent years, scholarships on children in situations of armed conflict focused on

the phenomenon of child soldiers. The studies dealt with the moral dilemmas the
child soldiers face when made to choose between self-preservation and killing other
people and the psychological effects of getting wounded, tortured or interrogated
(Protacio-De Castro, 2001; Marcelino, De la Cruz, Camacho and Balanon, 1996).
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in a 1998 study, raised
the issue of the New People’s Army (NPA) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) conscripting children. In another study in 1999, the UNICEF raised a
similar issue. Most of these studies look at the dimension of the child as a victim
or as a manipulated participant in the war, who can be transformed into a fierce
fighter through indoctrination (Protacio-De Castro, 2001; Efraime Jr., 1996).

Little is known about the fact that displaced children are not only passive victims
but also actors, rights holders and survivors who have actively harnessed coping
strategies either on their own account as individuals or with the help of their
families and communities. They are protagonists of their own struggle for survival
within a conflict environment. Although statistics vary according to source, at
least 600,000 persons were displaced during the war in 2000 (http://www.philsol.
nl/A00b/Minda-Mercado-jul00.htm.) According to the Annual Consolidated
Data of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the
Presidential Management Staff for 2000, they constituted 50 per cent of the
1.2 million displaced persons nation-wide during the period. The short-lived
government offensive against the MILF beginning February 2003 caused the
displacement of 354,306 persons by May of the same year (Disaster Alert #4 - 26
May 2003, Citizens Disaster Resource Centre [CDRC]). Government statistics
indicate that in Region XII a total of 163,614 children were victims of disaster
from 2000 to 2002, the highest being in 2000 when 47,849 children were noted to
be under difficult circumstances. Region XII includes the provinces of Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato and Sarangani.

This study proceeds from the other side of the above perspectives and zooms in on
coping strategies in the context of the effects of the conflict and the individual child’s
vulnerabilities and capabilities. The research was conducted in an environment
where child rights programming was, and still is, relatively alien to state and civil
society actors operating in the region. Results of the Child Rights Programming
(CRP) workshops conducted by Save the Children UK in Davao City (January
2004) and Cagayan de Oro City (February 2004), validate the novelty of the
approach to both government and non-government organisations (NGOs).
14

War Zone Mindanao

Chronic armed conflict has been synonymous with the history of Mindanao. The
pre-colonial sultanates of various Islamised ethnic groups such as the Tausugs of
Sulu, Maguindanaos of Cotabato and Maranaws of Lanao had independently
resisted Spanish and American colonial domination. These sultanates emerged
in the 13th century as a result of the expansion of the Islamic civilisation from
the Arabian Peninsula. Many scholars recognise that Islam is not only a religion.
It is a civilisation in itself with distinct cultural characteristics that transcends
political boundaries. The sultanates of South-Western and Central Mindanao
formed part of this civilisation and operated like independent states that predated
the introduction of Western civilisation into what would become the Philippine
islands by the coming of the Spaniards in the 16th century. Muslim resistance to
colonial rule was an earlier embodiment of what Huntington (1996) describes as
a clash of civilisations. The introduction of Western democracy and Christianity
coupled with alien cultural elements significantly put a brake to Islamic expansion
in Mindanao. But as experience shows, the historical process did not end with
peaceful co-existence and unity within diversity.

From the perspective of Philippine history, the history of Mindanao has the
distinction of being complex because of perennial conflicts and a demographic
configuration that evolved without establishing a solid unity among the various
ethnic groups. The Mindanao region is home to various ethnic groups. At the onset
of American colonial rule, it was the land of Muslim and non-Muslim indigenous
tribes. The Muslim population traditionally composed the majority of the island
until Christian settlers were inserted into various parts under the sponsorship of
the American colonisers and by a succession of post-colonial administrations. In
1903, Muslims comprised 76 per cent of the population. By 1990, they comprised
only 19 per cent of the population. Conversely, the non-Muslim population grew
from 24 per cent to 81 per cent during the same period (Jubair, 1999). Census
data indicates that of the 14.1 million people of Mindanao in 1990, 2.7 million
(19.1 per cent) were Muslims and 0.72 million (5.1 per cent) were indigenous
peoples.

Demographic mix in one territory does not necessarily result to violence or armed
conflict. In fact, traditional thinking in sociology argues that smaller social groups
and minority cultures would ultimately be assimilated into more dominant groups
and larger cultures. But not so in Mindanao and in other parts of the world where
people continue to define themselves in terms of religion, language, ancestry, values,
customs and institutions. The social occurrence in Mindanao is a diversity of
populations influenced by two civilisations – Western and Islamic. The Philippine
 15

nation, as it is, is still a work in progress. The western tradition of the Filipino
nation which is predominantly constituted by Christianised tribes in the three
major islands is not only defining its affinity to the emerging Asian civilisation but
is also painfully trying to resolve its relationship with the Muslims in the south.

Certainly, there are issues beyond culture and religion. The demographic changes
in Mindanao have been accompanied by changes in institutions of property
ownership and governance. These incursions affected the property rights claims
of the indigenous populations. Colonial and post-colonial administrations of the
Philippine state offered Mindanao as a promised land to Christian settlers without
settling the rights claims of the native population. This problem was exacerbated
by the introduction of institutions that tended to favour the Christian population
and the Christian-dominated government (eg, land laws).

The birth of Philippine independence beginning with American tutelage during

the Commonwealth Period in the mid-1930s was accompanied by an episode of
peace in Mindanao. During the Second World War, Muslims even fought with
Filipino and American soldiers in the war against Japan. But this episode did not
endure history as expected. As Herber Gans (1996) argues, the acculturative and
assimilative actions of the Christian majority generated revivalist reactions from
the Muslim minority. By 1968, the Maguindanaos of Cotabato raised the banner
of independence with the establishment of the Muslim Independence Movement
(MIM). In 1969, this call was reformulated and raised to a higher level by young
Muslim intellectuals and activists led by Nur Misuari who established the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF).

The MNLF proposed a primordial claim on Mindanao as Moroland under the

concept of Bangsamoro or the notion that all Muslims in Mindanao belong to
the Moro nation, with Mindanao and certain parts of the Visayas islands as their
ancestral land. By 1971, war started in the Muslim areas of Mindanao. This lasted
until 1976 when the MNLF and the government signed the Tripoli Agreement.
Brokered by Muammar Qadhafy of Libya, the Tripoli Agreement stipulated a truce
and the creation of an autonomous region composed of 13 provinces in Mindanao
for the Muslims. During the same period, Maoist insurgents led by the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the NPA waged their own wars in non-Muslim
areas of the island. By the time the MNLF and the Philippine government signed
the Jakarta Peace Agreement in 1996, more than 100,000 persons had died in the
armed conflict (IBON Facts and Figures, 2000).

The Philippine public and the international community thought that the Jakarta
Agreement signified a closure of the Muslim rebellion. History proved them wrong.
Barely a month after the agreement was signed, a rival group, the Maguindanao-
16

based Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rejected the agreement and prepared
for war. In April 2000, the Philippine government under President Joseph Estrada
took a massive offensive that demolished all MILF military camps.

One month later, government casualties rose to 810 dead and 2,156 wounded
(Quitoriano & Libre, 2001). Most of the skirmishes occurred in the Central
Mindanao provinces of Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Lanao del
Sur. By August, almost half a million civilians had been displaced from their
homes.

Armed skirmishes lasted throughout the year. This was exacerbated by the
MNLF’s abandonment of the Jakarta Peace Agreement when, during a convention
in Zamboanga City in April 2001, the Fourth Bangsamoro National Congress
declared the creation of a Bangsamoro Republic with Nur Misuari as President
(Ferrer, 2001). Misuari was incarcerated soon after, however. The MILF continued
to launch guerrilla warfare. But before it could consolidate and establish its new
headquarters, the government launched another major offensive in February 2003,
causing displacement of civilians in the Pikit and Pagalungan areas of Cotabato.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) of Central Mindanao regard three major wars
as the most devastating: the 1970-1976 MNLF rebellion and the 2000 and 2003
government offensives. Of the three peak periods, the worse was in 2000 when
a significant number of IDPs had evacuated up to 12 times or had stayed for
more than one year in evacuation sites. Statistics from the Cotabato headquarters
of the Philippine National Police (PNP), in particular the Annual Incidence
Reports of Carmen and Datu Muntawal PNP Stations, indicate that 516 houses
in Carmen (Cotabato) and 287 houses in Datu Muntawal (formerly, Pagagawan,
Maguindanao) were burned during the war in 2000. During the same period,
a total of 439,000 persons were displaced from their homes; 6,229 houses were
destroyed; 300 persons, mostly children, died of preventable diseases; 445 had been
killed or wounded in bombings (in various parts of Mindanao); and 144 had been
kidnapped (Quitoriano & Libre, 2001). The human and material costs incurred
by civilians far outweighed the damage incurred by the major actors – 810 Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) soldiers dead (as of May 2000) and 457 MILF
fighters dead (between January and August 2000). The Annual consolidated data
of the DSWD and the Presidential Management Staff for 2000 show that more
than 1.2 million persons were displaced nation-wide.
 17

Global Phenomenon of Displacement

What we find in Central Mindanao is a reflection of a global phenomenon, or of

many developing countries where inequality and injustice is exacerbated by social
and political structures that undermine collective interests and marginalise the
needs and aspirations of the poor. The United Nations presents the data below.
(Report of the Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced
People; cited in Item 108 of the Provisional Agenda of the 51st General Assembly
of the UN, August 1996.)
• The number of internally displaced people has escalated in recent years,
reaching 30 million by 1996;
• The most affected countries are in Asia and Africa;
• Most of them remain near conflict zones such that their displacement is usually
repeated over time;
• At least half of them are children, brutally uprooted and exposed to danger and
insecurity at a most crucial and vulnerable time;
• In the course of their displacement, children are either separated from their
families, physically abused, exploited or abducted by military groups;
• Internally displaced children are worse off than (international) refugees because
they lack access to protection and assistance;
• There is no clear institutional responsibility for the protection and assistance
needs of children, and the organisations mandated to do so, like UNICEF,
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and World Food
Programme (WFP), do not consistently ensure the protection and care of
internally displaced children;

Central Mindanao Phenomenon

Central Mindanao suffers worse than most regions facing the serious problem of
poverty. An ocular view of the region provides evidence of economic stagnation
and critical decline in the economic and human resource base due to continuing
disincentive in productivity and employment.
18

The region suffers from low agricultural income and from the inability of its
human resource to significantly benefit from labour opportunities in the service
sector, except in marginal jobs such as domestic helpers or waitresses in small food
shops. Rural labour generation is very weak and is characterised by unregulated
wage rates.

There is a wide gap between what the rural labour force is able to do and the specific
requirements of the service sector, especially the Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) sector. Trends observed among displaced families indicate that
access to service jobs is usually a function of female members of the family as
male siblings are usually mobilised for farm work (or armed defence, in certain
communities).

Walking through the region, one sees pockets of dynamic markets like Kidapawan
City, Carmen, Kabacan and Midsayap, or secondary markets like Libongan and
Pigkawayan. These markets are not necessarily offshoots of rising incomes and
productivity in other areas. Their existence is a result of a silent desire of the
population to secure enclaves of growth where both warring groups and affected
civilians can benefit from exchange entitlements either through the sale of
agricultural commodities or human labour.

The war-affected economic experience of Central Mindanao is a fundamental

disincentive to the inhabitants of the region and to outsiders, especially investors.
While some investors are attracted to economic enclaves like Kidapawan, Carmen,
Kabacan and Midsayap, these are not adequate to fulfil the credit needs of the
rural population in the outlying areas. Most of the investments are in trades that
are designed to extract resources from rural areas but not necessarily plough back
capital that would propel higher productivity and develop human resources.

While certain economic enclaves benefit from relatively dynamic markets, other
areas are extremely prone to weak markets and chronic armed conflict. Although
the wars in the late 1960s up to the mid-1970s were widespread and were marked
with certain clarity on battle lines owing to the massive mobilisation of the Moro
population, the wars in the 1990s and in 2000 were characterised by pockets
of intense armed conflicts. In the 2000 war, the most affected areas were Pikit,
Aleosan and Pagalungan. Pikit was most affected because the concentration of the
AFP offensive was in Buliok, an interior barangay within the municipality.
 19

In between heights of conflict, low-intensity conflicts occurred in interior villages

that are in the path of AFP and MILF troop movements, or are targets of banditry
by other armed groups. In certain cases, some villages are affected by clan wars that
either coincide with peaks of AFP-MILF conflicts or anywhere in time in-between
major wars.

Central Mindanao is a world apart in the Philippine national psyche despite public
proximity to conflict in areas where the Abu Sayyaf and the communist-led NPA
operate. It is a world where international aid agencies are in constant alert since
the war in 2000. It is a region carved within a national landscape aspiring to lift
itself from poverty and deprivation. It stands apart as a region where human rights
violations prevail; where the civilian population can no longer pinpoint episodes of
growth and peace; and where children do not have a secure space for their survival
and development.

National and international public perception suggests that Central Mindanao is

not the place to be, neither for travel and leisure nor for investments. The Filipino
and international publics are often swayed by sensational news and travel advisories
that discourage people, especially foreigners, from travelling to the region. In
between peaks of conflict and displacement, it is cursorily easy for the mass media
to pick out images and news of what is socially undesirable: kidnapping for ransom,
bombings, clan wars, banditry, cattle rustling and unfinished development projects.
In recent years, terrorism has become the defining element of what the war is all
about in the region and other neighbouring parts. The truth behind the supposed
facts is hidden somewhere in the political squabbles on how to solve the Mindanao
problem.

Almost no one gives attention to the case of children in Central Mindanao. The
children are forced to choose between life and limb and their childhood possessions
during evacuation. They abandon every space they have carved as their own. Many
parents of the current generation feel incompetent to explain what the situation is
to their children since it is also beyond their comprehension.

Not that there are real playgrounds available to children in rural villages. Cemented
solar dryers double up as children’s space off harvest season, or when adults are
not using the space for community meetings. When rebels and government
soldiers bring the war into the community, however, the space is transformed into
a temporary shelter. A solar dryer is a cemented open space, the size of a regular
basketball court. It is the most common post-harvest facility funded by the local
government. When it is not being used to dry rice, corn or copra, it serves as a
playground for the children. The children must always compete with the adults
for its use, however.
20

It is only when they are being interviewed and weighed in the evacuation centres
that children are given attention during the war. Otherwise, they are simply
numbers in the statistics of the homeless, sick and hungry who form part of the
beneficiaries of food and non-food assistance. In the case of Central Mindanao,
much is known about the effects of the armed conflict at the individual level where
statistics from government and non-governmental sources indicate the number of
the dead, wounded and those suffering from hunger, disease and lack of shelter.

Despite massive and repeated displacements, Central Mindanao remains a home

to the victims. There are no indications of civilians moving away from the region
in order to join the mass of rural poor seeking greener pastures in urban centres
like Metro Manila, Cebu or Davao. There are no indications of Christian settlers
returning to their places of origin in the Luzon and Visayas islands to show that they
can no longer co-exist with their Moro and Lumad brothers and sisters. Despite
the diversity in cultures and political perspectives, Central Mindanao is a common
space that binds populations together, in peace or in war.

Despite poverty and lack of peace, despite the erosion of material and social assets
they have tried to solidify over the years, the civilian victims of the war continue to
stick their fortunes in the war-torn region.

The children too are still there, despite everything.

21
© Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms

1
Chapter 1

CHILDREN IN THE CLUTCHES OF WAR

Central Mindanao - 2000, 2003

Effects of War on Children

A meenah witnessed two wars. She was only eight when the Philippine
government waged an all-out war against the MILF in 2000. War
erupted again in 2003 when she was 11.

“Napakahirap ng buhay pag nagkakagulo. Wala kaming tamang direksyon.

Hindi namin alam kung saan kami lalapit at kung saan kami pupunta.”
(Life is very difficult when there’s fighting. Our lives lack direction. We
do not know what to do. We do not know whom we should approach for
help.) Ameenah sits almost stone stiff as she recalls the difficulties she went
through during the war. Her eyes hardly meet her interviewer. “Takot na
takot ang buong pamilya namin.” (Our family was very much afraid.)

A stray bullet killed Ameenah’s grandmother. Afraid to lose another life,

their whole family decided to evacuate. Life at the evacuation centre
disoriented Ameenah. “Magulo doon. Ang mga kapatid ko kahit saan
pumupunta.” (Everything was in chaos. My siblings became restless, so
they gallivanted around.)

Inug-ug, Ameenah’s village in Pagalungan, Maguindanao, became a

military target because MILF rebels took positions there. The bombs
burned down the school building, the rice fields and the cornfields. Even
the trees were bombarded because they were said to be hiding places of the
Muslim rebels.
24

For Ameenah, the 2000 war was just between the military and the rebels. She says
that the war started because of Liguasan.

Collectively known as Liguasan Marsh, Liguasan is actually composed of two

marshy basins - Liguasan (at the confluence of the Pulangi, Maganoy, Buluan and
Allah rivers) and Libungan (at the confluence of the Libungan and Mindanao
rivers). The municipalities of Cotabato-Pikit, M’lang, Tulunan, Matalam,
Kabacan, Midsayap, Libungan and Pigcawayan; Maguindanao-Datu Paglas, Datu
Piang, Sultan sa Barongis, S.K. Pendatun, Buluan and Kabuntalan; and Sultan
Kudarat-Lambayong, share the area.

There is physical evidence that the marsh contains mineral deposits. That is why
there are speculations that external investors are interested in developing the area.
Government officials, all of them Christians, are contesting ownership rights over
the marsh so that they can attract investors to their respective provinces. Muslim
rebels, meanwhile, want to maintain the area as their base.

After a year of living as refugees, Ameenah’s family and the other residents of
Pagalungan returned to Inug-ug. But the military soldiers had remained in their
home site. Sometimes, Ameenah’s family would go to the farm to till the land and
check on their crops. The army helicopter would be there, circling the area. “Para
sa akin, pag nandoon pa sila, ibig sabihin hindi pa tapos ang gulo.” (The war isn’t
over for me as long as they’re there.)

Ameenah did not misread the signs. In less than three years, the government
launched another offensive attack against the MILF rebels. Pagalungan and its
residents suffered the effects of war once again.

The government’s war against the MILF in 2000 was the peak of a buildup of
political tensions arising from the MILF’s rejection of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines-Moro National Liberation Front (GRP-MNLF)
Peace Agreement (otherwise known as the Jakarta Agreement of 1996). In 1997,
the MILF openly declared its intention to assume leadership of the Moro rebel
movement as the MNLF decided to lay down its arms and integrate a portion of
its armed forces to the government military. The Ramos government signed the
agreement and informally allowed the MILF to maintain more than 20 military
camps. This tolerance was abandoned by the succeeding Estrada administration
that assumed office in 1998. Sporadic skirmishes evolved into a crescendo of larger
battles beginning 1999. Prior to the Estrada government’s offensive in 2000, the
MILF had an estimated number of 22 major military camps. The main camp was
Camp Abu Bakar, which also hosted a military academy, an Islamic university and
 25

several other facilities. This camp was demolished and taken by government forces
during the 2000 war.

Marie Lyn, an 11-year-old daughter of Christian settlers, remembers

the day the rebels came. It was 4am on November 2000. They arrived
in three groups. One group flagged down vehicles along the highway.
One group came to their house. Her parents thought that they were
government soldiers because they wore uniforms and had handheld
radios.

“We had no choice but to run to Pikit in North Cotabato,” Marie Lyn
recounts. When they reached Pikit they learned that three houses were
burned in their community, theirs included. On top of that, two of
her uncles and an aunt were murdered.

While in the evacuation centre, Marie Lyn got sick. “We could not
afford medicines and my mother did not want to bring me to the
hospital because of our problem with money,” she sighs. The other
members of the family suffered different sorts of illness too.

Marie Lyn cannot help but reminisce the years before the war erupted.
“We were able to raise hogs and plant vegetables. There was enough
food in the house for all of us in the family,” she relates. “Our harvest
was abundant and could last us the whole year.” She remembers that
during special holidays like All Souls’ Day, her parents brought her to
Cotabato City or to Kidapawan City for recreation. “We were very
happy before the war,” Marie Lyn’s face lights up.

The whole country anticipated that war was coming. The mass media monitored
deployment of government troops as well as rebel tactical offensives. The warring
parties were not interested in talking peace anymore. The government was mainly
bent on implementing the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement instead of crafting
another peace agreement with another group espousing the same agenda. The
MILF, on the other hand, was not interested in subsuming themselves under the
peace agreement. It demanded that the Estrada government honour the previous
government’s tacit recognition of the autonomy of the MILF military camps.
Everyone was supposed to know that war was coming. But not everyone really
expected that war would be brought directly to homes and communities.
26

Gloria is an 11-year-old Lumad Manobo girl. She talks about her war
experience with disarming openness. “Wala ko kasabot sa akong gibati.”
(I couldn’t understand my feelings then). Moro rebels and government
soldiers engaged in a fight in their village in Sitio Baruyan in Nalapaan.
She cringed in terror as bullets whizzed overhead and bombs whistled
in the air. “Mga tulo ka adlaw kami didto nagtago sa sapa.” (We hid
along a stream for about three days.)

On the fourth day, a dump truck came to rescue the people of their
village. They were brought to an evacuation centre in Pikit, North
Cotabato.

The first thing Gloria did upon reaching the evacuation centre was to
sit down. “Kapoy kaayo.” (How exhausting.) She still couldn’t believe
that the entire neighbourhood fitted into the back of the rescue truck.
Even if they were given the best possible care in the evacuation centre,
she could not qualify their stay there as a picnic. She says that they had
to work around the limited space of the area.

Until now, she is confused about what caused the whole conflict that
killed hundreds and affected thousands in Mindanao. She can only
offer a very simplistic view of the Estrada administration’s all-out-
war against the Moro separatist rebels, “Wala nag sinabtanay.” (Just a
misunderstanding.)

The 2000 war was the country’s first major national war effort since the 1973-1976
war with the MNLF and the 1983-1988 offensive against the Communist Party of
the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). This war, therefore, was widely
watched not only in the domestic, but also in the international front. Just as soon
as it began, local and international aid agencies moved into the region to launch
the first major collective humanitarian effort.
 27

Charisse is a 10-year-old half-Manobo and half-Bisaya. She vividly

remembers how the war came to their village when she was only six.
“Sa pagkabuntag namugas kami kay ulan sa pagka-gabii. Unya sa dihang
namugas kami hapit ma-odto, nakit-an namo nga ang among mga silingan
nga namakwit na sila. Busa midali-dali kami ug pa-uli sa among balay
alang sa pagpanghipos sa among mga gamit.” (We went to the farm to
plant corn in the morning because it had rained the night before. By
noontime, we saw our neighbours already evacuating. We hurriedly
went back to our house to gather our things.)

Using trapal and malong, they created a tent at the evacuation centre.
It was a far cry from a real home. Worse, they no longer had a farm to
harvest food from. “Lisod kaayo. Wala’y panginabuhian, usahay wala’y
makaon.” (Life there [evacuation centre] was very difficult. We had no
source of livelihood. Sometimes we had nothing to eat.)

Her parents and siblings had to find work to do in the village so that
they would have something to buy rice and food with. Charisse was
often left behind at the evacuation centre.

Displacement accompanied by hunger, deaths and disease became the defining

elements of the humanitarian crisis. According to the Annual Consolidation
Reports for 2000-2003 of the Disaster Response Monitoring and Information
Centre of DSWD, 1.2 million persons were affected and displaced by the conflict
nation-wide in 2000 and 93 per cent were from the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) and Region XII in Central Mindanao. In 2001, 122,373
persons were displaced in Central Mindanao, representing 43 per cent of total
displaced persons nation-wide. In 2002, 34,824 persons were affected by conflicts
in the region, representing 74 per cent of all displaced persons nation-wide that
year. In February 2003, the government launched a quick offensive against the
MILF. By the first quarter of the year, 292, 901 persons from the provinces of
Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat, had been again displaced from their
homes.
28

Abdurahim, a 13-year-old Maguindanaon Muslim, is now homeless.

Each day, he visits different houses in their village in Inug-ug, Pagalungan
and according to his whim, begs for a place to sleep in for the night.
He was nine years old when the military launched aerial assaults against
Muslim rebels hiding in their village. Bombs hit the houses and the
livestock. His school was turned into a temporary bomb shelter. His
greatest fear then was that the school building would be bombed too.

It was raining when he evacuated with some of his cousins at about

7am. The family had to leave the village separately to ensure their
safety. He was tasked to carry his youngest sister. The walk through
marshes and paddies was very difficult.

Upon return to Pagalungan a year later, they had to start all over again.
“Naiwan ang mga kagamitan namin. Kinuha ng mga sundalo.” (The
soldiers got everything that we left behind.)

Displacement is a common occurrence in Central Mindanao. It is the time when

the people lose their ability to labour for survival and the time when their basic
human rights are either derogated or violated. The displaced persons have not rested
since low-to-high-intensity wars afflicted the region since the late 1960s. Statistics
show the physical effects of the conflicts on the civilian population. There are still
many unknowns about the chronic conflict, however, such as its real impact on the
civilian population, especially on children.

“I was so afraid that I could not even bring myself to cry,” is how eight-
year-old Ahmed, a Maguindanaon Muslim, describes the day that
changed his life. He could still remember the purring of the engine of
a motorcycle that came to their village in Dalengaoen in Pikit, North
Cotabato. As he expected, the motorcycle stopped in front of their
house. His father was standing at the front yard then, as he always did
on mornings.

Somehow, Ahmed felt that something was not right. And then, in a
couple of seconds, the bloodied body of his father fell to the ground.
Then there was running, much running and screaming.
 29

Ahmed’s family fled to the town where they took shelter in a relative’s
house. It was not the first time that they ran to their relative there.
Talk of the war about to reach their community had driven them to
seek shelter there before.

War affects everyone, irrespective of sex, age, ethnic origin or income status. The
difference in effect lies in the intensity of the impact and the varying psychosocial
and physiological changes that would linger among the affected population. In
Sudan, for example, people affected by famines used to believe that wealth and
poverty have no effect on differences in mortality due to hunger (Sen, 1981). A
close look at the outcomes, however, show variations in impacts – that the poor
are likely to die than the rich; that children are more likely to die than adults, etc.
(Sen, 1981; de Waal, 1989). There are varying long-term effects on the affected
population. In fact, effects on children’s attitudes and behaviours are issues that
really need to be assessed.

What Do Children Really Feel During Peaks of Conflict?

Children do not easily forget what happened and where they were during the
critical moments when but a thin line separated them from death.

Children aged 7 to 11 translated the images of war in their minds into the following
drawings and sketches:
 30

© Oxfam-GB
31
 32

© Oxfam-GB
33
34

Children aged 12 to 17 mentioned the following immediate effects during

shocks:
• Fear of death
• Fear of losing one’s mind
• Fear created by the smell of gunpowder
• Physical weakness due to hunger
• Rage against a war that seems to never end

These effects mentioned by the children could be overcome with the help of
the parents and the assisting organisations at the evacuation centres. There are
effects with long-term consequences, however. These are the effects borne after
the war, upon return from evacuation. Most of these are in the emotional, social
and economic realms. There is a high probability that these would spill over into
further negative effects that would hinder the children’s return to normalcy. These
are:

Anger and loathing

“Nagalit talaga ako sa mga sundalo.” (I was really angry at the soldiers.)
Abdurahim, his face as stiff as ever and his eyes avoiding everyone else’s gaze,
declares. “Dahil sa pagbomba ng mga sundalo, nashock ang lolo ko. Yun ang
dahilan ng kanyang pagkamatay.” (My grandfather got shocked when the
soldiers bombed our area. That caused his death.)

Ameenah, face grimly set, echoes Abdurahim’s anger against soldiers. “Pag
nandoon sila sa baryo namin, napakabait nila. Pero pag dumaan na kami sa
kampo nila, ang yabang-yabang nila.” (When they’re in our barrio, they’re very
kind. But they’re very arrogant when we happen to pass by their camp.)

“Hadlok sila mouban sa amo kay basin patyon sila namo.” (They didn’t want
to join us, afraid that we would murder them.) Daniel, the child of an
Ilonggo-Christian couple, reasons out why Muslims did not want to stay in
the Christian-only evacuation centre. Daniel was only nine at the outbreak of
war in 2000.

The loss of loved ones, the sight of destruction and the general disruption
of normal life, induce anger. Children point their fingers at the government
and the MILF as the causes and the main protagonists of the war. This anger
can turn purposive, especially among those whose families or communities are
 35

identified with either side of the warring parties. Families whose fathers are
Civilian Volunteer Organisation (CVO) or Citizens’ Armed Force Geographic
Unit (CAFGU) volunteers, are objects of anger of the Muslim civilians who
suffered in the hands of government forces. Vice-versa, Muslim families who
are suspected of having links with the MILF or other Muslim armed groups
are objects of anger of the Christian and Lumad civilians who have suffered in
the hands of MILF rebels. This kind of anger escalates during shocks, more
so when lives are lost or when properties are destroyed. In the children’s own
experience, the level of anger decreases only after neighbours return to their
homes and start talking again.

Feeling of violation at the loss of child space

Child space is both a physical and psychosocial space where the child can claim
his or her right to privacy, rest, education and other rights.

“Napilitan kaming tumira sa evacuation centre para makaiwas sa gulo. Wala

kaming tamang higaan. Lahat nagsisiksikan…” (We were forced to live in the
evacuation centre to avoid the skirmishes. We had no proper place to sleep.
We were all crammed together.), Ameenah sighs about the lack of privacy in
the evacuation centre.

Gloria, despite the rush to evacuate, thought of her school. “Nahadlok ko sa

among school kay basin sunugon sa armadong grupo kay didto man nag-away
ang army ug MILF.” (I was afraid that our school would be burned because it
became the battleground of the army and the MILF.)

In the absence of playgrounds in the community, the home and its surroundings,
are claimed by children as their own space. It is there that they find their own
corner for play or for other activities. The decision to abandon the home is a
family decision forced by circumstances and influenced by external messages
(by neighbours or local officials). In most cases, the child is not invited to
participate in the decision-making process because of the haste required by the
situation. To the child, the abandonment of a home is also the loss of child
space. At the core of this effect is a basic rights issue: if no one can respect and
protect the privacy of home, where else can the child find space she or he can
claim as his or her own? Children also acquire a sense of ownership of their
school. But this place is also not protected in times of war.
36

Sense of helplessness at the loss of economic resources

“Sana makabalik sa dating tirahan dahil tahimik doon at mahangin.” (I wish

we could go back to our old place because it’s quiet and airy there.) Marie Lyn
sighs as she says this. She now lives with her family in a cramped hut that has
no bedroom or bathroom, definitely without privacy. It is another one of
the many temporary shelters called evacuation area or relocation site she has
stayed in for the past four years. How she longs for home. But home is now
just a pile of ashes left blowing in the wind in Sitio Daya in Dalengaoen in
Pikit, Cotabato. Not only did Marie Lyn’s family lose their house and personal
belongings, they also lost their crops and livestock.

Charisse shakes her head as she describes life in the evacuation centre. “Usahay
wala kami makaon, ug ang akong mga ginikanan ug igsoon nagtrabaho sila sa
baryo aron aduna kami ipalit og bugas ug sud-an.” (Sometimes we had nothing
to eat. My parents and siblings had to work in the village so that we would
have something to buy rice and food with.)

When resources are either eroded or totally lost and livelihoods are abandoned
during wartime, children feel a sense of helplessness similar to what their
parents feel. The amount of losses has a direct relationship to their survival and
development. The loss of a carabao may mean one son off school to help the
father in farm work, or one daughter going to the nearby town centre to work
as a domestic helper.

Yearning for personal belongings left behind

Charisse recounts their rush to evacuate, “Ang akong dala sanina lang ug kaldero.
Wala namo nadala ang tanan namong gamit, gisiguro lang ang among lawas.”
(I only brought clothes and the cooking pot. We were not able to bring all our
things, being concerned only for our safety.)

Abdurahim echoes a similar sentiment, “Konti lang ang gamit na kaya namin.
Tama lang yung dala namin…” (We only brought a few things, only the
basics…) he sighs, then mentions that he brought the cooking pot, “kasi
kailangan sa pagluto.” (It is needed for cooking.)

Children’s accounts of the 2000 war indicate that most of them were taken
by surprise. Facing immediate threats of hunger, death or physical disability,
priority items that their families brought were food, clothing and kitchen
utensils. Children had no choice of what to bring.
 37

Sadness at separation from classmates, friends and neighbours

“I lost all my old playmates,” Marie Lyn pouts, “I did not feel happy in the
evacuation area.”

Charisse expresses a similar feeling. She prefers to live in Sitio Pinamentangan

despite its rough terrain. “Tungod kay naa didto ang akong mga barkada.” (My
friends are there.)

Narrative accounts of children indicate their special concern for classmates,

friends and neighbours. This social concern is an extension of their sense of
loss of child space, of their very own physical place as children. They believe
that child space is nothing without their classmates, friends and neighbours.
Although most can seek comfort among siblings within the family, the bigger
world they seek is a world where there are classmates, friends and neighbours.
At every evacuation period, children immediately feel the loss in their minds
and in their hearts. The first thing they want to know upon reaching the
evacuation centre, is whether or not their classmates, friends and neighbours
are safe, and whether or not they can see one another again.

Strained relations with children from other ethnic groups

“Bisaya lang ang akong kadula palagi ug kapareho nako nga lumad.” (I only
played with Visayans or with my fellow Lumads.) Gloria stresses this fact,
making it clear that she never played with Muslim children.

Abdurahim, on the other hand, claims that he only plays with children who are
“hindi magnanakaw at hindi matigas ang ulo.” (not thieves and not hardheaded).
He is referring to his fellow Muslim children.

Marie Lyn wishes that she could do something about the widening schism
between the Muslims and the Christians. “It is not difficult to live in the
evacuation centre,” she says, “it is how to bridge the gap of relations (between
Muslims and Christians) that is difficult.”

Survival strategies of children indicate idealised longing for harmonious

relations between ethnic groups. No one tends to discriminate or to be selective
in socialisation. Muslim children play with Christian or Lumad children in
school. However, conflicts tend to threaten or significantly change idealised
social relations, especially in mixed communities where one ethnic group or
another has become victims of, or directly got involved in the armed conflict.
38

Some families are vulnerable to these changes and this affects the behaviour of
children.

Stress at the loss of freedom and the limitation of choices

Upon return to their village, Ameenah realised that the military had stayed on.
“Para sa amin pag nandoon pa sila ibig sabihin hindi pa tapos ang gulo.” (As long
as they’re still in the village, war may erupt again anytime.)

“Apas na manggiginawa” (Striving on our own to survive), is how Sauda,

Abdurahim’s elder sister, describes their present life. She says that sometimes
children must give up school to work and to be able to contribute to family
income. For Abdurahim, war is synonymous with no work, which means no
supply of food or clothing.

It takes time for children to regain a sense of freedom when they return to their
home communities. The need to adjust to the changes brought by the war
causes stress.

Anxiety at the abandonment of schools

Charisse recounts the effects of the war in 2000, “Wala na ko naka-eskwela

tungod sa kahadlok….usab ang among maestro mibakwet kay nahadlok pud siya.”
(I had to stop going to school because of fear… even my teacher was so afraid
that he also evacuated.)

“Tingali dili na ko makaeskwela” (I might not be able to go back to school),

Gloria lamented as she moved out of Sitio Baruyan with the rest of her
neighbours. Her school was her main concern.

One of the most serious consequences of the armed conflict is the disruption of
the education of children. There are no exact figures as to how many schools
were closed or abandoned during the 2000 and 2003 wars. Based on the
magnitude of displacement, one can surmise the negative consequences of the
conflict on child development.
 39

Fear of losing father because of association with armed groups

Job, a 15-year-old son of a Christian settler family from Panicupan (Pikit),

fears for his father. “I am afraid that my father will get killed because he is a
member of the CVO.”

Many women lose their husbands as a direct or indirect result of the war.
The task orientation of the men in general, is biased towards protection and
defence of the family and property. Among Christian settlers and Lumads,
this orientation extends to armed defence of the community as members of
paramilitary organisations under the command of the AFP. Local governments
also have their defence organisations called CVO, members of which are
informally authorised to carry weapons, which they themselves usually procure.
Government forces provide assistance in the form of ammunition. Children
whose fathers form part of military organisations are often emotionally affected.
Muslim children also fear for their fathers, not because they are paramilitaries,
but because they are Muslims. It is common knowledge among Muslims that
their men are usually suspected of being involved with the MILF.

Physical and emotional pains

“Natamaan ako sa kanang hita.” (I was hit on the right leg.) Abdurahim recalls
the day their whole village ran for cover.

“I was so afraid that I could not even bring myself to cry,” is all that Ahmed
could say about his father’s death. He nods his head and blinks his eyes as he
speaks. His Bapa Dandoy and some other relatives surround him, sometimes
answering the questions for him when he refuses to.

Charisse recalls how her brother, just a little older and just as confused and
frightened, was made to take responsibility at evacuation time. “Ang akong
magulang nga igsoon si Elmer ninghilak tungod kay gipadala og bugas nga bug-at
kaayo.” (My brother Elmer cried because he was made to carry a very heavy
container of rice.)

The 2000 and 2003 wars differed in intensity for the civilian population. The
war in 2000 was widely anticipated because of the transparent positioning of
government forces and the political announcement of President Estrada. Still,
many were caught by surprise when the war was brought into their villages.
40

The Annual Incidence Report of Carmen and Datu Muntawal PNP Stations,
year 2000, reports that 300 persons (most of them children) died of preventable
diseases during that period.

The children related many other physical effects of the war. These include
kaluli or scabies. On closer look, however, this is a health problem prevailing
under conditions of poverty and lack of sanitation, whether or not there is a
war. Dr. Ernest Guevarra of the Pikit-based Balik Kalipay, argued during a
validation workshop, that this problem is equated with the war because it is
highlighted during monitoring activities at the evacuation centres, where there
is a big chance of contamination.

The experiences of children in times of war are oftentimes relegated to

the sidelines, lumped as part of the general story. Their anecdotes of fear,
loneliness, hunger and anger, are but footnotes in the bigger story of death and
destruction. Abdurahim, Ahmed, Ameenah, Charisse, Daniel, Gloria, Job,
and Marie Lyn, are only a few of the children whose stories need to be known.
Through their stories, the world would see the 2000 and 2003 wars in Central
Mindanao through children’s eyes.

War and its impact on the children is anchored on war and its effect on the
people upon whom the children place their trust. It is thus essential to look at
the effects of war on men and women, on the family, and on the community.

Effects of War on Men and Women

The physical effects of the war on the family, on persons, and on property, is of
primordial concern to men. Men are less candid on the emotional effects of the
war on themselves and on other men. For example, while men recognise that
the women are afflicted with the fear of losing their husbands, a man may find it
difficult to express his own fear of losing his wife or child.

In contrast, women are more candid about the effects of the war on their physical
state and emotions and on their social and economic life. Women talk about how
the war led to their physical separation from their men. They express their anxiety
over the loss of support from their men and the possible association of the men with
 41

armed groups. They also bring to the fore the multiple burden of reproductive1
and productive2 duties of women that remain constant even in times of war.

It is the culturally-prescribed role for men to be economic providers for the family.
That is why the loss of economic resources is traumatic to them. When the
displaced persons of Saranay (Takepan, Pikit) lost their livestock to MILF rebels, it
took time for the men to accept the loss. “Ang mga tigulang dili na intawon makatuo
nga wala na silay mga kalabaw. Mangmata lang tawon sila mga alas 3 sa buntag unya
magdanguyngoy na dayon sa hilak.” (Our elders could not really believe that their
carabaos were gone. They would wake up at 3am and would start crying.)

Women across ethnic groups are collectively concerned about the welfare of their
children, primarily on the matter of the disruption of their studies. This basically
means that in times of war, child space in terms of the school building, is always
violated.

One hardly articulated effect among men is the loss of self-esteem. For Maguindanaon
Muslims in particular, it is a downgrading of their maratabat or self-worth if they
are forced to feel helpless. Like the fear affecting displaced persons across sexes
and age groups, however, men are affected by the fear of dying. They overcome
this fear by taking a proactive mode, either by taking up arms or seeking substantial
information with which to estimate the chances of survival.

Effects of War on Families and Communities

The aggregate effects on all family members constitute the effects of war on
families.

A basic loss in times of war is the loss of the family house. This loss does not only
mean difficulty in resuming normal life. It also means the denial of a primary
sanctuary for children.

Other than their houses, the civilian population of Central Mindanao has
significantly accumulated losses in livestock and other properties since the armed
_______________
1
Reproductive functions refer to activities carried out to care for and maintain the household, eg child care and
rearing, food preparation, water carrying, washing clothes, etc.
2
Productive functions refer to activities inside or outside the home that generate marketable goods or services,
eg vegetable growing, raising animals, fisheries, handicrafts, etc.
42

conflicts began in the late 1960s. No attempt has yet been made on quantifying
these losses and there is no existing monitoring tool and mechanism by which
losses are accurately accounted for. In both wars of 2000 and 2003, significant
losses in property were incurred before and long after each conflict, but the region
does not have a repository of information regarding losses.

But more than the loss of the house, livestock, and other properties, the family has
to contend with the loss of family members. Ahmed’s father was shot before his
eyes. Abdurahim and Ameenah witnessed the death by shock and by stray bullet
of their respective grandparents.

In some cases, loss comes in the form of separation from family members.

Some separations can be traumatic as in the case of families that are forced to split
either because there is not enough space in the new home or they cannot anymore
support the needs of everyone if they were to stick together.

Another major form of loss is the loss of privacy at home. In 2000, residents
of Dalengaeon were asked by rebels to vacate their own homes. Their houses
were eventually burned. Such risks leave families with no choice but to move to
evacuation centres in times of war.

The aggregate effects of the war on individuals and families define the effects of
war on communities.

Central Mindanao is a mixed ethnic community of Maguindanao Muslims,

Christian settlers and Lumads. There are conflicting claims on land exacerbated
by conflicting notions of ownership, such as the customary claims (ancestral
domain) of Maguindanaos and Lumads and the property rights claim (based on
post-colonial and modern land laws) of Christian settlers. Since the region became
a host of settlers from Luzon and the Visayas, mixed ethnic communities struggled
to exist in harmony, often engaging in property trade-offs and social relations.
Settlers purchased land space from Lumads and Maguindanaos. Christian settlers
intermarried with Maguindanaos. Lumads refused to be converted to Islam
and adopted the Christian religion because of traditional enmity with Muslims.
These are economic, social and political investments all aimed at building new
communities. However, these are significantly threatened, if not totally lost,
during armed conflicts. To protect human lives, communities are abandoned and
everyone, regardless of ethnic origin, becomes displaced. With this comes the
erosion of trust between ethnic groups.
 43

Characteristic of wartime is lack of road safety. In August 2000, during the height
of the conflict in Carmen, the national highway between Carmen (Cotabato) and
Damulog (Bukidnon) became unsafe for travellers. The Pikit-Aleosan stretch of
highway between Davao City and Cotabato City, is notoriously unsafe during
heights of conflict. In November 2000, MILF rebels flagged down or strafed every
vehicle passing through the village of Dalengaoen along that stretch of highway.
The same scene was re-enacted on March 2003, after the government’s offensive
on Buliok (Pikit).

Not only roads pose threats, even common resources become difficult to access. In
Kilabao, a sitio of Bgy Kimadzil (Carmen), Lumad and Maguindanao communities
separated by a creek line used to be bound by the traditional pahalatan (customary
agreement). In the 2000 war, MILF rebels used the Maguindanao community as a
transit route for the attack on Kimadzil and Aruman. A number of Lumad villagers
in Kilabao were killed. Since then, the two communities no longer accessed the
wellspring near the creek without clearing the hills on either side with rifle fire for
fear of being ambushed.

Expected is the collapse of civil governance. During heights of conflict, the

environment is transformed into a military situation where armed groups assume
authority, whichever armed group is in control of the territory.

Children find their place amid this scenario. Through work and play, they do
their best to cope in this world of war. How they do so in their very own way is
discussed in the next chapter.
© Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms

2
Chapter 2

FAMILY, FRIENDS AND PRAYER

(How Children Cope)

M any of the children victims of the Mindanao war are still searching for answers
even as they may have produced certain answers to immediate threats. Others have
successfully coped with stress while others have failed and are still in need of assistance.
What follows are the successful ways of coping of the children that can be enhanced
and supported by duty bearers. Duty bearers include governments and state agencies,
NGOs and other civil society organisations. In relation to child rights, duty bearers
also include adult members of the community, such as parents, teachers and religious
leaders.

Interviews and discussions with children aged 12 to 17 reveal ways of coping during the
war common to children across all ethnic groups and certain ways that are particular
only to children who belong to a certain ethnic group (Annex 1, Tables I and J).
The particularity, however, is not much about the ethnicity of the children, but more
about the external environment evolving from the ethnic identification of the family
or group which influences the types of stress affecting the children.

War harnesses the innate ability of children to cope with stress. They have their own
successful coping abilities or strategies (Tables 18 and 19). These are considered
successful because they contain elements of intentional choice of approaches rather
than automatic reflex responses used in defensive responses (Yamamoto, 1993). It may
be premature, however, to argue that the children of Central Mindanao have gained a
certain level of mastery in coping (since most of the children interviewed have grown
46

up through several acutely stressful conditions). These children have survived physical
isolation (they walk to and from school several miles a day, rain or shine, through
isolated trails). They are familiar with deprivation (they have little or no cash allowance
at all when they go to school, no playthings they can call their own, no protection
from harsh weather). They have been bombarded with bad news (killings, stealing of
carabaos, burning of houses). Studies show that children who have achieved mastery
of experience where the locus of control is internal, are likely to cope successfully with
stress (Terr, 1979, 1981,1983; Handford et al, 1986; Malmquist, 1984; Tuckman,
1973 and Glesser et al, 1981).

It may be safe to argue that children may have acquired the ability to repeat coping
styles they have acquired early in life (Murphy et al, 1976). There is a risk that some
may be exhausted and may have depleted their body resources. This can be seen
in some young children who, until now, have not recovered from the physiological
effects of the war. Since the post-conflict environments are less than ideal because of
continuing poverty and lawlessness, additive effects have to be considered. Studies
show that children’s reactions to armed conflict are complicated by additive effects of
continuing violence and deprivation (Bell-Dolan & Hussain, 2002).

How Do Children Cope in Times of War?

The children employ various ways of coping. They do the following:

Seek the support of the family, especially of the mother

Daniel is familiar with rifle fire because his father used to teach him how to handle
a cal.45 pistol and an M14 automatic rifle. But when he heard the deafening
explosion of a bomb coming from the sky, he shuddered in fear. He sought refuge
in his mother’s arms.

The predominant tendency of children is to seek comfort from their mother since
in most cases the father is out somewhere to either get information on what’s
happening or is preoccupied with protection duties for the family property or
the community. The important role of mothers in providing emotional shelter is
validated by the accounts of mothers who, threatened by their own fears, always
strive to remain strong in order to assure their children that everything will turn
out fine.
 47

Invoke protection of God or Allah

“Akong nadungog ug akong nakita ang helekopter nga nagabomba…” (I heard the
helicopter and saw it bombing our place), Charisse recounts. “Nag-ampo ko sa
Ginoo.” (I prayed to God.)

Across all ethnic groups, children tend to seek protection from a Superbeing.
Prayer is the most common method of seeking protection, with the belief that
God or Allah is just around to help.

Maintain Sense of Coherence (SOC)

Sense of coherence refers to the individual’s confidence in the predictability and

manageability of the environment, and his or her belief that everything will get
back to normal (Antonovsky, 1979; Sagy, 1986). SOC is said to be an important
factor in resiliency.

Raja, a 13-year-old Maguindanaon from Carmen, was nine years old when the war
erupted in 2000. “We could hear the explosions and the exchange of fire between
the AFP and the MILF. I dropped down and protected myself,” she recounts her
ordeal.

“My right leg was hit,” Abdurahim states in a matter of fact manner what befell
him during evacuation time. He does not relate anymore how he managed to keep
up with the rest of the evacuees after that.

Daniel ran with his mother to a kind of natural bomb shelter by the back of their
house when the bombing happened. Even if he was trembling in fear, he did not
cry at all.

Maryam was only 14 when the war erupted in 2000. She recounts: “Ang maalala
ko ay bitbit ko ang kaldero at hilahila ko ang kambing kasi nagputukan na.” (I
remember that when the bombing started, I carried our cooking pot and pulled
our goat behind me as I ran.)

Mentally and physically, children 11 to 17 years old, are generally able to maintain
a sense of control (or strive to maintain such control) in various ways. This is
evidenced by a child nursing his own wound during an evacuation, children
seeking physical cover instead of getting immobilised during exchange of fire
or children carrying food stuff and clothes during the journey to avoid hunger
and lack of clothes. Children behave in such ways because they sense that the
emergency situation will somehow change to normal although they have no way
48

of determining when. This can also be seen in the children’s ability to identify
safe grounds (swamp, underground portion of house) or to identify source of risks
(location and direction of gunfire, volume and intensity of fire) from which they
can determine steps for temporary safety. Although children do not have control
of external conditions around them, the ability to cling to the belief that things will
get back to normal improves their resiliency.

Exercise resilience

Gloria reports that she didn’t lack friends to play with at the evacuation centre.
All her neighbourhood friends were there too. “Bisaya lang ako kadula palagi ug
kapariho nako nga lumad.” (I played with the Lumad and Bisaya children.)

Children have the ability to get back to normal as soon as external conditions
improve. Even during heights of conflict, children are able to bring themselves into
the family process once the intensity of firing subsides. In the evacuation centres,
children quickly restore their social activities by seeking old friends or making
new ones. One of the most favourable influences that enhance this resilience is
the presence of the mother during the most crucial times. Children become more
resilient when it is the mother who appears on the scene in the nick of time to offer
support, warmth and comfort (Werner & Smith, 1992).

Maintain normalcy

Marie Lyn befriended their neighbours upon relocation. It was comforting for
her to know that they would be with neighbours who “have the same experience
as ours.”

To keep the boredom and loneliness at bay in the evacuation centre, Charisse made
new friends among the other evacuees. “Mga igsoon nakong Lumad, adunay Bisaya.”
(Some of my friends there were Lumads and Visayans.)

This sense of normalcy at wartime is indicated by purposive actions such as making

new friends, sharing stories or waking up early to do household chores. It provides
relief for short-term periods, primarily because the application of the strategy is
constrained by the absence of favourable conditions.

Inter-sibling co-operation

Charisse recalls how her sister Jocelyn helped their brother carry his load during
evacuation. “Unya gitabangan sa akong igsoon nga babaye si Jocelyn aron madala
ang bugas, pero ang uban nayabo ug nausik tungod kay nagdali-dali kami aron dili
 49

maabotan sa rebelde.” (My sister Jocelyn helped him so that they could bring the
rice, but some of it got spilled and got wasted because we were in a hurry.)

Despite extremely difficult circumstances, close family ties continue to provide a

buffer to stave off stressful conditions. This can be seen in various forms of inter-
sibling co-operation, such as an elder brother or sister taking the load off a younger
sibling’s load of rice during the evacuation.

Keep hope and optimism alive

Throughout their whole journey out of Nalapaan and their stay at the evacuation
centre, Gloria says she did not lose hope. “Sama-sama kami.” (We were all together.)
The togetherness of their family and the community mattered most to her.

Marie Lyn attended the inter-generational healing and counselling conducted by

Balay, Inc., an NGO. “I was able to work on the acceptance of our situation,” she
said after the experience.

The knowledge that they are not alone in the middle of war is essential to the
children. The active participation of NGOs and government agencies in the relief
effort, including psychosocial initiatives by some NGOs, enhance this feeling of
optimism. The mere presence of duty bearers, in fact, brings hope.

It is equally important and in fact compelling to note that there are unsuccessful
coping strategies that need to be looked into and addressed effectively. Children who
lose a parent or a relative, children who nursed bullets and constantly remember
the events from the scars and children who witnessed the killing of a parent or a
relative, find it difficult to cope. They have tried to but failed, because the success
desired is beyond their own means of coping.

Studies show that children 7 to 11 years old may not completely eradicate the
memories and effects of the stress they have experienced (Dacey & Travers, 1996).
The children from Mindanao with physiological effects are in this age group.
These children may fall under the group of children who are likely to increase their
vulnerability or attain limited immunity to later stresses because of their earlier
stressful experiences, as Rutter describes in a study done in 1983.
50

These are stressful experiences that prove too strong for children to cope with alone
and require external interventions:
• Witness to a killing, especially killing of a next of kin
• Getting wounded during a crossfire
• Witness to death of a kin because of shock during skirmishes or bombing
• Witness to a family confrontation with armed groups, eg, rebels or government
soldiers barging into homes
• Destruction of school buildings (affects children wishing to finish their
education); and,
• Chronic violation of rights, eg, theft of livestock, burning of homes, where
the violators roam around with impunity resulting in chronic stress to affected
persons.

The Ways Men and Women Cope

Women tend to be more flexible than men in harnessing abilities and developing
strategies. Their body language and thoughts are more transparent to their children
and to their peers. They do not necessarily assert rights to make decisions of their
own, but they engage the men in discourses leading towards decisions, at home or
in the community. Women are always ready to assume leadership of the family in
situations where a husband is deceased or incapacitated.

In contrast, a complex backdrop influences the characterisation of men in the

armed conflict in Central Mindanao. A sociological dimension influences their
behaviour according to their ethno-religious backgrounds. A gender dimension
influences their behaviour with respect to their relations with women and children.
And then there is the general notion of men as men at war.

It is difficult to isolate the men from the war. Wars are characteristically male in
nature. So too is the conflict in Central Mindanao. The men’s ways of coping need
to be understood within this context. Whether by choice or physical and social
location, men are closer to war than women and children. Looking at a family
from the outside, women and children tend to confront more stressful conditions
than men, because the men in the family are themselves contributors to stress
conditions.
 51

Amid the chaos, women maintain a sense of control by calming children. This
action re-emphasises the role of the family as a mantle of security for all of its
members. It directly supports the emotional needs of children during acute stress
conditions. Mothers play a crucial role in supplanting the need since in most cases
the male head of the family is out somewhere either to secure information or to
physically protect family property or territory.

During heights of conflict, the first thing that men do is to connect with other men in
the community and to co-operate with community leaders. In most communities,
official communications tend to flow along male lines of communication. Men,
therefore, have the natural tendency to connect with community leaders and to
co-operate in community decisions. These decisions are relayed back to the family.
This is reflective of the impulse to defend the community from aggressors and to
protect family property, in accordance with their task orientation. In the 2000
and 2003 wars, a number of men died defending their homes and livestock from
armed groups.

Through it all, women maintain their optimism. They pull this through by
maintaining physical calmness in front of the family, praying to gain more strength
or by mental exercises that eliminate fears. Like the women, the men resort to
prayer to God or Allah for protection. This is common to men from different
ethnic backgrounds.

Before NGOs introduced methods of formalising support systems through

organising (largely after the war in 2000), the women have created their own
support systems in manageable scales such as in neighbourhoods (among old friends
and neighbours) or new friendship groups in the evacuation centres. Similar to
this strategy, men tend to sustain the socialisation process in evacuation centres by
seeking new friends. This usually occurs when old neighbours no longer find each
other in the evacuation centre. It is also normal for men to seek external assistance,
making use of their connections with the local government and the military.

Under extreme conditions such as evacuation in the thick of fighting, the spirit of
bayanihan (sharing) is activated. Along the route, women offer support to their
neighbours. Men on the other hand, negotiate with armed groups. When directly
confronted with threat groups, men are forced to negotiate in order to bide time
and allow the other members of the family to move to safety.

During the 2000 war, a significant portion of income from distress sales of livestock
was used to purchase weapons. This tendency is common among Christian and
Lumad men who predominantly compose village-based paramilitary organisations
attached to government forces and local government units.
52

There are limits to what men can do, however. Although farms are closely associated
with their self-worth, they are forced to abandon these when defence is no longer
feasible without risk to life.

Women acquire the ability to develop inner strength, especially when the men
are absent. This is evidenced by physical behaviours such as remaining calm on
the outside despite inner fears. In contrast, it is keeping busy with work to deny
what is happening and to overcome grief over losses in property that men resort to.
They tend to focus their attention on whatever work they can lay their hands on.

Duty bearers provide an external mantle of security ranging from ensuring food
security while in the evacuation centre to providing some resources that have been
lost to displaced persons. There are indications that in areas where NGOs are
present, women are the most active participants of community activities.

The Way Families and Communities Cope

Displaced families in Central Mindanao are vulnerable to economic-related chronic

stress. This is due to poverty, low level of human resources and conflicting claims on
land and other natural resources. The wars of 2000 and 2003 occurred amid these
circumstances. Hence, the coping abilities of displaced families emanate from a
material base wherein families are heavily and solely dependent on depleted assets.
Their ability to cope would normally be effective for short periods of displacement.
Long displacement periods would make it very difficult for these families to make
a good start and recover from the shock.

Just as individuals seek comfort in their own families, families also tend to seek
comfort in being with other families during external shocks. Isolation tends to
contribute to stressful situations within a family such that they always strive to
regroup. Joining other families increases the chance of survival.

Distress sales normally occur shortly before or immediately after evacuation. In both
periods, actual conditions in the villages are no longer manageable for continuing
normal economic activities. Some families unload their assets to informal markets
at sub-market prices before the war based on the estimation that they would be
incapable of protecting their properties. Others unload assets after the evacuation
for the simple objective of generating whatever exchange entitlement to resources
 53

they would have lost otherwise. These assets are acquired over time. At every
distress sale, the family loses not only its assets, but also the opportunity to make
life better for the children.

In communities where trust levels between ethnic groups have diminished and
are infected by mutual suspicion, families tend to regroup selectively. This
tendency is never formalised as policy. It simply emerges as a group choice. Duty
bearers adapt to it accordingly by serving all groups wherever they are located.
During the 2000 war, the Christian settlers of Malapag (Carmen) evacuated to a
Christian-only evacuation centre in Damulog (Bukidnon). They did not invite
their Maguindanaon Muslim neighbours. The latter evacuated to Muslim villages
or occupied spaces in uninhabited rubber plantations. During the same year,
Christian settlers in Pikit sought refuge in the gymnasium owned by the Catholic
Parish while their Muslim neighbours occupied the town plaza and some public
schools.

Displaced communities are formally divided according to the political map of

municipalities. All are governed by formal civil structures created by the Local
Government Code of 1991. Local officials are elected according to law. Unlike
other communities in non-conflict areas, the civil governance structures in displaced
communities are extremely under pressure from armed groups. On the side of
government, military presence preponderates over the presence of and activities
of civilian agencies. Outside of government, various armed groups operate in the
territory.

Since the 1970s, displaced communities have never experienced peace and
development. In between heights of armed conflict, the people’s struggle for
survival is constantly put under threat by low intensity conflicts. The peace of
Muslim communities can, at any time, be disrupted by clan wars affecting not only
families but entire communities. Christian communities, on the other hand, are
constrained by disruptions in their economic activities, not to mention the lack of
access to basic services from the government.

Their experiences over several decades of conflict, however, show that these
communities have the ability to cope. There is no single community in the region
that has ever been completely abandoned.

While it may be argued that displacement is an effect of the war and is forced
upon people by external circumstances, evacuation is a kind of coping strategy
during the war. This is designed to achieve several objectives, such as prevention or
protection from unnecessary loss of lives, prevention of hunger due to inability to
produce goods and to seek external support.
54

In mixed communities where the relations between ethnic groups are manageably
harmonious, community representatives can jointly negotiate with either the
rebels or government forces for the protection of civilians. Antonio, a 61-year-old
Cebuano Christian settler who resides in Baruyan (Nalapaan, Pikit), woke up one
day in 2000 facing MILF rebels in front of his house. His instinct told him that
he could negotiate with the rebels, but since he is a Christian, it would be more
effective if a Muslim representative from the community would be around. Having
instructed his wife and children to slip out of the house and hide in a safe place, he
and his two brothers, a neighbour and a Muslim member of the barangay council
negotiated with the rebels. At stake was the safety of the civilian population. The
rebels wanted food, the community representatives wanted sufficient time for the
civilians to evacuate to safety. A deal was made. The rebels would wait for their
food supply from the community. The community representatives would collect
food from the neighbourhood. The civilians would slip out towards the town centre
of Pikit across the Panicupan River. The evacuation was done at night. Antonio,
together with the other men, remained behind as “guarantees”, a euphemism for
being held as hostages.

Problems occur when displaced communities move to host communities.

Competition occurs between the evacuees and their hosts over relief resources.
Schools also pose problems. A number of schools in host communities had
remained operational during the war. The problem was that these schools could not
readily accommodate the displaced children. Some schools that were not damaged
by the armed conflict could not operate because the teachers refused to return to
their posts for security reasons.

There are communities that remain under constant threat because of their geographic
location, physical isolation or demographic configuration. Correspondingly, their
coping abilities are often inadequate to withstand external pressure. Muslim
communities in far-flung areas that are close to rebel camps or positions are
vulnerable to harassment by government forces. Christian communities in similar
locations are also vulnerable to harassment by rebel groups or bandits that are
alleged by government to have links with the MILF.

Some communities have improved their coping abilities due to external inputs of
NGOs, such as provision of economic inputs, psychosocial-related interventions,
or peace initiatives. In Pikit, many mixed communities that used to be devastated
economically and socially in 2000 were spared from devastation in 2003 because
of the ‘space for peace’ technology that empowered civilians to claim their rights
 55

to protection. In Carmen, mixed communities that used to suffer from ethnic

cleavages after the war in 2000 have held their ground and resisted being embroiled
in the armed conflict of 2003.

Crucial to the coping abilities of displaced communities are basic resources that
will enable them to resume livelihoods and to harmoniously co-exist with other
ethnic groups. Experience alone will not improve their coping abilities. They have
to have sufficient material resources, social capital and political strength to cope
with armed conflicts.

The ability of children to cope during the war is anchored on the ability of the
men and women in their lives to cope. They look up to their families and their
community leaders. They respond to the needs of the time, be it evacuation,
family reorganisation or whatever is appropriate for the safety of everyone. They
do not give themselves the chance to question what is happening. They simply do
the best they could to help their families survive.

What is most remarkable, however, is the way the children face life after the
evacuation centre, after the deaths and the losses, after the nightmare that is the
war.
© Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms

3
Chapter 3

THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN

(In The Aftermath of War)

F rom historical experience, the end of war, or the post-conflict scenario, is not exactly
the end. It is but a prelude to new conflicts saddled with additives like poverty,
lawlessness and violence. Aid agencies operating in the Mindanao region operated on
a post-conflict mode, believing that the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement in 1996 was
a definitive post-conflict policy statement agreed upon by warring actors. It was a
mistaken perception. Two major wars in 2000 and 2003 erupted.

After the war, most displaced persons return to their home communities. In everyone’s
mind is the desire to start life anew, to pick up the pieces. To most people, their own
home is always better than the evacuation centre. Everyone in the family takes on a
task - house is cleaned (if it still stands), farm is visited, leaking roof is repaired - that
serves as a collective strategy for moving on. Led by the parents, the strategy is shaped
from individual wishes and actions.

The question that needs to be asked is where the children are amidst all these, when it
is not a time of war, but neither is it a time of peace.
58

How Do Children Face the Future

After the Pains of War?

Children make it a point to adapt to the world after the war. They know very well
how to move on. To do so, they do the following:

Take responsibility

Every day after classes and during weekends, Ameenah helps her mother at home
with the chores. She also assists her father in the farm. Their family needs all the
able hands to make sure that they will have a good harvest.

Weekends and school breaks see Ahmed working very hard in his Bapa Dandoy’s
farm. So far, he has helped his grandfather plant a hundred mango trees. “I do
so because my father is already dead,” he says. He is fully aware that the earnings
from the farm would support his studies in the future.

Marie Lyn is given the responsibility of bringing food to her father in the farm.
Since both farm and school are far from their house, she often misses her classes.
This saddens her because she values her studies.

Usually, elder children are in the first line of duty to take on more production
functions to the extent that some have to forfeit their right to formal education.
In situations where the male head of the family is no longer present, the eldest son
usually takes over management of the farm in partnership with the mother. The
new roles also signify new time management requirements. Children in school
need to wake up early to do household chores or farm work in order to catch up
with school hours and come back early to finish the day’s work at home.

Pasadiyos (Leave everything to God)

At night and on Fridays, Abdurahim goes with his sister Sauda to the mosque to
pray. “Pasadiyos,” he says.

At the time of evacuation, Charisse knew that she had no one but Ginoo (God).
“Nag-ampo ko sa Ginoo nga unta dili kami maigo sa bala.” (I prayed to God to
protect us from the bullets.) After the war, she knows that Ginoo is still her only
hope. “Tabang sa Ginoo” (Help from God), is all that she asks for.

Children in their innocence know that a Superbeing is looking over them all the
time.
 59

Reunite with old neighbours and friends

Charisse has re-established ties with her neighbours. “Maayo. Nagsinabtanay

man kami, nagestoryahanay kung unsa’y problema.” (It’s good. We talk about our
problems. We understand each other.)

For Marie Lyn, seeing her old friends in the neighbourhood and in school once
again is a great relief. The chapel is one of her favourite places. “I see my old
friends there,” she says.

As soon as the family is settled back home, children immediately reconnect with
their friends and peers. They swap stories (mostly about the previous evacuation),
play and talk about the future. Bonding assures children that they can start life all
over again.

Adjust to family re-organisation

As a consequence of the two major wars, Ahmed and his family were relocated
twice. First in Punol, Pikit and then in Batulawan. He is now back in Sitio
Daya where he lives with his grandfather, Bapa Dandoy. Bapa Dandoy is now the
surrogate father of Ahmed and his two younger sisters. Their mother remarried a
year after their father’s death.

Families tend to make adjustments by re-organising for various practical reasons.

This means transferring one or distributing a few children to relatives. Children
adapt to this by not resisting temporary separation. Some relatives require able-
bodied children for temporary adoption so that they can be on hand to help.
Grandparents would prefer children in the lower age brackets to accompany them
during their retirement from farm duties. Parents know that the chances of reuniting
are low, but they find comfort in the feeling that their children have secure shelter
and food and that they are within reach because they are with relatives.

Bond with family members

Ameenah says it well, “Basta kasama ko ang buo kong pamilya, masaya na ako.” (I
am happy as long as I am with my family.) She is definite about who causes the
war, “Yung mga taong walang minamahal sa buhay.” (People who love no one.)
She will survive anything as long as her whole family, whom she truly loves, is with
her.

Abdurahim says that he would never want to leave Pagalungan because his family
is there. By family he means his sister Sauda and his other siblings.
60

Closeness with the members of the family is essential to the children. It is a form
of reassurance that their world is intact.

Children have different ways of coping after the war. The children whose families
are unable to cope with the challenge of returning to their original homes are
forced to face extended stresses in the evacuation centres. Some children trade-off
space and the joy of being home with the mantle of physical safety provided by
the evacuation centres. This is not their decision. It is an adjustment to a decision
made by their parents. Indeed, in the post-conflict scenario, children mostly abide
by the decisions made by the adults. The children know that it is not just they, but
their parents, the other families, and the whole community, that is in the process
of adjustment.

Men and Women After the War

“Gikapoy na ko sa interview. Kapila na mi gi-interview sa NGO wala may resulta.”

(I am tired of interviews. We have been interviewed several times by NGO people
but nothing has been done to help us.) Milia Limpiado, a 46-year-old Lumad
mother of four, declares her aversion towards NGO interviews.

While NGO assistance is governed by basic principles including non-discrimination,

there is always a possibility that some families or communities may be excluded
either due to limitations in resources or due to their distance from village centres.
Some Lumad communities in Carmen, Cotabato are located in far-flung areas with
no access to transportation. Residents, therefore, are not easily accessible to duty
bearers. They are not able to avail of opportunities that may enhance their coping
abilities. Given this reality, they rely on their own ways of coping after the war.

Appended to a woman’s role as mother and wife are reproductive and productive
tasks. Women tend to tailor their ways of coping to these tasks. They immediately
create an environment of normalcy. This is done by immediately organising
household routines such as taking care of their husbands and children, and involving
children in household chores. Hand-in-hand with this, they re-establish social
bonds and get more involved in community activities. They take time to sing,
watch television and share stories with other women. In some communities, this
socialisation process graduated to an agenda-oriented process through community
organisations. In 2003, when many NGOs penetrated home communities, this
became more prominent. It is also the women’s initiative to take charge of managing
the time of family members, especially the children. This comes with managing
 61

financial resources. The latter actually means tightening food and education
budgets, which significantly affect the well being of children. It is therefore the
women who know at once that the family can no longer survive without external
assistance. In communities that are not served by NGOs or government agencies,
families turn to their relatives for help.

The ways of coping of the men is anchored on their task orientation to do their
role as protector and provider of the family. Prayer to gain spiritual strength comes
with this. Christian men take time to analyse objective conditions and to determine
whether the community is safe before they announce the decision to return home.
This is because many of them had almost fatal experiences with rebels and bandits
who attack mainly Christian families. Lumad men tend to spend more time with
their children after the war. They also promote closer co-operation among family
members. Christian men pray to God and Maguindanaon men pray to Allah to
derive inner strength. Lumad men emphasise faith as a community activity that
strengthens their bond. Bintana, the Lumad house of prayer, also doubles as a
community centre, where community members reaffirm their allegiance to their
indigenous leadership structure and ancestral beliefs. The will to breach the ethnic
divide is articulated by Christian and Maguindanao men. The ‘space for peace’
programme of the Immaculate Conception Parish with the assistance of NGOs in
Pikit effectively mitigated risks during the 2003 war.

Men make it a point to avail of government and NGO assistance. These forms
of assistance provide opportunities for them to get involved in community
organisations (other than their men-only defence-related activities).

Families and Communities After War

Displaced families face a sudden crisis of confidence once they leave the evacuation
centres. They are aware that their resources have been depleted. The notion of
resuming normal life is saddled with anxiety arising from risks related to economic
uncertainty and the prospect of resurgence of violence and armed conflict. To
cope, families make it a point to adapt to their new economic status.

Reduction of expenses is a common consequence. This includes reduction of

budget for education. Some children, especially those in the upper age bracket,
absorb the risks by dropping out from school.
62

Essential to families is the ownership of a work animal. To acquire a replacement

for the animal lost during the war, families sell their other assets. Large families
who lost not only their livestock but also their homes are forced to re-organise.
Some children move to their relatives while elder siblings find work in town centres.
The members of the family create a normal environment despite this reality. This
is done through routines in house and farm work. More time is allocated for
production. Children are mobilised for farm duties.

Communities cope and move on after the war with external assistance.

After the war in 2000, aid agencies were confronted with the problem of how
to sustain gains and how to prepare communities for future disasters. Using
participatory methods of social and needs assessment, strategies were developed
and designed to build on indigenous capacities developed through humanitarian
assistance projects.

“Space for peace” was popularised in the Pikit area. The displaced communities
were encouraged to collectively and jointly confront inter-ethnic concerns and
problems. This led to peace dialogues that ultimately engendered the emergence
of community organisations representing various ethnic groups.

Some civil society organisations posit that Mindanao is a society comprised of

three distinct but co-existing peoples. These are the Islamic tribes aggregated as the
Moro people; the non-Muslim indigenous groups aggregated as Lumads; and the
various non-Muslim settlers from Luzon and the Visayas aggregated as Christian
settlers. The idea of bringing these ethnic groups into a dialogue for peace has been
welcomed by the civilian population and by warring actors.

The participation of displaced persons in the delivery and distribution of relief

assistance has developed the capacity of communities to purposively engage
government agencies and NGOs for post-relief agendas such as community
institution building, peace building, health and sanitation and livelihood assistance.
Lately, psychosocial-related activities of NGOs attracted the participation of
displaced persons.

There had been a number of dialogues between displaced persons and the AFP, and,
in some instances, dialogues between the MILF and the displaced persons. These
dialogues have improved the capacity of civilians to deal with armed groups.
 63

Communities normally have indigenous structures that serve as indigenous

mechanisms for governance and conflict mitigation. These have been maintained
and enhanced with new community organisations designed not only for community
institution building but also for purposive functions around specific agendas such
as health and sanitation, livelihood and peace building.

Upon returning home from the evacuation centre, the children assume
responsibilities way beyond their age as they hold on to a Superbeing whom they
believe would help them. Foremost in their minds is the reality that they are still
with their families and their old friends and neighbours. And even when family
re-organisation takes that away from them, they do not complain. They allow
themselves to be mobilised for work. They agree to quit school. In short, they
wholly and thoroughly adjust to the decisions of the adults.

How can the children adjust that easily? From where do they gather their inner
strength? What are their vulnerabilities and capacities? These are the questions
that the next chapter will tackle.
© Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms

4
Chapter 4

INTO THE CHILDREN’S WORLD

H ow the children feel and how they view the world around them matter most,
whether in time of peace or of war. Children have common vulnerabilities in
the area of access to education, economic resources and level of awareness of children’s
rights. Children are most open to stress regarding their education in view of the
incapacity of their parents to sustain their schooling and the limited time they have for
studies due to their participation in economic production.

Variations in vulnerability occur in the area of physical locations of children (see Table
1). Children in evacuation centres are most vulnerable to exposure to health risks
and vagaries of nature. Among children in the home communities, the Lumad and
Maguindanao are most affected by isolation (no access to electricity and transportation)
and difficulties in accessing potable water. There are also distinct variations in physical
health. Some children afflicted with skin diseases develop an inferiority complex that
affects their social relations. There are also cases where the social life of children is
affected because of prohibitions from parents or because of family demands for them
to work.
66

Table 1.Vulnerabilities of Children

(Self-rating)

Christian Lumad Maguindanao

• house far from school • source of water far • shelter in EC made of
• no privacy in from house tarpaulin
LOCATIONAL

evacuation centre • village not accessible • house far from school

(EC) to transportation and barangay centre
• exposure to health • no electricity • source of potable
risks at EC • village easily affected water far from house
by armed conflict

• lack of food • skin diseases

PHYSICAL

• living conditions in EC
• prone to diseases

• not allowed by other • time for play diverted

SOCIAL

to socialise to work
• scabies affect social life

• not enough money to • not enough money to • not enough money to

go to school go to school buy basic needs
• not enough money to • not enough money to
ECONOMIC

buy medicines go to school

• house made of light • work reduces time for
materials education
• lack of food
• farm work reduces
time for education

• lack of knowledge • no knowledge of

MENTAL, EMOTIONAL

about government children’s rights

• lack of knowledge
about children’s rights
• family lacks capacity
to handle problems
regarding health and
survival

Children have more things in common than differences in terms of capacities (Table 2).
Most highlighted are the social (to breach ethnic lines in socialisation) and economic
capacities (to work while studying to contribute to family income). It is also important
for them to attain a mantle of security (with emotional support from the family), and
to live in home sites where there is ample space, fresh air and clean water. Home sites
also have the common advantage of being close to the school, house of prayer and
playground. Lumad children, however, generally reside in isolated communities (far
from schools and playgrounds).
 67

Table 2. Capacities of and Opportunities for Children

(Self-rating)

Christian Lumad Maguindanao

• fresh air • fresh air • house near school,
LOCATIONAL

• house near library, mosque and health

playground centre

• can combine work and • can work in the farm

PHYSICAL

study

• easily relates with • can relate with other • can relate with
other people ethnic groups children from other
• opportunity to read • articulate ethnic groups
SOCIAL

books, watch TV, listen • opportunity to watch

to radio TV, listen to radio,
• can use chapel as read books
venue to socialise

• can earn income from • can work for income • financial support from
ECONOMIC

work to support study and help parents relatives to finish

school

• optimistic about the • strong drive to finish • have access to books,

MENTAL, EMOTIONAL

future education TV, radio

• emotional support • emotional support • emotional support
from family and friends from parents from siblings
• faith in God • can reason out well
• belief in oneself

Vulnerabilities and Capacities

of Men and Women

The stereotyped roles prescribed for women influence their self-assessment of

their vulnerabilities. Although they have the capacity to relate with women and
men from other ethnic groups, their prescribed role in the family limits them
from optimising such capacity. Only in communities where civilian agencies of
government or NGOs are active are women able to avail of opportunities for wider
socialisation and learning.
68

Men, on the other hand, tend to highlight more capacities than vulnerabilities in
all aspects except in some capacity areas where there are differences between ethnic
groups. Ethnic variations flow along social and emotional aspects. Lumad men
highlight the issue of marginalisation (being treated as a minority group) and its
accompanying stress on the persons affected. Maguindanao men highlight stressors
arising from living conditions in the evacuation centres. Lumad and Christian men
highlight location of home sites as a capacity area because of physical advantages
such as sufficient space, fresh air and clean water. Maguindanao men, on the other
hand, consider their location due to constriction in space and lack of access to basic
services as vulnerabilities.

In general, women are more vulnerable than men. It is very difficult for them to
attend to their multiple tasks when they get sick. Even those who are not sick
find it difficult to do these multiple tasks, especially when food needs are not
secure. Insufficiency in household income increases the vulnerability of women to
additional emotional and physical burdens. As mothers, they suffer from emotional
stress when their children are not able to go to school due to low finances. They
also suffer from physical stress when family members get sick and they are not able
to buy medicines.

In the context of multiple tasks, women highlight capacities needed to attend to

these tasks. It is important to note that while these capacities may be deemed to
be sufficient for women’s roles, they do not address women’s needs for their own
development. Rural women are physically and emotionally resilient but there may
be a danger of exhaustion, which will ultimately affect their coping abilities during
emergencies.

Physical capacity on the other hand, is a common attribute of men across ethnic
lines. The physical ability to do farm work or other livelihoods is a basic requirement
in fulfilling their task-oriented function as provider for the family. Lumad men
make special mention of their capacity to withstand hunger. This coping ability
is important, especially in upland areas where hunting, slash-and-burn farming in
forest lands and foraging account for household food supply more than domesticated
agriculture. In most cases, this capacity is externally assisted by hunger suppressants
such as betel nut chewing or by physical and mental conditioning.

Religion provides a levelling point. Both men and women find strength in religion.
Religious activities serve as venue for socialisation with neighbours. Regular prayer
services provide a sense of community and identity. It also functions as support
mechanism for families in need of social bonds. Religious practice, however, tends
to confine socialisation to neighbours from the same ethnic group or religious
faith.
 69

Vulnerabilities and Capacities

of Families and Communities

Displaced families are generally poor. There may be a difference in the depths
of poverty across ethnic groups, but this difference is insignificant. Within a
mixed community, Christian settlers tend to be better off than their Maguindanao
or Lumad neighbours due to technological and capital advantages, as well as
access to external support. That is not to discount the fact that there are upper
class Maguindanaos who are economically and politically a class apart from the
majority of the Maguindanao population. Lumads are generally marginalised
and dispossessed of their ancestral possessions. Some of them have affiliated
themselves with Christian churches and have benefited from the higher education
opportunities offered by these churches.

Continuing deprivation affect the coping abilities of displaced families. Due to

subsistence economies, the families are hardly able to generate surplus income.
Subsistence production may be seen as a capacity for survival. However, it becomes
a vulnerability especially to large and expanding families that rely on the same size
and quality of land for survival. The absence of surplus capital and lack of external
capital inflows make displaced families vulnerable to maintaining the same form of
economy for survival. This creates uncertainties for current family members and
their future children. Subsistence production does not show positive economic
growth corresponding to the population growth of the family. This vulnerability
remains unattended by duty bearers whose interventions are mainly focused on
relief aid during emergencies and less on post-emergency assistance.

Sizes of displaced families are relatively big, with more than sufficient human
labour capacity that can be converted to incomes. This human resource, however,
is mainly and sub-optimally utilised by families on small-sized farms. To add to
that, the physical location of these farms and home sites render families vulnerable
to lawless elements and warring actors during heights of armed conflict. With no
access to communication and transportation, they easily fall prey to human rights
violations. Many displaced families rely on the radio or on their neighbours who
own televisions, for information. Children in school relay information, but not
on the issues of the day, which are the ones most useful to adults. There is scarce
information on armed threats and on development opportunities. These families
are also the least accessible to NGO and government agency support.

Repeated displacement has enabled families to develop and reuse coping strategies.
This resiliency has improved after the war in 2000 due to external support from
NGOs which are beginning to give attention to post-displacement needs such as
70

home site development, livelihood programmes, psychosocial-related interventions

and community institution building.

Strong family ties are proven to have mitigated risks and improved the coping
abilities of families and individual family members. This is evidenced by the
distinct role of families as governing organisations during heights of conflict.
Outside of designated evacuation centres, there are families absorbing displaced
families beyond the knowledge of duty bearers. The extent of this practice is not
yet studied, but accounts indicate that this capacity is historical and has remained
functional. This tends to be more predominant among Maguindanaon Muslim
families and Lumads, where clan structures are fairly strong and bloodlines are
customarily taken into account.

Displaced families aim for the basics. Adults simply want peaceful environments
so that they can produce incomes to support their families. Children simply want
better opportunities so that they can educate themselves and become productive
citizens.

An overview of displaced communities show that these areas have economic-

related attributes common to all other poverty-ridden communities in the
country. However, they have the distinction of suffering from the additive effects
of chronic armed conflicts (inclusive of parallel events such as clan wars, human
rights violations, banditry and others) and their resulting negative impacts on
productivity, political institutions and social relations of the civilian population.

Displaced communities are highly vulnerable to external and internal risks and
threats. These include chronic stressors such as the recurring armed conflict,
lawlessness and violence and rampant poverty. There has been a depletion of
human capital that contributes to chronic stress among the civilian population.

Communities are also vulnerable to inter-ethnic rivalry because of external pressure

from ethnic-based armed actors. Moro communities perceive government action as
mainly emanating from a Christian-dominated civil state. Christians and Lumads
perceive the rebellion as a mainly Muslim agenda. The disasters caused by war lead
to human and material losses that tend to induce biases and replicate the conflicts
at the community level.

Filipino nationhood is still a contested identity mainly because of the predominantly

Christian character of the civil state, which is perceived as foreign to what is claimed
as Moroland. Christian settlers are identified with the Christian-dominated civil
state that has been cited by Moro rebels as the successor of colonial aggressors
to Mindanao. Maguindanaon Muslims identify themselves with Bangsamoro
 71

or “Moro Nation” which is being espoused by both the MNLF and the MILF.
Lumads are caught in between but they tend to voluntarily side with Christian
settlers rather than their Maguindanaon Muslim neighbours.

A key issue in the armed conflict between government and Moro rebels is the issue
of land. Rebels assert the issue of ancestral domain rights inclusive of the rights of
non-Muslim indigenous peoples like the Manobos living in the region. This claim
tends to be primordial in character and proceeds from pre-colonial land ownership
which, politically, rejects the ownership claims of Christian settlers who base their
claims on land laws promulgated by the Philippine state. The ancestral domain
claim of the Moro people has been put forward by the MILF to the peace talks
(with the government). The issue remains unsettled, lending uncertainty to the
property rights environment of the region.

There are no accurate data on human rights violations in the region. There is
currently a low level of awareness of human rights among the civilian population
and the various armed groups. There is an incontestable accumulation of human
rights violations ranging from summary killings, destruction of houses, schools
and houses of prayer and illegal confiscation of property.

Despite the vulnerabilities mentioned, displaced communities have innate

capacities that enhance their coping ability and the quality of their coping strategies.
Historical data show that communities are very much capable of breaching the
ethnic divide. The first Christian settlers arrived in the region in the early 1900s
based on colonial land laws that effectively divested Muslims and Lumads of their
ancestral possessions. This notwithstanding, the new settlers were able to co-exist
in harmony with the pioneers. Dalengaoen (Pikit) is one of the oldest Christian
settlements in Cotabato, where settlers from Luzon and the Visayas inter-married
with Maguindanao Muslims and Lumads. The 2000 war tested this capacity of
communities to breach the ethnic divide.

Peace building is a post-2000 crosscutting intervention of local NGOs with the

support of aid agencies and international development agencies. Experience shows
that communities devastated by war actively participate in peace-building initiatives.
Although these initiatives are still vulnerable to negative external influences, they
show that communities have the innate capacity to create a culture of peace within
a diverse cultural milieu.

Recognising that the coping abilities of individuals, families, clans and ethnic
groups are not sufficient to prevent the disintegration of communities, displaced
communities are now discovering the value of community organising as an
instrument for improving the coping abilities of the communities.
72

The coping abilities of individuals, families, clans, ethnic groups and the whole
community shape the way the children of Central Mindanao cope at wartime.
Caught within issues beyond their own understanding -- Filipino identity,
Christians versus Muslims, ancestral domain, the protracted war -- the children
are in essence totally vulnerable. Wholly unaware of their rights as children in
the vast confusion of it all, however, it is remarkable that they have the capacity to
survive.

What choices the children have given their vulnerabilities and capacities amid the
war will be discussed in the next chapter.
73
© Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms

5
Chapter 5

CHOICES
(When Children Make Decisions)

I nformation plays a critical role in shaping ways of coping during emergency

situations. Where information is slow or defective, civilians may suffer irreversible
losses. Forewarning and foresight are critical factors that improve the coping abilities
of displaced persons and their communities. But these factors are contingent on the
availability of information. Most communities affected by the 2000 war were not
prepared for the shock despite the relatively high level of public anticipation that war
was coming. On the other hand, forewarning may not have changed the flow of events
at all. The preponderant pressure from external forces like the AFP and the MILF
would have overwhelmed the civilian population.

Communities that are forewarned are able to minimise risks and to move more
efficiently. Families that are forewarned are able to collect enough necessities during
evacuation. They would be less deprived during the interim period prior to the arrival
of duty bearers in the evacuation centres. Only a few communities and families had
this opportunity in 2000. They were more prepared to deal with the conflict in 2003.
But this was largely because the war was short-lived and was confined to the Pikit and
Pagalungan areas.
76

What Choices are Open to Children

in Times of War?

One important area of concern in conflict situations is the problem of asymmetry in

information. Children have limited capacity for acquiring information, especially
under conditions where information flow is hindered by lack of infrastructure and
poor information management within the family and community. Both parents
and children in Central Mindanao have ethnically biased perceptions about the
war. Christian settlers and Lumads argue that the Muslim rebels cause the war.
Maguindanaon Muslims argue that it is due to the government soldiers. This
implies that even parents find themselves inadequate in providing answers to
the key questions about the war being asked by the children. Children identify
themselves with the thinking of their parents simply because they do not have
access to other information.

Children are hardly aware of their rights. Much less are they aware that their rights
are recognised and protected by law. The same lack of awareness afflicts parents,
except those who have attained higher education or are exposed to the external
world through NGO activities. There is a glaring scarcity of information. Rights
issues do not form part of the early education of the children. Outside of school,
there are no materials available for them to learn about their rights.

In general, children do not make autonomous decisions whenever they are with
the family. Those who are away from elders during skirmishes usually make
instantaneous decisions to seek physical cover and immediately reconnect with
families. Adolescents are generally articulate about their choices. This capacity
is a product of an empowerment process resulting from their participation in the
family’s economic upkeep. Where children are involved in production, they are also
entitled to speak their minds. Younger children may be silent about their choices
but the elder ones usually speak their minds, although they may not necessarily be
counted as a vote in family decisions.

During armed conflict, a child’s response and choice is triggered by certain factors,
such as:

Recognition of acute stress and threat to life

Raja, a nine-year-old child when Carmen was bombarded in 2000, recounts, “We
could hear the explosions and the exchange of fire between the AFP and MILF
fighters, so that I dropped down and protected myself.”
 77

Explosions and gunfire are threats to life that immediately induce the coping ability
of children to protect themselves.

Need to be with family

Gloria recalls that she had a voice in decision-making during the 2000 war.
“Ginikanan namo ang nag-desisyon nga mobalik kami sa among lugar sa Baruyan
(Nalapaan, Pikit). Pero usahay mosulti ko sa akong parents nga kinahanglan mopauli
na mi kay lisod kayo ang kahimtang sa evacuation centre.” (Our parents were the
ones who decided that we return to Baruyan. But before that I also spoke to them
and told them that we should return home.)

In times of acute stress, the second immediate choice of a child is propelled by the
need to have a mantle of security and protection. A child, therefore, immediately
seeks protection from and submits to the decisions of the family. This submission
is close to absolute during peaks of armed conflict when the emergency situation
requires quick decisions and movement. The same submission is observed in
decisions to return after the evacuation, although the circumstance in the evacuation
centre allows children to speak their minds.

There is a limit to child participation in decision-making, however. Gloria

remembers how her mother dissuaded her from going to school for safety reasons
in 2003. “Ang akong pag-eskwela nahunong panahon sa giyera…. Ang akong mama
dili na pud gusto nga moadto ako sa school kay ang among agianan kuyaw…” (I had
to stop going to school during the war. My mother did not allow me to go because
the route to school was not safe…)

Family survival

“Ang maalala ko ay bitbit ko ang kaldero at hilahila ko ang kambing kasi nagputokan na.
Ang tatay ko ang nagsabi na bakwit na tayo.” (I remember that when the skirmishes
began I immediately carried our cooking pot and pulled our goat behind me. It
was my father who decided that we evacuate immediately.) Soraya is an 18-year-
old daughter of Maguindanaon Muslim parents. She was 14 when the war erupted
in 2000.

Children recognise that their survival depends on the family. They spontaneously
participate in securing collective interests, such as the economic means of survival
during the evacuation.
78

Community decision

Charisse remembers the day they evacuated. “Wala kaming papel. Ang papel sa
among barangay officials kay siya ang nagsulti nga mamakwit na kami kay ang kalaban
duol na; ang amo usab nga silingan sila ang nagsulti kanamo nga mamakwit na.”
(We had no role in decision making. The decision to evacuate was made by our
barangay officials. The barangay leader was the one who told us to evacuate.)

Some children believe that major decisions such as an evacuation is done outside
the family and that each family has to submit to that decision.

Men and Women’s Decisions in Times of War

Cultural and interpersonal limitations have significant influence on the quality

of participation of women during emergencies. In most cases, emergency
situations re-emphasise the primacy of men’s views and prerogatives. This is also
borne out of the fact that the information network available in the community
is characteristically male. The protagonists of the war (AFP, MILF, paramilitary
groups, bandits) are mainly male. Because of the military character of the conflict,
the civilian population tends to empower the men to take the lead in ensuring the
physical safety and security of homes and communities.

The “maleness” of the war influences the decision making of the men. Some of
their decisions are preceded by their own behaviour. This occurs in communities
where the men are armed and are prone to armed defence at every instance when
there is a perceived threat to the community. The movement of armed men within
the village, then, becomes a trigger for other males to shape information and take
action.

Women are usually confined to reproductive roles, except in cases where women
have attained higher education and are producing incomes for the family or when
there are opportunities for off-home activities provided by government agencies or
NGOs. Women who are engaged in community organisations or entrepreneurial
activities are usually able to reshape their views regarding the relations of sexes.

Women experience in the 2000 and 2003 wars re-emphasise the application of
stereotypical arrangements within the family and community. In both emergencies,
women promptly assume the role of securing the home and the children while
 79

the men take defensive positions to protect the family and property and to seek
information from neighbours, local officials and elders.

The realm of authority of the women provides a positive contribution to the

survival of the family. During the critical period when the male head of the family
is “absent”, the woman makes emergency decisions designed to ensure family
survival during the evacuation.

Female adolescents highlight their own role in the family rather than their own
interests for survival and development as women. Early in life they focus their
mind on family co-responsibility (care for younger children, work in the farm or
earning income through wage labour) in partnership with their parents.

Men reveal a different perspective compared to women and children. Children talk
about themselves as individuals then gradually zoom out to family and community.
Women talk about themselves as key players within the family, but tend to confine
their thoughts on their role as wife and mother. Men, on the other hand, tend
to immediately zoom out and speak from the outside. Men have more thoughts
about communities than themselves and their families.

Men are proactive in collecting information through various means (radio, TV,
word of mouth, networks with rebels or the AFP) and usually shape this information
from the outside before bringing the news to the family. When emergencies arise,
men usually go back to the family to announce decisions and initiate emergency
tasks. Then they go back to community-related tasks.

Male bonding is a common phenomenon in communities under threat. This

is usually associated with information exchange and activities related to armed
defence. Where men are armed, their decisions and actions tend to be influenced
by the potency of their weapons. The AFP and the MILF harness this behaviour.
In fact, the mass armed strength of the MILF (and the MNLF in previous years)
is based on community-based armed individuals who are either mobilised or
proactively participate in warfare during heights of armed conflict. The AFP, on
the other hand, makes use of armed civilians as local networks of defenders. The
AFP would normally close its eye on legal constraints such as illegal possession of
firearms.

Accounts of deaths occurring during clashes within the community indicate the
prevalence of male deaths than those of women. This phenomenon owes to the fact
that men are easily induced to participate in the conflict.
80

Community Decisions

When a community wants to determine if war is indeed imminent, precise

information is of prime importance. Muslim elders get information through their
networks on the rebel side. Christian leaders get information from their networks
linked to the AFP through the CAFGU or CVO. The barangay officials make
the authoritative move of verifying the information from municipal officials and
higher officials of the AFP in the vicinity.

Only in a few cases do communities voluntarily evacuate because of foreknowledge

about the war. In general, anticipation of war triggers certain levels of preparedness.
People start to pack belongings, but they do not move, except for some families
residing in isolated sections. These families would move to temporary shelters at
night but go back to their homes during the day.

The reality of war comes in various streams: bombing, artillery, the visibility of
armed groups, exit of families. Displaced persons caught in this situation initially
respond emotionally and physically – first, to struggle between fear and composure,
and second, to secure life and limb.

This is the most critical phase where damages could be fatal and coping abilities
confront thin lines of time and space. In the interim, the community temporarily
loses its sense of community. The responses of individuals and families come into
play.

A community usually has an official or unofficial pre-designated rallying point

where families can seek temporary shelter and submit themselves to a command
structure higher than the family. This can be a school, a post-harvest facility like a
solar dryer or a place of worship. At this stage, local authority assumes leadership.
This can be the civil authority of the local government or the informal authority of
indigenous structures such as the tribe or community organisation.

Evacuation is also a critical phase in terms of governance. While the civil authority
assumes command of transposing the community to the evacuation centre, in the
very same process, this authority fades away. As soon as the community members
reach the evacuation centre, they would respond to new authority.

For displaced persons, the evacuation centre is an arena for transitions. Economically,
duty bearers are able to arrest hunger and deprivation through supply of food and
non-food items. Socially, displaced persons are torn between re-establishing bonds
with former neighbours and friends from whom they may have been separated
 81

during the evacuation or establishing new bonds with displaced persons from other
communities. While this bonding reduces stress in the evacuation centre, it does
not necessarily secure social capital and other investments in preparation for their
return home. Politically, the formal civil structure that governs displaced persons
in their home communities tends to fade away in the evacuation centre.

Decision to Return Home

Local officials are influential on the decision of displaced families to return to their
home villages. Charisse verbalises why: “Nagdesisyon ang akong parents ug barangay
officials; nahatagan pud mi og bag-ong balay nga gamay… lisod kayo sa evacuation
center kay panginabuhian, usahay init kayo ug walay makaon.” (The decision was
made by my parents and by the barangay officials. It was very difficult to live in
the evacuation centre because there was no livelihood for us. Sometimes the heat
was unbearable. Sometimes there was nothing to eat.)

After the conflict in 2000, it took evacuees in General Luna (Carmen) almost two
years to return to their home villages. They did so by batches, to ascertain that
it was safe to return. The first set of 10 families returned in January 2002. Some
preferred to remain in the evacuation centre because their home village is just seven
kilometres away. They could farm during the day and return to the evacuation
centre during the night.

Children do not find comfort in evacuation centres. They feel that despite the
physical safety, temporary shelters are less than ideal in terms of survival and
development.

Russell, son of a Christian settler family from Malapag (Carmen), had begged to
return home after 20 days in the evacuation centre in Damulog, Bukidnon. He
was 12 when armed conflict erupted in his village in November 1999. “Kapoy
kaayo magpuyo sa evacuation centre ug wala pa gyod kwarta, sige lang mokmok walay
mahimo…kulang pagkaon…pag-eskwela naundang…dili makadula kayo tungod
dili nako kauban akong mga barkada…” (Life in the evacuation centre was very
difficult. There was no money. I was idle. Food was lacking. I could not go to
school. I could not even play because my friends were not with us.)

Eva, a 15-year-old child of a mixed marriage (Maguindanao-Cebuano), begged

to return to her village after one month in the evacuation centre in February
2003. “Lisod kaayo labi na sa pagkaon usahay walay sud-an, ang akong pag-eskwela
82

naundang… dili ko kalihok-lihok pag-ayo unya wala nay nanghatag og hinabang….

Dahon sa saging ang ulugan…” (Life was difficult in the evacuation centre. Food
was lacking. We only had rice. I could not go to school. I could not do anything
and nobody was giving us relief assistance anymore. We used banana leaves as
mats.)

Some children, however, bear it in the evacuation centre. It is their families’ decision
to do such. Lalaine, a 15-year-old Cebuana whose eight-member family stays on at
the Layog Mosque Evacuation Centre (Pagalungan), explains why. “Kung babalik
kami ay mahirapan din kami kasi luma na yong bahay, butas na butas ang atip at
mahirapan na kaming magbungkal sa bukid dahil naipagbili na ang aming hayop
pansakahan.” (Life would be more difficult if we would return home. Our house is
already dilapidated and the roof is leaking. It would be difficult to tend our farm
again because we already sold our work animals).

Children below seven years of age are fully dependent on the decisions of their
parents. Children above seven years, meanwhile, do not participate in decision-
making, but are normally taken into account because of their needs. Those who
are 12 to 17 years old actively inform their parents of what they want based on
their own interests. Their recommendations revolve around basic needs such as
food, shelter and access to education.

What the children know about the war is based on what their parents tell them,
what they learn about in school and what they hear over the radio. They know
nothing about their rights during this crucial time. What they know is that they
are fully dependent on their parents for survival during and after the war. They also
know that in some situations, families need to abide by the decisions of community
officials. The choices made by the family and the community, therefore, are the
choices that the children eventually adopt. Even if they are allowed to speak their
minds, the children are aware that the best option is still submission to family and
community decisions.
83
© Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms

6
Chapter 5

THE WAY OF THE DUTY BEARERS

A n organised, co-ordinated and relatively massive humanitarian assistance in Central

Mindanao, with the participation of international aid agencies, is fairly new. Before
the 2000 war, the humanitarian crisis in the region was principally an affair between
the victims and the protagonists of the conflict. Concerned government agencies and
local communities alone delivered relief assistance. Local and international aid agencies
focused their services elsewhere, mainly on the area of natural disasters.

The thick of Philippine experience in emergency response to complex emergencies

refers mainly to the humanitarian crisis in Central Mindanao. Humanitarian assistance
experience in the region was scarce prior to the war in 2000. Since then, substantial
resources have been made available to displaced persons by government and non-
governmental agencies. Correspondingly, there is a growing body of documentation
of this experience although most of the documentation tends to flow between service
providers in the field and donor agencies based in Manila or abroad. There is little
horizontal flow of information in terms of literature discourse although there have
been initiatives by international aid agencies to promote exchanges through forums,
training and workshops.
86

Humanitarian attention to Central Mindanao was induced by the war in 2000. Table
3 (below) indicates assistance flows to the region as a response to the humanitarian
crisis resulting from the armed conflict. There are basically two sets of assistance flows.
The first wave (Special Zone of Peace and Development [SZOPAD] funds, peace and
development funds) was induced by the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement of 1996, when
most donor countries promoted the so-called post-conflict foci of assistance. However,
the post-conflict euphoria did not last long. When the war in 2000 erupted, the new
assistance flows were reoriented towards relief and rehabilitation.

Table 3. Sampling of Development Assistance Programmes

for Mindanao, beginning 2000

Financing
Programme/Year Area Covered Amount Donor
Scheme
ProPEACE (Mindanao Mindanao and Palawan 61.7million Canadian P49.3m grant
Program for Peace and pesos International P12.4m local
Development), 2001-2003 Development counterpart
Agency (CIDA)
SZOPAD Rehabilitation Cotabato and €2.4m European 80% grant
Project, 2001-2003 Maguindanao Union (EU)
Support to Agrarian Reform Cotabato, Sultan €23.3m European €18.4m grant
in Central Mindanao (StarCM) Kudarat, Lanao del Commission (EC) €4.9m
Norte and Lanao del counterpart
Sur
Support to IDPs and Host Cotabato and €1.67m EC through grant
Communities in CMR, 2001 Maguindanao Oxfam-GB

Technical and Organisation Lanao provinces, €1.19m EC through grant

Assistance for Civil Society Zamboanga provinces, Voluntary Service
Action of the Displaced and Bukidnon and Misamis Overseas (VSO)
At Risk in Mindanao Occidental
(TOSCADAR), 2001-2004
Assistance to Facilitate the Maguindanao €1.58m EC through Accion grant
Return to Normal Life of Contra El Hambre
the War-Affected Families in (ACH)
Maguindanao 2001
Mindanao Rural Development Cotabato, US$41.0m World Bank $27.5m loan
Program (MRDP) Adoptable Maguindanao, Sultan $12.5m grant
Programme Loans Kudarat, Compostela
Valley
ARMM Social Fund, 2000, ARMM US$38.5m World Bank loan
five years
 87

The selected programmes above have available details. Many programmes listed in
government agencies do not contain detailed information, eg, project amount. Actual
Official Development Assistance (ODA) fund flows may differ from scheduled amounts
since they are dependent on government capacity to provide counterpart funds.

Relief ideologies of donor agencies usually accompany the assistance flows. These are
embedded in the relief assistance package. Intense processes have been observed in
the area of protection of humanitarian assistance from political capture. Independent
documentation of lessons in this regard exists. But horizontal discourses among aid
agencies and between state and non-state agencies have yet to spiral into a height by
which the national and international publics are able to understand what is really going
on in Central Mindanao. As yet, there is no central repository of information that is
readily accessible to the public. Most of the literatures available are project-related
researches confined to the bilateral links between donors and implementing agencies,
or between local NGOs and intermediary donors.

The Government’s Role

There is limited information on government experience in humanitarian assistance.

Much of what can be found are the documentation of deployment of resources,
which form part of operational routines of specific agencies. There is no doubt,
however, that a significant number of resources have been poured into the region
to respond to the emergency. The lingering question is whether these emergency
resources are sufficient to supply the needs of the displaced persons during heights
of displacement. Displaced persons would unanimously argue that although relief
assistance would appropriately mitigate the hardships they face during displacement,
the combined efforts of aid agencies would fall short of the aggregate costs incurred
over time by the civilian population. The ultimate question, therefore, is whether
or not they will continue to suffer from a war that is not of their own desire.

Consolidated data from 2000 to 2003 prepared by the Disaster Response

Monitoring and Information Centre of the DSWD indicate the following costs of
relief assistance to the region (see table on the next page):
88

Table 4. Magnitude of Displacement and Cost

of Relief Assistance for Central Mindanao

Estimated no. of IDPs (Individuals)

Share of Non-
Governmental
Cost of Relief Agencies
Year CMR
Nationwide Assistance (domestic and
(ARMM & Region 12) foreign,
in per cent)

2000 1,123,563 1,049,771 122.0m pesos 34%

(93% of national total)
2001 ------------- 122,373 185.6m pesos 14%
(43% of national total)
2002 ------------- 34,824 76.0m pesos 14%
(74% of national total)
2003 ------------- 292,901 (almost 100% 68.7m pesos 3%
of national total)
Source: Disaster Response Monitoring and Information Centre, DSWD

This is as of first quarter of 2003, in the provinces of Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat

and Maguindanao.

It is not clear how the DSWD gathered these figures and whether or not the
aggregate volume of funds completely capture the amount of resources poured
into the humanitarian effort. Quantitatively, the amount of relief resources is
significantly small compared to the estimated cost of war (expenses of the AFP and
MILF) and the cost of destruction (lives and property). Based on the above figures,
it may be argued that the per capita spending for each displaced person in 2000
was a mere 108 pesos. This rose to 653 pesos per capita in 2001, 1,614 pesos per
capita in 2002 and slid down to 234 pesos per capita in 2003. Although these
figures may be an understatement of what has been made available to the region,
there are indications that per capita assistance, when not paired with development
assistance upon return home, may contribute to economic-related stressors.

From the perspective of the displaced, the government is a direct party to the
conflict. Therefore, it is primarily responsible for the humanitarian consequences.
What often occurs is that aid resources of the government are mainly visible in
the evacuation centres. Upon return to their homes, the displaced families are
directed to access basic support services supplied by bureaucratic arms of local
governments, which even under normal conditions find themselves inadequately
equipped to respond effectively.
 89

What is perplexing to the civilian population is the irony of government budgets.

Even if calculations are based on the 2002 high end per capita spending of 1,614
pesos, this figure merely translates to four pesos per day. This is perplexing because,
according to IBON Facts and Figures, the government has already spent more than
73 billion pesos to prosecute the war since 1970, which translates to a spending
pattern of 7.1 million pesos per day.

The civilian population affected by war is bothered by the irony that while the
government spends substantial resources to prosecute the war, it is inadequate to
pay for the civilian costs of the war. Neither does the MILF find itself accountable
to the civilian cost of the war because it positions itself as the representation of the
legitimate demands of the Moro people in Mindanao and blames the government
for its lack of readiness to resolve the Mindanao problem. Many displaced persons,
however, accuse the MILF of adding to the civilian cost of the war because of its lack
of concern for the property rights of civilians, especially those of Christian settlers
who are related by blood to members of anti-Muslim paramilitary organisations.

Resource Capacity of Local Government Agencies

1. Provincial Social Welfare and Development Office

(PSWDO), Cotabato

Emergency response activities of the Cotabato provincial government is handled

by special agencies like the PSWDO and the Provincial Health Office (PHO)
in co-ordination with national line agencies like the DSWD, OCD and the
Department of Interior and Local Governments (DILG). During the 2000
war, there had been greater co-ordination between the provincial government,
the NGOs and civic organisations.

Secondary data indicates that the provincial government is perennially

confronted with calamities ranging from droughts, floods, tornadoes and
displacement due to armed conflicts.

Its emergency response capacity is contingent on annual allocations for calamity

based on resolutions of the local legislature.
90

Table 5. PSWDO, Cotabato: Volume of Relief Assistance

Calamity Victims Served

(Families)
Year Amount Source of Funds
Armed
Natural
Conflict

2000 6.0m pesos

2001 4.45m pesos Calamity Fund • 11,774, floods 4,536

• 207, tornado
2002 2.12m pesos Calamity Fund • 12,909, floods 1,482
(1st qtr) • 717, drought
• 47, tornado
2003 12.0m pesos Calamity Fund • 15,796, floods 11,464
• 27,199, drought
Source: PSWDO, Cotabato

According to Ms. Zaida Rinsulat, the PSWD Officer, the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan (SP, or local legislature) allocated 10m pesos in calamity funds
for the year, but disbursed 12m pesos in calamity funds. The PSWDO has
an annual budget (as of 2003) of 2.76m pesos, of which 2.14m pesos go to
personnel costs. Real resources available for calamity victims come from the
calamity fund which is variable based on the decision of the local legislature
and the PSWDO’s share from the Economic Development Fund (EDF) which
comprises 20 per cent of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). The EDF is
shared by various agencies. As of 2003, the PSWDO was given 1m pesos share,
which was used to support various programmes such as the campaign against
illegal drugs, rehabilitation of former rebels, emergency assistance and support
for the elderly.

Support for displaced persons is basically dependent on augmentation funds

from external sources like the national government, foreign donor agencies and
non-governmental aid agencies. Heavy external assistance flows were observed
in 2000 (with fund flows spilling over to 2001) and 2003. Table 6 indicates
the source of external assistance flows as a response to the humanitarian crisis
in 2000. These were augmented by block grants that spilled over to 2001
like the 10m pesos grant from the United Nations Mindanao Development
Programme (UNMDP) for three barangays located in Carmen, Alamada
and Tulunan, plus another 17m pesos for Matalam, Kabacan, Carmen and
Aleosan. Also in 2001, Australian Agency for International Development
(AusAID) provided 1.5m pesos for the Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of
Social Services (CIDSS) programme of the DSWD.
 91

Table 6. PSWDO Cotabato, Relief Assistance in 2000

Municipality No. of No. of Period Form of Sources

FH Dependents Served Assistance

6,180 15,765 02 May to Assorted, Provincial Local Government

06 June mainly food: Unit (LGU), ABS-CBN
2000 rice, milk, TV station, Commission
sardines, sugar on Elections (COMELEC),
United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), DSWD-
12, United Church of Christ in
PIKIT

the Philippines (UCCP-Pikit),

Immaculate Concepcion Parish
(ICP), Al Hayat Foundation, Pikit
External Assistance Team (EXAT),
Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC), Task Force Justice and
Peace (TJFP-Davao), Together
Ensemble
1,058 4,801 03 May to Assorted, Provincial LGU, UNDP,
CARMEN

05 June mainly food: COMELEC

2000 rice, milk,
sardines, sugar
675 2,852 12 May to Assorted, Provincial LGU, UNDP,
MIDSAYAP ALEOSAN

16 June Mainly food: COMELEC, ABS-CBN

2000 rice, milk,
sardines, sugar
570 2,850 03 May to Assorted, Provincial LGU, UNDP, Task Force
06 June mainly food: Tulong Cotabato, Likas Kaya
2000 rice, milk, Foundation
sardines, sugar
34 131 ---- ----------- ----
PIGKAWAYAN

269 2,704 12 May to Assorted, Provincial LGU, DSWD-12,

KABACAN

16 June mainly food: PhilRADS, BSP-USM

2000 rice, milk,
sardines, sugar

626 2,704 12 May to Assorted, Provincial LGU

MATALAM

16 June mainly food:

2000 rice, milk,
sardines, sugar
92

Municipality
No. of No. of Period Form of Sources
FH Dependents Served Assistance

721 3,085 11-25 Rice, dried Provincial LGU, UNDP

ALAMADA

May 2000 fish, mongo,

assorted
goods

53 181 11-17 Rice Provincial LGU

KIDAPAWAN

May 2000

120 600 16 May Rice, assorted Provincial LGU

MAGPET

2000 goods

188 940 29 May Rice, assorted Provincial LGU, UNDP

BANISILAN

2000 goods

10, 494 38,613 Total volume

not available
TOTAL

Source: PSWDO, Cotabato

Emergency response for 2003 consisted mainly of 19.45m pesos shelter

assistance for five municipalities of the province. This was used to build 839
houses for displaced families (see Table 7 below).

Table 7. PSWDO, Summary of Shelter Assistance for 2003

Project No. of % of
Amount Source of Fund
Location Houses Accomplishment

Pikit 620 15.5m pesos DSWD 86.93%

P. Roxas 59 1.18m pesos DSWD 100%
M’Lang 25 .5m pesos DSWD 92%
Carmen 50 1.0m pesos DSWD 100%
Banisilan 85 1.27m pesos Provincial Government 7.05%
TOTAL 839 19.45m pesos
Source: PSWDO, Cotabato, 2003
 93

Programme for Children

Local government attention to children is pushed from the outside. The

provincial government co-operates with the UNICEF in implementing the
latter’s 5th Country Programme for Children. PSWDO records indicate the
following accomplishments in 2001:
1. Orientation training and planning workshop for Barangay Early Childhood
Care and Development (ECCD) Teams attended by 10 Barangay
officials.
2. Organisation of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children
(BCPC).
3. Trainer’sTraining on Enhanced Parent Effectiveness Service attended by 30
Municipal Officials.
4. Training for 26 Law Enforcers on the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and National Laws on Child Protection.
5. Trainer’s Training on Youth Peer Educators attended by 35 youths.
6. Training for 25 teachers on Children in Need of Special Protection
(CNSP).

Accomplishment records for 2001 and 2003 indicate that much of the local
government’s initiatives in the area of assistance for children is still limited
to capacity-building of duty bearers like government officials, teachers, social
workers, prosecutors and the police (see table 8). Narrative accounts from
the displaced persons indicate that the impact of these initiatives is not yet
felt on the ground. Much less is felt by displaced children. Accounts from
government duty bearers at the municipal level indicate that child-focused
initiatives are moving too slow despite the creation of the BCPC. The BCPC
concept, even if it was created by law way back in the 1970s, is still facing a
crisis of direction. BCPC members and movers themselves are at a standstill
on what this structure is supposed to do in the communities. In fact the BCPC
hardly provides support in developing the coping abilities of children during
armed conflicts.
94

Table 8. PSWDO Activities for Children in Need of Special Protection and

Early Childhood Care and Development, 2003

Kind of training Date Conducted Participants

1. Parent Effectiveness Training
2. Bio-Psychosocial Help for
CNSP & Parent Education
Modules for Service Providers
(2 batches)
3. BCPC Trainers’ Training
4. Social Welfare Officers Bio-
Psychosocial Help on CNSP
5. Training & Capability Building
of Municipal Core Trainers on
ECCD
6. Responsible and Effective
Parenting on CNSP
7. Training Orientation for Ser-
vice Providers on ECCD
3-5 September 2003 • 15 Day Care Workers
• 14 Municipal Health Officers
• 4 Social Workers
• 1 Sangguniang Barangay
Member
24-26 September 2003 • 17 Day Care Workers
3-5 December 2003 • 1 Municipal Planning and
Development Co-ordinator
(MPDC)
• 14 Municipal Health Officers
• 10 Social Workers
• 2 Department of Education
(DepEd) Representatives
16-17 September 2003 • 12 Municipal Local
Government Officials (MLGO)
• 18 Social Workers
• 17 MPDC
• 1 Prosecutor
• 1 DepEd Representative
18-22 September 2003 • 18 Social Workers
30 September - • 3 Day Care Workers
3 October 2003 • 1 Municipal Planning and
Development Office (MPDO)
• 7 DepEd Representatives
• 5 PNP Personnel
• 8 Municipal Health Officers
• 11 Social Workers
5-7 November 2003 • 6 Day Care Workers
• 15 MSWDOs
3-5 December 2003 • 12 Barangay Health Workers
• 5 Municipal Nutrition Action
Officers

2. Pikit Municipal Health Office (MHO) and Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Office (MSWDO)

(Based on interviews with Lucia Guerrero, Municipal Health Officer of Pikit,

Mary Grace Cadungog, MSWD Social Welfare Officer III and Imelda Balios,
MSWD Officer, on 12 January 2004.)

On 12 January 2004, Dr Edwin Cruzado, head of the Pikit MHO, confided

that his agency is not prepared for another influx of evacuees to Pikit. As of
 95

June 2003, the Immaculate Concepcion Parish (ICP) Emergency Response

Team was dealing with 6,160 evacuees (1,764 families) in six barangays of
Pikit. Dr Cruzado says they only have 20 bottles of medicines, mainly syrups
for children, available for the next emergency. In short, the agency is not
prepared to deal with another emergency such as the one that occurred during
the first quarter of 2003. Its preparedness has improved, however, since it was
caught by surprise in 2000. Now it has developed wider engagements with
local NGOs and the Pikit Parish.

The Pikit MHO has 30 personnel (1 doctor, 1 dental aide, 8 nurses, 10 midwives,
9 volunteer midwives and 1 sanitary inspector) to serve a population of more
than 11,500 families in 42 barangays. It has a Mobile Health Team that
visits two barangays per month and connects with around 70 trained Barangay
Health Workers (BHW). However, delivery of health services is constrained by
resources. The office gets health information materials from NGOs.

The Pikit MSWDO has more focused programmes for the elderly, women and
children. It has four staff members with an annual budget (2003) of 1.25m
pesos. It was primarily responsible for responding to the needs of 23 affected
barangays in 2003. Its emergency resource is equivalent to five per cent of the
municipal government’s IRA, which is not sufficient for the needs of displaced
persons. In 2003, it served 9,000 families with resources coming from the
national and provincial government agencies. Being a 5th class municipality,
Pikit has an annual budget of 70.1m pesos. Based on this budget, the annual
calamity fund is a little over 3m pesos, which is not enough for massive
displacement in the municipality, such as the one that occurred in the first
quarter of 2003.

Attention to children is still limited to promotion of child rights through

training and seminars. The Municipal Nutrition Action Office (MNAO)
conducts Operation Timbang (weighing of children) as basis for supplemental
feeding activities. The local government co-operates with local NGOs like Balay
Inc. and Tabang Mindanaw in supplemental feeding and psychosocial related
interventions. The local government has organised the BCPC in almost all
barangays and has trained members in 14 barangays in 2001.

3. Carmen MSWDO, DILG and MHO

(Based on interviews with Elena Dapon, Carmen MSWD Officer, Jose

Naquitquitan, Municipal Health Officer, 16 January 2004 and Rebecca Ajero,
DILG Officer for Carmen, 19 January 2004.)
96

The Carmen MSWDO is mandated to implement three welfare programmes

(family, child and youth and senior citizens) and emergency response in calamity
situations. There is no readily available information regarding the volume of
resources at its command. In 2003, it was able to provide emergency assistance
in co-ordination with NGOs. It constructed 11 core shelters for displaced
persons. Much of its current resources come from external sources since it
is covered by donor funded programmes like the UNMDP and Support to
Agrarian Reform in Central Mindanao (STARCM). The DILG satellite office
in Carmen also provides emergency assistance. In 2000 it contributed one
truckload of rice. Its attention to children is currently limited to supplemental
feeding and psychosocial-related activities in co-ordination with an NGO.

The MHO has a larger complement of 22 personnel. In terms of focus, the

agency gives primary attention to children and women.

4. Pagalungan MDCC and MSWDO

(Based on interviews with Rex Maongco, Municipal Civil Registrar and head of
the Municipal Disaster Co-ordinating Council and Editha Equito, Pagalungan
MSWD Officer, 12 January 2004.)

The Pagalungan Municipal Disaster Co-ordinating Council (MDCC) is an

inter-agency body headed by the Mayor. Its current programme is focused on
assisting returnee displaced persons in three barangays (Dagkang, Buliok and
Kalbugan). The amount of resources available to the agency is not readily
known. The co-ordinator simply says that their resources have already been
“exhausted”.

The MSWDO, on the other hand, is a one-person office. Like other municipal
agencies, the amount of its resources is not readily available to the public. The
MSWDO operates through a network of Disaster Response Teams (DRTs)
and Sumpats (Maguindanao term for volunteer). Editha Equito, head of office,
says that her agency is dependent on external resources to effectively provide
emergency response.
 97

5. OCD-ARMM

(Based on interview with Benjamin Varga, OCD Officer for Tawi-Tawi, 16

January 2004.)

The OCD-ARMM is based in Cotabato City. It has a personnel complement

of seven persons and an annual budget of 600,000 pesos. The agency is directly
accountable to the National Disaster Co-ordinating Council (NDCC) which is
lodged under the Department of National Defence (DND). The office claims
that in the aftermath of the war in 2000, they provided 10,000 pesos worth of
assistance per displaced family. This money lasted until the middle of 2002.
It also responded to the humanitarian crisis in 2003, but its resources for the
period were relatively smaller than in 2000. Lessons learned by the office in
the 2003 crisis indicate problems in the listing of displaced persons and issues
of the displaced persons’ dependence on relief assistance even after the crisis is
over.

The OCD works with a network of disaster co-ordinating councils from the
regional, provincial, municipal and down to the barangay levels. A standby
calamity fund is reserved every year at the NDCC level. For this year, the
standby fund is around 800m pesos.

Resource Capacity of Non-Governmental

Aid Agencies

The non-governmental aid community in Central Mindanao is a small community

of international aid agencies. These are Oxfam, Accion Contra El Hambre (ACH),
Movimondo and Community and Family Services International (CFSI) linked to
a scattering of local NGOs and supported by foreign donor agencies. The presence
of international aid agencies became more significant in the aftermath of the 2000
war (except Oxfam, which had established a major presence in the region since the
El Nino disaster in the late 1990s).
98

Table 9. Selected International and Local Aid Agencies in

Central Mindanao Region: Programmes, Personnel and Resources

Name of Financial
Programmes Personnel Local Networks
Agency Resources
Oxfam-Cotabato • livelihood 14 --NA-- Kauyahan Foundation
(based in support (supported Inc. (KFI), Tri-People’s
Cotabato City) • public health by EU, Oxfam Organisation Against
• support Network, Disasters (TRIPOD), ICP,
to public Department for Kutawato Council for
education International Justice and Peace (KCJP);
• protection Development government agencies like
[DFID], etc.) OCD, DepEd
ACH • nutrition 13 ---NA--- Mindanao State University
(based in • health (supported by (MSU), Notre Dame
Cotabato City) • food security EU) University (NDU), United
• water and Youth of the Philip-
sanitation pines (UNYPHIL), Tripol,
Bangsamoro Youth,
COM and Lumad NGOs;
government agencies
Balay • integrated 8 ---NA--- SC-UK, ICP, local partner
Rehabilitation rehabilitation (70,000 pesos for NGOs, government agencies
Center Inc. programme relief mission in
(based in (relief, youth 2000; supported
Kidapawan City) and children) by foreign and
• advocacy local donors)
Balik Kalipay • psychosocial 5 (plus 7 ---NA---
(based in Pikit) intervention community (supported by
for children leaders) Oxfam, Danish
affected by Embassy, DSWD)
war
ICP • space for 10 ---NA--- Local communities in Pikit
(based in Pikit) peace (supported by
programme Oxfam and other
• peace building agencies)

Although government tends to have a preponderance of emergency resources during

calamity periods, the resources of international aid agencies tend to have longer
term effects because of the modalities of implementation that involves community
participation inclusive of the creation of community organisations around specific
programmes or projects. These resources are also able to transfer capacity to local
NGOs, which have closer links with specific communities.

International aid agencies operate according to specific programmes and division

of territory with clear objectives directed towards displaced persons and their
communities. They deal with NGO partners, which define their own territories
 99

and assert autonomous and long-term agendas. The relationship provides a kind
of dynamism in humanitarian discourse. Sometimes it magnifies the impact
of aid beyond its declared objectives; at other times, it constrains the tempo of
implementation.

A number of issues have emerged from the aid experience of 2000 and 2003.
Among the most important ones are the following:
• There is a growing need to address issues of humanitarian protection. Emergency
response cannot be isolated from the rights-based claims of displaced persons
and the whole civilian population affected by war. Impunity in human rights
violations has exacerbated the losses incurred by the civilian population,
leading to the ever-expanding needs of displaced persons during periods of
displacement.
• Child-focused programming is glaringly absent in the past and current
interventions of duty bearers despite the reality that children constitute one
half of the civilian population and more than one half of displaced persons in
evacuation centres.
• Close co-ordination remains an elusive goal despite the common humanitarian
objectives declared by international aid agencies and their local NGO partners.
While division of territory and programme focus achieve a certain level of
efficiency in delivery of services to a wider area, the tendency to allow this divide
to impair the horizontal exchange of information or cross-flows of resources will
ultimately create aggregate inefficiency. It is perplexing to displaced persons
that while duty bearers are able to co-ordinate and co-operate in their work in
evacuation centres, they are not able to do so in the home communities.

Addressing the above issues can be built upon the positive impacts of humanitarian
assistance in both wars and the gaps that need to be filled. Lessons learned by
displaced persons themselves indicate that it is possible to achieve more efficiency
and disaster preparedness if duty bearers can build on the successes of past and
present interventions and fill the gaps in their humanitarian and development
needs:
• Home and host communities assisted by NGOs are better prepared for disaster
than most other communities. This is shown by the experience of the ‘space
for peace’ communities in Pikit which have been insulated from the war in
2003 despite the concentration of the crisis in Pikit itself. It is likely, therefore,
that if home and host communities are assisted, they can very well mitigate
risks and prepare for future disasters.
100

• Post-conflict assistance of NGOs in home communities enhances the coping

abilities of returning displaced persons. Assistance flows appropriately fill the
gaps in resources needed to start anew. Assistance for livelihoods and peace
building programmes provide favourable environments for reducing risks in
economic-related and social-related endeavours.
• Assistance in the evacuation centres can provide relief to acute stresses such as
hunger, lack of shelter, medicines and fear for life and security. This assistance
falls short of the requisites necessary to improve the coping abilities of displaced
persons upon their return to the home community.
• There are long-term stresses – social, economic, political, emotional, that
have yet to be quantified and addressed. Failure to address these will bear on
the capacity of displaced persons to prepare for the next disaster. Moreover,
such failure may even lead to collapse of coping mechanisms even before the
onslaught of another disaster. There are communities where stress factors are
overwhelming and where the coping abilities of the people concerned will
require external assistance to withstand possible collapse.
• Impunity in human rights violations is a long-term stress on the civilian
population. These are issues that cannot be adequately addressed by indigenous
coping mechanisms of families and communities. External intervention is
necessary to arrest further damage to the civilian population.
• Much of the inadequacies in coping strategies across age groups, sexes and
ethnic lines, are brought about by lack of information. There is a big demand
to supply information through adequate media and with appropriate substance.
Of immediate need is to supply information on human rights because of the
critically low level of awareness and practice.
• Local governments have made advances in interventions for children. However,
these advances are deemed to be stagnating at the level of bureaucratic structures
and capacity building of duty bearers. What children need are substantive
services responsive to their need for survival and development.

There are feasible recommendations within the grasp of duty bearers in the region.
It would be ideal to encourage more involvement from civil society and to sustain
the flow of assistance toward key areas likely to have greater effects and long-term
impacts on children’s rights and developmental needs.
101
© Gil Nartea / Philippine Action Network on Small Arms

7
Chapter 7

CONCLUSIONS

E xisting literature and statistics do not capture the real situation of children in
Central Mindanao. Information on children is buried in the general information
on families. There is a dearth of research and scholarly studies on the effects of war on
children and how they cope with adversity. The few scholarly studies from the academe
are either not disseminated or not available to the public.

The immediate effects of the 2000 and 2003 wars are direct threats to life and physical
security, lack of food security, threat to privacy of home and presence of danger in
public places. There is also the impunity enjoyed by those who commit human rights
violations. The fighting in war-torn towns like Pikit, Pagalungan and Carmen uprooted
whole communities, where losses of life, property, homes and erosion of mutual trust
between individuals and families from different ethnic groups were rife. Assistance of
aid agencies that generated much of the people’s emergency food, shelter and medical
needs helped the war-torn communities to cope with harsh conditions.

Current data on disaster preparedness in the region highlight food and non-food needs
but hardly look into the psychosocial effects of armed conflicts, especially on children.
There are no long-term assessments on the conflict’s impact on poverty, inter-ethnic
relations and the coping abilities of the affected population. Perhaps this is because of
104

the nature of emergency response in the region that is patterned after foreign experience
in humanitarian assistance. Lessons in local experience are still being gathered from
emergency responses beginning 2000 that provide immediate needs for food, public
health, shelter and education.

Little resources are available for post-conflict development and psychosocial needs
of the affected population. There are serious cases among children that need special
attention but these may not surface through current and locally available appraisal
methods. There is an urgent need to determine the extent of medical, psychosocial and
educational cases that humanitarian assessments have overlooked.

There is a big gap in the flow of post-conflict assistance. Most are short-range assistance
controlled by terms agreed upon by intermediate providers and donors. Although
there is a slow and gradual change in the policy of aid agencies, the main bulk of their
resources and support schemes are still oriented toward relief assistance.

Despite the growing demand for post-conflict home site assistance, there are no
indications that aid agencies are responding proactively. Much less is there any
indication that development agencies are coming in to fill the gaps in post-conflict
assistance.

The chronic and complex characters of the recent conflicts are consistent with the
history of war in Mindanao and Sulu. Unceasing uncertainty and insecurity encourage
repetition of old ways of coping with the effects of war. For example, there has been
no significant change in the coping strategies of IDPs residing in areas hit by chronic
armed conflicts in 2000 and 2003. This means that if the basic characteristics of the
conflict remain the same, the civilian victims tend to use old but effective strategies.
Changes in coping strategies are found only in communities that have benefited from
post-conflict external assistance.

Evidence shows that there is no distinct difference between pre-conflict and post-
conflict strategies. If there is, it is primarily because of the availability of external
support provided at the home sites in 2003.
 105

Specific Conclusions

Children are the most vulnerable among all the sectors, yet their needs are also the
least attended to in current aid programmes. Most of those who were affected by
both 2000 and 2003 wars no longer have a fair chance of full childhood development
before transcending to adulthood. Superficially, children seem to have coped with
stressors before, during and after conflict periods. However, the long-term effects
of war on their lives are still unknown. There is also no long-term study on the
children who failed to adjust to the war and its aftermath. Moreover, many of the
children who seem to have coped have already suffered from irreparable losses in
their childhood development.

The role of adult and married women is most effective in reducing stress during
emergencies, especially in situations where children seek their support in the face
of acute stress and trauma. Women seem to have abandoned aspirations for
community and socially oriented development in favour of fulfilling their role as
mothers and wives. This trend is a result of scarce opportunities during pre-conflict
environments and much lesser opportunities during and after conflict periods.

Adult married men take on the roles of being providers and protectors of family
property and territory. These roles shape coping strategies of men in all phases
of the conflict. The loss or decrease of assets and material resources that is the
basis of their roles and functions result in grave psychosocial effects that may not
be obvious on the surface. Symptoms of the problem may manifest in the men’s
adverse behaviour towards women and children, bias against men or families from
other ethnic groups, lack of drive to increase productivity, tendency to get directly
involved in the conflict and others.

Families affected by war tend to use the same time-honoured survival strategies
like subsistence livelihood during pre-conflict situation and evacuation during
heights of conflict. However, while the resources during emergency periods have
improved due to better aid delivery, there has been a degeneration of resources to
help families uplift their situation after the war. There is a need to address the big
resource gap in post-conflict strategies at home sites.

Communities constantly affected by war are resilient. They have coped with
conflict-related disasters by fleeing and then returning when stressors subside.
They have also used the same effective survival strategies before and after every
conflict. Communities tend to band together according to ethno-religious
groupings when fleeing and relocating in evacuation centres. Such differences
in ethno-religious groupings are highlighted in post-conflict environments that
106

show disparity in various groups’ access to resources and/or differential pressures

from armed actors. Communities assisted by duty bearers especially in the area of
livelihoods, public health and peace building tend to have improved their coping
abilities and mitigated ethnic-based vulnerabilities.

The major vulnerabilities that increase the disastrous effects of armed conflicts and
affect the coping abilities of displaced persons and communities are the following:
• Impunity in human rights violations is a chronic source of stress that has a
broad and profound effect on the victims. Children are vulnerable to violations
of their rights. It also violates the property rights of persons and the common
properties of families and communities.
• Erosion of material assets and human capital produce constant economic
stress.
• Social stressors result from erosion of social trust between and among ethnic
groups.
• Inter-ethnic biases result from unequal or lack of access to correct information
and education.
• Psychosocial and physical stresses arise from social disadvantages such as
poverty, hunger, isolation and deprivation.
• Children are specifically vulnerable to denial of space and opportunities for
childhood development, especially education.
• Women tend to be confined to the stereotypical wife and mother roles.
• Men who are psychologically trained to hide their emotional needs are
specifically vulnerable to getting directly involved in the armed conflict because
of their role as family protector.
• Some families and communities are specifically vulnerable to acute stressors
because of their isolation and demographic constitution.

The major capacities that mitigate risks and threats and enhance the coping abilities
of IDPs and their communities are the following:
• Resiliency against stressors: Affected individuals are able to cope by using
physical, social and economic resources at their command and by combining
these with assistance given by aid agencies. Most of the affected communities
have been displaced repeatedly but they have always returned to their homes.
• The existence of indigenous governance structures of communities is an inherent
capacity that complements the weaknesses of civil governance structures and
non-observance of rules and laws.
 107

• Communities can overcome tension between ethno-religious groups especially

with the assistance of NGOs. In many communities where NGOs are
present, the level of trust between and among ethnic groups improved due
to peace building and transfer of resources. The favourable situation provides
opportunities for community members to work together.
• IDP families are capable of providing sense of security to family members,
especially children, during times of acute stress.
• Children can rely on their youthful physical abilities and emotional strength
during acute stress. They are able to sacrifice their own time and space for the
sake of the family’s collective interests or in favour of the interests of younger
children. However, these sacrifices may be detrimental to their own survival
and development.
• Men are physically capable of fulfilling their role as provider and protector of
family. With external assistance, their practical experience compensates for the
generally low level of formal education.
• Women have the capacity to lead the family even in the absence of the men.
They provide the emotional security that children need during the terrible
circumstances of war.

General Recommendations

Urgent issues in Central Mindanao Region

• Work for the creation of a regional policy environment that establishes the
parameters for the application of International Humanitarian Law and
International Human Rights Laws.
• Address post-conflict and onsite flow of assistance to improve the coping
abilities of affected populations and to mitigate risks and costs of humanitarian
assistance during emergencies.
• Study and quantify the losses caused by effects of successive wars on the civilian
population. In addition, utilise this as frame of reference in designing post-
conflict assistance schemes.
• Recognise that the future of the region significantly rests on the quality and level
of development of the child population. Create conditions for the formulation
of child-focused programmes or projects.
108

Approach in humanitarian assistance for

Central Mindanao Region:
• Combine needs-based approaches with solutions-based approaches. The former
is inclined towards periods during conflict while the latter is orientated toward
pre-conflict and post-conflict environments. Re-align the flow of resource
towards home communities. In terms of programmes, this means integration
of relief and rehabilitation within one agency or promoting collaboration
between aid agencies and development agencies on priority areas.
• Integrate child-focused projects within existing programmes or develop
specialised child-focused programmes in partnership with international aid
agencies, non-state development agencies and government agencies.
• Put in child rights (in the context of human rights) as an approach in
interventions.

Child Rights
Promote child rights protection. Demand creation, recognition and protection
of child space such as schools, homes, houses of prayer, playgrounds and other
areas for children’s development. Strengthen sense of ownership among children
through child and youth organisations and promote their active participation
in local governance.

Information, Education and Communication

Reduce inequality in the access to accurate information and remove distortions
and biases in the knowledge base of civilians and armed actors through proper
gathering and dissemination of information. This can be done through a
multimedia approach to information, education and communication (IEC)
that utilises existing indigenous and acquired information and communications
systems. There is a need to intensify information and education about child
rights, humanitarian and human rights laws and conventions.
 109

Specific Recommendations

For Save the Children UK:

• To assist in creating and multiplying child-focused local NGOs in the areas of
psychosocial assistance, education and child rights protection;
• To support baseline studies and monitoring of the effects of the war on children
and to support a regional assessment on resiliency and psychosocial effects on
children;
• To support IEC programmes of local NGOs aimed at raising level of human
rights awareness and child rights protection, in the form of multi-media
approaches such as radio programmes, print media, video or community
theatre;
• To assist local NGOs in child rights programming combined with funding
support for pilot demonstrations;
• To support training needs of NGOs and local government agencies involved in
child-focused programmes.

For non-state duty bearers:

• To improve co-ordination and collaboration among various NGOs;
• To raise level of discourse in humanitarian assistance and to create more
dynamism in the exchange of information and lessons learned;
• To improve human resource capabilities in pre-conflict and post-conflict
assistance in home communities;
• To increase collaboration with state-based development agencies and mobilise
resources;
• To mobilise or engage the academe and medical institutions in understanding,
monitoring and responding to psychosocial needs of affected populations in
the region;
• To push the case for Central Mindanao into the international arena by increased
collaboration with international agencies and bodies.

For state agencies:

• To improve co-ordination and collaboration with NGOs;
• To engage NGOs and academe in policy discourse;
110

• To arrest inequality in communication systems through more transparency in

the gathering and dissemination of information flows, and to share information
with non-state duty bearers;
• To involve NGOs in raising the level of child-focused initiatives such as the
UNCRC and to promote and create BCPCs;
• To encourage NGOs in helping raise the momentum of the BCPCs;
• To improve services directed towards children;
• To promote participation of children in disaster preparedness and other
training.

For the academe:

• To help raise level of discourse in finding solutions to the conflict in Central
Mindanao and initiate a multi-disciplinary approach in informing the warring
groups and the civilian population;
• To provide impetus for the creation of a favourable policy environment for
the recognition and application of International Humanitarian Law and
International Human Rights Laws in the region;
• To establish baselines and help start policy development processes leading to
appropriate solutions for determining accountabilities and reparations for the
losses brought upon the civilian population;
• To provide a venue for the affected civilian population to argue their case in a
wider public;
• To serve as a channel through which the civilian population can rally for
protection of basic human rights.

For individual and institutional donors:

• To provide more assistance to specific projects that will benefit children, like
providing assistance to displaced families in sending children to school, support
for the medical needs of child victims suffering from physiological disease or
impairment; or educational scholarships for child war victims;
• To give attention to college and vocational education in order to significantly
improve the level of human capital in affected communities;
• To help in providing work animals that will aid in productivity and increase
incomes.
 111

For communities (local governments, community organisations):

• To help establish children and youth organisations that will encourage child
and youth participation in local governance;
• To promote family and community values geared towards ensuring the
protection, survival, development and participation of children;
• To propose policies and rules designating child space as protected areas such as
playgrounds, schools, health centres, day care centres and temporary shelters;
• To mobilise external resources that would respond to children’s needs such as
scholarships, toys, books and other reading materials, school supplies, sports
equipment, etc.;
• To directly intervene in domestic or family conflicts that subject children to
physical and psychological abuse;
• To encourage women’s organisation and participation in community affairs;
• To develop and enforce local policies which recognise and protect human
rights.
112

ANNEX 1
DATA TABLES

TABLE A.
Pre-Conflict Survival Strategies, IDP – Children

IDP Children Pre-Conflict 2000 Pre-Conflict 2003

Muslim • helps in household chores • helps in household chores
Maguindanaon • goes to school, plays, strolls, shares • goes to school, plays, strolls, shares
stories with friends stories with friends
Lumad • helps parents in household chores • helps parents in household chores
• prepares for evacuation • prepares for evacuation
• reads books other than school books • reads books other than school books
• goes to school • goes to school
• plays with friends at the solar dryer • plays with friends at the solar dryer
• listens to radio or watches TV with • listens to radio or watches TV with
friends friends
• participates in livelihood activities
Christian Settler • enjoys simple pleasures with family • helps in farm, in utmost care and
• attends school caution
• reads books • helps mother in household chores
• watches TV, listens to radio with • attends school
friends • reads books other than school books
• reads bible • watches TV and listens to the radio
• plays and spends time with friends with friends
and peers • avails of NGO assistance
• helps in farm

TABLE B.
Pre-Conflict Survival Strategies, Women

Ethnic
Pre-Conflict 2000 Pre-Conflict 2003
Group
• plays with children • allots time for children
• takes care of family • does household chores
• does household chores • takes care of family
Christian Settler

• reads children’s books • avails of relief assistance from government

• listens to the radio organisations (GOs) and NGOs
• manages time for husband and children • reads children’s books
• watches TV with neighbours • listens to the radio
• does farm work • manages time for husband and children
• farms
• avails of livelihood assistance from NGOs
and GOs

• finds security in ancestral home, close to
nature and religion
• spends time with children, in farm
Lumad • does household chores and takes care of
family
• watches TV in neighbour’s house
• works in farm
• sells animals
• avails of assistance from DSWD
• spends time with and plays with children
• manages time
• takes care of family
• reads available materials at home
• watches TV
Maguindanaon
• listens to the radio
• joins women’s organisation
• works in farm
• avails of assistance from GOs or NGOs
TABLE C.
Pre-Conflict Survival Strategies, Men
Ethnic
Pre-Conflict 2000
Group
• family members help one another
Christian
Settler
• takes charge of farming and other
livelihood activities
• shares housework with wife
• shares housework with siblings
• reads books and other reading materials
Lumad
• monitors news over the radio
• neighbours help one another
• takes charge of farm
• family members help each other do
housework
Maguindanaon
• makes most decisions for the family but
open to ideas of wife
• does farm work and other livelihood
activities
113
• participates in psychosocial programmes
of NGOs
• does household chores and takes care of
family
• attends community meetings for livelihood
programmes
• attends seminars offered by NGOs
• avails of livelihood assistance from NGOs
• spends time with and plays with children
• takes care of family
• manages time
• does volunteer work
• stays at home always
• reads available materials at home
• listens to the radio
• attends community meetings for livelihood
activities
• organises women
• chats with neighbours
• works in farm
• accepts assistance from NGOs or GOs
Pre-Conflict 2003
• family members help one another
• co-operates with other men in the
community
• reads books and other reading materials
• monitors news over the radio
• takes charge of farm
• makes most decisions for the family but
open for ideas of wife
• does farm work and other livelihood
activities
• avails of relief assistance from NGOs
114

TABLE D.
Effects of War: Perspectives of Children
(Focus Group Discussion [FGD] Result)

Impact
War in 2000 War in 2003
Areas
12 to17-year-olds from Carmen, Cotabato
Mental • fear that everyone will die • anxious that the intensity of the war in
• afraid of being hit by stray bullets 2000 will be repeated
• fear losing one’s mind
• can not go out
Physical • physical weakness due to hunger, smell of • no longer sad and sleepless
gunpowder and extreme fear • no longer as hungry as in 2000
Emotional • nurture anger and loathing • more relaxed
• feel sad to leave place of abode • still have anxiety that war will break out
again
Social • separated from friends and neighbours • visit friends and plays
• visit friends and neighbours • visit other places
Economic • cannot cultivate farm • cultivate farm
• sell work animals at very low prices • improvement in income
• depend on government ration for food • some find it difficult because they lost
needs work animals
12 to17-year-olds from Pikit, Cotabato
Mental • extreme fear • less fear than in 2000
Physical • harassment of armed groups
Emotional • extreme fear • can overcome anxiety
Economic • loss of income; abandons livelihood • resumed normal livelihood activities
12 to 17-year-olds from Pagalungan
Mental • can not think well • can think better because the war is less
intense
Physical • sick • seems like people are dying every month
• wounded • skin diseases
Emotional • feel bad that they cannot go anywhere • feel bad for the restriction of movement,
• feel bad that the war seems not to end with very few places to go to
• extreme fear • caught between fear and the desire to
finish studies (despite the risks)
Social • little time to play with friends • children cannot play in some places
• avoid playing for fear of getting hit by
bullets
Economic • lack of food • father lost job
• abandon farm • incurred loans
• parents have no work • some families have improved their
incomes
 115

TABLE E.
Effects of War on Women: Result of FGD among Women from the Municipalities of
Carmen, Pagalungan and Pikit, 10 January 2004

Impact
War in 2000 War in 2003
Areas
Mental • has become irritable • has become overly sensitive
• afraid of going out
Physical • premature delivery of baby • physically weak due to change of diet
• miscarriage due to tension in the evacuation centre, where food
• loss of appetite assistance is in the form of noodles,
• lack of sleep sardines and NFA rice
Social • loss of desire to mingle with other people • has become reclusive
Economic • serious crisis due to destruction of crops • difficulty to earn income
and loss of household belongings • lack of livelihood
Emotional • self-pity and pity for the children • constant fear and anxiety

Table F.
Effects of War on Women
(based on interview data)

Ethnic
War in 2000 War in 2003
Group
• extreme fear • anger over loss of property stolen by
• anxiety over economic survival armed men
Christian Settler

• confusion, knows not where to go • sickness and injury

• anxiety over safety of family • anxious about return to normalcy
• anxiety over education of children • fear that sons will be abducted by armed
• fears that sons will be abducted by armed men
men • loss of livestock and work animals
• reduced opportunity for farming
• destruction of property
• insecurity over dislocation from ancestral • not affected
home
• death of loved ones
• danger of getting shot
• hunger, sickness and injury
Lumad

• fear of dying
• anxiety over education of children
• estranged relations with other groups
• establishment of new friendships
• loss of property
• abandonment of farm and livelihoods
116

• fear • loss of self-confidence

• sickness and hunger • anxiety over safety and welfare of family
• lack of sleep • establishment of new friendships at the
• suspension of classes and anxiety over evacuation centre
education of children • destruction and loss of property
Maguindanaon

• anxiety over safety and welfare of family • scarcity of food

• confused
• worried that male members of family will
be tagged as MILF rebels
• establishment of new friendships in the
evacuation centre
• destruction and loss of property
• abandons farm

TABLE G.
Effects of War: Result of FGD among Christian and Muslim Men of Pikit

Effects
War in 2000 War in 2003
of War
Mental • fear of dying • fear of dying and losing property, but
• fear of losing property lesser than in 2000 because of external
support from NGOs
Physical • sickness • sickness and disease minimised because
• nervous breakdown of medical assistance from NGOs and
• loss of weight government agencies
• women losing husbands
• orthopedic problems among children
• children dying in evacuation centres
Social • can no longer go to house of prayer • can seek NGO assistance on peace
• lost contact with friends building
• children cannot play anymore with other • can meet with friends and neighbours
children • can go to house of prayer
• children can no longer go to school
Economic • abandons farm • lose livestock due to thievery
• abandons livestock and other properties • lose livestock due to distress sales
• no more capital for livelihood project

Emotional • frustrated about the continuing conflict • more frustrations

• cannot sleep in peace • emotional distress over loss of livestock
• headaches and other properties
• do not know what to do anymore • emotional distress over lack of food
 117

TABLE H.
Effects of War on Men
(based on interview data)

Ethnic
War in 2000 War in 2003
Group
• anger towards perpetrators • anxiety over safety of family
Christian Settler

• destruction and loss of property

• grief over loss of loved ones
• death of civilians
• anxiety over safety of family
• abandonment of farm and livelihood
• fear • not affected
Lumad

• anxiety over safety of family

• abandonment of farm and livelihood
• fear • separation from family
Maguindanaon

• hunger, sickness, death and injury • hunger, sickness, death and injury
Muslim

• confusion and difficulty in making decisions • confusion

• destruction and loss of property
• financial difficulty

TABLE I.
Coping Strategies of Children 12-17 years old
(based on interview data)

Ethnic
War in 2000 War in 2003
Group
• moves to evacuation centre • seeks refuge and help from relatives when
• brings food available separated from parents
Maguindanaon

• gathers information about schedule of • gets sick

relief distribution • moves to evacuation centre
• avails of assistance from NGOs • brings food available
• family sells farm animals to meet needs • treats own wound using herb called
Kagebpa-gebpa
• avails of NGO assistance
• finds security in the company of family • not affected
members
• prays
• visits community solar dryer to play and
watch TV with friends
Lumad

• hides in the swamps for safety

• helps siblings carry their load during
evacuation
• listens to parents’ advice
• makes new friends at the evacuation
centre
118

• finds security in the company of family • avails of NGO psychosocial programme

members • listens to parents’ story about the war
• prays • feels secure in the company of family
• desensitised to the situation members
• asks help from relatives when separated • moves to nearest evacuation centre
from family • sleeps at evacuation centre in the night,
Christian Settler

• seeks place to hide in goes back to village during the day

• moves to nearest evacuation centre
• crawls to avoid being shot
• scrambles to ride a vehicle
• helps others carry their things during
evacuation
• avails of relief assistance in evacuation
centre
• makes use of banana leaves as matting for
tents
• wakes up early to do household chores
and catch up with school
• avails of relief supplies at evacuation centre
• avails of NGO psychosocial programme
• visits friends and neighbours in the
evacuation centre

TABLE J.
Coping Strategies, 12-17 Age Group
(FGD Result)

Areas of
War in 2000 War in 2003
Stress
12 to17-year-olds from Carmen
Mental • mental exercise to dig underground • mentally more prepared than in 2000
shelters to protect the innocent
Physical • avails of external medical assistance • eats more vegetables to improve body
resistance to disease
Emotional • overcomes fear by believing that God is • lesser anxiety; happier
just around to help
• holds on to the belief that there is hope
when one is still alive
Social • reduces time for play for fear of being • gives more time to family than friends;
caught in skirmishes finds it more important to stick with
• reduces time for play with other kids; family
has more time to play with brothers and
sisters inside the house
Economic • makes use of emergency crops, such as • improves income by engaging in other
root crops and bananas livelihood
12 to 17-year-olds from Pagalungan and Pikit
Mental • waits for exchange of fire to subside • more relaxed; able to concentrate on
before getting out of the house studies
• has to leave home for fear that houses • avoids thinking what will happen next
would be hit by bombs
• community decides to stick together as a
group during evacuation
Physical • takes any medicine available just to • avails of medical services
alleviate pain • does physical exercise every morning to
• tries to overcome hunger improve readiness

Emotional • finds it hard to overcome pain from
wounds and the loss of a relative who
dies from the bombing
Social • cannot play and communicate with
friends; just plays it by ear to know if the • enjoys the company of friends
fighting is near
Economic • finds time to fish in the river
TABLE K.
Coping Strategies of Women
(based on interview data)
Group During Conflict 2000
• prays to keep calm
• moves to evacuation centre at night,
comes back home during the day to
Christian Settler
cultivate farm
• brings only what is necessary to facilitate
movement during evacuation
• stays home for safety
• co-operates with community, shares labour
in cleaning farm and planting crops
• avails of NGO assistance
• prays to ease fear
• moves to high ground in order to be
spotted by AFP helicopters
• hides in the swamps; listens to the sound
of gunfire
• seeks information to determine whether
there is need to evacuate
Lumad
• avails of NGO relief aid
• brings only what is necessary
• discusses with husband whether to
evacuate or not
• shares stories and jokes with women
neighbours
• makes new friends at the EC
• abandons farm
119
• not too difficult as it was in 2000
• more fear of rebels, especially since they
steal work animals
• plays with friends
• resumes cultivation of farms and recovers
crops taken over by rats
During Conflict 2003
• prays for strength
• asks help from local officials
• moves to evacuation centre
• moves to evacuation centre at night,
returns home the following day to get
more personal belongings
• diverts attention to forget what’s
happening
• avails of NGO assistance
• negotiates with armed groups to spare
work animals
• meets with barangay leaders
• puts up tent as temporary shelter
• moves to evacuation centre but goes to
farm during the day
• stays at home
• avails of NGO assistance
120
• cracks jokes and shares stories to reduce
fear
• appears strong in front of children,
especially the small ones
• avails of relief aid from DSWD and NGOs
• moves to evacuation centre
• prepares things to carry during evacuation
• gets some rest during evacuation
Maguindanaon
• gets information to make decision on
whether to evacuate
• consults with neighbours to decide on
what to do
• shares stories with other IDPs in the
evacuation centre
• makes new friends in the evacuation
centre
• accepts NGO assistance
• takes turns with neighbours to guard work
animals
TABLE L.
Coping strategies of Women: Result of FGD among adult Women from Carmen,
Pagalungan and Pikit
Areas of
2000
Stress
Mental • tries to forget what happened
Physical • forces oneself to eat despite loss of appetite
Social • socialises with friends
• spends time in front of the TV
• attends community meetings regularly
Economic • works hard to earn income
• works hard with other people
Emotional • hopes for an end to war
• forgets the worries
• cracks jokes and shares stories with
neighbours
• remains strong in front of children
• prays to Allah to relieve fear
• gets more information to make decision
on whether to evacuate or not
• moves to evacuation centre during war
• moves to evacuation centre even before
the war starts
• attends training to reduce shock
• chooses an evacuation centre that is near
the mountain, so won’t be hit by bullets
• shares stories with friends
• abandons farm
• makes new friends at the evacuation
centre
• accepts NGO assistance
2003
• not affected by war
• not affected by war
• not affected by war
• not affected by war
• not affected by war
 121

TABLE M.
Coping Strategies of Men
(based on interview data)

Group During Conflict 2000 During Conflict 2003

• spends time with children
• feels secure with government soldiers
around
• entrusts everything to God
• abandons community due to pressure
from rebels
• avails of assistance from local government
and NGOs
Christian Settler
• gets used to material destruction of the
war
• helps in construction of temporary shelter
• moves to evacuation centre
• avails of relief assistance from government
and NGOs
• co-operates with neighbours and
community leaders, to know what to do

• abandons livestock for easier movement during armed conflict

during evacuation
• remains at home during evacuation in
order to protect the house
• keeps busy with work to forget what’s
happening
• sends wife and children to evacuation
centre for safety
• co-operates with neighbours and
community leaders to know what to do
during armed conflict
• sells farm animals to buy food
• negotiates with rebels
• prays to relieve fear • avails of relief assistance from government
• runs and lies face down to avoid being agencies and NGOs
shot • neighbours take turns in guarding their
• moves to a safe place communities
• avails of relief aid from NGOs and • hides in the farm or in the swamps
Lumad

government agencies • fortifies will to survive

• fortifies will to survive
• thinks of happy thoughts
• tries hard to forget what’s happening
• neighbours help each other during
evacuation
• abandons farm for safety
• avails of assistance from government
agencies (food and tents)
• moves to evacuation centre
• makes use of shortcuts in going to
evacuation centre
Maguindanaon
• neighbours help each other during
evacuation
• abandons farm for safety
• prays to Allah for more strength
• avails of assistance from government
agencies (food, tents)
• moves to evacuation centre
• makes new friends in the evacuation

• stops and waits for others on the way to centre

the evacuation centre • neighbours help each other in building
• neighbours help each other during temporary shelter
evacuation and share what they have
• makes new friends in the evacuation
centre
• brings carabao, farm equipment and other
livestock to the evacuation centre
122

TABLE N.
Coping Strategies of Men During Conflicts: Result of FGD Among Men from Pikit,
Pagalungan and Carmen, 10 January 2004

Areas of
2000 2003
Stress
Mental • turns to God through prayers to • connects with NGOs for support
minimise fear
• thinks about farm
• tries to forget what happened
Physical • seeks assistance from health agencies of • not many health problems
government and from NGOs
Social • organises meetings to resume normal • seeks assistance from NGOs and
activities government agencies
• initiates inter-ethnic dialogue between
Muslims and Christians
Economic • seeks external assistance • bayanihan (community self-help) system
• rents carabao
• borrows capital
Emotional • tries to enjoy and to forget what • no more fear, except loss of livelihood
happened (but really finds it difficult to • fear of military presence
accept reality)

TABLE O.
Trigger Mechanisms and Processes Influencing Decisions of Women: Data from FGD
among IDP Women from Carmen, Pagalungan and Pikit, 10 January 2004

Trigger
2000 2003
Mechanisms
1. Source of • local officials • not affected by 2003 war
Information • from neighbours
• visual of movement of government troops
• direct experience of aerial bombing
2. Who makes • Father decides because not married • not affected by 2003 war
the decision? • the whole family decides
• husband decides
3. Process within • family agrees to proceed to temporary • not affected by 2003 war
the family shelter
• agrees on what to do in the evacuation
centre; there is more discussion when
family members are adults
• everyone prepares survival goods for the
evacuation
 123

4. Process within • the barangay captain calls for a community • not affected by 2003 war
the community meeting
• local leaders call for a meeting in every
community
• some families with enough means to pay for
transport make their own decisions
• families move as one group
• Nag meeting nga magtinabangay inig naa na
sa evacuation center (community agrees to
help one another in the evacuation centre)

TABLE P.
Trigger Mechanisms, Perspective of Men: Result of FGD of Men from Pikit, Carmen and
Pagalungan, 10 January 2004

Trigger
2000 2003
Mechanisms
Type and • men in the village take out their • we heard bombs and artillery fire
Source of weapons for defence • relayed information about the war
Information • exchange of fire • radio and TV news
• families are leaving the village
• radio news
• municipal mayor
• relatives within the AFP
Who makes • President of the Philippines • nobody knew
the decision? • local government officials
• heads of the family (father and
mother)
Process within • evacuates to a safer place to avoid • evacuates to a safer place
the family bombs and cross fire
Process within • no more process within the • community able to discuss because
the community community, everyone caught by there is time to prepare
surprise

TABLE Q.
Post-Conflict Strategies of Children 12-17 years old
(based on interview data)

Group Post-Conflict 2000 Post-Conflict 2003

• (son) helps father on the farm; plays in • helps build new home or repair old home
school • membership in youth organisation
Maguindanaon

• (daughter) helps mother clean house; • watches TV in neighbour’s house

plants vegetables and flowers • listens to music
• socialises with friends • stops schooling due to lack of money
• watches TV in neighbour’s house
• listens to music
• stops schooling due to lack of money
124
• avails of NGO feeding supplements
• takes a good sleep upon return to village
• goes back to school
• enjoys the home environment upon
Lumad
return
• does farm work to help parents earn
income
• takes over responsibility to manage farm
left by deceased father
• talks with mother frequently to avoid
getting sad
• gets strength from family
• sets mind to start new life
• bring things from evacuation centre and
fixes them up for the home
• prays to ease restlessness and lessen
Christian Settler
weight of problems
• goes back to school
• adjusts behaviour because some things
done at home cannot be done in
evacuation centre
• prepares self for another disaster
• shares stories and plays with other
children
• spends time with friends and hangs out
with them
• moves to relatives’ home and works to
support studies
TABLE R.
Post-Conflict Strategies of Women
(based on interview data)
Group Post-Conflict 2000
• makes use of relief assistance from NGOs
• teaches good values to children
• watches TV and shares stories with
neighbours, especially women
• resumes livelihood activities
Christian Settler
• wakes up early to have enough time to
do household chores and go to school on
time
• spends time with peers and friends
• avails of NGO livelihood assistance
• helps mother in household chores
• remains in evacuation centre for safety
reasons
• prays to ease restlessness
• resolves to overcome the hardships
• manages time to be able to do housework,
work in farm and study
• joins community organisation to broaden
horizons
• plays and shares stories with friends to
ease the trauma
• plans to acquire a gun to protect self
• helps in the farm
Post-Conflict 2003
• attends bible services
• takes care of family
• makes use of relief assistance from NGOs
• teaches good values to children
• manages time
• tight budgeting of food and other
resources
• behaves well in evacuation centre
• watches TV and shares stories with
neighbours
• sings with neighbours
• watches children play
• resumes livelihood activities
• sells remaining farm animals to buy food
and other necessities
• makes use of financial assistance from the
government
• avails of NGO assistance
 125

• helps in re-packing relief aid while in the • not much affected by 2003 war
evacuation centre
• takes care of husband and children
Lumad • behaves well while in evacuation centre
• manages time
• joins organisations
• resumes farming activity
• moves to EC at night; returns to farm by • attends psycho-social activities of NGO
day • mental conditioning to accept reality of
• takes care of family war
Maguindanaon

• cleans and fixes house upon return
• avails of assistance from NGOs
• makes oneself busy with house work to
forget what happened
• spends time with friends
• visits siblings who live in another town
• avails of NGO assistance for livelihood
• avails of assistance from NGOs
• practices time management
• chats with neighbours
• attends meetings and seminars
• resumes farming activities

TABLE S.
Post conflict strategies of men
(based on interview data)

Group Post-Conflict 2000 Post-Conflict 2003

• prays to God • trusts and respects people from other ethnic
Christian Settler

• avails of food assistance from groups

government and NGOs • avails of assistance from government and NGOs
• observes conditions to find out
whether the home village is safe
• goes back to farming

• spends time with children • spends time with children

• avails of food assistance from
government and NGOs
• family members help each other
• reads books and other reading
materials
Lumad
• avails of food assistance from government and
NGOs
• reads books and other reading materials
• listens to the radio
• shares fish catch with neighbours

• joins religious activities • plays basketball with friends

• resumes livelihood activities • resumes livelihood activities
• avails of livelihood and • avails of livelihood and rehabilitation assistance
rehabilitation assistance from from NGOs
government and NGOs
126

• prays hard to Allah to relieve fear • avails of assistance from NGOs and LGUs
• avails of livelihood assistance • resumes livelihood activities
from NGOs and LGUs • restores mutual trust
Maguindanaon

• cleans house; checks belongings

• never gives up
• attends meetings
• shares stories with neighbours
• resumes livelihood activities
 127

ANNEX 2
LOCALE OF THE STUDY

The municipalities of Pikit and Carmen (in the province of Cotabato) and
Pagalungan (in the province of Maguindanao), Central Mindanao, serve as
locale of this study. The two provinces are the core of what is known as Central
Mindanao which, geographically, covers a wider radius that includes Bukidnon,
South Cotabato, Lanao del Sur and Sultan Kudarat. The term ‘Central Mindanao’
as used in this study, does not strictly follow the political subdivision defined by
the government; rather, it focuses on the impact area of the conflict with general
reference to the geography of the island.

Cotabato and Maguindanao were main impact areas of the 2000 and 2003 wars.
This is not to discount the fact, however, that in both wars, the effects radiated
to as far as north-western and south-western coasts of Mindanao and the islands
of Basilan and Sulu. Maguindanao was host to Camp Abu Bakar, the central
headquarters of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which was demolished
and overran by government troops in 2000. Cotabato is host to the Buliok
Complex, the alternate headquarters developed by the MILF after the loss of Abu
Bakar. In February 2003, Buliok became the principal military object of the AFP’s
rapid offensive that resulted in massive displacement of the civilian population.

Table A2.a. Selected Statistics of the Research Locale

No. of
Province/ Population Land Area Elementary High School
Municipalities/
Municipality (families) (has.) School Population Population
Barangays

Cotabato 176,834 731,102 18/544 168,225 54,456

(as of 1997) (SY ‘98-’99) (SY ‘98-’99)
Pikit 11,555 60,461 42 ------- -------
(as of 1999)
Carmen 9,395 111,043 25 9,497 1,610
(as of 2000) (SY ‘98-’99) (SY ‘98-’99)
Maguindanao 131,654 688,000 18/466 107,938 16,005
(as of 1997) (SY ‘98-’99) (SY ‘98-’99)
Pagalungan 4,715 62,024 12 4,328 1,207
(as of 2000)
Sources: Provincial Socio-Economic Profiles of Cotabato and Maguindanao and Municipal Socio-
Economic Profiles of Pikit, Carmen and Pagalungan
128

Cotabato and Maguindanao are lands of contrasts. Cotabato’s populace is

composed of an ethnic mix of Christian settlers, Lumads (Arumanon Manobo
tribe) and Muslims (Maguindanao ethnic group), but politically dominated
by Christian settlers. The Maguindanao populace is composed of an ethnic
mix of Maguindanao Muslims, Christian settlers and Lumads, but politically
dominated by Maguindanaos. The present political leadership of Cotabato is a
staunch defender of the rights of Christian settlers and the political authority of
the Philippine state. Maguindanao, on the other hand, is the political base of
the MILF that openly demands autonomy, including ancestral domain claims on
behalf of the Moro people of Mindanao.

Maguindanao is much poorer than Cotabato. This is evidenced by the contrasts

in the quality of life of the people; the level of dynamism in commerce, trade and
agricultural production; and infrastructure development. In the 2002 Philippine
Human Development Report (PHDR) published by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Philippine Human Development
Network (PHDN), Maguindanao has been listed among the lowest provinces in
Human Development Index (HDI), the 6th from the bottom as of 2000. It is also
the lowest in life expectancy (bottom ten as of 2000); lowest in percentage of basic
enrolment rate of people 7 to 16 years old (bottom ten as of 1999); and lowest in
Gender Development Index ([GDI] bottom ten as of 2000). Life expectancy in
Maguindanao is 53 years compared to 66 years in Cotabato. While the poverty
incidence of Cotabato has decreased from 42.7 per cent to 34.8 per cent between
1997 and 2000, the poverty incidence of Maguindanao has increased from 24 per
cent to 36.2 per cent during the same period.

Table A2.b. Enrollment Data, Maguindanao and Cotabato

Province/ No. of Families Elementary School High School

Municipality (1997) (1998-1999) (1998-1999)

Cotabato 176,834 168,225 54,456

Maguindanao 131,654 107,938 16,005

Sources: Provincial Socio-Economic Profiles of Maguindanao and Cotabato, 2000.

Access to education and health is also an area of significant contrasts. Enrolment

figures for 1998-1999 (see Table 3) indicate that enrolment incidence per family
is lower in Maguindanao in both elementary and high school levels. While 30.7
per cent of families in Cotabato have at least a son or daughter in high school,
only 12.1 per cent of families in Maguindanao can send children to high school.
 129

Enrolment incidence per family in the elementary level is also higher in Cotabato
(at 95.1 per cent) compared to Maguindanao (at 81.9 per cent).

Health service provision is also a problem in Maguindanao, with only 420 beds
in eight hospitals, representing one hospital bed per 313 persons. Cotabato has
754 beds in 36 hospitals representing one bed per 254 persons. At the grassroots
level, only 31 per cent of barangays in Maguindanao have barangay health stations
compared to 40 per cent in Cotabato.

Although the contrasts are significant, both provinces are victims of a national bias
in public services. Government figures show that for the period 1996 to 1998,
Mindanao got an average of only 18 per cent of the education budget compared to
Luzon (48 per cent) and Visayas (20 per cent). This is not to mention the fact that
children in these provinces have accumulated losses in opportunities for education
due to disruptions in schooling caused by the chronic conflict.

Table A2.c. Education Budget Per Capita,

CY 1996-1998 (in pesos)

Island Group 1996 1997 1998

Luzon 591.00 674.00 924.00

Visayas 684.00 772.00 1,077.00

Mindanao 521.00 617.00 883.00

Source: National Statistics Office (NSO), 2000

The chronic conflict has also created economic uncertainties resulting to lack
of incentives for production. With less-than-dynamic markets that discourage
people from producing surplus goods, much of existing economic activities are at
the subsistence level. This is exacerbated by rampant violation of human rights,
including property rights, which also provides disincentives to capital accumulation
and re-investments in production. The other end result is high food subsistence
incidence – where families are not able to provide enough food to their members.
Table 5 indicates that Region 12 (where Cotabato belongs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (where Maguindanao belongs) top in the average
food subsistence incidence from 1985 to 1997 – not to mention the fact that these
were the years prior to the war years of 2000 and 2003. In 1997, Region 12 had
a food subsistence incidence of 30.6 per cent compared to the national mean of
16.2 per cent.
130

The subsistence incidence is measured by determining the number of families with

per capita annual incomes below the food threshold. To get the monthly food
threshold, the per capita food cost is multiplied by 30.4 (approximate no. of days
per month).

Table A2.d. Food Subsistence Incidence (Families),

1985-1997 (In per cent)

1985 1988 1991 1994 1997

Philippines 24.4 20.3 20.4 18.1 16.2
Mindanao 29.7 23.1 29.6 26.4 24.8
Region 12 29.6 16.8 34.3 32.6 30.6
ARMM - - 26.7 25.3 27.7
Region 9 34.6 22.8 28.0 25.9 20.6
Region 10 33.4 27.2 33.6 30.0 26.8
Region 11 23.3 24.0 26.2 21.2 21.7
Source: NSCB 2000

Grassroots Access to Basic Services

While the intra-regional picture is already in bad shape, the situation at the
grassroots level is even worse. Pikit, a town in Cotabato, has a high rate of illiteracy.
As of 1995, according to National Statistics Office (NSO) data, around 23 per cent
of persons five years old and above have never been to school. This already is a
significant improvement from an illiteracy rate of 29.5 per cent five years earlier.
Of the elementary school population, only 45 per cent are able to proceed to Grade
V or Grade VI and of the high school age population, only 47.9 per cent are able
to graduate. Only a small percentage is able to proceed to college (4.32 per cent)
and only 2.53 per cent are able to complete college education. There were 49,814
persons five years old and above in 1995 and of this figure, only 17 persons (0.03
per cent) were able to take post-graduate studies.

In Pagalungan, there are three secondary schools hosting 1,207 students in 23

classrooms. This indicates a dense ratio of 52 students per classroom. In Carmen,
Lumad children in the interior villages have to walk 16 kilometres a day in order
to attend school. In the village of Kilabao (a sitio of Barangay Kimadzil), the small
high school has been closed since 1987. Although the village has been able to
produce nine high school graduates since it was established, it has never produced
a college graduate.
 131

Unlike the more fortunate rural villages in the country, the villages of Pikit and
Pagalungan are deprived of what should have been basic in their existence. The
Municipal Waterworks system of Pikit provides potable water to only four out of
42 barangays in the municipality. Nestled on the Liguasan Marsh, the population
relies on shallow tube wells for their daily water needs. In Pagalungan, the power
utility provides energy to only 330 households (6 per cent) out of 4,715 households
in the municipality.

Chronic Displacement and the Fate of Children

Chronic conflict and resulting displacements are the common denominators to

Cotabato and Maguindanao. The same denominator also distinguishes them from
other poverty-stricken areas of the country where the population’s struggle for
survival and development is hampered by continuing dislocations and prevalent
uncertainty.

During the first half of the 1970s (Martial Law years), the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) rebellion against the government caused massive displacement of
the population. In Pikit, more than 10,000 persons disappeared from the town
between 1970 and 1975, and the population dropped from 55,423 to 45,220.
This was the period when international aid agencies were not yet in a position to
provide emergency response in the region.

In Pagalungan, the NSO noted a significantly high population growth rate of more
than six per cent between 1995 and 2000. This was attributed to displacements in
surrounding areas that brought refugees to the town.

Displaced persons interviewed vividly portray inter-generational testimonies of

conflicts and displacements. Most people refer to the years 1970-1976, 1990-
1992, 1999-2000 and 2003 as the peaks of conflict, with varying intensities felt by
communities according to their geographic proximity to the warring parties.

Records at the Provincial Social Welfare and Development Office (PSWDO) of

Cotabato show that 80,535 persons in the province were displaced during the
1999-2000 war. Of this number, 21 per cent refused to return to their homes
because they had no more homes to return to. Their houses were either destroyed
by bombs from government forces or burned by rebels. The government partly
provided for their emergency needs by constructing 191 temporary shelters as of
March 2001 and another 93 shelters by October of the same year.
132

During the same war period, the traditionally harmonious existence of

Maguindanaos, Lumads and Christian settlers in Carmen was ruptured by
the conversion of their communities into a battleground between rebels and
government forces. In Barangay Malapag, the eastern village bordering the
town of Damulog (Bukidnon Province), the community was literally split into
three. The Christian settlers evacuated to the Christian-only evacuation centre in
Damulog; the Lumads ran to the barangay centres under the protection of the local
government or government forces; and the Maguindanaos hid in the forests with
their fellow Maguindanao neighbours. In Kimadzil and Aruman, the traditional
peaceful co-existence between Lumads and Maguindanaos was broken as MILF
rebels and their Maguindanao sympathisers launched an offensive that was aimed
at taking control of the village centre of Aruman. The attack caused the deaths
of some Lumads, that the latter sought protection from government forces and,
eventually, joined government forces as members of the Citizens’ Armed Force
Geographic Unit (CAFGU). In the nearby Maguindanao village of Langogan,
government forces destroyed the two-room primary school with cannon fire from
armoured vehicles and, after the war, established a CAFGU base in the middle of
the village. Adding insult to social injury between Lumads and Maguindanaos,
government forces deployed Lumad CAFGUs in the village.

The war in 2003 was less widespread in the region but caused negative political
impact on a large scale as the government offensive was launched on a Muslim end-
of-Ramadan prayer day. The Cotabato towns of Pikit, Aleosan and M’lang were
most affected, as 56,203 persons had to vacate their homes. The displacement was
exacerbated by natural calamities (drought and floods) from January to April and
from July to August of the same year. According to provincial government records,
the drought caused hunger to 27,199 families and the floods destroyed 110 houses
in 84 barangays, affecting 15,796 families.

At the peak of the armed conflict in 2003, 11,464 families had vacated their
homes in 58 barangays of nine municipalities. Pikit became the central refuge
as displaced persons and their livestock trooped to the town centre, the public
schools, and the gymnasium of the Catholic Immaculate Conception Parish (ICP).
Correspondingly, the town became an instant command centre of aid organisations
that converged to provide emergency response. To many of the duty bearers
involved in relief services during the period, the Pikit emergency experience was a
lesson of magnitude in relief needs and an arena of difficulty in co-ordination. It
was a time when relief actors also competed for space with beneficiaries.

The fate of the children was not invisible to the duty bearers and the general public.
They were accounted for in the statistics of the sick and the hungry and those who
stopped going to school either because the schools were gone or the teachers had
 133

refused to resume their duties. The national leadership of the Department of

Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) prominently espoused the need to look
into the psychosocial needs of children by providing toys for play therapy. Some
aid agencies would later provide improved services by re-instituting education
services even in the evacuation centres.

But no one really asked the children how they coped and survived. They were not
asked what kind of information they have and how they managed to exercise their
options. No one has made clear how the people around – parents, neighbours,
the larger community in general – have treated them. Even the adult displaced
persons, who were children once, and who faced the same predicament in earlier
years, have never had the experience of being asked how they coped and survived.
134

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K Yamamoto, Their World, Our World: Reflections on Childhood, CT: Praeger
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L E Arnold (ed), Childhood Stress, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1990.
M R El-Ghonemy, The Political Economy of Rural Poverty, London & New
York: Routledge, 1990.
M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.
R Chambers, N C Saxena and T Shah, To the Hands of the Poor: Water and
Trees, London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1989.
S Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, NY:
Simon & Schuster, 1996.
V P Varma (ed), The Secret Life of Vulnerable Children, London: Routledge,
1992.
VP Veninga, (ed), A Gift of Hope: How We Survive Our Tragedies, Boston: Little
Brown & Company, 1985.

2. Journals
A De Wall, “War and Famine in Africa”, IDS Bulletin, 24 (4), 1993.
A Dyregov, R Gjestad and M Raundalen, “Children exposed to warfare:
longitudinal study”, Journal of Traumatic Stress, 15 (1), 2002, pp. 59-68.
E Protacio-De Castro, “Children in Armed Conflict Situations: Focus on Child
Soldiers in the Philippines”, Kasarinlan, 16 (2), 2001.
E Quitoriano and E Libre, “Reaching for the Gun: The Human Cost of Small
Arms in Central Mindanao, Philippines”, Kasarinlan, 16 (2), 2001.
J D Altwood and J.W. Donnelly, “The children’s war: Their reactions to
devastating events”, Family Journal – Counselling and Therapy for Couples
and Families, 2002, pp. 10, 11-18.
J Dollard, “The Life History in Community Studies”, American Sociological
Review, 3 (5), 1938, pp. 724-737.
L Shields, and B Bryan, “The effect of war on children: The children of Europe
after World War II”, International Nursing Review, 49 (2), 2002, pp. 87-98.
M Altwood, D Bell-Dolan and S A Hussain, “Children’s trauma and adjustment
reactions to violent and non-violent war experiences”, Journal of the
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 41 (4), 2002, pp.
450-457.
M C Ferrer, “Armed to the teeth”. Kasarinlan, 16 (2), 2001.
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M Grgic, N Mandic, O Koic and M Z Knezevic, “Differences in depression

and hopelessness between displaced children and non-displaced children”,
Socijalna Psihijatnja, 30 (3), 2002, pp. 154-159.
P Smith, S Perrin, W Yule, B Hacam and R Suviand, “War exposure among
children from Bosnia-Herzegovina: Psychological adjustment in a
community”, Journal of Traumatic Stress, 15 (2), 2003, pp. 147-156.
Philippine Human Development Report, Manila: Human Development
Network (HDN) and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), 2002.
Poverty and Hunger,1986, Washington: The World Bank.

3. Web Publications
B Harris, “The War Isn’t Over When the War Is Over”, http://www.oneworld.org/
child_rights/maputo_war.html, 1996, Retrieved 6 January 2004.
Cotabato (North) Province, Region XII,Philippines, http://oasis.fortunecity.com/
acapulco/215/region12/cotabato/cotabato.htm, Retrieved 30 April 2002.
D Yagcioglu, “Psychological Explanations of Conflicts between Ethnocultural
Minorities and Majorities”, http:www.geocities.com/Athens/8945/psycho/
1996, Retrieved 6 January 2004.
J Boyden, “Children affected by armed conflict and forced migration”,
http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/ruboyden.html, 2001, Retrieved 6 January 2004;
Cotabato, http://www.geocities.com/lppsec/pp/cotabato.htm - Cotabato,
Retrieved 1 June 2002.
J Jewett and K Peterson, “Stress and Young Children”, http://ecap.crc.uiuc.edu/
eecearchive/ digests/2002/jewett02.html, Retrieved 6 January 2004.
J A Myers-Walls, “Talking to Children About Terrorism and Armed Conflict”,
The Forum for Family and Consumer Issues, 7 (1), http://www.ces.ncsu.edu/
depts/fcs/pub/2002w/myers-wall.html, Retrieved 26 January 2004.
“Promoting Psychosocial Well-being Among Children Affected by
Armed Conflict and Displacement: Principles and Approaches”, SCF,
http://www.savethechildren.org/publications/psychsocwellbeing2.pdf,
Retrieved 26 January 2004.
“Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict
of Children”, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/51/plenary/a51-
306.htm, Retrieved 9 September 2002.
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R Allen and W Rosse, “Children’s response to exposure to traumatic events”,

http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/qr/qr103.html, 1998, Retrieved 26 January
2004.
R J Apfel and B Simon, “Psychosocial interventions for children of war: The
value of a model of resiliency”, http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/themes/
psychosocial/default.html, Retrieved 26 January 2004.

4. Unpublished Research
I Bacus, “Stress, coping and resilience among rural disadvantaged children: focus
on the students of a boarding school in Mindanao”, Unpublished thesis,
University of the Philippines-Diliman.

5. Government Data
National Economic and Development Authority, “1998 Socio-Economic Profile
of Central Mindanao (Region XIII)”, Cotabato City, 1998.
National Economic and Development Authority, “Philippine Poverty Statistics”,
Pasig City, January 2000.
National Economic Development Authority. “Regional Economic Situationer”,
Cotabato City, 3rd Quarter, 2001.
National Economic and Development Authority, “Strategic Action Plan for the
Immediate Relief and Short-Term Rehabilitation of the Conflict-Affected
Areas in Mindanao”, Pasig City, September, 2000.
Philippine Poverty Statistics, National Statistical Co-ordination Board, January
2000.
Profile of Cotabato Province, 2000, “Provincial Social Welfare and Development
Office Summary of Report (2000)”, Cotabato Province.
Provincial Social Welfare and Development Office Accomplishment Report
(January-June 2001), Cotabato Province.
Socio-Economic Profile of Cotabato, 2000.
Socio-Economic Profile of the Municipality of Carmen, Cotabato, 2000.

6. Non-government Organisation Data

Oxfam, “Participatory Needs Assessment at Barangay Panicupan, Pikit, Cotabato”
(Undated; unpublished report).