De la Camara vs.

Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September 1971]

Facts:
Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis
Oriental was arrested on 7 November 1968 and detained at the Provincial
Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the
wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato,
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968.
Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan
filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder
and another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-accused
Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid
occurrence.
Then on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la
Camara with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no
evidence to link him with such fatal incident of 21 August 1968. He likewise
maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II)
started the trial of de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution
resting its case on 10 July 1969.
The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la
Camara's application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part
of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara would flee even if he had the
opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount
of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated
murder.
On 12 August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos,
upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating
that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00
bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. De la Camara filed
motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount.
The Judge however remained adamant. De la Camara filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, de la Camara
had escaped from the provincial jail.
Issue:
Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the
amount of bail, excessive enough to discourage the accused from fleeing.

Held:
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there
were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would
have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in
the fundamental law.
It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits
itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest
American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure
the accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set at a higher figure
than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive"
under the Eighth Amendment."
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of
10 August 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should
be posted by de la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information
charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the sum of
P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being
12 victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision.
Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the
amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for
frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the present case that the
Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the
two offenses. No attempt at rationalization can give a color of validity to the
challenged order.
There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail
but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What
aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield
to the command of the fundamental law.
In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of
the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe
that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances
be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he
must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath that he was
told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean
that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more
forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be
availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then.
De la Camara's subsequent escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is
why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on the
other hand, does call for repudiation from the Supreme Court.