LIST OF CASES:

1. Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299, G.R. No. 157053, Aug. 19, 2003
2. Ledesma vs. CLimaco, 57 SCRA 473 (1974)
3. Spouses Saburnido v. Madrano,418 Phil. 241,247-248 (2001)
4. In re: Howard D. Terell, G.R. No. 1203, May 15, 1903
5. Algura vs. LGU of the City of Naga, Atty. Teoxon, et al., G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006
6. Paras v. Paras Mar 13, 2017
7. In Re: Adriatico, 17 Phil 324
8. Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, 192 SCRA 381
9. Cui v. Cui, 11 SCRA 755
10. OPDC vs. Atty. Tumulak, Mar 14, 2017.

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003 x-----------------------x
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisements, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667" in the following issues of newspaper:

• July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer

• August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin
• August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said
that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of
Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
 Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising;
and that the rationale behind the decades- old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed
that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and
public order as long as it is dignified.

On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, finding
respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with
the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo violated Rule 2.03, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.

Held: Respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in
our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six
months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise
been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the
name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical
and informative data is likewise allowable. The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily
for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or
standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law.

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
FERNANDO, J.

Facts:
On October 13, 1964, Adelino H. Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was
counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
motion to withdraw as such.

Respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as
well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said
motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse
of discretion.

Held:
No, Hon. Climaco’s action of denying his withdrawal is not a grave abuse of discretion.The petition for
certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily
be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding
concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration.
What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities
incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position,
his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him
to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill.

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

A crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, the proceedings having started in the municipal
court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962, and has been postponed at least eight (8) times and even there are two
witnesses who are ready to take the stand. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election
Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed October
15, 1964. It was noted that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and
to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and
that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel
de oficio”.

Petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The law is a profession, not a trade or a
craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of
the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. Justice
Sanchez in People v. Estebia reiterated it: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say
that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by
defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional
ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-
defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is
a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less
of self- interest.”

The welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory.
ts importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important
that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for
him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.”

MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FLORANTE E.

MADROÑO,1 respondent.
A.C. No. 4497 September 26, 2001 QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former
judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental. Previous to this
administrative case, complainants also filed three separate administrative cases against respondent.

In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave threats and acts
unbecoming a member of the judiciary against respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty of
pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was unarmed at the time, during a heated
altercation. Respondent was accordingly dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in
government but without forfeiture of retirement benefits.

Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge
Madroño, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. MTJ- 90-486.4 In
the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted
and reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses
Saburnido charged that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were deposited,
allowed other persons to take the goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Some
of the goods were lost while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent was found guilty
of both charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.

In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against them, namely:

1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who
thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the then
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and
two others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in the case,
inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of Venustiano's firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal
Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano
Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into custody a prisoner by final Judgment
who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33,8 filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as chairperson of the
Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being related to a candidate for
barangay councilor.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Florante E. Madroño’s act of filling multiple complaints constitute gross misconduct
that will warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Held:

Respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
The Supreme Court affirms to the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The IBP concluded that
complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross
misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction.

A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.11 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically,
in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:

RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall be whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness
to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait
whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal
from the judiciary. We see in respondent's tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the
persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact
revenge. Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It
constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, which provides:

SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do.

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law. Solicitor-General
Araneta for Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
G.R. No. 1203 May 15, 1903
PER CURIAM:

Facts:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance, in the
city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as a member of the bar
of the city of Manila for the reasons:

First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified
that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its
organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the law. The
accused made answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not Howard D. Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law.

Held:
Howard D. Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year from February 7,
1903.

We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were such as to
justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the accused in
connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as
to warrant his suspension from practice.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or evading
the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as
amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or
suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney
knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA, petitioners,

vs.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR.
LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO,
SR., respondents.
G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts:
The petitioners source of income are their house and Mr. Antonio Algura’s salary as a policeman. Their
house serves as a boarding house, a mini-store and a computer shop. Naga City Government conducted a
demolition, as a result a portion of petitioners' house was destructed, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly
income of PhP 7,000.00 from their boarders' rentals. With the loss of the rentals, the meager income from
Lorencita Algura's sari-sari store and Antonio Algura's small take home pay became insufficient for the
expenses of the Algura spouses and their six (6) children for their basic needs including food, bills,
clothes, and schooling, among others.

On September 1, 1999, spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint
for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal
demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid
by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.

Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants, to which petitioner
Antonio Algura's Pay Slip No. 2457360 was appended, showing a gross monthly income of PhP
10,474.00 and a net pay of PhP 3,616.99 for July 1999 and also a July 14, 1999 Certification issued by the
Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property declared in their
name for taxation purposes.
On October 13, 1999, respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim dated October 10, 1999, arguing
that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses' boarding house
blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.

Praying that the counterclaim of defendants (respondents) be dismissed, petitioners then filed their Reply
with Ex-Parte Request for a Pre-Trial Setting before the Naga City RTC on October 19, 1999. On
February 3, 2000, a pre-trial was held wherein respondents asked for five (5) days within which to file a
Motion to Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants.

On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing
Fees dated March 10, 2000. They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of
petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura
also had a mini-store, a computer shop and a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP
3,000.00 a month.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners should be considered as indigents litigants who qualify for exemption from
paying fees.

Held:
NO, the petitioners are not considered as indigent litigants who are qualified for exemption from paying
filing fees.

The petition is GRANTED and the April 14, 2000 Order granting the disqualification of petitioners.
Dismissing Civil Case RTC-99-4403 and application of Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure to determine whether petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants.

The Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section
18 on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party which
took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants which became effective on July
19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.

The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as a pauper litigant
by submitting an affidavit that they do not have a gross income of PhP 2,000.00 a month or PhP
24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila and PhP 1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a year
for those residing outside Metro Manila or those who do not own real property with an assessed value of
not more than PhP 24,000.00 or not more than PhP 18,000.00 as the case may be.

There are two requirements:

a) income requirement—the applicants should not have a gross monthly income of more than PhP
1,500.00, and;
b) property requirement––they should not own property with an assessed value of not more than PhP
18,000.00.

In the case at bar, with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP
10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when
combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule 141, Section
16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied.
The petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order
disqualifying them as indigent litigants that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21
of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if the
court is satisfied that the party is "one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family." The trial court did not give credence to this view
of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party.

The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as indigent
litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and
Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and discard
Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.

The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section 18
on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now
the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants. For one, the history of the two
seemingly conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the intent of the Court to consider the old
Section 22 of Rule 3, which took effect on January 1, 1994 to have been amended and superseded by Rule
141, Section 16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M. No. 83-6-389-0. Furthermore, Rule 141
on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000 and the second on August 16, 2004; and
yet, despite these two amendments, there was no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This
clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules on indigent litigants to cover
applications to litigate as an indigent litigant. Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been
superseded and impliedly amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that
the two rules can and should be harmonized. The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141,
Section 19 because

it is a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to
harmonize them.

Therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When an application
to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents
to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present
Section 19 of Rule 141. If the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to
litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a
hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has "no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.” The court should apply the
"indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the
prayer for exemption.

ROSA YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, Respondent A.C. No. 5333, March
13, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:
In a Decision dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for
one (1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served
simultaneously. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the Court denied it with finality in a
Resolution dated January 22, 2001.

On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his
associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and
that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension order. On March
26, 2001, complainant filed a second motion for contempt and disbarment, claiming that, on March 13,
2001, Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the suspension
order issued against respondent. Complainant filed two (2) more motions for contempt dated June 8, 2001
and August 21, 2001 raising the same arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective
comments, and complainant filed her replies to both comments.

Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he
completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started
accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension. Also, complainant
manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the
pendency of his motion to lift suspension.

On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order on the status of
respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the
Court's order to lift his suspension.

Issues:
The issues before the Court now are (a) whether respondent should be held administratively liable for
allegedly violating his suspension order and (b) whether his suspension should be lifted.

Held:
(a)Yes, the respondent should be held administratively liable for allegedly violating his suspension.

WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of
in this case – are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The

practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Also, According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal
knowledge, training[,] and experience." During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted,
a lawyer must desist from practicing law. It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not
automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required
documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the
practice of law.

(b) No, the respondent’s suspension should not be lifted. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However, considering that respondent has already been
previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed, but nonetheless should be adjudged for
recording purposes.

In re MACARIO ADRIATICO, Petitioner W. A. Kincaid, for Petitioner

G.R. No. L-2532. November 17, 1910.

JOHNSON, J.

Facts:
On the 11th day of December, 1906, the petitioner was by this court removed from his office as a lawyer,
and the certificate permitting him to practice law theretofore issued to him was canceled and annulled, for
the reasons set out in the decision. (See in re Adriatico, 7 Phil. Rep., 173.) He now, through his attorney,
Mr. W. A, Kincaid, presents a petition asking for reinstatement.

Issues: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to reinstate an attorney who has been disbarred.

Held:
Yes, The Supreme Court may reinstate an attorney at law who has been disbarred, for reasons and upon
assurances satisfactory to the court.

Considering the conduct of Mr. Adriatico since his suspension and considering the power of this court in
the premises, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that Macario Adriatico may be admitted to the bar of the
Philippine Islands upon taking the usual oath. It is so ordered.

This petition or motion is not only presented by one of the leading members of the Philippine Bar, but the
reinstatement of Mr. Adriatico is also urged and recommended by the Philippine Bar Association. Also,
Mr. Adriatico was elected a member of the First Philippine Assembly, as well as of the Second, from the
same Assembly District, the Island of Mindoro. His conduct as a member of the Legislature has merited
the approval of the Philippine Islands, and Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the Philippine Assembly. His good
conduct is also certified to by the Hon. Mariano Cui, judge of the Seventh Judicial District. Furthermore,
No objection is made by anyone to the motion which he presents. The petitioner promises that, should he
be reinstated by this court, he will, in the future, observe the laws and will, in all respects, act honestly
and uprightly.

PRUDENTIAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, Respondent A.C. No. 2756 : December
18, 1990
PER CURIAM
Facts:
In a Decision, dated 12 November 1987, this Court, upon finding that respondent Benjamin Grecia had
"proven himself unfit to continue in the pursuit of his profession," ordered his disbarment. Respondent
Grecia thereafter sought a reconsideration of the said Resolution on 14 December 1987. This was denied
in the Resolution of 12 January 1988 for lack of merit, the issues raised having previously been duly
considered and passed upon.

On 29 December 1988, respondent, through counsel, filed a "Petition for Reinstatement as a Member of
the Bar," this time praying for "justice, leniency, understanding and mercy from the Members of this
Honorable Court," citing several cases of lawyers previously disbarred but who were eventually
reinstated. Respondent averred that he comes to court "on bended knees asking for the same kindness,
understanding, liberality and leniency." This was once again denied in the Resolution of 15 June 1989 the
same being substantially a repetition of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 12 November
1987, which was already denied with finality in the Resolution dated 12 January 1988.

On 24 November 1989, respondent filed a "Motion for Permission to Reiterate his Petition for
Reinstatement" stating that he humbly begs permission to plead again for its forgiveness and clemency;
that he has suffered the harsh and supreme sanction of disbarment for two long years now; that this is his
first offense; that he solemnly declares that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense
for which he is fully repentant and learned the most bitter lesson of his life to such an extent that he
solemnly vows never to commit any offense again; that his sufferance of the extreme sanction of
disbarment has changed him for the better; that he had fully purged himself in the proper and
irreproachable manner and that he prays that he be forgiven and pardoned by this Court. The Motion was
denied with finality in the Resolution of 21 December 1989.

On 21 May 1990, Mrs. Maria Luisa B. Grecia, wife of respondent wrote a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court stating that she has long wanted to write and if it need be, on
bended knees, to ask the Court sincerely to forgive her husband and permit him to practice his profession;
that it is not only he who is suffering the anguish and shame caused by his disbarment but also his
children and herself; that it is now two and a half (2 1/2) years since her husband has been disbarred and
completely without any means to support his family; that their youngest daughter may altogether have to
stop studying; that during these years, her husband has deeply repented and is now very humble and
prayerful and has reformed for the better and that she pleads that her husband be forgiven and reinstated
as a lawyer. The letter was Noted for the time being in the Resolution of 28 June 1990.

On 17 October 1990, the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar, submitted to the Bar Confidant for
the Court's consideration, Resolution No. 90-057, adopted on 9 October 1990, praying that the Court
extend its judicial clemency to respondent Grecia and reinstate him as a member of the Philippine Bar,
reasoning among others, that he has been "sufficiently punished," has reformed and rehabilitated himself,
and can again be entrusted with the exercise of the noble profession of law.

In a letter, dated 21 November 1990, addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Court,
respondent Grecia pleaded anew that once the Court restores him to the practice of law, he "unreservedly
bind(s)" himself "henceforth to act and behave carefully as a worthy member of the Philippine Bar."
Issue:

Whether or not previously disbarred member of the bar who has proven himself unfit to continue in the
pursuit of his profession may be allowed for readmission?
Held:
Yes, respondent Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby ordered READMITTED to membership in the Bar.

"The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously
disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive
evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been successful, and,
therefore, he is entitled to be readmitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.

"The criterion for reinstatement has been stated as follows: Whether or not the applicant shall be
reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend,
generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an
attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the
Court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court
will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the
time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement."

Cognizant, therefore, "that the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle," (In re Juan T. Publico, supra), we heed
respondent's plea for reinstatement. His expiation subsequent to his disbarment; his realization of his
mistake and the gravity of his offense; the testimonials from exemplary members of the Bar as to his
fitness to resume the practice of law; and his solemn pledge to the Court, that if his disbarment is lifted,
he will always closely and faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession, call for
this affirmative response.

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant, ROMULO CUI,
Intervenor-appellant
G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Facts:
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui,
now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them."

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one
of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio"
entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his
brother's assumption of the position.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but
is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui,
on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957
(administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two
weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant qualifies to the position of administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili.

Held:
Yes, the defendant qualifies for the position. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession.
The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme
Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's
oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the
profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar,
except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
"successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by
the Secretary of Education."

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and
provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil
engineer

or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among
those otherwise qualified.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the
office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless
disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may
be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident
sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29
March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated
on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of
his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first
place.

ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY JANICE MONTERO,

Complainant, v. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, Respondent.
A.C. NO. 11385, March 14, 2017
PER CURIAM
Facts:
Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land located in Ortigas Avenue
Extension, Pasig City. The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29, 2012, Atty.
Tumulak, accompanied by uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered
and took control of the entrance and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the incident, Atty.
Tumulak had furnished several documents to the complainant, including the deed of assignment executed
by one Henry F. Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez
designating Atty. Tumulak as an assignee. The documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to
the intestate proceedings of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez... which involved the claim
of the heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez to several parcels of land situated all over the country.

The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have
coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible intrusion. The
complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his principal in the
property was barred by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name.
Accordingly, his conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.

Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards of Nationwide Security Agency
entered the complainant's property. He insists that the allegations against him were pure hearsay because
Ms. Montero, the representative of the complainant, had no personal knowledge of the incident; that the
documents he had furnished to the complainant included records of the intestate proceedings in the RTC
involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez; that he had no hand
in procuring the documents; that he did not himself enter the property; and that the entry into the property
was effected by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution.

After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline Ricardo M. Espina submitted his Report and
Recommendation, wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to have violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty.
Tumulak from the practice of law for two years.

Issues:
Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
he facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and the entry into the complainant's property?

Ruling:
Yes, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK guilty of violating
the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of TWO(2) YEARS EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

a) Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish title can no longer be
cited as legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892...

b) Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner, is presumed to know that the Supreme Court has
promulgated a case specifically addressing the fake titles arising from spurious "Deed of Assignment" of

the supposed Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the 2005 case of Evangelista, et al. vs.
Santiago [G.R. No. 157447; April 29, 2005] where the same modus as the one adopted by respondent
lawyer, was used by an "assignee" in claiming properties located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa,
Cavitc, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and
Rizal, allegedly as part of the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;

We find respondent's actions highly questionable and contrary to legal protocol

1. (i) the court documents were issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94;
2. (ii) it "affects" a property located in Pasig City;
3. (iii) respondent lawyer became the "assignee" of a Pasig City property;
4. (iv) no taxes were paid for the "assignment"; (v) assistance of the Sheriff of Pasig was not
enlisted

by respondent, instead, he enlists the help of the Sheriff of Manila;

5. (v) all that the Sheriff of Manila did was to deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34 court documents to

complainant but with a twist; the Sheriff and respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx of

security guards;

6. (vi) the uniformed guards, obviously upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the gates of

OPDC offices with attendant force and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's claimed innocence
cannot prevail over these illegalities of which he, or his agents, had a hand.

Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the
property just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact,
such physical participation was not even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal
responsibility for the intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of
assignment and other documents as the source of his authority.

Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since the time of the execution of the deed of
assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that he had been in charge of doing all the actions necessary
to enforce the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010, and that the forcible intrusion complained
about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than two years from the execution of the deed of
assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed to have coordinated all the actions leading to the
intrusion.

Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was valid and enforceable, Atty. Tumulak could not
legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest of the assignor. The more appropriate
action for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title instead of forcibly entering the
property with the aid of armed security personnel.

Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled rulings
in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's Oath "to support
[the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein."
He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or
omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his or her
commendable character but also inspires in the public a becoming respect and obedience to the law.

The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility to respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition for retaining
membership in the Legal Profession. The lawyer must act and comport himself or herself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession. Members of the
Bar are reminded, therefore, that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than to
seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act that warrants disciplinary action against him or her.

The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of a lawyer is justified if he or she proves
unworthy of the trust and confidence imposed by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found to be wanting
in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their
professional duties.