On the eve of its creation Pakistan faced a number of stupendous problems which hardly had any

parallel in the history of the world e specially of any newly born state. She had too many burdens to
carry and too many problems to solve. She came into being almost with practically no central
administration of office routine. She was a state without any practicable economic or geographic basis,
political organization or political tradition with any pertinence to modern conditions. Militarily she was
weak and defenseless, with enemies, not r econciled to her establishment, busy in conspiring to
strangulate her on its very birth. But fortunately she had a great leader and organizer in person of 
Quaid-i-Azam to steer the ship of her destiny to safety and security. Almost single handedly he grappled
with all these problems which would have broken a man of lesser mettle. But he was not a man to be
over-powered by any danger, challenge or obstacle that confronted him. Under his inspired leadership
the nation also showed its inherent strength to grapple with these problems with remarkable
determination and success.

Pakistan’s very existence was threatened and the happiness of her independence, marred by an unjust
Boundary Award. After the third June Plan,
P lan, the Quaid had been confronted with the problem of 
demarcating the boundaries of India and Pakistan. In order to determine Muslim and non-Muslim
majority areas, three commissions (Punjab Boundary Commission, Bengal Boundary Commission and
District Sylhet Boundary Commission) were appointed. Muslim and non-Muslim members were equally
represented in these commissions. While Sir (Later Lord) Cyril Radcliffe was Chairman of all those
Boundary Commissions, other members were as follows:

The Muslim members of Punjab Boundary Commission were:

1.Justice Din Mohammad and;

2.Justice Muhammad Munir

The Non-Muslim Members of the Punjab Boundary Commission were:

1.Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan and

2.Justice Teja Singh.

Similarly, in the Bengal Boundary Commission the following were the Muslim Members:

1.Justice Abu Saleh Muhammad Akram and:

2.Justice S.A. Rehman.

The Non-Muslim members of the Bengal Boundary Commission were:

1.Justice Bijan Kunar Mukherjea and;

2.Justice C.C. Biswas.

The Quaid-i-Azam originally favoured asking the U.N. to nominate three members of each commission.
Nehru argued that it would involve intolerable delay. The Quaid then proposed that three Law Lords
from the U.K. be appointed to the Boundary Commission as impartial members. But again was told that
the elderly
elderly persons would not bear scorching heat of India’s summer season1. Radcliffe “Knew virtually
nothing about India and had never written about it”.2

Radcliffe was to draw his boundary lines ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and
non-Muslims.
non-Muslims. In doing so he would ‘take into account other factors’. The other factors’ were neither
elaborated nor properly defined. The Quaid-i-Azam
Quaid-i-Azam and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan protested “violently”
against a statement made by Mr. Henderson, the Under-Secretary of state in the Parliament on 14 July:
“The provision that other factors’ will be taken into account has been made primarily to enable the
commission to have regard to the special circumstances of the Sikh community in the Punjab, where
considerations such as the location of their religious shrines can reasonably be taken into account up to
a point”.3

The Pakistanis maintain that the unspecified other factors’ phrase was incorporated in order to cover
vital mental reservations which depict that the inside story of t he Award was replete with dishonesty
and fraud”4. Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan who was a non-Muslim
non -Muslim member of the Punjab Boundary
Commission, stated in his autobiography:

“I was not inclined to accept the invitation as it seemed t o me then that this
this commission was a farce and
decision would be taken by the Viceroy himself”.5

The Chairman of the Commission presided over two of t he four procedural meetings on 14 and 15 July
1947 and did not attend any session
se ssion of the regular public sittings. Since there was disagreement and
virtually a tie between the Muslim and non-Muslim members of t hese commission, so practically, it was
the Chairman’s Award.

It appears that Radcliffe’s interpretation of the phrase of ‘other factors’ did not favour Pakistan but
India
India only. The popular belief in India at the t ime of declaration of the Award was that “Radcliffe will
award as His Excellency dictates. That was a truly popular belief “and nothing “would” shake their
conviction” that this was so6. He included Muslim majority
major ity areas in Bharat but did not give the benefit
of the same to the inclusion of areas in Pakistan7. He “jeopardized the Muslim interests” through the
device of “other factors.” “This legal quibbling, fallacious arguments and principles” worked only to the
benefit of ‘one party”8.
East Bengal being an exclusively raw jute producing area, Calcutta, a home of jute industry and districts
of Nadia and Kutli, should have been awarded to Pakistan. Darjeeling and Jalpaigari were also handed
over to Bharat. Instead of awarding the whole Sylhet District and the contiguous Muslim majority areas
Assam, only Sylhet District was transferred to Pakistan. The re ferendum in Sylhet had resulted in a
majority of 55,578 votes in favour of joining East Be ngal 239,619 votes were in its favour and 184,041
against9. In the Punjab Award, the tehsils of Feroze pur, Zira, Ajnala, Batala and Gurdaspur which
comprised of an overwhelming majority of population of the Muslims, were awarded to Bharat. The
tehsils of Julundur and Nakodar were also given to Bharat.

According to the 1941 census, percentages of contiguous Muslim majority tehsils were as follow:

Name of the Tehsil

Percentage of Muslim Majority

Gurdaspur tehsil

52.1

Batala tehsil

55.06
Shakargarh tehsil

51.3

Ferozepur tehsil

55.2

Zira tehsil (Ferozepur Distric)

65.2

Nakodar Tehsil

59.4
Jullundur tehsil

51.1

Ajnala tehsil (Amritsar District)

59.4

Name of the Tehsil

Percentage of Muslim Majority

Fazilka
75.12

Muktasar

66.56

Jagraon

69.32

Ludhiana

68.95

Samrala
70.59

Nawanshahar

50.59

Pillaur

67.24

Thana Majitha (Tehsil Amritsar)

51.9

Una

55.02
The privilege that I and my ancestors have had of associating with the British Empire for about a centry
and a half. I still firmly believe that you Government through t he good offices of Lord Mountbatten the
Governor-General, can exert sufficient morals and material influence to bring about an honourable and
amicable settlement between the Dominion of India and Hyderabad without impairing the dignity of my
house and my people and without putting my State to material disadvantage. In the absence of such
settlement, I foresee a great deal of internal and external disorders, bloodshed and chaos such as now
prevalent in the East and West Punjab and other parts of India which can indeed even now be avoided in
Hyderabad.81

The Nizam appealed to the British Government to intervene but the latter adopted a lukewarm attitude
and refused to mediate between the Nizam and the Indian Government. Prime Minister Attlee told the
Nizam:

I do not think my Government is in a position to tender advice to the Indian Government or to Your
Exalted Highness as to the precise constitutional relationship. I believe it to be the case that the Indian
Government have agreed that Lord Mountbatten as Governor-General should continue to play a part in
the negotiations between India and Hyderabad.82

Winston Churchill, the Leader of the Opposition, told the House of Commons that Hyderabad was
entitled to UN membership: that, out of 54 members of the UN, 39 have smaller population, 20 smaller
territory and 15 smaller revenue83. On 21 August 1948, Hyderabad first brought the dispute between
India and Hyderabad before the Security Council under Article 35, paragraph 2 of the Charter as the
Indian Government, despite its Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad on 29 November 19 47, had
continued:

The economic blockade which had started prior to that date…..with increasing intensity and included
even such items as medicine, chlorine for purifying water and other basic essentials…..It has also been
indicated that the blockade may soon be followed by military invasion.
Although India had entered into Standstill agreement with Hyderabad yet it was not observed by the
former. The Prime Minister of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali pointed out:

This Standstill Agreement, however, unfortunately, never came to be observed in spirit or letter by the
Indian Union…..I hope this matter will receive the British government’s and in particular Mr. Attlee’s and
you (Bevin’s) sympathetic and immediate consideration.84

Mountbatten tried his utmost through Walter Monckton, the constitutional Adviser to the Nizam, to
merge the State of Hyderabad with the Indian Union. He himself confessed before a crowded audience
in London on 29 June 1948 that: “We have had long discussions on how to fit this great State, with its
17,000,000 population, into the picture……It was heart breaking to S ir Walter Monckton, and to myself 
that the proposals we jointly worked out were not accepted.85

The Nizam, on the other hand, leveled charges against Mountbatten and the Indian Government that
they failed to supply arms and ammunition which was urgently needed for the internal security of 
Hyderabad as they would have under the Standstill Agreement: that when Hyderabad tried to import
arms and ammunition from other sources, the Indian Government did nothing to pre vent border raids
inspite of the repeated representations: that the Indian Government sent their soldiers in mufti to
create trouble inside Hyderabad: that the economic blockade of the State since 15 August, was
intensified. The Nizam also accused Britian of sacrificing tried friends because they had too little
nuisance value.86

Realizing that his repeated requests to the British Government had borne no fruit, the Nizam turned
towards America and requested President Truman to mediate and use his good offices to settle the
dispute between Hyderabad and India. Unluckily, the response from this quarter, too, was not
encouraging as the President replied that the e xtension of good offices was usually successful only when
requested by both parties. But since America had not hear d from India on the matter, so he could not
comply with the request87. In the meanwhile India created trouble in Hyderabad, Pakistanis believe that
an organized campaign of border incidents and raids was started by India. Subversive activities were
encouraged within Hyderabad.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir posed a threat to the stability of the new nation with seemingly
endless hostility between India and Pakistan. The state had about 80 percent Muslims, but its ruler was
Hindu. The Indian government secured, under questionable circumstances an instrument of accession
from the Hindu Maharaja on 27 October 1947, thus opening the way to India’s military intervention in
Kashmir. Under Mountbatten’s direct guidance airborne units of the Indian Army landed in Srinagar,
thus halting the advance of liberation forces outside Srinagar. This was most shocking to the people of 
Pakistan because from the time the Lahore Resolution of 1940 was passed, Kashmir had been regarded
as an essential part of Pakistan, both politically and economically.88

When India sent its forces to Kashmir, the Quaid-i-Azam immediately ordered the officiating C-in-C
Pakistan Army, General Gracey as General Frank Messervy, first C-in-C of Pakistan Army, w as in London
at that time to send troops into Kashmir to seize Baramula and Srinagar also Banihal Pass and to send
troops into Mirpur district of Jammu. The Quaid-i-Azam at once instructed Francis Mudie, Governor of 
the Punjab, who was with him, to tele phone Gracey to obey his orders immediately. But an acrimonious
conversation followed in which general Gracey attributed to Sir Francis Mudie language of undiplomatic
tone and imperiousness89. It is lamentable that the British C-in-C o f Pakistan Army did not obey the
orders of the Quaid-i-Azam. First, he tried to persuade the Quaid that this was not possible, because the
Pakistan Army was not in full strength nor fully equipped. When the Quaid did not listen to his excuses,
he refused to obey. Had the orders of the Quaid-i-Azam been obeyed, troops moved to their objectives
and a few PAF fighters flown to intercept Indian war planes, the story of Kashmir would have been
different. But, unfortunately the acting C-in-C of Pakistan Army was a Barister and not a Pakistani.90

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands were also suddenly allotted to India although they never formed the
subject of discussion or agreement between the two parties at any time. Neither historically nor
geographically they were parts of India. Their tribes were not connected with the Indian population by
ethical, religious or cultural ties. These island were British possessions and administered by the Ce ntral
Government so they did not fall in the same category as other Chief commissioners Provinces reserved
to the Governor-General under the Act of 1935. Pakistan’s claim to these islands was very strong: since
the only channel of communication between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan was sea, so they
were important for it and could conveniently serve the purpose of refueling bases for vessels playing
between the two parts. On the other had, India had not such claim91. Although Mountbatten knew the
utility of these islands for Pakistan yet he pleaded for the congress and consequently the islands were
handed over to India and not Pakistan.92

The states that were contiguous to West Pakistan and had a Muslim majority and Muslim rulers were
quite a few, Bhawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat, L as Bela, Kharan, Makran, Dir, Swat, Amb and Chitral.
Bahawalpur acceded to Pakistan on 3 October 1947, followed by Kahirpur, Chitral, Swat, Dir, and Amb
during the next few months. The states of Las Bela, Makran, Kharan, and Kalat, after protracted
negotiations, acceded to Pakistan by the end of March 1948.93

The Princes, who were lured into signing the instruments of accession in favour of India, met a sad end.
They lost control of their states, even their own assets, in a few years and their states were absorbed
into the contiguous state provinces of the Indian Union.

Pakistan has had to face several forces working to cripple and thwart her very existence. Geographically
she had been placed in an extremely delicate situation, with her two parts i.e., East and West Pakistan
separated from each other by a ‘hostile distance’ of over a thousand miles. The ambitious and militant
rulers of this ‘hostile distance’ have been expressing and planning hostile design against her existence
right from the very beginning. For them Pakistan was only a transient phase, a tactical treat that did not
affect their strategic aims. The tragic events immediately following the partition in the withholding of 
military stores and other assets and illegal occupation of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kahsmir, bear
eloquent testimony to India’s persistent hostility towards Pakistan and her ambition to truncate
Pakistan” and encircle her territory, weaken he r militarily and strangle her economically. This could
hardly be an enviable situation, much less for a country like Pakistan. The first and the foremost problem
faced by Quaid-i-Azam immediately after the establishment of Pakistan was, therefore, the ensure the
security of the country.
The division of assets between India and Pakistan was a significant issue, on the eve o f independence
between the two Dominions. It was the mor al and legal obligation of the British Government in general
and Mountbatten as the last Viceroy in particular to ensure t he supply of its due share of assets to
Pakistan-military stroes as well as cash balances. Had Pakistan received its due share of assets, it would
have ushered in an era of cordial relations between the two states. But, with the background of 
traditional Hindu-Muslim rivalry before partition, the leaders of the two dominions started their
relations in a climate of mutual suspicion, distrust, fear and jealousy. Pakistan believed that India will
not allow her to rest in peace and will destroy her whenever she has an opportunity and India thought
that whenever Pakistan gets an opportunity, she will move against India and attack her.94

Since Pakistan was placed in a miserable and deplorable condition after independence, so, if the Indian
leaders in general and Mountbatten in particular, had tried to help Pakistan at the crucial time, it would
have been appreciated not only by the Pakistanis statesmen, politicians and public but by the whole
world at large. But to the surprise of the Pakistanis, the Indian foreign policy behavior, instead of helping
Pakistan, further aggravated its position. Rushbrook Williams points out:

The Hindus feeling that Pakistan need not have emerged at all is important politically, because it shaped
the Indian attitude and influenced Indian behavior, towards Pakistan, not only in the early critical
days…..but in the later years.95

The following issues clearly indicate India’s antagonistic attitude towards Pakistan in matters related to
assets; first, India withheld agreed share of Pakistan’s military assets. The Armed For ces Reconstitution
Committee, with sub-committee for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Finance had made agree d
recommendations, which were accepted by the Joint Defence Council that army assets betwee n the two
Dominions be divided in the proportion of 64% to India and 36% to Pakistan. The report of the Supreme
Commander Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck to the British Prime Minister, Mr. Att lee reveals:

“Military opinion is unanimous that this general principle for the division of movable assets is so
obviously found on common sense and practical considerations as to be incontestable. The Indian
Government, however, is apparently determined to contest it to the last ditch. I have no hesitation
whatever in affirming that the present India Cabinet is implacably determined to do all their power to
prevent the establishments of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In this I am supported by the
unanimous opinion of my senior officers and indeed by all responsible British officers cognizant of the
situation since the 15th August……the Indian leaders, Cabinet Ministers. Civil officials and others have
persistently tried to obstruct the work of partition of Armed Forces….Their aim is to prevent Pakistan
receiving her just share, or indeed anything of t he large stocks of reserve arms, equipment, stores held
in the arsenals and depots in India. This is an open secret”.96

The above quoted stunning report of Claude Auchinleck, Supreme Commander of the armies of India
and Pakistan was sent to British Prime Minister on 28 September, 1947, just six weeks after the
Partition. If the Indian leaders, on account of their rivalry and antagonistic attitude towards Pakistan,
obstructed the work of division of military assets, it was t he legal as well as moral duty of Mountbatten
and Auchinleck to carry on the process till Pakistan received its just share. Pe rhaps Mountbatten was
Canal water, and other questions were also products of the Indian aggressive designs aimed at
strangling her economy on the eve of its very birth. The Indian leaders reckoned that, since Pakistan was
not economically viable while India was, they could, without serious injury to themselves, hasten her
collapse by an antagonistic policy.

Many of Pakistan’s economic problems were the result of the lack or nearly total absence of modern
industries on the eve of her independence. Though in East Pakistan, she produced 70 percent of the
world’s jute, she did not possess a single jute mill e xcept a few babing-presses136. The jute produced in
East Pakistan, had, therefore, to be sent to Calcutta for industrial process. This left the farmers and in
fact the economy of the East wing at the mercy of Indian mill owners for a reasonable price of their
product. The same position existed about the cotton crop in West P akistan. In 1947, of the 1,500,000
cotton bales produced, only went to the mills on Pakistani terr itory137. Though cotton was the largest
cash crop in West Pakistan, there were only a few cotton – mills – quite inadequate to handle it. In the
whole country less than 77,000 kilowatts of generating capacity existed138. At the time of 
independence, Pakistan had, therefore, practically no industries to start with, no factories to press its
 jute, no mill for its cotton, and no tanneries for its hides. Speaking on the occasion of the foundation-
stone laying ceremony of the Valika Taxtile Mills, Quaid-i-Azam emphasized the need for
industrialization in these words: “Pakistan, at present mostly an agricultural state and for manufactured
goods it is dependent upon the outside world”139. If Pakistan was to become a modern nation,
industrialization would have to be one of the first aims.

Pakistan was also faced with problem of the lack of financial skills of expertise. Before partition, most of 
the junior officers and clerks in banks and insurance companies big mercantile concerns and the
Government offices that dealt with economies had been Hindus or Sikhs: and their departure in 1947-48
for a while created cause something like chaos in Pakistan140. For example, East Pakistan had only 5
percent of the total number of industrial workers of undivided Bengal at the time of partition.
Industries, Banks, insurance companies, commercial house, Import and export firms, communication
centres, power stations, and educational institutions were all located in Calcutta141. Similarly, in West
Pakistan, the people were less well-educated and less politically mature than those in India.

Pakistan was also poor and ill developed in mineral wealth. Her t otal coal, production that too of an
inferior quality amounted to a meager 500,00 0 tons a year. She had no accessible iron-ore; very little oil,
limited to the Attock area We st of Rawalpindi; and no rich mineral like India’s manganese or thorium;
though rock-salt was available in the Khewra mines, its money earning power was meager.142

There was a shortage of electricity power in both the wings. A large area in West Punjab was dependent
for its electricity needs upon the Mandi Hydroelectric Works in East Punjab. The total installed capacity
in the country at the time of partition was only 75,028 k.w., but lack of repairs and of competent staff 
greatly reduced the actual capacity. In East Pakistan, the capacity was only 15,600 k .w. The Karnaphuli
Hydro-Electric Project was still in its developmental stage. East Pakistan had been dependent for its
supplies of fuel from India; this created numerous difficulties for getting coal and oil from across the
border. Very little exploration of oil and mineral r esources in Pakistan had been carried out before
partition143. Rail and road communications were also poor and ill-developed. Agriculture by which 80
percent of the population lived, was still carried on by antiquated and inefficient methods in which
mechanization played no part at all.144

Ports of Karachi and Chittagong, were poorly e quipped to deal with incoming and outgoing Cargo145.
East and West Wings were separated by 1,200 miles by air and 3,000 miles by sea. Establishment of 
Telephone communication between them was an urgent necessity.

At the time of partition, West Pakistan had a surplus of food grains, but East Wing faced a deficit in rice,
its staple food crop though West Pakistan had a surplus of rice, yet there were difficulties of 
procurement and transport. On some branches of the railway system in West Pakistan, services had to
be suspended because of the shortage of coal. Shipping was scarce. Food shipments from West Pakistan
were fortunately arranged in time. After January, 1948, there was a wheat shortage in West Pakistan
due to the refugees influx. In some districts there was scarcity of wheat and no surpluses were available
from abroad.146

Hindus had been actively trying to undermine the economic fabric of Pakistan even before it came into
existence. They had almost exclusively been controlling trade and industry in the part of India which
became Pakistan. The Civil and Military Gazatte of Lahore, in its issue of 6th May, 1947 wrote that the
Punjab national Bank had decided to transfer the registere d office of the company from Lahore to Delhi.
Two more important Banks and two premier insurance companies are contemplating to move out of the
Punjab. The total capital under flight is estimated at Rs. 250 crores”. The Gazette also produced the
words of a Hindu bankers, “After us the deluge. We are leaving Pakistan an economic desert”.147

In undivided India, banking too had been a virtual nonopoly of Hindus. During the partition days (from
June 3 to August 15, 1947) most Hindu – managed banks transferred their headquarters and funds from
Pakistan to India. The Punjab disturbances completed the process of 487 offices of scheduled banks in
West Pakistan, only 69 were left after partition 148. Only one bank – the Muslim-owned Habib Bank –
moved its headquarters from India to Pakistan. Credit facilities were t hus greatly curtailed and a special
effort had been undertaken in this r espect.

The establishment of a new administration and the vast influx of refugees had thrown a heavy financial
burden upon the new government. The disruption of communications and trade had brought business
activity and revenue receipts to a low level. A reas of taxes left behind by evacuees could not be
recovered. The standstill arrangement with India under which each dominion was to receive only the
revenue collected in its own operated was unfavorable for Pakistan. Taxes were collected to the head
offices of firms, most of which were located in India. Central excise duties were levied at points of 
manufacture, and India refused to give rebates of duty on excisable commodities exported to
Pakistan149. Quaid-i-Azam’s government, however, had to secure capital. Especially foreign exchange,
in order to build new industries, power projects, and adequate irrigation schemes. The story of 
Pakistan’s economic struggle in 1947-48 was on “of advances setbacks, natural catastrophes, and
invaluable ‘Good Samaritan”150.

In addition to these problems of social and economic development, Pakistan had also to face a heavy
burden of defence. The staggering burden of military expenditures occasioned by the cold war with
India – which became hot for a brief period in Kashmir – diverted funds from essential nation-building
services like health, education, and irrigation.151

Amidst these numerous difficulties, problems and shortages, the work of development was undertaken
in full earnestness. Despite the most discouraging condition, Quaid-i-Azam Government was able to
make astonishing strides in building an economically viable state. The new state of Pakistan needed a
leadership which could inspire confidence in the people and weld them together into one solid whole
despite cultural pluralism. Such leadership could only be provided by Quaid-i-Azam who by virtue of 
having led the common struggle for freedom, symbolized their deepest hopes and aspirations for a
comprehensive life as sovereign nation. He alone could inspire hope in moments of despair and
galvanise the people to a mighty concerted effort t o overcome the odds and difficulties with their path
in the beginning was beset.